the courage to defend the Doctrine of the Trinity in point of Reason but I see you are a bold Man and will venture farther than wiser Men. Pr. It may be others have not had the leisure or curiosity to examine a Mystery believed to be so much out of the reach of our Understanding or have confounded themselves and others so much with School-â—erms as to leave the matter rather more obscure than it was before But I shall endeavour to make things as clear as they will bear And that which I insist upon is that the Absurdities are not to appearance so great as those of Transubstantiation And therefore I desire you to produce those which appear the most dreadful P. I shall reduce all to these two which comprehend the rest 1. How there can be three Persons and but one God. 2. How these can agree in a third and not agree among themselves For the first it seems very absurd that there should be three Persons really distinct whereof every one is God and yet there should not be three Gods for nothing is more contradictions than to make three not to be three or three to be but one Pr. I hope now you will give me leave to make an Answer to your Difficulty as distinct as possible We do not say that three Persons are but one Person or that one Nature is three Natures but that there are three Persons in one Nature If therefore one Individual Nature be communicable to three Persons there is no appearance of Absurdity in this Doctrine And on the other side it will be impossible there should be three Gods where there is one and the same Individual Nature for three Gods must have three several Divine Natures since it is the Divine Essence which makes a God. But to make this more plain Do you make any difference between Nature and Person P. Yes Pr. Wherein lies it P. Excuse me Sir for you have undertaken to explain these things Pr. I will begin with Person Which Name was originally taken among the Romans from some remarkable distinction of one from another either by some outward appearance as a Vizard or Habit or some particular Quality or Disposition And from hence it came to be applied to those inward Properties whereby one Intelligent Being is distinguished from another and from those Properties to the Person who had them Thus Person is used even by Tully himself at least twenty times in his Books of Rhetorick and the old Civil Law speaks of Personal Rights and Personal Actions So that the Criticks such as Valla and others had no cause to find fault with Boethius for applying the Notion of a Person to an intelligent Being subsisting by it self and so the Soul is no Person in Men but the Man consisting of Soul and Body having some incommunicable Properties belonging to him Therefore I cannot but wonder at the niceness of some late Men who would have the Names of Person and Hypostasis and Trinity to be laid aside since themselves confess Boëthius his definition of a Person to be true enough but they say it belongs to the Creatures and not to God for it would make three Gods. Which is to suppose without proving it that the Divine Nature can communicate it self after no other manner than a created Nature can This is now to be more strictly enquired into And it is very well observed by Boëthius de Trin. l. 1. Principium pluralitatis alteritas est That Diversity is the Reason of Plurality And therefore in the Trinity so far as they are different they are three i. e. in regard of Personal Properties and Relations but so far as they agree they are but O N E that is as to the Divine Nature It is very true that according to Arithmetick Three cannot be One nor One Three but we must distinguish between the bare Numeration and the Things numbred The repetition of three Units certainly makes three distinct Numbers but it doth not make three Persons to be three Natures And therefore as to the Things themselves we must go from the bare Numbers to consider their Nature Where-ever there is a real distinction we may multiply the Number tho the Subject be but One. As suppose we say the Soul hath three Faculties Understanding Will and Memory we may without the least absurdity say there are Three and One and those three not confounded with each other and yet there is but One Soul. P. But the Socinians object that there is a difference between three Properties and three distinct Persons because a Person is an Individual Being and so three Persons must be three Individual Beings and therefore as there is but one Divine Being there can be but one Person Pr. This is the main strength of the Cause to which I answer That altho a Person be an Individual Being yet it implies two Things in it 1. Something common with others of the same Nature as three Men have one and the same Nature tho they be three Persons 2. Something peculiar and incommunicate to any other so that John cannot be Peter nor Peter James P. But what is it which makes one not to be the other when they have the same common Nature Pr. You ask a hard Question viz. about the Principle of Individuation but if it be so hard to resolve it as to created Beings there is certainly far less Reason for us to be unsatisfied if it appear difficult to clear the Difference of Nature and Person in an infinite Being Yet all Mankind are agreed in the Thing viz. That