you no further trouble having with all the Respect and Reverence due to such great and renowned Bodies given you an account of the Occasion of this Address to you as a Thing well deserving your most serious Thoughts and representing the cause of our Venerable Old Religion now at stake as in truth it is I humbly leave the whole matter before you and remain As by Duty and Inclination equally bound Honoured Sirs Your most faithful and devoted Servant A. A. A Collection of several Choice New Theological Terms made use of in Two Books One Entituled A Vindication of the Doctrine of the Holy and ever Blessed Trinity c. The other A Defense of Dr. Sherlock 's Notion of the Trinity c. and first Introduced by the said Doctor for giving the Church a better Explication and a clearer Notion of a Trinity in Unity than it has had for above sixteen hundred years before Which Collection is as follows SElf-Consciousness Vind. p. 49. l. 27. Mutual Consciousness Vind. p. 52. l. 4. Natural Self-Consciousness Def. p. 8. l. 7. Natural Mutual Consciousness Def. p. 18. l. 8. Intimate conscious Knowledge Vind. p. 59. l. 4. Conscious life Def. p. 60. l. 20. Self conscious Principle Def. p. 67. l. 16. Natural Principle of mutual Consciousness Def. p. 67. l. 22. Conscious Union Def. p. 9. l. 10. Natural Unity of Mutual Consciousness Def. p. 33. l. 2. Communion of Mutual Consciousness Def. p. 72. l. 9. Self-Conscious Love and Self-Conscious Complacency Def. p. 68. l. 2 4. Intellectual Sensation Def. p. 77. l. 16. Self-Sensation Def. p. 39. l. 24. Conscious Sensation Def. p. 8. l. 4. Self Conscious Sensation Def. p. 7. l. 15. Natural Self Conscious Sensation Def. p. 7. l. 30. Natural Mutual Conscious Sensation Def. p. 8. l. 2. Feeling each other's Knowledge Vind. p. 56. l. 24. Self-Consciousness between the Father and the Son Vind. p. 60. l. 14. The Son 's feeling the Father's Will and Wisdom in himself Vind. p. 60. l. 22. The Son the Self Conscious Image of his Father's Will and Knowledge Vind. p. 60. at the end Continuity of Sensation Def. p. 7. l. 12 13. Three distinct Infinite Minds Vind. p. 66. l. 22. One Individual Nature subsisting thrice not by multiplying but only by Repeating it self Def. p. 24. l. 2 3. The Divine Nature repeated in its Image without multiplication Def. p. 37. l. 1. The same Substance repeated in Three distinct Subsistences Def. p. 91. l. 8. The same Individual Nature repeated in its living Image Def. p. 70. l. 4. One Eternal Infinite Mind repeated in Three Subsistences Def. p. 94. l. 6 c. Which Terms with some others like-them are to be substituted in the room of Nature Essence Substance Subsistence Suppositum Person Hypostasis and Relation All which though constantly used hitherto both by Fathers and Councils yet serving only as this Author affirms to pervert and confound mens Notions and Discourses about the Divine Nature and Persons ought utterly to be exploded and laid aside as meer Gibberish and Gipsie Cant especially by such as account all Greek and Latin so too Several New Heterodox and Extraordinary Propositions partly in Divinity and partly in Philosophy extracted out of the Two forementioned Books 1. THE Three Divine Persons are Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits and not to hold so is both Heresie and Non-sense Vind. p. 66. l. 25. 2. Unless every Person of the Blessed Trinity considered as a distinct Person be allowed to be a distinct Infinite Eternal Mind we shall have nothing left us but a Trinity of meer Modes Names and Postures Defen pag. 8. lin 24. pag. 30. lin 24. 3. That which makes a Spirit whether Finite or Infinite and consequently each of the Divine Persons which according to this Author are Three distinct Infinite Spirits One with it self and distinct from all others is Self-Consciousness and Nothing else Vind. p. 67. lin 11. p. 68. lin 5. 13. 74. lin 15 c. 4. A natural Self-Consciousness makes a Natural Person Def. p. 8. lin 7. 5. If the formal Reason of Personality be that which makes a Mind or Person which with this Author are always Terms convertible one with it self and distinguishes it from all others then Self-Consciousness is the formal Reason of Personality Def. p. 37. l. 8 9 10 c. 6. Mutual Consciousness is that which formally unites the Divine Persons in Nature or Essence and makes them all essentially and numerically one God Vind. p. 68. l. 6 7 8. and p. 84 l. 29 and elsewhere frequently 7. There is no other mutual In-being or In-dwelling of the Father in the Son and of the Son in the Father called by the Fathers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 conceivable or possible but by mutual Consciousness Def. p. 9. l. 15 16 c. 8. The Son and the Holy Ghost are in the Father as in their Cause Vind. p. 69. l. 29. Which Term Divines generally decline the use of using the word Principle instead thereof However this overthrows the foregoing Proposition viz. That the Son can be no otherwise in the Father than by mutual Consciousness 9. The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 used with reference to the Divine Persons by the Nicene Fathers is not sufficient to prove a Numerical Vnity of Nature or Essence in the said Persons Def. p. 69. l. 1 2 c. 10. The Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Divine Persons is partly specifick partly numerical Def. p. 17. l. 27. 11. It is impossible to conceive a more close and intimate Union in Nature than mutual Consciousness Def. p. 35. l. 22. Whereas an Vnion in one Numerical Essence or Nature is and must be in the very Conception or Notion of it greater and more intimate as being the Ground the Reason and Foundation of the other 12. The very Nature and Subsistence of the Father Son and Holy Ghost is wholly Relative Def. p. 27. l. 21. And for their Subsistence I grant it to be so but if their Nature be wholly Relative too I am sure there is nothing absolute belonging to the Deity 13. The Case of a Man and his living Image though even by this Author 's own confession a meer Fiction or Supposition is a plain Account of the essential Vnity between God the Father and God the Son Def. p. 21. l. 10. That is to say in a Romance we have a clear Explication of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the first and second Person of the Trinity And in Two who are actually separate and loco-distant from one another we have a plain Account of the Union of Two who both in their Essence and Persons are actually and absolutely inseparable 14. If the Three Divine Persons be considered as Three Infinite Minds distinguished from each other by a Self-Consciousness of their own and essentially united to each other by a mutual Consciousness which is the only way of distinguishing and uniting Minds then a Trinity
easily evince For this Victorinus was old before he became a Christian and when upon his becoming so he betook himself to write upon some Articles of the Christian Faith he did it so perplexedly and obscurely and very often so dangerously and unjustifiably as to his way of expressing himself that the Learned Dr. Cave but with a modesty equal to his Learning gives this Character of him in his Historia Literar p. 181. Non videtur ubique Fidei Dogmata satìs accuratè percepisse saltem non satìs feliciter expressisse So that for ought I see this Defender might as well have quoted the Epistolae obscurorum virorum or even himself for the Elegancies of the Latine Tongue as Victorinus Afer for an Authentick Director how we ought to conceive or to express our selves about the Article of the Trinity But to conclude this head what design this Man could have in thus stripping the Divine Nature of it's singularity by making a difference between this and it's Individuality unless he thinks hereby the better to introduce his Tritheism and in time to give another sence even of Individuality too I cannot imagine But I doubt not but his not duly stateing distinguishing the Terms used in disputation will quickly drive him headlong into the grossest Heresies And so I pass to 3. His Third Proposition which runs thus That upon supposal of the singleness or singularity of the Divine Nature the whole Divine Nature cannot be incarnate in the Incarnation of the Son but the whole Trinity must thereby be incarnate too Now this blessed Proposition is borrowed from the Socinians also and is as arrant Socinianism as any part of that whole Heresy But the Answer to it is this That in the Incarnation of the second Person the whole Divine Nature is incarnate but not wholly That is to say non-quoad omnem suum subsistendi modum not in respect of all its Modes or ways of subsisting but only of one Alone viz. that founded in Filiation and proper only to the second Person of the Trinity And therefore since the Godhead is not incarnate under that proper mode of subsisting which it has in the Father nor under that other which it has in the Holy Ghost the Incarnation of the whole Divine Nature in the Son does not infer the Incarnation of the whole Trinity since the said Nature is not hereby Incarnate as to those other Two modes of Subsistence which it has respectively in those other Two Persons And this passage I recommend to the Reader 's Observation as one Notable Instance of those Intolerable Heterodoxies which this Man 's denying all Modes in the Divine Nature will and must inevitably plunge him into 4. As for his Fourth and last Proposition viz. That one single Nature can subsist but once or have but one Subsistence This is so beyond all bounds of shame Scandalous and Heretical and so absolutely destroys Three Personal Subsistences in one single Divine Nature That I shall say nothing in Answer to it having sufficiently overthrown it by what was said before but only set down the Doctrine held by all Catholick Divines and Writers in direct opposition to it Viz. That one and the same Numerical Individual single Divine Nature has Three distinct Persons or Subsistences so belonging to it that it exists in Common in them all and severally in each of them This I affirm to be the Catholick Doctrine and shall say no more to the fore-recited shameful Proposition but leave both it and it's Author to be argued down by that Authority which is much abler and fitter to deal with such Persons and Doctrines than any Disputant can be In the mean time if these Villanous Heterodoxies should as was hinted before in the Animadversions Chap. 12. chance to cross the Water with what Tragical out cryes and clamorous reflexions upon our Church would both Papists and Protestants from all Parts Eccho them back to us again Only our poor Church has this one small happiness amongst her many unhappinesses at present that many of those who receive her Revenues and wear her Honors and in requital of Both invade her Doctrines yet thanks be to God neither do nor can carry her disgrace further than the Reach of their Native Tongue But our Innovator rests not in his former Explications of the Trinity but offers us another and a plainer and that is by a Man and his living Image if any one could tell where to find it However the Notion of it is as the rest were perfectly his own and if possible extreamly more Absurd And to lay it before the Reader it is thus He considers a Man seeing himself represented by Reflexion from a Glass or some such Body for it is an Image by Reflexion only which he here professes to speak of Now says he let us suppose this to be a living Image and that such an one as should exactly answer it's Prototype not only in its external Features Colours and Postures but also in the internal Acts of the Soul such as Knowledge Volition Ioy Grief c. So that as the Man himself Knew or Willed any Thing the Image likewise should exactly Know and Will the same This supposed He tells us further That this Image would be another Person from the Prototype but not another Man forasmuch as he supposes the Prototype and the Image to have the same Numerical Humane Nature in them both and that so as to perform all the Acts of a Man both in the One and in the Other This is the Account he gives us of this living Image in order to his Explication of the Trinity by it And I shall bring it under a particular Examination But before I do so I require this Author to tell me Whether in pag. 6. of this Defence he does not profess to lay the Foundation of his New Hypothesis in giving an Account of the Mysterious Vnion of the Divine Persons by the Unity of a Spirit And whether he does not withal declare himself certainly in the Right in pitching upon that as the best way of explaining the said Union and not the best only but indeed the only fit and proper way of doing it forasmuch as in the strength of it he does with great Contempt reject all the Material sensible Representations which the Fathers were wont to set forth this Mystery by making it his Business to substitute his own Account of this Mysterious Union of the Persons from the Unity of a Spirit as the only thing that could make it Intelligible This is certainly so as appears from the fore-cited place and since it cannot be denied I desire this Author in the next place to inform me how the Explication of this Mysterious Union by a Man and his living Image is explaining it by the Unity of a Spirit and whether the Man or his Image or both be Spirits and the Resemblance between them be this Unity of a Spirit which he spoke of in the place
Vse of the Word as applied to Created Minds and Spirits but so is a Person also as much as Mind p. 16. l. 10. But stay here good Sir stay a little For this I utterly deny having before demonstratively shewn That though the word Person in the Original Use of it was actually applied to Beings of an Absolute and Separate Subsistence such as Angels and Men yet that even then they never signified them under the Proper Formality of Absolute and Separate but only of Complete Subsistences and by consequence equally agreed to all Complete Subsistences whether Separate and Absolute or only Distinct and Relative as the Divine Persons are so that here is not only the Vse of the word Person but also the Definition of it making it equally applicable to both these sorts of Subsistence viz. Absolute and Relative But on the other side I would fain know of this Author Whether the Definition of a Mind or Spirit can agree to any but to an Absolute Being Nature or Substance and if it can agree to none else how it can be applied to a Subsistence perfectly Relative as all the Divine Subsistences are so as in its Original and properest Signification to signifie that too which yet as I have shewn the Definition of a Person properly does Well but admitting though not granting that the Term Mind or Spirit may be drawn off from its Proper and Received Signification and Definition so that Three Minds or Spirits may signifie Three Distinct Relative Subsistences of one and the same Infinite and Eternal Mind or Spirit included in All or Each of them I say if the Term Three Minds may be brought to this Signification it must have been by a long received Custome which this Man calls Theological Vse And then I require this Author to shew us such a Theological Use of this word Mind that is a Concurrence of all Divines for several Ages throughout the Catholick Church expressing the Three Divine Subsistences or Persons of the Godhead by Three Distinct Infinite Minds that is to say Three Relatives by Three Absolutes The Term Persons indeed has been applied to these Three Subsistences and that both from the Original Signification and Definition of the Word as also from the constant Use of it by the Church for many Centuries But the term Infinite Minds was never plurally applied to them upon either of these Accounts by any Orthodox Divine or Writer unless this Particular Author's making use of it in his pretended Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity c. can be called the Theological Vse of the Word for I suppose That neither are all Divines included in him nor is he to be thought equivalent to them all whatsoever he may think himself Nevertheless for his own and the Worlds satisfaction I shall shew him what Theological use of the word Three Minds or Spirits instead of Three Divine Persons I meet with And first of all Theodoret in his first Book Haereticarum fabularum and the 18 Chapter tells us of a certain Sect called the Peratae who held in the Divine Nature 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 So that here is one Theological use of the word Minds or Spirits thus applyed for him And Valentinus Gentilis held in the Godhead Three Eternal Spirits or Minds of which one was called by him the Essentiator and the other Two the Essentiati In which I cannot see what he differs from this Author So that here is another Theological Vse of this word for him And thirdly his Friend Stephanus Curcellaeus in his Treatise de Trinitate frequently calls the Divine Person Tres aeternos Spiritus asserting a Specifick Vnity between them which this Author also would fain be at and denying a Numerical So that here is a Third Theological use of the same word to comfort and encourage him And I wish him all the Credit and Satisfaction that such Theological Company can give him In the mean time whereas he tells the World in the close of this Paragraph That when the Dean as he calls him speaks of Three distinct Infinite Minds which are essentially and inseparably one he could mean nothing more where he gives us meaning against words again than Three distinct Intelligent but not separate Subsistences p. 16. l. 20. I must tell him in answer to This That if he here speaks of Three distinct Minds as Essentially one by one and the same Numerical Essence which is the only Essential Vnity here spoken of with reference to the Trinity it is an intolerable contradiction Forasmuch as each Mind or Spirit being one by a particular Essence of it's own constituting it such a Particular Mind or Spirit Three distinct Minds or Spirits can never be essentially one by one Numerical Essence belonging to them all which yet the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity are and must be And whereas he says That by Three Minds he means Three Intelligent Subsistences I ask him whether these Three Subsistences are Relative or Absolute If he says Relative I do here tell him that then they are not Three Minds a Mind being defined An Intelligent Immaterial Substance which imports nothing Relative in it at all But if he says that these Subsistences are Absolute I then affirm That they are not the Three Persons in the Trinity which as such both are and of Necessity must be Relative So that it is evident that this Man knows not which way to turn himself nor how to speak of the subject he is treating of with any consistency with common sence And this makes his Boldness the more unpardonable in saying That he needs ask no other Pardon for affirming the Three Divine Persons to be Three Infinite Minds but for the use of a word which the Schools had not Consecrated p. 16. l. 24. In answer to which since he here charges the non-using of it only upon the Schools I challenge him to shew me any other Writers of the Church accounted Orthodox who have made use of it or affirmed the Three Divine Persons to be Three distinct Minds or Spirits Let him I say assign them if he can And if he cannot the using of the word thus applyed must even by his own Confession p. 9. l. 3. be an unusual way of speaking at least that is to say a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and if it were no more than so let him shew â—ow he is able to justifie the Use of that which a General Council had denounced an Anathema to the Users of in these high Points about the Trinity and Incarnation But this is not all for I come upon him yet further and demand of him how he will answer to the Church not only his presuming to introduce such a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in treating of this high Mystery and that in the Room of the anciently received Terms but his venturing to do this when he himself confesses and declares as he does in the 2â— th page lin 13. That there could not have
which we observe in men and since the perfection of Generation in them is for a Father to produce his like shall men generate others of the same nature with themselves and shall God generate one of quite another Nature from his own as a Finite Nature must necessarily be This was the force of their Argument and it was directed against the Arians but never were these Explications alledged as adequate Representations of the same Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons that was in Men. But as it was intimated before in the Animadversions no doubt this Author has been all along pursuing this Tritheistical Whimsey of a Specifick Vnity only in order to the providing an Unity of Nature for his Three Infinite Minds or Spirits which by all the Wit of Men and Angels can never be proved capable of any greater Vnity than Specifick But this Point about a Specifick Vnity of the Godhead has been so throughly debated and the Impossibility of it so clearly demonstrated by the Animadverter Chap. 7. from the 178 to the 188 page That this Man should have done well to have answer'd what was to be found there before he troubled the Reader with the same old baffled story again I conclude therefore against this Author that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 applyed to the Divine Persons does fully and sufficiently express the Numerical Vnity and Identity of the Divine Nature belonging to them without importing any Thing of Specifick Vnity in the same or any thing so much as Analogous to it After he has done with the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he excepts against the Terms Single and Singular as applied to the Divine Nature But he first draws them off from their proper and received Signification according to which all Divines whether Schoolmen or others have in treating of the Divine Nature generally used them expressing the said Nature by no word more commonly than by Singularis essentia singularis Natura And does this Man now think to take this word by a wrong exotick signification of which more presently and in the strength of that to run down and casheir the True and Genuine sence of it Which besides the confusion it must needs bring upon all Discourses about the Godhead and the Divine Persons will not fail also to give mighty scandal to all sober and learned Men both Papists and Protestants who are concerned to have these weighty Points not only truly stated but also warily treated of For my own part I must declare That I never met with stranger and more untheological Assertions than what this Author has concerning the Application of the Terms single and singular to the Divine Nature and yet the true sence of them lies pain and obvious almost in all Scholastick Writers So that whatsoever is signified by Hoc unum Individuum and numericè unum the same also is signified by singulare they being all but Synonymous words to express that greatest and perfectest Vnity which we call Numerical and it will be hard to assign where we may properly apply any one of them and not as properly apply the other So that if this Author would but have understood these and the like Terms in the same sence in which both Philosophers and Divines use them he could never have abused the Subject he wrote upon nor exposed himself with such false and scandalous Assertions as these that follow 1. That the Vnity of Nature between the Eternal Father and Son is such an Vnity as is both Specifick and Numerical 2. That the Divine Nature is not a Single or Singular Nature p. 18. lin 13. 3. That upon supposal of the Singleness or Singularity of the Divine Nature the whole Divine Nature cannot be Incarnate in the Incarnation of the Son without the Incarnation of the whole Trinity thereby p. 18. lin 18. 4. That one Single Nature can subsist but once or have but one Subsistence p. 19. lin 23. All which Four Propositions I find in the compass of less than three whole Pages viz. 17 18 19. And they are of that vile Import that I defie either Arian or Socinian to speak more against the Vnity of the Three Divine Persons in one and the same Infinite Divine Nature than this Man in some of the forementioned Propositions has done But I shall consider them particularly though they are much fitter for the Publick Censure of the Church than for any Private Man's Confutation And first for the 1. First Proposition viz That the Vnity of Nature between the Eternal Father and Son is such an Vnity as is both Specifical and Numerical This is fully and plainly asserted by this Author though not in these very Words as the Reader will find in the 17 th page and 19 th line of this Defence Where speaking of the Vnity of Nature between the Eternal Father and Son he affirms That there must be that in it that perfectly answers that Specifick Sameness of Nature that is between Father and Son in Humane Persons of which but four or five Lines before he had given an Instance in Abraham and Isaac and withal that it must not only perfectly answer but much out do it too But now on the one hand Nothing can perfectly answer one Instance of Specifick Unity or Sameness but another Instance of the same Kind forasmuch as Two Kinds or Sorts of Unity can never perfectly answer one another nor on the other hand can any Sort of Unity out do a Specifick Vnity but a Numerical For no one Specifick Vnity can do more towards the Uniting the Things it belongs to than another there being but one and the same formal Effect common to all Specifick Vnities which is to render and denominate their respective Subjects Specifically one and no more This I say is all that a Specifick Vnity can do and if more be done it must be by a Numerical But again in the 27 th Line of the same Page He tells us to the same purpose That the Vnity or Sameness of Nature between the Father Son and Holy Ghost is not a meer Specifick Sameness which Words must imply and inferr That it is a Specifick Sameness though he affirms it to be also something more To which Passages we may add Two more altogether as full for this Complex Sort of Vnity viz. One in page 114. line 26. and the Other p. 121. l. 22. of his Vindication From all which it is manifest That this Author holds such an Vnity or Sameness of Nature in the Divine Persons as is both Specifick and Numerical which I affirm to be as gross an Absurdity as the Reason of Man can well imagine For a Specifick and a Numerical Unity are not Two degrees of one Kind but Two several Kinds of Unities Two Unities differing toto genere and consequently such as cannot possibly coincide into any one Unity which shall comprehend and partake of both For a Numerical Vnity is the Unity of One Individual Nature or Being and no
