believes no man can tell what it is For how can such actual sensation be imagin'd to be union As well might the use of sense its self speaking of any thing singly to which it belongs be said to be its constituent form or consequently the doing any thing that proceeds from Reason be the form of a Man So the writing a Book should be the Author And whereas he says it is certain the Dean took it to be so and therefore he did not leave out a natural external union it follows indeed that he did not leave it out in his Mind and Design but he nevertheless left it out of his Book and therefore said not enough there to salve the unity of the Godhead but ought to have insisted upon somewhat prior to mutual consciousness as constituent of that unity and which might make the three one and not meerly argue them to be so 2. But now p. 105. he comes to find as great fault with the Enquirers way of maintaining this unity and because he is resolv'd to dislike it if he can't find it faulty sets himself to make it so The Temper of Mind wherewith he writes to this purpose what follows p. 105. and onwards to the end so soon and so constantly shews it self that no man whose mind is not in the same disorder will upon Tryal apprehend any thing in it but such heat as dwells in darkness And he himself hath given the Document which may be a measure to any apprehensive Reader True divine Wisdom rests not on an ill natur'd and perverse Spirit I understand it while the ill fit lasts But 't is strange he could write those words without any self-reflection The Thing to be reveng'd is that the Enquirer did freely speak his Thoughts wherein he judg'd the Dean's Hypothesis defective his not taking notice of what he reckon'd naturally antecedent and fundamental to mutual consciousness A most intimate natural necessary eternal union of the sacred Three If the Enquirer spake sincerely as he understood the matter and him and it evidently apppear the Defender did not so I only say the wrong'd person hath much the advantage and wishes him no other harm than such gentle Regrets as are necessary to set him right with himself and his higher Judge He says he the Enquirer represents this Unity by the union of soul and body and by the union of the divine and humane nature c. 'T is true he partly doth so but more fully by the supposed union of three created Spirits to which he that will may see he only makes that a lower step and he says with respect especially to the former of these That an union supposeable to be originally eternally and by natural necessity in the most perfect being is to be thought unexpressibly more perfect than any other But he adds these are personal unions and therefore cannot be the unity of the Godhead And he very well knew for he had but little before cited the passage that the Enquirer never intended them so but only to represent that the union of the three in the Godhead could not be reasonably thought less possible What he farther adds is much stranger and yet herein I am resolv'd to put Charity towards him to the utmost stretch as he professes to have done his understanding for he says as far as he can possibly understand and that he should be glad to be better informed tho' there is some reason to apprehend that former displeasure darkned his understanding and even dimn'd his Eye-sight which yet I hope hath it's more lucid Intervals and that his distemper is not a fixed habit with him And what is it now that he cannot possibly understand otherwise that no other union will satisfie him viz. the Enquirer but such an union of three spiritual Beings and individual natures as by their composition constitute the Godhead as the composition of soul and body do the Man i. e. He cannot understand but he means what he expresly denies Who can help so cross an understanding If he had not had his very finger upon the place where the Enquirer says in express words I peremptorily deny all composition in the Being of God this had been more excusable besides much said to the same purpose elsewhere It had been ingenuous in any man not to impute that to another as his meaning which in the plainest terms he disavows as none of his meaning And it had been prudent in the Dean or his Defender of all Mankind not to have done so in the present case as will further be seen in due time But he takes it for an Affront when he fancies a man to come too near him He adds for this reason he disputes earnestly against the universal absolute omnimodous simplicity of the divine Nature and will not allow that Wisdom Power and Goodness are the same thing in God and distinguished into different Conceptions by us only through the weakness of our understandings which cannot comprehend an infinite Being in one thought and therefore must as well as we can contemplate him by parts I know not what he means by earnestly the matter was weighty and it is true he was in writing about it in no disposition to jeast But it 's said he disputed against the universal absolute omnimodous simplicity of the Divine Nature I hope the Defender in this means honestly but he speaks very improperly for it supposes him to think that the universal absolute omnimodous simplicity so earnestly disputed against did really belong to the Divine Nature but I can scarce believe him to think so and therefore he should have said his disputation tended to prove it not to belong If he viz. the Defender or the Dean did really think it did they or he must be very singular in that