OF the Principles and Duties OF NATURAL RELIGION TWO BOOKS By the Right Reverend Father in God JOHN late Lord Bishop of CHESTER To which is added A SERMON Preached at his Funerals by WILLIAM LLOYD D. D. Dean of BANGOR and Chaplain in Ordinary to His MAJESTY LONDON Printed by A. Maxwell for T. Basset H. Brome R. Chiswell at the George in Fleetstreet the Gun at the West-end of St. Pauls and the Rose and Crown in St. Pauls Church-Yard 1675. THE PREFACE THE ensuing Treatise is sufficiently recommended to the World by the Name of the Author and needs nothing else to make way for its entertainment I shall only therefore give a short account of these Remains of that learned and excellent Person and of the particular design and intention of them He was pleased by his Last Will to commit his Papers to my care and out of his great friendship and undeserved good opinion of me to leave it wholly to my disposal whether any or what part of them should be made publick This Treatise I knew he always designed for that purpose and if God had been pleased to have granted him but a little longer life he would have published it himself And therefore though a considerable part of it wanted his last hand yet neither could I be so injurious to deprive the world of it because it was less perfect than he intend ed it nor durst I be so bold to attempt to finish a Piece designed and carried on so far by so great a Master The first twelve Chapters were written out for the Press in his life-time The Remainder hath been gather'd and made up out of his Papers as well as the Materials left for that purpose and the skill of the Compiler would allow So that it cannot be expected that the Work should be of equal strength and beauty in all the parts of it However such as it is I hope it may prove of considerable use and benefit to the World and not altogether unworthy of its Author The Design of it is threefold First To establish the great Principles of Religion the Being of God and a Future State by shewing how firm and solid a Foundation they have in the Nature and Reason of Mankind A work never more necessary than in this degenerate Age which hath been so miserably over-run with Scepticisme and Infidelity Secondly To convince men of the natural and indispensable obligation of Moral Duties those I mean which are comprehended by our Saviour under the two general Heads of the Love of God and of our Neighbour For all the great Duties of Piety and Justice are written upon our hearts and every man feels a secret obligation to them in his own Conscience which checks and restrains him from doing contrary to them and gives him peace and satisfaction in the discharge of his duty or in case he offend against it fills him with guilt and terrour And certainly it is a thing of very considerable use rightly to understand the natural obligation of Moral duties and how necessarily they flow from the consideration of God and of our selves For it is a great mistake to think that the obligation of them doth solely depend upon the Revelation of Gods VVill made to us in the Holy Scriptures It is plain that Mankind was always under a Law even before God had made any external and extraordinary Revelation else how shall God judge the World how shall they to whom the Word of God never came be acquitted or condemned at the Great day For where there is no Law there can neither be obedience nor transgression It is indeed an unspeakable advantage which we who are Christians do enjoy both in respect of the more clear and certain knowledg of our duty in all the branches of it and likewise in regard of the powerful motives and assistance which our blessed Saviour in his Gospel offers to us to enable and encourage us to the discharge of our Duty But yet it is nevertheless very useful for us to consider the primary and natural obligation to piety and virtue which we commonly call the Law of Nature this being every whit as much the Law of God as the Revelation of his VVill in his Word and consequently nothing contained in the Word of God or in any pretended Revelation from Him can be interpreted to dissolve the obligation of moral duties plainly required by the Law of Nature And if this one thing were but well consider'd it would be an effectual antidote against the pernicious Doctrines of the Antinomians and of all other Libertine-Enthusiasts whatsoever Nothing being more incredible than that Divine Revelation should contradict the clear unquestionable Dictates of Natural Light nor any thing more vain than to fancy that the Grace of God does release men from the Laws of Nature This the Author of the following Discourses was very sensible of and wisely saw of what consequence it was to establish the Principles and Duties of Religion upon their true and natural foundation which is so far from being a prejudice to Divine Revelation that it prepares the way for it and gives it greater advantage and authority over the minds of men Thirdly To perswade men to the practice of Religion and the vertues of a good life by shewing how natural and direct an influence they have not only upon our future blessedness in another VVorld but even upon the happiness and prosperity of this present Life And surely nothing is more likely to prevail with wise and considerate men to become Religious than to be throughly convinced that Religion and Happiness our Duty and our Interest are really but one and the same thing considered under several notions J. TILLOTSON THE Contents FIRST BOOK Of the Reasonableness of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion Chap. I. COncerning the several kinds of Evidence and Assent Pag. 1. Chap. II. Two Schemes of Principles relating to Practical things whether Natural or Moral proposed in the method used by Mathematicians of Postulata Definitions and Axioms p. 12. Chap. III. Some Propositions necessary to be premised for the removing of several prejudices in debates about Religion p. 22. Chap. IV. Concerning the Existence of a Deity and the Arguments for it 1. Arg. From the Universal Consent and agreement of Mankind And the Objections against it answered p. 36. Chap. V. 2. Arg. From the Original of the World p. 62. Chap. VI. 3. Arg. From the admirable Contrivance of Natural things p. 78. Chap. VII 4. Arg. From Providence and the Government of the World p. 85. Chap. VIII Concerning the Excellencies and Perfections of the Divine Nature And first of those which are commonly called Incommunicable namely Simplicity Unity Immutability Infiniteness Immensity  Eternity p. 100. Chap. IX Of the Communicable perfections of God And first of those which relate to the Divine Understanding viz. Knowledg Wisdom particular Providence p. 124. Chap. X. Of the Perfections relating to the Divine Will
