The utmost their Hypothesis will allow them to pretend to is That the Humane Nature of Christ is not a distinct Person from the Person of the WORD According to the Schoolmen the Humane Nature of Christ subsists and is a Principium quod of all its own Actions equally with the Humane Nature of any other Humane Person they seem to me to strive to disguise the Heresy of Nestorius by saying That the Humane Nature of Christ is not a distinct Person from the Person of the WORD because it subsists by the Subsistence or Personality of the WORD To explain this a little The Schoolmen who under pain of Heresy assert but one singular absolute Substance in the Trinity found a great and almost insuperable difficulty so to explain the Incarnation that only the Person of the WORD and not the whole Trinity was incarnated or became Man This is an obvious enquiry What it is which was immediately united to the Humane Nature of Christ so as to denominate Christ both God and Man To assert that the singular common Divine Nature was immediately united to the Humane Nature was to assert the Incarnation of the whole Trinity since whatever belongs to the common Divine Nature immediately belongs equally to the whole Trinity it remains therefore according to them that only the Mode of Subsistence of the WORD was immediately united to the Humane Nature This Answer has visibly many difficulties in it which may be considered hereafter Now I am only to enquire how it denies the Humane Nature of Christ to be a distinct Person from the Person of the WORD The Humane and Divine Nature of Christ have say they but one singular Mode of Subsistence Well grant that possible What follows The Schoolmen say that then they are not two distinct Persons I cannot for my life see the Consequence That Maxim of the Law Quando duo jura concurrunt in una persona oequum est ac si concurrerent in duobus may be as I conceive applied here If we suppose it possible for one Personality to constitute two distinct Natures each a Person it is a meer wrangle of a term to deny these two Natures to be two distinct Persons they have all the Properties of two distinct Persons they are two distinct Principia quoe equally with two other Persons The Animadverter does not barely alledge these to me unintelligible Subtilties of the Schools as the only defence of the sacred Article of the Incarnation against Nestorianism but in his third and next Argument to prove that Self-consciousness is not the formal Reason of Personality in finite Persons He unwittingly I charitably presume has endeavoured to overthrow the defence which the most Learned and Orthodox Fathers of the Church have given us of this sacred and mysterious Article P. 73. N. 4. The Soul of man is Self-conscious and yet not a Person therefore c. P. 74. lin 22. If the Soul be a Person then the Body must be joined to it by being assumed into the personal subsistence of the Soul as the Humane Nature of Christ is assumed into the personal subsistence of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whereupon the composition and constitution of a man will be an Hypostatick Union between Soul and Body which I suppose no Body will be either so bold or absurd as to affirm all Divines accounting an Hypostatical Union so peculiar to Christ's Person as not to be admitted in any other Person or Being whatsoever For an Hypostatick Union and an Hypostatick Composition viz. such an one as makes a compound Hypostasis are quite different things and this Author shall in due time be taught so much if he has any thing to object against it The Compiler of the Athanasian Creed has in this spoke the sense of the Catholick Church For as the reasonable Soul and Flesh is one man so God and Man is one Christ that is One not by Confusion of Substance but by Unity of Person I hope no True Son of the Church of England nor indeed Candid Lover of the Article but will pardon my digression if it deserve to be called such to vindicate this Similitude whereby the most Learned Fathers of the Church have endeavoured to illustrate and defend this Article against all its Heretical Opponents The Animadverter first objects That then the Constitution of a Man will be an Hypostatick Vnion Alas Obj. 1. How extremely afraid are some persons of having the Articles of their Faith found agreeable to the common Principles of Reason If by an Hypostatick Union he means that the Soul and Body of Man only subsist by the same singular Mode of Subsistence and that nothing but the Mode of the Subsistence of the Soul is immediately united to the Body I do assure the Animadverter that I believe not a Syllable of this I do not believe that one Mode can modify two Subjects or that a corporeal Body can be terminated perfected by a Mode of an incorporeal nature such as the Soul is Figure is a Mode of quantity and yet to me it seems unconceivable that a Giant should be terminated by the figure of a Dwarf without any alteration of his quantity or that a Dwarf should have the figure of a Giant and yet not altered in quantity Less am I able to conceive that the Humane Nature of Christ should be terminated by a Mode of Subsistence which belongs to a Divine Nature Secondly Obj. 2. If the Constitution of a Man be an Hypostatick Union then an Hypostatick Union and an Hypostatick Composition viz. such an One as makes a compound Hypostasis will not be quite different things then the Hypostatick Union in Christ will be also an Hypostatick Composition and then the Person of Christ will be a compound Hypostasis Well and what follows from all this why nothing but a threatning of the Animadverter's That in due time we shall be taught the Falshood of all this But not to await his due time I answer that to say that the Hypostatick Union in Christ is also an Hypostatick Composition or which is the same that Christ is a compound Hypostasis is so far from being a Paradox that it is the received Language not only of the Greek Fathers but of the Councils Syn. 5a. Constantin Can. 4. Sancti Patres docuerunt unitatem Dei verbi ad carnem animatam anima rationali intellectuali secundum compositionem Theodori autem Nestorii sequaces divisione gaudentes affectualem unitatem introducunt Sancta Dei verò Ecclesia utriusque perfidioe impietatem ejiciens unitionem Dei verbi ad carnem secundum compositionem confitetur Vide Can. 7um hujus Concilii Lib. 3. de Trin. cap. 3. sect 12. p. 232. Hear Petavius's Confession Christi Domini Hypostasin sive personam à plerisque Patribus dici compositam ex naturis duabus ut ab Cyrillo Damasceno Maximo aliis To which add what the Learned Suarez hath observed Suarez de
and a compleat Substance too Again a Million of Qualities Attributes Faculties can never make one God so that if Father Son and Holy Ghost signify three Faculties three Attributes three Modes not only each single Person is ungodded but the whole Trinity conjoyntly cannot be God The Sabellians acknowledge the Divine Persons to be Deum unum the Catholicks Deum unum trinum but this opinion neither unum nec trinum And hence we may see with what Prudence the Church chose the Phrase of three Hypostases and what danger there would be to change it with a late Reverend Author for three Somewhats P. 247. lin 2. n. 16. Which three Persons superadd to this Divine Nature or Deity three different Modes of Subsistence founding so many different Relations Three human Persons add to the common universal human Nature three different Modes of Subsistence according to the Schoolmen and the Animadverter What then would the Animadverter take this Answer for a Solution of this question what three human Persons are The same reply may justly be made to himself This is the difficulty what in the Deity the ternary number can belong to which a Divine Person is not as the Animadverter has mistaken it what in the Deity the ternary number can belong to which a Divine Person has The Schoolmen answer that the ternary number belongs to an infinite relative Substance I agree with them that a Divine Person is an infinite Substance or which I like better as freer from Ambiguity an infinite substantial Being and that this may be multiplied as well as Divine Person with the Trinity N. 17. The design of the Animadverter in quoting so many places of the ancient Fathers is very vain to prove a Conclusion which none denies that the three Personalities are in some Sense or other three Modes of Subsistence However in respect of the Greek Fathers I have formerly observed that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 does not signify a Mode of Subsistence nor 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Subsistence in the Abstract but a subsistent Person or Being in concreto Ruffinus believed Trinitatem in rebus ac subsistentiis N. 18. Anim. p. 268. and not with the Animadverter Trinitatem in modis ac subsistentiis Subsistentia to the Ancients signified concretely the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Boetius of all the Latin Fathers of those times seems most acquainted with the Writings of the Greeks and therefore most expresly determins for the Universality of the common Divine Essence N. 19. he defines a Person in common to God Angels and Men to be rationabilis naturoe individuam substantiam he uses Subsistentia afterwards which shews he looked upon the terms as equivalent Secondly He gives us these remarkable words of the Greek Fathers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which Boetius thus translates Id est essentioe in solis universalibus quidem esse possunt in solis verò individuis particularibus substant Quo circa cum ipsoe substantioe in universalibus quidem sunt in particularibus verò capiant substantiam jure substantias particulariter subsistentes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 groeci appellaverunt These words are capable of no Evasion that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was in Universals 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Individuals and Particulars that the Greeks whose very words he quotes understood it in this Sense and by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 understood Substantias particulariter subsistentes and this jure not impropriè not by a Fetch as Thomas Aquinas Anim. c. p. 272. afterwards Secundum quod Divina verbis humanis significari contingit This Caution is necessary to reconcile the Subtleties of the Schools and the Faith of three Hypostases But Boetius had no need of any such Caution and therefore he used it not and it is the more remarkable that these words I have quoted out of Boetius are in that very Book of two Natures in the one Person of Christ which the Animadverter quotes so that either the Animadverter never read Boetius or read him at a very careless rate N. 20. Peter Lombard is express against the Relativeness of this Term Lib. 1. Sent. Dist 23. n. 1. Person Est unum nomen c. Persona quod secundum substantiam dicitur de singulis Personis pluraliter non singulariter in summa accipitur c. and Dist 25. That this Term Persona is to be taken in one Sense when we say that the Father is a Person the Son is a Person c. and in a different Sense when we say that Father Son and Holy Ghost are three Persons in this last Phrase it only signifies three Personalities in the former a proper Person Now this to me is a betraying of the Catholick Faith a Confession that we ought not to say three Persons if we speak properly if we understand this Term Person in the same Sense in which we say that the Father c. is a Person N. 21. P. 273. The Animadverter quotes these words of Thomas Aquinas Hoc nomen persona in divinis significat relationem per modum rei subsistentis sic hoc nomen Hypostasis I wish our great Critick had translated these words I take this to be the meaning of them viz. That this Name Person in the Trinity signifies a relation conceived by us after the Nature of a Substance and not after the Nature of a Mode which the Animadverter has all along with so much confidence pretended I cannot define Substance better than by res subsistens N. 22. P. 275. lin 9. Only I think fit to remark this That whereas I have alledged some of the Schoolmen and particularly Durandus Thomas and Suarez expressing the Divine Personalities by Relations as well as by Hypostases or Subsistences as they do in both these mean but one and the same thing viz. a Relative Subsistence or a subsisting Relation c. If the Animadverter means that a Relative Subsistence and a subsisting Relation are according to the Schoolmen materially identically the same thing it is no News The Schoolmen hold that the Relation and the Divine Essence in each single Person are thus identically the same each single Person being God that is a pure simple Act. But if he means that they are formally the same it is manifest that he understands neither of the Phrases nor what the Schoolmen meant by them Subsistence which himself very justly calls p. 97. Self-subsistence is an absolute Attribute and can no more be relative than Self-Consciousness By a relative Subsistence the Schoolmen mean that the Relation in each single Person modifies the one common absolute essential Subsistence and renders it incommunicable which of it self as being infinite it was not But a Divine Person being as Ruffinus observed Hoc ipsum quod extat subsistit and consequently the Divine Persons being three Somewhats subsisting three Hypostases in concreto and not three Personalities with Peter Lombard Thomas Aquinas