more and a Specifical Vnity is the Unity of Several Particular Individual Natures or Beings and therefore unless the same Thing can both be One Individual and no more and be Several Particular Individuals too for any one to assert the same Vnity to be both Specifical and Numerical as this Author undeniably does is a monstrous Contradiction But this has been so fully laid open already as to that part of it especially which concerns a Specifick Unity in the Divine Nature that to say any more of it would be but a needless Repetition And so I proceed to the 2. Second Proposition viz. That the Divine Nature is not a single or singular Nature Def. p. 18. l. 13. which I on the contrary positively assert it to be upon these following Considerations First That the Divine Nature is either a Singular or an Vniversal Nature but not an Vniversal and therefore a Singular The Consequence is manifest because singular and universal adequately divide Being and therefore there can be nothing but what must fall under one of the Members of the Division and then that the Divine Nature cannot be Vniversal is as evident because if so it must be drawn off from several particular Natures but there are not several particular Divine Natures for it to be abstracted or drawn off from Add to this That the Denial of the Singularity of the Divine Nature would overthrow its very Existence for nothing exists but Singulars Secondly Individuality and Singularity of Nature are the same thing both of them importing the greatest and perfectest degree of Unity which is Numerical and consequently since this very Author affirms the Individuality of the Divine Nature p. 18. line 12. the Singularity of it must be granted too Thirdly This Man all along supposes Singleness or Singularity essentially to imply in it Subsistence but this is a gross Mistake for neither does it imply it in the Essential Notion nor yet in the Real Existence of the Thing Not in the first For the Singularity of a Thing belongs to its Essence even as prescinding and abstracting from its Subsistence as something posterior to it and therefore it does not essentially imply it And accordingly when we consider the Divine Nature abstracted from its respective Subsistences which we may and often do we still consider it as one Numerical Individual Substance that is to say in its highest Unity and Singularity and therefore the Essential Notion of Singularity does not imply Subsistence in it Nor in the next place does it necessarily imply the same as it actually exists For the Second Person of the Trinity assumed the Humane Nature without its proper Subsistence but not without its proper Singularity For it was one Numerical Individual Single Humane Nature which he took upon him so that upon this Account also Singularity does not necessarily inferr Subsistence But here I think fit to observe that the word single or singular which are here the same there being but one Latine word singulare for both may be taken in Two very different Sences First In its strict and most proper Sence for Numerical or Individual Unity of Nature Or Secondly in a larger and less proper Sence for that which has but one Subsistence only and this is not so properly called single as solitary and by no means applicable to the Divine Nature which has not only One but Three Subsistences belonging to it This was the Sence in which the Sabellians used the word or rather which they put upon it contending for and allowing only a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is such a Divine Nature as was capable but of One Subsistence and no more But such a Singleness in the Divine Nature the Catholick Church neither knew nor owned and yet still maintained the Individuality and Numerical Vnity and consequently the true and proper Singularity of the same And will this Man now from the Improper Signification of the word Single or Singular as applied by the Sabellians to the Divine Nature deny the Divine Nature to be a Single or Singular Nature according to the true proper and generally received Sence of Singularity which both with Logicians and Philosophers is so perfectly the same with Numerical Unity that it is impossible for any thing to be Numerically One and not Singular too But how positively soever he denies the Singleness or Singularity of the Divine Nature here he asserts it as positively and that as the Universal Concurring Sence of all the Fathers in his Vindication p. 121. line 18. where he roundly tells us That all the Fathers assert the Singularity of the Godhead or Numerical Unity of the Divine Essence and that the Three Divine Persons are united in this One Numerical Essence which according to the Fathers he calls the Singularity of the Godhead This I say he expresly says in the place alledged and I desire him to reconcile it to what he says every whit as expresly in page 18. line 12. of this Defence viz. That the Divine Nature is One Individual Nature but not one single or singular Nature And again that one single Nature can be but One Person whether in God or Man and yet further p. 19. line 23. That it is demonstrable that one single Nature can have but one Subsistence So that if he will abide by what he says in this Defence he absolutely casheirs whatsoever he himself had elsewhere owned to be the sence and language of all the Fathers and he might have added of the Schoolmen and all other Divines besides nor is this all but he utterly overthrows also a Trinity of Persons by averring it demonstrable that there can be no plurality of Subsistences in one single or singular Nature and if no plurality of Subsistences then I am sure no plurality of Persons neither But thanks be to God though he uses this Big word Demonstrable yet what he calls Demonstration others account not so much as a probable Proof where he is the Demonstrator And let none wonder that he can so scandalously contradict himself in Two Books who so often does it in the space of Two lines But methinks what he alleges out of Victorinus Afer for disproving the singularity of the Divine Nature in Three Persons comes something with the latest viz. those Notable Words of his Non oportet nec fas est dicere Vnam esse substantiam Tres esse Personas p. 19. l. 2. In opposition to which one forlorn Testimony it were easy to allege forty Fathers at least constantly expressing the Trinity by Vna substantia and Tres Personae but that I think it very needless to assign who does so when it is hard to assign who does not And therefore as for his thus recurring to Victorinus Afer I must take the Boldness to tell him that this is not so much a Quoting as a Weeding of Antiquity since surely a more Incompetent Authority in the present subject could not well be found as the Circumstances of the Man might
inexisting in one Another and lastly Only distinct in their Subsistence but by no means Separate or Divided Let all this I say be supposed on the Part of the Eternal Father and Son And on the other side let us suppose Two other Persons viz. The Prototype and his Living Image and these without any Necessary Coexistence with one Another and the latter not having it 's sole dependance upon the former and both of them such as cannot mutually exist in one Another and withal are not only distinct in their respective Subsistences but also actually separate and locally divided from each other Now I say when we have collated all these Disparities together must not that Comparison think we give us a blessed edifying Representation of the Unity of the Eternal Father and Son in the same Numerical Divine Nature when one side of the Comparison is so far from being an Explication of that it is a direct Irreconcileable contradiction to the other But as we first waved the consideration of those monstrous Absurdities that were involved in this notion of a Man and his living Image with reference to the Eternal Father and Son so let us at present wave the forementioned gross disparities between them also yet still this Notion is utterly unfit to give us any Explication of the Trinity as being every whit as Difficult if not more Difficult for the Mind of Man to conceive than the Trinity it self For the grand Difficulty here is to conceive how one and the same Infinite Nature can be in several distinct though intimately Vnited Persons And the Thing which this Author would explain this by is a Man and his Image where he supposes one and the same Numerically subsisting human Nature to be in Two locally distinct and separately subsisting Persons But now in this Case is it not much more conceivable that an Infinite Nature whose boundless perfection reaches to more ways of subsisting than one should subsist in several persons and those only distinct than that a Particular finite Nature which can have but one Subsistence should subsist in Two Persons and those also locally distant and separate from one Another I appeal I say to any Man of Judgment alive whether this be not the greater and more inexplicable Difficulty of the Two For the mind of Man finds an utter Contradiction in making a Finite Being exist at onâ—e in Two distant Places or Vbi's but in the former though it finds an insuperable Difficulty yet it can allege no Contradiction And therefore I say again that it is in the highest degree senceless and irrational to assign that as an Explication of a Thing which is more difficult perplexed and Inconceivable than the Thing it self which it pretends to explain Which yet is the case here of a Man and his living Image as the Notion of it has been stated and applied to the present subject So that this wonderful 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a clearer Idea of the Trinity than ever the World had before has these Three Excellent Qualifications to recommend it 1. That it supposes and builds upon several Things utterly contradictious and impossible 2. That it makes one Thing the Representation of another between which yet as to the very particulars wherein the Resemblance should be there is the highest and utmost Disparity And Thirdly and lastly That it offers to explain a Thing Difficult obscure and by human Reason not Comprehensible by another Thing which is ten times more so So that if this must be the Lot of the Church of England to sit down and see her most Holy Religion practised upon by such wretched Innovations as can tend only to ridicule and expose the chief Articles of it to the Scorn of Arians and Socinians and all this under pretence of explaining them I can but say God deliver our poor Church from such Explainers and our Creed from such Explications And as I heartily commiserate the Vnhappy State of that so I really pity this Bold Man himself that he should be thus suffered to go on venting his Scandalous Heterodoxies without finding either Friends to Counsel or Superiors to Controll him Nevertheless should we with a non obstante to what has been said comply with this Man 's absurd Notion so far as to allow his Prototype and his living Image to bear such a peculiar Resemblance to the Eternal Father and Son as he pretends but can never prove them to do yet how does this any way explain or give us as he calls it any Idea of the Trinity For are the Father and the Son the Trinity without the Holy Ghost And how does this Prototype and living Image set forth to us the Procession of the Holy Ghost from both of them when it makes no mention of any Third Person at all The Son indeed issues from the Father in the way of Knowledge by a Reflex Act thereof expressing his Infinite Nature and Perfections whereupon as it is the Property both of Knowledge and of an Image to represent some thing so if this Prototype and living Image can be of any Use to help our Notions of the Eternal Generation it must be by its Representing Quality But now the Holy Ghost issues from the Father and Son per modum voluntatis by an Eternal Incomprehensible Act of Love streaming from them both and the Property of Love we know is not to represent as Knowledge does but to unite to the Object Known And here I pray what does the living Image do towards the setting forth of this Why our Author indeed makes the Prototype One Person and his living Image Another but do these Two by an Act of Love or any other Act proceeding jointly from both produce a Third Person If not what Idea of a Trinity can be drawn from these Two But if this Author will say as he says things no less Absurd That the Prototype and his living Image do produce some certain Third Person distinct from Both of them and so answering to the Holy Ghost in the Trinity I desire him to tell the World what kind of Thing this Third Person is and by what Name it is to be called and expressed for I never yet heard or read of any such nor am I so much an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Man as to fetch it from my own Invention But besides all the foregoing Absurdities It is worth observing what a notable cast of his Ignorance he gives us about Emanation Def. p. 28. l. 10. And in order to it I think fit to shew What an Emanation and a Cause by Emanation is Now a Cause or Principle by 〈◊〉 Emanation is that which produces its Effect or Term without any intervening Action really distinct from either the Agent or Effect And accordingly That is properly called an Emanation or an Effect by Emanation for the word here signifies passively which issues immediately naturally and necessarily unless hinder'd by a supernatural power from the Substance of its productive
according as the Thing is which it belongs to For all these Three necessarily go together and essentially imply one another and consequently there must be one and the same Principle of them all And now if we would see whether or no this Author applies all this to Self-Consciousness with reference to Minds or Spirits which he constantly makes to be Persons let the Reader cast his Eye back upon some of the fore-alleged Passages particularly upon that in Vindic. p. 49. l. 12. That this Self-Consciousness makes a Spirit numerically one with it self And in Vind. p. 68. l. 6. That the Self-Consciousness of every one of the Persons viz. in the Trinity to it self makes them Three distinct Persons And again Vind. p. 74. l. 13. That the Essential Vnity of a Spirit consists in Self-Consciousness and that it is nothing else which makes a Spirit one and distinguishes it from all other Spirits Likewise in this Defence p. 7. He tells us expresly That the Nature of a Spirit consists in Sensation which with him is only another word for Self-Consciousness Nay and to go no further than the very next page to that in which he here so positively declares That he no where makes Self-Consciousness the formal Reason of Personality viz. Defence p. 43. He roundly affirms That Self-Consciousness makes a Mind or Spirit one with it self and distinguishes or separates it from all other Minds or Spirits And that such a distinct and separate Self-Conscious Mind is a Natural Person Now I would have this Man in the first place tell us whether all these Passages have not in them a causal sence but only an Illative or Probative and no more And in the next place I would have him shew me whether there be any Thing more signified by the formal Reason of Personality than what the forecited Passages fully contain in them and if he cannot prove that there is any more signified by it as there is not then let him for the future leave off shuffling and own that by what he has asserted in the said Passages he has made Self-Consciousness the formal Reason of Personality with reference to Minds or Spirits which he Universally affirms to be Persons And by this I hope the Judicious Reader will see with both Eyes what a slippery Self-Contradicting Caviller the Animadverter has to dispute with In the mean time the sum of the Animadverter's Argument against him stands thus This Author asserts every Mind or Spirit to be a Person He places this Personality in Self-Consciousness he holds this Self-Consciousness to be Essential to and Inseparable from a Mind for as much as he positively asserts the Nature of a Mind or Spirit to consist in it Defen p. 7. l. 11. whereupon it does and must follow That since our Saviour in assuming the humane Nature assumed an humane Mind Soul or Spirit he assumed an humane Person too for as much as its Personality was as Inseparable from it as its Self-Consciousness from which it necessarily resulted was Nor will it avail him to allege the Interposal of Supernatural and extraordinary Power in the present Instance since such Power though never so extraordinary and Supernatural never destroys the Essence or Essentially necessary Connexion of Things And therefore if the Personality of a mind be implied in the very Nature of a Mind a Mind can be no more without its Personality than without its Nature which would be a direct Contradiction to the effecting whereof the Divine Power it self does not extend But on the other side when we state the Personality of an humane Nature upon the compleat Subsistence of it which is a mode not necessarily implied in it the Humane Nature of Christ might very well by the Divine Power be made to exist without it and so in a supernatural way be taken into and supported by the Personal Subsistence of the Eternal Word And all this with full accord to the strictest Principles of Reason without the least necessity of making Two Persons in our Saviour whereas according to this Author's Hypothesis it is impossible for all the Reason of Minkind to keep off an Humane Person as well as a Divine from belonging to our Saviour by his Incarnation or Assumption of the humane Nature As for his taking shelter in Boetius's Definition of a Person that will not help him neither since the utmost that can be proved against it is that Boetius was under a mistake and one Man's mistake certainly cannot make another in the right For all both Schoolmen and other Divines agree that this Definition strictly taken is defective and that instead of substantia Individua alone it should be substantia Individua completa Incommunicabilis or something Equivalent to the Two last Terms For otherwise this Definition also would infer Two Persons in Christ since there are Two Individual Substances belonging to him viz. an Humane and a Divine But after all we have great reason to believe that Boetius here uses the word Substantia for Subsistentia as several of the Ancient Fathers of great note did and particularly St. Hilary in his Books of the Trinity very often and St. Austin sometimes And then the Boetian Definition is perfect and good and no such Consequence of a double Personality in our Saviour can be drawn from thence For as much as the Son of God took our humane Nature without its proper Subsistence into the Subsistence of his own Eternal Person And so I proceed to the Animadverter's Third Argument proving Self-Consciousness not to be the formal Reason of Personality in Created Beings which is this The Soul in its separate state is conscious to its self of all its own Internal Acts or Motions c. and yet the Soul in such a state is not a Person and therefore Self-Consciousness is not the formal Reason of Personality for if it were it would constitute a Person wheresoever it was This Argument is of the same Nature with the former each of them being brought as a Particular Negative against an Universal Affirmative And how does this Defender confute it Why by the easiest way of Confutation that it is possible for Ignorance to give it viz. by saying That it is nothing to the Purpose But does he know what is and what is not an Argument and what is to confute an Assertion or Position and what is not Let him know then That to confute an Argument is properly to conclude the Contradictory Proposition of that which is held by the Respondent or Defendant and is called by the Greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and by the Latines Redargutio And here I would have this hardy Ignoramus own before the World if he dares That one Negative Instance does not overthrow an Vniversal Affirmative as really and effectually as Ten Thousand But possibly one who can be of all sides may be for both sides of the Contradiction too and hold That Self-Consciousness is the formal Reason of Personality Personal
compound viz. the whole Man or Person as the Subjectum ultimum and Principium Quod and as that which receives the whole Denomination from what belongs immediately to any Part of it For it is the whole Man or Person who is properly said to be a living Reasonable Sensible Creature though it be by Virtue of his Soul as the Principium Quo that he is so After this comes another Absurdity where he tells us p. 48. l. 2. That an Hypostatical Vnion is the swallowing up of a Natural Personality in its Vnion with a superior Person Which if it be so Then say I where is the Hypostatical Union of Christ's Person with the humane Nature for the humane Nature which was united to his Divine Person had no Personality of its own to be swallowed up for Christ assumed it without any Subsistence or Personality belonging to it which it neither has nor ever had and consequently could never be said to be lost or swallowed up by this Union So that we have a new sort of Heresie started viz. That as Eutyches heretofore affirmed Christ's Humane Nature to have been swallowed up by His Divine so this Author holds an Humane Personality to have belong'd to this Humane Nature which in like manner is swallowed up by the Superior Person of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But where these vile Heterodoxies will stop God only knows For I cannot see but this Innovator may freely and uncontrollably vent as many of them as he pleases and no doubt he has a great many more such in Reserve and will in due time produce them But the Animadverter had argued against the Personality of the Soul in Conjunction with the Body thus If the Soul in the Composition of a Man's Person were an entire Person it self and as such concurred with the Body towards the Constitution of the Man then the Man would be an Imperfect Accidental and not a Perfect Natural Compound He would be that which Philosophy calls Unum per Accidens that is a Thing made up of such Beings as cannot perfectly coalesce and unite into One Animadvers p. 75. And what says he to this Why he tells us That the Soul and the Body are vitally united and that the Animadverter's own beloved Philosophy never calls Things vitally united Unum per Accidens To which I answer That no Created Person ever was or could be vitally united to any Being distinct from it self And therefore since it is certain That the Soul is vitally united to the Body it is impossible that the Soul should be a Person For this beloved Philosophy teaches me That in Created Beings there can be no Vital Vnion but between Parts and consequently that since there is a Vital Vnion between Soul and Body this Soul and Body must be united as concurrent Parts of the same Compound And this by this Author's Favour must utterly destroy his senceless Notion of the Personality of the Soul since that which is a Part cannot be a Suppositum or completely subsisting Nature and whatsoever is not so can never be a Person So that the Animadverter's Argument stands good viz. That in created Beings an Entire Person united to a Body would make an Unum per Accidens and consequently that a Vital Vnion between them would be impossible Yet nevertheless since it is certain that there is actually such a Vital Vnion between Soul and Body it is upon the same account also as certain That the Soul which must be one of the Terms of that Vnion and by consequence a Part cannot be a Person So that all this is but a meer Petitio Principii first to suppose the Soul a Person which is the principal Thing in Dispute and then to say that its being vitally united to the Body keeps it from making a Man That which we call Vnum per Accideâ—s Whereas it is affirmed and argued against him That this very Vital Vnion of the Soul with the Body overthrows the Soul's Personality as a Thing which this Vnion is utterly inconsistent with In short the Soul 's being a Person if it were so can never prove it vitally united to the Body but its being vitally so united irrefragably proves it to be no Person But he is now for confounding the Animadverter with Two Questions but still in pursuit of the same Point First Whether the Eternal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 before the Incarnation were a Compleat Being which is readily answered in the Affirmative That he was Secondly Whether the Humane Nature assumed by him were a Compleat or Incompleat Being I answer That though it were a Perfect Nature yet since it was without a proper Natural Subsistence of its own it was upon that account an Incompleat Being But then I add that this was a Peculiar and a Supernatural Case there being no other particular Humane Nature in the World without its particular proper Subsistence but this alone which subsists wholly by a borrowed Subsistence as being assumed into that of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But now what is all this to the Vnion between the Soul and Body which are vitally united as essential Parts of the whole Humane Person But the Person of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is not vitally united to the Humane Nature as to a Part of it And though as I noted before it be impossible for a Finite Person to be vitally united to any other Being distinct from it self yet an Infinite Person as we see in the Person of our Saviour may be united to another distinct Being or Nature For this is neither a Composition nor yet a Natural Vnion But to this our Author very Learnedly excepts and affirms the Vnion between the Person of Christ and his Humane Nature to be a Natural Vnion and gives this as a Reason for it Because it is a Vnion of Natures and that an Vnion of Natures is a Natural Vnion by whatsoever Power it is done p. 49. In answer to which though I might say That This is not properly at least not immediately an Vnion of Natures but of the Divine Person of Christ to the Humane Nature which by and through the Person comes to be united to the Divine Nature yet to let that pass I absolutely deny both his Propositions viz. That the Vnion between the Person of Christ and his Humane Nature is a Natural Vnion And that all Vnion of Natures must be a Natural Vnion by what Power soever it is wrought Both which are absolutely false Forasmuch as a Natural Vnion is only that which is wrought by a Natural Cause or Principle acting according to the Ordinary Course and Measures of Nature which an Vnion between Two Natures so vastly disproportioned as a Finite and an Infinite can never be effected by For will this Man affirm That GOD by the ordinary Exercise of that Power by which He carries on the daily Production of Things in the World and which is properly called Nature united the Divine Person of the 〈◊〉
so of the Ignorance of him who thinks that it can prove any Thing else but the Weakness of Him who uses it For I appeal to the whole World to judge what a Consequence this is viz. That because every Person feels himself by Self-Consciousness to be himself and not to be another therefore this Self-Consciousness is that which distinguishes him from all others For can a Person 's perceiving his own Distinction properly make or give him this Distinction Upon the whole matter I must declare that I cannot think any one who looks upon this as serious Arguing worth arguing against And whereas he says that this first Argument of the Animadverter has been sufficiently exposed already I shall securely venture it upon the Bottom upon which it stands without any fear of its being exposed any more than answered especially by one who never yet exposed any Thing or Person but himself And so I pass to the Animadverter's Second Argument Which proceeds thus Nothing in the Nature of it absolute and irrelative can be the Formal Reason of Personality in the Persons of the Blessed Trinity But Self-Consciousness is a Thing in the Nature of it Absolute and Irrelative and therefore it cannot be the Reason of Personality in any of the said Persons In reply to which Argument thus fairly formally and Syllogistically proposed why does not this Author as in all Regular Disputations it ought and uses to be done apply an answer either by denying one of the Two Propositions or by distinguishing one or more of the Terms but this not being to be done without Logick our Author must be so far excused And therefore he very prudently wraps himself up in such a Cloud of Insignificant words as may enable him to escape his Adversary without encountring him For one of these two things he must of Necessity disprove viz. Either first That the Divine Persons and Personalities are perfectly and wholly Relative Or Secondly That Self-Consciousness is a Thing wholly absolute and Irrelative As to the first of which he himself elsewhere acknowledges and affirms That the Three Divine Persons are Three Relative Subsistences And let me tell him further That they are so entirely Relative that their very Subsistere is Referri and their Referri not only consequent upon and supervenient to their Subsistence as it is in Created Persons but one and the same with it so that by vertue thereof they are indifferently termed by all Schoolmen and Divines either Relative Subsistences or Subsisting Relations The Concrete and the Abstract Terms in the Divine Persons being by reason of the peculiar condition of their Personality as well as the Absolute Transcendent Simplicity of the Divine Nature only different ways of expressing the same Thing And therefore whereas this Author says p. 63. l. 8. Does that which makes John a Person make him a Father I answer No but affirm also That that which makes the first Person in the Trinity a Person makes him a Father and convertibly that that which makes him a Father and that only makes him also a Person And the Reason of the Difference here is not as this Ignorant Man alleges because every humane Person has an Absolute Nature belonging to him as the subject of the Relation for each of the Divine Persons has an Absolute Nature distinctly belonging to him though not a distinct Absolute Nature But the Difference lies in this That an humane Person has not only an Absolute Nature to be the Remote subject of the Relation but also an Absolute Personality as the Immediate subject of the same by vertue whereof the Person of Iohn continues after the Relation of a Father ceases But in the Trinity every Person and Personality is wholly Relative forasmuch as the very Subsistence of each of them is so So that the Eternal Father is and subsists as a Father by having a Son and not by knowing himself to be a Father and by Communicating his Essence to Another not by an Act passed upon and wholly Terminated in his own Person No this is postnate to the former as all other Personal Acts whatsoever are and must be And therefore the Godhead or Divine Nature which is absolute is not as this Man precariously pretends originally distinguished by Three Self-Consciousnesses p. 63. l. 24. But by Three original Relative properties viz. the Innascibility and Paternity of the first Person which make one Personal Property and the Two distinct Originations of the other Two Persons whereby they are both mutually distinguished from and opposed to one Another as all Relatives are But this Man's offering here at an Explication of these Divine Relations by that exploded Figment of a Man and his living Image p. 63. l. 21. is an unsufferable Profaneness as well as an arrant Petitio Principii For will he pretend to explain a Thing in it self obscure by another that is more obscure and which is worse impossible besides Let him for the future learn that no Man who understands what arguing is ought to bring that as a medium either of Explication or Probation which he knows to be doubtful or has just cause to suspect that his Adversary may reject as Absurd and Unreasonable But in the next place to shew whether Self-Consciousness be a Thing in the Nature of it perfectly Absolute and Irrelative and consequently unable to give such a Subsistence and Personality to the Three Divine Persons as shall be wholly Relative There needs only a Repetition of what is said to this purpose in the Animadversions and which this Author has very discreetly said not so much as one word to viz. That Self-Consciousness is a Thing in the Nature of it Absolute and Irrelative as being that Act by which each Person intimately knows and is conscious to himself of his own Being Acts Motions and every Thing personally belonging to him so that as such it terminates within and looks no further than that one Person whom it is an entire survey and comprehension of And as it is an Absolute and Irrelative Term so it may be conceived distinctly and fully without conceiving or implying the conception of any Thing or Person besides And now what Relation does or can such an Act of Self-Consciousness imply in it It is indeed on the contrary a direct contradiction to all that is Relative For it encloses the Person wholly within himself neither pointing nor looking further nor referring to any one else Anim. p. 99. All which is so very plain and full that I defy this Author or any Man alive to prove either that this is not a True account of Self-Consciousness as to the Absolute and Irrelative Nature of it or if it be that it can give a Subsistence purely Relative to the Person which it shall belong to But to make short work with this Man of words without Sence There are in every Relation these Things to be considered The subject of the Relation both Remote and Immediate the foundation of