according as they are good or evil Such an one must needs have his heart affected with a great awe and dread towards the Divine nature The very Heathens were wont upon this account to paint their Jupiter with a thunderbolt in his hand to strike an awe into men from daring to offend him who stands always ready armed with vengeance against such as provoke him CHAP. XVI Of Obedience And first of Active Obedience to the Laws of God HAving dispatched the duties we are more especially obliged to with regard to Gods wisdom goodness power I shall now treat concerning such other duties as refer more particularly to his Dominion and superiority over us his right to command and govern us which are comprehended under the general name of Obedience The Habit of which may be described to consist in such a submissive frame of spirit whereby a man doth always devote and resign up himself unto the disposal of his maker being ready in every condition to do or suffer that which he apprehends to be most reasonable and acceptable and whereby he may best express his love and subjection By which description it may appear that this Obedience is of two kinds Active  Passive 1. Active Which consists in a readiness of mind to do what God shall injoin 2. Passive In an acquiescence of mind under what he shall inflict Both which do necessarily flow from the apprehension of Gods dominion over us his right to govern and dispose of us as he pleaseth Obedience in the true notion of it being nothing else but that homage which we owe to such as are in a superior relation who have a right to command us Every relation of superiority and dominion being a distinct engagement to subjection whether Oeconomical as that betwixt Parent and Child Political as betwixt Magistrate and Subject Moral as betwixt Benefactor and Beneficiary or lastly that which is Natural which above all other things gives the highest title to dominion as that betwixt the Maker and his Work the first Cause and that which he bestows being upon And God by all these Titles and many more may justly challenge dominion over us Under this first kind of Obedience styled Active are comprehended these three particulars 1. A knowledg of and an acquaintance with those Laws which we are to observe 2. A consent to them or an approbation of them 3. A conformity to them 1. An acquaintance with the Laws of God whether discovered to us by Revelation the principles of nature obliging us to observe and submit to all things which we have reason to believe do proceed from God or by natural light abstracting from Scripture and revelation as the substance of that which we call the Moral law is Now though such persons only are under the obligation of those Laws which depend upon revelation to whom a revelation is made and sufficiently proposed because Promulgation is essential to a Law Yet the Moral Law being discoverable by natural light to every man who will but excite the principles of his own reason and apply them to their due consequences therefore there must be an obligation upon all men who have but the use of their reason to know these Moral Laws and the ignorance of them must be an inexcusable sin Ignorantia juris can be no plea in this case because the Law is written in every mans heart by nature and the ignorance of mankind as to any part of it hath been wilfully contracted The duties concerning natural worship our adoration of the Deity by affiance love reverence praying to him expecting mercies from him returning to him our thanks and acknowledgments being reverent and solemn in all our addresses towards him our thoughts and speeches of him and of the things that refer to his service may be evidently inferred from those natural notions which we have concerning the excellencies of his Nature and our own dependance upon him The duties which concern the promoting of our own and our neighbours wellfare that mutual justice charity helpfulness which we are to exercise towards one another these may each of them be deduced from that common principle of self-love whereby every one doth naturally seek his own well-fare and preservation We are all of us desirous that others should be just to us ready to help us and do good to us and because 't is a principle of the highest equity and reason that we should be willing to do to others as we desire and think them obliged to deal with us this must therefore oblige us to the same acts of charity and helpfulness towards them Now the drawing out of these general rules and fitting them to particular cases a studious and inquisitive endeavour to find out what our Masters will is in several relations and circumstances this I call the duty of knowing the Commandments And 't is necessary that they should be thus distinctly known before a man can keep them 2. A consent to them or approbation of them as being haly just and good Which will necessarily follow from a true notion of the ground and reason of them and must necessarily precede a genuine obedience and conformity to them He that looks upon them as fetters and bonds doth rather indure them out of necessity than obey them out of choice and love I consent to the Law that it is good saith the Apostle that is I do in my judgment own the fitness and reasonableness of the things therein injoined as being the most proper means to advance the perfection of our natures The law of the Lord is perfect saith the Psalmist not only formaliter in it self but also effectivè as to us it makes us to be so And in another place Thy law is the truth namely such as it ought to be There is a congruity betwixt our well-beings and the nature of the things enjoined And it is this conviction alone that must beget in us a love of it and a delight to practise it He that harbours any prejudice in his mind against the ways of God as if they were unprofitable or unequal can never submit to them willingly but out of a constraint he may look upon them as his task and burden but not as his joy and delight Our external submission to the Law can never be kindly and regular till our minds be cast into the same mould with it and framed unto a suitableness and conformity to it And such a temper doth in the judgment of Seneca render the mind truly great and noble Hic est magnus animus qui se Deo tradidit And in another place In regno nati sumus Deo parere libertas est Such a man hath a truly great and generous mind who can resign up himself to Gods disposal The greatest liberty is to submit to the Laws of our Soveraign His service is perfect freedom 3. An observance of them and conformity to them in our lives This is the end both of