that the term three intelligent Persons is adequately and convertibly predicated of God For whatever is adequately and convertibly predicated of any term may in all Propositions be put in the place of that term according to which Rule we may say that three intelligent Persons sent his Son gave his only begotten Son That our Saviour is the Son of three intelligent Persons Blessed be three intelligent Persons even the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ There needs no words to expose or confute these Expositions Is this the Person who calls so loud for a Decretum Oxoniense for a Theological Censure from both the Universities Is this the Person who is to vindicate the Reputation of the Church of England to Foreigners Is this the Man who is to warn us that our Religion our old Religion lies at stake If it does it is from such Heterodox Expounders of it as himself To conclude This Proposition viz. God is the Father which the Animadverter with so much ignorance of the received language of the Church and in the consequence Blasphemy charges with Absurdity and Illogicalness was in the judgment of the greatest Man as to this Controversy next to the Divinely inspired Writers whom the Church ever enjoyed the Learned Athanasius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the most sacred and venerable Article of the Church of God But this belongs to my Second Part concerning the Vnity of God ERRATA PAge 9 l 6. f. sive r. sine p. 11. l. 10. f. by it r. by it self l. 29. r. Praeter p. 15. l. 25. r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 18. l. 27. f. part of r. co-part with p. 42. l. 23. r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ibid. Marg. r. denominari p. 44. l. 15. after prius posterius add in the Divine Nature p. 46. l. 15. r. Principle p. 47. l. 15. f. such r. each p 48. l. 9. r. judicarunt p. 71. l. penult r. according p. 73. l. 23. f. personallity r. personally p. 88. l. 29. r. vindicates p 92. l. 2. f. senses in r of p. 98. l 13. r dicunt and place the Quotation after the following Sentence p. 109. l. penult f. these r. three p. 110. l. 28. f. as one r. in one p. 114 l. 7. f. but therefore r. so that p. 116. l. 17. r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 120. l. 5. f. Apostasit r. Hypostasis p. 129. l. 21. r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 l. 25. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 137. l. 27. r. praeter p. 148. l. 24 r. believes p. 153. l. 8. r. Hypothesis p. 155. l. 21. f. assent to r. assert p 163. l. 4. r. subsistit l 5. gignit l. 9. seipsam the same mistake in some other places l. 23. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 165. l. 21. r. subsistit There are some other literal mistakes as Logicks for Logick Hypostases for Hypostasis and several mispointings which will not much disturb a judicious Reader and the Animadverter if he pleases may correct them himself if this Book does not find him other employment The Pages are mistaken from 132 to 137. INDEX A Preface to the Reader concerning Tritheism charg'd c. i. An Introduction by way of Letter to the Animadverter Page 1 The Socinian Historian's Encomium on the Animadversions c. ibid. The Animadverter's Treatment of the Dean of St. Pauls 2 The Hypothesis of Three Infinite Minds and Three Modes compared 4 My Design and Surprize in four particulars ibid. The Faith of the Church as to several Extra-scriptural Terms and several Scriptural Expressions 5 The design of my First Part to state the Doctrine of the Trinity the Reason of my proceeding by way of Animadversions on the Animadverter 6 The design of my Second Part to state the Article of the Unity of God ibid. CHAP. I. N. 1. THE absolute necessity of the Scholastick Terms their usefulness at this time 8 N. 2. Whether Accidents are distinct Beings from Substance 9 N. 3 4. Of Substance and Accident 10 N. 5 6. Of the Nature of Modes of the reason of inventing Modes the Animadverter's mistake N. 7. Of Modal Difference 13 N. 8. Of the Animadverter's definition of Essence 14 N. 9. Whether Existence be a Mode 15 N. 10. Of Subsistence of the Animadverter's addition to the common definition of Subsistence 16 Whether the Human Nature of Christ be barely an adjunct to the WORD 18 N. 11. Of one singular Existence of the Trinity 19 N. 12 13. More Considerations about Subsistence 20 N. 14. Of Modal Composition of the reduction of Modes Whether a Divine Person is compounded 21 N. 15. Whether things formally different be affirmable of one another 25 CHAP. II. N. 1. OF the Debate betwixt the Reverend Dean and the Animadverter concerning Self-consciousness and Mutual-consciousness 27 N. 2. Whether Personality be the Principle of Action N. 3. Whether the Human Nature of Christ be a Person And of some of the Subtilties of the Schools relating to the Incarnation 28 N. 4. Whether the Soul of man is a Person and of the illustration of the Incarnation from this similitude Whether Christ is a compound Hypostasis 30 N. 5. Whether the Soul can be a Part and Person both 33 N. 6. Whether the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and man be Unum per Accidens or Unum per se 34 N. 7. Whether the Soul be the same Person with the Man and whether the WORD be the same Person with whole Christ How a whole and compound Being or Person differ 36 N. 9. A Retortion of the Argument against the Socinians and the Animadverter 40 N. 10. What denominates any Being a distinct Person 41 CHAP. III. N. 1. OF a Prius and Posterius in the Trinity 44 N. 2. Whether Self-consciousness be a Personal Act 46 N. 3 4. Whether to be a Person be a Relative Attribute in this Mystery 47 N. 5. Why we believe Three Divine Persons and no more 52 N. 6. Of the Singularity or Plurality of the Predication of any Attribute concerning the Divine Persons Of the Distinction of Personal and Essential Predicates Of the distinction of Nouns Substantive and Nouns Adjective in relation to this Mystery Of the distinction of Absolute and Relative Predicates in relation to this Mystery St. Augustin's Axiom of quicquid ad se Deus c. confuted Of St. Augustin's Opinion in this Article A Character of the Schoolmen by Mr. Dodwell The Answer to an Arian Objection Of the true Rule of Singular and Plural Predications in the Trinity That the Articles of the Unity of God and the Unity of the Trinity are distinct Articles 55 CHAP. IV. N. 1. OF Orthodox Forms of Speech in relation to this Mystery 65 N. 2. Whether Three Persons in God 67 N. 3. Of the Reason of using Extra-Scriptural Terms in this Controversy Of the Schoolmens Principles 69 N. 4. Of the import of this Phrase of Three Infinite Minds Why this Phrase so rare Of the Phrase of One Infinite Mind in relation to the
by which the Humane Nature of Christ exists in the person of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we shall hardly find a fitter than to say that it exists in it as an Adjunct in the Subject For it is certain that it does not exist in it as a Part in the Whole since by this means the Second Person in the Trinity must till his Incarnation have wanted one part of his person But I shall not be positive in the application of this term here This Sacred Article of the Incarnation of the Son of God deserves a particular Treatise by it self However I could not in the Interim forbear to vindicate it from those Misrepresentations the Animadverter has unwittingly I charitably presume put upon it The Animadverter did not understand or not consider the relation of an Adjunct to a Subject or he would never have made this Application in reference to the Hypostatic Union of the Humane Nature of Christ to the Person of the WORD Where a Substance is an Adjunct the Adjunct is predicated of the Subject more Accidentis after the nature of an Accident This the predicament of Habitus might have informed the Animadverter We say not that a man is his Cloaths but that a man is cloath'd so that if the Humane Nature of Christ be barely an Adjunct to the Person of the WORD we could not say that the WORD was or became Man but only that he was externally cloathed with Humanity Secondly The Animadverter confutes himself when he tells us That the Humane Nature of Christ exists in the Person of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A substantial Adjunct can never exist in its Subject but only an accidental Adjunct as a Quality c. If the Humane Nature exists in the Person of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it must in some sense be a part of the Person of the WORD Thirdly Nor is there any Absurdity in acknowledging the Humane Nature to be a part of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nay very learned persons have not scrupled to call the Person of the WORD a Part of Christ taking that term Part in a large sense and abstracting from the imperfections which are included in the common acceptation of it The Person of the WORD is not an imperfect Part nor the Humane Nature a Part in such Sense that the Person of the WORD wants such Part to complete it In an Hypostatical Composition the Inferior Nature is in some Analogy a Co-part in other respects an Adjunct and of necessity imperfect but to be the superior Nature in such Composition infers no Imperfection But of this more hereafter One and the same undivided Existence P. 34. lin 28. N. 11. as well as one and the same Essence or Nature belongs to all the Three Persons equally whereas yet every Person has his own distinct Subsistence by himself There is not a more intricate Dispute amongst the Schoolmen than this which the Animadverter argues from as a Principle To assert above one singular Existence in the Trinity thô the Sacred Scriptures expresly multiply this Attribute I and the Father are One these Three are One was to give up the Hypothesis of the Schools of the singularity of the common Divine Nature But the Schoolmen were at a loss Probabilius tamen ac verius existimamus illam substantiam singularem quae communis est tribus personis ut sic subsistentem esse ex se essentialiter habereque unam subsistentiam absolutam essentialem tribus personis communem haec enim sententia communiter recepta est à Theologis utriusque Scholae D. Thomae Scoti ab aliis etiam Suarez Metaph Disp 34. Sect. 1. N. 3. when they came to enquire into the Modus of this singular Existence There are but two Modes of a substantial singular Existence incomplete which belongs to a substantial Part complete which belongs to a Suppositum Complete Existence is but another Phrase for Subsistence and so there will be but One undivided Subsistence of the whole Three Persons and this the whole Party of the Thomists and Scotists affirm and call it an absolute essential Subsistence so little did the Animadverter understand these Disputes The acute Petavius could not here keep pace with the Schoolmen all Antiquity knew nothing of this Essential Subsistence he embraces the former and attributes one singular incomplete Existence to the Divine Nature Now certainly this Learned Person strained very hard to ascribe something incomplete to the Divine Nature I will give the Reader his own words Petav. lib. 4. de Trin. cap. 12. Sect. 13. p. 421. Non enim de tali Existentia hîc agimus quoe perfecta completae substantioe propria sit sed quoe formis imperfectis Rebus ex quibus quasi componitur quippiam congruit P. 35. lin 11. N 12. Now whatsoever Being or Nature this Mode of Subsistence does belong to that is properly called a Suppositum And the consequence of this is That as Subsistence makes a Thing or Being a Suppositum so Suppositality makes it incommunicable This is worse Heresy to the Schoolmen than the phrase of three infinite Minds They acknowledge this in finite Beings or Natures but affirm the quite contrary in the Divine Nature Not the Absolute Essential Subsistence renders the Divine Nature a Suppositum but the Divine Relation whether it be Paternity Filiation or Procession according to the Schoolmen constitutes the Divine Nature a Person or Persons Secondly Not the Subsistence with a relation renders the Divine Nature incommunicable but only the Divine Person incommunicable Subsistence in finite Beings renders that particular Nature as well as Person incommunicable but in the Divine Nature only the Person P. 35. lin 30. N. 13. So that as a Suppositum is substantia singularis completa per se subsistens so the Ratio intellectiva being added to this makes it a Person which is a farther perfection of Suppositality I only ask the Animadverter Whether he acknowledges three Suppositums in the Trinity And whether the Objection of three Substances is not as strong against that Confession from this Definition of a Suppositum as himself brings against the phrase of three infinite Minds 2dly Ratio intellectiva is a farther perfection of a Suppositum but not of Suppositality A Beast as truly as perfectly subsists by its self as a Man Rationality is a Perfection a Mode taking that term in a large sense of Animality but not a Perfection or Mode of Subsistence If it be here asked P. 36. lin 3. N. 14. Whether Subsistence or Suppositality added to bare Nature does not make a Composition I answer That in created finite Persons it does but not in uncreated and infinite And the reason is because tho all Composition implies Union yet all Union is not therefore Composition but something higher and transcendental So that in the Divine Persons of the Trinity the Divine Nature and Personal Subsistence coalesce into one