Spiration and Procession accordingly there are Three and but Three Personalities founded upon the said Oppositions as is clearly shewn in the eight Chapter of the Anim. p. 244. But on the other side since there is nothing in the Nature of Self-Consciousness to determine it to any certain Number of Self-Consciousnesses it must follow that neither can any certain Number of Personalities be derived from thence In short if the Divine Nature or Essence thus Abstractedly taken on the one hand cannot be supposed to communicate or determine it self and the Personalities on the other which alone should and can determine it are of that Condition as not to imply any certain Number in themselves but are Indifferent to any that can be assigned then it is impossible for the said Personalities to determine the Divine Nature to Three Personal Subsistences and no more And this I account a full and sufficient proof that the fixed Ternary Number of the Divine Persons can never be stated upon Self-Consciousness but so far as the Influence of that reaches may be multiplyed into any Number whatsoever But says our Author That which naturally distinguishes Three Persons from each other would distinguish Three Thousand if there were so many but does not prove that there may be so many p. 65. l. 11. To which I answer that the Distinction all along insisted upon hitherto is not such an One as supposes or follows but such an one as Constitutes or makes the Person and therefore it is Ridiculous to argue That supposing there were so many Persons they might all be distinguished by so many Self-Consciousnesses For that is not the Point here but whether there be any Thing in the nature of Self-Consciousness rendring it uncapable of such a multiplication or no and if there be not then it is certain that supposing there might be so many Self-Consciousnesses there might and would be also so many Persons For as much as that which originally and principally distinguishes any thing must of necessity constitute it too But he goes on and tells us That though there may be no Repugnancy to such a multiplication on the part of Self-Consciousness yet on the Part of the Divine Nature there may and therefore that the Argument does not conclude l. 15. ibid. To which I answer that the Divine Nature as this Author considers it actually determined by its respective Personalities must needs have a Repugnancy to any other or greater multiplication of the same But as the Animadverter here considers it entirely abstracted from all Personal Determination I affirm that it is impossible to prove a Repugnancy in it so considered to subsist in 3000. Self-Conscious Spirits any more than in Three And therefore I would have this Author take notice That the Animadverter was not concerned to conclude That absolutely there might be so many Persons in the Godhead but That so far as this Man's Hypothesis reached and for ought that could be determined from thence about the Number of the Divine Persons this might be so and withal that nothing yet appeared on the Part of the Divine Nature so Abstracted to prove that it could not be so And as this was the utmost that the Animadverter undertook by this Argument so it was sufficient for him to prove thereby the Absurdity of this Author 's New Hypothesis compared with the old received one of the Church which makes it utterly impossible that there should be any more than Three Persons in the Godhead and that from the peculiar Condition of the Persons themselves necessarily determining them to the fixed number of three and no more which this Man's Hypothesis of Three Personal Self-Consciousnesses from the very Nature of the Thing as we have shewn can never do And this was the sum of the Animadverter's Argument which this Man with such a Magisterial Ignorance pronounces a meer Non sequitur if we may take his word for a sequitur or non sequitur who has more Logick a great deal to distinguish good money from bad than a true Consequence from a false And so we are come at length to see upon what Terms the Animadverter's Fourth Argument stands with this Defender Fourth Argument If Three distinct Self-Consciousnesses formally Constitute Three distinct Personalities then Three distinct Self-Complacencies will constitute Three distinct Personalities too But our Author I suppose will not allow of the latter and therefore neither ought he to assert the former This is the Animadverter's Fourth Argument upon the head of Self-Consciousness with reference to the Divine Persons and he first declared That he produced and looked upon it only as an Argument ad Hominem There being as much Reason to state the formal constitution of a Person upon one as upon the other though in Truth upon Neither For all that could or can be alleged for Self-Consciousness upon this Account is that it is Essential to each of the Divine Persons and inseparable from them And so much I affirm is allegeable for Self-Complacency Besides that if this Author pleads no more for Self-Consciousness than that it barely distinguishes the Divine Persons from one Another as in this whole Defence by way of Subterfuge he pretends to no more and that also without proving it their Principal Distinction I challenge him to prove that Self-Complacency does not distinguish the said Persons from one Another as much as Self-Consciousness does or can do To which we may add that Self-Complacency is the nobler Act of the Two and a step beyond the former and for that Reason the fittest to give the perfectest state of Being which is Personality if Personality could depend upon or be derived from any personal Act as the Animadverter has all along contended that it cannot But says our Author the Animadverter proceeds all along upon a Mistake viz. That by Self-Consciousness he understands the Acts of Self-Consciousness p. 66. the end whereas our Author understands only the Principle of it To which I answer as I have done several times before First That by Self-Consciousness which this very Man over and over expresses by Self-Feeling or Sensation nothing can properly be signified but an Act and that we may as well say That Seeing Hearing Tasting and Smelling signifie the Principle of these Respective Acts and not the Acts themselves as that this Self-conscious Feeling and Sensation do so And this I shall immoveably insist upon as the genuine proper Signification of the Term without the least Regard had to this Man 's Meaning which in no Disputation ought to supersede or take place of the Proper universally Received Sence of his Words For his Meaning is to himself his Words to the World Nevertheless since like one beaten off from his hold he flies from the Act to the Principle I do here in the second Place deny also That the Principle of Self-Consciousness does or can constitute the Person or give Personal Vnity or Distinction to it which I reckon to be all but the same
Thing Forasmuch as the first and Original Principle of all Acts is the Nature and Essence of the Thing to which the said Acts belong But then the bare Essence or Nature of a thing whether Create or Vncreate can never of it self make or constitute that Thing a Person but the Determination of the said Nature by its proper and complete Subsistence must do that Accordingly in the Subject here before us The Principle of Self-Consciousness is no other than the Divine Nature as it is an Infinite Omniscient Mind which absolutely considered both as to its Being and Actings being the same in all the Three Divine Persons can never constitute them Persons nor originally distinguish them And if there be any Distinction in this Infinite Omniscient Mind either as to the Manner of its Subsisting or Acting for in that must lie all the Distinction that it is capable of it must be from the Personal Properties determining and distinguishing both and consequently since this Omniscient Principle and its Actings receive all their Distinction antecedently from the said Personal Properties or Personalities it is impossible that these Properties or Personalities should receive their Distinction from them In short the bare Principle of Self-Consciousness is the Divine Intellect or the Divine Nature as Omniscient which of it self neither is the Person nor constitutes the Person and the Actual Exercise of this Principle belongs to the Person himself who alone can be properly said to Act and therefore must be a Person antecedently to his Acting all Personal Acts proceeding from a Suppositum from both which it follows That Self-Consciousness neither in the Actual Exercise nor yet in the Principle thereof does or can constitute the Divine Persons or be the proper Formal Reason of their Personal Being Vnity and Distinction And whereas he tells us again That every Act of Self-Consciousness proves a distinct Person pag. 66. lin 6 7. This is an old Story and so often repeated that it is almost come to the Cuckow 's Note but he has been frequently told in Answer to it and must be so told again That the Question is not What proves a Person distinct but what makes it so and that not by any sort of Distinction but only by a primary and Original And this is that which I shall abide by and am resolved to hold him to notwithstanding all his Wrigglings and Turnings to get rid of it But it is now high time to remark upon some more of his Absurd Untheological and indeed Scandalous Assertions Which are these Three as we find them p. 67. l. 10. viz. That there are no Modes in the Divine Nature nor secondly any Affections in it nor thirdly that it admits of any Priority so much as in our conceptions of it To which I answer 1. That if there are no Modes in the Divine Nature there are no Persons in it neither For a Person is nothing else but the Godhead determined by a peculiar Incommunicable Mode of Subsistence To the Second I answer That these prime and transcendental Affections of Being viz. Unity Verity and Bonity do and must of necessity belong to the Divine Nature if we own it for a Real Being as I hope this Man does though I am not sure of it And then Thirdly If no Priority of conception is to be allowed in our Discourses about the Divine Nature as being uncapable of any we can never discourse of it as of a Being which has Attributes belonging to it or Immanent Acts flowing from it and resting in it For there is no conceiving of the former but per modum Subjecti Adjuncti nor of the latter but per modum Principii Actionis in both of which there is necessarily implyed a Priority and Posteriority of conception And I shall say no more of this Man here but that in these Assertions he opposes himself to all the Orthodox Divines in Christendom But that is the less to be wondered at if we consider also the Profaneness of some of his expressions here For the Animadverter having urged That Self-Complacency might be as well alleged for the Reason of the Divine Personalities as Self-Consciousness This Man Blasphemously subjoins p. 65. l. 29. Yes and he might as well have added Self-displeasure and Self-condemnation and as many more such Selfs as he could think of Now had the discourse here been of Men that is of weak sinful Mortals he might well enough have mentioned such kind of Selfs as Self-displeasure and Self-Condemnation and the like provided that the omitted not the Prime Self of all and most peculiarly his own which is Self-contradiction But when the discourse here is wholly of the Three Sacred Persons of the Trinity each and every one of which is God blessed for ever for him to affirm Self-Condemnation every whit as applicable to them as Self-Complacency when Self-Condemnation on the one hand must suppose Sin or Folly as the ground of it and Self-Complacency on the other is as essential to and inseparable from all and each of the Divine Persons as any other Divine Perfection can be this let me tell him is downright Blasphemy And therefore in requital of that scurrilous Character of an Ingenious Blunderer which he has so insolently reproached the Animadverter with I must and do here return upon him the just Charge of an Impious Blasphemer and that upon more accounts than this one telling him withal that had he lived in the former Times of our Church his Gown would have been stripped off his back for his detestable Blasphemies and Heresies and some other place found out for him to perch in than the top of St. Paul's where at present he is placed like a Church Weather-Cock as he is notable for nothing so much as standing high and turning round And now if he likes not this kind of Treatment let him thank his own Virulence for it in passing such base Reflections upon one among many more who he might be sure would repay him and certainly will though he has not yet cleared the Debt And thus having shewn that the Animadverter's Arguments against Self-Consciousness are not to be shook by any of this Author 's Pittiful Cavils we will now pass to the Examination of what he opposes to the Arguments brought by the Animadverter against his Muâ—â—â—l Consciousness also Of which the First is this No Act of knowledge can be the formal Reason of an Vnity of Nature in the Persons of the blessed Trinity But an Act of mutual Consciousness is but an Act of Knowledge c. And what answer does he give to this Why the old one viz. That he no where asserts That mutual Consciousness is the formal Reason of this Vnity but only that the Three Persons who are thus mutually conscious â—o each other must be essentially One p. 68. l. 5. To this he has been still answered That though he uses not the Term yet he asserts the Thing And whether he does not so
Reader to consider with me these following Particulars 1. That this Author throughout his whole Vindication wherein he first laid down and verited his new Hypothesis of Self-Consciousness and mutual Consciousness and Three Infinite Minds never so much as once mentions The Principle of either of those Acts even where he yet most professedly undertakes to explain the said Terms in excuse of which it will be in vain for him to take shelter in so speaks and so says and to pretend that we want words to express the meaning of these Notions for surely the word Principle was as obvious and easy to be thought on when he wrote his Vindication as it could be since in the writing this Defence of it 2. That as he made no mention of it in that former Book so neither does he mention it in this Defence where in like manner he delivers and explains his Doctrine about the said Terms and Notions but only when he finds himself pressed by his Adversary and then he flies to it as a shift started on purpose that he may seem to say something to an Argument which he cannot answer 3. That when he mentions this Principle of Consciousness upon this occasion he never expresses what it is or what he means by it when yet he lays all the stress he can upon it to keep off a baffle and when withal it is far from being so clear and certain but that it may be stated more ways than one Fourthly and lastly That if instead of Self-Consciousness and mutual Consciousness the Term Principle of Self-Consciousness and mutual Consciousness were substituted throughout the Writings of this Author it would so utterly pervert them that it would be impossible to make so much as common sense of most of those Passages wherein it should occur All which particulars I desire the Learned Reader to lay together and when he has throughly weighed them to believe if he can that by Self-Consciousness and mutual Consciousness this Author understood only the Principle of these Acts but not the Acts themselves And thus much for what this Man could in reason be presumed to mean by these Terms But then in the Second place The Reader is desired to take notice also That the word Consciousness as determined by the constant and universal use of it will not bear this signification And accordingly I do challenge this confident Man to produce me so much as one English Writer before this New Philosophy came to be treated of in our own Tongue who ever used the word Consciousness of whatsoever sort it was to signify any Thing but the bare Act of the said Consciousness And whereas to support his Arbitrary distinction he would pretend a parallel Case between the Term Consciousness and the Term Reason and thereupon conclude that because Reason is sometimes used to signify the Rational Principle or Power and sometimes also the Act of Reasoning therefore Consciousness may be so used too p. 67. l. 27. I answer That there is no Parity in the Case For as much as there has been frequent and common use which ought to fix the sence of words for such a double signification of the word Reason but none at all for two significations of the word Consciousness And therefore let me tell him further that since Consciousness always imports the Act it cannot answer as a Parallel to the Term Reason as Reason is indifferent to signify either the Act or Principle but as it is limited to the Act and so signifies only Ratiocination And accordingly as Ratiocination can never signify the Principle by which we Reason so neither can Consciousness signify the Principle by which we are conscious to our selves of any Thing So that his allegation of the Principle either of Self-Consciousness as the Reason of Personal Unity and distinction or of mutual Consciousness as the Reason of the essential Unity of the Divine Persons which he had expresly before stated upon the respective Acts of each is nothing else but a Ridiculous shift and the affixing a sence to a word which it never had before and which this Man 's puny Authority â—s far from being sufficient to give it now I have now evinced and that I hope to the full satisfaction of the Judicious Reader that this Author neither did nor could by the Terms Self-Consciousness and mutual Consciousness understand the Principles of these Acts but only the Acts themselves till he was forced to use the word Principle to elude if he could his Adversarie's Argument Nor in the next place That the words themselves can according to their constantly received sence bear any such signification After which That I may leave him no further subterfuge I will now argue the same from the reason of the Thing it self and to that end supposing for the present that he might and did all along mean the Principle and not the Act I will prove that neither can the Principle of mutual Consciousness be the formal Reason of the Essential Vnity of the Divine Persons nor in other words That wherein the Unity of their Nature does consist or whereby they are Naturally and Essentially one God Both which this Author has expresly and in Terminis more than once asserted though his skill reached not to the Philosophical Term made use of by the Animadverter who yet for his own part can indifferently make use of all these Three Expressions as equally for his purpose And here I must premise some things which though they have been sufficiently shewn already yet in dealing with such an Everlasting Tautologist must be repeated again viz. First That the formal Reason of a Thing and the Thing whereof it is the formal Reason do so essentially cohere and coexist in Nature and so imply one Another that there is no conceiving of one without the conception of the other So that in the natural way of our conceiving of any Two objects where either of them may be conceived of without the other there neither of those Two can be the formal Reason of the other Secondly That the Essential Unity of the Divine Persons is not a Specifical but a Numerical Unity of Nature and consequently that the community of one end the â—ame Individual 〈◊〉 to the said Persons is that which renders them naturally and essentially one God Which two considerations being thus laid down I deny the Principle of mutual Consciousness to be the formal Reason of the Unity of the Divine Persons in the same Individual Essence or Nature and that for these following Reasons 1. If the Divine Essence as it subsists in and is common to the Three Divine Persons must according to the Natural order of conceiving Things be conceived of as one in it self before it can be conceived of as the Principle of any Act and particularly that of mutual Consciousness then its being the Principle of that or any other Act in the Divine Persons cannot be the formal Reason of Vnity of Essence in
the said Persons But the former is true and therefore the latter must be so too The consquence is evident from this That the formal Reason of a Thing cannot be conceived of as Posterior to that of which it is the formal Reason And the Truth of the Assumption is as clear because Vnity in order of Nature is the first affection or Attribute of the Divine Essence whether as considered in it self or as subsisting in the Three Persons and therefore must be conceived of antecedently to any other particular Perfection or Attribute belonging to the same and consequently may be conceived of without it too which makes it impossible for any such Perfection or Attribute to be the formal Reason of this Unity Accordingly since there is the same order of Priority and Posteriority between such of the Divine Attributes as immediately affect and relate to the Divine Essence or Being and such as immediately import and relate to some Divine Act which there is between Being and Action themselves and since withal Vnity is the first and principal of the former sort and the Divine Intellect which is the proper immediate Principle of all Acts of Consciousness in the Divine Persons is only an Attribute or Perfection of the second sort it is impossible that the said Principle of mutual Consciousness should be the formal Reason of the Essential Unity of the Divine Persons or that wherein the said Unity of Essence properly consists 2. The Formal Reason that the Three Divine Persons are essentially one God is the Community of One and the same Individual Divine Nature to the said Three Persons But a Principle of mutual Consciousness is not a community of the same Individual Nature to the Three Divine Persons And therefore such a Principle is not the formal Reason that the said Three Persons are essentially one God The Major is proved thus Because we cannot conceive such a community of the same Individual Divine Nature to the Three Persons without conceiving a Numerical Vnity of the said Nature in the said Persons nor vice versa can we conceive the latter without the former The Minor is proved thus No particular perfection of the Divine Nature is properly and formally a Community of the Divine Nature considered under all its perfections But the community of the Divine Nature to the three Persons is a community of the Divine Nature so considered And a Principle of mutual Consciousness is but a Particular Perfection of the Divine Nature viz. the Divine Intellect which is the Divine Nature as formally determined to one particular sort of Acts and Objects and therefore this Principle of mutual Consciousness is not formally the Community of the Divine Nature to all the Three Persons 3. If the Principle of mutual Consciousness in the Divine Persons must be multiplied according to the Number of the said Persons then it is impossible that this Principle should give a Numerical Unity of Essence to those Persons But according to this Author's Hypothesis the Principle of mutual Consciousness is and must be multiplied according to the Number of the Divine Persons and therefore the said Principle can never be the formal Reason of a Numerical Essential Unity in them The consequence is evident For three Numerically distinct Principles can never as such formally give Numerical Unity to any Thing and much less to the most transcendently simple and uncompounded of all Beings as the Divine Nature in the three Persons confessedly is And then as for the Assumption viz. That according to this Author's Hypothesis the Principle of mutual Consciousness must be multiplied according to the Number of the Divine Persons this also is as evident Because he asserts the three Divine Persons to be three distinct Infinite Minds which are Three distinct Essences And since they are so I affirm that the Principle of Action in every Mind or Essence is and must be as distinct as the Mind or Essence which it belongs to and which it is comprehended in And therefore since these three Numerically distinct Minds must have each of them a Numerically distinct Principle of mutual Consciousness it is impossible that these three distinct Principles should either have a Numerical Vnity themselves or give a Numerical Vnity of Essence to the said Three Infinite Minds or to the Divine Persons which this Author holds to be Three such Minds 4. If a Principle of mutual Consciousness may make Three Infinite Minds essentially one Infinite Mind then it may also make Three Infinite Intelligent Persons essentially one Infinite Intelligent Person But this latter is impossible and therefore the former must needs be so too Nevertheless the consequence is evident because according to this Author Infinite Mind and Infinite Intelligent Person are Terms perfectly equipollent p. 32 l. 23. and consequently whatsoever is affirmed or denied of the one must be equally affirmed or denied of the other so that if it be truly affirmed that Three distinct Infinite Minds may by a Principle of mutual Consciousness become essentially one Infinite Mind it may be as truly affirmed that three Infinite Intelligent Persons may become one Infinite Intelligent Person since there is a Perfect equipollence in these Two Predications As for the Assumption That it is impossible for Three Infinite Intelligent Persons to be one Infinite Intelligent Person This is so Self-evident that I suppose neither my Reader not my Adversary unless a Sabellian will expect any further proof of it These are my Reasons upon which I conclude that this new 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a Principle of mutual Consciousness cannot formally give a Numerical Unity of Essence to the Three Divine Persons And I doubt not but this Defender who is such an utter stranger to all Metaphysical Knowledge will call these Arguments as he does others in p. 2. l. 20. of this Defence Thin airy Weapons though by his favour they may be never the less piercing for that but I would have him know That Arguments drawn from and founded upon the general Reason and notions of Things are as strong and conclusive as any that are taken from any particular material objects incurring into the sense And as for the Divine Nature in the Divine Persons the only subject now before us since it is a Being absolutely and entirely simple and as the Schools call it Simplicissimè simplex I affirm that there is no ground of Reason to discourse of it Philosophically upon but the Natural order and distinction of our conceptions of it founded upon the several Modes Acts and Objects belonging to it And this Man who explodes all prius and posterius in the conceptions which our Reason forms of the Deity is extremely Ridiculous and yet withal affirms Three absolute distinct beings as three Minds are in one Numerical Absolute and most simple being is if possible infinitely more so And therefore without adding any thing further I leave the Reader to make himself merry with that silly swaggering Conclusion which he
