be only such things as are honest I think no man ever justified his Conclusion as he understands these termes of profit and right He ends this Sect. with an endeavour to prove his Conclusion For saith he there is little use and benâ—fit of that right a man hath when another as strong or stâ—engtâ— then himself hath right to the same This Argument would have some force if his foundation had been well laid which was that every man had right to every thing even in anothers possâ—ssion but that appeares to be a mistake in him and therefore this Argument is weak which is drawne ex non concessis CHAP. XXV Concerning nature's right liberty power Of warre and self-preservation by it For what ends and advantages a man may renounce his right to life liberty c. Sect. 1. THus having finished my discourse upon this subject as much as concernes his Corpus Politicum I returne to examine his handling the same in his Leviathan to see if the diversity of expression in this from the other doth adde any thing to the confirmation of his designe Cap. 14. pag. 64. He defines the right of nature to be the liberty every man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature This definition I except against as not cut out even to the thing defined First it is too narrow for this right of nature concernes not himself alone but a man by right of nature hath right to many things which relate not to his owne life Yea if it have such a liberty which consisteth in to do or not to doe as he expound's it presently after then it is a right of nature to forbeare to use his owne power for the preservation of his life aswell as to use it so that out of this regard his definition agree's not to every particular contained in the right of nature Secondly like an ill made garment as it is too streight in one place so it is too wide in another the liberty a man hath to use his power as he will himself for the preservation of his owne life is not a right of nature for the right of nature as I have shewed is a result out of the law of Nature which impower's him for that action but the law of nature gives not a man leave to do what he will for the preservation c. as I have shewed before but only such things as are just and according to right reason and the most publique and greatest intendments of Nature to which every particular man's nature and life is aimed by that Nature which gives him his nature are to be preferred before his life Sect. 2. The next thing I blame is his description of Liberty thus By liberty is understood according to the proper signification of the word the absence of externall impediments This is a most improper exposition of that liberty he immediately before put in the definition of right for externall impediments have nothing to doe with the liberty of right nor doth the taking away the ability to recover his estate by strength of opposition take away the right to have it especially this natural right for other rights by civill institution and donation do in some manner depend upon outward things because those Nationall lawes which give them these rights are outward although right and title be an inward thing the issue of that outward law but in natural right the very law which give 's a man this right is an internall law a law writ in man's heart and therefore the liberty which attend's this right and which he saith this right is can in no sense be understood to be the absence of externall impediments he adds Which impediments may oft take away part of a mans power to do what he would This is weakly said or most impertinently or both for external impediments can take away no part of natural power which alone is necessary to natural right this may hinder nature in its operations but this cannot take away the power of operating and in oecconomicks the disobedience of a Son may hinder the acts of a Parents exercising his jus naturale his natural right over his son but it cannot take away his natural right over him These rights are internal things which are not much concerned in what is outward but remaine and keep their being whatsoever outward things happen Sect. 3. His third thing to be censured in this Chap. and Pag. is his definition of a Law of nature which is this A law of nature Lex naturalis is a precept or general Rule found out by reason by which a man is forbidden to doe that which is destructive of his life or taketh away the meanes of preserving the same and to omit that by which it may be best preserved He is a most unhappie man in his definitions which are foundations upon which he build's his discourse yet are so weake as they cannot themselves withstand the least opposition which many Reasons may assault them with First for this we may observe that if he had said such a Precept as he seâ—s down had been a law of nature or a conclusion deduced out of a law of nature he had spoke truth but saying a law of Nature is such a precept he makes this precepe to be the Predicate as we University-men abused with Universityâ—learning terme it and then it must be as large as the subject A law of nature is what this is not for first he makes this precept to be only a prohibition To a negative law A precept saith he by which a man is forbidden c. when certainly although there are negative precepts yet they are founded upon affirmative precepts no negative which is not supported by an affirmative and this law forbidding must be founded upon this