is elapsed that which is now future will become present Which is the ground of mens dealing for Reversions And thus likewise is it for such things as may probably come to pass Though this probability should be somewhat remote It is counted a valuable thing and may be estimated at a certain rate for a man to be one amongst four or five equal Competitors for a place to be the fourth or fifth expectant of an inheritance though in such cases there be the odds of three or four to one yet the price that is set upon this may be so proportioned as either to reduce it to an equality or make it a very advantageous bargain A present Good may reasonably be parted with upon a probable expectation of a future Good which is more excellent Which is the case of Merchants who have large estates in their own possession which they may safely keep by them and yet chuse to venture them upon a thousand hazards out of an apprehension that there is a greater probability of their gaining than of their losing by such adventures And this would be much more reasonable if besides the probability of gaining by these adventures there were the like probability of their being utterly undone and ruined if they should neglect or refuse to venture The greater the advantage is the more reasonable must it be to adventure for it If it be reasonable for a man to run the venture of 20 l. for the gain of a hundred pounds much more for a thousand The reason why men are moved to believe a probability of gain by adventuring their stocks into such Forraign Countries as they have never seen and of which they have made no trial is from the Testimony of other Credible persons who profess to have known those places and the advantages of traffick thither by their own experience And this is generally accounted a sufficient argument to perswade others unto the like trials The reason which moved men to adventure for the first discovery of unknown Countries is because they had fair probabilities to perswade them that there were such places which would probably afford very gainful Traffique And upon the same ground if any considerable number of men such whom we esteem the most wise and the most honest should assure us that they did firmly believe though they did not know it by experience that there was such an undiscovered Country to which if men would make any ventures their gains would be a thousand times more than could be expected by any other way of Traffique and that upon this perswasion they themselves did resolve to venture their estates and should withal offer such arguments for the reasonableness of what they assert as to any men whose judgments were unprejudiced would render it much more probable than the contrary In this case he that would act rationally according to such rules and principles as all mankind do observe in the government of their actions must be perswaded to do the like unless he would be counted foolish and one that did affect singularity A present Evil is to be endured for the avoiding of a probable future Evil which is far greater Which is the reason of mens undergoing the mischiefs and hardships of War the charges and vexations of Law-suits the trouble of Fasting and Physick A man will endure the pain of hunger and thirst and refuse such meats and drinks as are most grateful to his appetite if he be perswaded that they will endanger his health especially if he believe that they are poisoned He will chuse to take nauseous offensive Physick upon a probable expectation that he may thereby prevent or cure a dangerous sickness The greater the Evil is the more reason is there to venture the loss of a less Good or the suffering of a less evil for the escaping of it A Scheme of Moral Principles There are several kinds of Creatures in the world and several degrees of dignity amongst them some being more excellent than others Animate more than Inanimate Sensitives more than Vegetatives and Men more than Brutes It is a greater preheminence to have life than to be without it to have life and sense than to have life only to have life sense and reason than to have only life and sense That which doth constitute any thing in its being and distinguish it from all other things is called the Form or Essence of such a thing That state or condition by which the nature of any thing is advanced to the utmost perfection of which it is capable according to its rank and kind is called the chief end or happiness of such a thing The nature of Plants doth consist in having a Vegetative Soul by which they receive nourishment and growth and are enabled to multiply their kind The utmost perfection which this kind of Being is capable of is to grow up to a state of maturity to continue unto its natural period and to propagate its kind The nature of Brutes besides what is common to them with Plants doth consist in having such faculties whereby they are capable of apprehending external objects and of receiving pain or pleasure from them The perfection proper to these doth consist in sensitive pleasures or the enjoying of such things as are grateful to their appetites and senses The nature of Man besides what is common to him with Plants and Brutes doth consist in that faculty of Reason whereby he is made capable of Religion of apprehending a Deity and of expecting a future state of rewards and punishments Which are capacities common to all mankind notwithstanding the utmost endeavours that can be used for the suppressing of them and which no other Creature in this visible world except Man doth partake of The happiness of man doth consist in the perfecting of this faculty that is in such a state or condition as is most agreeable to reason and as may entitle him to the Divine favour and afford him the best assurance of a blessed estate after this life That which every man doth and must propose unto himself is the being in as good a condition as he is capable of or as is reasonable for him to expect And the desire of this is not properly a duty or a moral vertue about which men have a liberty of Acting but 't is a natural principle like the descent of heavy bodies it flows necessarily from the very frame of our natures men must do so nor can they do otherwise The Customary Actions of men considered as Voluntary and as capable of Reward or Punishment are styled Moral As that which hath a fitness to promote the Well-fare of man considered as a Sensitive Being is styled Natural Good so that which hath a fitness to promote the Well-fare of man as a Rational voluntary and free Agent is styled Moral Good And the contrary to it Moral Evil. That which is morally good is to be desired and prosecuted that
Goodness Justice Faithfulness p. 135. Chap. XI Of the Perfections belonging to the Powers and faculties of Acting viz. Power Dominion Distribution of future Rewards and Punishments p. 143. Chap. XII Concerning the Duties of Religion naturally flowing from the consideration of the Divine Nature and Perfections And first of Adoration and Worship p. 176. Chap. XIII Of Faith or Affiance p. 189. Chap. XIV Of Love p. 200. Chap. XV. Of Reverence and Fear p. 216. Chap. XVI Of Active Obedience to the Laws of God p. 227. Chap. XVII Of Passive Obedience or Patience and submission to the Will of God p. 239. SECOND BOOK Of the Wisdom of Practising the Duties of Natural Religion Chap. I. SHewing in general how Religion conduces to our happiness p. 285. Chap. II. How it conduces to our present Happiness in this world And first to the happiness of the Outward-man 1. In respect of Health p. 314. Chap. III. In respect of Liberty Safety and Quiet p. 324. Chap. IV. In respect of our Estates and Possessions Riches p. 330. Chap. V. In respect of Pleasure or the chearful enjoyment of outward blessings p. 344. Chap. VI. In respect of Honour and Reputation p. 353. Chap. VII How Religion conduces to the Happiness of the Inward-man As it tends to the perfecting and regulating of our Faculties and to the Peace and tranquility of our minds p. 372. Chap. VIII How Religion conduces to our Happiness in the next World p. 388. Chap. IX The conclusion of the whole shewing the excellency of the Christian Religion and the advantages of it both as to the knowledg and practice of our