closes his wretched trifling dodging answer to the Animadverter's Argument with Thus says he All his Arguments vanish like smoak rise in a dark Cloud but immediately disperse and are seen no more till they return as such vapours use to do in Thunder and lightning or some Threatning storm p. 87. at the end But was there ever such a Rhodomontade in words so Big with Nothing and without one grain of sense at the Bottom of them For is this the way to expose an Adversarie's Argument to contempt first to represent it as vanishing into smoak and vapour and afterwards returning in storm and thunder But it shews that his Rhetorick keeps pace with his Logick and that whether he would describe or prove a Thing it is much at the same rate In the mean time the Reader may take this for an Observation that will never fail him viz. That this Author is never so high upon the Huff and Rant as when he is lowest nay and knows himself lowest in Point of Reason And so I pass to the Vindication of the Second Argument Which is this If Vnity of Nature in the Divine Persons be the Cause Reason or Principle of mutual Consciousness in the said Persons then their mutual Consciousness is not the cause or principle of the Vnity of their Nature but the former is true and therefore the latter is so too This is the Argument and a plainer and clearer there cannot well be To which our Author answers thus That the Divine Persons may be thus essentially one by mutual Consciousness or mutual Consciousness may be essential to this Vnity though they could not be thus actually conscious to each other unless they were thus united as to have and to feel each other in themselves Def. p. 68. l. 22. Which Enigmatical obscure and confused stuff if the Reader understands it is well for I profess that I do not But so far as the Term Essential made use of here may seem to make any Thing for his Purpose I answer That mutual Consciousness is Essential to the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons not as that wherein this Unity does consist but as that which is essentially consequent upon it and inseparable from it So that there is an Homonymy in the Term Essential as either importing that Essential Principle wherein the Nature or Essence of a Thing is placed or some thing necessarily resulting from it in which latter sense alone mutual Consciousness is essential to the Unity of the Divine Nature And whereas he says That if by Vnity of Nature in the Divine Persons the Animadverter means the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That he says is indeed a Necessary foundation of this mutual Consciousness but not the immediate Cause of it For that the Fathers he pretends were sensible that this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 could not of it self make this Essential Vnity and therefore added the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which he affirms to be that very mutual Consciousness here maintained by him to perfect it p. 68. l. 27. In which words there are several very vile Heterodoxyes For first I affirm That the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 adequately perfectly and sufficiently makes the Vnity and Identity of the Divine Nature in the Divine Persons and that as I have already shewn not meerly from the force of the word it self but from the peculiar condition of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which it was applyed to which being Infinite could not possibly be otherwise than numerically one and the same and consequently that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or agreement of the Divine Persons in such an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 could be no other than a Numerical Vnity and Identity of Nature belonging to them upon that account And therefore I deny That the Fathers ever reckoned the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 insufficient of it self to make this Unity and challenge him to prove they did And I deny further that they ever alleged the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as an addition to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to perfect this Unity but as an Explication and Illustration of it and I add moreover That the Fathers never accounted this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 either to be mutual Consciousness or to consist in it but to be the mutual Inexistence or Indwelling of the Divine Persons in each other founded upon and resulting from their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mutual Inexistence being no more mutual Consciousness than bare Existence can be said to be Knowledge and lastly I affirm that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ascribed to the Three Divine Persons to which this Author may add his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 too if he pleases is not the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it self but a consequent or effect of it for as much as they are not therefore in one another because they mutually know one another but they thus know one another because by the essential Identity of their Nature they mutually are and exist in one Another All which having been so fully proved in the seventh Chapter of Animadv p. 201 202 203 204 205 206. and the ninth Chapter p. 295. 6 7 8 9. and 300 301. to allege it again is in effect but dictum dicere which though it is the constant practice or rather Trade of this Author is the scorn of the Animadverter But to go on the Animadverter having said as is here alleged That Vnity of Nature is the Cause and Principle of mutual Consciousness which being an Essential Property equally belonging to all Three Persons must issue and result from the Divine Nature and so can have no Antecedent Causal Influx upon the same Nature Our Author in answer to this tells us That mutual Consciousness belongs not immediately to Nature but to Persons p. 69. l. 20. And I dare say he tells us the best he knows But in reply to it I must tell him again That it belongs immediately to both but upon a different account viz. to Nature as the immediately producing Principle of the Act and to the Person as to the immediate proper subject of Denomination from the Act. But he adds That he for his part will not Philosophies upon Antecedent causal Influxes in the Divine Nature p. 69. l. 24. Nor does any one else in the strict proper and Philosophical sense of these Terms pretend to do so but only by accommodating them to help us with the better Method and Distinction to conceive and discourse of so high a Subject as the Divine Nature is And therefore it was not for nothing That he passed over the Nine preliminary Considerations at the beginning of the fourth Chapter of the Animadversions without so much as touching upon them For they would have corrected his Ignorance and taught him how these words are to be understood and used about the Divine Nature and Persons But his Modesty adds That it contents him to know what is Essential not Absolutely to the Vnity of the Divine
Nature but to the Vnity in Trinity p. 69. l. 29. And will this Man say That any Thing can be essential to the Vnity of the one which is not as essential to the Vnity of the other For though we frequently use the word Vnion of Persons yet strictly speaking it is improper since it is not an Vnion which is but another word for Vnition but an Vnity of Persons in Nature or an Vnity of Nature in the Persons which is the proper expression and therefore we neither say an Vnion in Trinity nor a Trinity in Vnion but always apply the word Vnity to both But our Author closes this Paragraph with these words p. 69. at the end That if mutual Consciousness be essential to this Vnity of Nature so that the Three Persons are thus united and cannot be one without it he will contend no further And so far I think he does discreetly but too late For whether he will contend further or no his Adversary both does and will for as much as this Author has asserted a great deal more than what this Concession amounts to and if he does not prove all that he has asserted he is a baffled Person For he has positively asserted as we have shewn from his own words that mutual Consciousness makes the Three Divine Persons to be Naturally one p. 66. Def. 26. and to be essentially one God Vind. p. 68. l. 6. And this by his favour is quite another thing from only asserting that mutual Consciousness is essential to that Vnity of Nature which is in the Three Persons For that it may be as it is an essential consequent of the said Unity of Nature and no more As also from asserting as he here does p. 69. l. the last That the three Divine Persons cannot be one without it For surely that which is only a Conditio sine quâ non and without which the said Divine Persons cannot be one in Nature and that which formally makes them so or wherein their Vnity does consist are wholly different Things And therefore since it is manifest that this Man has no Logick I heartily wish that he had some shame In the mean time he is for shewing as well as he can how the Animadverter mistakes the whole matter in these words quoted from him Anim. p. 108. l. 14. The Divine Nature or Essence being one and the same in all the Three Persons there is upon this account one and the same knowledge in them also And they are not one in Nature by vertue of their mutual Consciousness but they are therefore mutually conscious because the Perfect Unity and Identity of their Nature makes them so Thus the Animadverter and where is now the mistake why our Author tells us That Three Persons who have the same Nature may know the same Things without feeling one another's thoughts and knowledge in themselves p. 70. l. 22. To which I answer first That the foundation of this reply is That there is such a thing as Feeling in God distinct from knowledge which is the height of nonsence and Absurdity as shall be declared before we pass from this head of mutual Consciousness Secondly I utterly deny That Persons who have the same Divine Nature can know the same Things I mean all the same Things for that only here can be insisted upon without knowing each other's thoughts and knowledge in themselves For as much as whatsoever each of these Divine Persons knows he does and must know by an Infinite Act of Knowledge comprehending both himself and the other Two Persons and all that is Knowable in the World besides and how each of the Divine Persons can know all this without mutually knowing one another I desire this Man to shew But he argues further That if by one and the same knowledge the Animadverter means that the knowledge of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons is but one Individual Act as the knowledge of one single Person is this destroys the Distinction of Persons which cannot be distinct without distinct personal Acts as mutual knowledge is and destroys mutual Consciousness for there is no place for mutual Consciousness or mutual Knowledge where there is but one single Act of Knowledge p. 70. l. 24. In answer to which I observe these Two Notable Instances of his Great Ignorance First His supposing and taking for granted the very Thing in dispute between him and his Adversary viz. That the Distinction of the Divine Persons depends upon certain Distinct Acts of Knowledge as the cause or antecedent Reason of that Distinction whereas his Adversary on the contrary affirms all Distinction of Divine Knowledge as well as all Diversification of the Divine Nature it self to be from the Distinction or distinct Subsistence of the Divine Persons as the Prime and original Reason of it And whereas this Author says again That the Divine Persons cannot be distinct without Distinct Personal Acts as mutual knowledge is it is true That they cannot be without them as Inseparably consequent upon their Personal Distinction but not as constituent of it Secondly The other Instance of his Ignorance here is his affirming that there can be no place for mutual Consciousness or Knowledge where there is but one single or Individual Act of Knowledge Which I utterly deny as false and in order to the proving it so I do here observe That there is but one single Act of Knowledge in all the Three Divine Persons that is to say single as to the Substance of the Act though diversified by the several modifications which it receives from the Persons whom it proceeds from and from the several respects it bears to the several objects it terminates upon Which different modifications and respects do by no means infer diverse or distinct Acts of Knowledge but only variously modify determine and distinguish one and the same Act. Accordingly in the present Case I do here affirm to this Author That mutual Consciousness is nothing else but one and the same Act of Divine Knowledge differently modified as it proceeds severally and after a different manner from Father Son and Holy Ghost as the Persons knowing and jointly terminated in them all as the objects known as on the other side Self-Consciousness is no more than this one and the same Act of Knowledge as it issues only from one of the Persons and terminates upon the same too Though I confess if the Three Divine Persons were Three distinct Minds or Spirits mutual Consciousness could not be one Act only but must be Three This I hold concerning the Divine Knowledge and the respective distinctions of it and I leave this Author to try his best skill in Divinity and Philosophy to confute it In the mean time he gives us one Absurdity more out of his inexhaustible stock viz. That the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ascribed by the Fathers to the Three Divine Persons is that very mutual Consciousness which the Dean means For these are his words p. 7.
of Essence Nature or Substance common to all Three But I shall now apply my self particularly to answer his noisome extravagant Ignorance in reproaching even to the degree of Insultation all use or admission of Priority and Posteriority of Conception in apprehending or discoursing of the Divine Nature And in order to this I shall lay before the Reader some of his expressions concerning it as p. 73. l. 20. After all this huffing and swaggering says he This notable dispute issues in a meer Metaphysical subtilty about the natural order of our conceptions of Things But by his favour they are not meer conceptions and no more but conceptions founded in the Nature and Reason of the Thing which they are imployed about as it exerts different Acts respects different objects and sustains different Relations and Considerations thereupon But he goes on What confounded work says he does this make with the pure simple uncompounded Eternal Nature of God so to prove a Priority or Posteriority of Being or Causality in the Divine Nature from the order of our Conceptions p. 74. l. 22. But can this Man make it appear That any Philosopher and Divine does this No they do not pretend to prove a Priority or Posteriority of Being or Causality in the Divine Nature from the order of our Conceptions for they professedly disavow it But they say and affirm that there can be no discoursing of the Divine Nature by any Humane Reason but by such an order of Priority and Posteriority in our Conceptions of it This Sir is their affirmation and the other is your Lye For neither do Philosophers nor Divines ascribe these Things to God formally but only Virtually and Eminently viz. That God as a pure simple Act or Being performs all those Acts immediately by one simple efficiency or exertion of himself Which a finite Being cannot do but by several Acts Powers Faculties and sometimes Parts enabling it to operate and produce Things No Man I say ascribes these things to the Divine Nature in the strict and Philosophical sense of the Terms but by way of Analogy to what reason observes in the Creature and that also founded upon God's own condescension to describe and represent himself to us in this manner And what the Animadverter says in the fifth Preliminary of his fourth Chapter is sufficient to blow off all these senseless Cavils viz. That when the Terms Cause formal Reason Constituent or Productive Principle and the like are used about the Divine Nature and Persons they are not to be understood as applicable to them in the strict and proper signification of the said Terms but only by way of Analogy as really meaning no more than a causal or necessary Dependance of one Notion or Conceptus objectivus upon Another so that it is impossible for the Mind to conceive distinctly of the one but as depending upon or proceeding from the other In answer to all which I defy this Man to speak Three words of sence if he can And whereas he Ignorantly says That all such Conceptions are false p. 74. l. 33. I must tell him on the contrary That where nothing is affirmed or denied as in bare conceptions nothing is there can be no Falshood It is a common Rule and Maxim in Philosophy and not to be over born by this weak man's little Objections That Abstrahentium non est mendacium For to consider one thing without another though it neither is nor can be without the other is no Falshood And the chief thing by which we form several distinct Conceptions of the Divine Nature is this Abstraction by which the Mind first considers one Conceptus Objectivus without the other and then considers and compares both together according to the respect they may have to each other and the Natural Order which that places them in But I shall try what Metal that Confidence is made of which thus explodes all Priority and Posteriority in our Conceptions of God by these following Questions As first I demand of this man Whether he does not own a Necessity of our forming several Inadequate Conceptions of God and that we have no other way of conceiving of him This I am sure he has asserted several times and if he had not the whole World does and therefore in the next place I ask him Whether many of these Inadequate Conceptions do not imply a necessary and essential dependance of one upon the other and if so Whether it be possible for the Mind of Man to form a Conception of one thing depending upon another but seoundùm Prius Posterius Again I demand of him Whether we can consider God as an Intelligent Being and Agent endued with Vnderstanding Will and Power as he in Scripture represents himself and as we must conceive of him if we conceive and discourse of him at all without conceiving of him as willing a thing before he does it and as understanding it before he wills it And again I demand of him Whether the Divine Nature and Persons consider'd all together are not one pure simple uncompounded Act or Being I am sure all Orthodox Divines affirm it And yet I demand of this man Whether he or any one alive can conceive of the Father as begetting and of the Son as begotten and of the Holy Ghost as proceeding from both without a Priority and Posteriority in the conceptions we form of them And lastly to instance in his own whimsical Notion of Self-consciousness and mutual Consciousness I challenge him to prove it possible for the Mind of Man to conceive how the Divine Persons can be mutually conscious to one-another but subsequently to each Person 's being first conscious to himself forasmuch as their several Self-consciousnesses are properly the Object of their mutual Consciousness and so in order of Nature cannot but be before it Nay and to go further Does not this very man in stating his Self-consciousness and mutual Consciousness distinguish between the Act and the Principle Which tho' it be but a meer Shift as has been shewn is yet a good Argument against himself For can any one conceive of a Principle but as Prior to the Act In fine I challenge this equally Insolent and Heterodox man to satisfie the World about him by a clear and positive Answer to these two Questions 1 st Whether all Divines Schoolmen and Philosophers excepting perhaps such as Conradus Vorstius and Crellius in their Books de Attributis Dei do not in treating of the Divine Nature unanimously acknowledge and affirm That God is a Pure Simple Vncompounded Act Essence or Being And 2 dly Whether notwithstanding this acknowledgment and affirmation they do not universally treat of God in Terms necessarily importing and requiring a Priority and Posteriority of Conception But why do I dispute against such sottish Paradoxes which all the Schools in Christendome would hiss or rather spit at the Author of them for But this poor ambitious Animalculum Gloriae has been always affecting to
Mind and there be Three Infinite Minds it must follow That each of these Infinite Minds distinctly and by himself considered is God not that these are Three distinct Gods but one God p. 84. l. 7. But I affirm that it must follow not only That each of them distinctly is God but that each of them is a distinct God For since he grants God and Infinite Mind to be Terms equipollent and since Terms equipollent must have the same Predicates and consequents if the Term Distinct be ascribed to and predicated of Infinite Mind it must be predicated of and ascribed to the Term God as to the other equipollent and so one must be as distinct as the other and then if each Infinite Mind be â— distinct God Three Infinite Minds must be Three distinct Gods if there be any such thing as consequence in the World In a word Distinction and Multiplication are according to this Author Predicates belonging to Infinite Mind and therefore by vertue of the equipollency of the Terms they must equally belong to God too But this is not all that follows from this Man's Assertions For as he grants here that the Terms Infinite Mind and God are equipollent so he affirms p. 82. l. 24. That God and Infinite Intelligent Person are Terms equipollent also whereupon by the Rule of equipollency if there be but one God there can be but one Infinite Intelligent Person likewise For as much as both equipollents must have the same Predicates and consequents belonging to them Which certainly represents this Author's Hypothesis as the greatest Monster that ever the Tongue or Pen of Man brought forth For first by owning the equipollency of God and Infinite Mind and withal asserting Three Infinite Minds he inevitably brings in Tritheism and next by asserting the equipollency of God and Infinite Intelligent Person and thereby a Singularity of one as well as of the other he does as necessarily run into the contrary Heresy which is Sabellianism And so I pass from the equipollency of Terms to the second Part of my Answer which was to examine whether the Term Three distinct Infinite Persons does not as much infer a Plurality of Gods as the Term Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits does Which the Defender here affirms and the Animadverter as positively denies And both the Reason of his Denial and the Difference of the Case are very full and clear And 〈◊〉 in This That Three distinct Minds are Three distinct Absolute Beings Three Essences Three Natures each existing by it self without requiring any subject to inhere in or to be supported by And every such Numerical Nature or Essence must have its Numerical distinct Attributes or Predicates so belonging to it that one and the same Numerical Attribute cannot belong to any other Numerical Distinct Nature besides but that each Numerical Nature must have its Numerically distinct Attributes confined wholly to it self whereupon one and the same Numerical Infinity which is a Natural Attribute cannot belong to more Numerically Distinct Natures than to one alone But now on the other side Three Divine Persons are not Three distinct Natures Essences or Absolute Beings existing by themselves as Minds or Spirits do but Three Modifications or Relative Subsistences of one and the same Nature in which they all exist together as in their subject and cannot possibly exist by themselves without it whereupon as one Numerical Nature is common to these several Subsistences so the Numerical Infinity of the said Nature must together with it belong in common to the same In short Three Distinct Minds being Three Distinct Essences or Natures existing by themselves can never be Infinite by one Numerical Infinity any more than one Numerical Nature belonging in common to them But on the contrary Three Divine Persons being properly Three Subsistences of one and the same Nature may have one and the same Infinity as well as Nature belonging to them all But you will say when there is mention of Three distinct Infinite Persons does not the Term Distinct being joined to the Term Infinite import a distinction and consequently a Plurality of Infinites and so of Gods too I answer No Because the Term distinct though next in place to the Term Infinite yet being but an Attribute must immediately in construction affect the Term Persons as the proper subject of it and not the Term Infinite which is but another Attribute it self and immediately affects the same subject too So that Three distinct Infinite Persons signify but as much as Three distinct Persons who are Infinite the Term distinct being here exegetical of the Numeral Term Three and so belonging directly to the Persons not to their Infinity just as if we should say Three distinct Omniscient or Omnipotent Persons the Term distinct belongs immediately and directly to the Persons and is not properly an Attribute of their Omniscience or Omnipotence In like manner the Divine Persons are said to be Three distinct Infinite Persons but how not by three distinct Infinities of which each Person has one of it self but by one and the same Numerical Infinity common to all Three And yet I own that even this one common Infinity belongs distinctly that is to say after a distinct manner to each of the Divine Persons even as the Divine Nature it self does And this is what I insist upon as the True state of this matter and shall add no more but leave it to the Learned and Impartial Reader to judge of the Disparity of the Case for nothing can prove a parallel in the Two forecited Instances or in the consequences of them but that which prove Three absolute entire Beings or Essences and Three Râ—lative subsistences of one Numerical Being or Essence to be the same and that one and the same Numericall Attribute may as well belong to Three such Absolute entire Beings or Essences as to one Numerical absolute Being under Three distinct Modes or Relations And by this we may judge of the Truth of the Defender's following words viz. That the Adimadverter was aware That the Objection of Three Gods would lye against Three Persons as well as against Three Minds p. 85. l. 13. To which I answer that the Animadverter never judged so but yet judged it the Part of a Disputant to answer any seeming Objection against the Truth defended by him and accordingly he produced and answered this as such an one and no better But how did he answer it Why by shewing that there was this difference between them viz. That the Notion of a Person in the Godhead essentially importing an Absolute Being under a certain Relation afforded something for the Divine Persons to be distinguished by and something for them to agree in but that the Notion of a Mind or Spirit importing nothing but a bare Absolute simple Being without any such Relation Three Infinite Minds or Spirits could not be otherwise distinguished from one Another but by that whole Absolute Being or Nature and consequently by