there is a Community of the same Nature and a real Distinction of Persons among Men tho they cannot tell what that is which discriminates the Humane Nature in John from the same Humane Nature in Peter and James And it is observable that as Beings arise in Perfection above each other it is still so much harder to assign that which is called the Principle of Individuation In gross and material Beings we can discern a number of Accidents or peculiar Modes and Properties which distinguish them from each other but it is much harder to assign it in Spiritual and Intellectual Beings whose Natures and Differences lie not so open to our Understandings If so be then it appears more difficult in an infinite and incomprehensible Being what Cause have we to wonder at it But we must always make a difference between what we have reason to believe and what we have a power to conceive Altho we have all the Reason in the World to believe that there is a God i. e. a Being Infinite in all Perfections yet we must yield that his Essential Attributes are above our comprehension As for Instance 1. We must believe God to be Eternal or we cannot believe him to be God. For if he once were not it is impossible he should ever be And therefore we conclude necessary Existence to be an Essential Attribute of the Divine Nature But then how to conceive that a Being should be from it self is at least as hard as how one and the same Individual Nature should
be communicated to three distinct Persons nay it is somewhat harder since we see something like this in other Beings but we can see no manner of Resemblance of a thing that hath its Being wholly from it self 2. We must allow God to be Omnipresent or else we must suppose him so confined and limited to a certain place as to be excluded from any other and if he can Act in all Places he must either be present in them or his Power must be larger than his Being which is Infinite but after this we have not a Power to conceive how a Being should be present in the whole World and not to be extended and if it be extended how it should be uncapable of being divided into Parts which is certainly repugnant to the Divine Nature I therefore produce these two Instances to let the Antitrinitarians see that what they object in Point of Reason as to the Incomprehensibility of the Mystery of the Trinity will in consequence overthrow the Divine Nature But as there is the highest Reason to believe there is a God tho we cannot comprehend his Perfections so there may be great Reason to believe the Doctrine of the Trinity tho we cannot comprehend the manner of it P. I had thought you intended to explain the Mystery of it and now you tell us it is Incomprehensible Pr. It is a good step to our believing it to make it plain that the Difficulty of our Conception ought not to hinder our Faith. And I have made some advance towards the explication of it by shewing that since Mankind are agreed about the difference between Nature and Person the whole Difficulty comes to this that the same common Nature in Mankind makes three Persons but that it is the same Individual Nature in all the Persons of the Trinity And now let us consider the Infinite Perfection and Simplicity of the Divine Nature and we shall think it unreasonable that it should be so bounded as to the manner of its Communication as the Nature of Man is Every Individual Man hath not only Individual Properties but an Individual Nature i. e. the common Nature of Man limited by some unaccountable Principle that doth make him different from all other Men having the same Nature with himself The Difficulty then doth not lie in a Community of Nature and a Distinction of Persons for that is granted among Men but in the Unity of Nature with the difference of Persons And supposing the Divine Nature to be infinite in its Perfection I do not see how it is capable of being bounded as the common Nature of Man in Individuals is and if it be not capable of being bounded and limited it must diffuse it self into all the Persons in the same individual manner and so this Doctrine of the Trinity is not repugnant to Reason P. But what say you to the Athanasian Creed is not that repugnant to humane Reason Pr. I think not but that it is a just Explication of the Doctrine of the Trinity rightly understood P. I see now you are upon hard Points you will stick at nothing and Transubstantiation it self will down with you anon Pr. I doubt that but at present we are upon the Athanasian Creed And I desire but one Principle to clear it which follows from what is said already viz. That what is affirmed of the Divine Nature as such must be common to all three Persons but whatever is affirmed of the several Persons as such must be peculiar to themselves Now this is a clear Principle of Reason and hath no appearance of absurdity in it And from hence the Athanasian Creed will easily be cleared For Eternity Incomprehensibility Omnipotency belonging to the Divine Nature as such we ought to say That they are not three Eternals three Incomprehensibles three Almighties but One Eternal One Incomprehensible One Almighty Because the Attributes belonging to the Persons by reason of the Divine Nature and the Attributes being really the same with it the Nature is