Duty above the mere Light of Nature p. 394. THE FIRST BOOK Shewing The Reasonableness of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion CHAP. I. Concerning the several kinds of Evidence and Assent I Intend by Gods assistance in this First Book to treat concerning the Reasonableness and the Credibility of the Principles of Natural Religion in opposition to that Humour of Scepticism and Infidelity which hath of late so much abounded in the world not only amongst sensual men of the vulgar sort but even amongst those who pretend to a more than ordinary measure of wit and learning In my entrance upon this work I am sensible of what ill consequence it may be to lay the stress of a weighty cause upon weak or obscure Arguments which instead of convincing men will rather harden and confirm them in their Errors And therefore I cannot but think my self obliged in the management of this Argument to use my utmost caution and endeavour that it be done with so much strength and perspicuity as may be sufficient to convince any man who hath but an ordinary capacity and an honest mind which are no other qualifications than what are required to the institution of men in all kinds of Arts and Sciences whatsoever In order to this I judg it expedient to premise something concerning the several kinds and degrees of Evidence and Assent and to lay down some common principles which may serve as a foundation to the following Discourse The several ways whereby men come to the knowledg or belief of any thing without immediate Revelation are either by such Evidence of things as is more Simple relating to the Senses Outward Inward Understanding arising either from the Nature of the things in themselves Testimony of others concerning them Mixed relating both to the Senses and Understanding I. By Senses I mean those faculties whereby we are enabled to discern and know such particular objects as are present These are either 1. Outward by which we can apprehend external objects as when we see or hear or touch any thing presented to us 2. Inward by which we can discern internal objects and are conscious to our selves or sensible both of the impressions that are made upon our outward senses and of the inward motions of our minds namely our apprehensions inclinations and the power of determining our selves as to our own Actions and by which we can at any time be assured of what we think or what we desire or purpose II. By Understanding I mean that faculty whereby we are enabled to apprehend the objects of Knowledg Generals as well as Particulars Absent things as well as Present and to judg of their Truth or Falshood Good or Evil. That kind of Evidence may be said to arise from the nature of things when there is such a Congruity or Incongruity betwixt the Terms of a Proposition or the Deductions of one Proposition from another as doth either satisfie the mind or else leave it in doubt and hesitation about them That kind of Evidence is said to arise from Testimony when we depend upon the credit and relation of others for the truth or falshood of any thing There being several things which we cannot otherwise know but as others do inform us of them As namely matters of fact together with the account of Persons and Places at a distance Which kind of Evidence will be more or less clear according to the authority and credit of the Witness Besides these there is a mixed kind of Evidence relating both to the Senses and Understanding depending upon our own observation and repeated trials of the issues and events of Actions or Things called Experience These are the several kinds of Evidence whereby we attain to the knowledg or belief of things The kinds of Assent proceeding from them are reducible to these two Heads I. Knowledg or Certainty which may be distinguished into three kinds which I crave leave to call by the names of Physical Mathematical Moral II. Opinion or Probability I. That kind of Assent which doth arise from such plain and clear Evidence as doth not admit of any reasonable cause of doubting is called Knowledg or Certainty 1. I call that Physical Certainty which doth depend upon the Evidence of sense which is the first and highest kind of Evidence of which humane nature is capable Nothing can be more manifest and plain to me than that I now see somewhat which hath the appearance of such a colour or figure than that I have in my mind such a thought desire or purpose and do feel within my self a certain power of determining my own actions which is called Liberty To say that we cannot tell whether we have Liberty because we do not understand the manner of Volition is all one as to say That we cannot tell whether we see or hear because we do not understand the manner of sensation He that would go about to confute me in any of these Apprehensions ought to bring a Medium that is better known and to derive his Argument from somewhat that is more evident and certain than these things are unless he can think to overthrow and confute that which is more plain and certain by that which is less plain and certain which is all one as to go about to out-weigh a heavy body by somewhat that is lighter or to attempt the
proving of ten to be more than eleven than which nothing can be more absurd 2. I call that Mathematical Certainty which doth more eminently belong to Mathematical things not intending hereby to exclude such other matters as are capable of the like certainty namely all such simple abstracted beings as in their own natures do lie so open and are so obvious to the understanding that every man's judgment though never so much prejudiced must necessarily assent to them 'T is not possible for any man in his wits though never so much addicted to Paradoxes to believe otherwise but that the whole is greater than the part That contradictions cannot be both true That three and three make six That four is more than three There is such a kind of Connexion betwixt the Terms of some Propositions and some Deductions are so necessary as must unavoidably enforce our assent There being an evident necessity that some things must be so or not so according as they are affirmed or denied to be and that supposing our faculties to be true they cannot possibly be otherwise without implying a Contradiction 3. I call that Moral Certainty which hath for its object such beings as are less simple and do more depend upon mixed circumstances Which though they are not capable of the same kind of Evidence with the former so as to necessitate every man's assent though his judgment be never so much prejudiced against them yet may they be so plain that every man whose judgment is free from prejudice will consent unto them And though there be no natural necessity that such things must be so and that they cannot possibly be otherwise without implying a Contradiction yet may they be so certain as not to admit of any reasonable doubt concerning them Under each of these Heads there are several Propositions which may be styled Self-evident and first Principles Self-evident because they are of themselves so plain as not to be capable of proof from any thing that is clearer or more known First Principles because they cannot be proved à priori