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Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
nature_n	contain_v	law_n	moral_a	2,485	5	9.8922	5	false

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ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A41688	The court of the gentiles. Part IV. Of reformed philosophie wherein Plato's moral and metaphysic or prime philosophie is reduced to an useful forme and method / by Theophilus Gale.	Gale, Theophilus, 1628-1678.	1677 (1677)	Wing G142; ESTC R25438	525,579	570

which it appears that the proper office of this Syneidesis is self-reflexion whence follows accusation or excusation c. as Rom. 2.15 And because this reflexive Light of Conscience does necessarily suppose inward sense hence 't is oft called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sensation also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Synesis or sensate judgment So Aquinas Synesis or sensate judgment imports a right judgment about particular operables So Plato in his Theaet makes al true Science to be a kind of Sensation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Science is nothing else but Sensation And more particularly in his Timaeus pag. 103. he cals 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Prudence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a good Sensation which exactly answers to the Scripture Phraseologie which sets forth this reflexive act of Conscience by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Phil. 1.9 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and thence Heb. 5.14 we read of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Phil. 1.9 c. The life of the new Creature as wel as of the old consistes in these self-reflexive Acts of Conscience which spring from inward sense and feeling And Plato in his Alcibiad pag. 133 134. tels us That he that reflectes upon himself his own Soul and Wisdome thereby becomes as it were omniscient whereas they who know not themselves know not what is good or evil for them nor yet what belongs to themselves or to other men such therefore can never make good Politicians or Occonomists c. In brief Self-reflexions or our actions upon our selves are of al the highest and noblest and those by which we live and worke as men and perfect that part of the Soul called Conscience which directs al we do according to right Reason c. 3. As for the Measure or Rule of Moral Prudence 3. The Rule of Prudence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Right Reason we find it expressed in the fore-mentioned Platonic Definition under this notion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to right Reason This Platonic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is asserted in like manner by the Stoics and others right Reason is the same with the Light or Law of Nature which is twofold 1 Subjective 2 Objective 1. As for Subjective Right Reason Light or Law of Nature Right Reason is 1. Subjective it is no other than those commun Principes of Moralitie seated in that part of Conscience which they cal Synteresis of which in the foregoing § 6. This Seminarie of engrafted active Notions or moral Principes is stiled by the Stoics 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Commun Law also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 right Reason against which say they nothing is to be done as Diog. Laert. in Zeno. 'T is termed by Plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Law of Being So Minos pag. 315. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 where saies Serranus by this appellation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Plato understands the Eternal Law of Nature which amidst the various Laws of Nations and their vicissitudes continues uniforme and the same and thence is truly termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Being therefore he cals it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the right Reason of the Eternal Law and because our actions are to be measured by the Rule of these commun Notions therefore Plato names this Law 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Royal Law So again Serranus in Plato de Legib. 8. The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Delineation of this Eternal Law is this There is in the minds of al as soon as they are borne a certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sacred Law He that consecrates this Law in his mind as a certain sacred is thereby furnished with an excellent remedie against the insolence and impotence of human lusts as it was said of the Tyrant 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 These active Principes conteined in this interne Law of Conscience are generally stiled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 commun Notions they were named by Zeno 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Comprehensions because they comprehended the first seeds or principes of knowlege Cicero tels us that Epicurus called them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Anticipations as he translates the word because they supposed a Previous formation of things in the Soul The Stoics used the same terme likewise Chrysippus defined this natural Law or Conservatorie of commun Principes a natural Intelligence of those things which universally are Cicero stiles these commun Notions Inchoate Intelligences of which see Lud. Vives in August Civ lib. 8. cap. 7. The Scripture also stiles these commun Principes fixed in Conscience a Law so Rom. 2.14 15. where the Gentiles are said to be a Law to themselves c. And indeed these commun seeds of natural light are a private Law which God has deeply engraven on mens Consciences and is universally extensive unto al though with a latitude of degrees it being in some more in some lesse but in al in great measure obliterated and defaced since the Fal. It is also by Divines generally termed the Light or Law of Nature because it flows in and with and from human Nature either immediately or mediately 2. As for the Objective 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2. The Objective 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Law of Nature Right Reason which Plato seems to have had some traditional notices of it contains those broken Traditions of the Moral Law which were scattered up and down among the Gentiles That Plato had received some fragments of Gods Law and that by his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Right Reason he does import the same seems very probable both from that expression in his Minos pag. 315. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Law of Being i. e. of the first Being as he usually stiles God as also from that other expression of his Minos pag. 317. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This right Reason is the Royal Law i. e. Gods Divine Law which is so stiled Jam. 2.8 In this sense right Reason may be said as the Scholes wil have it to give 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 esse morale or Moralitie to human Acts so Stobaeus de Virtut Ser. 1. fo 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue is a conformitie according to right Reason and Sin is a transgression against right Reason Where by right Reason we must understand not the subjective Light or Law of Conscience which is imperfect but the objective Light of Nature comprised in the Moral Law In this sense we must understand that Principe in the Scholes That right Reason gives the esse morale to moral Beings Thus much for the Platonic Definition of Moral Philosophie § 2. Next to the generic Notion of Moral Philosophie The last End its Influence in Morals the first thing that comes under consideration is the last End which is first in intention though last in execution Yea indeed the last End is the first Principe of moral Prudence For what is Prudence but the right disposition and ordination of al means and actions And

Reason is cried up by some as the only Rule of Moralitie Thus Seneca would needs persuade us That we have this merit of Nature that virtue doth premit its light into the minds of al yea those that wil not follow yet see it And not only some vulgar capacities now a-days but also the Stoics of old generally cried up the Light within them as the Rule of Moralitie The Schole-men also in imitation of Aristotle their Oracle generally proclaim right Reason to be the formal Rule of moral Good But that Aristotle and Plato by their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 right Reason understood the objective Law either of Nature or Moses I no way dout but hereafter to demonstrate Indeed al our subjective Light by Nature is no other than a nocturne dreaming tenebrous knowlege as Plato stiles it 2 That no human Law or Laws is the perfect measure of moral Bonitie No human Laws a perfect Rule of moral Good is also evident because al human Laws are extreme defective in their extension and prescripts as to al the Causes and Principes of moral Goodnesse how deficient are they both as to the Mater and Manner of moral Good What Restrictions Emendations and Alterations do they need What an infinite number of particular cases are there which no human Law can reach Wel therefore doth Androcles in Aristotle Reth l. 2. c. 25. informe us That al human Laws need another Law to correct them as fishes need salt to preserve them from putrefaction This corrective Law they terme 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Equitie which indeed is no other than the Law of Nature as hereafter cap. 5. § 5. 4. The Divine Law the Rule of moral Good Prop. The adequate perfect rule and measure of moral Bonitie is the Divine Law This Hypothesis being the main wil require more ample explication and demonstration 1 The Divine Being is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first essentially just and holy Being and therefore the first essential rule or measure of al Justice and Sanctitie 2 But the Divine Essence being too remote and distant from the Creature he hath therefore given us a divine Law as the Miroir and Idea of his essential Sanctitie to be the rule of al moral Bonitie as to us 3 This Divine Law given us as the Rule of moral Bonitie was concreate and connatural as to Adam it being impressed and engraven on his nature and so needed not any further promulgation 4 Hence the objective and subjective Law or Light of Nature was to Adam in his innocent state one and the same he having a perfect understanding and comprehension of the whole Dutie of man and so became a Law unto himself 5 But lapsed man having lost his subjective Law and Light of Nature as to supernaturals and very far as to naturals and civils retaining only some fragments or broken notices our most benigne Lord out of his great clemence and pitie to lapsed man gave a new Edition of that natural Law and therein fresh notices of his soverain wil and pleasure touching mans dutie So that the World was never without an objective Law and Light of Nature albeit the subjective was lost in Adam Yea some Divines of great note conceive that those very commun natural Notions communly called the Fragments or Remains of the Image of God lost by Adam are vouchsafed to us by the Covenant of Grace in and by the Mediation of Christ Thus they interpret Joh. 1.9 of Christ's illightening every man Joh. 1.9 i. e. not only supernatural light vouchsafed to the Elect but even the natural notices or Light of Nature vouchsafed to the lapsed Sons of Adam is the effect of the second Covenant and Christ's Mediation And the reason seems demonstrative because our very Beings and al the comforts of our Beings having been forfeited by the breach of the first Covenant whatever good we enjoy on this side Hel is but the overflowing of the Grace of the second Covenant and Christ's Mediation by which the whole World stands So far are we from any real claim to a subjective Light of Nature by virtue of the first Covenant as that both subjective and objective Light is from Christ The objective Light or Law of Nature is stiled by the Hebrews 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and its Offices 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the knowen Duties i.e. by nature to which they opposed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Divine namely Institutes or positive Commands of God For Jus naturale the natural Law is not opposed to supernatural but to positive Laws as Grotius hath wel observed Right Reason the objective Law of Nature 6 This objective Law of Nature in its second Edition as conteined in divine Revelations of moral Bonitie was not altogether unknowen to the wiser of the Heathen and that Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Right Reason was but an Imitamen hereof we now undertake to demonstrate He discourseth hereof professedly in Minos pag. 317. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That which is Right is the Royal Law 1 That by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he means the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is to me unquestionable and I think it wil clearly appear so to others by what follows 2 He saith this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Royal Law which is the stile the Hebrews gave their moral Law as Jam. 2.8 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jam. 2.8 And why doth he terme it the Royal Law but because it was the supreme Law of God the King of Kings Thence Socrates addes We therefore rightly granted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that this Law was the invention of Being it self or of the first independent Being For this generally he understands by his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thence Defin. Plat. pag. 416. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an operation against right Reason i. e. the objective Law and Light of Nature Thus also Aristotle Eth. l. 2. c. 2. art 6. pag. 76. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And truly this to act according to right Reason is commun to al and let it be fixed as a Canon So again Eth. l. 3. c. 8. pag. 153. he saith Virtues are mediocrities freely undertaken 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and so as right Reason shal prescribe This right Reason he elsewhere termes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the universal commun Law which al by nature are subject to So Rhet. l. 1. c. 14. art 3. pag. 69. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. I say Law is either proper or commun proper or private Law is that written Law which belongs to particular Nations 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The commun Law I cal that which is according to nature for there is a certain commun Just and unjust which al consent unto albeit there should be no societie or confederation of men This commun Law of Nature is the same with his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For look as in speculative Sciences there are certain first

Principes which are the foundation of al demonstration so in Practics and Morals there is an objective Law or Light of Nature containing certain practic Principes which are the Rule of Conversation Thus also we are to understand the Stoics if we wil make a right use of their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of which Diog. La●rt in Zeno The Stoics say that to live according to nature is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to do nothing that the commun Law prohibits which is right Reason diffusing it self throughout althings Where it deserves a remarque That they make the commun Law of Nature the same with right Reason Which cannot rightly be understood of subjective right Reason but of objective it may Again they say This right Reason diffuseth it self throughout althings Which cannot be understood of any subjective reason which is confined to individuals but must be applied to the commun objective Light and Law of Nature which is diffused throughout the whole Creation according to the various conditions of things Thus Hierocles in Pythagor Carm. pag. 106. saith That the vices of the mind are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aversions and Errata from right Reason And pag. 209. he addes This right Reason is the great Legislatrix and Judge of al human affairs c. And Stobaeus de Virt. Serm. 1. pag. 9. also informes us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue is a Syntaxe or orderly contexture according to right Reason but Vice a Transgression against right Reason Where by right Reason we must necessarily understand the commun objective Light or Law of Nature not that darke subjective Light in the minds of blind Mankind Thus also we must understand Parker Amyraldus and other Divines who make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 right Reason the unic Criterion or Rule of moral Virtue Though I denie not but that the Stoics generally and perhaps Aristotle as many of his Followers among the Schole-men by right Reason understand the subjective Light of Nature in mens minds yet I am very apt to persuade my self that Socrates and Plato who seem to be the first Promulgators of this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 meant thereby no other than the objective Light and Law of Nature whereof some more commun Precepts were conveighed down by the posteritie of Noah but those irradiant and bright notices thereof which shone among them they received by oriental Tradition from the sacred Books of Moses wherein Plato was not a little versed and which by his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 royal Law he seems to allude unto 5. The Mosaic Law a perfect Rule Prop. That Divine Law which is the adequate perfect Rule and Measure of moral Bonitie is no where to be found but in the sacred Philosophie or Scriptures Here and here only is extant Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This sacred Rule whereof he had great notices he sometimes cals 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Divine Word Here also Aristotle's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Commun Law of Nature in its perfection is alone to be found Hence likewise it was that Pythagoras Lycurgus Solon Minos and Plato borrowed the principal heads of their best Laws as we have at large proved Court Gent. P. 1. B. 3. C. 9. The sum of the Law of Nature and al divine Precepts is conteined in the Decalogue or Moral Law delivered by Moses which is thence stiled by the Hebrews 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the matrices of the Law and its roots And indeed what are the Ten Commandments conteined in the moral Law but a Transumt Compend Abstract or rather extended Copie of the Law of Nature given to man in the beginning from that first original Exemplar the eternal Law Is not the formal reason of al Equitie prescribed and expressed in the moral Law Ought not this then to be the terme measure and scope of al Laws To clear which we are to remember that the Ten Commandments conteined in the moral Law must not be taken literally as ten Words but in a more ample extensive notion as Christian Pandects or commun heads of al moral Duties towards God and man to be explicated and extended accordingly to the Illustrations and Commentaries of the Prophets our great Lord and his Apostles Though the Decalogue doth not mention each particular Dutie in the Gospel yet it doth command obedience to al that are or shal be specified and expresseth every particular Dutie generically or synecdochically and although it were not a Dutie from the general Precept til it was specified in the Gospel yet when it is once a Dutie the neglect of it is a sin against the Decalogue Indeed are there not almost in al the Precepts manifest Synecdoches Is it not then ridiculous for men to restrain the most ample sense of the moral Law to the narrow confines of its words Doth not the great Legislator take the blackest sins as Murder Adultery Theft c. and place them as so many commun Heads in the Decalogue that so by these we may be instructed how black and odiose al those other sins reducible to those heads are Wherefore to penetrate and dive into the nature and contents of the Ten Commandments we must in a particular manner inquire 1 What in every Command is treated of 2 The end for which it was given 3 What therein is displeasing or pleasing to God And after al we shal find that the moral Law is spiritual holy just and good as Rom. 7.12 14. reaching al the motions and dispositions of the heart And indeed how absurd is it to conceit that he who made the heart and knows al the diverticules or turnings and windings of it should make a Law to reach only the outward acts and not the inward principes and motions May we not then conclude that the Decalogue and moral Law of the supreme Legislator extends its Precepts to the whole Soul and al its Principes Powers Inclinations Thoughts Affections and Operations interne and externe directing the same to their right objects and ends affecting them with their inseparable Accidents and Modifications clothing them with their immutable circumstances in such sort that the action good by this Law can never be made evil that which is evil by this Law can never be made good that which is good or evil by this Law can never be made indifferent Hence Plato brings in Pindar speaking thus of the regal Power as I take it of the Law of Nature 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Law is King over al both mortals and immortals And Aristot. Pol. l. 4. c. 4. affirmes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That the Law ought to command al. Which is most proper and peculiar to the moral Law that lively Idea and Image of the Divine Sanctitie and Wil the original and universal Exemplar of moral Bonitie that great bond of union by conformitie whereto mans Wil becomes one with the Divine Wil yea man himself one with God Whence as Tyndal pag. 83. wel observes Mans

attends the fruition of the sweetest Good brings with it infinite Quietation and Satisfaction Satisfaction These spiritual pleasures do not only amplifie and widen the Soul but also bring satisfaction Carnal joys breed a vexatious enlargement of the desires but never sil them with satisfaction they may slater and tickle the senses but never quiet the appetite the best they leave behind them is repentance This is wel explicated by Digby of the Soul pag. 460. The violence of fruition in those foul puddles of flesh and bloud presently glutteth with satietie and is attended with annoy and dislike and the often using and repeting it weareth away that edge of pleasure which only maketh it sweet and valuable even to them that set their hearts upon it and nothing heighteneth it but an irritation by a convenient hunger and abstinence Contrary in the Soul the greater and more violent the pleasure is the more intense and vehement the fruition is and the oftener it is repeted so much the greater appetite and desire we have to returne unto the same Spiritual Delectation in the fruition of our last end doth not only widen but fil the Soul and crown its desires with satisfaction Delectation is the quiet of the Appetite in the fruition of its end where there is no rest there can be no perfect delight or satisfaction and where there is want there can be no rest every want wrings the Soul and keeps it in a restlesse condition So that Quiet and Satisfaction is appropriated to the fruition of the last end and sweetest good Thence Plato Conviv pag. 211. assures us That the contemplation of the first sincere most perfect Beautie is formal Beatitude that which brings with it perfect Delectation and Satisfaction for they who arrive hereto are content to live alone in conversation with this first Beautie c. Of which see Philos General Part. 1. lib. 3. cap. 3. sect 1. § 2. CHAP. II. Of the Moralitie of human Acts and Moral Bonitie The Moralitie of human Acts. Moral Goodnesse in Conformitie to the Divine Law The measure of moral Goodnesse perfect The Vniversalitie of a perfect Law Subjective right Reason not the measure of Moral Good but the Moral Law Right Reason among the Philosophers the objective Law of Nature The Mosaic Law a perfect Rule The Parts and Causes of moral Bonitie 1 The Mater Things indifferent in genere specie Nothing indifferent in individuo A virtuose Wil the Principe of Moral Good The best End essential to Moral Good The forme of moral Good Conformitie to Gods Law How 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gives Forme How far Circumstances formalise Moral Good The Vnitie and Vniformitie of al Moral Good There is no real moral or natural Good but what is supernatural Moral Good most difficult The Virtues of Pagans lesser sins only The distribution of Moral Good into Pietie and Justice § 1. HAving dispatcht the generic Idea and last End The Moralitie of human Acts. which has the place of a first Principe in Ethics we now passe on to the Moralitie of Human Acts and their Bonitie And here we should first treat of the natural interne Principes of human Acts namely the practic Judgement or Knowlege Volition Consultation and Election But having discussed these more largely in Court of the Gentiles P. 1. B. 4. c. 1. § 24. we shal not here undertake the discussion of them As for the Moralitie of human Acts there are great disputes in the Scholes Wherein the Esse morale of human Acts doth consiste Suarez in 1.2 which vulgarly they stile his Ethics Tract 3. Disp 1. pag. 207. discourseth largely of the Moralitie of human Acts under these heads 1 He makes the formal denomination or that forme whereby an Act is denominated moral to be more than an Ens rationis properly so termed or a figment of mens minds something in or appendent to the things themselves This we grant 2 He thence deduceth That the Esse morale in the act of the Wil besides its Entitie and substance addes a certain mode of emanation or moral dependence on the Reason adverting and the Wil freely working This Hypothesis needs animadversion and restriction It 's true the Moralitie of human Acts hath dependence on the Reason and Wil as the subject of those Acts for al moral Acts depend on the physic Principes of those Acts there is no moral Being but has its foundation in some physic or natural Being As al moral capacitie is subjected in natural so al moral Acts. Virtue flowing from God has its seat in the Creature and so supposeth a create intelligent Nature as antecedent thereto Thus Cyril Alexandr Compend Dialog de S. Trinit Tom. 5. part 1. pag. 673. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That which is holy by participation being the receptacle of adventitious Sanctitie that of it self existes primarily in proper nature namely as Man and Angel or any other rational Creature So Damascene Dialect cap. 59. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That is first by nature which is inferred but infers not i.e. secundùm existendi consequentiam if there be Grace there must be human Nature wherein it is seated but if there be human Nature it doth not necessarily follow that there must be Grace Thus the human Understanding and Wil precede Virtue as the subject thereof Yet hence it follows not as Suarez seems to conclude that moral Acts receive their formal denomination from their relation to the Understanding and Wil. 3 Hence Suarez concludes that the Esse morale is a mode not physically and intrinsecally inherent in the moral act but in the externe act it speaks denomination from the free act of the Wil and in the very act of the Wil besides its physic emanation from the Wil it speaks denomination from the reason directing and the Wil acting with a plenarie power Though as it has been granted al Moralitie of human Acts doth presuppose the emanation of those acts from the Understanding and Wil as their main Principles yet it follows not hence that the formal reason of their Moralitie must be taken from this mode of emanation May we not as wel argue that al virtuose acts are formalised by their relation to the natural Principes of human acts because they flow thence But there lies a mysterie in this Jesuitic Hypothesis which when laid open wil soon evidence its vanitie and falshood The Jesuites and some other Schole-men in imitation yet on mistaken grounds of the ancient Philosophers place the formal reason of al moral Virtue in conformitie to right Reason Hence no wonder if they make al Moralitie formally considered to be a mode dependent on Reason and Wil. But the falsitie hereof wil appear by what follows If we consider the Moralitie of human Acts as stated by Plato it cannot be denied but that he also makes mention of an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a right Reason which he seems to make the measure of al Moralitie