the proper Subject of them which being but One we are not to distinguish them as to Essential Attributes but only as to Personal Relations and Properties P. But if the Three Persons be Coëternal how is it possible to conceive there should not be three Eternals Pr. This seems the hardest Expression in the whole Creed but it is to be interpreted by the Scope and Design of it Which is that the Essential Attributes are not to be distinguished though the Persons be And so Eternity is not taken as a Personal Attribute but as Essential and so they are not three Eternals but one Eternal And the great Design of the Creed was to shew that the Christian Church did not believe such a Trinity as consisted of three Persons unequal and different in Nature and Substance and Duration P. But what say you to the damning all those who do not believe it in the beginning and end of it Pr. This is off from our Business But to let you see I will not avoid the Difficulties you offer I will give an Answer even to this The meaning is not that every one is damned who doth not conceive aright of the Difference of Nature and Person in the Trinity or of the Essential and Personal Attributes but that those who set up in opposition to it the worship of a meer Creature as God or the worship of more Gods than one or who wilfully reject this Article of the Christian Faith when it is duly proposed to them are guilty of a damning Sin. For even the disbelief of Christianity it self is not supposed to be the Cause of Mens Damnation but where the Doctrine of the Gospel hath been proposed in a way of Credibility If when this Doctrine of the Trinity is proposed to Mens Minds they will not consider it nor weigh the Arguments on both sides impartially but with scorn and contempt reject it and endeavour to bring reproach upon Christianity for the sake of it and disturb the Peace of the Church about it such cannot be said to receive or believe it faithfully and by such Sins they do run the hazard of perishing everlastingly P. I see you have a mind to smooth every thing relating to the Trinity I wish you would do the same about Transubstantiation But yet you have not answer'd the other great Difficulty in Point of Reason viz. That those things which agree or disagree in a third must agree or disagree one with the other And therefore if the Father be God the Son God and the Holy Ghost God then the Father must be Son and Holy Ghost and the Son and Holy Ghost must be the Father If not then they are really the same and really distinct the same as to Essence distinct as to Persons and so they are the same and not the same which is a Contradiction Pr. And
in the one being intrinsecal and substantial the other extrinsecal and accidental And that Hypostasis is the same with the Divine Nature and yet is most closely united with the Human Nature which is so different from the Divine so that it is incomprehensible by us how in that Union the Natures are not confounded or the Hypostasis divided Pr. Suppose now we grant all this that there is an incomprehensible Mystery in the Incarnation what follows from thence Have I not hitherto owned that there must be something incomprehensible by us in what relates to the Divine Nature And it is the less wonder it is so in the Incarnation wherein an Union is implied between an Infinite and Finite Nature when the Union of the Soul and Body though both Finite is above our Comprehension though we our selves consist of Souls and Bodies so united But what Consequence is it if we are not able to explain this that then we must admit that the same Body may be not meerly in two but in ten thousand places at the the same time i. e. If we cannot explain the Hypostatical Union then all manner of Absurdities must go down with us that relate to things of a very different Nature from it P. I am glad to find you are set at last and that now you have a Difficulty before you which you can never get through Pr. Be not too confident I have only hitherto denied the Consequence as to the Difficulties of Transubstantiation But it is possible that setting aside the Confusion of School-Terms I may be able to give a far more intelligible and reasonable Account of the Incarnation it self than you can ever do of Transubstantiation P. First shew that it is possible and then explain the manner of it Pr. But let us in the first place agree what we mean by it P. By the Incarnation I mean the Union of the Divine and Humane Nature so as to make one Person in Christ. Pr. If this be not possible it must either be 1. Because two Natures different from each other cannot be united to make one Person The contrary whereof appears in the union of Soul and Body to the Person of a Man. Or 2. because it is impossible that an Infinite Nature should be united to a Finite P. How can there be an Union possible between two Beings infinitely distant from each other Pr. Not in that respect wherein the Distance is Infinite but if there be nothing destructive to either Nature in such an Union and the Infinite Nature do condescend to it why may it not be so united to an Intelligent Finite Being as to make one Person together with it For in respect of Union the Distance is not so great between Finite and Infinite as between Body and Spirit