affirmative duty enjoyned by the law of nature that a man must love his own life Certainly had not Mr. Hobbes proudly contemned University learning he would have writ more properly and have seduced himself into fewer errors next observe with me that generall error which runne's through his whole discourse that he makes Nature aiming in all her intendments at the benefit only of particulars in those provident lawes which she hath made for the universal when indeed the nature of all lawes is to looke to the publique and particulars only as they are parts of the publique The latter part of that Section I have shewed erroneous already which affirmes law and right inconsistent Sect. 4. His next Sect. in the same page and Chap. begins thus And because the condition of man as hath been declared in the precedent Chap. is a condition of war of every one against every one in which case every one is governed by his own reason He said somewhat like truth when he said it was declared in the precedent Chapter for certainly there was a bare declaration of such a
thing no mâ—nner of proof that had shew of reason Posito quolibet sequitur quidlibet if men suppose impossible things they may from thence-argue impossibilities Uno absurdo concesso mille sequuntur an errour in the foundation in the first drawing a line multiplie's its self all the way thus in this instance he goes on And there is nothing he can make use of that may not be a helpe unto him in preserving his life against his enemies it followeth that in such a condition every man hath right to every thing even to one anothers bodies see how many falshoods are supposed to make up this horrid conclusion First that unreasonable definition of the right of Nature Secondly that as bad of the law of Nature Thirdly That not to be imagined thesis that every man is at war with every man without all which this cannot follow that every man hath right to one anothers bodies for certainly that Nature which gave a right in common to the universal world besides that gave every man a propriety in his owne body and none had interest in it but by jus naturae as Parents or by some concession expressed or implyed as in polities yea in warre saith he certainly not so neither for by the law of Armes men have not right to butcher one another without there be martiall opposition there are inhumanities in warres which men have no right to use as perhaps will be shewed hereafter so that then all these Propositions which are all appâ—rently false must be granted or else the Conclusion which is drawne out of these denied premisses is void and of no cleerness yet take his Conclusion altogether it hath some likeness of truth with it That in such a Condition every man hath right c. In such a condition which was never knowne which is impossible in such a condition a man may have such a right he proceeds in the same place And consequently it is a Precept or generall rule of reason that every man ought to endeavour peace as far as he hath hope of obtaining it and when he cannot obtaine it that he may seeke and use all helpes â—nd advantages of warre This conclusion might have been granted without these unjust meanes of obtaining it only one terme added to the last clause which is when he hath used sufficient meanes to obtaine peace and cannot get it then he may make use of the advantages of warre for without this terme sufficient a man may attempt a peace and upon any deniall or pause at the first he might with justice engage in a war which were most unjust Sect. 5. That which followe's is against his own Principles the first branch of which rule saith he containeth the first and fundamental law of nature which is to seeke peace and follow it this according to his principles can be but a deduction out of the law of nature for if the law of nature be as he defined it just before in this page a Precept by which a man is forbidden to doe that which is destructive to his life this can be no other but a deduction out of that The second saith he is the summe of the right of nature which is by all meanes we can to defend our selves The second branch is not the summe of this right c. but a branch of it for there are many other meanes to preserve our selves besides war although in a desperate case war may be one What followe's in that Chap. concerning the second law of nature deduced out of this that a man should lay downe his right to all things c. I think it needless to speake of for first there is no man hath by nature right to any person but his owne secondly a man need 's lay down his right to nothing for his right to any thing returnes to him if any thing lack an owner which is not disposed of by such powers which by deduction from the law of nature are authorised to settâ—e them otherwise and therefore all those needless definitions and descriptions of what it is to lay down a right what renouncing what transferring what obligation duty injustice are which are touched in the 65. Page I let goe at present and for altogether unlesse some just occasion hereafter may make me look back upon them only that require's a censure which he deliver's in the bottome of that Page and the beginning of the next which discourse as I conceive it wicked in its self so it render's all which he spake before exceeding malicious Sect. 6. This discourse begin's thus Whensoever a man transferreth his right or renounceth it it is either