4 This moral objective Bonitie ariseth from the mater as clothed with al its conditions and circumstances whereby it is rendred a meet object for the Soul to close with 5 The moral goodnesse of any object consistes in its conformitie to or agreament with the Divine Law 2 There is also formal Bonitie or Goodnesse which constitutes a man formally good For 1 An object though never so good cannot constitute a man or his act formally good It 's true the Act receives some goodnesse from its object yet only materially and terminatively not formally so as to constitute the Act formally good 2 The Act is so far formally good as virtuose i. e. proceding from right Principes tending to a right end and measured by a perfect Rule Al which presuppose some divine Law as the measure 2. The Measure of Moral Good perfect Prop. That Law which is the measure of moral Bonitie must be perfect This Hypothesis is most evident and wil appear to be such if we consider either the nature of a measure or the condition of the thing measured 1 As for the nature of a measure Plato Repub. 6. wel explicates the same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A defective measure of such things is no measure for that which is imperfect cannot be the measure of any thing Every Measure or Rule is indivisible and therefore capable neither of addition or substraction Thus Phavorinus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A Canon or Rule is an infallible measure admitting neither addition nor detraction And thus much indeed is formally included in the notion Canon for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Canna whence it is derived primarily denotes a reed of such a just longitude whereby they measured their Lands and thence it was used in the general for an exact measure as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Job 38 5. is rendred by Aquila 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Cor. 10.13 Phil. 3.16 Thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Cor. 10.13 is explicated by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 such is its use Gal. 6.16 Phil. 3.16 whereby the perfection of the Divine Law is illustrated 2 That the measure of moral Bonitie must be perfect is easily demonstrated from the condition of moral Bonitie for a plenitude of being or integritie of Bonitie is essential to al moral good Moral evil ariseth from the least defect but moral good requireth an integritie of causes and parts If there be the least circumstance misplaced or mistimed it renders the act vitiose Now if al moral good must be thus perfect and entire then it necessarily follows that its measure and rule must be perfect and entire But of this more in what follows 3. The Vniversalitie of a perfect Law Prop. The perfection of a Law as it is the measure of moral Bonitie consistes in its comprehension of the most perfect objective mater end and principes The explication and demonstration of this Proposition depends on the explication of moral good as to its constitutive parts and causes It was said before that al moral good requires an integritie of Being and Causes In the Scholes they make four Causes of moral Good proportionable to those in natural productions namely Mater Forme End Efficient We shal not at present think our selves obliged to examine or defend the legalitie of this distribution but endeavor to demonstrate that a perfect measure of moral Bonitie comprehends each of these Causes and Principes 1 It must comprehend the objectmater of al moral Bonitie in its fullest Amplitude Extension and Vniversalitie Thus Plato Leg. 1. pag. 630. Truth and Equitie require that they who wil discourse of a divine Republic determine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the Legislator has respect not to one only particle of virtue and that truly the least but rather to al virtue and that he find out Laws according to those several Species of Virtue i. e. The Law of moral Bonitie must extend it self to al the various Species and Offices of Virtue If there be any moral Dutie which the Law of Moralitie extends not to it is no perfect measure And this argues the imperfection of Natures light in us and al human Laws as hereafter 2 As for the Forme of moral Bonitie it consistes in conformitie to the Rule or Law of Moralitie which if perfect exacts the most perfect conformitie Thus Plato Leg. 1. pag. 630. Our whole discourse tends to this to shew that this Legislator and al other who wil institute utile Laws 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ought in framing Laws to aim at the highest Virtue i. e. at the highest conformitie to the best Law 3 That a perfect Law of Moralitie comprehends the most perfect End is also most evident because the end is as the Soul and Spirit in Morals al offices of virtue are but as a dead Corps without a spirituose perfect end as Jansenius demonstrates out of Augustine Thence Plato Repub. 5. pag. 444. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good Institutes or Laws make way for Virtue but bad precipitate men into vice Now he elsewhere assures us That the end gives life and perfection to al virtuose Acts. Yea Leg. 1. he openly saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al Laws are to be so constituted as that they may promote the best end 4 The Law of moral Bonitie must be perfect as to the Efficient or Principe of Moralitie i. e. it must extend it self to the qualification of the subject and its virtuose disposition for as the end directs the act so the principes or dispositions of the subject direct the end Arist Eth. lib. 3. c. 10. assures us That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the end of every act is according to the habit i. e. if the mind be not wel-disposed or clothed with virtuose habits it wil never aim at a virtuose end Thence that great Saying of Augustine The intention of the best end makes the worke good and Faith directs the intention So that the Law of Moralitie if perfect extends it self to al virtuose principes and moral habits which the subject ought to be invested with 3. Subjective right Reason not the measure of moral Good Prop. Subjective right Reason or objective human Laws are not a perfect Rule of moral Bonitie There are two parts in this Proposition to be examined 1 That subjective right Reason is not a perfect Rule of moral Bonitie To explicate and demonstrate this Hypothesis we grant 1 That Reason is the Organ of apprehending albeit not the measure of our dutie 2 That practic Reason or Conscience so far as illuminated by the Spirit of God is the regula regulata of our dutie for Conscience is God's Deputie and a Law unto a mans self Yet we denie that there is an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or right Reason in nature corrupted which may suffice as a Rule of moral Goodnesse I am not ignorant how much the Light of Nature or as some terme it Right

imagination can make the Law of God neither greater nor lesser neither can it adde to or diminish from the Law of God Gods Commandment is as great as himself Such is the Amplitude of the moral Law as the immutable universal Rule of moral Bonitie § 3. Having considered the Measure and Rule of moral Bonitie The parts and causes of moral Good we now passe on to examine the Nature and Causes thereof It was before suggested that al moral Bonitie requires a plenitude of Being and integritie of Causes albeit any defect render an action morally evil This Canon holds true whatever distribution we give the causes of moral Bonitie Jansenius in imitation of Augustine makes two essential constitutive parts of al moral Good 1 The Office or Mater of the Act which he makes to be as the Corps and the End which he makes to be as the Forme that specifies 2 Plato in his Theaetetus pag. 187. and Arist. Eth. l. 2. c. 4. seem to distribute moral Good into the good deed done and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the wel-doing of it i.e. into Bonum and Bene. The good deed-done is as the mater and the bene or wel-doing of it as the forme 3 Others according to the Aristotelian distribution of the causes make four causes of al moral Good the Mater Efficient End and Forme Albeit I judge this distribution of Causes as to Naturals every way absurd and that which can never be defended because it makes the same things both constitutive Parts of the whole and yet also Causes thereof so that it hence follows the mater and forme are causes of themselves which constitute the whole yet in Morals where the causes need not such an accurate distinction from the parts we may admit this distribution or else we may take the mater and forme as parts and the efficient and end as causes of moral Good This being the commun and received distribution I am not scrupulose in following the same yet so as not to exclude the two former divisions 1. The Mater of moral Good If we reflect on the Mater of moral Good it comprehends al human Acts with the Objects and Circumstances relating thereto whether things necessary or indifferent It 's true as to the Circumstances of moral Good there are some that relate to the forme others to the efficient and end yet some also that regard the mater The mater of every good action is either good or indifferent it is good when commanded by and conforme to the moral Law the measure of objective goodnesse as before it is indifferent when neither good nor evil but as it were in the middle between both Here that which chiefly requires an examen and discussion is the nature of things indifferent which so far as it may concerne moral Good we shal inquire into Plato in his Gorgias Things indifferent cals a thing indifferent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 neither good nor evil but a middle between these So Diogenes the Cynic taught 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That things between virtue and vice were indifferent And the Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of things some were good some bad some neither good nor bad i. e. indifferent These neuters or things indifferent they said were such as neither profited nor did hurt Again they affirmed That things might be termed indifferent two ways 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Such things as pertein not either to felicitie or miserie as Riches Glorie c. 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Such things as men act neither with an Impetus nor aversation as the extending the finger or numbering the hairs of the head c. as Laertius in Zeno. But the more fully to explicate the nature of things indifferent we are to consider that things are said in the general to be indifferent which in themselves are neither good nor evil but equally inclined to either Now this indifference of actions or things may be considered physically or morally according to the generic specific or individual nature of Actions and Things 1. If we consider Actions and Things in genere abstracto Physic Indifference in Genere in their generic abstract nature without the supervenient determination of the moral Law so they are in themselves nakedly considered indifferent For althings physically considered without their moral estimation and respect to the Law are neither morally good nor evil Thus al our Thoughts Words and Actions nakedly and physically considered without respect to the moral Law which is the rule and measure of moral Good and Evil are said to be indifferent 2. Actions and Things are said to be indifferent in specie Moral Indifference in Specie when the mater of them is neither commanded nor forbidden by the moral Law For as althings are of God through God and for God so it belongs to his regal Wil to give moral or spiritual determination to them whereby they are made good or evil in specie as to the mater of them Neither can any created limited power make that which is good evil or that which is evil good or that which is indifferent good or evil except on supposition of predetermination from him who being Creator of al has an absolute dominion over al. Every Creature having termes to its Essence has also termes to its dominion and operation a limited Cause must necessarily have a limited power and activitie Except man had being of himself and a World of his own framing he could not be a rule to himself for the determination of his actions but must be determined by the Law of his Maker for the specific nature or qualitie of his acts as good Quando dicimus dari actus indifferentes quoad speciem qui non sunt boni nec mali id intelligendum est negativé Petr. à Sancto Joseph Thes 167. or evil or indifferent Thence a thing is said to be morally indifferent in specie when it is neither commanded nor forbidden by God and so neither good nor evil for al moral determination ariseth from the Divine Wil expressed in the moral Law Whence it appears evident that The reasons of good and evil are not eternal as some Platonists would fain persuade us but dependent on the divine Wil and Determination for althings are therefore good or evil in specie because so determined by the soverain Wil promulgated in the natural or moral Law Whence also we may easily perceive the danger of that commun Notion among some Divines That somethings are good because commanded other things are commanded because good Indeed this Maxime may be of use to expresse the difference between moral and positive Precepts with this limitation that positive Precepts which regard Worship c. are good because commanded but moral Precepts are commanded because good i. e. agreable to human Nature not that they have any moral goodnesse antecedent to the divine Wil and Determination Hence 3. No Action

indifferent in individuo No Action considered in individuo in its individual nature is morally indifferent i.e. every individual action considered as clothed with its Circumstances and in relation to its Principes Manner and End is either good or evil That moral Indifference hath place only in specie in the specific nature of Acts not in individuo in their individual nature is generally avouched by the Orthodoxe yea among the more sober of the Schole-men This was one of John Husse's Articles condemned in the Council of Constance Art 16. Quòd nulla sint opera indifferentia sed haec sit divisio immediata humanorum operum quòd sint virtuosa vel vitiosa That there are no workes in individuo indifferent but this is an immediate division of human workes that they are either virtuose or vitiose This indeed we may argue from Plato's Placites who strongly proves That al our Acts ought to tend to some good end So Gorg. pag. 499. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It seems that althings must be done for good c. So elsewhere he saith That God is the marque and scope unto which al our Acts as so many arrows ought to tend This is wel determined by Aquinas 1.2 Quaest 18. Art 9. It happens sometimes that an Act is indifferent as to its Species which yet considered in individuo is either good or evil and that because every moral Act receives its Bonitie not only from its object but also from its circumstances And it 's necessary that every individual Act hath some circumstance by which it is drawen to good or evil at least as to the intention of the end For in as much as it belongs to Reason to order al human Acts if any Act be not ordered to its last end it is so far evil if it be ordered to its last end it is then good c. Thus Gibieuf de Libertat pag. 74. We most evidently gather from the subordination of our Wil to its last end that there are no human Acts indifferent in individuo but al are good or evil for it is not lawful for a rational Creature so long as he is such not to returne that back to God which he received from God Again p. 77. Every thing ought to act according to its nature and he that doth otherwise is deficient because nature is the measure of other things If therefore man puts forth an human Act he ought thereby to be converted towards God Indeed Indifference can no more be found in individual Acts than it can be denied as to some Acts considered in their Species Al Acts of Man in Innocence were good al the Acts of man under the dominion of corrupt Nature are evil al the Acts of man in Glorie shal be good al the Acts of man under Grace are either good or evil not one of al these indifferent Were al our actions regulated by the Divine moral Law they would be al good Yea our very natural and civil Acts as to their manner so far as they are morally good or evil are al regulated and determined by the moral Law For albeit the Divine Law be not as it ought not to be a general sum of Arts and Sciences nor yet a particular Directorie for the Government of States or Politic Acts yet the particular determination of al our Acts fals under the Divine Law so far as they are moral and Christian according to the nature of al Professions and Sciences coincident for the most part in the mater but distinct in the manner of consideration Thus much Petrus à Sancto Joseph that late compilator of Schole-Divinitie Thes 167. acknowledgeth There is not saith he any Act indifferent in individuo but every such Act if it procede from sufficient deliberation is either good or evil although not as to its object yet in regard of its circumstances The scratching of the head or the taking up of a straw is either good or evil This seems a Paradoxe to some that are ignorant and disgustful to Libertines who would be so yet generally granted by Philosophers and Divines yea scarce ever professedly denied by any save some sew who distinguish between Acts proceding from mere Imagination and such as are deliberate That no Acts in individuo are indifferent see the Commentators in Sent. lib. 2. dist 41. and in Thomam 1.2 Quaest 18. Art 9. 2. A virtuose Wil the Principe of moral Good Having discussed the Mater of moral Good we now procede to its next efficient Cause or Principe which is the Wil or rather Soul clothed with supernatural Habits of Virtue or Grace The moral Law requires that to the constitution of an Act morally good there concur a good Principe now the Wil or Soul as willing being the fountain of al moral efficience and operation its rectitude is necessary to constitute an Act morally or spiritually good Such therefore as the disposition of the Wil is such wil the action prove as to its goodnesse or pravitie The bent of the Wil is as a Pondus that carries the whole Soul either to good or bad when the deliberation and intention of a bended Wil concurs in a good mater for a good end the action is good And what bends the Wil in this manner Actio recta non erit nisi recta fuerit voluntas ab hac enim est actio but virtuose habits So many degrees as there are of a sanctified Wil in any Act so many degrees there are of moral Good therein Moralitie as wel as Divinitie is in a more special manner conversant in ruling the Wil which is the measure of good and evil The bent of the Wil makes a good or bad man as also act Thus Plato Meno 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue is to wil and to be able to performe good Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If he wil not to do unrightcously this is sufficient he shal not do unrighteously But more particularly Plato Leg. 3. thus philosophiseth This is not to be desired 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that althings follow his Wil but that his Wil follow Reason i.e. that it prosecute what is good This is wel expressed by Simplicius in Epich c. 1. pag. 14. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For when the Wil is free and pure in the power of Reason it self on which our nature dependes then it is carried to things truly eligible yea to truth it self Wherefore the proper good of the Soul is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly desirable and attained by real election Simplicius here in imitation of Plato whom he much follows asserteth 1 That the moral Goodnesse of human Acts dependes on the puritie and goodnesse of the Wil. 2 That moral Good is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue because most eligible Which derivation he borrowed from Plato What Virtue properly is and how it disposeth the Wil to what is morally good wil hereafter § 4. and sect 3. §