by an incomprehensible ineffable kind of Union and Conjunction And if this does not satisfy as it rationally may I must needs profess that my Thoughts and Words can neither rise higher nor reach further This difficulty is not peculiar to the Asserters of a Trinity of Divine Persons They who acknowledge but one Divine Person in the Godhead are equally concerned in this question Whether the Subsistence of one or more Divine Persons added to the Divine Nature infers a Composition in a Divine Person The Animadverter confesses That in all finite Persons Subsistence and Nature infer a Composition he means a modal Composition a Composition of Substance and Mode This manifestly increases the difficulty how a Substance and Mode should not be a modal Composition in a Divine Person He tells you indeed it does not if we please we may take his word if not his thoughts and words can reach no higher But by his leave I shall consider this point more carefully All Composition is Distinctorum Vnio so as to constitute some whole that is in Composition there must be an Union and also the several things united must in some sense be component parts otherwise we could not distinguish Composition from a bare local Union Now according to the Animadverter the Divine Nature or Substance is one thing and the Mode another a Mode is to him a thing added and a Divine Person a whole so that it is manifest according to him that there must be a modal Composition in a Divine Person in God in a pure simple act which is void of all Composition Nay further those Schoolmen who assert these real Modes reduce some of them to Substance some of them to the accidental Predicaments Those Modes which intimately adhere to Substance as Existence Subsistence they reduce to the predicament of Substance those Modes which complete Substance it self cannot be any thing accidental of a different kind and nature from Substance and yet they cannot be perfect Substances for then they would want other Modes to perfect them but they suppose each of these Modes a substantiale quid a substantial thing tho not so perfect as Substance So again those Modes which perfect an Accident are each of them accidentale quid something accidental tho not a perfect Accident Now I freely profess that I have no Notion of this substantiale quid which is not a perfect Substance nor of an accidentale quid which yet is not a perfect Accident However from this Explication of these Philosophers minds it is manifest that a Substance and Mode in finite Persons infer a Composition of a Substance and a distinct substantiale quid To apply this to the Opinion of the Schoolmen concerning the simplicity of a Divine Person The Subsistence as I have already declared they believed to be one absolute Essential the Divine Relations which they call Modes of Subsistence because according to them they constitute the Divine Persons and render each Person incommunicable which a Mode of Subsistence does in finite Persons I say the Divine Relations of Paternity Filiation and Procession they first declared to be no predicamental Relations for then they must have been esteemed proper Modes Modus non potest non esse quid imperfectum cum non attingat absolutam rationem entis Suarez lib. 4. de Trin. cap. 4. N. 11. p. 410. and the Schoolmen were never so silly as to believe there was any thing so imperfect as a Mode in God they never believed a substantiale quid which was not so perfect as a Substance in God They call the Divine Relations transcendental Relations which in our imperfect way of Conception are but as so many substantial Modes perfecting the one absolute Subsistence of the Divine Essence they believed each distinct Divine Relation to be not a bare substantiale quid but a most perfect infinite Substance with a Relative Form or as they often speak a Relative Substance And here I must again acknowledge that I am as little able to conceive a Relative Substance as a substantiale quid before J am substantia non erit substantia quia relativum erit Absurdum est autem ut substantia relativè dicatur omnis res ad scipsam subsistit quanto magis Deus St. Austin lib. 7. de Trin. cap. 5. But will not this Notion of the Schoolmen infer an higher Composition in a Divine Person viz. of two Substances an Absolute Substance the Divine Nature and a Relative Substance the Relation They answer That the Absolute and Relative Substance are not united but identified one with another this being an Axiom to the Schoolmen Suarez lib. 4. de Trin. cap. 2. N. 3. p. 407. In Divinis omnia sunt Vnum ubi non obviat relationis oppositio but there cannot be pretended relationis oppositio betwixt an Absolute and Relative Substance and by the same Axiom they endeavour to shew how these three Relative Substances may be one absolute Divine Nature one God But then comes the grand Difficulty of all If each distinct Relative Substance be the same or identified with the one singular absolute Divine Nature are not the three Relations from thence identified one with another Is not this an infallible Axiom in reason Quae sunt eadem uni tertio sunt eadem inter se This is the Gordian Knot which almost every Schoolman gives a different answer to but at last they are generally obliged to cut it and deny the truth of the Axiom in the Divine Nature I thought it necessary to give this account of the Opinions of the Schoolmen to shew the Animadverter how little reason he had to lay so great a stress upon the Metaphysicks of Modes Nothing was farther from the thoughts of the Schoolmen with whose Names he flourishes so often than to believe that there were true Modes in God The Divine Relations according to them were only Modes in Name or in our imperfect Conception of them As for my own private Opinion with all submission to better Information I conceive That Existence in a finite Person or Being much more in a Divine Person is only the actuality of a Person or Being That Subsistence adds only a Negation of incompleteness to substantial Existence even in finite Persons and consequently infers no sort of Composition in them and therefore much less infers a Composition in a Divine Person Again I do believe that all predicamental Relations amongst the Creatures are no positive Modes but only external Denominations the same which the Schoolmen are obliged to affirm of the Relations of the Divine Persons to the Creatures Nor can I see any Absurdity of extending the same conclusion to the Internal Relations as the Schoolmen call them As for instance The Relation of Paternity may justly as I conceive be stiled an extrinsical Denomination extrinsical I say not to the sacred Triad but to the Person of the Father who is denominated by it and in the same sense Filiation extrinsical
to the Person of the Son and Procession extrinsical to the Person of the blessed Spirit This naturally and easily defends the Simplicity of a Divine Person this frees us of endless and inextricable Questions which fill up every page of the Scholastical Writers This forces us not to hide our selves in a Cloud of Words which signify nothing A Substance and a Mode says the Animadverter infer not Composition in a Divine Person because in him the Substance and Mode coalesce into one by an Vnion and Conjunction that is in other words they infer not Composition because they are compounded Composition and Coalescing into One by an Union and Conjunction differ no more than Definitum and Definition It is truly therefore incomprehensible and ineffable that a coalescing into one by an Union and Conjunction should not be a Composition Mind Wisdom Power Goodness P. 39. lin 6. N. 15. c. are formally distinct from one another and so not affirmable of one another and in speaking of things the formal differences of them must still be attended to Gods Justice and his Mercy are one pure simple Act in him But he that says His Justice is his Mercy speaks absurdly for all that c. Whatever differs really differs also formally but here by formal difference the Animadverter understands that difference which is only formal and not real Now in this sense of the term the express contrary Conclusion is true That whatsoever things are only formally different are therefore affirmable of one another The Conclusion the Animadverter ought to have deduced from his Premises is That Mind Wisdom Goodness viz. in God are not formally affirmable of one another But it is Fallacia à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter to put the first Conclusion in place of the second to say That Mind Wisdom Goodness are not simply affirmable of one another because it will be acknowledged that they are not formally affirmable of one another Secondly Whereas the Animadverter tells us That in speaking of Things the formal Differences of them must still be attended to We need no other Confutation of this Proposition than his own immediate following words viz. That God's Justice and his Mercy are one pure simple Act in him His Justice and his Mercy are formally or in our way of Conception two distinct nay two opposite Acts it is only in the Reality that we affirm them to be one pure simple Act in him Thirdly If things only formally different are not affirmable of one another there could be no Propositions but identical ones or at most where the Subject and Predicate are synonimous Terms No man could say without absurdity That the Father is God because these two terms Father and God formally differ and therefore according to this wise Rule of our Animadverter are not affirmable of one another Has the Animadverter never heard of the Distinction of Sensus Identicus and Sensus Formalis This Proposition God's Justice is his Mercy is true Sensu Identico tho not Sensu Formali We are cautioned indeed by the Learned that we avoid Conclusions which are only true Sensu Identico when such way of speaking is against common Custom or when the formal Sense carries a formal Opposition as in the Divine Attributes of Justice and Mercy and the reason they give is because in such instances the Propositions lead to a formal Sense in which Sense they are false But if we add Sensu Identico that is in what sense we understand these Propositions then they are true and consequently not absurd unless a Truth can be absurd CHAP. II. I Shall crave leave of the Reader N. 1. to say thus much in general of the Animadverters Third and Fourth Chapter wherein he endeavours to prove That Self-consciousness is not the Formal Reason of Personality in the Divine Persons nor Mutual-consciousness the Formal Reason of their Vnity of Nature That all this is said as I verily believe without an Adversary The Reverend Dean of St. Paul's does not once in his Vindication of the B. Trinity expresly affirm either the one or the other of these Propositions He asks no more of his Reader if I misunderstand him not save to acknowledge That a distinct Self-Consciousness is a firm proof of the Distinction of Persons in this Sacred Mystery and that a singular Mutual-Consciousness is an equal proof of the Singularity of the Divine Nature I conceive That the Reverend Dean never intended to deny that the Distinction of Persons is in order of Nature