in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself or for some other good he hopeth for thereby This I grant so far as the words expresse it but there is something he implies which will render it fit for censure anon his reason likewise I allow which followe's for it is a voluntary act and of the voluntary acts of every man the object is some good to himself as for his deduct on which is layd therefore there be some rights which no man can be understood by any words or other signes to have abandoned or transferred this in generall hath some truth for since the end of man is his happiness which he must needs love happiness and goodness being as proper an object of the will as colours to the sight or any other yet this applyed to any particular thing will be found erroneous for although good and happiness must needs by the law of nature be desired yet because what is that good and happiness is not so universally apparent when that good and happinesse shall be instanced in any particular it will not be universally received Now I will consider his examples As first saith he a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them that assault him by force to take away his life This is a mistake in him a man can and many men have done it a man can for a man can preferre other things before his life and therefore can exchange hâ—s life for that men ought to preferre their Countries good before their owne both being in its self a greater good and of greater durance men may preferre their souls eternall good beyond this life the hope of which give 's the greatest comfort this life is capable of one may and ought to preferre the glory of God before his own life by which that eternal good of his own soul shall be assured to him these men may and ought to preferre who are Christians and as Reason guide's to these actions so Experience of them who have done it for these ends shewe's it may be done but there are a hundred little by-ends for which men have done it those of honour in severall kinds for riches for present pleasures and there is almost no worldly contentment for which some men have not adventured and lost
mine and thine you may reade a most excellent passage in the 23. of Gen. with what civility of discourse and reciprocal courtesies Abraham bought the field in Machpelah of Ephron the Hittite First I collect thence that Abraham judged there was a legall interest in Ephron for else he would not have payd such a round price for it as foure hundred shekels of Silver and then you may observe how sacred amongst all people the preservation of interest was for in the last of Gen. you shall find that Jacob when he died in Egypt a great way off in another Nation having both he and his left the Land neare two hundred yeares after the purchase when he and his without doubt were not known scarce remembred Iacob gave order for the burying of his body there and it was performed without any disturbance so sacred did those people without any positive law but the principles of nature observe the particular interest of particular men even such who at the time of the Purchase were but sojourners among them and at the time of the last usage were not so much as cohabitants but strangers in another Country and Nation so that we see as men have had alwaies Consciences which directed them in their actions so those Consciences have had a sense of intruding upon another's interest and Abraham was assured that it was such amongst them for upon that presumption he paid so great a price for that field Sect. 11. If it should be asked how men should come to get these interests I will not here scan all wayes one is evident that is Occupancy taking possession of it first for all the things in this world being but Bona utilia and the profit they have is their service to man he who first gets possession of them is Lord of them thus Fowles and Fishes even in planted Nations which are no mans possessions being caught by any man are his to make profit and when one man hath caught them that they are his possession it is thievery to rob him of them I speak not here of Deere Conyes Hares nor Fishes in ponds c. which are impaled and so for their habitation by our laws are made to pay their host with their lives nor such things which our lawes indulging the pleasures of Gent. and men of quality have appropriated to certain persons and places as Pheasants and Partridges and the like but whatsoever no nationall particular Law hath given to another that the law of Nature gives to the first possessor and this law men find before any positive law of Nations in the practise of the world so that then it is apparent that without positive laws or an outward humane coercive power the law of Nations hath alwaies given a propriety in this world's goods to the sons of men Thus I have passed my opinion upon his 13. Chapter and I think have given reasons for what I spake but if this be not enough let the Reader consider what I shall speake to the next Chapter and that will the more fully discribe the mist of his opinions and confirm mine more stronger Censures upon the 14 th Chapter of LEVIATHAN which is entituled The first and second naturall Lawes and of Contracts which thus begin's CHAP. XXII Concerning the pretended necessity in Nature for the preservation of life The prospect of an happiness beyond it Death represented more terrible than it is c. Sect. 1. THE right of Nature which Writers