a Total Distinction This Argument the Defender repeats adding withal That the sum of it amounts to no more but this viz. That Three distinct Minds are Three distinct Gods because they are distinguished l. 20. But will this shameless Falsificator say so and affirm That for several Beings or Essences to be distinguished by the whole of what they are is no more than barely to be distinguished For are there not partial Distinctions and modal distinctions and accidental distinctions of some things and will this Ignoramus say That Things thus distinguished are distinguished by the whole of what they are But says he again If notwithstanding this Distinction they are essentially and inseparably one they are not Three distinct Gods p. 85. l. 22. And no doubt they are not so if they are essentially one as on the contrary they must be so if they are not essentially one But then can there be a grosser Absurdity in Nature than to suppose it possible for Three distinct Essences as three distinct Minds are to be essentially one I must tell this Author that it is a contradiction in the Terms All distinction of Essences by themselves being as the very Term imports an Essential Distinction of the same and for Three essentially distinct Things to be essentially one is for them to be Three and One Distinct and not Distinct in the same respect which is absolutely impossible and would utterly confound the Distinction and Vnity of the Divine Pesons which can never be Both of the same kind And I am confident that there is hardly a Sophister of a Years standing in either of the Universities but would look upon this Proposition viz. That Three distinct Essences or essentially distinct Minds may yet be essentially one as much fitter to be hissed at than disputed against But says the Defender are not Three Infinite Intelligent Persons as much Three Absolute simple Beings and Essences as Three Minds p. 85. l. 27. No He has been told again and again that they are not and that because Three Persons are only Three distinct Relative Subsistences of one and the same Infinite Intelligent Being or Essence included in all and each of them Whereupon he repeats these following words out of the Animadversions viz. That the Divine Persons are Three Relatives or one simple Being or Essence under Three distinct Relations and consequently differ from one another not wholly and by all that is in them but only by some mode or respect peculiar to each and upon that account causing their distinction Thus the Animadverter And what says Sir Scorn and Ignorance to this Why that it is all perfect Gibberish That is in other words That he is not able to answer or refute one Tittle of it For let me tell His Emptiness that such Gibberish as it is it is the Language used by all the Divinity-Schools in Christendom in the Explication and account they give of this great Point of Divinity And accordingly I have transcribed the whole Passage as avowing every Syllable of it against this Ignorant Assumer and desiring the Learned Reader to pass his strictest Examination and his severest censure upon it But let us see what follows And here he asks the Question What the Three Divine Persons in the Vnity of the Divine Essence are Three Relations Three Modes Three Respects without some Being p. 86. l. 17. I answer That they are neither Three bare Modes nor Relations or Respects but Three Relative Subsistences or Subsisting Relations of one and the same Infinite Divine Nature Essence or Mind included in and belonging to all and each of the said Subsistences This is the Account which I have given and still give of the Three Divine Persons and which as I told him before I shall firmly abide by and therefore without asking any more such silly Questions let him reckon upon it and set himself to confute it and prove that it makes the Divine Persons Three meer Modes or Relations if he can And whereas he says That Three Relatives are not Three Relations but Three Things related to each other p. 85. l. 15. I answer that the first part of his Assertion viz. That Three Relatives are not Three Relations is a meer Childish Cavil For both Person and Relation are sometimes taken in an Abstract and sometimes in a Concrete sence and no Body says that Persons are properly called Relations but thus concretely taken and as Relation implies the Essence conjoined with it though yet to help us to a better and more distinct conception of these Things we are sometimes forced to conceive and speak of one as Abstracted from the other but still as the Schools observe Relative and Relation in Divinis are not really distinct Things but one and the same Thing under several ways of Conception and Expression But it is the latter part of his Assertion in which we are most concerned viz. That Three Relatives are Three Things related to each other Where if he understands the word Things in a strict Metaphysical sence for Three distinct entire Beings or Essences I deny That the Three Divine Persons are in this sence Three Things related to each other But one Thing that is to say one entire Being or Essence under Three distinct Relations or Relative Subsistences mutually respecting or referring to one Another And this indeed is the Point which this Man has been driving at all along viz. That each of the Divine Persons has a distinct entire Being or Essence of its own belonging to it and that as really distinct from the Beings or Essences of the other two as one Being or Essence can be distinguished from another Which I affirm to be perfect Rank downright Tritheism Whereupon he tells us again with his usual Confidence and no Proof That though the Three Divine Persons may with respect to their Three Real subsistences be called Three Infinite Eternal Minds yet they are not Three Absolute simple Beings or Essences p. 87. l. 19. To which I answer First That the Term Mind is a Term properly importing Nature not Subsistence and consequently That the Divine Persons can never be called Three distinct Minds barely from their being Three distinct Subsistences since all these subsistences may be in one and the same Infinite Mind but from their being Three distinct Natures or Essences which because they can never be neither can they be called Three distinct Minds Secondly I affirm That the Term Mind universally signifies an Absolute Being and that to talk of a Mind that is not an Absolute Being is as much as to talk of a Man that is not an Animal Rationale and so well am I assured of this That I do here Challenge this Man to produce me so much as one Classick one Scholastick or Theological Writer or Christian Council that ever used the word Mind of Minds in any other signification than that of an Absolute Being or Essence And therefore when he shall have proved That Three Minds are not
Power it self inseparable both from the Essence which they belong to as also from one Another which distinct Minds can never be But the Defender adds That the True and short answer to the Animadverter's Argument is That the same Substance repeated in Three distinct Subsistences is not Three Substances but one p. 90. ibid. In answer to which he has been sufficiently told already That the Term Repeating the Divine Substance or Nature is New Odd and Unjustifiable and such as the Catholick Church never made use of and for that cause ought utterly to be condemn'd and thrown aside But for a further answer to it I do first affirm in general That for the same numerical Nature or Substance to be repeated is impossible and a contradiction Repetition as we have shewn being nothing else but Another Production In the second place I deny in particular that there is any such Thing as a Repetition of the Divine Substance or Nature in Three Subsistences The said Nature indeed is and exists in Three Subsistences but I absolutely deny that it is repeated in them and it will concern this Bold Novellist to prove as well as assert that it is so In the mean time it is no small shame and calamity to the Church that he is not called to account for such horrible Innovations But the Animadverter had argued further against Three distinct Substances in the Godhead thus That if the Three Persons are Three distinct Substances then Two distinct Substances will concur in and belong to each Person to wit That Substance which is the Divine Essence and so is communicable or common to all the Persons and that substance which constitutes each Person and thereby is so peculiar to him as to distinguish him from the other and consequently to be incommunicable to any besides him to whom it belongs since for one and the same substance to be common to all Three Persons and withal to belong incommunicably to each of the Three and thereby to distinguish them from one Another is contradictious and impossible And what can this Man oppose to this Argument with the least shew or shaddow of Reason What part of it does he deny Or what Term of it does he distinguish For the Argument proceeds upon his own supposal at present that the Three Persons are Three distinct Substances as the Animadverter had fully proved them to be before Why all that he says is That he is heartily ashamed and sorry good Man to see such stuff as must necessarily expose our Faith to the scorn of Atheists and Infidels and therefore that he may not contribute to it he graciously declares that all this Non-sense shall escape the lash of his Pen p. 91. l. 22. That is according to his constant never failing way he is then highest in Noise and Vapour when he is brought most to a Nonplus But I have some Answers of another sort to make to this passage alleged out of him As first That whatsoever his Sorrow in this Case may be he will hardly convince the World that he has any shame Secondly That to expose our Holy Faith to the scorn of Atheists and Infidels by one's Folly and Nonsense is very bad But that to make Atheists and Infidels by one's Scandalous Writings and more scandalous Practices is much worse Thirdly That nothing does or can more expose our Holy Faith to the scorn of Atheists and Infidels than for any one who wears but the Name of a Christian to assert Three Gods which Three distinct Infinite Minds Spirits or Substances upon all the Principles of common Reason and Philosophy certainly and undeniably are and withal that there can be no Non-sense comparable to the asserting Three distinct Absolute Infinites And fourthly and lastly Whereas he says That all the Non-sense of the foregoing Argument as he calls every thing which he cannot Answer shall escape the lash of his Pen I would have this poor Whipster know that the Animadverter is far from dreading the lash of that Pen which never yet drew blood of any one but of Priscian And so having answered his compassionate Preamble in behalf of our suffering Faith forsooth we will now see what he has to say upon occasion of the Animadverter's Argument for it can be no more called an Answer to it than to that Learned Reply made to his Hobbian Vindication of his Case c. And in order to this I demand of him first Whether that one Infinite common Essence or Substance which formally unites the Divine Persons together does or can formally distinguish them also from one another Secondly Whether since he utterly denies all Modes as well as Accidents in God that which distinguishes each Person from the other can be any thing else but a Substance there being nothing in Nature conceievable by the Mind of Man but what is either a Substance an Accident or a Mode of Being and I defy this Man or any one besides to give Instance of a fourth which is none of these And Thirdly and lastly Whether each Person hereupon must not either have Two Substances belonging to him viz. One uniting him to and the other distinguishing him from the rest or be both united and distinguished by one and the same substance common to them all Both of which are Impossible This is the Argument though after another and more particular manner proposed and I Challenge this Piece of a Disputant to overthrow any one Part or Proposition of it by solid and clear Reason for fooling and flounceing and throwing out the word Non-sense from a plentiful stock within will not do it But to shew how wofully he is hampered see what desperate assertions he advances p. 91 92. for the disentangling himself And first in p. 91. l. 28. he roundly tells us That the Dean knows not any distinction between the Divine Essence and a Divine Person but that the Essence makes the Person In which words there are Two as false and Heterodox Propositions as can well be delivered by any one professing Divinity viz. First That there is no distinction between the Divine Essence or Substance and the Divine Persons And secondly That the Divine Essence makes the Person Both of which I will distinctly examine and first as to the first of them I affirm That the Divine Essence is and cannot but be vertually and fundamentally distinguished from the Persons That is to say it affords a Reason and Foundation in the Thing it self sufficient for the Mind to form thereupon a different Conception of the Divine Essence from the Conception of the Divine Persons by proper and Metaphysical abstraction and that so distinct that the Conceptus objectivus of one neither is nor can be the Conceptus objectivus of the other And if this distinction or rather distinguishableness should not be admitted in the Divine Nature and Persons as founded upon some Reason in the Things so distinguished I desire this Man to tell me upon what account it is
have shewn be not an Attribute which imports only some particular perfection of the Divine Nature but the Subject of all such Attributes yet in these Propositions The Father is God the Son is God and the Holy Ghost is God it is a Logical Attritube in every one of them And let him champ upon this till he breaks his Teeth upon it if he pleases But as Men sometimes in a drunken fit cry out Fire Fire not from what they see without them but from what they feel within So this Man out of an Internal plenitude of Ignorance cries out here in most Tragical manner What will this Animadverter make of God at last when the Divine Essence is an Attribute and a Divine Person a mere Mode p. 94. l. 30. In answer to which as it has been sufficiently explaiend how the Animadverter makes the Divine Essence concretely expressed by the Term God an Attribute so if this Defender will say further That he makes a Divine Person a mere Mode I do here Challenge him to point out that place in the Animadversions where the Animadverter says so He has indeed over and over declared and that without shuffling from his words to his meaning That he holds a Divine Person to be properly the Divine Nature under such a certain mode of Subsistence or in other Terms such a certain mode of Subsistence of the Divine Nature still including the said Nature in it This I say the Animadverter all along holds and asserts and if this Man calls this the making a Divine Person a meer Mode as it is a gross and direct falshood and utterly disowned by his Adversary so should I take the Liberty of calling Things by their own proper names it might justly entitle him to a very coarse one Now the Proposition from first to last asserted by this Author is this That the Three Divine Persons are Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits which the Animadverter affirmed to be contrary to the Athanasian Creed as he shewed by casting it into the same Form and consequently that if the said Form were a True way of Reasoning concerning the Divine Nature and Persons This Proposition ought to be rejected as utterly inconsistent with it And how does our Author counter-argue this Why why by running out into an Impertinent proof that Infinite Mind belongs distinctly to the Three Divine Persons and consequently may be distinctly predicated of each of them Both which are as easily granted him as they can be alleged by him But by his favour the Question here is not Whether each of the Divine Persons be distinctly an Infinite Mind but whether each of them be a distinct Infinite Mind which this Defender affirms and that so positively that he lays the whole stress of his Hypothesis upon it in these remarkable words That if every Person in the Trinity considered as a distinct Person be not a distinct Infinite and Eternal Mind there is an end of the Dean's Notion Def. p. 8. at the end And the Animadverter on the other side as positively denies each of the Divine Persons to be a distinct Infinite Mind or that the Term Distinct Infinite Mind can be truly predicated of or belong to any of the Persons of the Blessed Trinity And therefore for the clearing of this matter and that even to this Man's Understanding if possible we must always distinguish between Attributing a Distinct Thing to each Distinct Person and between Attributing a Thing distinctly to the said Person For there is a vast Difference between these Two and yet this Author perpetually confounds them and still from the latter infers the former which is a manifest Paralogism à Dicto secundùm Quid ad dictum simpliciter viz. to conclude absolutely a diverse or Distinct Thing from a diverse or distinct mode of a Thing As for instance Omnipotence belongs to each of the Divine Persons distinctly but that does not prove that there is a distinct Omnipotence belonging to each of them but only one and the same Omnipotence belonging to the Three Persons according to Three distinct ways and what I have said of Omnipotence holds equally in Omniscience or Infinite Intelligence and in all the Essential Divine Attributes besides For a Thing 's belonging distinctly to the Three Divine Persons distinctly considered imports no more but that it belongs after a distinct manner to each of them so considered which one and the same Infinite Being may without any multiplication of it self very well do But says our Author The Athanasian Form does not forbid us to attribute to each distinct Person what is common to all Three for it does it expresly by affirming that the Father is Vncreate the Son Vncreate and the Holy Ghost Vncreate p. 96. l. 10. In which words as by the Term Vncreate I affirm ought to be understood an Vncreate Being or Essence So I readily grant that Father Son and Holy Ghost distinctly considered are each of them an Vncreate Being but for all that shall never grant each of them to be a distinct Vncreate Being But utterly deny That the Father is a distinct Vncreate Being the Son a distinct Vncreate Being and the Holy Ghost a distinct Vncreate Being as being all of them Propositions absolutely false and founded upon this perpetual Blunder That he shifts the Term distinct from the Subject to the Predicate still arguing thus That because every distinct Person distinctly considered is an Infinite Mind therefore every such Person so considered is a distinct Infinite Mind Which no Logick or Rule of Consequence will or can infer And therefore whereas he makes the Animadverter give this as the Reason of the Athanasian Predication That what is common to all Three Persons does not distinctly belong to each Def. p. 96. l. 22. I must tell him That it is false For the Animadverter affirms the same Nature which is common to all the Persons to belong distinctly to each Person but nevertheless denies That in the same respect in which it is common to all it does or can belong distinctly to any one For it belongs to all as an Essence or Being absolutely considered but it belongs distinctly to each Person according to a distinct way or mode of subsisting which the said Being or Essence has in each Person and consequently since the same Divine Essence or Being has Three Distinct ways of subsisting it does according to each of them belong distinctly to each Person Yet still as I said before not as a distinct Being or Essence in any Person And whereas this Man states the Reason of the Athanasian Form upon this That the Divine Perfections distinctly existing in the Divine Persons are so inseparably united as to be essentially one p. 96. l. 26. That is still Trumping the same old Petitio Principii upon the Reader for it is still positively denied him and will be so for ever That an Inseparable Vnion of Three distinct Infinite Minds were such an Vnion possible can make the said
in Unity is a very plain and intelligible Notion Vind. p. 73. l. 17. from whence follows another Proposition viz. the 15. That the Divine Persons have no other Distinction but what they have by Self-Consciousness and no other Vnion but what they have by mutual Consciousness And consequently That the Trinity thus stated really amounts to no more than a Council or Cabal of Gods and that it is in no degree so much Prophaneness for the Socinians to call it so as for this Man by his Three distinct Infinite Minds to make it so 16. The Three Divine Persons in the Godhead are not only modally distinguished Vind. p. 83. l. last But generally all the Divines in Christendom hold them to be so distinguished and no otherwise 17. There are no Modes no more than there are Qualities and Accidents in the Deity Vind. p. 84. l. first 18. Persons distinct yet not separate but essentially one by mutual Consciousness do not act upon each other Def. p. 73. l. 23. 19. The Divine Nature or Essence is not a single or singular Nature Def. p. 18. l. 13. 20. It is absurd to say That the one Divine Nature of the Father the Son and Holy Ghost is Incarnate and yet none but the Son Incarnate Def. p. 18. l. last and p. 19. l. first 21. One single Essence can subsist but once or have but one Subsistence Def. p. 19. l. 23. and p. 24. l. 29. and yet for all this it follows 22. One Eternal Infinite Mind is repeated in Three Subsistences Def. p. 94. l. 6. 23. There is no Distinction between the Divine Essence and a Divine Person Def. p. 91. l. 28. And yet all Divines speak of the Divine Essence as communicable or common to the Persons and account of the former as Absolute and of the latter as Relative and that surely â—mports Distinction 24. The Divine Essence makes the Person ibid. 25. The Divine Essence must be acknowledged to be a Person Def. p. 92. l. 19. 26. No man has an Idea of an Intelligent Nature or Essence distinguished from a Person Def. p. 92. l. 10. 27. Infinite Mind and Infinite Intelligent Person are Terms as equipollent and convertible as God and infinite Mind Def. p. 81. l. 23 c. 28. There are in God Acts of Sensation of a different kind and species from Acts of Knowledge and Self-Consciousness and mutual Consciousness are of the former sort Def. p. 77. l. 10 c. 29. It is the Soul only that can be happy or miserable rewarded or punished in or out of the Body Def. 54. l. 31. And if so what need say I can there be of a Resurrection Such Doctrines certainly back'd with Licence and Authority may come to something in time 30. We can frame no Idea of Substance but what we have from Matter Vind. p. 69. l. first 31. We cannot imagine how any Substance should be without a Beginning Vind. p. 70. l. 6. And if that be true then I affirm that Nothing can be imagined to be so 32. The Nature of a Spirit consists in Vital internal Sensation Def. p. 7. l. 11. 33. The Unity of a Spirit consists in Continuity of Sensation Def. ibid. 34. One Numerical Nature whether Finite or Infinite may be repeated without being multiplied Of the first whereof he often gives us an Instance in a man and his living Image Def. p. 91. l. 10. and of the other in the Divine Nature it self Def. p. 31. l. first 35. A man and his living Image are two distinct men though the Image is not another man Def. p. 31. l. 19 21. 36. An Image is wholly and entirely the same with the Prototype Def. p. 28. l. 16. 37. The Soul is the person and the Body only the Organ or Instrument of it Def. p. 51. l. 2. p. 57. l. 11. and p. 58. l. 16. 38. The whole entire Personality is in the Soul Def. p. 50. l. 20. 39. The Soul is the person and the Body is taken into the Unity of the said person Def. p. 60. l. 22. 40. The Soul is not properly part of the Person Def p. 61. l. 3. 41. The Body is not a Part of the Person Def. p. 60. l. 23. 42. The Soul is a Complete Being Def. p. 49. l. 30. 43. The Soul may be a complete and perfect Person and yet not a perfect Man Def. p. 49. l. 28 Whereas a Person implies all the essential perfections of a Man and something more 44. A Man with a Body Blind Deaf and Lame is not a perfect Man viz. upon a Natural and essential Account not so Def. p. 50. l. 10. 45. All Union between Natures is a Natural Union Def. p. 49. l. 16. 46. The Soul is as much the same with or without the Body as the Body with or without its Cloaths Def. p. 60. l. 29. 47. Unless there be two Personalities as well as Two Natures viz. Soul and Body the Two Natures cannot be two parts of one human Personality as they are parts of a Man Def. 45. l. 25. Now what gross Ignorance is this For an human Personality no less than a Particular Humanity essentially and metaphysically implies and connotes Parts Though only the Person and Man himself in the Concrete is actually and Physically compounded of them To which I add that Two Personalities can never be two parts of any essential compound whatsoever but Two Natures may and in the Present instance certainly are See this further explained p. 115 116. These Propositions with several others like them are his New Dogmata in Divinity and Philosophy which as they are most absurd and false in themselves so the Consequences of many of them with reference to the Incarnation of our Blessed Saviour I leave to the Thinking and Judicious Reader himself to draw out and to the Church â—oâ— judge of And possibly some time or other Foreigners also may be presented with a View of them in a Language which they understand better than they do ours THE CONTENTS Humbly Presented To the Reader 's perusal before he proceeds to read the following BOOK AN Account of the Civil Language bestowed by the Defender upon the Animadverter and Animadversions Pag. 2 3 The Objection about the word Mystery proved only the Blunder of the Objector 4. The Defender wearies the Reader with a nauseous Repetition of his old confuted Hypothesis without any new Argument to enforce it 7 He begins it with a gross Vntruth 7 8 9 He adds another as gross 9 10 c. He does not as he falsly affirms concur perfectly with the School-men in stating the Unity of the Godhead 11 The Vnconceivableness of the Mystery of the Trinity never accounted by the Christian Church any Objection against it at all 12 The Fathers way of explaining the Trinity wrongfully slighted and reflected upon by this Author 12 13 14 There is no such thing as Spiritual Sensation it being no better than a Contradiction in Adjecto 15 16 c. The