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Virtue has for its rule a decorum or that which is most convenient i.e. agreable or conformable to the Law of Nature Hence 3 This Conformitie is stiled by Plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Symmetrie and Symphonie Al these notions Aristotle comprehended under his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Mediocritie of which more fully B. 4. C. 1. § 30. and Philos General P. 2. l. 1. c. 1. sect 4. § 4. Others place the Forme of moral Good in the mode or manner of doing namely that it be done wel How the Forme of Good consistes in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 wel doing and we find some foundation for this Hypothesis in Plato's Theaetetus pag. 187. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It 's better to a little wel than much il Where he seems to make the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the w●l doing the forme and measure of good So Aristotle Eth. lib. 2. cap. 3. pag. 83. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. He therefore shal be a Grammarian who doth what is Grammatic Grammatically i.e. according to Rules of Grammar But yet he addes by way of caution That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the wel-doing of Arts is not the same with that of Virtues for the perfection of Arts is included in themselves without regard to the perfection of the Artificer but the perfection of Virtue requires that the subject be so and so qualified And then he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He is a righteous and temperate man not that doth those things but doth them in such a manner as righteous and sober men do them i.e. rightcously and soberly Hence that vulgar Effate That good workes are to be judged by Adverbes for al must be done with those adverbial conditions of sacred Philosophie Tit. 2.12 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 soberly and righteously and piously This is in a peculiar manner true of good actions where the mater is indifferent because such have no goodnesse at al but what is from the Adverb So that it sufficeth not that the Act be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good but it must have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a right manner of being done and herein according to some the Forme of its goodnesse doth consiste even in the manner of it and any defect herein wil render the action evil according to those scholastic Maximes The forme gives being and any omission or defect therein gives millitie as to moral Good So in the Canon Law they tel us That the forme must be precisely and punctually observed And indeed this notion of the forme of moral Good amounts to the same with the former and must be resolved thereinto For a moral Act may be said then to have its 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or bene factum wel done when it is in al points exactly conformable to the moral Law for al moral Good is a relation of conformitie with the rule of Morals but the least privation thereof is sin But How far Circumstances formalise moral Good to descend to particulars an human Act is then conformable to the Law and wel done when it is not only good for the mater but also clothed with al those Circumstances which necessarily attend its moral goodnesse The particular forme of moral Good consistes much in the Circumstances that attend it The Circumstances oft formalise and specisie the Act making it good or evil sometimes they only make it better or worse But the Circumstances have the greatest sway in things indifferent where the manner of doing doth chiefly specifie the Act. We find the Circumstances of human Acts wel expressed by Aristotle Eth. l. 2. c. 5. Virtue saith he consistes in the wel doing of things for we may fear trust desire hate despise be angrie pitie rejoice and grieve 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not duely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But truly to be moved with these affections when and in what things and towards whom and for what end and in that manner as we ought this is the golden mean and that which is best wherein Virtue consistes Whence also Aristotle Eth. lib. 3. cap. 10. art 5. pag. 160. assures us That a defect in any one Circumstance renders an Act evil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But sins may be committed some when that is done that ought not others when not as it ought others because not at that time when it ought or the like Thence art 10. he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For a valiant man suffers and acts according to the dignitie of the mater and when and in that manner as reason or the Law of Nature dictates Thus we see how Plato and Aristotle require to the constitution of moral Good not only a right mater but that it be clothed with al due Circumstances whereby it may be rendred conformable to the Law as to manner This Hypothesis has been generally maintained among the more sound Schole-men Thus Aquinas 1.2 Quaest 7. Art 2. A Circumstance is a condition or accident of an human Act which toucheth it extrinsecally And seing human Acts are disposed towards their last end by circumstances the contemplation hereof greatly concernes Theologues For a Theologue considers human Acts as a man is thereby ordained to Beatitnde Now whatever is ordained to an end ought to be proportionate thereto But Acts are rendred proportionable to their end by a certain commensuration which they receive from due circumstances whence the consideration of circumstances chiefly belongs to a Theologue What these circumstances are he addes Art 3. In human Acts Who did it By what aides or instruments What Why How When and Abour what he did it are to be inquired into Some explain these Circumstances thus 1 Quis who must not be taken for the efficient cause but for his condition and qualitie as a private person or public c. 2 Quid what must not be understood of the mater or object but of the qualitie thereof 3 Neither must Quomodo how be taken for the forme or manner but whether it be done openly or secretly c. Greg. Ariminensis 2. Sent. Dist 38. Quaest 1. Art 1. strongly assertes and proves That no moral Act wanting its due Circumstance is morally good By an Act morally good I understand saith he no other according to the Doctors than an Act conforme to right Reason objective i.e. the Divine Law according to al circumstances requisite to this that the Act be truly virtuose When therefore a moral operation is not conforme to right Reason or the Law according to al due circumstances it is vitiose and morally evil This his Hypothesis he proves by two Conclusions 1. Conclus That no moral Act wanting any one due Circumstance is truly virtuose This he proves by shewing that the contrary implies a contradiction For if a moral Act want any one due circumstance it is not as it ought to be therefore it is evil Due circumstances are communly said to be such things as are required to this that

the Act be truly virtuose and if an Act be truly virtuose it is conforme to right Reason or the moral Law and if such then it wants not any due circumstance wherefore if any Act wanting a due circumstance should be truly virtuose it wil then necessarily follow That it doth want and yet that it doth not want a due circumstance or That it is truly virtuose and yet that it is not truly virtuose 2. Conclus That every such Act as wants its due Circumstances is morally evil and sin It is evil because it wants its due bonitie or goodnesse namely its due circumstance For sin is nothing else but the want of a due good or voluntarily to act against the Divine Law Thus much also Suarez grants us That some conditions that are only circumstantial and accidental to an Act in esse rei as to the physic being are yet essential in esse moris as to its moral being So Suarez 1.2 Tract 2. Disp 5. pag. 169. The first opinion saith he is That an human Act may be considered in its natural or moral being and that circumstances are so called in relation to the natural not the moral being of the Act but that al these conditions are substantial Principes or proper Causes of the moral action as such He mentions this as the opinion of some Scholemen namely that there are no accidental circumstances of human Acts morally considered but that al these Circumstances are essential and properly influential on the said moral Acts. Which indeed is a great truth whereunto though not fully yet thus far he assents It is true saith he what the first opinion asserted That some conditions may be accidental to the act in esse rei as a natural act and yet essential to it in esse moris morally considered And the reason addes he is taken à priori because the esse morale or moral being of an Act primarily dependes on the order of Reason we say of the Law but now it oft happens that an act or object hath a diverse order to reason by reason of diverse conditions of those things that concur to the moral Act. Thence pag. 174. he tels us what Circumstances are essential Right Reason which must be understood objectively is the rule of human acts and their circumstances therefore the affection or reason of these Circumstances cannot be better explicated than by their order or regard to right Reason I would say the Divine Law And the same rule is to be used for the understanding when the conditions of moral Acts are not properly Circumstances but essential namely when they are such as according to right Reason are altogether necessary not only as to degrees but simply as to the honestie or turpitude of the act For when a Circumstance altogether changeth the conformitie or difformitie of an human act it changeth its Species In which he plainly grants That al those Circumstances which change the conformitie or difformitie of an human act are specific and essential Which is al that we need contend for because the Controversie is not about natural or civil Circumstances but such as belong to the act morally considered which if good requireth an integritie of Causes and plenitude of Circumstances so that if one Circumstance due to the moral bonitie of the act be defective the whole act is changed and rendred morally evil By the whole of which it is most evident that al Circumstances due to the moral goodnesse of an human act are essential and specific such as concur to formalise moral Good which requires a complete conformitie to the Divine Law not only in Mater Principes and End but also in al Circumstances morally due to the integritie of such an Act For al good as has been sufficiently demonstrated requires an integritie of Causes whereas sin ariseth from the least defect according to that knowen Effate of the spurious Dionysius Divin Nom. cap. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good is from one and complete cause but sin from many and singular defects § 4. The Vnitie and Vniformitie of al moral Good Having considered moral Good in its Causes and constitutive parts we now descend to the contemplation thereof in its proper Adjuncts and Attributes which we shal deduce and draw forth in the subsequent Corollaries 1. Al moral Good Virtues and virtuose Acts have one and the same simple uniforme Idea and Nature For al moral Good and virtuose Acts flow from one and the same virtuose Principes tend to one and the same End and are formalised by one and the same conformitie to the Divine Law Thus Plato Repub. 5. pag. 445. It appears to me as it were in a Watch-tower 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the face or forme of Virtue is one but that of Improbitie manifold and almost infinite His mind is that al Virtues have one and the same formal Idea or face but sins have varietie yea almost infinite deformed shapes This Aristotle Eth. lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 89. having proved that al moral Virtue consistes in a Mediocritie and Vniformitie he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Moreover we may sin many ways for as the Pythagoreans conjecture sin is infinite and boundlesse but good is terminate and bounded but there is but one way of doing good Wherein we may observe 1 That al sin is difforme boundlesse and endlesse it hath no forme measure or number 2 But Virtue and moral Good is bounded and uniforme Whence he concludes with a Verse out of some ancient Poet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For good men truly are simply and uniformely such but wicked men are difformely and variously so Thus also Aristotle Mag. Moral lib. 1. cap. 25. affirmes That al Good is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 uniforme but al Vice 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 multiforme Hence Plato asserted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That which is just is equal and uniforme Whence that Stoic Hypothesis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al moral goods are equal and uniforme i.e. conforme to the rule of Moralitie Al this is wel expressed by Augustine who makes al Good to consiste in Modo Specie Ordine in Mode Species and Order i.e. in a uniforme conformitie to the rule of Moralitie Hence 2. Al moral Good and Virtue supernatural There is no real moral Good or natural Virtue but what is supernatural This Corollarie evidently follows from the former and indeed from the whole of this discourse about moral Good For if al moral Virtue or Good requires an integritie of causes and is formalised by conformitie to the Divine Law thence it necessarily follows that moral Good or Virtue can be but one uniforme simple thing Thence Chrysostome Hom. 4. in Gen. cals Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a gift above nature overcoming nature And Cyril in Esa termes it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 above proper Nature as elsewhere 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Prerogative above Nature I am not ignorant that many of the Scholemen and

that arise from evil customes and follow the wil do not constitute a sin of passion Thence Aristotle Eth. l. 3. c. 3. saith That every sin from passion is not involuntary Thus also Suarez 1.2 Tract 5. Disp 4. pag. 395. Now involuntarinesse in sins either of ignorance or of passion takes away something of their aggravation where there is real unaffected ignorance passion or perturbation there is lesse of sin Where there is involuntary Ignorance there is want of that which might help the understanding where antecedent involuntary passions hurrie men into sin there is voluntary dissent or subsequent repentance Hence the Disciples of Aristippus said That they who sin from perturbation not voluntarily deserve pardon as Laertius 2. Voluntary wilful Sins are such as procede from a strong bent of wil without ignorance or passion as the original cause thereof Such sins are of greater aggravation because of lesse provocation and excuse From a perseverance in voluntary sins and frequent repetition thereof procedes a fixed custome and rooted habit of sin touching which we find many good Philosophemes in Plato of which hereafter § 7. of the necessary servitude of Sin § 6. The Nature The moral servitude of Sin Causes and Kinds of moral Evil being laid open we may with more facilitie explicate and demonstrate what that moral Servitude is which attends it That al moral Evil or Sin is attended with the highest moral Servitude is evident from sacred Philosophie as also the Philosophemes of Plato and others There were three ways whereby men were brought under civil servitude among the Ancients some were made servants by being taken in war others were bought with a price others became such by being borne in the house of servants as Ishmael Sacred Philosophie in treating of the servitude of sin alludes to al these three kinds of service 1 Sinners are said 1 Kings 21.20 2 Kings 17.17 To sel themselves to worke evil i.e. deliberately and voluntarily to commit sin and that with a ful bent of heart which is opposed to Pauls being sold under sin Rom. 7.14 2 The servants of sin are said to be led captive by sin 2 Pet. 2.19 3 Al men by nature are said to be borne slaves of sin Ephes 2.2 5.6 Eph. 2.2 Children of disobedience i.e. addicted devoted given up to it So Ephes 5.6 Col. 3.6 This is an Hebraic Idiotisme for among them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Son being put in the state of Regiment and construed with a Noun signifying an inanimate thing is emphatically used to note that such a person or thing is addicted or given up to that which is predicated of it Thus a child of disobedience is one that is a perfect slave or devoted to it And Plato Rep. 9. pag. 575. tels us That he who is subject to the Tyrannie of his own Lusts is the greatest slave imaginable for he cannot do what he would but is shut up in the prison of his own unbridled lusts Therefore in his Cratylus as he derives 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 always to flow which importes libertie so he derives 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Vice from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because a wicked man is ever fettered and chained by his lusts But to illustrate the miserable vassalage and slaverie which attends al Sinners by nature we shal consider this servitude of Sin 1 In regard of the Adjuncts and Effects that attend Sin 2 In the proper Adjuncts or Attributes that attend this servitude First as to the Adjuncts and Effects that attend Sin we shal draw them forth according to the mind of sacred and Platonic Philosophie in the ensuing Propositions 1. Al moral Evil or Sin is repugnant to human Nature The Civilian Sin repugnant to human Nature Justin Institut l. 1. tit 3. defines Civil Servitude a constitution of the Law of Nations whereby one is subject to the Dominion of another against Nature And is not this most true of the moral servitude of Sin What more against human Nature than to be subject to the tyrannie of irregular passions Yea doth not Sin make not only the Creatures an enemie to man but also himself the greatest enemie to himself That Sin is most repugnant to human Nature may easily be evinced out of Plato's Philosophie Thence he cals it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Discord and Confusion because it causeth an intestine war discord and confusion in human Nature Thus also in his Lysis he saith Al good is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 proper and agreable to human Nature but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 evil is aliene and repugnant to it Good albeit it slow not from Nature yet it inclines us to what is most for the perfection of human Nature whereas al Sin tends to its ruine As al moral Libertie consistes in Virtue which gives an elevation and advance to human Nature so al moral servitude arising from Sin implies a depression of human Nature Thus Psal 106.43 And were brought low for their iniquitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies attenuated depressed Psal 106.43 Vitium contra naturam est ut non possit nisi nocere naturae Non itaque esset vitium recedere à Deo nisi naturae cujus id vitium est potiùs competeret esse cum Deo August de Civ Dei l. 11. c. 17. It 's here spoken of their being brought down from an high to a low condition Then follows the cause of this their being brought down 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for or in their iniquitie Their iniquitie was not only the meritorious cause but also the instrument or machine by which they were brought down Nothing doth so much empoverish and bring down human Nature as Sin So Psal 107.12 Therefore he brought down their heart with labor they fel down and there was none to help 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with toilsome labor The toilsome labor of Sin is most potent to bring down human Nature 1 Sin brings down human Nature and is most repugnant to it in that it importes an aversion and falling from God who is our most laudable and excellent Being our first Principe and last End This is implied in that dreadful interrogation of God to Adam Gen. 3.9 Gen. 3.9 Where art thou In this Question we may consider 1 That it regards not Adams place but state Where art thou Not in what place but in what state How is it with thee now Adam How doest thou do Is al wel What is the condition of thy Soul Art thou in that state I placed thee in 2 It 's a question not of ignorance as to God but of conviction as to Adam it is the question of a Judge making inquisition after the Malefactor Where art thou Where is now thy confidence in thine own strength Doest thou see unto what a condition thy pride thy unbelief has reduced thee Thou aimedst to be as God free from my yoke

as are dead in sin are under an universal privation of spiritual life and total impotence to what is spiritually good This Hypothesis may be demonstrated 1 From the universal ignorance of the natural mind Plato discourseth accurately of this Theme as we have in what precedes § 3. mentioned but more fully Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 5. Yea so great and soverain is the natural ignorance of the mind that those very commun notions of knowlege loged therein are not to be estimed as some cal them the fragments of the Image of God but rather effects of divine Bountie vouchsafed his lapsed Creature upon the Intercession of the Mediator who illuminates every man that comes into the world as Joh. 1.9 That al true knowlege of things divine is the effect of divine illumination has been generally confest by Platonists as wel as Divines Thence Clemens Alexandr cals Faith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a supernatural contemplation So Chrysostome cals divine Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which instructes and illustrates the mind Grace from above not from human Nature 2 From the formal Idea and nature of moral or spiritual good which consistes in a conformitie to the moral Law and that not only as to its mater but also as to its end and manner now it is impossible for corrupt nature by its own power to reach a supernatural end or conforme to the moral Law 3 From the disproportion and incapacitie of the subject The natural power of the Wil as now vitiated has no connatural capacitie next power or formal capacitie for the production of what is spiritually good Alas what proportion is there between a carnal mind and spiritual objects And can an object be received into the mind unlesse there be some proportion Is not every thing received according to the nature and disposition of the recipient Can then a carnal mind have any other than carnal notions of things spiritual as a spiritual mind has spiritual notions of things carnal See 1 Cor. 2.14 Joh. 6.44 8.43 12.39 40. So also for the corrupt wil it cannot possibly have any connatural virtue next power or formal capacitie for the production of any virtuose Act. Is it possible that a natural power should have any causal connexion with or connaturalitie unto a supernatural act or effect 4 Should we suppose corrupt Nature to have any moral power for the production of Virtue would not this subvert the whole Oeconomie and Dispensation of efficacious Grace For 1 Thence the whole efficace of Grace would be measured and specificated according to the complexion of Free-wil and so variated according to its diversitie 2 Whence also the last differential reason whereby Grace is differenced from Nature must be resolved into Nature 3 Natural Free-wil would from this Hypothesis be of it self and nextly flexible to spiritual good and so Virtue not the gift of God Aristotle himself who was a good Friend to corrupt Nature confesseth al good to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the gift of God 5 From sacred Philosophie Jer. 13.33 Thus Jer. 13.23 Can the Ethiopian change his skin c. Consider 1 That this is a proverbial speech touching the vain attemts of such as endeavor to bring about things impossible Hence that commun Proverb To wash a Black-moor relating to such as attemt things impossible 2 The manner of expressing it is very emphatic for such rhetoric interrogations carrie in them more vehement logic negations Then he addes or the Leopard his spots Then may ye also do good who are accustomed to do evil And that this impotence is total and universal on al mankind is evident from that other Proverb Ezech. 16.44 As is the mother such is the daughter Ezech. 16.44 i. e. This contagion runs in the bloud it is an hereditary disease commun to al mankind Hence sinners are said to be borne in sin Psal 51.5 and to be in sin Exod. 32.22 1 Joh. 5.19 The whole world is said to be in sin i. e. immersed and plunged thereinto What this impotence to sin is and how far natural we have explicated Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 5. § 1. 4. Prop. Man under the servitude of Sin cannot dispose or prepare himself for the reception of Virtue Thus Greg. Nyss or de Scopo Christ Man cannot prepare himself for Virtue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The force of human virtue is not of it self sufficient to elevate Souls void of Grace to a forme of divine life unlesse God build the house c. That there can be no disposition though never so remote unto true moral Virtue from the alone facultie of Nature is evident because nothing can dispose it self to a condition above its nature by its own force unlesse it be influenced by a superior Agent A man in the state of corrupt nature cannot by al his own forces natural or moral 1 overcome any one tentation or 2 mortifie any one lust or 3 attain any one good thought inclination or desire or 4 remove the Remora or bar in his heart against conversion or 5 by doing what in him lieth lay any obligation on God to give grace I know it is a Position maintained by some That such as improve their natural abilities to their utmost power shal thereby obtain supernatural Grace But for answer hereto 1 It 's certain that none ever did or wil improve to the utmost their natural abilities 2 Or if men should improve their natural forces to the utmost what obligation is there on God to give to such supernatural Grace Is God obliged by any law or promise to give grace upon the performance of such an act or condition which is in it self sinful and hath nothing of true moral virtue in it And have we not already sufficiently proved that there can be no true moral virtue but by supernatural Grace That there is no law or obligation on God to give supernatural Grace to natural emprovements is wel demonstrated by Bradwardine de Caus Dei l. 1. c. 37. pag. 316. Yea doth it not implie a contradiction in the Adject that man should make a right use of his natural abilities or prepare himself for the reception of supernatural Grace Is it not also a sacrilegious Hypothesis to suppose that God should fetch the commun rule of his giving or not giving grace from mans dignitie or indignitie Corrupt nature wants not only an active power to do good but also an immediate passive power to receive good thence it can't dispose it self to virtue which is above its natural capacitie Is not al true virtue above the whole sphere of corrupt nature The Greek Fathers such as were more orthodoxe acknowleged That the preparation to Grace was from Grace whence it was by them termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the direction of the way also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the preparation of the wil likewise 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the attraction of