before their distinct acts of Self-Consciousness or that their Unity of Nature is in the same degree of Priority before their singular Mutual-Consciousness but only intended that quoad nos or in our way of Knowledge or Conception their distinct Self Consciousness proved or was known to us before their distinct Personality and their singular mutual Consciousness in order of our Knowledge before the Knowledge of their Unity of Nature In the Animadverter's Third Chapter N. 2. he endeavours to prepare the way by denying that Self-Consciousness is the formal reason of personality in finite created Persons A Conclusion none affirms who understands the meaning of the terms It is impossible that a personal Act an Effect should any ways be the proper formal cause of its efficient a Person Animad c. P. 71. lin 10. But when he tells us That Personality is the ground and principle of all Action wheresoever it is he is guilty of a great Paradox in Philosophy and a greater in Divinity Personality is properly the Principle of no Action a Person is the Principium quod the Principle which acteth Nature is the Principium quo the Principle by which the Person acts Personality is but a necessary condition of a Being to enable it to act a causa sine qua non which is equivocally called a Cause or Principle Secondly Not the Personality of the WORD but the Humane Nature of Christ exerts the acts of Self-Consciousness Ibid. P. 72. lin 12. and other Humane Personal Acts the Humane Nature of Christ has all the Principles and Powers of Self-Reflection upon its own Acts otherwise Christ would not be a perfect Man P. 72. lin 21. N. 3. That the Humane Nature of Christ is not a Person is no less evident Since it is taken into and subsists in and by the Personality of the Second Person of the Trinity and therefore can have no distinct Personality of its own 1. Never was so obscure an Argument brought to prove so acknowledged a Conclusion Self-Consciousness is not the formal reason of Personality in finite Persons because the Humane Nature of Christ in the Hypostatical Union is Self-Conscious and yet not a Person nay this latter no less evident than the former 2. 'T is a received Article of the Church That the Human Nature of Christ is not a Person but how to reconcile this with the Subtilties of the Schools is above my skill
is one he is not the other this latter is a Modal not simple Negation But the Animadvertor himself tells us That wheresoever there are Two distinct Persons we do and must by all the Rules of Grammar and Logick say Animadv c. p. 74. l. 1. that one of them is simply not the other Which single passage overthrows our Animadvertor's Hypothesis that the Divine Persons differ by a Modal difference We have no way from Logicks of knowing when Two Beings differ wholly but from such simple negation a Negative Sign in Logicks distributes all which follows it in the same Proposition but of this more hereafter And therefore to argue from a Person to a Spirit here is manifestly sophistical P. 121. N. 9. and that which is called Fallacia accidentis or since several fallacies may concur in the same proposition it may be also a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter For so it is to conclude that three Persons are three distinct Gods since the difference of Persons is only from a diverse respect between them but three Gods import three absolute distinct Natures or Substances Where are we now this is a perfectly new Topick To argue from a Person to a Spirit is manifestly sophistical it is fallacia Accidentis and fallacia a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter Grant all this for once how is this a consequence from the former why is this ushered in with a therefore The former Answer obscurely denies that there are Three Persons this denies that a Divine Person or a person in this Mystery is a Spirit or God and asserts that a Divine Person is only ex accidenti or secundum quid a Spirit or God This will make strange Divinity if we apply it to the Father Son or Holy Ghost The Father is a Divine Person or a Person in this Mystery Will the Animadvertor himself have the Confidence to deduce the Conclusion that the Person of the Father is only ex accidenti or secundum quid a Spirit or God If the Animadvertor does not already know it let me inform him that the Catholick Faith is That every single Divine Person is essentially quidditative as the Schools speak a Spirit or God as fully as every single Angelical person is essentially a Spirit or an Angel And therefore when the Animadvertor tells us in the same page That a Person here imports only a Relation or Mode of Subsistence in conjunction with the nature it belongs to he is guilty of two absurdities First it is unintelligible cant a singular nature or substance in conjunction with the Mode or a singular nature sustaining a Mode is usual but to put the cart before the Horses to put the Mode before the Nature the Adjunct before the Subject is new Philosophy peculiar to the Animadvertor Secondly A person in this Mystery is not in recto a relation or Mode but the subject of the Relation or Mode a Divine Person has a Relation or Mode the Father has a relation or Mode but the Father is not a relation or Mode Animad c. p. 321. The Animadvertor himself tells us that a Person as such is a Substance and a compleat substance therefore not a Mode Ib. p. 121. Every Spirit has a Mode a proper Mode of subsistence belonging to it and yet in the same place the Animadvertor tells us that a Spirit is not a Mode of Being Ib. p. 121. N. 10. The ternary number all the while not belonging to their infinity but only to their personalities Will the Animadvertor stand by this Conclusion that the ternary Number belongs only to the Personalities if he does I am satisfied he gives up the Catholick Faith for that asserts that the ternary Number belongs to the Persons as well as Personalities If the Animadvertor will confess to the Socinians that there is but one Person in the Trinity I believe they will scarce think it worth their while to dispute whether there are Three Modes or not or whether these Modes are to be called Personalities or not One and the same Nature may sustain several distinct Relations or Modes of Subsistence P. 121. N. 11. A Mode of Subsistence in the sense of the Animadvertor for a Subsistential form or Personality is improperly said to be sustained Personality is the constituent form of the Person and not an adjunct of the Person Again Nature when distinguished from the Suppositum or Person is not the Subject of the Relations or Modes The Suppositum or Person is the proper Subject of the Relations or Modes sustained by that Person Further The common Assertion of the Schools is not barely that the Divine Nature sustains three distinct Relations or three distinct Modes but that it sustains three Relations of the same kind three distinct Personalities which is the great difficulty One and the same Person may be twice a Father if he has Two Children that is Natural But can we conceive that a Man can be twice a Father of one and the same Son This is the question how according to the Schools one and the same singular Nature when it is become one Person in the Father by one subsistential form can receive a distinct subsistential form without losing the first and also a third without losing the first or second I freely acknowledge that this is to me an insuperable difficulty and therefore I bless God that to me the Faith of Three Divine Persons needs not so nice a speculation Argument II. Three distinct Minds or Spirits P. 122. N. 12. are Three distinct Substances c. Tres Substantiae signifies no more than Tres Substantialem naturam habentes which is allowed by the strictest of the School-men Secondly The Phrase of Three Substances has been more or less allowed in all Ages of the Church to be predicated of the Three Divine Persons Calvin 's Instit lib. 1. cap. 13. n. 5. St. Hillary calls them so says the Learned Calvin plus Centies more than an hundred times The Greek Fathers understood the same by the term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the Plural Number St. Augustin confesses this of the Greek Fathers and that he knew no other signification of the term Hypostasis In Monologia cap. Anselmus very plainly Hoec nomina sc Persona substantia aptius eliguntur ad designandam pluralitatem in summa essentia quia Persona non dicitur nisi de individuâ rationali natura Substantia principaliter dicitur de individuis quoe maximè inpluralitate subsistunt Suarez lib. 1. de Trin. cap. 2. n. 11. Suarez Metaph. Disp 34. s. 1. n. 6. The School-men acknowledge Tres substantias incommunicabiles Ita D. Thom. 1 Part quoest 30. artic 1. ad 1. dicit juxta consuetudinem Eclesioe non esse absolutè dicendas tres substantias propter nominis oequivocationem addendo vero aliquid quod determinet significationem dici posse ut si
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or likeness of Nature between them but therefore we have the less cause to wonder if there be defects in some of their Arguments if some of their reasonings about the Trinity seem to look no further than a specifick Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons This is as little to the advantage of the Animadvertor's cause as the former allegations The Arians would not allow so much as a specifick Unity between the Father and the Son Nicepho Callist Eccles His lib. 18. cap. 47. I would fain know what Hereticks ever did allow it Nicephorus Callistus charges indeed this Opinion upon Philoponus and his followers who are commonly called the Tritheit Hereticks but he is a later and fabulous Writer wrote in the fourteenth Century long after the prevailing of the School-Divinity Philoponus and his followers the Tritheit Hereticks of the seventh Century inclined nearer to Sabellianism than to a belief of a specifick Unity of the Trinity that hard name of Tritheit Hereticks was given them by reason of some uncouth Phrases which they used of which hereafter Secondly what consequence will the Animadvertor draw from the Arians not allowing a specifick Unity between the Father and the Son This is what he aims at that it sufficed to maintain a specifick Unity to confute the Arian Heresie I desire to know why the same Plea might not have served the Reverend Dean in his learned Vindication of this Article against the Socinians who no more allow a Specifick Unity of the Trinity than the Arians of old The Socinians deny them to be three infinite minds why will not that Apologize for the Reverend Dean Why is not this molified and called only a defect in the Reverend Dean as the Animadvertor here Stiles it in the Antient Fathers Thirdly the Arians objected Tritheism against the Orthodox Faith as the Socinians do to this day So that had the Ancient Fathers believed this Heresie a consequence of asserting a specifick Unity in the Trinity they would as carefully have avoided the asserting of it as the School-men and Moderns do on all occasions Fourthly The answer of the Antients to this Objection of Tritheism by the Arians is the clearest demonstration of their judgment this is the Objection Peter James and John are three Men therefore Father Son and Holy Ghost are three Gods The general answer of the Ancients is by denying the truth of the Antecedent that Peter James and John are improperly abusively called three Men that it is contrary to the rules of Philosophy to call them otherwise than one Man and three Human Persons as we say in the Blessed Trinity there are three Divine Persons and one God Now not one School-man or Modern as I believe ever gave such an answer Not one of them ever imagined that the affirming Father Son and Holy Ghost to be one God did in the least enforce them to affirm Peter James and John to be one Man The Animadvertor thinks this Objection only Jocular only fit to be Laughed at which the Antients thought so weighty that to get rid of it they endeavoured says the learned Dr. Cudworth reflectingly with their Logick to prove that three Human Persons ought not to be called three Men. I shall consider their Logicks afterwards at present I declare that is a manifest conviction to me that they did conceive the Unity of Nature between Human and Divine Persons parallel equal n. 9. Fifthly those words are very remarkable in our Animadvertor but instead of an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 held only an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or likeness of Nature between them which insinuates as if the debate of the Catholicks and Arians in the Nicene Council were only about a Title whether the Son be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to