P. The Distance is Infinite in one Case but not in the other Pr. I do not speak of them with Respect to Perfections but to Union and an infinite Distance in that must imply an absolute Repugnancy which you can never prove For since Body and Spirit may be united to make one Person an Infinite Spirit may be united to a Finite Nature P. But the manner of the Hypostatical Union is impossible to be conceived Pr. Let the thing be granted possible and the difficulty of conceiving the manner may be as great in the Union of Soul and Body Will you undertake to explain that to me and yet I hope you believe it But let us hear your Difficulties again which you object from Bellarmine P. That there should be but one Hypostasis in two Natures and that in the Union the Natures should not be confounded nor the Hypostasis divided Pr. All these Difficulties arise from the sense of the word Hypostasis Which originally signifies a Real Being and not such which depends only on Fancy and Imagination from thence its signification was enlarged not only to things real in opposition to meer Appearances and Creatures of the Mind but to such a thing which did subsist of it self and had not its subsistence in another as Accidents had So that an Hypostasis was a real Substance which had subsistence in it self But such are of two kinds as the Greek Fathers observe 1. Such as are real Substances in themselves but yet are capable of being joined with another to make up a Person thus the Soul and Body have two different Hypostases and make up but one Person of a Man. 2. It is taken for a compleat individual Subsistence which is not joined with any other as a Part and so Hypostasis is the same with a Person which is nothing else but a compleat intelligent individual Hypostasis And in this sense there can be but one Hypostasis in Christ i. e. one Person tho there be two Natures P. But our Divines say that the Humane Nature after the Union hath no Hypostasis it being swallowed up by the Divine Pr. I know they do but if they mean that the Humane Nature after the Union loses that subsistence which is proper to the Humane Nature it is impossible for them to avoid the Eutychian Heresy condemned by the Council of Chalcedon but if they mean no more than that there is a true Nature but no Person save only that which results from both Natures they then agree with the Sense of the Church which condemned the Eutychians For as much as the Heresies of Nestorius and Eutyches differ'd in themselves they were both built on the same Ground viz. that there could be no true Nature but there must be a Person and that two Natures could not make one Person From whence Nestorius asserted there were two Persons in Christ and Eutyches denied that there were two Natures P. What doth all this signify but that the Authority of the Church must determine whether there be two Natures or two Persons in Christ Pr. It seems then the whole Business wherein the General Councils were so warmly concerned was only to make an Ecclesiastical Dictionary and to appoint what words are to be used and what not Do you think then there were no such real Heresies as Nestorianism and Eutychianism but only they happened to take the words Nature and Person in another sense than the Church would have Men use them P. I trust the Church for all these things Pr. Then if the Church would have you affirm two Persons and one Nature or two Natures and one Person it were all one to you P. Why not since the Church must determine Pr. What if you had been to dispute with Nestorius and Eutyches P. I would have told them they must submit to the Church about the use of words Pr. And they would have laughed at you for your pains For the Controversy was really about the Truth of Christ's Incarnation as the Fathers proved and the Councils determined which in Consequence was rejected by both of them as I will evidently prove if you have any longer Patience P. I beg your pardon Sir I
now I think you have drawn out the most refined Spirits of Socinianism to make the Doctrine of the Trinity and Transubstantiation parallel because you say it implies a Contradiction which is the nearest Parallel you have yet offered at But this terrible Argument is grounded on the same Supposition viz. That the Divine Essence is no more capable of communicating it self to three distinct Persons than any created Being is The Reason of that Axiom being that created Things by reason of their finite Nature cannot diffuse or communicate themselves to more than one and therefore those which agree in a Third must agree together but supposing it possible that the same finite Nature could extend it self to several Individuals it would be presently answered the Axiom did hold only where they did adequately and reciprocally agree and not where they did agree only in Essence but differ'd in the manner of Subsistence For where a different manner of Subsistence is supposed possible in the same Individual Nature the Agreement in that cannot take away that Difference which is consistent with it which we attribute to the unlimitedness and perfection of the Divine Nature P. But you can bring no other Instance but the thing in Question and therefore this is a Petitio Principii or taking that for granted which