between Three Infinite Persons and Three Infinite Minds 228 A Syllogism very learnedly form'd by this Defender for his old Friends the Socinians with two Terms and no more 229 The Nature Import and Force of the Equipollency of Terms declar'd 234 235 236 The Assertion of Three distinct Infinite Minds inevitably inferrs a plurality of Gods but the Assertion of Three distinct Infinite Persons does not so and the reason of the Difference plainly shown 237 238 239 c. The Defender confuted by his own express concession 244 His New-coin'd and never before heard of Expression viz. That the Divine Nature is Repeated in Three Subsistences ought by no means to be endur'd but utterly rejected as absurd both in Philosophy and Theology 242 item 260 c. This Defender manifestly ignorant what the true definition of Substance is 247 His equally gross and ridiculous Ignorance in supposing a Res Cogitans to be a different thing from a Substantia Cogitans or Intelligens 249 Naturae Rationalis Individua Substantia an Essential Predicate indeed but not the Definition of a Person 250 The Three Divine Persons proved not to be Three distinct Substances but Three distinct Minds proved necessarily to be so 251 Proved That the Fathers by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as apply'd to the Divine Persons never meant to conclude a Specifick but only a Numerical Vnity of Nature or Substance belonging to them by shewing how far they argued against the Arians from the said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 253 254 That the Ancients never admitted three individual Substances in the Godhead proved from the Latine Churche's refusing for a long time the use of the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 255 This Author 's fulsome Ignorance in supposing a Numerical Difference not to be an Essential Difference 257 It is impossible for three Minds to exist in one infinite Mind or Substance so as thereby to become essentially one 259 It is impossible for any two or more Substances to be absolutely inseparable which is another Demonstration That the three Divine Persons cannot be three distinct Substances Minds or Spirits ibid. The Animadverter's Argument against three Substances in the Godhead asserted and confirmed 262 The Defender's scandalous Assertion concerning the Divine Essence and a Divine Person examin'd and overthrown p. 263 to 267 A notable Passage out of Faustinus against the admission of Three Individual Substances in the Godhead 268 The Animadverter's Third Argument against the Three Divine Persons being Three distinct Minds vindicated and the force of it prov'd to be founded not in the meer Opposition of the Numeral Terms One and Three but in the peculiar Nature and Condition of the Subject which they are here apply'd to 270 271 Three Infinite Minds can no more be essentially One Infinite Mind than Three Persons can upon any account whatsoever be naturally One Person 272 For Three to be One and One to be Three in respect of one and the same kind of Unity or Diversity is impossible ibid. A Ridiculous Cavil of the Defender proceeding from his gross Ignorance of the Sence and Vse of the word Attribute as apply'd to God 275 The Defender's perpetual Blunder in concluding each of the Divine Persons to be a distinct Infinite Mind because Infinite Mind belongs distinctly to each of them p. 277 to 280 To assert the Three Divine Persons to be Three Infinite Minds utterly irreconcilable to the form of the Athanasian Creed ibid. The same Individual Divine Nature belongs in common to all the Divine Persons but upon the same account on which it is common to them all it does not belong distinctly to each or any of them 279 A Notable Passage out of a Latin Tract inserted into Athanasius's Works expresly denying the Three Divine Persons to be Three Spirits 281 The Blasphemy charged upon the Passages extracted out of Dr. Sherlock's Book of the Knowledge of Jesus by the Animadverter in his Preface still insisted upon and the Charge made good against him 283 284 Good and Charitable Advice given to this Author 285 286 A summary Account of the several Ways and Shifts made use of by the Defender throughout this whole Defence p. 286 to 289 Some Instances of the extraordinary Vertues of Mr. Dean's Meaning shewing of what singular use it is to him upon more occasions than One p. 289 to 292 The Complaint made by some against the Animadverter as if he had treated Mr. Dean forsooth with too much sharpness shewn to be partial and unreasonable and consequently not worth regarding 293 294 The Animadverter's Resolution how to deal with him for the future 294 His Scurrility towards the Animadverter in six several Instances laid open and remarked upon such as for example his traducing him as One who can only make a shift to read and to transcribe and as one who must be taught to construe the Fathers calling him withal Grinning Dog c. p. 294 to 302 A brief Vindication of the Animadverter against the Objections and unprovok'd Spight of the Socinian Considerer p. 302 to 312 A memorable Saying of a certain Dean to a poor Widow desiring to renew her Lease with him 308 Dr. Sherlock and not the Animadverter a Favourite of the Socinians 302 303 304 c. A Remark or two upon the little Oxford-Excommunicate lately expell'd from Exeter College 313 This New Hypothesis sufficiently debated and confuted already and the Truth asserted against it by Argument and consequently the Exertion of the Episcopal Censure and Authority the fittest way to deal both with That and its Author for the future 315 The whole closed up with a remarkable Expression apply'd to the present Subject Some ERRATA of the Press IN the Table of New Heterod Propositions page the last lin 15. for of judge of r. to judge of p. 22. l. 5. for intire read entire p. 49. l. 12. for 26th r. 25th p. 60. l. 14. for singulur r. singular p. 73. l. 5. dele E. p. 76. l. 25. for Effential r. Essential p. 83. l. 11. for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 174. l. 15. for coutradicting r. contradicting p. 236. l. 14. for Inâ—inite r. infinite p. 244. l. 31. for Thnig r. Thing p. 246. l. 27. for consist r. consist p. 251. l. 1. for Substancs r. Substance p. 280. l. 22. for is evident r. is as evident p. 302. l. 15. for 7. r. 6. Where Adimadverter occurrs r. Animadverter For and indeed r. or rather indeed p. 313. last line but two TRITHEISM CHARGED c. AS it may justly be accounted a needless so it is certainly a Nauseous Task to attempt the Confutation of a Book more than sufficiently confuted already by the very Book which it was wrote against For so much I dare and shall averr That there is not one Passage in all this Defence of Dr. Sherlock's Notion of the Trinity as it is called carrying with it so much as the Face of an Argument as none carries with it
this he had told us before in the 7 th and 8 th pages of his Vindication and that therefore not being able to express it adequately we must be contented to express it as well as we can viz. by so speaks and so says and by Continuity where there can be no Parts for such a Plea though admitted would manifestly give up his Cause by shewing that he had undertook to explain the Vnity in Trinity by such an Vnity as he himself can neither conceive nor express We have seen therefore what these two Propositions viz. That the very Nature of a Spirit consists in Internal Sensation and the Vnity of a Spirit in Continuity of Sensation amount to but let us now see how he proves them for I fansie the World will hardly take them upon his bare 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And here supposing that I need not tell the Reader That this Author by Sensation and Continuity of Sensation means Self-Consciousness we shall find that his Argument runs thus So far as a Man feels himself or is self-conscious so far he is one â—â—tire Person For it is a self-evident Proposition That in an Intelligent Self-Conscious Being self can reach no further than he feels himself And I would desire any thinking Man to tell me how he Knows himself to be a distinct and separate Person from all other Men but only by this That he feels his own Thoughts Volitions Passions c. but feels nothing of all this in other Men p. 7. l. 14. But what wretched Inconsequences are these Self can reach or exist no further than a Man feels himself and therefore a Man's feeling himself and his Existence is that wherein Self and the Existence of self does consist It follows indeed from hence That his Feeling is the measure of his Existence So that one cannot extend beyond the other but that does not therefore place his Existence in his feeling that he does exist A particular determined Portion of Matter cannot reach or exist beyond the Quantity that bounds or determines it but does the Existence and Being of that Matter therefore consist in this Quantity The Body of a Man cannot extend further than its just Stature but does the Body therefore consist in its Stature Again A Man cannot as this Author-says Know himself to be a separate distinct Person from all other Men but by Self-Consciousness and Internal Sensation and therefore forsooth these are and must be the Things wherein his being a distinct Person does consist And let any one alive shew that this Argument proves any more if he can But this Man confounds the Principle of Knowledge with the Principle of Being all along Whereas the Point here is Whether the Vnity and Distinction of a Spirit consists in Internal Sensation as the formal Reason of it not whether Internal Sensation be that whereby alone a Spirit can Know it self to be one with it self and distinct from all others For though this latter be granted to this Author as often as he pleases yet the former will be as stiffly denied him I find and feel my self to be one Man and to be distinct and separate from all others but does this therefore make me to be so Or does my being so consist in my feeling my self to be so One would think that a Man should be ashamed to argue at this Rate especially having been baffled in it more than once But it is a Custom which he is grown old in To be baffled and to talk on and it is too late to cure him of it now In the mean time there are some other choice Things which deserve our consideration and particularly this So far says He as a man feels himself or is Self-Conscious he is one entire Person where this Self-Conscious Sensation ends he becomes a distinct and separate Person p. 7. l. 13. But is it possible for the mind of Man to imagine any one to be an entire Person and consequently one in himself and yet nor distinct from all others besides when the very essential Notion of Vnity connotes Distinction too and when according to all the Rules of Philosophy that which is the Principle of Constitution to any thing is the Principle also of Distinction to the same Every Thing being distinguished from all other Things by what it is in it self Continuity of Sensation he says makes a Man one in himself and the ending or ne plus ultrà of that Sensation makes him a distinct Person And yet he appeals to every Thinking Man whether he knows himself to be a distinct Person any other way than by this Self-Conscious Sensation Whereas he had said but just before that it is the ending of this Self-Conscious Sensation which makes him a distinct Person and if so can he then know himself to be a distinct and separate Person by that which must be at an end before he can be a distinct Person Certainly a grosser and more fullsome contradiction scarce ever dropped from the Tongue or Pen of Man and if this be not Non-sence in the highest and gibberish truly so called I dare averr that Bedlam affords none But his Complement to the Animadverter must not be passed over so for whose Instruction forsooth he says he was so large in his Discourse about Sensation and Self-Consciousness p. 7. For since he is so very kind he must give me leave to be as Charitable in my Admonitions as he was liberal in his Instructions and accordingly to advise him for the future to keep his Instructions to himself and what he can spare to bestow upon his Boys that so they may not at their Father's Age come to need such correction as their Father has had And whereas he says the Animadverter understood not one word of his Hypothesis I must here tell him in the Animadverter's Name That he accounts it no disparagement at all to any Man of Sence not to understand Him who speaks none But he proceeds and to shew us how methodical he is in his Absurdities he tells us That the Dean as certainly no man living was ever so much a Dean in his own Eyes having observed That the Vnity of a single Spirit consists in such a Natural Self-Conscious Sensation this led him on to that other Notion of mutual Consciousness which may be between Three distinct Spirits and make them Naturally one as much as Three can be one p. 7. l. 29. And that in good earnest is a limitation with a Witness a limitation amounting to an utter Negation of the Thing which it is applyed to It being impossible for Three distinct Absolute Beings which Three distinct Spirits certainly are to be One by one Numerical Nature belonging in common to them But besides observe the fallacy couched under this Ambiguous Parenthesis as much as Three can be one for by Three here he may either mean Three Spirits or Three Persons And he imposes grosly upon his Reader and begs the Question besides if he
do or can inferr in it a Plurality of Minds forasmuch as the said Acts belong to the Three Divine Persons as has been just now observed by vertue of that One Infinite Mind from which they flow and which is numerically one and the same in all Three But this Author is now upon an higher strain and resolving under the Protection of a Licence to open himself farther than before tells us in plain Terms That if every Person in the Trinity considered as a distinct Person be not a distinct Infinite and Eternal Mind there is he confesses an end of his Notion p. 8. And I think it had been well for the Church and himself too if it had never had a Beginning But then he adds with unsufferable Presumption and equal Falshood That with that there will be an End of a Trinity of Persons also and that we shall have nothing left but a Trinity of Modes Postures and Names not in the Vnity of the Godhead but in the Vnity of One Person who is the whole Deity These are his detestably Heretical and senseless Words In answer to which I demand of this Confident Man How he dares in defiance of the Doctrine of the Catholick Church place a Trinity of Modes Postures and Names upon the same Level as if they all indifferently amounted but to the same Thing Whereas Names are certainly of Arbitrary Imposition whether God or Man imposes them and Postures none ascribe to God but that silly Sort of Men the Anthropomorphites But as for Modes they result eternally and necessarily from the Divine Nature and eternally and inseparably remain in it and withal import such distinct Relations as can never coincide in one and the same Person and how then can this Ignorant Man talk of the Vnity of one Person who is the whole Deity or Godhead when these Three Relations can never concur in such an Vnity of Person but all of them may and do concur in the Vnity of the Godhead In a word I do here ask this bold Man whether he will venture to affirm That the Divine Nature determined or modified by such a certain subsistence or subsisting Relation is a meer Mode or no and I do here leave it to his second Thoughts whether he will venture to say so And if not why does he here against his Conscience reproach the Doctrine of the Catholick Church for so it is as if it established a Trinity of meer Modes Which it is so far from that I do here affirm against this Author and others who speak like him upon this Subject That according to the sence of the Catholick Church The Three Divine Persons are Three distinct Relative Modes of Subsistence or Three subsisting Relations of one and the same Infinite Divine Nature included in all and each of them or again They are the Divine Nature it self subsisting with Three distinct Relations This I say I affirm and doubt not but that to all Men of sence it confutes the Three Divine Persons being Three meer Modes and shews withal what an irrational Blasphemous Cavil it is to call them so For certainly a Mode in concretion with the Essence cannot with the least pretence of Reason be called a meer Mode And This I do again avouch for the Doctrine of the Catholick Church concerning the Trinity and do over and over challenge this Pert Novellist to disprove it if he can But in the next place he is for confirming his Trâ—â—â—theistical Assertion with this Invincible Argument as he thinks Poor Man p. 8 9. If says he every distinct Person in the Godhead considered as Distinct be not an Infinite and Eternal Mind as it must be if every distinct Person be God unless any Thing else than an Infinite Mind can be God then though it be an unusual way of speaking to call them Three Eternal Minds yet there is no Heresy in it nor any intended by it In answer to which I must tell him That I shall not much concern my self about what he intends it being his old way when he is pressed with his Words to fly to his Intentions but shall only consider what his words express or infer And whether they carry any Heresy in them or no shall appear presently And in order to this I must remind him of these Two Things First That God and Infinite Eternal Mind are Terms perfectly equipollent And Secondly That in Terms equipollent putting one in the room of the other you may argue with the same consequence from one that you can from the other According to which rule we will try the force of his Argument by proposing it with the bare change of one of the forementioned Terms for the other Thus. If every distinct Person in the Godhead considered as distinct be God as it must be if every distinct Person be an Infinite and Eternal Mind unless any thing else than God can be an Infinite Mind then though it be an unusual way of speaking to call them Three Gods yet there is no Heresy in it nor in spight of his words any intended by it Now let this Author consider how he will allow of this Conclusion for if his own Conclusion holds good this is certainly good also since the Validity of the Consequence is the same in Both the Matter of the Argument being the same and the Form of it the same too There must be therefore a gross Fallacy in the Argument it self and it lies in the Homonomy of the Term as distinct For the English Particle as and the Latine quà or quatenus thus applied has Two Significations 1. The first importing any Qualification specifying affecting or any way denominating the Subject and so a Person as distinct signifies no more than a Person who is distinct or a Person under this Qualification or Denomination 2. But secondly the other Signification of the Particle as is causal and imports a causal Connexion of the Term to which it is joined with some Predicate or Attribute belonging to the Subject and so a Person as distinct signifies as much as a Person because distinct or by reason of his distinction And this makes an Attribute to be necessarily and universally predicated of its Subject so that if the Subject be multiplied the Thing predicated of it must be multiplied too but in the former Signification of the Particle as it is not so for as much as the Predication imported thereby is only Accidental and has no causal necessary nor Universal Connexion with it's Subject Accordingly in the causal sence of the Term as distinct I must tell him that no Person in the Godhead as distinct is an Infinite Eternal Mind that is to say This Attribute belongs not formally to his Distinction and that his Distinction is not the cause or reason that it is affirmed of him For it is an Attribute Springing from the Divine Nature which is in the Person and not from his Personality or Personal Distinction for as much as that does
own sence and conception of it for surely so far as any one conceives of a Thing if he has a Command of the Language he makes use of as the Fathers plentifully had he may express himself proportionably to what he conceives But not to insist any further upon this We have our Author in the next place upon no small Tryal of his skill and that in such an Instance as he well knows will very nearly affect his whole Hypothesis For finding the World not very ready to digest his Scandalous Notion of Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits he would fain slide it out of their sight by casting a mist before their Eyes and that is by offering to perswade the World That the word Mind may be as well applyed to the Three in the Godhead as the word Person To which purpose he tells us page 13 line 17. That the word Person signifies not only distinct but also separate subsistence and was first used to signify separately subsisting Beings such as Men and Angels and from thence was applyed by Theological use to signify also Persons having only a distinct subsistence as these in the Blessed Trinity have no more Thus says He. In Answer to which and in direct contradiction to what he has here affirmed I deny that the Term Person does or ever did signify separate subsistence but only complete subsistence For though in its original use it signified indeed separately subsisting Persons such as Men and Angels yet I deny that it signified them under the Particular Notion or formality of separate or properly denoted their separation but only their completeness And this is undeniably proved from the Received Definition of a Person That it is an Intelligent Completely subsisting Nature or an Intelligent Nature with or under a complete subsistence So that an Intelligent Nature is one part of the Definition and the complete subsistence of it the other which making up the whole of it it is manifest that it is Indifferent to signify all Intelligent Natures thus completely subsisting whether they be separate or only distinct and that without any regard either to their Separation or bare Distinction forasmuch as neither of these make any part of the Definition of a Person as has been shewn And therefore though I grant that the word Person was first applied to signifie separate Subsistences and afterwards used to signify the Subsistences of the Godhead which were only distinct but not separate yet I deny that it did this by a Translation of the word from one sence or signification to another but only by enlarging and extending the use of it mark that to more Things than it was actually applyed to at first yet still so that it was applyed with the same Propriety to them all and without the least change of its original Signification From all which I inferr That the word Person is a common Term equally drawn off from and equally predicable of Persons under both these ways of Subsistence viz. Separate and barely Distinct. But before I proceed further I shall from the foregoing Particulars remark these Two Things First That this Author by asserting the word Person to signifie originally not only distinct but what is more Separate Subsistence has given the Socinians that Advantage which the contrary Notion of it quite cuts them off from For most of their Arguments against a Trinity of Persons in the Godhead are drawn from a Supposal That the very Notion of a Person imports and signifies a separately subsisting Being and if this Author asserts the same too he fairly plays so much of the Game into their hands and he must not think to resume it at his pleasure and to beat them off from the True and Proper Signification of the Term as he makes it without being told by them That it is wholly precarious for him so to do and a meer Petitio Principii But Secondly I must tell him also which yet can be no News to any one that he does by the same very grosly contradict himself For having in the 13 th Page said that the Term Person signifies not only a Distinct but something more viz. a separate Subsistence afterwards in the 15 th Page He says That the Word Person is properly enough applied to the Three Divine Persons because all that is essential to the Notion of a Person belongs to each of them though they do not subsist sepaâ—ately which is a manifest Contradiction to what he had said before in the 13 th Page For if a Person signifies as he there affirms not only a Distinct but also a Separate Subsistence then how can the Word Person be properly applied to these Three Subsistences which are Distinct but not Separate Or how can he truly affirm That all that is essential to the Notion of a Person belongs to each of them if a Person signifies as he said before not only a Distinct but a Separate Subsistence For whatsoever is included in the proper Signification of it must needs be essentially included in the Notion of it too But let him go on for while he is contradicting himself he is in his Element and it would be as unkind as difficult to offer to take him out of it But he proceeds and with great confidence and without the least pretence of Proof tells us That it has by Vse obtained That the Term Persons signifies such as have a separate Subsistence and the Term Subsistences such as have only a Distinct Subsistence as those of the Trinity have and no more To which I answer positively That no such Distinguishing Vse has ever yet obtained but that the Use of Both Terms is and all along has been promiscuous the Persons of the Trinity having for these 14 or 15 Centuries at least been as often and commonly expressed by the Term Persons as by the Term Subsistences if not much oftner And therefore this Difference of the Signification of these Terms is perfectly arbitrary and of this Man 's own Invention as he who takes upon him to make Divinity may as well take upon him to make Distinctions too And therefore whereas he would make the word Person signifie one sort of Persons and the word Subsistence signifie another sort I do again tell him here That Person is a common word to both and in this Mystery differs no more from Subsistence than Two synonymous Words differ from one Another And I challenge him to produce out of the Writers of the Church any thing so much as tending to a Proof That it is otherwise But he now comes as he says to apply this Discourse of his about Persons and Subsistences to his own Hypothesis about Minds or Spirits and that in these Words What I have said of the Word Person is with equal Reason applicable to the Word Mind The Animadverter he says objects against the Dean That a Mind or Spirit is an Absolute Being Nature and Substance And I grant it is so in the Common