the Father but this is to misrepresent the Fathers of that august Assembly The Arians liked neither the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nor the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God and a Creature are improperly said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Again the Catholicks approved of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 provided it were understood without equivocation if there was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 added to it that is perfectly alike in their Essence is to the Catholicks the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Consubstantial The Arians never consented to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but when their Party was too weak and they were obliged to dissemble with some Catholicks who were otherwise favourable to their Persons and cause It must be confessed that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 will not without great force suit with the Hypothesis of the Schools of the Singularity of the common Divine Essence A Singularity will not admit of a Comparison of likeness so saith Ricardus de S. Victor Lib. 6. de Trin. c. 20. Siquidem ubi est simplex Vnitas summa simplicitas quid ibi facit qualis talis It is less wonder therefore if the School-men charge 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with Arianism or Semi-arrianism Vid. Petav. lib. 4. de Trin. cap. 6 per totum whereas it is capable of an Orthodox Exposition I thought it necessary to follow the Animadvertor thus closely in the examining of this Historical Truth viz. whether the Fathers of the Church believed the Modus of a Specifick Unity of the Trinity Two very great and learned Persons have said it have abundantly proved it saith the Reverend Dean Their Assertion has never yet been confuted They were not drawn into this Assertion by the heat of Disputation or to favour their own Hypothesis neither of them approve of a Specifick Unity of the Trinity The Reverend Dean rightly judged that those places they had already produced abundantly proved their conclusion and yet Petavius gives them but as an Essay and pronounces this Opinion to be the judgment of all the Greek Fathers especially Shall I ask the Animadvertor a few Questions Was not Petavius as capable of judging betwixt occasional and designed Expressions as himself as capable of judging betwixt an Allusion or an Argument a minore ad majus as himself Did not Petavius know that the Arians denyed a Specifick Unity of the Trinity Shall I ask the Animadvertor whether he ever consulted St. Basil's 43d Epistle and if he did whether he can have Brow enough to say That that Epistle was not designedly wrote of the difference of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or whether St. Basil has not in the fullest manner delivered his judgment in this point I particularly mention this Epistle because our Animadvertor quotes a passage out of it Pag. 149. of his Animadversions under the name of Greg. Nyssen de differentia 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to whom in the Printed Editions it is also ascribed and because this Epistle being both in the Works of St. Basil and Gregory
Nyssen the Reader may more easily consult it and there from his own Eyes be satisfied that this was the judgment of that most learned Father St. Basil This Epistle is the first Authority Petavius quotes in the aforementioned seventh Chapter of his fourth Book of the Trinity I do not desire of the Animadvertor to traverse and examine all Petavius's Allegations much less all the Greek Fathers I am content to stand or fall by this single Epistle if this does not assert a Specifick Unity of the Trinity I am content that it pass for a Traducing mis-representing of the Fathers to say That any one of them ever held such a Notion And now I hope with the leave of the Reader I may add that Petavius as well as Dr. Cudworth stands as an unanswered witness and that in the Mouth of these two Witnesses till better Testimony appear the Historical Truth of this disquisition stands at present unshaken n. 10. I in the second place descend to the Problematical part whether the Reasons of the Animadvertor are so cogent as to forbid the Admission of a Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature The Animadvertor gives us five Reasons p. 181. c. the three first of which are dispatched in a word His first That if a Numerical Unity the Animadvertor means a Singularity in the same Divine Nature be sufficent to make the three Persons one God then a Specifick Unity of the same is not necessary I answer those who admit of a Specifick Unity in the Trinity strictly so called do it upon this account That they are afraid that a Singularity a Numerical Unity in the Animadvertors sense will make Father Son and Holy Ghost one Person as well as one God They conceive that three truly three distinct three can have no other Unity of Nature save a Specifick Unity and those who admit of both mean it only in our imperfect conception of things otherwise they believe that the Unity of the Divine Nature is above both these terms of Art that in our imperfect conception it partakes of some properties of both these Unities but strictly and really it is neither Singular nor Universal The same answer solves the Animadvertor's second Reason n. 11. that a greater and less degree of Unity are not to be admitted in the Divine Nature They who admit of a Specifick Unity deny a Singularity They who in words admit of both do not in reality believe two Unities in the Divine Nature but only one Transcendental Unity in our imperfect Conception partaking of the properties of both these Unities His third has been already answered See cap. 3. n. 5. that a Specifick Unity may agree to ten thousand Individuals as well as to three so may one simple Being have ten thousand Relations or Modes as well as three this Article is wholly owing to Revelation His fourth is that a Specifick Unity is principally n. 12. p. 182. if not absolutely notional and therefore cannot any ways properly belong to the Divine Persons nor is by any means necessary to make the three Persons one God First The Animadvertor brings in his Conclusion with an if if not absolutely notional and yet argues from that Conclusion as if it were the most allowed Maxim Secondly The Distinction of the Divine Attributes of Justice and Mercy is confessedly notional and yet the Animadvertor formerly pronounces it to be Absurd to contradict that Distinction Thirdly The Unity of Nature betwixt Christ and his Mother is certainly a Specifick Unity according to the Animadvertor a notional Unity and yet it is Heresie to deny That Christ and his Mother are of one Nature or Consubstantial Fourthly The Relations of likeness equality which are betwixt the Divine Persons though founded on the express words of Scripture Christ thought it no robbery to be equal with God the Image of the Invisible God the express Image of his Fathers Apostasis are by all the School-men confess'd to be relationes rationis that is Notional and yet I hope the Animadvertor will not hence deny that they ought not properly to belong to the Divine Persons nor necessary to make them one God Fifthly The Unity of the Divine Nature is also a Relation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Consubstantial unius substantioe of one Substance implies a relation in Substance We cannot say That the Father and the Spirator of the Holy Ghost are Consubstantial 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unius substantioe This term is as contrary to the Sabellian Heresie as it is to the Arian and therefore according to the School-mens own Principles this Relation of Unity of Substance must be relatio rationis that is notional Sixthly those Fathers who assert a Specifick Unity of the Trinity do not believe that the Divine Persons are said to be one upon no other account save a Specifick Unity or that they are deny'd to be three Gods from a Specifick Unity alone this Unity they conceive necessary but not of it self sufficient Seventhly Even a Specifick Unity hath a sufficient fundamentum in re A Specifick Unity is indeed a Logical Notion but the Foundation of it is something real viz. a real agreement of the distinct Persons or individuals in the same reason of Nature The Father is God the Son is God the Holy Ghost is God as really as Peter is a Man and James is a Man and John is a Man Peter James and John are not notionally each of them a Man nor Father Son and Holy Ghost notionally each of them God From this real agreement in Human Persons we Form in Logicks the notion of a Specifick Unity and the Ancient Fathers applied the same notion to the agreement of the Divine Persons The Animadvertor's fifth and last Argument is n. 13. That a Specifick Unity of Nature implies a Multiplication of the said Nature in every one of the particulars to which it belongs therefore such an Unity cannot be admitted in the Divine Nature The Argument put into due Form is to this purpose If a Specifick Unity of Nature in Created Persons or Beings implies a Multiplication of the said Nature then a Specifick Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons implies a Multiplication of the Divine Nature But a Specifick Unity of Nature in Created Persons or Beings implies a Multiplication of the said Nature therefore a Specifick Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons implies a Multiplication of the Divine Nature But the Conclusion is Absurd the Divine Nature being uncapable of Multiplication therefore a Specifick Unity in the Divine Nature is not to be allowed from whence such Conclusion follows Now in this Argument as it stands betwixt the Animadvertor and my self I deny the consequence of the Major because I am satisfied the Animadvertor would do the same if I should retort the same Argument mutatis mutandis against his own Hypothesis as for Instance if I should thus urge If a Singularity of Nature in Created Persons or Beings forbids a Plurality
Trinity Genebrard justifies the Phrase of Three Infinite Minds Of the Phrase of Three Gods 70 N. 5 6. Whether God and Infinite Mind are Terms equipollent 72 N. 7. Of the Animadverter's Answer to the Objection of Polytheism from the Assertion of Three Divine Persons Three Relatives not one simple Being under Three Relations 73 N. 10. Whether the Ternary Number belongs only to the Personalities 78 N. 11. Whether the Divine Nature sustains Three Modes of Subsistence 79 N. 12. Of the Phrase of Three Substances N. 13. Whether two Substances necessarily differ in substance Of Bellarmin's Orthodoxness in relation to this Controversy 80 N. 16. Whether one Infinite Mind can be Three Infinite Minds In what sense the Trinity One God 82 N. 18. Of the God of the Heathens and Jews In what sense God Three Persons 83 N. 19. In what sense the Father is the only True God 85 N. 20. Of the Father's being the Fountain of the Deity 86 CHAP. V. N. 1. WHether the Ancients believed the Divine Persons to be Intelligent Beings 89 N. 2. How the Son is the Wisdom of the Father Of the Particle of in this Mystery God of God Whether Three Persons infer Three Gods 90 N. 3. Whether the same Wisdom can be both unbegotten and begotten 92 N. 4. Of the Distinction of the Divine Persons 95 CHAP. VI. N. 1. OF a double Care in Mysterious Articles What is fundamental in this Mystery Three Hypotheses concerning the Trinity In what sense I affirm the Universality of the Common Divine Essence Of the Blasphemy of the Modern Socinians compared with the Ancient Socinians Of the Antiquity of both parts of my Hypothesis 96 N. 2. Petavius and Dr. Cudworth's Assertion That a Specifick Unity of the Trinity was the dogma of the Nicene Fathers considered as to its Historical Truth and vindicated from the Animadverter's Exceptions 102 N. 10. The same discussed Problematically betwixt the Animadverter and my self 118 N. 12. How far a Specifick Unity is notional 119 N. 13. Whether a Specifick Unity implies a Multiplication in the several Individuals Lombard the first who denied that the Divine Persons differ in number Two Corollaries 1st That a numerical Unity and a specifick Unity are not according to the Philosophy of the Ancients inconsistent 2dly That it was no such Paradox in the Ancient Fathers to deny that three Human Persons ought to be called three men as it is commonly esteemed 121 N. 16. The Principles of Individuation according to the Schoolmen 128 N. 17. The Opinion of Philoponus and the Tritheit Hereticks 129 N. 18. How far a Multiplication of the Divine Nature may be allowed 130 N. 20. Whether the term Deus be a Terminus Communis 131 N. 21. The