That which is first can have nothing before it Only they may receive some kind of Illustration by Instances and Circumstances and by such Universal effects as do proceed from them and from the monstrous Absurdities that will follow upon the denial of them Such deductions as do necessarily flow from these Principles have the same kind of Certainty whether Physical Mathematical or Moral with the Principles themselves from which they are deduced The two first of these namely Physical and Mathematical Certainty may be styled Infallible and Moral Certainty may properly be styled Indubitable By Infallible Certainty I do not mean absolute infallibility because that is an Incommunicable Attribute And it were no less than a blasphemous arrogance for any man to pretend to such a perfect unerring judgment on which the divine power it self could not impose But I mean a Conditional infallibility that which supposes our faculties to be true and that we do not neglect the exerting of them And upon such a supposition there is a necessity that some things must be so as we apprehend them and that they cannot possibly be otherwise By indubitable Certainty I mean that which doth not admit of any reasonable cause of doubting which is the only certainty of which most things are capable and this may properly be ascribed both to that kind of evidence arising from the Nature of things and likewise to that which doth arise from Testimony or from Experience I am from the nature of the things themselves Morally certain and cannot make any doubt of it but that a mind free from passion and prejudice is more sit to pass a true judgment than such a one as is byassed by affections and interests That there are such things as Vertue and Vice That Mankind is naturally designed for a sociable life That it is most agreeable to reason and the common interests of those in society that they should be true to their Compacts that they should not hurt an innocent person c. And as for the evidence from Testimony which depends upon the credit and authority of the Witnesses these may be so qualified as to their ability and fidelity that a man must be a fantastical incredulous fool to make any doubt of them And by this it is that I am sufficiently assured That there was such a person as Queen Elizabeth That there is such a place as Spain And so for the evidence of Experience I am by that to a great degree assured of the succession of Night and Day Winter and Summer And have no such reason to doubt whether the house wherein now I am shall this next minute fall upon me or the earth open and swallow it up as to be in continual fear of such accidents II. That kind of Assent which doth arise from such evidence as is less plain and clear is called Opinion and Probability When though the proofs for a thing may preponderate any thing to be said against it yet they are not so weighty and perspicuous as to exclude all reasonable doubt and fear of the contrary And this doth arise from a more imperfect and obscure representation and conception of things either by our Senses or Understandings by Testimony or by Experience When the Evidence on each side doth equiponderate this doth not properly beget any Assent but rather a Hesitation or suspension of Assent CHAP. II. Two Schemes of Principles relating to Practical things whether Natural or Moral proposed in the Method used by Mathematicians of Postulata Definitions and Axioms HAving premised these things in general concerning several kinds of Evidences and Assents I shall in the next place offer some particular Schemes of Principles relating to Practical things whether Natural or Moral in the same way and method as is used in the Mathematics consisting of Postulata Definitions and Axioms A Scheme of Natural Principles Every thing is endowed with such a natural Principle whereby it is necessarily inclined to promote its own preservation and well-being That which hath in it a fitness to promote this end is called Good And on the contrary that which is apt to hinder it is called Evil. Amongst which there are several degrees according as things have more or less fitness to promote or hinder this end The lessening or escaping of Evil is to be reckoned under the notion of Good The lessening or loss of Good is to be reckoned under the notion of Evil. That which is Good is to be chosen and prosecuted that which is Evil to be avoided The greater Good is to be preferred before the less and the lesser Evil to be endured rather than the greater Such kinds of things or events whether Good or Evil as will certainly come to pass may fall under computation and be estimated as to their several degrees as well as things present Because when such a space of time
which is evil is to be avoided The greater congruity or incongruity there is in any thing to the reason of Mankind and the greater tendency it hath to promote or hinder the perfection of mans nature so much greater degrees hath it of moral Good or Evil. To which we ought to proportion our Inclination or Aversion There is in some things such a natural decency and fitness as doth render them most agreeable to our reason and will be sufficient to recommend them to our practice abstracting from all considerations of Reward As in loving those who are kind to us and from whom we receive benefit In compensating Good with Good and not with Evil. It is most suitable both to the Reason and Interest of mankind that every one should submit themselves to him upon whom they depend for their Well-being by doing such things as may render them Acceptable to him It is a desireable thing for a man to have the assistance of others in his need and distress And 't is not reasonable for him to expect this from others unless he himself be willing to shew it to others The rational nature and the Perfection belonging to it being more noble than the Sensitive Therefore Moral Good is to be preferred before Natural and that which is Morally Evil is more to be hated and avoided than that which is Natural A present Natural Good may be parted with upon a probable expectation of a future Moral good A present Natural Evil is to be endured for the probable avoiding of a future Moral Evil. CHAP. III. Some Propositions necessary to be premised for the removing of several prejudices in Debates about Religion BEsides what hath been already suggested concerning the first foundations to be laid in order to a discourse about Natural Religion I shall in the next place offer to consideration these seven following Propositions as being very proper to prevent or obviate the Cavils of Sceptical captious men 1. Such things as in themselves are equally true and certain may not yet be capable of the same kind or degree of Evidence as to us As for instance That there was such a man as King Henry the Eighth that there are such places as America or China I say these things may in themselves be equally true and certain with those other matters That we now see and are awake That the three Angles in a Triangle are equal to two right ones Though for the first of these we have only the testimony of others and humane tradition whereas for the other we have sensitive proof and Mathematical