commonly call jus Naturale is the liberty each man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature that is to say his own life and consequently of doing any thing which in his own judgement and reason he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto Here is a description of the right of Nature which is that he saith Writers call Jus Naturale I believe this Gentleman never in his life read Jus Naturale so described in any Author It is true to preserve a mans own life is a branch of the right of nature but it doth not contain the whole nature of it as if the right of nature extended to nothing else but the preservation of a mans own life there are many other things which the right of nature enables us to doe but because I find this question in my opinion more methodically and Schollarly delivered in his Book entituled De Copore Politico Cap. 1. I shall therefore consider that first and having cleared that discourse apply my self to this description and I will begin with his 6. Number That number begins thus Sect. 2. Forasmuch as necessity of nature maketh men to will and desire that which is good for themselves and to avoyd that which is hurtful but most of all the terrible enemy of nature Death from whom men expect the losse of all power and also the greatest of bodily paine in the loosing The phrase which I here censure first is that necessity makes us do this I know this word Necessity is often used for what we terme want or poverty because such a man need 's somewhat therefore we say he is in necessity and in this sense there may be some truth in that Proposition for because men's lives have lack of supplies and according to this Gentleman all the world are his enemies or what is the truth no man will have so much care to supply him as himself therefore he must doe it but then take necessity as it opposeth contingency which is the common logical sense it is absolutely false for many men throw and take away their own lives now that which is necessarily done cannot be otherwise men cannot choose but doe what they doe out of necessity the phrase were much more proper to say that the law of nature enjoyne's them to provide for themselves for the great Natura naturans God as I said before know's our necessities and like a wise law-maker makes lawes to provide for them and so infinitely wise are those laws that what he hath not by some law or other provided for it is not necessary for any man whatsoever and certainly therefore where is no lawfull and honest way to preserve it life its self is not necessary he seem's therefore to expresse himself better in Corpore politico then in Leviathan because in Leviathan he restrain's this right of Nature only to the preservation of his own life but in this I now write against he saith not only but most of all his own life other things he may have a right unto but most of all or chiefly the preservation of his own life or rather the avoyding of death Sect. 3. What he saith that necessity of nature makes us desire our own good and avoyd that which is hurtful is true in that generality but applyed to any particular is false for there is no particular but may appeare to some men good and to others hurtfull even
that abominable Aphorisme before refuted that all men are naturally at war one with another untill I come to the last Clause where he fall's foule againe upon all manner of writers page 80. where he saith that the Science of Vertue and Vice is Moral Philosophy This so far is true that it is a good piece of moral Philosophy to treat of the Law of Nature and to shew how all vertuous actions are deduced out of it and agree with it but this is not all the Office of a moral Philosopher he is first to teach the end which is man's Summum bonum his chiefe good his felicity happinesse then to teach the meanes which are those vertues deduced out of the Law of nature and to shew how they conduce to the end so that he confined moral Philosophy in too narrow bounds when he restrayned it to Virtue and Vice which are only the meanes and are handled by a moral Philosopher onely in order to his end Now he come's to his high strain againe censuring the world Sect. 9. But saith he the writers of moral Philosophy though they acknowledge the same Vertues and Vices yet not seeing wherein consisteth their Goodnesse nor that they come to be praised as the meanes of peaceable sociable and comfortable living place them in a mediocrity of passions as if not the cause but the Degree of daring made Fortitude or not the Cause but the quantity of a gift made liberality There are many things in this Period to be cenâ—ured First I blame him for accusing the whole Company of the Philosophers of ignorance in so weighty a businesse not so much as pardoning any one when for my part who have turned over hundreds of bookes in this businesse I know no one so blind as himselfe in this particular point I say no one either Christian or other for first he committeth a mighty fault in forgetting that famous distinction betwixt a good man and a good Citizen acknowledged by multitudes of Philosophers and must needs be by any man who consider's that a man may be discoursed of either concerning himselfe in his owne nature and the wayes of perfecting it or else in relation to others in the first consideration that Science which perfect's him is called Ethicke or Morall Philosophy for the second which referre's him to others