Divine Attributes no Modes 132 N. 22. Of the Animadverter's definition of the nature of God 138 CHAP. VII N. 1. SCripture the only Rule of Faith 139 N. 2. The Unity of God an Article of natural Riligion Heb. 1.3.141 Not the Warrant of Three Hypostases 142 What Three Personalities are Of the Subtleties of the Schools in relation to Three subsistences Of the sense of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 143 The Trinity one Suppositum to Cajetan 217. The Godhead sustains not the modes of Subsistence 218. Of Personal acts according to the Schoolmen 219 N. 3. A Deity diversified Whether the Personalities are Modes 223 N. 4. Whether Modes in God Modes according to the new and old Philosophy 150 N. 6. Three Modes not sufficient to explain the Trinity The principal inquiry in this Mystery what the Three Persons are 155 N. 10. Of Real and Modal Distinction Whether the Divine Persons differ Modally 159 N. 11. Whether Personality is a personal property 161 N. 15. Three kinds of Sabellianism Confusion of Persons Contraction of the Deity to the single person of the Father The Compounding of the Trinity 163 N. 18. Rufinus acknowledges trinitatem in rebus 167 N. 19. Boetius for the Universality of the common Divine Essence N. 20. Peter Lombard 168 N. 21. Thomas Aquinas N. 22. Of a Relative subsistence and a subsisting relation The Conclusion Containing a summary Account of the whole 170 AN ANSWER TO THE ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE Vindication of the TRINITY c. By way of LETTER to the Animadverter SIR I Make bold to follow your own Example and offer the following Papers to your Admirers your self and the late Socinian Historian and Considerer This last Person has given us his judgment Considerations of the Explications of the Doctrine of the Trinity c. P. 12 13. That you are the only Writer since the revival of these Controversies who has indeed understood what the Church means by a Trinity in Vnity that your Explication is a true and orthodox Explication of what the Church intends to say That your design being only to declare and explain the Doctrine of the Trinity that is to notify in what sense and manner 't is held by the Church In reference to such design We this great Author and his Party the English Socinians must say That his Performance is an accurate and learned Work Thus this Socinian Historian like a Second Celsus pretends to know all the poor Orthodox are able to say in Defence of the tottering and falling Ark Ibid. p. 20. as he Blasphemously calls the Doctrine of the Sacred Trinity You you Sir have without question laid down the very Explication of the Schools Ibid. p. 4. the Doctrine or Explication generally received in Vniversities which he doubts not would be approved by most of the Chairs of our European Vniversities or Schools of Learning you verily have acquitted your self like a Man of Learning and Wit All must bow before you but his own greater Self In your Person he slays his ten thousands When Goliah is defeated the Philistines must fly This Euge concludes that Pamphlet Ibid. p. 35. And indeed he this Considerer and all others that have laboured in this Controversy may surcease their Pains henceforth and leave what they have already said to the Judgment and Conscience of all considerate and sincere Men. How much you are an Admirer of your own performance may be more than surmized from several Passages in your Book and especially from your scornful treating of your Reverend and Learned Antagonist In your Preface you tell us That you neither Reverence nor Fear him and in the same Preface you charge him P. III. With defying the Church with so bold a Front P. II. with being so very Rude Scandalous and Provoking P. IV. that it is impossible for the Tongue or Pen of Man to reply any thing so severely upon him which the foulness of his Expression will not abundantly warrant both the speaking and writing of And in the same page with peculiar Modesty you call his Vindication Stuff if his Stuff should live so long Nay not content with this Censure upon his own Person you add in the same place concerning the Governors of
Incarn Q. 2. Disp 6. sect 4. p. 194. Ibid. p. 193. Alii Patres licet non apertè utantur nomine compositionis aliis tamen quoe perinde esse videntur utuntur ut adunationis copulationis ex duobus conjunctionis c. Illa vero particula ex planè designat compositionem The phrase of the Hypostatick Union is most opposite to the Heresy of Eutyches who believed that there was not an Union of Two Natures but a Confusion of One of them But the phrase of the Hypostatick Composition is most opposite to the Nestorian Heresy who asserted a kind of Hypostatic Union that is an Union of Two Persons and denied that Christ God and Man was One Person compounded of Two Natures The Animadverter shews his skill in this Controversy to oppose these two phrases and to condemn that phrase of an Hypostatick Composition which the Church has received As great an Opiniator as the Animadverter is I believe he will scarce have the confidence to say that he can teach these great Fathers of the Church how to speak in this Mystery I promise faithfully to attend him when ever he begins The Soul being a Part cannot possibly be a Person P. 75. lin 4. N. 5. Forasmuch as a Part is an incomplete Being and therefore in the very nature of it being designed for the completion of something else must subsist in and by the subsistence of the Whole But a Person imports the most complete Degree and Mode of Being as subsisting wholly by it self and not in or by any other either as a subject of inherence or dependence so that it is a direct Contradiction to the very definition and nature of the thing for the same Being to be a Part and a Person too And consequently that which makes the Soul a Part does irrefragably prove it not to be a Person I answer That to be a Part and a Person in a simple Person in a Person consisting of one Nature I confess to be contradictious and impossible 2dly To be the inferior part in a compounded Person to be in any Actions an Instrument a Principium quo as the Body in the mixt Actions of Sense is to the Soul is contradictory to the Notion of a Person A Person as such is the Principium quod of all the Actions which proceed from it but to be the superior Part in such Composition is very compatible with the Personality of such superior Nature For such superior Nature may very well retain its own proper Mode of Subsistence if we explain Personality with the Schools such a superior Nature retains all the Perfections all the natural Perfections of a whole and complete Being is a Principium quod not only of its own natural Actions but of the mixt Actions of the whole compounded Hypostasis Such a superior Nature may be a Person and at the same time in a large acceptation of the term a Part that is a Part as Aristotle defines that term Arist 4. Met. cap. 25. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that into which any thing is divided or of which that consists which we call a Whole in which sense of the term Part the Learned Petavius is not afraid to call the Divine Nature of the WORD a Part laxius sumpto partis vocabulo Petav. lib. 3. de Trin. cap. 3. sect 12. p. 232. I must pass over the Animadverter's boldness in determining That a Part subsists by the subsistence of the Whole which is very near asserting an Hypostatical Union of every substantial part Others who embrace these Scholastical Subtleties chuse rather to assert That a Part subsists by a partial subsistence and that the subsistence of the Whole is compounded of the subsistence of the Parts So when the Animadverter tells us that a Person does not subsist in any other as a subject of dependence I must crave his pardon for I thought before that every Creature had subsisted in God as a subject on whom we depended that in him we live and move and have our Being P. 75. lin 16. N. 6. If the Soul in the composition of a man's Person were an entire Person it self and as such concurred with the Body towards the constitution of the Man then a Man would be an imperfect accidental and not a perfect natural compound He would be that which Philosophy calls Vnum per Accidens that is a thing made up of two such Beings as cannot perfectly coalesce into one Mutatis mutandis this is the Great Socinian Objection against the Incarnation of the Son of God That Infinite and Finite cannot perfectly coalesce and unite into One that God and Man 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the name of the most unnatural compound and mixture The same Answer will satisfy both Objections To confound the two Natures of God and Man or of Soul and Body would confessedly make the most unnatural compound and mixture But we maintain an Union in both Cases and not a Confusion The Divine Nature retains all the Perfections of a Divine Person in the Composition and the Human Nature by the Composition loses none of the natural perfections of the Human Nature It cannot indeed properly be called by the metaphysical name of a suppositum as becoming an Instrument a principium quo to the superior Divine Nature but then thereby it becomes capable of being an Instrument in the noblest Acts of the Mediatorial Office which subsisting by it self it was uncapable of So the Soul in the Constitution of Man retains all the Perfections of a separate intellectual suppositum nor did any Philosoper ever assert that an Human Body was more imperfect than a Stone notwithstanding this latter is a suppositum and the former not The Human Body by the Composition is an Instrument a Principium quo to the Soul an Instrument in the mixt Actions of Sense which of it self it was uncapable of And if a Stone could speak it would never complain if God should miraculously change it into an Human Body notwithstanding the compleatness of a suppositum and the incompleatness of an Inferior Nature in an Hypostatick Composition Secondly The Animadverter mistakes that which Philosophers call Vnum per Accidens for that is when two Beings which differ toto Genere as Substance and Accident are united Such an Union say they is accidental and consequently the Compositum not Vnum per se but Vnum per Accidens Or when two Compleat Beings are united as in all Artificial Works where each part is a distinct suppositum which is more properly called Aggregatum per Accidens But the Divine and Human Nature the Soul and Body differ not toto Genere each are Substances and so are capable of a substantial Union which suffices to denominate the Compositum Vnum per se and not Vnum per Accidens Again The Divine Nature is and remains compleat in the Composition the Humane Nature subsists ad modum partis in the nature of a part of an Instrument in the
from believing three Gods that they did not as Eulogius there tells us believe that either Father Son or Holy Ghost were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly God and in the next words gives us their positive Faith that they esteemed the Personal properties to be the Persons themselves There may be a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a Personal property of what we conceive in the Nature of an Accident 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is by Aristotle appropriated to Substance Again a Personal property an Accident or Mode can never be properly God So that these Hereticks as the Church then judged them believed one Essence with three properties they believed these properties to subsist or to be Hypostases How near the Animadvertor comes to them when he tells us Animadv c. p. 121. Ibid. p. 275. that the ternary Number belongs only to the Personalities that a Person here or in this Mystery imports a Mode or Relation c. that the Relations subsist I leave to Himself upon cooler consideration Pholii Biblio Cod. ccxxx p. 866. If he desires to see these Notions confuted He may please to consult Eulogius in the same place where He will find that Eulogius thought them scarce in their Senses that could imagine a Relation or Personal property could subsist or be a Person I was the more willing to explain this obscure Heresie since this is the eternal Harangue of the Socinians that the Faith of three proper Persons was condemned by the Ancients in the Person of Philoponus when yet at the same time they confess that the belief of a Specifick Unity of the Trinity was the Faith of the Nicene Fathers which two Opinions are inconsistent that they should condemn that for Heresie the worst of Heresies in Philoponus which they esteemed Orthodox in themselves and their own Party n. 18. Fourthly and lastly Though I see no necessity of Multiplying the Divine Nature if we assert a Specifick Unity of