sentiment I would have them name me the man that ever laid down and asserted such a position Some I know have said of that Sacred Being that it is summè simplex or more simple than any thing else but that imports not universal absolute omnimodous simplicity which is impossible to be a perfection or therefore to belong to the Divine Nature No man that ever acknowledged a Trinity of persons even modally distinguished could ever pretend it for such simplicity excludes all modes Nay the Antitrinitarians themselves can never be for it as the Calm Discourse hath shewn And if the Dean be he is gone into the remotest extream from what he held and plainly enough seems still to hold that ever man of sense did But for what is added that he will not allow that Wisdom Power and Goodness are the same thing in God This is not fairly said Civility allows me not to say untruly There is no word in the place he cites nor any where in that book that signifies not allowing 't is intimated we are not instructed by the Scripture to conceive of the Divine Nature as in every respect most absolutely
be the same but must be two No man is his own Image nor is an Image the Image of it self And he adds this is so self evident c. But whereas the distinction all this while might be understood to be but modal and that appears to be the Defenders present what ever was the Deans former meaning that the three subsistences differ only in their different manner of subsisting yet with this meaning his other words do little agree for he plainly asserts a real distinction of three in the same individual numerical nature And who did ever make a real distinction to be but modal More expresly he had said before p. 18. the Divine Nature is one individual nature but not one single nature for one single nature can be but one person whether in God or man I shall not here discuss with him the Criticism upon which he lays so mighty stress of one individual nature and one single nature but take the terms he chooses and if the Divine Nature be not one single nature it must be double it must be triple And what doth this come to less than three Natures unless all ordinary forms of speech must be quite abandon'd and forsaken And wherein doth it come short of what is said by the Enquirer p. 50. and 51. This term individual must in the case now supposed as possible not as certain admit of a twofold application either to the distinct essence of the Father or of the Son or of the Holy Ghost or to the entire essence of the Godhead in which these three do concurr Each of these conceived by it self are according to this supposition individual essences but conceived together they are the entire individual essence of God for there is but one such essence and no more and it can never be multiplied nor divided into more of the same name and nature Duplicity triplicity are admitted simplicity rejected if simple and single be of the same signification Where is the difference but that the one thinks absolute omnimodous simplicity is not to be affirmed of the Divine Nature as he often speaks The other says downright it is not single or simple without limitation The one denies multiplication of it so doth the other The one indeed speaks positively the other doth but suppose what he says as possible not certain And there is indeed some difference between supposing a thing as possible for ought one knows and affirming it so positively as to impute Heresie and Nonsense to all Gainsayers But both bring for proof the same thing The incarnation as in the Postscript the Defender takes notice the Enquirer doth p. 102. And so doth he himself in his letter p. 102. The Divine Nature was incarnate in Christ he was perfect God and perfect man and if there was but one single Divine Nature in all three persons this one single Divine Nature was incarnate and therefore the Father and the Holy Ghost who are this single Divine Nature as well as the Son must be as much incarnate as the Son was He makes the contrary absurd And brings in fitly enough Victorinus Afer teaching that we ought not to say nor is it lawful to say that there is but one substance i. e. as he paraphrases it one single subsisting nature therefore there must be three single subsisting natures and three persons For if this same substance did and suffer'd all Patri-passiani et nos we must be Patri-passians which God forbid And what the Defender alledges from the Ancients against the Sabellians allowing only a Trinity of Names and his taking the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the concrete not in the abstract fully enough speaks the Enquirers sense his accounting the contrary too Fine and Metaphysical for him was what was writ to Dr. Wallis Calm Discourse p. 107. too fine or too little solid c. In short till it can be effectually prov'd that Mind and Spirit do not signifie somewhat as absolute as Nature or Essence or rather more than the former which signifies the Principle of Operation as the other of Being And till it can be as well prov'd that asserting a thing as certain so as to pronounce it Heresie and Nonsense to think otherwise is less than only to propose it as possible or enquire whether it be so or no The Dean must be judg'd by every one that understands common sense to have heightened the Distinction of three Persons at least as much as the Enquirer And whether the Enquirer have supposed more than is defensible against the Defenders objections will be considered by and by in its