it is either to a family then it is Oeconomick or else to a State or City and then it is Politick Now the writers of moral Philosophy discourse which way a man should perfect himselfe so that they give Ruâ—es which way he should be happy in a desart in the midst of the most unhappy state in the world in the midst of worldly plenties miseries such surely are perfect in this world and such onely and this is the foundation of all Oeconomicks and Politicks no man can be either Oâ—conomically or Politickly vertuous who is not so in himselfe and being so in himself having neither family nor City to dispose himself to he may not be such to other men Mr. Hobbes dedicate's a mâ—n wholly to others in this place as in others he make's a man dispose all things to himself and consider's not the divers shâ—res which his Parents his friends I may adde his Children and above all his God is to have out of him as well as his Country Now Mr. Hobbes placeth the whole relation of man to be towards others when in this period he saith in effect That Sect. 10. The Philosophers did not know that humane vertues came to be praised as the meanes of peaceable sociable and comfortable living which are things onely in respect of others but I may tell Mr. Hobbes that in their politicks and Oâ—conomicks they teach this relative perfection as fully and much truer then hd as will appear but in Ethicks they teach how these vertues are excellent in themselves and doe perfect the owner this is done by all sorts of Philosophers to begin with the Epicureans whose Philosophy doth in many things agree with his although in some things he consent's with the Stoicks in mine opinion he chooseth the worst pieces in both first Epicurus agree's with him in this that he makes pleasure the happinesse the chiefe good of man as Mr. Hobbes doth in many places and I know Lactantius favour's Epicurus so much as to say he meant the pleasures of the soule yet surely it seemes to be the sensuall part of the Soule only for in that Epistle he writes to Menoeceus which is the chiefe we have of his moral Philosophy he seeme's to me to doe otherwise and places man's happinesse as Mr. Hobbes doth elsewhere in the enjoying sensuall Contentments now Mr. Hobbes in those other places did better then in this where he placed man's happinesse within himself and the use of his vertues conducing to himselfe but here in relation to others which is so extrinsecall a thing as it is impossible for a man 〈◊〉 be happy in for it is possible a man may lack these accommodations of other men to converse and be sociable and affable with and then he is not happy who can be miserable which Epicurus himself denied to be possible to a vertuous and prudent man so that in respect of the end although Epicurus make the same happinesse as Mr. Hobbes in other places yet Epicurus and Mr. Hobbes in other places speake righter then Mr. Hobbes in this Then consider the meanes of obtaining this end Epicurus first writes against the fear of the Gods as he call's them a thing which Mr. Hobbes countenanceth although he let 's fall in one place as Mr. Hobbes now and then will that God doth punish wicked men and blesse the honest and vertuous yet he after speake's against man's feare of any such thing because saith he nothing must be spoken of the Gods but eternal felicity which they could not have if they were concerned in humane affaires therefore denies prayers or any religious duty to have any power with the deities as I remember Mr. Hâ—bs out of his Stoical principles of the fate or necessity which belong's to all things and actions Cross principles produce the same wicked conclusion in both like as Herod and Pilate joyne together in nothing but crucifying Truth To the same purpose Lucretius a follower of Epicurus speak's in his first fifth and sixth books and diverse times make's it the greatest piece of happinesse to abhorre Religion and contemne it and make's man by that act to be the greatest Conquerour Quare religio pedibus subjecta vicissim Obteritur nos exaequat victoria Caelo And one of Mr Hobbes his Principles of religion is made by him to be the chiefe the ignorance of second causes Thus doe men who conspire against Religion meet likewise in the meanes But Epicurus and Lucretius spake out fully Mr. Hobbes darkely thus they joyne in one Principle by which happinesse may be acquired but in another Epicurus farre
Wisdome but that this Wisdome should be a person that this person should be the Son of God without some other Light then he hâ—th naturally a man cannot perceive it for although it be a most received Axiome in the School that Omnia opera Dei ad extrà sunt indivisa that all the outward workes of God are wrought by the whole Trinity yet they are done by such an unity of the Trinity as is not observed out of those vestigia's as they speak those partiall representations which are in the Creature of it and therefore I am perswaded that Trismegistus Socrates Plato and such others who have such lively expressions of these mysteries either had some revelations made to them from above or else had met with some Prophet or prophetick writing upon which they confiding were bold out of tâ—em to make these expositions to this which I have said I cannot discerne any thing answered because I have not known it urged to that height by others nor do I know what they can object unlesse it be that St. John seeme's to upbraid the world