8. also Philos Gen. P. 1. L. 1. c. 2. s 5. L. 3. c. 4. BREVIARIE OF CONTENTS The COURT of the GENTILES PART IV. Of Reformed Philosophie Preface THE first Reformers of Philosophie Wiclef Wesselus Savonarola Picus Mirandula Lud. Vives Melanchton Stapulensis and Ramus 1. The Right Vse and Abuse of Platonic Philosophie 4. The Designe of this Discourse to render Philosophie subservient to Christian Theologie 6. A Proemial Scheme of Reformed Philosophie Philosophie Considered 1. Generally 1 in its Historie 2 In its generic Nature Cognition Which includes nine Intellectile Habits 3 In its Ends Adjuncts Differences Right Vse Abuse Parts and Characters c. 1. 2. Particularly 1. As Notional or Logic. Wherein consider 1 Its End the Refinement of the Intellect 3. 2 Its Parts touching 1 Simple Ideas or Notions both Objective and Subjective and these both first and second 4 5. 2 Propositions and Judgements 6. 3 Syllogisme and Discourse its Mater and Forme Figures and Modes 8 9. 4 Method which regardes the former three Parts 12. 2. Real Philosophie 13. 1 Natural Physiclogic and Mathematic Ib. 2 Moral Ethic or Private Oeconomic and Politic. Ib. 3 Metaphysic or Prime 14. BOOK I. Of Moral Philosophie CHAP I. Of Prudence the last End and chiefest Good Use Fruition and Delectation MOral Philosophie its Genus Prudence 2 Prudence its Nature and Object Ib Its Offices and Parts 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 3. 4 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 4. The Subject of Prudence Conscience 5. The Law of Conscience Ib. Synteresis and Syneidfies what 6. The Rule of Purdence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 7. 1 Subjective right Reason Ib. 2 Objective right Reason 8. The Last End its influence in Morals 9 The last End as extensive as the First Principe and but one 10. The last End desired infinitely 11. God the Last End of al. 12. Assimilation to the Divine Bonitie the Last End of Man 13 To adhere to God as our Last End speakes Perfection 14. The Chiefest Good its Proprietles Ib. 1 It 's the Idea of al Good 15. 2 It 's the Preme Beautle Ib. The Nature of Beaurie Explicated 16. The Soverain Beautie of God 17. 3 The chiefest good most proper 18. Vse and its Regulation Ib. What Temperance is 19. The Vtilitie of things in reference to their Last End 20. Concupiscence the Fruition of created good for itself 22. Intention of God as the Last End how it must be ever actual 23. Fruition its Difference from Vse 25. Al Fruition importes 1 Love 26. 2 Vnion and Possession 28. 3 Communion with the best Good 29. By Contemplation and Love 30. 4 Delectation and Joy 31. Which requires 1 a sweet Good 32. 2 Possession thereof 33. 3 Action thereon 34. Adjuncts of Delectation 1 Realitie 35. 2 Connaturalitie and Agreament 36. 3 Vniformitie and Harmonie 37. 4 Puritie 5 Force 39. 6 Infinitude without excesse 40. The Effects of Delectation 1 Amplitude Ib. 2 Quietation and Satisfaction 41. CHAP. II. Of the Moralitie of human Acts and Moral Bonitie THE Moralitie of human Acts. 42. Moral Bonitie in Conformitie to the Divine Law 46. The measure of Moral Good Perfect 48. The Vniversalitie of a perfect Law Ib. Subjective right Reason not the measure of Moral Good 50. No human Law a perfect Rule Ib. The Divine Law the rule of Moral Good 51. Right Reason Objective Light 52. The Mosaic Law a perfect Rule 54. The Parts and Causes of Moral Good 55. The Mater of Moral Good 56. Things Indifferent in Genere and Specie 57. No Action Indifferent in Individuo 58. A Virtuose Wil the Effective Principe of Moral Good 60. The best End Essential to Moral Good 62. The Forme of Moral Good in Conformitie to the Moral Law 63. How the Forme of Good Consistes in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Wel-doing Ib. How far Circumstances Moralise 64. The Vnitie and Vniformitie of Good 68. Al Good and Virtue Supernatural 69. The Difficultie of Moral Good 70. The Virtues of Pagans only lesser Sins 71. The Distribution of Virtue into Pietie and Justice 72. CHAP. III. Of Virtue and Moral Libertie MOral Virtue an Habitual Perfection 74. Moral Libertie as to State in Virtuose Habits 76. Virtue gives 1 Dominion 78. 2 Life Health Vigor and Force 79. 3 Amplitude and Enlargement 80. 4 Nobilitie and Dignitie 82. 5 Beautie and Glorie 84. Moral Libertie as to Exercice 85. 1 Contemplation of God 86. 2 Adherence to the chiefest Good 87. 3 Dependence on the first Cause 90. 4 Conformitie 1 To Gods Precept 93. 2 To his Providential Wil. 95. 5 The reference of althings unto God as the Last End 96. Moral Libertle of Exercice the highest demonstrated 1 From its Order 98. 2 From its Spontaneitie and Suavitie 99. 3 From its Vitalitie 101. 4 From its Amplitude 103. 5 From its Purgation of Sin Ib. 6 From its Stabilitie 104. 7 From its Improving Virtue 105. 8 From its Formal Beatitude 106. CHAP. IV. Of Sin and Moral Servitude SIN a Transgression of the Law 108. Sin as to its formal Reason Privative 110. The Causes of Sin 1 Mans Defectibilitie 111. 2 The Vitiositie of human nature 112. The Nature and Influence of Original Sin 114. 3 Practic Error 115. 4 Self-love 119. Sins of Ignorance Passion Wilful 121. The Moral Servitude of Sin 122. 1 Sin repugnant to human Nature 123. 1 As a Falling from God Ib. 2 As it strips of the Image of God 124. 3 As Enmitie against God 125. 4 As it divestes men of Humanitie 126. 2 Sins repugnant each to other 127. 3 Sin most Impotent 128. 4 Sin the defilement of the Soul 129. 5 Sin ful of Shame and Reproche 130. 6 Sin the Tyrannie of the Soul 132. 7 Sin ful of Penurie and Want 133. 8 Sin the Fetters of the Soul 134. 9 Sin Folie and Madnesse 135. 10 Sin makes Men Bestes 136. The Adjuncts and Effects of this Servitude 137. The Servitude of Sin 1 Voluntary Ib. 2 Necessary the Degrees and Kinds of this sinful Necessitie 138. 3 Infinite as to Number and Magnitude 141. 4 Penal with the Nature of Punishment 142. 5 Sin in it self the greatest Punishment 144. 6 Other Punishments of Sin 145. 1 Sin breeds Fear and Shame Ib. 2 Sin ful of Instabilitie 146. 3 Sin ful of Anxietie and Torment Ib. 4 Eternal Punishment of Sin 147. Sinners Dead in Sin 148. 1 The Death of Sin not Metaphoric or Hyperbolic but Real 149. 2 No Seeds of Virtue or Spiritual Life in Corrupt Nature 150. 3 The Impotence of Corrupt Nature to what is Good Vniversal and Total 152. 4 Man cannot prepare himself for the Reception of Virtue 153. 5 No Freewil in Nature to Moral Good 155. CHAP. V. Of Plato's Politie its Essential Constitution and Administration POlitic Philosophie what 158. Politie its Forme in Order 159. The Object of Politie the Multitude or Communitie 161. God the Founder of al Polities 162. Man's

too many of our Divines in imitation of them make a twofold Good and Virtue one natural and moral the other spiritual and supernatural The natural Virtue and moral Good they make to be that which a man may by the force of natural Conscience and other natural Principes attain unto The spiritual and supernatural Good or Virtue they make to be infused Albeit this distinction may with due limitations passe for orthodoxe yet in as much as it was at first framed by the Pelagians and taken up by their Sectators in the Scholes I should be glad if Jansenius's advice for the utter extirpation of it were embraced who in his August Tom. 2. lib. 4. cap. 14. pag. 256. gives us the origination of this Distinction which he makes to be first taken up by the Pelagians from the Gentile Philosophers specially the Peripatetics and Stoics who held that there were in men natural seeds of Virtue which being wel cultivated might arise up to perfect Virtue These natural seeds of Virtue addes he first the Pelagians and Semipelagians brought into their Heresie and afterwards the Schole-men introduced the same into the Christian Scholes to the great prejudice of our Doctrine For those Heretics held that out of those philosophic seeds true Virtues-might be educed by the alone power of the human Wil. But because the Schole-men saw that this Dogme was openly contrary to the constantly received Doctrine they therefore framed a double man in one man and thence a double Charitie double Virtues double Workes some natural others supernatural of which there is not the least footstep in the whole Doctrine of Augustine As if those very Virtues which the Philosophers and Schole-men cal Natural were not by Augustine stiled Vices And Tom. 2. lib. 2. cap. 2. pag. 326. he assures us That he has oft greatly wondred that many of the Philosophers had more truly accurately and holily philosophised of the main Heads of moral Doctrine than many Schole-men who would fain frame two men in one the one a Philosopher and the other a Christian whence they also coined a twofold Charitie twofold Virtues twofold Workes and a twofold Beatitude the one natural the other supernatural Hence 3. The difficultie of moral Good To performe any moral Good or virtuose Act is most difficult and rare O! how difficult and rare is it for men to performe what is good from good Principes Ends in a good manner as to Circumstances and universal Conformitie to the Divine Law Thus Plato Repub. 5. pag. 476. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But of such as can arrive to the first Beautie and contemplate him in himself are there not very few So Phileb pag. 16. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To explain Wisdome is not very difficult but to reduce it to practice and use most difficult So again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 What way men may attain to be good is most difficult i.e. to understand and practise Again he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is difficult for a man to be made good and to continue such Whence in his Cratylus pag. 385. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 According to the old Proverbe things good are very difficult Thence also in his Epinomis pag. 973. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I say it is not possible for men to be blessed and happy here except some few only Lastly Plato in his Repub. 6. saith That Virtue hath the most perfect accurate forme and therefore it requires 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the most perfect exactitude and diligence for the acquirement thereof for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Do not the greatest things require the greatest exactitude And what things greater than moral Goods and Virtues Thus Aristotle also in imitation of his Master once and again demonstrates the difficultie and raritie of moral Good So Eth. lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 89. having shewed That there were varietie of ways wherein men might sin but one only way of doing good he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore it is most easie to offend but most difficult to do good for to erre from the scope is most-facile but to hit it is most difficult So in like manner c. 9. pag. 108. he saith Virtue consistes in mediocritie i.e. in one indivisible point of conformitie Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Wherefore to acquire Virtue is most difficult and laborious for it is an hard worke to attain to the middle of any thing As every one cannot find out the point of a Circle but only the intelligent Mathematician So to be angrie to give money or the like is easie but to be angrie to give money c. to whom and in such a measure and at such a time and for such an end and in such a manner as we ought this is not easie Thence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The bene or manner of doing good is difficult laudable and beautiful Wherein indeed he gives us an excellent account of the nature and difficultie of moral Good 1 He supposeth al moral Good to consiste as it were in one middle indivisible point so that the least deviation therefrom destroys it Quò enim magis strenuè currit extra viam eò longiùs à scopo recedit ideóque sit miserior Calvin 2 That it is very difficult to find out this golden mean but much more difficult to reach it by our actions True indeed it 's no difficult worke to performe the act materially good as to give almes or the like but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the wel doing of it i.e. from those Principes for those Ends and with those Circumstances that the Act requires in regard of its formal constitution this is most rare difficult and only laudable Hence 4. The splendid Heroic deeds of Pagans The Virtues of Pagans lesser sins only and al such whose minds are not virtuosely disposed are but lesser Sins This is most evident by the confessions of the Philosophers themselves who require to moral Good an integritie of Causes and constitutive Principes so that it sufficeth not that the Mater or Office be good but there is also required a good disposition and habit the best end and al such Circumstances as essentially concur to formalise the Act or denominate it morally good Now let us inquire did ever any Pagan or man in his natural state performe any one Act thus morally good What can we produce any Pagan or natural man who had his mind so far sanctified by Faith and Love as to act by force received from God out of love to God and his Glorie Truly Augustine and Jansenius out of him are not afraid to declare that al those Heroic Acts and Exploits which the Philosophers and Schole-men honor with the title of natural or moral Virtues are indeed but more splendid sins because poisoned with pride and vain-glorie Yea they rise higher and affirme that the Stoics themselves who seemed to be the greatest admirers and sectators

of Virtue did indeed come under the Apostles condemnation Rom. 8.6 c. of living after the flesh because they made their carnal Reason Free-wil and Self the only measures and springs of their pretended Virtue Lastly al moral Virtue according to philosophic Placits is but one so that the Virtues of Pagans must be supernatural or none at al as before Thence Greg. Nazianzen Orat. 3. in Julian speaking of the Platonists Stoics and peripatetics saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue to them is only a speciose name and in nothing more lasting than this life Thus Chrysostome Hom. 27. in Joan. It is not yet apparent to me that the Gentiles lived wel For if the hope of the celestial Kingdome and the commination of Hel with other such like sollicitude 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 can scarce keep men in Virtue those who are persuaded of none of these things wil not embrace Virtue But if some of them counterfeit the same this they do out of desire of Glorie c. This Hypothesis is frequently inculcated by Augustine and he grounds it on that eternal Veritie of our Lord Mat. 7.18 Mat. 7.18 Neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit So contra Julian l. 4. c. 3. The unbelieving wil as every Christian grants is an evil tree which cannot produce any other than evil fruits i.e. sins only The like Cyril in Hos 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Probitie in those that God hates is without its reward and good manners tending not to true good shal be always reprehended by him Not but that many Heathens as Christian Hypocrites may performe Acts and Offices materially good which yet may be deservedly as they are by the Ancients termed Sins as they procede not from Faith in Christ and Love to God the main Principes of al true moral Good So Chrysost Tom. 17. Hom. 17. Edit Paris 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 They are good workes i.e. materially but dead because they have not Faith 5. The distrioution of moral Good or Virtue into Justice and Pietie Albeit al Virtue according to its formal Idea and Reason be but one yet according to its objective material consideration it may be variously distributed Thus in sacred Philosophie moral Good or Virtue is distributed as to its object or mater into Holinesse and Righteousnesse Ephes 4.24 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 In Righteousnesse and Holinesse Righteousnesse comprehends al Second-table-duties which regard men and Holinesse al First-table-duties which regard God This distribution is most ancient and I presume was communly received among the Jews Sure I am Plato has it and as I conjecture from the Mosaic Institutes Thus in his Gorgias pag. 507. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But now he that comports himself decently towards men doth righteous things but he that behaveth himself aecently towards God doth holy or pious things but he that doth both rightcous and holy things must necessarily be righteous and holy Wherein observe 1 That he distributes al moral Good into just or righteous and pious or holy 2 That he makes Justice or Righteousnesse to regard men but Pietie or Holinesse to regard God 3 That some may seem to be righteous towards men who yet are not pious or holy towards God as on the other hand some may pretend to be pious towards God who yet are not just and righteous towards men But 4 he that is just and righteous towards men in giving them their due as also pious and holy towards God in giving him his due such is indeed a virtuose man morally good just and pious Thus also Serranus on Plato Alcibiad 2. pag. 136. takes notice how Plato distributes Virtue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 into Pietie and Justice the former relating to the Worship of God the later to men whereby our whole life is duely framed and regulated these being two seminal roots or commun heads of particular Offices and Duties Lastly Plato in his Minos pag. 319. saith That we should take diligent heed first that we offend not in word or deed against God and then that we offend not against men specially such as are divine A Golden Rule for moral Duties CHAP. III. Of Virtue and Moral Libertie Moral Virtue an habitual Perfection Moral Libertie as to state in virtuese Habits Virtue gives 1 Dominion 2 Life Health Vigor 3 Amplitude 4 Nobilitie and Dignitie 5 Beautie and Glorie Moral Libertie as to Exercice consistes in virtuose Acts. 1 The Contemplation of the first Truth 2 Adherence to the chiefest Good 3 Total actual dependence on the first Cause 4 Conformitie to the divine preceptive Wil as also submission to his providential Wil. 5 Vsing althings in subordination to the Fruition and Service of God Moral Libertie as to exercice the greatest because it brings 1 Order 2 Spontaneitie and suavitie 3 A Divine Life 4 Amplitude 5 Freedom from Sin 6 Stabilitie of Spirit 7 Improvement of Virtue 8 Formal Beatitude § 1. Moral Virtue an habitual Perfection THE general Idea and Nature of Moral Bonitie having been discussed we now procede to the discussion of Virtue as it is the origine and cause of moral Libertie Plato discourseth of Virtue in his Meno the title of which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue properly according to its orgination signifies a Power or Efficace it being derived from Vir which primarily signified among the Ancients a stout valiant man answering to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 among the Hebrews So the Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 primarily and properly signifies warlike Virtue or Courage from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Mars and this from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 arits terrible valiant potent or as Vossius from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 marats to waxe strong Hence in the N.T. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is used to expresse the Divine power and efficace of God as 1 Pet. 2.9 and 2 Pet. 1.3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i.e. by his gloriose power Thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is expounded by Hesychius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a divine power So the LXX translate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies the gloriose power of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Hab. 3.3 Zach. 6.17 Neither is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 used in the N. T. more than once if ever to denote a virtuose disposition of mind namely Phil. 4.8 So curiose were the sacred Pen-men in avoiding philosophic termes which had been so much abused But by moral Virtue we here understand an habitual disposition of Soul conforme to the Rule of Moralitie the Divine Law In which strict notion it has one and the same formal idea or reason with supernatural Grace as Jansenius Amesius and others understand it For that there is no real moral Virtue but what is supernatural has been sufficiently demonstrated in the precedent Section § 4. Whence true moral Virtue is nothing else but a certain perfection whereby man is ordained and disposed towards God as Aquinas 1. Quaest 95. Others cal Virtue the

most regular and best state of a rational Creature Whether Virtue be a Power Affection Habit or merely Act has been disputed among the ancient Philosophers Gratia non est habitus propriè sed habitudo sive sanitas mentis Aq. 1.2 Quaest. 100. Art 3. as wel as Schole-Divines But the communly received opinion is that it is an Habit or as Aquinas expresseth it an Habitude of the Soul That Virtue is an Habit Aristotle largely demonstrates Eth. l. 2. c. 4. as Philos General P. 2. l. 1. c. 1. sect 4. § 3. An Habit properly is of a middle nature between a Power and an Act which gives the power an accidental facilitie of acting 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a power Definit Platon is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which is of it self effective or operative but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an Habit is desined pag. 414. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a disposition of the Soul whereby we are said to be so or so qualified for acting So that every Habit is in order of nature at least if not of time before the Act but subsequent to the Power For the Soul by its Habits is made more facile or capable to act The definition and cognition of Habits depends on the cognition of their proper Object Subject Mode of existing in their Subject and Acts. For the forme of the Act follows the forme of the Agent and such as the Habit is in relation to its object such is the Agent Hence by how much the more noble and perfect the habit is by so much the more noble and perfect is the Agent and his operation Whence Virtue is a supernatural Habitude Habit or active Forme whereby the Soul is elevated to supernatural Acts. Thence Virtue is termed by Basil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Completive of Nature This indeed might be evinced out of Plato's Definition of Virtue drawen into forme by Serranus Meno pag. 68. Virtue is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the habit of the Soul rationally operating by the natural power the best worke and aiming at the best end So that al Virtue requires not only the best mater or object but also the best end And indeed such as the habitual aptitude or disposition of the Soul is such wil the end be as Aristotle Eth. l. 3. c. 10. pag. 160. wel observes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The end of every action is such as the habit is as an habit of fortitude makes men affect valiant acts Again lib. 4. cap. 13. pag. 254. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Such as every man is such is his action and speech and such is his life i.e. such as a mans habitual frame of Spirit is such is his end acts and life Al habits are as a Pondus affixed to the Soul whereby it is strongly bent and inclined towards objects ends and acts suitable thereto Al habitual Vertues are one and the same in regard of principe and seed though different as to their proper objects and acts The same habitual Entitie as it facilitates to know God is called Divine Knowlege but as it facilitates to love God it 's called Divine Love and so in the other virtuose Habits That Supernaturalitie is a Mode intrinsecally and essentially included in al virtuose Habits is evident because human Nature specially as now corrupted cannot reach an end or act supernatural For if a natural power should have any activitie in respect of a supernatural act and object it may by a paritie of reason by degrees attain to the highest supernatural objects and acts as Alvarez de Auxil Disp 65. demonstrates Of the nature of Supernaturalitie and how it is intrinsecally and essentially included in the substance of al graciose Habits see Choquetius de Grat. l. 1. Disp 7. 12. Also Thomas Hurtado Praecursor Theologus de Supernaturalitate Entis Disp 1. Controvers 1 c. § 2. Moral Libertie as to state in virtuose Habits From what has been laid down touching the nature of Virtue it evidently follows that al moral Libertie ariseth from those virtuose habits the Soul is clothed with and agreable exercices flowing therefrom What Natural Libertie is has been fully explicated Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. C. 9. Sect. 3. § 11. How much moral Libertie differs from natural may easily be discerned by any that impartially considers the same The later indeed is essential to and inseparable from man as man and al human acts but the former is proper to man as virtuose as wil sufficiently appear by what follows Every man is so far morally free as he is near to God Althings aim at Unitie God who is the supreme Unitie convertes althings to himself and every thing is so far free and perfect as it comes near to God The human Soul has a twofold approche to God 1 by Similitude 2 by actual real Vnion and Fruition 1 The more like the Soul is to God the more one it is with him and free al similitude is a kind of Unitie and whence springs the Souls similitude to God but from virtuose habits 2 The Soul has actual real union with and fruition of God by virtuose exercices Hence ariseth a twofold moral Libertie 1 As to State 2 As to Exercice in that state The former depends on habitual Virtue the later on virtuose exercices Of each in their order Moral Libertie as to state consistes in virtuose dispositions of Soul whereby it is capacitated for and made like to God Thus the spurious Dionysius Eccles Hier. cap. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Seing the Divine Nativitie or Regeneration is a certain Divine state certainly he that has not attained to that divine state shal never know much lesse do the things delivered by God Whence also he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The principal progresse of divine dilection in the sacred observation of divine Commands consistes in the most ineffable framing of our divine state This Athanasius Dialog 1. contr Macedon termes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The participation of sanctitie by Grace And the supposed Ignatius ad Magn. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the forment of Grace i.e. that which gives a forment or principe of operation to the whole Soul And Greg. Nyssenus stiles this State of Virtue or Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Transelementation or Restauration of the Principes of the divine life or of the Soul whereby it is made like to God and capable of adhering to him Whence Damascene Orthodox Fid. lib. 2. cap. 12. gives us this excellent Character of Man as invested with the Image of God God made man a little world in the greater another Angel an Inspector of the visible Creature and Disciple of the intellectual King of those things that are on earth both terrene and celeste temporal and immortal and that which is supreme 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by accesse to God to be deified but to be deified not by transalition into the Divine Essence but by participation of the divine