proper place In the mean time let it 2. Be examin'd whether the Dean has said as much for salving the Unity of the Godhead as the Enquirer or as much as is requisite to that purpose And here our Business will be short for it all turns upon that one single point whether mutual Consciousness be that Union which must be acknowledged or suppose it only For which we need only appeal to common Reason whether Being do not in the natural Order precede even the Power of working and consequently whether being united vitally precede not the possibility of acting agreeably to that united state whereupon the Enquiry is not concerning actual conscience only but as he speaks Consciousness Is it possible any three Persons or Intelligent Subsistences should naturally have vital Perception of each others internal Motions and Sensations without being vitally preunited I say naturally for that God might give to three created Spirits a temporary Perception of each other without bringing them into a stated Union each with other is little to be doubted as a Spirit may assume a Body and animate it pro tempore without being substantially united with it And if that Body were also a Spirit they might pro tempore for ought we know by extraordinary Divine Disposition for within the ordinary course of Nature we know of no such intimacy of created Spirits to another be quasi animae to one another But if naturally they were so to mingle and transfuse Sensations mutually into each other they must be naturally first in vital union with one another Nor therefore did the Enquirer mistake the Dean's Notion as the Defender fancies in the passage he quotes p. 104. as if he took mutual Consciousness for meer mutual Perspection For tho' scire abstractly taken doth not signifie more than perspicere yet the Enquirer in that passage speaking of a never so perfect mutual perspection properly enough express'd thereby as great a feeling such Spirits were supposed to have of each other in themselves as mutual consciousness is apt to signifie or as the Dean can yet be supposed to have meant that perspection being more perfect which produces gusts and relishes suitable to the Object than that which stays in meer speculation only And upon the whole it seems very strange the Defender should say if such an internal vital sensation be not an essential union he
Image is not an emanation but a reflection But how should there be a reflected Image without an emanation Nor the Holy Ghost being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not in the sense of emanation but of the mysterious Procession I shall make no guesses about it for it concerns not the Enquirer only I think it very secure against the formidable Objection which he mentions p. 35. of it's being too intelligible Upon the whole matter I see not what service it can do him to put intelligent person instead of mind For I thought every Person had been intelligent Boethius his definition which he alledges plainly implies so much and one would think he must know that it is the usual notion of Person to understand by it suppositum rationale or intelligents Therefore methinks he should not reckon it necessary to distinguish Persons as he doth by this addition of intelligent into such as are Persons and such as are no Persons But since he expresly saies and I think for the most part truly that the three Persons or subsistences in the ever blessed Trinity are three real substantial subsistances each of which hath entirely all the Perfections of the Divine Nature Divine Wisdom Power and Goodness and therefore each of them is eternal Infinite mind as distinct from each other as any other three Persons and this he believes the Dean will no more recant than he will renounce a Trinity for all the wit of man can not find a medium between a substantial Trinity and a Trinity of names or a Trinity of meer modes Respects and Relations in the same single essence which is no Trinity at all As also he had said much to the same purpose before that to talk of three subsistences in the abstract without three that subsist or of one single nature which hath three subsistences when it 's impossible that in singularity there can be more than one subsistence c. I believe he will find no small difficulty to name what it is that with the peculiar distinct manner of subsistence makes a person not the very same common nature for the Persons can not be distinguished from each other by that which is common to them all Therefore the Divine Nature which is common to the three must according to him comprehend three single natures and not be absolutely simple Hither must be his resort at last after all his earnest disputation against it And these he will have to be parts which because they are undivided impartible inseparable everlastingly and necessarily united I do reckon the Enquirer did with very sufficient reason and with just decency and doth still continue very peremptorily to deny And whereas he contends that the whole Divine nature is entirely in each subsistence as he does again and again I think the term whole improper where there are no proper parts And I doubt not when he gives place to cooler thoughts he will see cause to qualify that assertion For if he strictly mean that every thing that belongs to the Godhead is in each Person I see not how he will fetch himself from the Socinian consequence that then each Person must have a Trinity subsisting in it and be Father Son and H. Ghost For I doubt not