been more proper Terms used by the Church to express a Trinity in Vnity by than those Ancient ones made use of all along about it viz. than Three Subsistences in one Individual Nature which he says differ nothing from each other but in their different manner of Subsistence These are his Words And when the Impartial Reader has perused them and compared them with what is cited out of his Vindication concerning this very Term Subsistence and Subsistences amongst others set down in the second Chapter of the Animadversions and the 63 and 64 th pages I suppose he will find it high time to bless himself For I here challenge this shameless Man to reconcile or do any thing like reconciling what he says here to what he has said there if he can And yet as great a Perversion as a word mis-applied and forced from its true Signification must inevitably cause in so nice as well as great a Point as this is it is not however barely this Author 's not hereafter using this Term Three Minds as equipollent to Three Persons that will justifie him if he still retains the Sence of it and therefore I must here tell him That if he holds the Three Divine Persons to be Three Distinct Infinite Absolute Beings Three Distinct Infinite Spirits Three Distinct Infinite Substances as Substance stands contradistinct to Subsistence let him abandon and lay aside the Use of the word Minds never so much he is yet a Tritheist and a Real Assertor of Three Gods But after all the Judicious Reader may here observe what a pleasant Manager of Controversie this Man is For he first asserted the Three Divine Persons to be Three Distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits affirming withal in most impudent manner That to hold otherwise was Heresie and Nonsence see his Vindicat. p. 66. lin 26. But when the World cried out of this scandalous Tritheism and the Animadverter even in the Judgment of the Animadverter's spightfullest Enemies had throughly confuted it and on the contrary maintained That the Three Divine Persons are Three Distinct Subsistences of one and the same Infinite Eternal Mind included in or belonging to all and each of them Why then this Man according to his Excellent and Known Talent of Tacking about fairly comes over to his Adversary so far as to proclaim shamelesly to the World That though he spoke indeed of Minds yet he meant only Subsistences whereas it is impossible that Minds should be Subsistences or Subsistences Minds Such a Felicity is it for a Man whose Word is so apt to throw him into a Plunge to have a trusty Meaning still ready at hand to fetch him out again But if this be to defend an Hypothesis then the way to carry a Cause is to give it up and the surest Conquest to quit the Field In the next place he passes from the distinction of the Divine Persons to the Unity and Identity of their Divine Nature And here according to his constant custom of charging the Fathers with some defect or other in expressing themselves he tells us That they were at a greater loss for words to express this latter by than the former p. 16. l. 26. There being but one word to do it viz. the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and this too of it self not sufficient Concerning which I must tell him in the first Place That the Truth receives no prejudice at all from there being no other one word to express this Unity or Identity of the Godhead in the Divine Persons by since God be thanked there are several very significant words and ways to explain this one word by But the main question is whether the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be sufficient to express this or no And here I must tell this presuming Man who denies it to be so First That the Nicene Fathers and the Catholick Church with them then thought it so And secondly That the Nature of the Thing necessarily proves it so And in order to this I would have him take notice That the sence of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is to be measured by the proper condition of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which it relates to and therefore though the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may in it self be indifferent to signify either a specifick or numerical Agreement in Nature according as the Nature is to which it refers yet when the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is joined with an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 importing such an Essential Unity in it as renders it uncapable of all multiplication as an Eus summà perfectum or an Infinite Nature in the very notion of it must be there the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must of necessity signify an Agreement in a numerical Unity and Identity of Nature and no other for still the condition of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is to measure the sence of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And accordingly I do affirm against this Man That there is no such Thing as Specifick Vnity or Identity or any Thing like it or Analogous to it belonging to the Divine Nature but only a Numerical Vnity and no more Which being the highest and perfectest sort of Vnity is above and instead of all other Unities whatsoever And the reason of this is because all Specifick Vnity of Nature is founded in the Imperfection and defect of the said Nature as rendring it capable of multiplication which is certainly a defect And let him take this Rule with him for once which I defy him to overthrow viz. That in Naturam non multiplicabilem non cadit Vnitas Specifica for as much as Specifick Vnity is but one common conception of the Mind gathered from the Agreement it finds in a Plurality of Particular Natures amongst themselves as every Created Individual has it's particular distinct Nature to it self and not a Part of a Common Nature shared amongst all the Individuals But will this Man affirm that there are Three particular Divine Natures out of which the Mind may form such a Specifick Vnity as we have been speaking of Let him therefore either renounce his very share in common sence and Reason or disclaim this abominable Absurdity of a Specifick Vnity in the Divine Nature or of any Thing so much as like it or Analogous to it or in his own words p. 17. that perfectly answers it And whereas he alleges the Fathers explaining the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by examples of a Specifick Vnity in Created Beings I tell him that the Fathers used not these Examples as Instances for representation of the like Vnity amongst the Divine Persons but as a ground for arguing aà minore ad majus against the Arians who would not allow so much as a Specifick Vnity of Nature between the Father and the Son whereupon the Fathers thus argued against them If you will allow the Generation of a Son in the Divine Nature certainly it ought to be more perfect or at least as perfect as that
declare that I can find nothing Invincible in all his Arguments but That And I hope the Reader will take a True measure of his Logical Talent from his Discourse about Proprium quarto modo which way of discoursing though I shall not ascribe to him as his Property yet it has so much of a Property that he is like to be known by it And so having made good what had been asserted by the Animadverter concerning the Formal Reason of Personality I leave Self-Consciousness to shift for it self and proceed to vindicate the Animadverter's First Argument against it which is this viz. That Self-Consciousness presupposes Personality in the Thing to which it belongs and therefore cannot be the Formal Reason of it forasmuch as nothing can be the formal Reason of that which is in Order of Nature before it This is the Summ of the Argument and what says this Defender to it Why he shifts the Terms and from Self-Consciousness understood as all the World understands it for an Act passes to the Principle of Self-Consciousness affirming That although indeed he speaks only of the Act yet that by an unfathomable Meaning still he intends only the Principle of the said Act as that alone which makes a Person or gives Personality And accordingly he discourses as follows Suppose says he that a Man should reason thus Actual Knowledge presupposes a Mind and therefore Knowledge in its Principle is not and cannot be the formal Reason of a Mind Def. p. 39. l. 13. To which I answer 1. That the Dispute here is not conâ—â—â—ning the Formal Reason of a Mind but of a Person and 2. That He who reasons in this manner quite alters the State of the Question which proceeds not upon the Principle but the Act of Self-Consciousness And so the true Reasoning must be This Actual Knowledge presupposes a Mind and therefore Actual Knowledge neither is nor can be the Formal Reason of that Mind This Sir is the true Arguing upon the Point according to the Terms which on both sides it has still been expressed by and in which there is not the least mention of the Principle of Self-Consciousness which is newly and postliminiously thrust in and is quite another thing from Self-Consciousness it self And this is evident not only from the proper unforced Signification of the Word importing no more than an Act in Conjunction with its Object viz. an Act of Knowledge terminated upon Self but also from this Author 's own Explication of it as still setting in forth by words importing bare Action Such as are a Person 's knowing himself and all his Internal Motions as likewise his actual Feeling or Sensation of the same These I say are the words which he always expresses Self-Consciousness by And will this Man now perswade the World that Acts of Knowledge and Acts of Feeling or Sensation signify the Principles of these several Acts This is so gross a changing the very subject of the Dispute that I need not make one step further towards the confutation of it For having beaten him off from his own Terms which he himself proposed and declared his Hypothesis by the Argument stands good against him and having disproved what he had argued from the Act of Self-Consciousness I am not conâ—â—â—â—ed about the new Medium he brings from the Principle since the Act was the only Thing so far as words can express Things which he has all along mentioned and insisted upon Nevertheless to pursue him through his Shifts I will consider his Self-Consciousness even in the Principle of it too and in order to this I shall observe That in every Suppositum or completely subsisting Being and consequently in every Person which is only a Rational Suppositum considered as an Agent these Three Things are to be taken notice of First The Form or Essence Secondly The Powers of Faculties and Thirdly The Acts proceeding immediately from these Powers but mediately from the Essence or Form it â—elf operating by them And now let us see whether any of all these as they belong to a Person give Personality or Personal Individuation to that Person Where in the First place I affirm That neither can the Acts themselves nor the Powers from with they flow reckoning the Act and Power of Self-Consciousness amongst the rest give Personality or Personal Subsistence to the Nature to which they belong and that as for other Reasons so particularly for this That both Acts and Powers are Accidents and that no Accident can give Personality or be the Formal Reason of a Person because the Formal Reason of any Thing must be always of the same Kind or Rank of Being with the Thing it self which is formally constituted by it But a Person is an Intelligent Substance compleated by its proper Subsistence as by its Substantial Mode And nothing Substantial whether it be a Substance it self or but a Mode of Substance which is always reduced to it is or can be of the same Kind with any Accident since these Two make the Two grand different Orders or Ranks of Being and consequently no Power or Faculty nor Action proceeding from it can constitute the Nature they belong to a Person by being the Formal Reason thereof To which we may add this further Consideration That no Accident can give so much as a Natural Individuation to its Subject and therefore much less can it give Personality or Personal Subsistence to the same This being a Degree of Perfection in the way of Existence beyond that of bare Individuation and consequently neither upon this Account can any Action or Power or Faculty of the Soul constitute an Humane or Intelligent Nature a Person In the next place therefore having thus shewn That neither the Act nor the Power of Self-Consciousness can give Personality Let us see whether it can be derived from an higher Principle of Action viz. the Form of the Self-Conscious Being which is the Rational Soul Now this we shall find sustains the Capacity of a double Principle viz. of a Constituent as it concurs with the Body informed by it towards the Constitution of an Humane Nature and Secondly of an Efficient and that both Emanative in respect of the Powers and Faculties belonging to it and properly Effective in respect of all the Acts whether Intellection or Volition c. produced by the Instrumental mediation of the said faculties But now under which of these capacities is it the Formal Reason of a Person why under neither For as much as in the humane Nature of Christ it sustains Both of them viz. of a principal part concurring to the Constitution of the said Nature both as to its being and unity and of an efficient Principle giving it all the Powers and Acts properly issuing from that Nature But for all that we know that it makes not that Nature a Person by giving it a Proper humane subsistence Since the Humanity of Christ has no such subsistence but subsists by that of the Eternal
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which shews that the said Subsistence has no such necessary connexion with Nature absolutely considered but that so considered as in the Present Case Nature may be without it For if it were necessarily included in Nature as Personality and the formal Reason thereof mutually and essentially imply and infer one Another the humane Nature of Christ could neither Naturally nor Supernaturally be without its proper humane Subsistence any more than without its Essence For still we speak here not of such a Subsistence as is opposed to inhesion in a Subject and so makes a Substance but of such an one as is opposed to all Dependance upon another as upon a Suppositum and so makes a Substance Complete and incommunicable by giving it its ultimate and most perfect manner of Existing But of this more again presently in my Examination of his Answer to the Animadverter's next Argument In the mean time the sum of what has been argued is this That if Self-Consciousness neither in the Act nor in the faculty or Power nor yet in its higher Principle viz. the form or essence from which it flows can formally give Personality or Personal Individuation to the Nature to which it belongs then Self-Consciousness in no respect whatsoever can be said to be the formal Reason of a Person But you will say what is it then that formally constitutes a Person In answer to which though it is sufficient for me to have overthrown my Adversary's assertion yet that I may not be only upon the Negative I affirm that that which formally gives Personality or constitutes a Person is an Intelligent Nature ultimately compleated by its proper Subsistence This I say I hold and let this Man of Arrogance and Ignorance overthrow it if he can As for what he says p. 40. l. 3. of Self-Consciousness in the Abstract viz. That it is as capable of being the formal Reason of a Person as Rationality is of being the formal Reason of a Rational Nature it needs no other Answer than that it is precariously and falsly said For the True Parallel between these two reaches no further than this That as Rationality constitutes and denominates its concrete Rational so Self-Consciousness constitutes and denominates its concrete Self-conscious And what then a Person is not the proper concrete of Self-Consciousness but a Self-Conscious Nature or Being whether it be a Person or no and a Self-Conscious Nature it may be and yet not a Person By which it is manifest that this Man understands not what Abstract and Concrete Person and Personality mean He uses the Terms indeed at a venture but they may be so many Greek words in English Characters for ought he knows But he will not give over the Animadverter so but has another terrible Objection against that assertion of his viz. That Personality is the ground and Principle of Action wheresoever it is Bragging forsooth that he has been taught other and better Things viz. That Natura est principium motûs quietis and consequently of all other Actions But was he never taught also the Difference between the Principium Quod and the Principium Quo of an Action and does he not consider withal that the Dispute here is not indifferently of any sort of Actions but only of such as are Personal and belong to a complete Agent or Suppositum And I would fain have this wonderfully-taught Man shew me any such Action proceeding from Nature as the Principium Quo which does not also proceed from the whole Suppositum as the Principium Quod and as that which alone claims the proper Denomination of Agent in respect of the said Action Which being the true state of this matter I suppose he has been told often enough that it is a Complete Subsistence added to Nature which makes a Suppositum and to an Intelligent Nature which makes a Person I have no more to say to him upon this head but that upon a Review of the Confirmation which I have now given the forementioned Argument viz. That Self-Consciousness cannot be the formal Reason of Personality because in order of Nature it follows and presupposes it I shall not stick in spight of this Man's Ignorance to affirm it again and again a Demonstration of the Point against him And therefore those words of the Defender upon this occasion are very pleasant I cannot says he but think how this Animadverter must look when he reads over this Argument again with its triumphant Conclusion p. 41. l. 26. In answer to which he must give me leave to tell him that thanks be to God the Animadverter's looks are not quite so bad yet as to put him in any danger of being mistaken for this Author 's living Image And as for his other scoff that this Argument was worth its weight in Gold though he fears it will not much enrich the Buyer p. 39. l. 9. What is that to him let him mind his own Markets who never writes to enrich the Buyer but the Seller and that Seller is himself and since he is so well is it for his Books and his Bookseller too that Men generally Buy before they Read The Animadverter for his part affects not the Reputation of a Scribler and much less of an Huckster But pass we now to the Consideration and Vindication of the Animadverter's second Argument against Self-Consciousness which proceeds thus The Humanity or Humane Nature of Christ is perfectly Conscious to it self of all the Internal Acts whether of Knowledge Volition or desire c. that pass in it or belong to it and yet the humanity or humane Nature of Christ is not a Person and therefore Self-Consciousness does not properly and formally give Personality for as much as it may be in that which is not a Person Thus the Animadverter And what says our Author to the contrary Why in the first place according to his constant custom of denying what he had before affirmed he says p. 40. l. 10. That he never expresly taught that Self-Consciousness was the formal Reason of Personality And again l. 27. That he no where makes Self-Consciousness the formal Reason of Personality But as it is very possible for a Man not always to understand his own words so I would have this good Man know that he has over and over made Self-Consciousness the formal Reason of Personality whether he understands so much or no. For if by his forementioned denyal of it he means no more than that he never made use of the Term Formal Reason this is readily granted him but then it is arrant trifling since it is certain that he has taught and asserted the Thing signified by this Term as effectually and plainly as if he had used the very Term it self For to tell him again what I had told him before the Formal Reason of a Thing is that which constitutes it such a Being giving it withal its proper Vnity and Distinction whether Natural or Personal
Vnity and distinction wheresoever it is and yet that there may be a Self-Conscious Being one in it self and distinguished from all others which is not a Person of which two Propositions this Man has affirmed the former though he uses not the Term Formal Reason and the Animadverter asserts the Latter And the whole dispute shall be resumed and the Thing debated again presently But as for that insufferably Rude and Scurrilous Reflexion here passed by him upon the Animadverter p. 43. l. 33. I shall take no further notice of it now intending effectually to account with him both for that and several other of his Billingsgate-Scurrilities as soon as I shall have finished the Argumentative part of my Reply In the mean time he declares in a Bravado p. 44. l. 15. Thâ—â— if the Animadverter can prove That the Vnity of a Mind and its distinction from all other Minds does not consist in Self-Consciousness the Dean is then a lost Man for ever and must be content to follow his triumphant Chariot And I on the other side affirm That if the Essential Being Unity and original distinction of every Thing is and must be in order of Nature before any Act can proceed or be so much as conceived to proceed from the said Thing then it has been already proved and that in Defence of the first Argument beyond all Contradiction That the Original Vnity of a Mind and its distinction from all other Minds neither does nor can consist in Self-Consciousness Act or Power these being in Nature posterior to the said Unity and Distinction And that one known short Axiom Agere praesupponit esse to which we may add also esse in se Vnum distinctum ab aliis omnibus utterly overthrows this part of his Senceless Hypothesis But as for his Scoff of following the Animadverter's Triumphant Chariot in this Case he will not claim his Promise as knowing something much fitter for him to follow than that and some body as fit to follow him But I shall now come to debate the Personality of the Soul with him which dispute he first tells us is nothing at all to the Purpose and then very discreetly bestows the full fifth part of his whole work against the Animadverter viz. Twenty Pages of 99. wholly upon this very point and this he also calls making some short Reflections upon it though more by half than what he has made upon any Two or Three and those principal Parts or Branches of the whole Controversy But whereas he says p. 44. l. 24. That all this was done only with a purpose to expose Mr. Dean forsooth I must assure him that it is a mistake for that the Animadverter found this work effectually done to his hands before ever he set Pen to Paper But to proceed This Author in his Vindication has asserted That the Soul without a Vital Vnion to an Humane Body is a Person Vind. p. 262 l. 17. And not long after he tells us also That the Soul as Vnited with the Body is a Person too Vind. p. 268. l. 28. In opposition to both which Propositions the Animadverter holds That the Soul of Man is not a Person and that neither in its Conjunction with the Body nor in its separation from it And what says our Author to this Why in the first place he says He grants That the Person of a Man as it is used in common speech to signify a Man must include both Soul and Body as the constituent parts of an Humane Person but that when we enquire into the strict Notion of Personality that must be a simple Vncompounded Thing as Indivisible as self is which cannot consist of parts separate from each other p. 45. l. 11. Whereupon with much foolish Confidence he disputes against the supposed Absurdity of Two Parts of Personality To all which I have several Things to Answer As first That he ought to prove and not gratis only to affirm That the Philosophical sence of this Term Humane Person and the Popular commonly received sence of it are not the same Whereas I affirm they are and challenge him to prove the contrary if he can For otherwise it is a meer supposing the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and a gross Petitio Principii Secondly I must tell him That he disputes not ad Idem for that he passes from the Concrete to the Abstract viz. from Person which consists of Parts to Personality which does not and then surely when the dispute is concerning the having or not having Parts there can be no concluding in that respect from one to the other Thirdly I tell him that self is not a simple indivisible Vncompounded Thing but as compounded as the Man himself and consists of Parts separable from one another viz. of Soul and Body as the Man himself does and is as much a Concrete as he is Fourthly and lastly I must tell him That though Personality in the Abstract be a simple Indivisible Term as all other Abstracts are and so cannot actually consist of Parts yet it connotes and implies a necessary inseparable Relation to the Essential parts of the Concrete and in this respect parts are and may be ascribed to it viz. by way of Connotation though not by way of Physical Composition And therefore that Question of his viz. Will the Animadverter venture to make the Body part of the Personality of a Man is very easily answered viz. That by actual real and Physical Composition it is not so but by Essential Connotation of and Relation to the Body as to part of the Concrete it is so That is to say Personality implies a Body as an Essential Part of a Person though not of the Personality it self And so both his silly Objection and his sillier Scoff of a compounded Personality page 48. and of the Bodies being a part of this Personality page 47. are at an end But his Absurdity in asserting a Beast to be a Person will never be so but stands as firm as ever For whereas he says Defence p. 46. l. 6. That he gave notice of the Impropriety of the Expression and used it only by way of Allusion and Accommodation Let the Reader but consult his Vind. p. 262. and he will find every Tittle of this an Impudent falshood For he speaks not there so much as one Syllable of the Impropriety of it nor does he pretend to use it by way of Allusion but as a Real and a Proper Instance of the Nature of a Person dogmatically asserting a brute to be a Person as much as a Suppositum and this without the help or Qualification of either a so say or a so speak With such a shameless front can this Man deny a Thing as soon as ever he has affirmed it And yet before the Denyal of it is well out of his mouth he offers with still a greater Impudence to justify it affirming p. 47. That Beasts may be said to have reason in a certain measure and degree
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the Humane Nature together If this be not a Supernatural Effect and consequently no Natural Vnion let this Man assign me any one that ever was or can be reputed such And therefore let him take notice for the future That it is not the bare Terms or Extreams of an Vnion as that it is between Two Natures that can make it Natural But an Agent acting and joining those Natures together according to the Ordinary Course of Nature which must make it formally so and which can never be wrought by any Agent so working where one of the Natures to be united is Finite and the other Infinite But as I said before what is all this to this present Argument which has nothing to do with the Hypostatick Vnion but only with that way or kind of Union by which Created Beings are united together And will this Man argue from one sort of Union to another between which there is no Cognation at all Wherefore let the Charge not only of Boldness but Prophaneness too rest upon him who dares make the common way of Natural Unions the measure of a Supernatural and that such a one as exceeds all the Miracles that Omnipotence it self ever yet wrought in the World But now as he tells us he is for quitting the School-Terms which he never understood and for speaking so as all may understand him And here the first Oracle thus delivered by him is this viz. That the Soul may be a Compleat and Perfect Person but not a Perfect Man p. 49. l. 28. To which I answer That a perfect Man is essentially a Compound Nature or Being And that an Humane Person is essentially so too And that therefore the Soul being as essentially a simple Vncompounded Being can neither be a Perfect Man nor a Perfect Person But this is such a Proposition that I shall say no more of it but leave it wholly to the Reader 's Admiration Nevertheless to dis-encumber him from such Stuff as this Man's Ignorance is still throwing in his way I think fit here to note the Difference between a Perfect and a Compleat Being Now a Thing is said to be Perfect in respect of its Essence as wanting nothing that is Essential to it But it is called Compleat in respect of its Subsistence as subsisting so by it self as to be neither a Part nor Adjunct of another Thing Accordingly the first of these is the Perfection of a Man considered barely as a Man as an Animal Rationale compounded of Soul and Body But the other is the Perfection of a Person or of a Man considered not only as a Rational Nature but as a Rational Nature completely subsisting From whence it follows That neither does the Perfection of a Man nor the Perfection of a Person depend upon the Perfections or Operations belonging to him as being neither Essential to him as a Man or as a Person and consequently though they be never so defective yet he who has the Essence or Essentials of a Man is a Perfect Man and he who has this Essence or Nature of a Man completed with the Proper Subsistence of the same is a Perfect Person But our Author is for explaining this matter to us further by an Instance Let us says he consider a Soul vitally Vnited to a Body with Organs so indisposed for Sensation that a Man can neither see nor hear nor tast nor smell but only just lives and breaths you will not say this is a perfect Man p. 50. l. 8. Yes good Sir I both will and do say so For he who has the perfect Essence of a Man is a perfect Man whether Halt or Blind or Deaf and as defective in the Actual Exercise of his faculties as of his Limbs But you will say do not all these great defects render a Man more Imperfect than he would be otherwise Yes as to his State or Condition they do but not as to his Nature or Essence And therefore this Author may take notice That there is a twofold Perfection belonging to a Man the first Essential which we have been hitherto speaking of and properly consists in that perfection of Nature or Essence without which he could not be a Man The other is Extra-essential and in respect of the former Accidental and may as we have noted be called a perfection of State or Condition and consists properly in an Integrity of Parts and a right disposition of the Faculties enabling a Man to exert all the Operations belonging to him And I do here according to all the Principles of Philosophy and the concurrent sence of Philosophers affirm that notwithstanding an Universal failure of all those Accidental Perfections a Man is as perfectly a Man by vertue of his bare Essence and as perfectly a Person by vertue of his Compleat Subsistence as if he had them all in their highest Pitch But our Author goes on If says he a Compleat Person may not be a Compleat and perfect Man then the Formal Reason of Personality and the Natural Perfection of a Man are Two Things p. 50. l. 15. I grant they are so But utterly deny That a Compleat Person can be otherwise than a Perfect Man though there may be a Perfect Man who is not a Person For every Person includes in it a Nature Rationalis which makes a Perfect Man and besides that a Compleat Subsistence of the same which makes the Person and whereas he says That the whole Personality must be in the Soul if a Man be a perfect Man who is united to a Body which is worse than none p. 50. l. 20. I must tell him first That there is no such Thing as a Man's being united to a Body for though the Soul is united to a Body yet the Man is not but contains both Body and Soul united to one Another And I must tell him further That the Soul 's being united to a Body which is worse than none does not make that Body less an Essential Part of the Man and of the Person than if it were the most accomplish'd Body in the World In the mean time I must desire the Reader to take Notice of the Intolerable Absurdity of this Author 's affirming a Man to be united to a Body and that his own Body too For at this rate the Man must be one Term of the Vnion and his Body the other But still he goes boldly on and tells us p. 51. l. 2 3. That the Soul is the Person and the Body only the Instrument or Organ of it In answer to which I must tell him That not the Soul but the whole Compositum is the Person and that the Body is not the Instrument of the Soul as of the Principal Agent but of the whole Compositum and moreover that the Soul is as much the Instrument of the said Compositum as the Body is or can be and lastly That Both of them are such Instruments as are also Vital Essential Parts of the Compound