irradiation Thence Augustine stiles Libertie the best disposition of Soul Similitude to God is the highest Libertie as to state so far as any is made virtuose so far he is made free The connexion between Pietie and Libertie is so intimate as that indeed they have one and the same beginning progresse and consummation By how much the more ample spiritual pure and perfect the Soul is by so much the more free it is and whence springs the Amplitude Spiritualitie Puritie and Perfection of the Soul but from virtuose habits Indeed Plato estimed nothing good but Virtue and moral Good whence Antipater the Stoic writ three Books with this Title 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That according to Plato Virtue only was good That Virtue is the most perfect state of the Soul and that which brings with it most moral Libertie is most evident because hereby it is rendred capable of adhering to its first Cause and last End which is the top of moral Libertie For wherein consistes the perfection of moral Libertie but in its conformitie to its most perfect Exemplar which is the Divine Bonitie And is not this the privilege of moral Bonitie or Virtue Hence Virtue is defined by Aquinas Dispositio perfecti ad optimum The Disposition of a perfect Subject to the most perfect Exemplar and End Virtue indeed is more perfect than the Soul it self so Aquinas Grace saith he in it self and according to its essence is more noble than the nature of the Soul because it is an expression or participation of the divine Bonitie and that which is substantially in God is accidentally in the Soul participating of the divine Bonitie That which belongs to God by nature belongs to us by Grace And Suarez saith That Grace is the Bond whereby man is conjoined to God his last end Now by how much the more the Soul is conjoined to God by so much the more sublime free and perfect its state and condition is In sum Libertie of state consistes in a virtuose or graciose disposition of Soul whereby it is enabled to understand embrace and adhere to what is good in that manner and measure as it ought Take al the notions of true moral Libertie and they agree to none but the virtuose man 1. Virtue gives Deminion Libertie is defined by the Platonist 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Principalitie or Dominion of Life also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a plenary power over althings Which the Stoics interpret 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a self-moving autoritie or power And whence ariseth this Dominion of the Soul over it self and other things but from virtuose habits Plato assures us That a virtuose temperate man is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 stronger than himself i.e. by virtue he has dominion over his sensitive part Again Repub. 9. he instructes us That he who is best is most happie and august or royal because he is able to governe himself 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But he that is most wicked is most miserable because he is a Tyrant over himself May we account him a man fit to governe himself who is a slave to his unlawful passions and lusts The Orator defines Libertie a power of living as men list and who hath this power to live as he list but the virtuose man whose wil is conformed to the divine Wil Doth the voluptuose sensual man live as he list whose mind is distracted and torne in pieces by unbridled lusts as by so many wild Horses Can it be imagined that the ambitiose man lives as he list whose mind is stil on the rack of ambitiose designes Doth the avaricious man live as he list who the more he has the more he wants It 's most evident that no man lives as he list but the virtuose man who has a wil slexible to the divine Wil. This Dominion that attends moral Libertie is wel expressed in sacred Philosophie Hos 11.12 So Hos 11.12 But Judah yet ruleth with God and is faithful with the Saints 1 Observe That Judah's ruling with God is opposed to that of Ephraim who ruled also but not with God as v. 7. Ephraim endeavored to exalt himself on the ruines of Gods Worship by erecting Calves at Dan and Bethel c. But Judah ruled with God and was faithful with the Saints 2 Judah rules with God i.e. by serving and obeying God obtains Dominion and Rule over himself and al lower things he lives as he lists because his wil is conformed to the Divine Wil. 2. Moral Libertie consistes in the moral Life Health Vigor Virtue gives life health vigor and force and Force of the Soul which also ariseth from virtuose Habits Al natural freedome supposeth a vital subject in which it inheres and so by a paritie of reason al moral spiritual Libertie supposeth a moral spiritual life and vital subject and indeed life renders every thing most beautiful active and perfect Whence by how much the more noble excellent and perfect the life of any thing is by so much the more raised noble and excellent is its state and al its operations Life is that which seasoneth every thing and every life draws to it things suitable to its nature so the spiritual divine virtuose life has Principes above human Nature more noble and excellent and herein consistes moral Libertie as to state Plato Repub. 4. pag. 444. informes us That the health of the bodie consistes in the equal temperament of al humors c. So in the Soul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue truly is a certain health pulchritude and good habitude of Soul but sin is the disease turpitude and infirmitie thereof Health according to Augustine and Jansenius consistes in the vigor force and strength of Nature and what makes the Soul more vigorous and strong than Virtue Whence is the vigor and force of any Creature but from its Spirits And are not virtuose Habits the Spirits of the Soul That Virtue is the vigor and force of the Soul Plato once and again assertes So in his Gorgias pag. 467. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Power is of good c. Also pag. 470. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To be able to do much is to be good And in his Hippias pag. 375. he saith Righteousnesse is the vigor and power of the Soul for the more righteous the Soul is the more potent it is Divine Light and Virtue is the strongest thing in the World In the sensible World nothing is so strong as Light and in the rational World nothing so strong as Truth and Virtue Al the force and vigor of lust comes from impotence but Virtue is as a Pondus or weight on the Soul which strongly impels it to its last end What more potent than Love whereby the Soul adheres to its last end By how much the more spiritual and pure any facultie is by so much the stronger it is and is not Virtue the puritie of the Soul Again the strength of every

saith That God according to the ancient Tradition I suppose Judaic is the Principe and End of althings And then he addes pag. 716. That he who adheres with a composed mind and sirme purpose to this last end is most blessed and free And in what follows he lays down the manner how the Soul adheres to God namely by conformable Acts of Pietie c. And herein indeed his Philosophemes are consonant to sacred Philosophie which frequently placeth moral Libertie as to exercice in inviolable close Adhesion unto God as our last End Psal 63.8 So Psal 63.8 My Soul adheres closely to thee as the Original 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 importes We find the same word in the same sense Deut. 10.20 Ruth 1.14 16. Job 41.17 Psal 119.31 and it primarily denotes that intimate inviolable conjugal Adherence which is or ought be between man and wife who are by Law of Nature one flesh as Gen. 2.24 And that this Adherence to God as our last End and chiefest Good is a main part of moral Libertie Psal 73.28 as to exercice is further evident from Psal 73.28 But it is good for me i. e. it is my chiefest Good that wherein my highest libertie consistes To draw near to God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Appropinquation Accesse Adherence to God Thence the LXX render it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To adhere to God to be as it were glued to God So the word in its primary notion signifies Thence it is frequently used to expresse that intimate conjunction that ought to be between man and wife as Mat. 19.5 yea Ephes 5.31 it signifies the conjugal adherence and union between Christ and his Church 1 Cor. 6.17 And we find 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 used in the same sense 1 Cor. 6.17 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He that is glued or conjugally united to God as his chiefest Good as the precedent words import And O! what an high piece of moral Libertie is this intimately and inviolably to adhere to God as our last End and chiefest Good Is the heart ever more free than when it doth most strongly by al manner of affectionate exercices adhere to its chiefest Good So many grains as there are of a bended wil for God so much moral Libertie A tenacious resolute invincible adherence unto our last end by acts of love desire and other affections makes the Soul exceding free in al its motions Psal 73.26 Thus Psal 73.26 My flesh and my heart faileth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies to consume with desire or to fail with long expectation This poor mans case was thus stated He saw the wicked to flourish and the godly oppressed which brought him under anxious disputes about the chiefest Good but upon inquirie in the Sanctuarie he was resolved to adhere inviolably to God as his chiefest Good So it follows But God is the strength of my heart and my portion for ever Some render it the reck unto which my heart adheres others the firme adhesion of my heart is to God my chiefest Good Whence follows his libertie v. 28. Psal 86.4 Thus Psal 86.4 Rejoice the Soul of thy servant i. e. make me free for and in al moral exercices and why for unto thee O Lord do I lift up my Soul i.e. unto thee as my chiefest Good do I adhere So Psal 25.1 This tenacious adherence of the Soul to its last end is lively illustrated by our Lord Mat. 6 20-24 v. 20. He exhorts them Mat. 6 20-24 To lay up treasures in Heaven i. e. to make God their last End and chiefest Good to cleave to himwith an inviolable intime bent of wil and he gives the reason of it v. 21. For where your treasure is there wil your heart be also the heart and the Treasure are ever together This our Lord illustrates by a lively notion v. 24. He wil hold to the one and despise the other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mordicus adhaerebit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly signifies to hold fast a thing in opposition to those that would pluck it from us Thence to be very tenacious in adhering to persons or things So in Plato Xenophon and Isocrates It 's emphatically here as Luk. 16.13 Luk. 16.13 applied to the Souls tenacious adhering to its last End and chiefest Good Whence it 's added and despise the other A Soul that tenaciously adheres to its chiefest Good despiseth al frowns or blandishments that may assault it Thence v. 25. our Lord concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore i. e. If you adhere to God as your chiefest Good you will not be so anxiously concerned about the goods of Time To sum up this Argument Every Creature has an Element to live in and when it s in that Element it is most free The Souls Element is its last End and chiefest Good and every man is more or lesse morally free as he more or lesse adheres thereto For such as a mans last end is such is the motion of his Soul as to moral good or evil and moral libertie or bondage By how much the more we love delight in and enjoy our last end by so much the more free we are in al our ways The libertie of a rational Agent consistes not in having varietie of objects to adhere to and take complacence in but in transmitting al to his last end which is his best good That a Wil actually and strongly bended to adhere to its last End and chiefest Good is most free wil appear by the following Particulars 1 The more the Wil is fortified by true Virtue to adhere to its last End and chiefest Good the more free it is from sin which is the worst servitude He indeed is truly noble and generose who is not a vassal to any base lust Al power to sin is the diminution of libertie Impeccabilitie or an utter impossibilitie of sinning is so far from destroying libertie as that it is perfected hereby The sweetest and highest libertie is to have no power to sin Now the more the Wil actually adheres to its last end the lesse power it has to sin 2 Moral libertie consistes in the Souls being preserved from whatever may damnifie or prejudice it and wherein consistes the preservation of every things but in its Vnitie Doth not division ever bring dissolution And what preserves the Souls unitie so much as actual adherence to God the first Unitie 3 The moral libertie of the Wil consistes chiefly inhaving al inferor things subject to it and when are althings more subject to the dominion of the Wil than when it is by a resolute actual adherence subject to the Wil of God 4 The more harmonious and uniforme the Souls acts are the more morally free they are And whence springs this harmonie but from actual regard and adherence to the last end 5 Where ever the Soul finds rest and satisfaction there it finds moral libetie and doth not the Rest of the Soul arise from its adherence to

the Soul and in regard of man nothing else but constant regard towards God and continual dependence on him As the excellence of the Angelic nature could not preserve them when self-dependent so the impotence of Human nature cannot prejudice us so long as we are dependent on the first Cause True moral Virtue is a celestial Plant fed by some invisible root in the celestial World from which it derives its influences Members and branches live no life but the life of their head and root al divine and moral Respirations toward the celestial world are from sweet Inspirations of divine Concurse We cannot actively draw down divine influences but we may enlarge our passive receptive capacitie by actual dependence thereon Al moral Beings even the Angels themselves as they have new services to do for God daily so they are dependent for new assistances and herein consistes a main part of their moral Libertie Those who are strongest in self dependence are soonest foiled as Peter 4. Another Exercice of moral Libertie consistes in actual conformitie unto God and imitation of him both by obedience to his preceptive Conformitie to the Divine preceptive Wil. and submission to his providential Wil. 1 It 's a great essential part of moral Libertie to conforme to the preceptive Wil of God God being the prime Exemplar and Measure of al Libertie it necessarily follows that the more we imitate and follow God the more freedome we obtein and who imitate and follow God more than they who conforme most to his Divine preceptive Wil Nothing more commun in sacred Philosophie than this That Adherence Conformitie and Subjection to the Divine Law is the top of moral Libertie Thus Psal 119.45 Psal 119.45 I wil always walk at libertie because I seek thy precepts 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in amplitude i. e. I wil walk in al manner of Amplitude and Libertie both of heart and ways because my heart adheres inviolably to thy royal Law of Libertie The Law of God written on the heart is no other than the very Image of God a bond or cord of Love whereby the heart is knit to God and so made free for the fruition of him Delight in and conformitie to the Divine Law by al manner of virtuose exercices is the highest libertie O! what a regal gloriose libertie is this to be always found in ways of obedience to the divine Wil What a practic contradiction is it to expect moral Libertie in ways of sin When the Spirit of God takes the Law of God and transcribes it on the heart and thereby makes it free to performe actual conformitie to the externe Law Rom. 8.2 what a soverain Libertie is this Thus Rom. 8.2 For the law of the Spirit of life i. e. engraven on the heart as 2 Cor. 3.3 hath made me free from the law of sin and death i. e. enabled me freely and chearfully to conforme to the Divine Law c. Thus also Jam. 1.25 Jam. 1.25 But whose looketh into the persect law of libertie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 denotes 1 an accurate inspection or prying into a thing as they who bring their eye close to an object in order to a more distinct perception thereof 2 A dwelling on an object as some curiose persons who spend much time in dressing themselves do as it were let their eye dwel on their glasse just so the eye of the mind should dwel on the Divine Law which is the glasse wherein we contemplate the Divine Wil Image and Sanctitie Thence follows the object the perfect Law of Libertie 1 The Divine Law is called perfect as it is an absolute perfect Miroir or Glasse wherein we contemplate the Image and Wil of God and whereby the mind is perfected 2 It is termed a Law of Libertie 1 As evangelised and sweetned by evangelic Grace 2 As it makes those free that conforme to it So far as the heart is made conformable to divine Commands so far its actings in conformitie thereto and free and chearful Hence a godly man is said to be a Law unto himself i. e. if there were no Law extant yet he would do the same virtuose acts from that inward Law engraven on his heart Whence Jam. 2.8 it 's stiled the Royal Law and v. 12. The Law of Libertie because conformitie thereto from an inward principe of Virtue is the highest Libertie according to Divine estimation And as sacred Philosophie so Platonic placeth much of moral Libertie in actual conformitie to the divine Law Plato Repub. 9. pag. 592. assures us that in Heaven there is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a perfect Exemplar for him that wil behold it and by beholding be conformed thereto Meaning God the original essential Exemplar of al Sanctitie whose sacred Wil is the grand Patterne of our Conformitie And leg 4. pag. 716. he largely demonstrates That by how much the more conformable the Soul is to the Divine Wil by so much the more perfect and free it is It is most evident saith he that every man ought mostly to attend this how he may be of the number of those that follow God What action therefore is it that is most beloved by God and most consentaneous to his Wil Truly but one according to the old Proverbe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because like is beloved by lie whereunto it is conformable c. Wherein he shews that moral Libertie consistes chiefly in following God which is performed by actual conformitie unto his Wil. Thence Philo Judaeus that great Platonist in his Book That every virtuose man is free demonstrates at large That to be free is to follow God by conformitie to his divine Wil. And indeed what is Libertie as to exercice but adhering unto God and who adhere to God but they who conforme to his divine Wil and Law Doth not moral Libertie arise from subjection to God And are not they most subject to God who conforme most to his Law It was a great Saying of Pythagoras 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Follow God Thus also Epictetus in Arrian lib. 1. cap. 20. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The end of Philosophie is to follow God i.e. to conforme to his divine Law And the ancient Philosophers specially Pythagoras Socrates and Plato made Assimilation to and Imitation of God the main end of al Philosophie 2 This actual Conformitie unto God implies subjection and submission to his providential Wil both Afflictive and Diretive Conformitie to Gods providential Wil. And herein also much of moral Libertie doth consiste Is not that mind most noble great and free which can bear great crosses with equanimitie and patience Doth not this give more libertie and enlargement than any temporal affliction can deprive us of O! what a sweet thing is it to have a free generose mind under a straitned consined condition How facile are burdens made hereby A virtuose Spirit that follows God in afflictive providences becomes a King over his crosses his losses