he will acknowledge that the entire Divinity includes in it the Father Son and Holy Ghost And therefore he must be beholden to an inadequate notion in this very case when all is done how much soever he hath contended against it I do however think it safe and free from any other difficulty than we unavoidably have in conceiving Infinites To say that all perfection is in each subsistent which I like better than subsistence as more expressive of the concrete as far as their natural necessary eternal order towards one another as the first is the fountain or radix the second from that and the third from both can possibly admit All must be originally in the Father with whom the other two have that intimate vital eternal union that what is in him the other communicate therein in as full perfection as is inconceivable and more than it is possible for us or for any finite mind to conceive Therefore since that difference which only proceeds from that natural eternal order is conjecturable only but is really unknown unrevealed and inscrutable it is better herein to confess the imperfection of that knowledge which we have than to boast that which we have not or aspire to that which we cannot have FINIS These Books written by the Reverend Mr. John Howe are sold by Tho. Parkhurst at the Bible and Three Crowns in Cheapside 1. THE Blessedness of the Righteous The Vanity of this Mortal Life On Psal. 17. ver 15. and Psalm 89.47 2. Of Thoughtfulness for the Morrow With an Appendix concerning the immoderate Desire of fore-knowing things to come 3. The Redeemer's Tears wept over lost Souls in a Treatise on Luke 19.41 42. With an Appendix wherein somewhat is occasionally discoursed concerning the Sin against the Holy Ghost and how God is said to Will the Salvation of them that perish 4. Of Charity in reference to other Mens Sins 5. Self-dedication discoursed in the Anniversary Thansgiving of a Person of Honour for a great Deliverance 6. A Sermon directing what we are to do after a strict Enquiry whether or no we truly love God 7. A Funeral Sermon for that Faithful and Laborious Servant of Christ Mr. Richard Fairclough who deceased July 4. 1682. in the Sixty First year of his Age. 8. A Funeral Sermon for Mrs. Esther Sampson the late Wife of Henry Sampson Dr. of Physick who died Nov. 24. 1689. 9. The Carnality of Religious Contention In two Sermons Preach'd at the Merchant's Lecture in Broadstreet Books lately Printed for Thomas Parkhurst Spira's Despair revived Being a Narration of the Horror and Despair of some late Sinners under the Apprehensions of Death and Judgment Wherein are such Unquestionable Examples produc'd and such Matters laid down and proved as may stop the Mouths of the Atheistical Scoffers and Mockers By Thomas James Minister of the Gospel at Ashford in Kent The Confirming Work of Religion and its great things made plain by their primary Evidences and Demonstrations Whereby the meanest in the Church may soon be made able to render a rational account of their Faith The present Aspect of our Times and of the Extraordinary Conjunction of things therein in a rational View and Prospect of the same as it respects the publick hazard and safety of Brittain in this Day These two last by Rob. Fleming Author of the fulfilling of the Scriptures and Minister at Rotterdam England's Allarm Being an account of Gods most considerable dispensations of Judgment and Mercy towards these Kingdoms for fourteen years last past and also of the several sorts of Sins and Sinners therein Especially the Murmurers against this Present Government With an Earnest call to speedy Humiliation and Reformation and Supplication as the chief means of prospering their Majesties Councils and Preparations Dedicated to the King and Queen A Discourse concerning Old Age tending to the Instruction Caution and Comfort of Aged Persons By Richard Steel A. M. Letter p. 24 25. See his Letter p. 1. Calm Discourse p. 34. Calm Discourse p. 89 90. p. 139. Calm Disc. Calm Disc. p. 140. His Letter p. 105. See Calm Disc. p. 122.123 p. 108.109 110. His Letter p. 5. Calm Disc. 47. His Letter p. 110. Calm Disc. p. 48. Calm Disc. p. 140. Postscr to his Letter p. 111. Calm Disc. p. 48. Calm Disc. p. 73 74. Defence p. 16. p. 18. Calm Disc. p. 50.51 Postscrip p. 108 109. Postscrip p. 108. Defence p. 30.
simple or that Power Wisdom Goodness in the abstract are the same thing and that our difficulty is great to apprehend them really undistinguishable And let me seriously ask himself doth he in good earnest think it is only through the weakness of our understandings that we distinguish the notions of the Divine Wisdom Power and Goodness certainly it were great weakness of unstanding to define them alike I believe he never met with the writer yet that distinguisht them less than ratione ratiocinatâ in contradistinction to ratocinante which implies somewhat corresponding to our distinct notions of them eminently and not formally in naturâ rei And whereas he further says This prepared his way to make Goodness Wisdom Power a natural Trinity n Unity herein the Defender is mistaken This is not the Trinity which the Enquirers discourse was ever intended to terminate in as he himself hath expresly said and the Defender takes notice of it which makes me wonder how he could think it was so intended citing the very passage p. 37. where the Enquirer professes not to judge that we are under the precise notions of Power Wisdom and Goodness to conceive of the Father Son and