to this Man is and must be even when united to the Body the whole Person Add to this that he affirms the Soul thus united to be the only Seat of Personality p. 60. l. 7. And if this Man will deny that to be the whole Person in which the whole Personality is he is rather to be exploded than disputed with But most remarkable are those wretched Assertions of his by which he directly and inevitably makes the constitution of every Man living to consist in an Hypostatick Vnion and Incarnation For the proving of which I shall first give this Account of an Hypostatick Vnion viz. That it is that whereby a Person or completely subsisting Intelligent Being assumes another Being or Nature into the Unity of its own Subsistence so that by vertue thereof the Person assuming and the Nature assumed are both but one Person yet so that the Nature assumed is not Part of the said Person This I affirm to be an Hypostatick Vnion and I gather it both from what Scripture and Reason discoursing upon Scripture teaches us concerning the Oeconomy of Christ's Person which according to the Unanimous Judgment of all Divines hitherto is the only Instance of an Hypostatick Vnion in the World But now let us see what a Parallel this Heady Venturous Man to say no worse makes between this and the Union of an humane Soul and Body in these following Propositions The Eternal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a Person The Eternal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 assumes the humane Nature into the Unity of the same person The Eternal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is vitally united to the humane Nature assumed by it The Eternal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the humane Nature thus assumed by it and united to it are but one and the same Person The Eternal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the humane Nature assumed by it are so One Person that the Nature assumed is no part of the said Person The Humane Soul is a Person The Humane Soul receives the Body into the Unity of the same Person p. 60. l. 22. The Humane Soul as a Person is vitally United to the Body p. 60. l. 21. The Body being United to the Soul which is the Person becomes together with the Soul one and the same Person p. 60. l. 19. The Soul and the Body United to the Soul as to the Person so become one Person that the Body is yet no part of the Person p. 60. l. 23. I know there are some disparities as to Finite and Infinite Eternal and not Eternal c. between the respective Subjects of the Union here represented but as to the Union it self and the Kind of it I freely refer it to the Learned Reader to judge whether those Conditions which Divines peculiarly assign and ascribe to that Supernatural Hypostatick Vnion be not here ascribed by this Author to the Natural Union between Soul and Body And indeed what other Kind of Union can it be For the constitution of an human Person must be either by such an Union as this or by an Essential concurrence of Parts compounding it But this though maintained by all the World besides this Author utterly explodes as absurd p. 48. l. 10. And the truth is if neither the Soul be a part of the Person nor the Body be a part of the Person as he denies both of them to be how can the Person be Such by an Essential composition where there are no Essential Parts to make the Composition Or what can be the Essential Parts if the Body and Soul are not so Nay and as a further proof of what he holds in this matter in the 268 269 270 271 pages of his Vindication he explains the Union between the second Person of the Trinity and the humane Nature and the Union between an humane Soul and Body by one Another and that in many more particulars than that mentioned in the Athanasian Creed But in the next place touching the Incarnation of the Soul in the Body which I likewise charge this Author's Opinion with as the direct result of it besides that it must necessarily follow from such an Hypostatick Vnion of the Soul with the Body as has been described he himself to give him his due in plain and express Terms owns so much by telling us That the Soul is an Embodied Person p. 60. l. 26. and that is manifestly only another word for an Incarnate Person For the Eternal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I am sure may be truly said to be an Embodyed Person by his Incarnation So that the Parallel we see still holds From all which new Cartesian Divinity therefore it does and must follow That so many Men as there are in the World so many Hypostatick Vnions and Incarnations there are also and that a Man is properly constituted a Man by an Hypostatick Vnion of the Soul with the Body and by an Embodyment or Incarnation of it in the Body So that hereafter if any one would express or define an humane Person properly and exactly he must not say That it is an Intelligent Being compounded of Soul and Body and completely subsisting for that is the Gibberish of the Schools but he must say That an humane Person is a Soul Incarnate For our Oracle has declared it so and therefore in that we ought to rest And now has not this Author think we shewn himself an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Man indeed For was there ever a more glorious 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 either in Philosophy or Theology than this of a new Hypostatick Vnion and Incarnation Which having been so happily discovered and so authentically vouched possibly when the Alterers of our Liturgy shall fall to work again to alter what they cannot mend it may be brought into our Creed too But after all there are Three Questions proposed in the Animadversions p. 83 84. mentioned indeed here but not replyed to And since they are not I do here Challenge this Author to answer them and I do it with more Scorn and Triumph than the Animadverter as he pretends at first propounded them The design of which Questions was to shew that according to this Author's Assertions The Soul in every Man and the Man himself are and must be Two distinct Persons and they have shewn it with that force and clearness that they stand not only unanswered but against him unanswerable And therefore to direct his laughter to its Right object I leave him and his Friend some old Conventicler I suppose to laugh at one another and to take notice withal That nothing in Nature is more to be laughed at than he who laughs at an Argument because he cannot answer it I have now examined this Man's discourse about the Personality of the Soul and must profess that I never met with so many vile Heterodoxies in so small a compass before And what offence they will give to the Pious and Orthodox and what advantage to Hereticks and Atheists I doubt
his Criticism with That had the Deaâ— been pleased to have returned mutual Acts he and the Animadverter might have been long since in a very strict Communion with each other p. 73. l. 16. I shall only return him this one short word That though all this may be perfect Riddle to the Reader yet I understand him very well and could easily give him such an answer as should make him understand himself too But to let the Reader see that he is a foul a Disputant as he can be a Speaker and a fouler upon both accounts the World never had with a Frontless Impudence he declares here p. 73. l. 23. That the Animadverter grants all that he says about the Notion of a Trinity in Vnity And in Particular That every Individual Person has a Self-Consciousness of its own and every such Self-Conscious Person is thereby one with it self and distinguished from all other Persons In answer to which shameless Unconscionable Falshood I do here in the Face of the World challenge the Author of it to prove That the Animadverter grants any one thing that is peculiar to his Hypothesis and particularly to shew that place in the whole Book of the Animadversions in which the Animadverter owns That a Self-Conscious Person is by virtue of it's Self-Consciousness one with it self and primarily distinguished from all other Persons which is the only distinction here spoken of I say I do again and again challenge this Man to prove this and promise withal That if he can do it I will forfeit to him more than ever he was born to and if he cannot I humbly appeal to the most rigid if but Impartial Reader whether I have not all the cause in the World to proclaim him to all Mankind for a downright Lyar Slanderer and Falsificator And as hard as these words may sound less than this upon such an occasion I neither can nor will say But we will see what other holes he can pick in the Animadverter's Coat And here he first taxes him p. 74. l. 1 2. for the Improper use of the Term Vnion of Nature telling him That the Dean forsooth would have said Vnity of Nature as the same Dean not only would have said but has said That a Beast is a Person with several other such choice Proprieties as Chrysome instead of Chrisme and Paraphrases instead of Periphrasis and above an hundred Solecisms to boot But I must here declare to this great Master of proper speaking forsooth as appears from the whole Tenth Chapter of the Animadversions That had the Animadverter in the place cited by him used the Term Vnion instead of Vnity which upon this subject are often promiscuously made use of surely this Man had been the most unfit Person in the World to reflect upon him for it who has stated the Divine Nature in the Three Persons so as to leave no numerical real Vnity in it at all but only an Vnion instead thereof For three Distinct Infinite Minds asserted by this Author being Three distinct Natures or Essences neither have nor can have any such Vnity in them but being United only by mutual Consciousness are capable of no more than a Conjunction or Vnion thereby and that a very slender one too and far from that Essential Vnity which belongs to the Divine Persons But after all I would have His Critical Ignorance know that the Animadverter by the Vnion of Nature here mentioned understands as he may very well and properly do no other than an Vnion in respect of Nature so that it is really an Vnion of Persons Connoting the Nature as the Term which they are United in And accordingly the Animadverter in defiance of this Man 's long silly Parenthesis which it had been more for his Credit to have spared than put in still owns and abides by the Expression But our Critick has not done yet But whereas the Animadverter speaking of the Divine Persons had used these words Their Essence and Personality he here cries out like one Big and bringing forth nothing What but one Personality as well as but one Essence in Three p. 74. l. 11. But may it please your Ignorance good Sir the Animadverter here spoke of Personality not with any respect to number of Particulars but to the common Nature and notion of the Thing and consequently might without the least impropriety use the Term Personality without any Epithete of Plurality For suppose that in a discourse of the general Nature of Celestial Bodies one should speak of the Sun and of the motion of the Heavens together would this Philosopher of Goatham presently cry out What but one motion of the Heavens as well as but one Sun And to give an Instance in Divine matters when the Prophet Ezek. 36.26 tells the Israelites that God would give them a new heart would this wise Man of the forenamed Society cry out here What but One new heart amongst so many thousand Men For certain it is that strictly speaking the heart here mentioned which could be nothing else but a pious and gracious disposition of Mind inclining them to obey God was to be multiplied according to the number of Individuals which it was to be given to But such as understand the force of words and the way of using them know that there is a kind of Grammatica Philosophica by which we may judge when a single word ought to signify singularly and when indefinitely and including all the Particulars that it may be applied to But this I confess is Gibberish and a Riddle as all sense and learning is to one who has neither Grammar nor Philosophy And so having answered his impertinent Cavils I come to give an answer to his equally impertinent Questions with such great huff proposed by him p. 74. l. 17. As first Can they viz. the Divine Persons be one before they are mutually conscious even in the order of conceiving it I answer That in order of conception they not only may but necessarily must and that as necessarily as it is impossible to conceive of â—â—owledge without conceiving of Entity or Being as the â—bject of it and for that cause in the Natural order of â—â—â—ceiving or apprehending Things before it The second Question is Can the Divine Persons be one before they are in one another I answer That in Priority of Time they cannot but that in order of Nature they may and must be so conceived For to be in one Another is but a subsequent circumstance of Being and consequently must presuppose the Being it self whereof it is the Circumstance as in Nature preceding it His third Question is Can there be any other mutual in-being of Minds but by Mutual Consciousness I Answer First That the Divine Persons are not minds Secondly That there is no such Thing as a mutual in-being of Minds in one another And thirdly and lastly That the Divine Persons are not properly and originally in one another by mutual Consciousness but by an Indentity
Three Absolute Beings or Essences or that three Absolute entire Beings can be Three Relative Subsistences or Modifications of one and the same Infinite Mind or Being then I will grant that he has defended his Assertion against the Animadverter and not only so but that he has full power also by a Theological use of his own making to alter the sence and signification of all words in spight of the World and by vertue of the same may if he pleases call the Deanry of Paul's the Archbishoprick of Canterbury and behave himself accordingly But it is very pleasant to see him here twice in p. 87. proving his Three Infinite Minds to be Three Personal Subsistences by that exploded Chimera of a man and his living Image which having been so fully baffled and exposed and rejected for its Prophaness as well as its Non-sence this Man surely must have a Degree of Luck equal to his Confidence if he thinks to make one gross Absurdity an Argument to prove and make good another At length he concludes his lame self-contradicting Answer with these words Had the Dean says he made Three complete Absolute Eternal Minds he had been justly chargeable with making Three Gods p. 87. l. 32. And that I assure him is a concession large enough For I do here affirm That he has asserted every one of the said Particulars whether he will own it or no. For first he has asserted Three Infinite Minds and it has been effectually proved against him from the Signification Definition and constant use of the Term. That Three Minds are formally Three Absolute Beings And secondly He has asserted these Three Minds to be Three distinct Persons and thereby has asserted also their Completeness since Personality is that which gives the utmost completion to the existence of an Intelligent Nature And thirdly and lastly By asserting the said Minds Infinite he asserts them also Eternal For as much as nothing can be Infinite but what is infinitely perfect nor can any thnig be Infinitely perfect without including the Perfection of Eternity in it So that if this Man would but once in his Life abide by his own words which a Self-Contradictor when he is pinched never will we should need no other proof but his forecited Confession to convince him That he stands justly charged with asserting Three Gods And whereas he asserts next That one and the same Infinite and Eternal Mind is repeated in Three Subsistences p. 88. l. 1. I must tell him again That the Term repeated is not to be admitted or endured here since the Repetition of a Thing is properly nothing else but the Production of another Individual Instance one or more of the same kind And whether this be applicable to or affirmable of the Divine Nature or Godhead let every one not abandoned by common sence judge In fine when this Man shall have proved these following Positions collected from him and held by him viz. 1. That Infinite Mind and Infinite Intelligent Person are Terms as equipollent adequate and convertible as God and Infinite Mind are 2. That though God and Infinite Mind are Terms adequately convertible and equipollent yet that Three Distinct Infinite Minds are not Three distinct Gods whereas one equipollent can never without a contradiction be multiplied without a multiplication of the other 3. That Three Minds are not Three Absolute Natures or Essences or that Three Absolute Natures or Essences can be Three Relative Subsistences and consequently Modifications of one and the same Infinite Mind 4. That Three distinct Essences or Three essentially distinct Minds may be essentially one When I say he shall have proved all these with as much Evidence as he has asserted them with Confidence then will he have secured his Tritheism against the Animadverter's first Argument and not before And so I pass on to consider what he has to say to the Second Which is this Three distinct Minds or Spirits are Three distinct Substances but the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity are not Three distinct Substances and therefore they are not Three distinct Minds or Spirits In answer to which the Defender tells us That the Dean does not pretend to know any thing of the Substance of a Mind and much less of God who is an Infinite Mind p. 88. l. 11. But does not this very Man who never contradicts himself but when he speaks or writes positively profess to give an Account of the Nature of a Mind or Spirit in p. 7. of this Defense telling us That is consists in Internal vital Sensation And is not the Nature of a Mind the Substance of it even according to this Author who in the 15 th line of this 88 th page uses the words Nature or Substance as signifying the same Thing And now will he disclaim all pretence of knowing any thing of the substance of a Mind or Spirit after he has undertook to give the World an Account what the Nature or Substance of them is and wherein it does consist But I leave the Reader to reconcile this Man as he finds him here in this 88 th page to himself in the 7 th page of the same Defense if he can But he must not think to carry off this fallacy of the consequent so For though we understand not by an immediate inspection of things themselves the Specifick Nature or Essence of this or that kind of Substance yet surely the General Nature of Substance may by discourse be known and it would be a pleasant consequence that because we cannot tell what the Particular Nature of such or such a substance is that therefore we cannot know it to be a Substance And therefore he asks p. 89. l. 20. What a Substance is Adding withal That he hopes the Animadverter will not affirm it to be that quod substat Accidentibus since that would make God himself who is incapable of Accidents to be no Substance And it is shrewdly argued upon my word But why then does he stop here without giving us the True Account what Substance positively is Which the very Elements of Logick and Philosophy might have taught him viz. That substance is a Being existing by it self so as neither to inhere in or be supported by another Being as a Subject This Sir is the true Account of what a Substance is And such a Substance I affirm a Mind or Spirit to be But as for that which does Substare Accidentibus it imports not the General Nature or Essence of Substance but only a property of one sort of Substance viz. Such as are created But he goes on and tells us That though understanding and Being Nature or Substance may be distinguished in Created finite Beings yet that St. Austin had taught him that they are the same in God p. 88. l. 15. And I grant that according to the Real Existence of the Thing they are so but for all that I affirm That they differ formally that is according to the several conceptus
a Subject are Three distinct Substances But Three distinct Minds are Three such Absolute Beings and Therefore Three distinct Minds are Three distinct Substances In which Syllogism to shew the disparity between Minds and Persons let the Term Three Persons be put into the Room of Three Minds and then the Minor which is true and must be granted of Minds must be denied of Persons for they are not Three distinct Absolute Beings so existing as was expressed in the Major Proposition and therefore that Argument which concludes Three Minds to be Three Substances can never conclude Three Persons to be so too And whereas the Defender affirms p. 89. l. 27. That Three Eternal Minds are but Three Eternal subsistences of one and the same Individual Eternal Mind I answer That it is the height of Absurdity and utterly impossible in Reason and Philosophy for a Mind which is an Absolute entire Being existing by it self to be the Subsistence of another Absolute Being For as much as Subsistence is properly and formally a Mode of substance and in the Divine Substance or Nature a Relative Mode too though still implying in it the said Nature as modified or determined by it So that we see here this Man's Philosophy in making one Mind the Subsistence or Modification of another Mind and Three distinct Minds so many distinct Subsistences or Modifications of one and the same Mind Which I am sure all the Schools in Christendome will with one voice explode And so I leave this Defender or rather this Dean in Masquerade to bring off his Three distinct Minds from being Three distinct Substances at his leisure But I fear it will cost him a new cast of his meaning to do it though let that be what it will it is not any one Man's meaning especially founded upon his Ignorance but the Universal Judgment and consent of all Learned Men that must determine the proper and distinct sences both of Substance and Subsistence in this Dispute But the Animadverter in proving an Absolute Unity and disproving all plurality of substance in the Godhead had first strengthned his Assertion with the Authorities of some of the most eminent Fathers positively asserting the former and not without indignation rejecting the other And what does this Defender answer to these Why he tells us That the Fathers by denying Three Substances principally rejected Three divers Natures of different Kinds or Species in Opposition to Arianism p. 90. l. 5. Very good they principally rejected a plurality of specifically distinct Substances and will this Man infer from hence that they did not reject also a Plurality of Individual Substances in the Godhead Why yes if he will invalidate the Authorities alleged by the Animadverter he does and must do so And accordingly he tells us That the Fathers by Unity of Substance here understand only the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies only a Specifick Vnity of Substance the Fathers in Opposition to Arianism designing only to disprove a Specifick plurality of substance in the Godhead not a plurality of numerical distinct Individuals So that it seems they resolved though they fell foul upon the Arians yet to do it so as to keep fair Quarter with the Heathens In answer to which since 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 imports an Union of Persons in such a Nature Essence or Substance as is uncapable of being numerically multiplied as the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 essentially is and cannot but be I affirm that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 irrefragably proves a Numerical Unity or Identity of substance in the Divine Persons and withal that all Specifick Unity in the Divine Nature or Persons is absurd and impossible for I must tell this puny Logician That it is one thing to disprove a Specifick diversity of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons and quite another to prove a positive specifick Vnity of the same which can never be done where there are not several Individual Natures of the same kind to collect it from Secondly I answer That though the Fathers in their disputes with the Arians alleged several Things for the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons which strictly reached no further than to Specific Vnity yet when they disputed this matter more exactly with the Heathen Polytheists they rested not in this but still insisted upon and contended for a Numerical Vnity of the Divine Nature Essence or Substance as the Catholâ—ck Church has done ever since And besides the Truth is Those very Arguments or rather Instances of Resemblance brought by the Fathers against the Arians though taken from things having no more than a Specifick Unity of Nature yet did not determinately prove either a Specifick or a Numerical Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons but only an Unity or Sameness of Nature indefinitely which being laid as a foundation the peculiar Condition of the Divine Nature quickly determined the kind of its Unity and by vertue of its Infinity proved that that Vnity or Sameness could be no other than Numerical And thus having answered what he has said about the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the Testimonies of the Fathers if he still persists in this Scandalous Assertion That the Fathers were only against several Kinds and Species of Substance in the Godhead and Divine Persons but not against several Individual and Numerically distinct Substances in the same I desire him to satisfy the World in these Two Things First How the Fathers came to look upon the Divine Nature or Essence in Three distinct Persons as such an amazing Incomprehensible Mystery as they still avowed it to be if the said Nature were not more than specifically one for that one and the same specifical Nature should be in a plurality of Individual Persons is no wonder at all Secondly I desire him to satisfy the World also Why the Primitive Latine Church with so much Zeal and for so long a time refused the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 declaring this for the only reason of their refusal thereof that they reckoned it to signify Three Substances for they could not reckon it to signify Three specifically distinct Substances For as much as they knew that the Greek Church which used the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and contended for it had constantly zealously and most expresly opposed the Arians in their asserting Three Species of Substance in the Trinity and therefore it is evident even to a demonstration that they were only jealous of Three Individual Substances which they feared the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 might introduce and so betray them into another sort of Arianism or rather Gentilism as bad as the first These Two Quaeries I say I challenge this Author to answer me in by making it appear notwithstanding the foregoing Particulars that while the Fathers asserted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one Divine Essence or Substance it was only a Specifick not an Individual Vnity of the same which they