〈◊〉 here doth not signifie the mere having of a Talent but the employing using or occupying the same for it is a good Rule among Grammarians That Verbes which primarily signifie to have or possesse oft denote the using of what we have So here Hath notes to use occupie or traffic with what we have To such it shal be given and he shal have more abundance i. e. God wil reward his diligence in using and occupying his Talent be it natural or supernatural with much more in the same kind If his Talent be natural gifts or commun illuminations he shal receive more in that kind if true moral supernatural Virtues his stock shal encrease in its kind Whence it follows But whosoever hath not i. e. employes not by exercice from him shal be taken away even that he hath i. e. his Talent shal be taken from him his commun gifts and seeming virtues shal wither Yea virtuose exercices in the sharpest winter of affliction make Virtue to flourish and prosper Heb. 12.11 12. Thus Heb. 12.11 Every chastisement for the present seems not to be joyous but grievous but afterward it yields the tranquille fruit of righteousnesse to them that are exercised thereby 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 exercised as in the Gymnade whence it follows v. 12. Wherefore lift up the hands that hang down 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies such a remission or dissolution as is opposed to intension firmitude strength It here denotes sloth and remisnesse as to labor whereof the hand is the instrument Thence he addes and the feeble knees 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the paralytic knees such as are as it were struck with a Palsie and therefore unapt for motion This later clause seems to refer to the Race which required the exercice of the knees as labor that of the hands 8. Formal Beatitude in virtuose Exercices A great and main part of moral Libertie consistes in virtuose exercices because herein consistes formal Beatitude Both Plato and Aristotle place formal Beatitude in virtuose operations Thus Plato in his Conviv pag. 211. makes the perfection of human Felicitie to consiste in contemplating 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. the most sincere uniforme divine Beautie c. of which before Chap. 1. The like in his Phaedrus pag. 250. So Aristotle Eth. l. 1. c. 7. defines formal Beatitude the exercice of the rational Soul according to the best and most perfect Virtue in the most perfect life And Cap. 8. he addes That to act wel and live wel makes man happy And the demonstration hereof is most evident For 1 Operation and exercice is the end of al virtuose Habits and Principes and therefore their perfection for every Forme Power or Habit is ordained to its act as to its perfection Whence Basil termes Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 completive or perfective of Nature Which chiefly belongs to gratiose Acts. Thence Aristotle strongly argues that formal Beatitude cannot consiste 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in possession of objective Beatitude and habitual union therewith but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in use and exercice For a man may possesse the chiefest good and have habitual likenesse thereto and yet not formally happy as virtuose men asleep 2 The more Virtue is in exercice the more it ressembles the Divine Libertie and Perfection The Divine Being and Libertie is a pure simple Act without the least habit or passive power either physic or metaphysic and therefore the more actuose Virtue is the more like it is to God 3 Virtuose exercices bring most satisfaction with them Both Plato and Aristotle instruct us That virtuose Acts are of themselves 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-sufficient They inspire sweet satisfaction into the Soul as before Chap. 1. § 6. And this is very commun in sacred Philosophie Yea we are herein assured that by virtuose exercices we may have some prelibations of formal Beatitude even in this life This seems the import of that Exhortation 1 Tim. 6.12 1 Tim. 6.12 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Exercise thy self in that famose contest of Faith Our Apostle alludes to those famose Olympian Games specially that of the Race wherein they contended for a Crown Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lay hold of eternal life 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here as v. 19. is of the same import with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 1 Cor. 9.24 Phil. 3.12 in which places the Apostle seems to allude to such as ran in the Race who when they came to the end thereof laid hold on the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Crown on the top of the Goal Thus Christians by virtuose exercices lay hold on eternal life as the Crown at the end of their Race Thus he speaks of himself 2 Tim. 4.7 8. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Tim. 4.7 8. I have exercised my self in that famose contest The double Article addes a great Emphase and shews with what vigor and activitie he had dispatcht his Christian race and therefore now was in expectation of the Crown Such efficacious and soverain influence have virtuose exercices on mans formal Beatitude and moral Libertie CHAP. IV. Of Sin and moral Servitude Sin a Transgression of the Law Sin as to its formal reason privative The causes of Sin 1 Mans defectibilitie 2 The Vitiositie of human Nature 3 Practic Error 4 Self-love Sins are either of Ignorance of Passion or wilful The moral Servitude of Sin as 1 Repugnant to human Nature 2 Repugnant each to other 3 The Disease of the Soul 4 Defilement 5 Shame and Reproche 6 Tyrannie 7 Penurie 8 Captivitie 9 Folie and Madnesse 10 It makes men Brutes The Adjuncts of this Servitude It is 1 Voluntary 2 Necessary 3 Infinite 4 Most penal Sin the worst punishment Other punishments of Sin It brings 1 Fear and shame 2 Instabilitie 3 Anxietie 4 Eternal punishment Al naturally Slaves of Sin No seeds of Virtue in corrupt Nature Natural impotence to what is good No moral Free wil. A sum of the Pelagian Historie § 1. HAving examined the nature of moral Good Virtue and Libertie we now passe on to the discussion of moral Evil and that Servitude which attends it It 's a good Notion of Aristotle Rhet. l. 3. c. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Parallel opposites illustrate each other So in his Ethics l. 5. c. 1. a. 17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the most part therefore the contrary habit is known by its contrary Which holds true here in as much as the beautiful Idea of moral Good serves greatly to illustrate the deformitie of moral Evil. Sin a Transgression of the moral Law Doth al moral Good consiste in conformitie to the moral divine Law What then is moral evil or sin but a Transgression of the Law as 1 Joh. 3.4 That al moral Evil or Sin is a Transgression of the Law is an Hypothesis frequently inculcated as wel in Platonic as in sacred Philosophie Thence Definit Platon pag. 416. 〈◊〉

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a practice against right reason which must be understood objectively of the Law of Nature as before Whence Plato himself Rep. 9. saith That Sin is most distant from Law and Order Again Leg. 10. he affirmes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That Sin is an intemperate excesse of the Soul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is of the same import with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and signifies primarily the excesse of any humor in the bodie and thence the inordinate and irregular excesse of the Soul and its Affections For look as Virtue is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Concent and Symmetrie of the Soul so sin is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Asymmetrie and Ataxie Hence also Plato in his Epinom pag. 978. cals Sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. A motion void of reason order decorum measure yea a confused agitation whereby the Soul is depraved and contaminated Whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 injustice Definit Platon is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an habit over-looking or despising Laws Yea Plato Repub. 9. pag. 574. cals sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Transgression of the Law as sacred Philosophie 1 Joh. 3.4 Thus also Aristotle 1 Joh. 3.4 both in his Ethics and Rhetoric stiles sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Transgression of the Law But this Hypothesis shines with more illustrious beams in sacred Philosophie whence Plato borrowed his choisest Philosophemes Thence in the O. T. al the notions whereby sin is expressed signifie a Transgression of the Law We find three several notions of sin together Psal 32.1 2. 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Psal 32.1 2. which denotes Defection Rebellion Prevarication against God 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies Aberration and Deviation from the right way of Gods Law 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which importes Perversitie Obliquitie Iniquitie Privation of Rectitude 4 Sin is stiled Psal 101.3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Psal 101.3 a mater of Belial i. e. a lawlesse mater such as wil not come under the yoke From 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without a yoke which the LXX translate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and whereto Paul seems to allude 2 Cor. 6.14 15. 5 Sin is stiled a Violation or making void the Law Psal 119.126 Zeph. 3.4 Hos 4.2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 They break the bounds of the Law An allusion to Inundations and Land-flouds that break down al bounds So great is the violence which sin offers to the Divine Law 6 Sin is said to be a Tortuositie or wresting of the Law Psal 125.5 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Obliquations or crooked ways 7 Sin is called a Declination Aberration Deflexion Psal 119 51 67. Psal 101.3 yea v. 4. it is stiled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 perverse 8 It is termed Rebellion Psal 5.10 66.7 Which termes though different in themselves yet they al import Transgression of the Law Thus also in the N. T. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with other notions whereby sin is expressed do al import Transgression of the Law Hence the Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That al sins are equal because the least deviation from the Law is a Transgression as wel as the greatest Yet hence it follows not but that there are degrees and aggravations of sins according to their various objects and circumstances Hence it follows Sin as to its formal Reason privative that sin as to its formal Idea Reason or Nature is not positive but privative For the clearing whereof we may consider these following Propositions 1 Al moral Evil or Sin is founded in some natural Good For albeit there be pure good which has no mixture of evil either natural or moral as the chiefest Good yet there is no pure Evil which has not for its subject some natural good It 's true there are some Acts that are intrinsecally evil that is so far evil as that they can never be good as the hatred of God and the like Yet these Acts are called intrinsecally evil not as if their evil were intrinsecal to the natural entitie of the acts for it 's possible that the evil may be separated from the acts but because they cannot be put forth towards such an object morally considered without sin 2 Al Sin is an aggregate composite Being composed of positive and privative The material Subject or natural Act is positive but the formal Reason or moral deficience of Rectitude is privative The positive Act of it self abstracted from the privation is not sinful but both together as mater and forme make up one Compositum It 's a Question in the Scholes Whether Sin thus compounded of privative and positive be unum per se or per accidens And Suarez wel solves this difficultie telling us That if we consider sin as a physical real Being it is unum per accidens but if we consider it as a moral Being so it is unum per se because the positive act and privative deficience are so intimately conjoined for the constitution of one moral Evil that they may be looked on under the notion of act and power or mater and forme so that the act cannot be evil without the privation nor the privation without the act 3 Every Privation as such is evil as every Forme or Act good For what is a privation but the want of some due perfection And is not every want of due perfection evil to that subject that wants it Every thing if it want any good that belongs to it is so far evil 4 When we say the formal reason of Sin is privative the terme formal must not be taken strictly but in a laxe notion and morally For the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Obliquitie of sin being that by which it is formalised and yet not formally intended by the Agent hence sin in a strict sense cannot be said to have any formal Cause yet because this obliquitie or privation of Rectitude doth morally constitute the act sinful it may in a more laxe notion be rightly termed the formal Reason or Cause 5 Sin as to its formal reason is not a Physic or Logic privation nor yet pure nothing but a moral privation or deficience as to moral rectitude In this respect some Divines ascribe to sin something positive not absolutely as if it were somewhat subsistent but relatively and morally as it is opposed to pure nothing for say they sin is a privation which makes the act whereto it belongs sinful and therefore it is not mere nothing So Suarez saith that sin is not a real Being yet it is such a Being as may suffice to the truth of a proposition Thus indeed Plato in his Sophist teacheth us that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non-ens may be considered as pure nothing and so it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unintelligible and ineffable or else it may be considered as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which truly is not yet not simply

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non-ens or nothing And such is sin not simply and purely nothing yet according to its formal reason not a positive real Being but a moral privation or as others a privative relation That Sin according to its formal Idea and Nature is privative was generally asserted by the ancient Philosophers both Platonists and others Thus Plato Repub. 2. pag. 380. denies God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the moral cause of sins because there cannot be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a positive idea of sin So Proclus argues from this place That there cannot be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an Idea of sins because then it would follow that God should be the Cause and Author of sin And Plato himself informes us that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an irregular affection and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 privation of order also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Injustice against Law Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a privative Being and lastly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 privation of moral Being as the night is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the privation of the Suns light But among the ancient Philosophers none hath more acutely and solidly defended this Hypothesis than Simplicius on Epicbet cap. 34. pag. 171. where he largely demonstrates that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin really is not in the nature of Beings but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a privation of good Of which see Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 2. Among the Schole-men this is strongly proved by Ariminensis Sent. 2. D●st 34. Quaest 1. Suarez in 1.2 Tract 3. Disput 7. sect 3. pag. 275-278 Barlow Exercit. 2. § 2. Having discussed the formal Nature of moral Evil or Sin we now procede to its Causes among which Mans Defectibilitie the first Origine of Sin if we wil ascend up to its first Origine we must reckon first the Defectibilitie of the human Creature as the original cause of al sin For to speak in the Platonic mode Man as al other Creatures being composed of something and nothing yea more of nothing than something hence passive power and defectibilitie is essential to his Being For whatever sprang out of nothing is capable of returning to its originary nothing Where there is place for Proficience there also remains a capacitie of Deficience Every Creature because made by God is capable of Proficience but because made out of nothing it is also capable of Deficience It 's true Man as made by God was void of al moral deficience or sin yet as Man he was never void of Defectibilitie and Mutabilitie he had a moral free-wil for good but a natural free-wil or defectibilitie as to sin which passing from power into act gave being to the first sin This is wel explicated by Suarez In a free Agent saith he the mode of failing in an act ariseth from the dominion he has over his act hence sin in a free cause doth not always suppose the like sin in the same cause for it may arise merely from the libertie of the Creature which is good That the Wil of Adam in his innocent state was capable of sinning was a natural defect conjoined with a natural perfection for it was also capable not to sin and this mutable capacitie being drawen forth towards a prohibited object was the first origine and root of al sin Thus moral Evil sprang out of natural libertie in it self good but evilly applied Adam's person being vitiated by that first Sin The Vitiositie of human Nature he thereby vitiated his own and our Nature Yea his personal actual sin is originally ours by imputation whence there adheres a vitiositie to our natures whereof we find frequent and great notices in Plato and other Philosophers Plato in his Timaeus pag. 90. makes mention of a Sin contracted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in our head which I understand of Adam whereby our nature from the first generation is corrupted And Timaeus Locrus from whom Plato borrowed many physic Philosophemes pag. 103. explicates the origine of this Vitiositie thus Vitiositie comes from our Parents and first Principes rather than from negligence and disorder of public manners because we never depart from those actions which lead us to imitate the primitive sins of our Parents A great confession of a Pagan beyond what many that professe Christianitie wil allow So Plato in his Critias saith That in times past the Divine nature flourished in men i. e. in the state of Innocence but at length it being mixed with mortal i. e. upon the Fal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 human custome or sin prevailed to the ruine of mankind and from this source there followed an inundation of evils on men So Leg. 5. pag. 731. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The greatest Sin is ingenite in mens Souls And Grotius assures us That the Philosophers confessed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that it was congenite or connatural to men to sin whence the Platonist makes mention 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of an evil nature which Definit Plat. pag. 416. is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Vitiositie in nature also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the natural disease or disease of nature Thence Plato in his Politicus pag. 274. being about to treat of Civil Politie gives this demonstration of its necessitie because the nature of mankind is greatly degenerated and depraved and al manner of disorders infeste human Nature and men being impotent are torne in pieces by their own lusts as by so many wild Horses And thence he concludes That from this plague of vitiositie men were driven to great straits and confusions The like Stobaeus Serm. 2. pag. 31. out of Lycurgus's Dictates 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Phy how depraved is mans nature altogether otherwise there were no need of Laws Dost thou thinke that man is any thing more excellent than Bestes Truly but little except only in figure Brutes look towards the earth but man has an erect countenance Thus also Plato Leg. 10. pag. 906. affirmes That Souls living on the earth are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a brutish nature And it is said of Democritus that he affirmed The diseases of the Soul to be so great that if it were opened it would appear to be a sepulchre of al manner of evils Yea Aristotle albeit he were too much a friend to corrupt nature yet he hath left this ingenuous confession of its vitiositie Eth. lib. 1. cap. 13. pag. 64. That there is in us somewhat 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 naturally repugnant to right reason But Seneca doth greatly illustrate this Vitiolitie of Nature So Epist. 50. Why do we deceive our selves our evil is not from without it is fixed in our very bowels Again Al Sins are in al men but al do not appear in each man He that hath one Sin hath al. We say that al men are intemperate avaricious luxurious maligne

of what he has Man is then said to live when he useth and enjoyeth things as he ought which sin deprives him of in that it makes him use things that are to be enjoyed and enjoy things that are to be used Thus it invertes the order of things Hence it was a commun Saying with Socrates as also the Stoics That al Vice is against Nature because human Nature as such was made to adhere unto God as its first Cause and last End which state man by sin doth relinquish and so by consequence lose the right use of his Being Life Reason Wil Affections and al human Acts. Such is the Repugnance of Sin to human Nature 2. Moral Evils or Sins are not only repugnant to human Nature Sins repugnant each to other but to themselves This greatly demonstrates the servitude and bondage of Sin for al moral Libertie implies Order Harmonie and Vniformitie which ariseth from Virtue but Lusts are extreme jarring dissonant and opposite each to other Oh! what strange discords confusions and seditions are there among lusts in the heart How is the heart distracted and as it were torne in pieces by them Lusts are extreme mutinous and lawlesse they keep no order Thence in sacred Philosophie it is said The corrupt mind cannot subject it self to the law of God Rom. 8.7 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rom. 8.7 cannot keep the place order and ranke the Law of God has put the Soul into It alludes to Military order for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 primarily denotes the order and discipline of Soldiers Yea it 's added 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 neither indeed can be namely because the Law is the rule of order but Lusts are al for disorder they disagree among themselves as wel as from the Law of God Lusts have no end bounds measure what is sin but a confused Chaos of al manner of disorders How do sensual passions fight not only against Gods Law but against each other And oh what a slavery ariseth herefrom Thence sinners are described Tit. 3.6 Tit. 3.6 Serving lusts and diverse pleasures These sinful pleasures are not only diverse as to Number but also as to Qualitie as different and opposite each to other Thence Jam. 4.1 Lusts are said to maintain an intestine war in mens Souls whence al externe wars and contests arise Thus Plato makes frequent mention of the discords and intestine wars of Lusts So Repub. 5. pag. 444. he makes injustice to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Sedition of the Soul or Insurrection So 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pag. 214. he makes al virtrose persons to be like each other and friends but as for profligate wicked men they differ as wel from themselves as each from other And in his Phaedo pag. 92. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Al sin is ful of discord but virtue is harmonious The reason of this Discord and Repugnance among lusts is this Al concord and agreament in the Soul ariseth from its adherence to God who is the first Unitie so far as men depart from this prime Unitie so far they fal under confusion Nulla major poena nequitiae est quàm quod sibi suis displicet Sen. Epist difformitie and disorder And what greater punishment of sin is there than this that it is displeasing yea repugnant to it self How oft do men relinquish the lusts they longed for and then reassume what they relinquished What a conflict is there between avaricious and prodigal lusts But of this more in what follows 3. Sin most impotent and infirme Sin is the Disease of the Soul ful of impotence and infirmitie Al moral Libertie implies health vigor force and strength and wherein consistes the vigor and strength of any thing but in adherence to its first Principes The more any thing departes from Vnitie the more Division Contrarietie Dissolution and Infirmitie And is not God the first Principe or Cause of the Soul Doth it not by departing from him depart from its first Unitie and strength O! then how impotent and infirme is sin This is every where intimated in sacred Philosophie Ezech. 16.30 So Ezech. 16.30 How weak is thy heart i.e. how sick faint and impotent by reason of lust Yet it follows Seing thou doest al these things the workes of an imperiose whorish woman She had potent imperiose lusts but a weak heart to resist tentations Sin is said to be a poisonous bitter root which sheds its maligne influences on al our Affections and Actions Deut. 29.18 Thus Deut. 29.18 Apostasie is said to be a root bearing gal and bitternesse The Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 rendred Gal signifies a poisonous herbe and so it must be rendred here a root whose influences and fruits are poisonous and bitter Thence the LXX render it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 springing up in gal or poison and bitternesse For 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies both gal and poison answerable to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because the poison of some Serpents lies in their gal Act. 8.23 Peter alludes hereto Act. 8.23 where 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies the bitter poisonous root of corrupt nature So Heb. 12.15 Heb. 12.15 Root of bitternesse i.e. poisonous root of sin Nothing so poisonous and killing as sin Whence sinners are said to be Jer. 17.9 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 desperately sick even unto death So Esa 24.4 languisheth as a feeble crazy consumtive bodie as v. 5. Basil in Psal saith That men are rendred by Virtue or Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without wound and blemish whence they become 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inexpugnable and free as before Chap. 3. Thence it necessarily follows that sin is the wound and blemish of the Soul that which renders it most impotent and servile That sin is ful of impotence and infirmitie Plato once and again inculcates So Repub. 4. pag. 430. he saith An intemperate man 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 weaker than himself whereas a temperate man is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 more potent than himself i.e. than his sensual appetite Thus in his Timaeus pag. 86 87. he proves That the irregularitie of our affections is the worst disease So Repub. 10. pag. 608. he informes us That evil is that which dissolves and corrupts things but good conserves and relieves And thence he concludes That a servile Sinner hath nothing sound Lastly Repub. 1. he saith Vnrighteousnesse is the disease of the Soul 4. Sin is the spot stain and defilement of the Soul Sin the defilement of the Soul and therefore the greatest servitude Virtue gives a Nitor Lustre Splendor Beautie and Glorie to the Soul but Sin is the Blot and blemish of human Nature indeed nothing can pollute and defile the Soul but Sin and sinful Idols Hence we find mention Deut. 29.17 Ezech. 23.7 Deut. 29.17 Ezech. 23.7 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gillulim filthy Idols The word signifies both filth and Idols or sordid dunghil