the Trinity and less if we assert it in the Sense I only contend for that is for such a transcendental Unity which in our imperfect Conception of things must either be called a Specifick Unity or confessed to want a Name in our present Philosophy yet ex abundanti I am not afraid to declare to the Sociniuns that I would sooner acknowledge three Singular Divine Natures in the Trinity than deny the Faith of three Divine Persons A Singular Nature or Essence if we admit such a Notion in Philosophy is also a Personal Nature or Essence and whatever is Personal in the Divinity it self may be Multiplied nor have the Ancients sometimes scrupled the Phrase of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nor Petavius that of Trina Deitas no more than Trinus Deus and genita and ingenita sapientia c. is of the same Import All I will say at present of these and the like Phrases is that they are fairly reconcileable with the true Notion of the Unity of God and no ways contradictions to Reason that I know of Both which I hope to evince in my Second Part where I shall also endeavour to explain the sense in which the Ancients used these different Expressions of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is evident that He the Reverend Dean makes Specifick sameness of Nature p. 186. lin 20. n. 19. and the Agreement of Things Numerically different in one and the same common Nature to signifie convertibly the same thing Well and what follows In this says the Animadvertor Ibid. He is guilty of a very great mistake by making those things the same which are not the same With the Animadvertor's leave the mistake lies wholly at his own door The Agreement of Modes Numerically different in one and the same common Nature and a Specifick sameness of Nature are vastly different But the Reverend Dean's words are the Agreement of Things Numerically different and it is the sense of all Philosophers that Things Numerically differing can only agree in one Specifick Nature The term Deus indeed is neither a Genus nor a Species p. 186. lin ult n. 20. Nevertheless all Divines and School-men allow it to be a terminus communis This great Dictator in Philosophy I find is yet to learn the first Rudiments in Logick A terminus communis in Logick is the same with a terminus Vniversalis with a terminus predicabilis and all Logicians I have had the Fortune to consult speak but of five Predicables Genus Species Differentia Proprium Accidens It is too great an absurdity for the Animadvertor to be guilty of to affirm that the term Deus is either Differentia Proprium or Accidens Besides that all the Arguments himself has brought against the Admission of a Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature are equally levelled against the Admission of the Universality of the common Divine Nature that is against this Assertion that Deus is a terminus communis Animadv p. 154. Essentia habet se per modum termini communis quia licet singularis sit tamen vere est in pluribus suppositis quare in praedicationibus fungitur munere vocis Vniversalis Bellarminus de Christo l. 2. c. 18. Well but do not all Divines and School-men allow it to be a terminus communis Shall I borrow his own words and answer that by this expression it would more than seem that He has read them all But by the conclusion that he has read none of them For not one single School-man or Modern who follow them do I verily believe allow this term Deus to be a terminus communis That famous Objection against the Faith of the Trinity which the Schoolmen and Moderns are so much concerned to answer viz. That if the Father is God and the Son is God the Father must be the Son grounded upon this Axiom Quoe sunt eadem unitertio sunt eadem inter se shews the judgment of the Schoolmen and Moderns that they take this term Deus to be a terminus singularis for that Axiom holds not in a terminus communis This indeed the School men and Moderns do hold that this term Deus is a terminus singularis communicabilis communicable by Praedication as a terminus communis but in it self a terminus singularis p 217. lin 2. n. 21. In God besides Essence or Substance we assert that there is that which we call Mode Habitude or Relation We cannot contemplate God as he is in himself a pure simple Act but to assert the existence of Modes in God from our imperfect Conception of things is peculiar to the Animadvertor but this falls in naturally in the next Chapter where we are to enquire whether the Personalities are proper Modes One thing I cannot omit the Animadverter tells us Ibid. That by one or either of these in Conjunction with Essence or Substance we give account of all the Acts Attributes and Personalities belonging to the Divine Nature What do we give
except Innascibility or the property of being unbegotten which notifies not a difference of Essence or a different essential Dignity but a personal Property even as Adam being unbegotten for he was immediately formed by God and Seth begotten for he was the Son of Adam and Eve proceeding out of the side of Adam for she was not begotten differ not in Nature for they are all Men or human Persons but in a distinct personal Property These words need no Comment Seth's Birth and Eve's Procession of the Rib of Adam are not their Personalities not their Modes of Subsistence but their personal Properties not that which constituted them Persons but that which distinguished them in our Conception one from another that which constituted them distinct Persons one from another Besides the Phrase 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is not of it self capable of any other Interpretation to be unbegotten a negation See Ch. 2. n. 10. can never be the Father's Mode of Subsistence his Personality 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 says the Animadverter is a term not importing in it any positive Relation but only a meer Negation of all Producibility by any superior Principle Anim. c. p. 248. This term therefore cannot signifie causally and consequently not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is here stiled contrary to the Animadverter's Observation I acknowledge to the Animadverter that every Person Ibid p. 250 251. and consequently the Divine Persons are formally constituted such by a Mode of Subsistence or what we are obliged to conceive of as a Mode of Subsistence that is each distinct Person has a distinct Mode of Subsistence and the three Divine Persons have in our Conception three distinct Modes of Subsistence Nay I will add further that I believe that no Man who understands the meaning of the term Hypostasis and uses it without Aequivocation will or can deny any part of this The Reverend Dean expresly acknowledges this truth A Beast is a Suppositum Vind. of the Trinity p. 262. that is a distinct living subsisting Being by it self But I do here deny to the Animadverter that the Ancient Fathers did ever assert that the Divine Relations were in this proper formal Sense Modes of Subsistence or that That Phrase 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 when applied to the Divine Relations and much more when applied to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was by them understood in the proper formal Sense of which we are now enquiring Secondly If the Animadverter could get over the first Difficulty Anim. c. p. 120. he would find a second behind how one simple Being which is the Animadverter's Hypothesis of the Trinity can have three Modes of Subsistence The whole School of the Thomists and Scotists assert an absolute essential Subsistence and consequently one Subsistence of the whole Trinity they esteem the three Divine Persons to be unum subsistens unum suppositum aut personam incompletam says Cajetan one of the most famous Commentators upon Aquinas to which Suarez only replies Suarez de incar q 3. Act. 1. disp 11. S. 5. p. 285. Cavendus est hic loquendi modus utpote alienus à modo loquendi conciliorum Patrum Theologorum that is have a care lest Hereticks hear us and take advantage at such a novel Expression otherwise Suarez finds no fault with the Doctrine and indeed to say That Existence or Subsistence by it self is Relative is a contradiction to the very Phrase Subsistence by it self denies all relation to any other So that according to the Thomists and Scotists the three Personalities are not three Modes of Subsistence not three Subsistences but one essential absolute Subsistence with three Relations or three relative Modes or three Modes of Incommunicability But of this I have already spoke Chap. 1. n. 11 12 13. Thirdly To allot three Subsistences to the God-head is to contradict the Ancients 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 these Properties are not Names of the Essence of the God-head but of the Persons The God head does not properly subsist but the Divine Persons subsist Cajetan may inform the Animadverter what is the consequence of ascribing Subsistence to the God-head even the same with calling it a suppositum or incompleat Person where the term incompleat is only added to avoid the grossness of the Phrase otherwise they ascribe all the Divine Acts to this unum subsistens unum suppositum and call them essential Acts whereas the Notion of Philosophers is that actiones non 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 attribuuntur that Actions ought not to be attributed to the Nature but to the Person endowed with such Nature The Person is the principium quod Nature only the principium quo the power by which the Person acteth The School-men retain in words the personal Acts of the Divine Persons that Generation is the personal Act of the Father Incarnation the personal Act of the Son Sanctification the personal Act of the Holy Spirit Active Spiration the personal Act of the Father and Son But these are meer words Generation according to the School-men is the reflex Act of the Divine Understanding whereby it knows it self and this singular individual Act they ascribe in common to Father Son and Holy Ghost So every thing that is an Act in Incarnation is according to them the Act of the whole Trinity they pretend indeed that the same singular reflex Act of the Divine Understanding only generates as it proceeds from the Person of the Father and that the Incarnation is only terminated upon the Person of the Son But what Pretence to invent for Sanctification I do not find that they are yet agreed The sacred Scriptures give Sanctification for the distinguishing Character of the third Person he is so called in the very Form of Baptism to deny this distinguishing Character was Sabellianism to the Ancients Yet this the School-men have undeniably done in the Act of Sanctification The Maxim of the Ancients was that Opera Trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa They have not only misconstrued indivisa for confusa but in reality left out the Exception ad extra and confounded the Actions ad intra as well as those ad extra So Spiration to the School-men is that Act of the Divine Will whereby it loves it self and this singular individual Act they also ascribe to the Holy Spirit equally with the Father and the Son Only say they The Divine Will 's loving it self is not Spiration in the Person of the Holy Ghost but only in the Person of the Father and Son How much better is it with the Ancient Fathers to confess these to be inscrutable Mysteries than to expose the sacred Article by such bold and abstruse Definitions and yet these are the Gentlemen whom the Animadverter commends for venturing little for preceding upon the surest grounds of Reason and Scripture Again Sanctification which the divinely inspired Writings give us as the peculiar