Holy Ghost But why then were these three so much discourst of before They are three most celebrated Divine Attributes wherein we have our most immediate and very principal concern And some have thought the Trinity was most fitly to be conceived by them The Enquirer did not think so but he thought first it would be requisite to have our minds disentangled from any apprehended necessity of conceiving them to be in all respects the very same things nor are they the very same if they be so distinguish'd as is expressed in the 16 th of the summary propositions where also they are each of them said to be common to Father Son and Holy Ghost whence therefore it is impossible they shou'd be thought to distinguish Father Son and Holy Ghost But that some distinction being admitted even of them this might facilitate to us our conception of the greater distinction which must be of Father Son and Spirit as is express'd p. 38. Indeed he did not think fit to interrupt his discourse by staying to shew reasons why he did not rest in that account alone of the Trinity tho' it might seem plausible or not absurd but proceeded further to what was more satisfying to himself and might be so to other men And as the intervening Series of his discourse leads thereto this is more directly done p. 47. 48. c. especially where he comes to speak of the necessary coexistence and the as necessary and natural order of the Father Son and Spirit towards each other The second being not by any intervening act of will but by necessary eternal promanation from the first and the third from them both And the true reason why Power Wisdom and Goodness were not thought expressive of the distinction of Father Son and Spirit but common to each of them as is said Summary Prop. 16. was thatt the two latter can not but be necessary emanations most connatural to their Original as is truely suggested by the Defender p. 1â—1 If you object as the Defender brings in the Enquirer saying That this gives us the notion of a compounded Deity c. This i. e. the supposition that absolute omnimodous simplicity belongs not to it is the thing which may be thought to give us this notion And he tells us he the Enquirer answers this difficulty by giving us a new notion of a compositum And what 's that which he calls a new notion that a compositm seems to imply a preexisting component that brings such things together and supposes such and such more simple things to have preexisted apart or separate and to be brought afterwards together into an united State And indeed is this a new notion as new as the Creation Let him shew me an Instance through the whole created universe of Beings And for the uncreated Being the Defender now at this time disputes against any composition there and the Enquirer denies any first where there hath been a compositum without a pre-existing component or next the compounded parts whereof if substantial did not in order of nature pre-exist separate i. e. whether esse simplicitèr do not naturally precede esse tale or which is all one to our present purpose whether they were not capable hereof if the Creator pleased Let any man I say tell me where was there ever a compositum made by substantial union that did not consist of once separate or of separable parts But note his admirable following supposition that is to say that if a man suppose who consists of body and soul had been from eternity without a maker and his soul and body had never subsisted a part he could not have been said to have been a compounded Creature This is said with design most groundlesly as we shall see to fasten an absurd consequence upon the Enquirer and see how it lucks Did ever any man undertake to reprove an absurdity with greater absurdity a Creature without a Maker what sort of Creature must this be we have a pretty saying quoted in the Defender's Letter He that writes lies down and we are apt enough too when we write to trip and fall down and ought in such Cases to be merciful to one another even tho' he that falls should be in no danger of hurting his fore-head much more if he be What was another man's turn now may be mine next But let the supposition proceed and put we Being instead of Creature which no doubt was the Defender's meaning for Creature he must needs know it could not be that had no Maker And what then why he should not says he have been said to be compounded though he would have had the same parts that he has now We have here a self-confounding supposition which having done that first can't hurt him whom it was designed to confound being taken in season Grant one and you grant a thousand A Being made up of a soul and a body is so imperfect an entity as could not be of it self Nothing is of it self which is not absolutely perfect If he mind to disprove this let him try his faculty when he pleases against it and which I sincerely believe he never intends together with it against all Religion But besides he hath destroy'd his own supposition himself to put us out of that danger by saying in plain words p. 107. We have no Notion of an eternal and necessary Existence but in an absolutely perfect and infinite nature Now say I what is so perfect and hath whatever belongs to it necessarily though distinguishable things belong to it hath no parts for what are parts but such things as can be parted such things as never were parted and never can be as 't is nonsence to talk of those things being parted that are united necessarily and of themselves are