hath conceived mischief and brought forth a lie It 's spoken of Sauls mischievous yet abortive designes against David and it alludes to the pangs and torments of a woman in travel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies hard toilsome miserable labor such as poor slaves are tormented with The LXX render it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which in the Greek Glossary found at the end of Cyril is rendred dolor So in the N. T. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies vexatious grief and torment as Rev. 16.10 11. 21.4 Hence the Greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an evil man received its derivation For every 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 conceives and brings forth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 miserable torments David's meaning here is Qui voluptari tradidere principia non ipsi voluptatem sed ipsos voluptas habet cujus aut inopia torquentur aut copia strangulantur Sen. That Saul had been long hatching mischievous designes ful of torment and anxietie and endeavored by much travel and sore labor like a woman in travel to bring them forth and accomplish them but he could bring forth nothing but a mere lie he was frustrated in al his mischievous contrivements Note here an elegant Allegorie in these termes Conceiveth travelleth and brought forth which argues the highest vexation travel and torment which Sinners labor under in al their mischievous designes as Jer. 4.31 Wicked men are as much tormented with the sin they love as with the fear of the punishment they hate al their labor is pain So Jer. 51.58 Habak 2.13 Sinners are said to labor in the fire Jer. 51.58 or for the fire i. e. 1 In vain without any profit as if any one should weave a thread over the fire which brings not only losse of labor but of materials also 2 To labor in the fire notes a dangerous tedious toilsome servile labor such as is proper to slaves What more tedious irkesome and fruitlesse than the drudgerie of sin Eccles 10.15 So Eccles 10.15 The labor of the foolish wearieth every one of them As in Nature it is not stormes without but vapors within the bowels of the earth raised up by subterraneous fires that cause Earthquakes and Tremblements so in the Soul it is not afflictions from without but the interne fire of lusts and sinful vapors that cause torments and tremblement in Conscience It 's better to be possessed of the Devil in the bodie than of lusts in the heart which always breed labor and pain No Sinner ever attains to what he aims at he would be somewhat else than what he is and these desires breed anxietie and torment 4 The servitude of Sin is of al most penal in that eternal punishment is annexed to and entailed thereon This is the top of al punishment that Sinners shal be turned into Hel with al their sins at their back Neither was this kind of punishment altogether hid from Plato for in his Gorg. pag. 522. we find this punishment thus described 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For a Soul to descend down to Hel laden with many sins is the most extreme of evils A great Philosopheme for a Pagan and that which argues his acquaintance with sacred Philosophie which more fully instructes us that sin is eternally punished in Hel because it makes a man eternally willing to sin The righteous God takes the same course in punishing sin as men take in the committing of it he sees men have an eternal love for and delight in sin and therefore they shal have an eternal punishment for sin As sinners lay up eternal treasures of sin so God layes up eternal treasures of wrath and punishment In fine what more just than that he who by sin acts eternally against the wil of God should suffer eternal torments against his own wil And can there be a more penal afflictive servitude than this § 8. Having explicated and demonstrated the servitude that attends Sin Al men borne servants of and dead in Sin it now only remains to demonstrate that al mankind are borne in this state of servitude It 's a Maxime in the Civil Law Just Institut l. 1. tit 4. That among Servants there is no difference so as one should be more a Servant than another though among Free-men there are many differences This holds true in moral servitude for among the Ilaves of sin there is no difference as to state because al are dead in sin and death as wel moral as natural admits no degrees al dead men are equally such without difference Whence the Civilians have another great Saying That a Servant is reputed dead whiles he lives Such are al the servants of sin who are really dead whiles they seem to live Lapsed man is under a miserable natural yet voluntary necessitie of sinning wherefore altogether uncapable of erecting himself to a state of virtue as before § 7. That al men by nature are dead in sin is an Hypothesis avouched not only in sacred but also in Platonic Philosophie Thus Plato in his Gorgias pag. 493. I heard this from the wise men 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that we are now dead and that our bodie is the sepulchre of our Soul By the wise men I presume he means the Barbarians specially the Egyptians and Hebrews from whom he received this Tradition That men are naturally dead in sin Thus Clemens Alexandrinus Strom. 5. pag. 419. In the Barbaric Philosophie they cal those dead who have fallen from their Dogmes and subjected their minds to lusts This Pythagoras expressed by the Symbol of a Coffin which he placed in the room of any expelled out of his Schole thereby to indigitate that he was dead Thence that other Symbol of Pythagoras Abstain from the dead i.e. from conversation with dead sinners which Symbol Grotius makes to be derived from the Hebraic Philosophie according to that of our Lord Mat. 8.22 Let the dead burie the dead Moreover Plato cals the life of men dead in sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a life without life Also he saith That mens Souls are in this life 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a ferine or brutish nature Yea Aristotle Problem S. 10. Prob. 45. assures us That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nature doth althings that are wicked Among the primitive Christians nothing more commun than this Hypothesis That Virtue or Grace could not be educed out of the potence of corrupt Nature because al men by nature are dead in sins Thus Clemens Alexandr Strom. 2. proves against the sectators of Basilides and Valentinus those fore-runners of the Pelagians That faith is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the good effect of freewil nor yet the prerogative of Nature But to explicate and demonstrate how al men by nature are under this spiritual death and moral servitude of sin take the following Propositions 1. Prop. This Philosopheme That al men are by Nature dead in sin is not hyperbolic but metaphoric and real Plato speaking of the moral death of

the Soul he understands it in his darke way according to the mind of sacred Philosophie whence he borrowed this as other of the choisest of his Philosophemes Now in sacred Philosophie this moral death of the Soul is not hyperbolic but real albeit metaphorically expressed Psal 5.9 Rom. 3.13 Thus Psal 5.9 cited by Paul Rom. 3.13 Their throat is an open sepulchre What David ascribes to the throat Plato Gorg. 499. attributes to the whole bodie namely that it is but the sepulchre of the Soul Whence he makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be by a Paronomasie derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a sepulchre as before And Democritus said That the diseases of the Soul were the greatest which if men could open they should find there 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a sepulchre ful of evils David cals the throat an open sepulchre because 1 the heart or soul of al by nature lies morally dead and rotten in the bodie as in a sepulchre 2 The Soul lying dead in this sepulchre continually sends forth loathsome and noisome smels as if you draw nigh to an open sepulchre where dead bodies newly rotten lie buried you wil soon scent their noisome sumes 3 Mens mouths and throats are as it were the mouth of this sepulchre by which mens dead rotten hearts breathe forth their loathsome smels You may scent mens corrupt hearts in their words which passe through their throats those open sepulchres Again that men are borne naturally and morally dead in sin is wel illustrated Esa 1.4 Ah! Esa 1.4 sinful nation a people laden with iniquitie as with a mountain of lead But lest men should conceit that al this iniquitie comes only by custome and frequence of sinful acts he addes a seed of evil doers or maligne sinners This notes that men are borne sinners a sinful brood that sin is hereditarie and not only by custome Esa 57.4 Thus Esa 57.4 Children of transgression i. e. 1 borne in sin of sinful parents 2 Addicted to transgression given up to it for according to the Hebrew Idiome 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a child being used with a Genitive Case of Appellatives is taken for such an one as is wholly addicted and devoted to such a thing Thence it follows a seed of falsehood i. e. a lumpe or masse of hypocrisie wholly composed and made up of iniquitie an adulterous brood Al sin is in the heart of man and the heart of man is in al sin albeit he be not always hurried into al acts of sin Hence Plato mentions 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an innate and connate evil or vitiositie of nature commun to al as before § 2. of this Chapter And Seneca assures us That corrupt Nature has drunke in such deep draughts of iniquitie which are so far incorporated with its bowels as that you cannot get it out but by tearing out its very bowels Hence 2. Prop. There are no seeds of spiritual life No seeds of Virtue in corrupt Nature no active power or disposition to what is spiritually good in corrupt Nature Thence Cyril Alexandr termes Virtue or Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Prerogative above the Creation And Chrysostome in Gen. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Gift above Nature overcoming Nature it self Where there is a spiritual death there is a total privation without the least seed of active power for the production of a virtuose life Free-wil in corrupt nature is alive to do evil but dead as to the doing what is good it is mighty knowing and potent to do evil as Jer. 4.22 but every way ignorant and impotent as to doing what is good it can find legs to run away from God but none to run to him And if the person be dead can his acts or workes be alive May we expect a good thought or word or deed from such al their days so long as they continue in such a dead state of sin Is it possible for a dead corps to take up its coffin and grave upon its back and thence to arise and walke And is it not much more impossible for a dead Soul to dispose it self towards a virtuose life It is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie That there are no seeds of spiritual life in corrupt nature A human power is not sufficient to produce an act more than human The divine life and motion towards God must procede from God Mans sin and miserie come from his own free-wil but al Virtue and Beatitude from free Grace he that is not acted by divine Grace is necessarily acted by carnal lust corrupt nature is not only emty of but contrary to al good and therefore al workes done by it are dead workes because they procede from a dead nature and tend to death wherefore true moral Virtue cannot be extracted out of the power of Nature Thus Cyril Alexandr lib. 1. in Esa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It 's proper to human Nature in no wise to receive any heavenly gifts of Grace out of its own nature but to enrich it self with the gifts of God above Nature This Hypothesis albeit the Stoics and Aristoteleans contradict it is evidently deducible from Socrates and Plato's Philosophie Thus Plato Meno pag. 99. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue comes not by Nature neither from the Institutes of Learning but by divine Afflation or Inspiration without the concurse of the human mind in those in whom it 's produced It 's true the Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That Virtue might be taught because there were sparkes or seeds thereof in human Nature which might be drawen forth by good institution but this Socrates greatly opposed as that which was inconsistent with the depraved state of the Soul and divine concurse for the production of Virtue And sacred Philosophie is most positive in this that there are no seeds of spiritual life or virtue in man Psal 5.9 Thus Psal ● 9 Their inward part or the most sublime refined intimate part of the Soul is very wickednesse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 wickednesses pravities The Plural for the Singular and abstract for the concrete which denotes 1 an Vniversalitie both of the predicate and subject that al their inward parts were ful of sin and that al sin was in their inward parts 2 The perfection of Sin For abstracts specially in the Plural Number speak Essences and Spirits The Elixir and Spirits of Sin are in the inwards of corrupt Nature Hence 3. Prop. The inclination of corrupt Nature to evil Natural impotence to what is good and its impotence as to what is good is universal and total This naturally follows from what precedes for if the Soul be morally dead in sin without any seeds of spiritual life or moral virtue then it follows that its impotence to good is total for as in naturals death is a total privation of life there is not the least seed for the reduction of the life lost so in morals such

God That man cannot either de condigno or de congruo merit the first grace is generally asserted by the sober Schole-men as Bradwardine de Causa Dei l. 1. c. 39. and Greg. Ariminensis Sent. 2. Dist 26. Quaest 1. Thence the Dominicans in the Council of Trent Hist Counc Trent pag. 209. denied That the workes preceding vocation are truly preparatorie and ever gave the first place to God And Alvarez Auxil Disp 36. Can. 1. demonstrates that God never established any Law for the giving grace to such who should improve to the utmost their natural power But none has more fully improved this Hypothesis than Jansenius August Tom. 3. l. 1. c. 5. where he proves that mens actions in their natural state merit damnation and therefore they cannot thereby merit grace And sacred Philosophic informes us Jer. 17.9 Jer. 17.9 The heart is above althings fraudulent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies to supplant and undermine whence the word here signifies perverse ful of wiles fraud guile Thence it follows and desperately wicked 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 desperately sick diseased incurable wicked And if so then how impossible is it that it should prepare or dispose it self for the reception of virtue See this more fully demonstrated Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 5. § 1. Hence 5. Prop. Free-wil in lapsed corrupt Nature hath no moral active power or facultie flexible to any spiritual or truly moral good In corrupt Nature no Free-wil to moral Good This Proposition is but the result of the former and may be demonstrated from these following Heads The Assertion of such a moral Free-wil in lapsed Nature doth 1 raise up the human corrupt Wil to the condition of God and is the Nurse of al Sin It feeds mens pride and affectation of a Deitie vain-glorie carnal confidence securitie Atheisme unbelief ingratitude It also cuts the nerves of al divine consolation and peace of conscience 2 It puls down God from his Throne of Grace and reduceth him to the condition of a Creature 1 It strikes at the very Being of God making him to be dependent on and moved by the human Wil. 2 It subvertes al the divine Attributes the Simplicitie Immutabilitie Infinitude Omnipotence Science Goodnesse Wil and al the Decrees of God 3 It strikes at the Dominion of God over his rational Creatures and ties him up by Laws and Rules of Justice dependent on the merits of his Creatures 4 It cuts off Gods Providence and Gubernation over the human Wil making it to be independent as to Gods Concurse 5 It abandons and banisheth out of the world al supernatural efficacious Grace admitting no Grace but what wil stoop and submit to the dominion of the human Wil and its soverain Empire 6 It is blasphemously injuriose to Christ and al his mediatorie Offices It subvertes his Priestly Office by laying a foundation for human Merits c. It strikes at his Prophetic Office by denying a necessitie of divine Revelation and Illumination in order to Salvation It undermines his Imporial Throne as King by denying him any Jurisdiction over the human Wil. It dispirits his special Love to the Elect by attributing to him universal grace and love to al even Reprobates 7 It takes away the office of the Spirit of Grace 8 It enervates the whole Covenant of Grace by reducing the whole of mans Salvation to a Covenant of Workes Yea 9 whiles it seems to exalt the Law of God it doth really take away the use thereof as a rule of life These and many other are the injuries which this Free-wil offers to God and man 3 Sacred Philosophie is positive and expresse in denying corrupt Nature any Free-wil to what is morally good Joh. 1.13 So Joh. 1.13 Not of bloud i. e. by natural generation Nor of the wil of the flesh i. e. Free-wil in corrupt Nature which is frequently in the Scriptures termed flesh by reason of its impotence and infirmitie So Joh. 3.6 Whatever is borne of the flesh i. e. of corrupt Nature or Free-wil in its highest elevation and refinement as adorned with the most raised commun illuminations and graces as Esa 40.6 Nor of the wi of man i. e. the best of men or Ministers as Gods Ambassadors But of God i. e. by his gloriose efficacious power So 2 Pet. 1.3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Pet. 1.3 by glorie and virtue i. e. by his gloriose virtue or power For 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue in God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his divine power as Hesychius So it 's used by the LXX Hab. 3.3 Zech. 6.17 where it answers to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies Glorie Power or gloriose Power And indeed it seems to be the grand designe of sacred Philosophie to divest corrupt Nature and Free-wil of al pretence to what is morally or spiritually good Can a vitiated corrupt Wil be supposed to have any natural connexion with or Virtue formally effective of a divine life Is it possible that the new Creature should be borne of the wil of the flesh which is potent and good for nothing but sin And must indeed the divine Wil be subordinate to mans Free-wil in the dispensation of grace Is it not more becoming the human Wil to be subordinate to the divine Must we take the adequate reason of Gods dispensing grace from the emprovement of Nature Is not the gift of Grace a participation of the divine Nature Must it not then excede the whole sphere of create Nature Is it not strange Theologie to reduce the discrimination of good and evil men to the contingence of mans ambulatorie corrupt Free-wil May we not justly applie Augustins complaint against Cicero to such Divines who to make men free make him also sacrilegious and a robber of God In sum we denie not but that the Wil is naturally free as to its physic act but we denie that it is morally free as to the mode or manner of acting wel Thus we see how this Pelagian Philosopheme doth elevate the Creature to the condition of God and puls down God to the condition of a Creature Thence Cyril Thes assert 32. to 5. pag. 268. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For we denie that there is one natural operation of God and the Creature that we may not elevate that which is create to the divine Essence nor on the contrary depresse the excellence of the divine Essence to a place agreable to Creatures Wherein he sums up the grand designe of the Pelagians then newly started up Clemens Alexandr Strom. l. 2. 5. is very invective against the fectators of Basilides and Valentinus because they hed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that Faith is natural i. e. educible out of the potence of corrupt Nature Which Hypothesis al the Assertors of moral Free-wil are sond of Theodoritus in Psal 118.32 saith peremtorily 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Neither can human Nature rightly performe virtue without divine aide It 's a great