demonstration And the reason is because all Truths are in themselves equal according to that ordinary Maxim Veritas non recipit magis minus And therefore nothing can be more irrational than for a man to doubt of or deny the truth of any thing because it cannot be made out by such kind of proofs of which the nature of such a thing is not capable A man may as well deny there is any such thing as Light or Colour because he cannot hear it or sound because he cannot see it as to deny the truth of other things because they cannot be made out by sensitive or demonstrative proofs The kinds of Probation for several things being as much disproportioned as the objects of the several senses are to one another 2. Things of several kinds may admit and require several sorts of proofs all which may be good in their kind The Philosopher hath long ago told us that according to the divers nature of things so must the Evidences for them be and that 't is an argument of an undisciplined wit not to acknowledge this He that is rational and judicious will expect no other kind of Arguments in any case than the subject-matter will bear Hâ—w incongruous would it be for a Mâ—â—â—â—â—atician to perswade with eloquence to 〈◊〉 all imaginable insinuations and 〈◊〉 that he might prevail with his hearers to believe that three and three make six It would be altogether as vain and improper in matters belonging to an Orator to pretend to strict Demonstration All things are not capable of the same kind of Evidence Though the Conclusions in Mathematicks by reason of the abstracted nature of those Sciences may be demonstrated by the clearest and most unquestionable way of Probation to our reason yet it is not rational to expect the like proof in such other matters as are not of the like nature This he himself applys to Moral things which being not of such simple abstracted naturès but depending upon mixed circumstances are not therefore capable of such kind of Demonstrative proofs 'T is a saying of Jamblicus That demonstrations are not to be expected in matters concerning God and divine things Nor is this any greater prejudice to the certainty of such things than it is that God is invisible And thus likewise it is for the same reason with many particular conclusions in Natural Philosophy And as for matters of Fact concerning Times Places Persons Actions which depend upon story and the relation of others these things are not capable of being proved by such scientifical Principles as the others are Now no sober man can deny but that several things in Moral and in Natural Philosophy are in themselves as absolutely and as certainly true and as firmly believ'd by us as any Mathematical principle or conclusion can be From whence I infer this That it is not ought not to be any prejudice to the Truth or Certainty of any thing that it is not to be made out by such kind of proofs of which the nature of that thing is not capable provided it be capable of satisfactory proofs of another kind 3. When a thing is capable of good proof in any kind men ought to rest satisfy'd in the best evidence for it which that kind of things will bear and beyond which better could not be expected supposing it were true They ought not to expect either sensible proof or demonstration for such matters as are not capable of such proofs supposing them to be true Because otherwise nothing must be assented to and believed but that which hath the highest Evidence All other things being to be looked upon as uncertain and doubtful and wholly excluded from all possibility of being known And at this rate men must believe nothing at all in story because such things cannot be demonstrated and 't is possible that the rest of Mankind might have combined together to impose upon them by these relations And how abhorrent such Sceptical Principles must needs be to common reason I need not say Those who will pretend such kind of grounds for their disbelief of any thing will never be able to perswade others that the true cause why they do not give their Assent is because they have no reason for it but because they have no mind to it Nolle in causa est non posse praetenditur And on the
other side when we have for the proof of any thing some of the highest kinds of Evidence in this case it is not the suggestion of a meer possibility that the thing may be otherwise that ought to be any sufficient cause of doubting To which I shall only add that we may be unquestionably sure of many things as to their existence and yet we may not be able to explain the nature of them No man in his wits can make any doubt whether there be such things as Motion and Sensation and Continuity of Bodies And yet these things are commonly esteemed inexplicable So that our not being able to see to the bottom of things and to give a distinct account of the nature and manner of them can be no sufficient cause to doubt of their being 4. The mind of man may and must give a firm assent to some things without any kind of hesitation or doubt of the contrary where yet the Evidences for such things are not so infallible but that there is a possibility that the things may be otherwise i. e. There may be an indubitable certainty where there is not an infallible certainty And that kind of certainty which doth not admit of any doubt may serve us as well to all intents and purposes as that which is infallible A man may make no doubt whether he himself were baptized whether such persons were his parents of which yet he can have no other Evidence than Tradition and the Testimony of others Who is there so wildly Sceptical as to question whether the Sun shall rise in the East and not in the North or West or whether it shall rise at all Because the contrary is not impossible and doth not imply any Contradiction Suppose that in digging of the Earth amongst some ancient ruins a man should find a round flat piece of Metal in the exact shape of an old Medal with the Image and Inscription of one of the Roman Emperours Or suppose he should dig up a large stone of the shape of an ancient Tomb-stone with a distinct Inscription upon it of the name and quality of some person said to be buried under it Can any rational man doubt whether one of these were not a piece of Coyn and the other a Grave-stone or should a man be bound to suspend his assent and belief of this barely upon this ground because 't is possible that these might have been the natural shapes of that particular Metal and Stone and that those which seem to be letters or figures engraven or embossed upon it may be nothing else but some casual dents or cavities which by the various motions and temper of the matter did happen to them amongst those many millions of other figures which they were capable of Who would not think such a man to be strangely wild and irrational who could frame to himself any real scruples from such Considerations as these Why 't is the same kind of absurd dotage that Scepticks in Religion are guilty of in suspending their assent meerly upon this ground because some Arguments for it do not so infallibly conclude but that there is a possibility things may be otherwise He that will raise to himself and cherish in his mind any real doubts