with ingratitude that they should not take notice of so great a goodnesse of God's who made it but this cannot be justly urged against them who could not know him whom as it seem's by discourse the world could not to this I answer that for any thing I see such an intention of the Text is yielded to by writers on both sides but I discerne nothing in the Text that enforceth any more then an historiall narrative of the nature and condition of the World that he was undiscerned in the world untill some supernaturall blessing enlightned men I cannot discerne any such upbraiding as they speak of but if there be any morall intention besides the history there is nothing can be deduced more naturally then that men who have this light are bound to a gratefull acknowledgment of all they have to arise from God both naturall and spirituall things and to use them to his glory or if men will apprehend such a thing as upbraiding be it that they may think it consisted in this that the generality did not know him as they might men did not apprehend so much as was apprehendible of him but I choose rather the first exposition although the second be the common road and I proceed to the next Verse He came unto his own and his own received him not this and the two next Verses yield a great many heavenly meditations which I could delight to discourse as well as thinke of but they are not pertinent to this businesse I have in hand to shew that our Saviour was the word of God which was God Sect. 14. I therefore let them passe and come to the 14. Verse where we find opposition from them with much art which we render thus And the Word was made flesh and dwelt amongst us there are two propositions in this particle And the Word was made flâ—sh that is the first Here by the Word the Socinian understand's the same Word as before Christ as by preaching and Miracles he manifested the will of God to men but that this could not be made flesh is evident because it was flesh alwayes and nothing can be made that which it is but this Word was alwayes such if it had been that flesh was made the Word there had been some sense in it because then we had understood that that man who at the first was not the Word by preaching c. was made the Word but this sentence the Word was made flesh abide's no such construction to avoid this therefore they fly to that other Term was made of which I have treated before when it came in my way at the sixth Verse this word say they with one consent signifye's to be and it should be read the word was flâ—sh this I have examined before and shewed that I can find no place in St. John where 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is so used that necessarily men must understand it in their sense so that that place in the sixth Verse was so read for the smoothnesse of the Latine or English Language which would not abide the verball translation of the Greek now I will adde thus much in these 14. Verses 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is used for was or being at the least nine or ten times and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 five or six times for made what reason can we imagine that the style or language should be altered here but then let us consider what the sense would be if the Text were read as they would make us believe the Word was flesh as much as if we should say the preacher was a man which were a most ridiculous speech and therefore to avoid this they fly to this Term flesh and say that that Term doth not signify flesh its self or a man cloathed with flesh pars pro toto which is often in Scripture but the humble estate of a man and here they bestow much Rhetorick to shew that the Evangelist having spoken so great things of the Word that it was with God was God that all things were made by him c. lest men should enter into this vain Conceipt that he was the great God he pluck's him down to consider that he is but a weak man flesh subject to many miseries and misfortunes death and injuries c. observe here that this word Flesh in its naturall and proper meaning signifye's a part of man in a figurative manner by a Synechdoche it signifye's the whole but for any thing I can discerne in Scripture it is not used for any base or miserable condition of man but onely in generall Terms to shew that man whilest he live's in flesh is subject to the infirmities of it the places produced by Socinus speak no more the first is Psal. 78.39 he remembred that they were but flesh here is a speech concerning the Israelites in their generall State as men and as frail and weak but no particular dejectednesse of their Condition but that they were no better then men His second place is Isaiah 40.6 All flesh is grasse and all the goodlinesse thereof as the flower of the field suppose I should yield that here by flesh is reprepresented a low and mean Condition yet here is such a Comment joyned to this word flâ—sh as enforceth that conceipt but in my Text there is no such thing so that still I may say that this Term flesh teacheth us no such thing without an addition of such other language as may render it of that sense but then again all the expression of any lownesse or dejectednesse of estate that is here made is nothing else but the generall condâ—tion of mankind no particular humiliation mean't by it and that is evident out of that phrase all flesh is grasse c. this sign all shew's it to be mean't universally So