is in Dispute Pr. I do not think it to be so where the Reason is assigned from the peculiar Properties of the Divine Nature to which there can be no parallel And I think it very unreasonable in the Socinians to send us to created Beings for the Rules and Measures of our Judgment concerning a Being acknowledged to be Infinite P. Are not the Divine Persons Infinite as well as the Divine Nature and therefore as created Persons do take in the whole Nature so infinite Persons will do the infinite Nature Pr. No question but the Persons are infinite in regard of the Nature which is so but if an infinite Nature be communicable to more Persons than One every such Person cannot appropriate the whole Nature to it self P. If the difference be on the account of Infinity then there must be an infinite number of Persons in the Divine Essence Pr. I answer that infiniteness of Number is no Perfection and as to the number of Persons we follow not our own Conjectures nor the Authority of the Church but Divine Revelation which hath assured us that there is but one God and yet there are three that are one Which depends not meerly on the place of St. John but the Form of Baptism is remarkable to this purpose which joyns together the Father the Son and the Holy Ghost without any other distinction besides that of Order and Relation And it is against the fundamental design of Christianity to joyn any Created Beings together with God in so solemn an Act of Religion And St. Paul joyns them together in his Benediction The Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ and the Love of God and the Communion of the Holy Ghost be with you all Amen 2 Cor. 12. 14. From whence the Christian Church hath always believed a Trinity of Persons in the Unity of the Divine Nature P. You have taken a great deal of pains to clear the Doctrine of the Trinity from any absurdity in point of Reason why should you not do as much now as to Transubstantiation Pr. In plain truth because I cannot for here lies a vast difference between them In the Trinity we consider'd an Infinite Being to which no bounds can be set without destroying its Nature but in Transubstantiation we suppose a true finite Body which hath its natural bounds and limits to one certain Place and yet you will and must suppose this Body to be equally present in many thousand distant Places at the same time which implies so great a Repugnancy to the very Nature of a Body that I can by no means give my Assent to it P. Alas Is this it which chokes your Reason so that you cannot swallow the Doctrine of the Church in this matter You do not consider that tho we allow nothing Infinite in the Body it self yet we suppose an Infinite Power to be imploy'd about it and an Infinite Power may produce things above our Comprehensions about Bodies in themselves finite Pr. This is the utmost your Cause will bear but I pray tell me Is there any such thing as a Repugnancy in the Nature of things or not i. e. Are there not some things which are endued with such Properties that if you alter them you destroy their very Nature as to suppose an indivisible Line a Triangle without Lines a Body without Dimensions P. Hold a little a Body must have Dimensions belonging to it but it is not necessary it should have those Dimensions where-ever it is present For it may be present in one Place as a Body and in another after the manner of a Spirit Pr. You might as well have said a Body may be consider'd two ways as it is a Body and as it is not a Body for there can be no Body where there are no Dimensions proper to it P. See how you are mistaken for it is 〈…〉 the Dimensions which seem to hinder a Body being in 〈◊〉 places at once but its Unity as Bellarmin well observe◠Pr. I say both of them 〈◊〉 For 〈◊〉 Body can no more be without it◠Dimensions than a Line without Divisibility P. I grant that naturally it cannot but by Divine Power it may Pr. Will you make the Power of God to change the Essential Properties of things while the things themselves remain in their true Nature You may as well say that naturally Man is a Reasonable Creature but by Divine Power he may be a true Man and yet want the Faculty of Reasoning That naturally two and two make four but God can make two and two to be joyned together in a supernatural manner so as that four shall not result from them that tho naturally speaking white-washing a Wall makes it look white yet by an extraordinary Power there may be the presence of all things which make a Wall white yet it shall not do so just so it is to make a Body present and yet to have no Dimensions of a Body Is there any real difference between the Nature of a Body and Spirit Wherein lies it Is it not as repugnant for a Body to be after the manner of a Spirit as for a Body and Spirit to be the same P. All this proceeds upon not considering the difference between the Essential Extension of a Body and that which is quantitative and hath relation to Place Pr. The Essential Extension of a Body without Quantity is Non-sense and a Contradiction For it is to make a Body extended and not extended at the same time I pray tell me what you mean by a Body as it is opposed to a Spirit P. I mean as all Mankind do such a Substance which consists of Parts extended and divisible