according to the meer possibility of things shall not be able to determine himself to the belief or practice of any thing He must not stay within doors for fear the house should fall upon him for that is possible nor must he go out lest the next man that meets him should kill him for that also is possible And so must it be for his doing or forbearing any other action Nay I add further that man is sure to be deceived in very many things who will doubt of every thing where 't is possible he may be deceived I appeal to the common judgment of Mankind whether the humane nature be not so framed as to acquiesce in such a Moral certainty as the nature of things is capable of and if it were otherwise whether that Reason which belongs to us would not prove a burden and a torment to us rather than a priviledg by keeping us in a continual suspense and thereby rendring our conditions perpetually restless and unquiet Would not such men be generally accounted out of their wits who could please themselves by entertaining actual hopes of any thing meerly upon account of the possibility of it or torment themselves with actual fears of all such evils as are possible Is there any thing imaginable more wild and extravagant amongst those in Bedlam than this would be Why Doubt is a kind of fear and is commonly styled formido oppositi and 't is the same kind of madness for a man to doubt of any thing as to hope for or fear it upon a meer possibility 5. 'T is sufficient that matters of Faith and Religion be propounded in such a way as to render them highly credible so as an honest and teachable man may willingly and safely assent to them and according to the rules of Prudence be justified in so doing Nor is it either Necessary or Convenient that they should be established by such cogent Evidence as to necessitate assent Because this would not leave any place for the vertue of Believing or the freedom of our obedience nor any ground for Reward and Punishment It would not be thank-worthy for a man to believe that which of necessity he must believe and cannot otherwise chuse Rewards and Punishments do properly belong to free Actions such as are under a mans power either to do or forbear not to such as are necessary There is no more reason to reward a man for believing that four is more than three than for being hungry or sleepy Because these things do not proceed from choice but from natural necessity A man must do so nor can he do otherwise I do not say That the Principles of Religion are meerly probable I have before asserted them to be Morally certain And that to a man who is careful to preserve his mind free from prejudice and to consider they will appear unquestionable and the deductions from them demonstrable But now because that which is necessary to beget this certainty in the mind namely impartial Consideration is in a mans power therefore the belief or disbelief of these things is a proper subject for Rewards and Punishments There would be little reason for the Scripture so much to magnifie the Grace of Faith as being so great a vertue and so acceptable to God if every one were necessitated to it whether he would or no. And therefore God is pleased to propose these matters of belief to us in such a way as that we might give some Testimony of our teachable dispositions and of our obedience by our assent to them Ut sermo Evangelii tanquam lapis esset Lydius ad quem ingenia sanabilia explorarentur as the Learned Grotius speaks concerning the Doctrine of the Gospel
that in one of these ways he shall meet with much trouble difficulty danger which the other is altogether free from In this case though a man be not bound to believe that one of them is a truer way than the other yet is he obliged in prudence to take the safest Nay I add further If the probabilities on the one hand should somewhat preponderate the other yet if there be no considerable hazard on that side which hath the least probability and a very great apparent danger in a mistake about the other In this case prudence will oblige a man to do that which may make most for his own safety These are those preparatory Principles which I thought fit to premise as a necessary foundation for any debate with captious men about these first grounds of Religion And they are each of them I think of such perspicuity as to need little more than the bare Proposal of them and the Explication of their Terms to evince the truth of them CHAP. IV. Concerning the Existence of a Deity and the Arguments for it The I. Argument From the universal consent and agreement of Mankind and the Objections answered THese things being premised I betake my self to that which was at first proposed as the chief design of this Book namely to prove the Reasonableness and the Credibility of the Principles of Natural Religion By Religion I mean that general habit of Reverence towards the Divine nature whereby we are inabled and inclined to worship and serve God after such a manner as we conceive most agreeable to his will so as to procure his favour and blessing I call that Natural Religion which men might know and should be obliged unto by the meer principles of Reason improved by Consideration and Experience without the help of Revelation This doth comprehend under it these three principal things 1. A belief and an acknowledgment of the Divine Nature and Existence 2. Due apprehensions of his Excellencies and Perfections 3. Suitable Affections and Demeanour towards him Concerning each of which I shall treat in order I. There must be a firm belief of the Divine Nature and Existence Primus est Deorum culius Deos credere saith Seneca Answerable to that of the Apostle He that comes to God must believe that he is Now that this is a point highly credible and such as every sober rational man who will not offer violence to his own faculties must submit unto I shall endeavour to evince by the plainest Reason In treating concerning this Subject which both in former and later times hath been so largely discussed by several Authors I shall not pretend to the invention of any new arguments but content my self with the management of some of those old ones which to me seem most plain and convincing Namely from 1. The Universal consent of Nations in all places and times 2. The Original of the World 3. That excellent contrivance which there is in all natural things 4. The Works of Providence in the Government of the World 1. From the Universal Consent of Nations in all places and times which must needs render any thing highly credible to all such as will but allow the human nature to be Rational and to be naturally endowed with a Capacity of distinguishing betwixt Truth and Falshood It is laid down by the Philosopher as the proper way of Reasoning from Authority That what seems true to some wise men may upon that account be esteemed somewhat probable what is believed by most wise men hath a further degree of probability what most men both wise and unwise do assent unto is yet more probable But what all men have generally consented to hath for it the highest degree of evidence of this kind that any thing is capable of And it must be monstrous arrogance and folly for any single persons to