Ancient Fathers denied them to have one simple subject Vt visum est Sabellio sed diversitatem illam multiplicitatem in subjecto esse reverà To assent to the ternary number to be only in the Modes or Properties is the Sabellian Heresy the Catholick Faith is that there are three Persons as well as three Personalities three Subjects of the Divine Relations It is no contradiction that the same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the same Subject should be Father and Son the contradiction is that the same Subject should be Father and Son to it self These Properties cannot have relation to the same Subject Otherwise they are consistent in the same Subject in the same Person in the same finite Person the same Man is both Father and Son The Divine Person of the Son according to the Western Church is produced himself and doth produce the Holy Spirit which are opposite Relations as well as Paternity and Filiation But the contradiction vanishes since those opposite relations respect distinct Subjects He is produced by the Father he doth produce the Holy Spirit This therefore is the principal enquiry in this sacred Article what is the Subject of Paternity not what is Paternity that is but a secondary Article of less moment what is the Subject of Filiation not what Filiation is What is the Subject of Procession not what Procession is in other words what is the Father what is the Son what is the Holy Ghost The Subject of Paternity is not the Subject of Filiation for then the Father would be the Son Nor is the Subject of Procession the Subject either of Paternity or Filiation for then the Holy Ghost would either be Father or Son or both To say that the Divine Nature is the Subject of Paternity Filiation and Procession is not only contrary to the Ancients who assert these Properties not to be the Names of the Essence but renders the Sabellian Heresy impossible to be confuted since an infinite Person is as capable of sustaining these three distinct relations as an infinite nature and makes one and the same Subject Father and Son to it self lastly contradicts our formal conception of these sacred Articles The Divine Nature is according to our conception the essential Form of the Divine Persons is predicated of the Divine Persons in obliquo Father Son and Holy Ghost have each of them the full whole and entire Divine Nature in them We are enquiring what it is which may be predicated in recto of them and which may be multiplied with them what is the Subject to which the essential form in our imperfect conception of these things is joyned and which we conceive as the proper subject of the Divine Relations And after the strictest enquiry I can make no better Answer than the Church has done before me Father Son and Holy Ghost are three Hypostases three Substances when that term is not understood as equipollent with Essence three infinite Substances so say the Schoolmen only they add Relative three infinite spiritual Beings which is all the Reverend Dean understood by three infinite Spirits That is that they are not three Faculties or Affections of one Being but three proper Beings Both Accidents and Modes are affections of Being And moreover P. 242. l. 5. n. 7. as every Mode essentially includes in it the Thing or Being of which it is the Mode so every Person of the Blessed Trinity by vertue of its proper Mode of Subsistence includes in it the God-head it self and is properly and formally p. 293. the God-head it self as subsisting with and under such a certain Mode or Relation This is a very fruitfull Period of Paradoxes A Mode according to the Animadverter is an Abstract not concrete Term to be understood as a simple Form as the Affection of a Being as Himself defines it p. 31. and not a Being affected The Concrete of a Mode includes the Being as well as the Mode Album includes the Thing that is white as well as whiteness but Album is not formally the Mode not Whiteness but that which has Whiteness the subject of Whiteness Whiteness the Affection the Mode is an Abstract and by the Term abstracts from the Subject Secondly The Father is Essentially God by his Nature this all confess but who ever said that the Father is Essentially God by his Personality by his Paternity Thirdly There can be no such Heresy as that of Sabellius if every Mode of the Deity essentially includes the Deity the Rankest Sabellianist never denied that Father Son and Holy Ghost signified three Modes of the Deity Fourthly I cannot but ask this great Master of Language why he uses those Terms its and it speaking of a Divine Person He was pleased to condemn this Language as improper and absurd when used of Human Persons Anim. c. p. 341. is there more respect due to Human Persons than to Divine Persons Had it been any fault to have expressed it thus So every Person of the Blessed Trinity by vertue of his not its proper Mode of Subsistence includes in Him not it the God-head it self Far be it from me to pretend to be a Critick in Words or Phrases I rather crave the Reader 's even the Animadverter's pardon for much greater slips than this However 't is some comfort that I find Homer Himself may nod sometimes P. 242. l. 17. n. 8. And accordingly as these Relations are three and and but three so the Persons of the God-head to whom they belong are so too viz. Father Son and Holy Ghost Some Persons take a priviledge to speak and write what they please The Animadverter might almost as well have said that the Persons of the God-head are but two as that the Relations are but three Nothing is more notorious than that there are four Relations in the Trinity if the Relation of the Father to the Son and of the Son to the Father inferr two Relations there can be no shadow of pretence why the Relation of the Father and Son to the Holy Spirit and of the Holy Spirit to the Father and Son should not make two more P. 243. There are says the Animadverter four internal Acts Generation Filiation Spiration Procession though by the By two of these are not Acts but Passions viz. Filiation and Procession upon which the Divine Relations are founded and from which they flow And in the same Page puts the Objection That four Relations inferr four Persons which he endeavours to solve in the following Words That is one Difficulty and unanswerable upon the Animadverter's Principles that one singular Divine Nature is the Subject of these four Relations The Second is What this Relation of it self is whether a Mode or not an infinite relative Substance or not The Schoolmen are obliged to confess this a Property of a Person already constituted and not a Mode of Subsistence Whereas if with the Ancients we assert the Divine Persons to be three substantial Beings three Hypostases
and the other Schoolmen found out a relative Substance a relationem per modum rei subsistentis a Relation subsisting and affirm that the three Divine Persons are three Relations subsisting But to this I answer First That this will assert four Subsistences in the Trinity one absolute and essential and three relative ones by which the Relations subsist which is contrary to all Antiquity Secondly This is but a subtler Disguise for what the Master of the Sentences spoke more plainly viz. That there are not three Persons in the same Sense in which we say that the Father is a Person For the Father is not Paternity and therefore not Paternity subsisting The Father is not a Relation subsisting but formally properly God an infinite Mind Lastly A Mode a Relation subsisting is perfectly unconceivable and contrary to the known rules of Philosophy And now it may be time to put an end to this First Part and to my Animadversions upon the Animadverter first taking a short review how far I have proceeded My first Chapter is chiefly spent in explaining the Metaphysical Terms used in this Mystery such as Substance Accident Mode the Nature of modal Difference Essence Existence Subsistence modal Composition c. How much reason there was to re-examine the Animadverter's Definitions and Distinctions of these things in Relation to the Subject of the Trinity I must leave to the Reader to judge when he has perused the Chapter My second Chapter is chiefly spent in defending that ancient Illustration of the Incarnation the Conjunction of the human Soul and Body in one Person from the Objections of the Animadverter one Question of which was briefly touched Chap. 1. n. 10. In the close of this Chapter I give the Reader a very necessary and usefull Distinction concerning the formal reason of Personality in reference not only to Finite Persons but to the Divine Persons My third Chapter enquires how far a Prius and Posterius may be admitted in the Trinity whether Self-Consciousness be a personal Act explains at large that Subtlety of the Schools concerning the relative Personality of the Divine Persons and shews the Animadverter's great mistakes therein as also that Question of the number of the Divine Persons why we believe a Trinity neither more nor fewer As also that difficult Problem concerning the Singularity or Plurality of the Predication of any Attribute concerning the Divine Persons where I first give the Predications themselves which are to be solv'd and shew the Insufficiency of the Schoolmen's Solutions from the Distinction of essential and personal Attributes from the Distinction of Nouns Substantive and Nouns Adjective from an absolute and relative Predicate Lastly I lay down the true rule my self which at persent I only vindicate from a Mis-interpretation of the Schoolmen by distinguishing betwixt the Articles of the Unity of God and the Unity of the Trinity which the Schoolmen confound My fourth Chapter treats of the import of these Phrases viz. Three infinite Minds three Gods three Substances one infinite Mind one God and how far they are allowed or disallowed in speaking of the Trinity of the Animadverter's Answer to the Objection of Polytheism from the Phrase of three Divine Persons and occasionally of the Notion of the Unity of God and of the Appropriation of the title of Only True God to the Person of the Father and of his being stiled the Fountain of the Divinity My fifth Chapter is chiefly Historical of the Opinion of the Ancients whether they believed the Divine Persons to be three intelligent Beings Of the import of that Phrase that the Son is the substantial WORD and Wisdom of the Father of the Particle OF in this Mystery and occasionally I give an answer to the Socinian Objection from the Phrase of three Divine Persons and enquire whether the same Wisdom can be both begotten and unbegotten My sixth Chapter treats of what is Fundamental in this Mystery of the different Hypotheses of explaining the Unity of the Trinity of the Blasphemy of the Modern Socinians compared with their Predecessors of the historical Truth of Petavius and Dr. Cudworth's Assertion that the specifick Unity of the Trinity was embraced by the Nicene Fathers which I largely vindicate against the Animadverter's Exceptions the same discussed problematically betwixt the Animadverter and my self Whether a Specifick Unity of the Trinity and a Numerical Unity were in the judgment of the Ancients inconsistent Why Philoponus and his Followers were called Tritheit Hereticks My last Chapter treats of Heb. 1.3 Whether that place was the Warrant of the Phrase of three Persons or three Hypostases Of the Divine Personalities according to the Schoolmen of the Sense of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to the Ancients of Cajetan's calling the Trinity one Suppositum of essential and personal Acts according to the Schoolmen Whether there are true Modes in God Of the Insufficiency of three Modes to explain the Trinity Whether the Divine Persons differ modally or really Of three different Species of Sabellianism Of the Distinction of a Relative Subsistence and a subsisting Relation There are several other material Enquiries in the Explication of these and others which are less material which I leave to the Reader 's own Observation This I hope I may say of this present Essay that there are very few of the material Disputes of the Schoolmen concerning this Article of the Trinity which the Reader will not find either explained in this Essay or at least a sufficient Key given to him who shall desire to consult the Schoolmen themselves The many and great mistakes of the Animadverter convinced me of the Usefulness of such an Explication he often swallowed without chewing what they strained very hard to believe and at other times sheltered himself under their Name and Authority when his opinion was contradictorily opposite to theirs and which is more forgot or omitted the principal and most material Enquiry in this Article of the Trinity viz. What the three Divine Persons are that is What Suppositum Persona Hypostasis signifies when these terms are predicated plurally of the Father Son and Holy Ghost The Animadverter defines Suppositum in the singular number Anim. c. p. 35. Substantia singularis completa per se subsistens but this according to the Animadverter only increases the Difficulty since he dare not deny a Multiplication of the Definitum of Suppositum He cannot deny that there are tria supposita in the Trinity yet with earnestness he contends that the Definition cannot be multiplied that there are not tres substantioe singulares completoe per se subsistentes in the Trinity but how unsatisfactory soever the Scholastick Subtleties in this Article appear to me I am satisfied that I had contented my self with a private Proposal of my Hypothesis to some of my Friends if the unmeasurable Blasphemy and boasting of our Socinian Writers had not over-perswaded me I plainly saw that nine parâ—s in ten of the Objections of the Socinians