are of al other living Creatures most 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inclinable to flock together as Herds For as God hath given Man the benefit of Reason and Speech the principal Organs of Societie so he has also given him natural inclinations and affections of and for Consociation And that which renders these natural inclinations more efficacious and forcible is the indigent necessitous condition of man in this his lapsed condition which cals for the Advice Conduct Assistance and Relief of Societie as hereafter when we come to the Ends of Politie 3. Albeit man has a natural inclination to Societie Consociation constitutes a politic Bodie yet that which formaliseth and constitutes any politic Bodie is Confederation and Consociation For a politic Bodie being an aggregate collected out of many individuals cannot acquire any real union but by Confederation Thus Plato Repub. 4. pag. 433. makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The consent of Governors and Governed to be the formal bond of al politic Societies This consent or confederation is either in a way of Subordination between the Governors and Governed or in a way of Coordination between the Governed themselves That Confederation is essential to al politic Societie is evident from the very nature of Order which gives forme to al Politie What is Order but the union of the things ordered And what union can there be between varietie of persons but by mutual consent The Order Beautie Vigor Force Consistence flourishing and perfection of althings both Natural Artificial Moral and Politic consiste in their Vnitie Division ever brings with it Dissolution and Confusion every natural bodie hangs together by some ligament or commun bond of Union so in like manner al politic Bodies Now what bond of union can there be in a politic Bodie but Confederation Plato Repub. 4. assures us That the best Terme or Boundarie of any Citie is its Vnitie and what more conduceth to the Unitie of a Citie than Consociation by mutual consent This may be also argued from the very nature and Idea of a Citie which is defined by Grotius de Jur. Belli Pacis pag. 6. A perfect Companie of Free-men consociated for commun utilitie and enjoying the same Right So that Confederation is by al made essential to a politic Bodie whether Civil or Ecclesiastic 4. Confederation by some Law The Confederation and Consociation of every politic Bodie must be bounded and regulated by some commun Law There can be no politic Societie without consent unto some certain Bond of Consociation which Bond is that commun Law whereby the Order of that Societie is bounded and regulated Thus Plato in his Politicus tels us That in al politic Communitie and Societie for the preventing Tyrannie and Anarchie there must be Laws agreed on according to which Magistrates must rule and people obey Thus also Leg. 3. he saith That man being by nature 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sociable and communicative he cannot want societie neither can human societie want a Law which Law gives bounds and measures to al Orders whereby the excesses of the more patent are restrained and the defects of the more infirme relieved The like in his Protagoras pag. 326. where he tels us That a wel-governed Republic is bounded by the formule of certain Laws which prescribe the Offices both of Rulers and Ruled and compel each to live accordingly This is also wel expressed by Hooker in his Ecclesiastic Politie pag. 25. Two foundations there are which bear up public Societies the one a natural Inclination whereby al men desire sociable life and fellowship the other an Order expressely or secretly agreed upon touching the manner of their union in living together The later is that which we cal the Law of a Commun-wealth the very Soul of a politic Bodie the parts whereof are by Law animated held together and set on worke in such actions as the commun good requireth Thus much touching the necessitie of some commun Law as the bond of Confederation but as for the Origine Nature and Effects of politic Laws we are to treat thereof under politic Legislation § 5. 5. Amitie and Fraternitie Perfect Politie requires not only Confederation but also intime Amitie and Fraternitie Plato Repub. 3. pag. 415. gives us a Phenician Fable touching the original Fraternitie of al men which he makes to be the foundation of Polities 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Ye are indeed al who converse together in the Citie Brethren but seing God has made those of you who are fit to rule as Gold and those who are to assist them as Silver the Ruled are but as Iron and Brasse Two things are here laid down 1 That al the Members of a politic Societie are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 borne out of the Earth that commun Mother and therefore a Fraternitie 2 Yet so as that this Fraternitie may not destroy the distinct Orders of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Governors and Governed This Amitie and Fraternitie is sometimes termed Familiaritie which Definit Plat. is thus described 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Familiaritie is a Communion or Societie of the same kind Sometimes it is stiled Fellowship which is thus defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Fellowship is an Amitie according to the same custome of life According to the Civil Law a Societie is defined a right of Fraternitie Societas est jus fraternitatis Thence Bacon in the Life of Henry VII tels us what we al know by experience That Colleges and Societies of Merchants and Artificers according to the English mode are called Fraternities So the Pythagoreans called in imitation of the Essenes their Societie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Fraternitie Plato carried this Amitie and Fraternitie so far as to take away al distinction of meum and tuum and to reduce al to a communitie of Goods So Repub. 5. pag. 462. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 These words Mine and not Mine are not used in the Citie And pag. 464. he gives the reason of this communitie of althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 There are no contentions or Law-suits each with other because none shal have any thing proper to himself but his own person althings else are commun to al. This communitie of althings if wel bounded and not abused may be of great use in some cases as in the primitive Churches it was a great effect of that Fraternitie and Amitie which was among them as Act. 2.44 45 46. Thence Plato Repub. 5. pag. 463. Act. 2.44 46. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He estimes and cals his familiar friend as himself We find this Fraternitie and Communitie establisht to an high degree by Lycurgus in the Spartan Republic as Plutarch in the Life of Lycurgus pag. 49 c. relates Lycurgus persuaded the Spartans to make a new division of their Lands equally among themselves to live from thenceforth as Brethren together so that none should seek to go before each other save in virtue only thinking there should be no difference

acquirement of these Qualifications Plato requires that Civil Magistrates have the best Institution and Education 4. Magistrates Education and Examen Thus Repub. 2. pag. 376. treating copiosely of the Institution of a Magistrate he distributes the Discipline in which he ought to be instituted into 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gymnastic and Music by Gymnastic Discipline he understands such Virtues as appertain to an Active life namely Temperance Fortitude Justice c. by Music Discipline he means such Virtues as concerne Pietie and Religion which is the Music of the Soul and Republics So again in his Repub. 3. pag. 395. he shews how a Magistrate ought to be instituted and instructed even from his infance in the best Principes and Exemples And he gives the reason of it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Because imitations imbibed from the childhood and of long continuance are converted into Manners and Nature According to that commun Effate Custome is a second Nature Neither ought a Magistrate to have good Education only but also general Approbation So Repub. 3. pag. 413. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And he that hath been tried thoroughout the degrees of al ages namely of Childhood Youth and virile Age and on that examen has approved himself innocent and spotlesse let him be constituted Prince and Conservator of the Citie These Qualifications of a politic Magistrate are more lively and perfectly laid down in sacred Philosophie Qualifications of Magistrates in Scripture Exod. 18.21 Thus Jethro as inspired by God to Moses Exod. 18.21 And thou provide out of al the people men of abilitie fearing God men of truth hating avarice 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 men of Abilitie Or of Power Force Virtue Activitie i. e. virtuose active and able men in bodie and mind as Gen. 47.6 LXX able or potent men The Hebrews describe them thus Men of Abilitie are such as are potent in the Commandments and exactly look unto themselves and subjugate their passions so that there remains nothing dishonest or reprocheful in them nor evil name And generally Able men are such as have a potent or couragious heart to deliver the oppressed out of the oppressors hand as Moses Exod. 2.17 Maimonides in Sanhedr cap. 2. sect 7. 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 men of Truth i. e. just men So LXX also Zech. 7.9 so Maimonides in Sanhed cap. 2. sect 7. Men of Truth are such as follow after justice for it self who do love the truth c. 3 Fearing God i. e. religiose 4 Hating Avarice Deut. 16.19 To these four Qualities here expressed three more are added Deut. 1.13 Deut. 1.13 5 Wise men 6 and Vnderstanding 7 and Known i. e. approved Under which seven proprieties the Hebrews include al other good Qualities as Maimonides Sanhedr cap. 2. sect 7. Hence 3. A Magistrates Facultie and Autoritie From the Aptitude and Qualification of a Magistrate we passe on to his Facultie Commission and Autoritie which is the second essential part For Civilians make two essential constitutive parts of any politic Administrator 1 His Aptitude which has been already dispatcht 2 his Facultie or Commission whence his Autoritie doth procede of which we are now to discourse 1. Divine 1 As for the Original Facultie Commission and Autoritie of al Magistrates Plato assures us that it comes from God the supreme Rector of the Universe So Leg. 4. pag. 713. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. When Saturne i. e. God understood no human nature was able to governe human affaires but if it should governe al according to its wil the World would be filled with al contumelie and injustice he constituted as Governors over human Societies not men but Demons of a more divine and excellent nature The great difficultie here wil be to find out who those Demons were which God constituted as the first Magistrates I conceive by these Platonic Demons we are to understand 1 the Patriarchs and the great Hero's who were the first Magistrates whereof Plato had many notices 2 But yet these Demons formally include the Souls of great men deified which the wiser Philosophers constituted as Mediators between the supreme God and men as also Administrators of human affaires in imitation of the Judaic Messias whereof they had many imperfect fragments and Traditions as we have at large proved Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 4. sect 4. as also Court Gent. P. 3. B. 2. C. 2. S. 2. § 3. And herein Plato imitates Moses who makes the Facultie Commission and Constitution of Magistrates to be from God Num. 27.16 17. So Num. 27.16 Let Jehovah the God of the Spirits of al flesh He termes Jehovah the God of the Spirits of al flesh not only as Creator of mens Souls but also as he gives them spiritual Gifts of Wisdome Knowlege Governement c. So Spirit is used 1 Cor. 14.12 God first qualifies men with an Aptitude or Gifts and thence follows the Constitution or Ordination Set a man over the Congregation Set or Visit i. e. provide or constitute for Bishop or Overseer who therefore is called v. 17. a Pastor or Sheepherd So among the Grecians Homer Plato and others a Magistrate is stiled the Pastor of the people Whence it follows v. 17. which may go out before them c. By this Hebraic Idiome of going out and coming in and that which follows leading out and bringing in is noted the Administration of the Civil Magistrate as Deut. 31.2 alluding to the office of a Sheepherd who in these times and countries went out from and came into the Fold before his sheep whence the same phrase is applied by our Lord to himself as Pastor of Souls Joh. 10.4 9. Thus God is said to choose David his servant Psal 78.70 Whence Magistrates are said to be Psal 82.6 Gods and the children of the most High i. e. constituted and appointed to their Office by God Thence also God saith Esa 22.20 I wil cal my servant Eliakim Esa 22.20 21 22. i. e. he shal not intrude into his place but be called by God So much the very name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Eliakim importes namely one raised up or setled by God as Jehojakim Thence he addes v. 21. And I wil clothe him with thy robe and strengthen him with thy girdle i. e. I wil give him thy power and authoritie and confirme him in thy place The Robe and Girdle were Emblemes of Power and Office Thence it follows and I wil commit thy governement into his hand c. So v. 22. The key of the house of David wil I lay upon his shoulder c. The Key was also an Embleme of Power and Autoritie As for the seat of the divine Facultie Commission and Autoritie from which al Civil Magistrates derive their Autoritie originally it is loged in the Law of Nature particularly in that moral Precept Honor thy father c. which gives divine constitution to the power of the Civil Magistrate This we have more

and may he not then appoint them to what end he please Is it not an end sufficient for the Being of a Creature to be the objective glorie of any Divine Attribute And therefore if God should make an innocent Creature to destroy it thereby to illustrate the Glorie of his Power who can say he is unjust The greatest notions that our minds can frame are too narrow to expresse the absolute Dominion of God over his Creature 2 God How far Gods punitive Justice is necessary by reason of his absolute Justice and Dominion could if it had-seemed good to him have freely pardoned sinners without satisfaction And here I find my self involved in that grand Question Whether the vindictive or punitive Justice of God as to its egresses be necessary I am not ignorant that great and holy Divines are divided in their thoughts and determinations hereof Some strongly defending the Affirmative others the Negative I may not be so far mine own flaterer as to presume my self to be capable of reconciling such extremes yet may I not humbly offer somewhat tending thereto And first we must distinguish the termes and then we shal with more facilitie determine the question so as to include the sense of both extremes We must distinguish 1 between the merit of punishment and the actual adjudging sinners unto punishment 2 Between the obligation on God to punish and the obligation on the sinner to receive punishment 3 Between Natural Necessitie and Moral 4 Between natural Congruitie and natural Necessitie 5 Between Gods absolute Justice or Dominion and his ordinate Justice These distinctions premissed we offer these following Propositions for the determining the question and reconciling the extremes 1 Prop. Al sin necessarily merits punishment albeit actual punition be not an effect absolutely and physically necessary for the vindication of Divine Justice Al sin has guilt necessarily appendent thereto and al guilt necessarily implies a merit of punishment for guilt is but a middle between sin and punishment it necessarily follows sin and bindes over the sinner or makes him obnoxious unto punishment yet actual punition is not absolutely necessary for the vindication of Divine Justice 2 Prop. There is a necessary debt or obligation on the sinners part to receive punishment albeit there be not a debt or obligation absolutely and physically necessary on Gods part to punish the sinner Guilt is not a physic but moral Accident or mode or debt improperly so termed whereby the offender is bound over to suffer such punishment as the merit of the sin requires whence on Gods part it implies a certain moral right or power of punishing not that God is bound by a necessitie of nature to punish although the sinner be bound by a necessary obligation of his nature to receive and suffer punishment Hence 3 God has a natural right to punish sin yet he doth not punish it from a necessitie of nature but freely God most justly punisheth sin yet he would not be unjust if we consider his absolute Justice if he did not punish it If Gods punishing sin be from a necessitie of nature and not from the free constitution of his Wil he must punish sin as necessarily as he loves himself and then it wil follow that God cannot relaxate his penal Laws as to the time measure and manner of punishing yea he cannot accept of the satisfaction of a Mediator for that is a degree of relaxation It 's true God necessarily loves his own Glorie which is darkened by sin but yet it is not Gods essential Glorie but only his manifestative Glorie which is hurt by sin as Elihu Job 39.6 Hence Gods punishing sin is not from a necessitie of nature such as that whereby the fire burnes or God loves himself For in al the Acts of God ad extra there is not only a concomitant but also antecedent Libertie or Libertie of Election which supposeth some possibilitie of rejection at least according to the prioritie of reason or nature as before Chap. 5. § 3.8 Prop. Whence Gods punishing sin being an act ad extra dependent on the free constitution of his Wil it cannot be from a necessitie of nature 4 Albeit God be not under a natural necessitie of punishing sin yet he is under a moral necessitie to punish the same By moral necessitie I understand that moral obligation he is under for the vindication of his Justice as Rector of the World This some cal a natural congruence or condecence which obligeth God to vindicate his own Justice and declare his infinite displeasure against sin by punishing of it 5 Lastly Albeit God might by his absolute Dominion considered antecedently to his Wil let sin passe unpunished yet by his ordinate Justice he necessarily punisheth the same In the consideration of Gods moral efficience on his Creature we are not to consider what God can by his absolute Justice or Dominion do but what by his ordinate Justice and moral Constitution he can do And in this regard it is most true that God is under a necessitie of punishing sin without a satisfaction and he were inevitably unjust if he should not punish it And thus as I humbly conceive both opinions though seemingly opposite may be easily reconciled And indeed we find this very Controversie on foot many hundred years since For Augustin held That God could save sinners without a satisfaction and Anselme held he could not And Bradwardine l. 2. c. 52. pag. 841. undertakes my taske to reconcile both by the distinction of Gods absolute Power and his ordinate Power as Rector of the World In the former sense he can but in the later he cannot save sinners but by Christ Hence 2. We passe on to Gods ordinate Justice Gods ordinate Justice from his Wil. which has a necessary relation to some qualitie in its object in this or that manner affected or constituted which qualitie being supposed its egresse to or execution on its object is necessary not by any physic necessitie of nature but by a moral necessitie or natural congruitie subsequent to the free constitution of the Divine Wil in order to the manifestation of the Divine Glorie And in this sense the Justice of God in sacred Philosophie is usually taken namely for that Attribute whereby God executes the Decrees and Constitutions of his own soverain Wil and Word for the manifestation of his own Glorie So that this ordinate Justice of God implies several particular Ideas which we shal endeavor to explicate in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Gods ordinate Justice ariseth from the free Constitution and Determination of his own Wil. Antecedently to the Wil of God nothing is so far just that it ought to be but only that it may be justly and conveniently done if God wil it there is no Law of Justice in the actions of God but what his own Wil prescribeth the Wil of God is not circumscribed by his Justice but his Justice by his Wil for nothing is just

before Thus Plato Leg. 10. p. 896. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But it has been sufficiently demonstrated that the Soul is more ancient than althings sithat it is the principe of motion His designe is to demonstrate the Providence of God from the Soul of the Vniverse which moves agitates foments vivisies influenceth orders and governes althings And he demonstrates this Universal Spirit or Soul of the Universe to be more ancient than althings i. e. Eternal and Increate because it gave forme life and motion to althings Thence he addes in the same page 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore shal we not necessarily acknowlege that the Soul doth universally governe and inhabit in althings that are moved yea that it governes Heaven Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. This Soul therefore actuates and impels by its motions althings that are contained in the Vniversitie of Nature namely of Heaven Earth Sea c. So pag. 898. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Sithat this Vniversal Soul moves the Sun Again he addes That the Soul of the Vniverse which is in that round splendid bodie of the Sun moves it every where as the Soul which is in our bodie leads it every where He gives us in these three pages several great Philosophemes to prove That God is the Soul of the Vniverse who actuates vivisies conserves and governes althings as our Souls do our Bodies Thus Proclus in Plat. Timae p. 93. explicates the Platonic Mundane Spirit After Amelius saith he Porphyrie thinking to agree with Plotimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. cals the Supermundane Soul the Opificer or Framer of the world The Spirit of God is called by these Platonistes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Supermundane Soul of the Vniverse as being elevated above the Universe yet animating actuating and influencing the whole and each part thereof Others terme him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Mundane Soul or the Soul inhabiting the Vniverse Al these Platonistes make the Universe to be as it were a great Animal and the Spirit of God to be the Soul that animates vegetates actuates and perfectes this Animal Thus Origen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 l. 2. c. 1. As our Bodie is made up of many members and contained by one Soul so do I conceive that the whole world is to be looked on as one huge great Animal which is contained as it were by one Soul the Virtue and Reason of God And so much seems to be intimated in Scripture Thus also the Pythagoreans held as we are assured by Minutius Foelix That God was the Soul diffused throughout the whole Vniverse from whom althings received Life Being and Motion So the Stoics said That the Divine Mind is diffused throughout al parts of the Vniverse as our Soul throughout our bodie as Laertius in Zeno. And that these Philosophemes touching the Spirit or Soul of the Vniverse must be understood of the Spirit of God and were so intended though imperfectly by the wiser Heathens we are assured by Cyprian Sermo de Spiritu Sancto p. 329. Edit Basil 1558. This Holy Spirit from the beginning of the World is said Gen. 1.2 to be superfused on the waters not as if he needed the material waters as a vehicle which he rather sustained and gave congruous motion and fixed limits to what comprehended the firmament The Eternal Virtue and Divinitie of this Spirit albeit the Ancient Philosophers those Inquisitors of the Universe could not find him out in his proper nature yet by their subtile conjectures they conceived him to be present with althings giving Life Motion Termes Stabilitie and Use to every thing This Life this Motion this Essence of things the Philosophers stiled THE SOUL OF THE WORLD conceiving that al Celostial Bodies I mean the Sun Moon and Stars yea the very Firmament was moved and governed by the virtue of this Soul and that the Waters Earth and Air were impregnated by the Seeds hereof Who if they had believed that this Spirit is both Lord and Creator and Vivificator and Nutritor of althings that are under him they might have had some convenient accesse to life But the Majestie of so great a Mysterie was hid from the wise and prudent of this world neither could the pride of human Ingenie concerne it self in such celestial secrets and penetrate the altitude of this superessential nature and albeit they understood that the Divinitie was the Creatrix and Gubernatrix of things yet they could no way distinguish what was the Trinitie of the Deitie or what was the Unitie or what the proprietie of persons This is the Spirit of Life whose Vivific heat doth animate foment advance and make fruitful althings See Philosoph General l. 1. c. 2. sect 3. § 3. and l. 3. c. 2. sect 1. § 4. 4. Albeit the Efficience and Concurrence of the Spirit in al Providential Operations be as to its manner of working Immediate Providential means used by the Spirit yet this hinders not but that ordinarily he makes use of means for the execution thereof not from any defect of his Divine Efficience but from the abundance of his Benignitie that so in and by the mediation of Instruments he might render his own Efficience more illustrious and conspicuous and leave some marque of honor on the means Whence oft times the Spirit of God useth the most unapt and unlikely means for the production of the most Noble Effects Yea oft God brings about the Issues of his Providence by contrary means which carry in them a seeming contradiction to what God intends By how much the more potent the virtue of any Agent is by so much the more doth it extend its operation unto things remote Now is not the virtue of Divine Providence most efficacious May it not then extend its efficience to means and effects most remote Doth it not belong to the Majestie Splendor and Dignitie of a Prince to have many Ministers of State under him for the execution of his Soverain Wil and Commands And doth it not in like manner appertain to the Majestie of God the Supreme Lord to have varietie of instruments and means for the execution of his Providence Al Providence according to its formal Idea includes two things Ordination and Execution The Ordination being an Act of Intelligence and Sapience belongs to the Supreme Ordinator who by how much the more judicious and prudent he is by so much the more capacious he is to order al means and affaires in subservience to his end and designe But the Execution requiring only Force and Power may as wel and oft more aptly be transacted by inferior Agents or Ministers invested with executive force in order thereto Thus in Divine Providence the Ordination and Disposition of al means the most wise God reserveth to himself as a Prerogative peculiar to his Imperial Crown but the execution he frequently commits to second causes and instruments furnishing them with executive Forces for the production of the effect and