prefer their own judgments before the general suffrage of Mankind It is observed by AElian That the notions concerning the Existence and Nature of God and of a future state were more firmely believed and did usually make deeper impression upon the illiterate Vulgar who were guided by the more simple dictates of Nature than upon several of the philosophers who by their art and subtilty were able to invent disguises and to dispute themselves into doubts and uncertainties concerning such things as might bring disquiet to their minds That all Nations of men now do and have formerly owned this Principle may appear both from present experience and the History of other Times and Places And here I might cite abundance of the best Authors that are extant concerning the truth of this in all other Ages and Nations But for brevity's sake I shall mention only two Tully and Seneca Quae gens est aut quod genus hominum quod non habeat sine doctrinâ anticipationem quandam Deorum quam appellat 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Epicurus What kind of men are there any where who have not of themselves this prenotion of a Deity And in another place Nulla gens est neque tam immansueta neque tam fera quae non etiamsi ignoret qualem habere Denm deceat tamen habendum sciat Amongst all mankind there is no Nation so wild and barbarous who though they may mistake in their due apprehensions of the nature of God do not yet acknowledg his being And elsewhere Nulla est gens tam fera nemo omnium tam immanis cujus mentem non imbuerit Deorum timor There is no Nation so immensely barbarous and savage as not to believe the existence of a Deity and by some kind of services to express their adoration of him So Seneca Nulla gens usquam est adeo extra leges moresque projecta ut non aliquos Deos credat There is no where any Nation so utterly lost to all things of Law and Morality as not to believe the existence of God He that shall traverse over all this habitable Earth with all those remote corners of it reserved for the discovery of these later Ages may find some Nations without Cities Schools Houses Garments Coin but none without their God They may and do vastly differ in their Manners Institutions Customs But yet all of them agree in having some Deity to worship And besides this Universality as to Nations and Places it hath been so likewise as to Times Religion was observed in the beginning of the World before there were Civil Laws amongst men I mean any other than the meer wills of their Princes and Governours The Works of Moses are by general consent acknowledged to be the most ancient Writings in the world And though the design of them be to prescribe Doctrines and Rules for Religion yet there is nothing offered in them by way of proof or perswasion concerning the Existence of God but it is a thing taken for granted as being universally acknowledged and believed Nor do we read that any of the other
obvious to every ones understanding as the Being of God is but will require some deeper consideration and some skill in the rules of reasoning Now it could not be reasonably expected that either the generality or any considerable number of the Vulgar should attain to such a degree of knowledg as their own natural reason duly exercised and improved might have furnished them with Partly by reason of the prejudice of Education which must needs incline them to acquiesce in what is delivered down to them as the belief or practice of their Forefathers and consequently hinder them from an impartial enquiry into the nature of things But chiefly for want of sufficient leisure to apply themselves to the business of contemplation by reason of their being immersed in the affairs of the World either pleasures ambition riches or else being wholly taken up with cares about providing the necessaries of life for themselves and their families which must needs much divert them from the serious consideration of things and hinder them from the improvement of their natural light to all the due consequences of it 2. The most considering and the wisest men in all Ages and Nations have constantly differed from the Vulgar in their thoughts about these things believing but one supreme Deity the Father of all other subordinate Powers Hominum sator atque Deorum Whom they called Jupiter or Jove with plain reference to the Hebrew name Jehovah And to this one God did they ascribe several names according to those several virtues they suppos'd to be in him or benefits they expected from him Bacchus and Neptune Nature Fortune Fate Omnia quidem Dei nominasunt varie utentis suâ potestate saith Seneca So likewise Pythagoras Socrates Plato Aristotle c. And they advise men to worship this God not so much by Images or by Sacrifices as by inward goodness by endeavouring to be like him as I shall shew more largely afterwards Now though the opinion of the Vulgar with the consent of the Wise may be of great Authority yet being separated from or especially opposed unto their opinion who are best able to judg it must needs signifie but little If the question should here be proposed How comes it to pass that mankind should thus consent and agree in the notion of a Deity and to what ground or cause may it be ascribed To this I shall suggest something by way of answer both Negatively and Positively 1. Negatively from what hath been said it may appear that this belief doth not proceed from any particular infirmity or occasional prejudice in the judgment because it hath been so constant and universal amongst Mankind And besides there is not the least probability for those things which are assigned as the grounds of this Prejudice namely Fear Policy Stipulation 1. Not Fear or a certain jealousie of the worst that may happen For though it must be granted natural to the minds of men to be possessed with an awe towards such things as are able to hurt them yet 't is much more probable that the fear of a supreme Being is rather the consequence and Effect of such a belief than the Cause of it For this reason Because the Notion of a Deity doth comprehend under it infinite Goodness and Mercy as well as Power and Justice and there is no reason why Fear should dispose a man to fancy a Being that is infinitely Good and Merciful 2. Not Policy or the device of Statists to keep mens Consciences in awe and oblige them to subjection 1. Because the greatest Princes and Politicians themselves have in all ages been as much under this conviction of a Deity and the lashes of Conscience as any other persons whatsoever which could not be had they known this business of Religion to have been a device or state engine whereby their Subjects were to be imposed upon 2. Because this belief is amongst the more rude and savage Nations such as in all other regards are ignorant and wild and utterly destitute of all common Policy 3. Not Stipulation or mutual agreement for the same reason Because 't is amongst those barbarous and savage people who decline all kind of commerce with others Nor is it imaginable how such kind of persons should agree together to promote any opinion who are wildly separated from one another by Seas and Mountains and Desarts and yet not at so great a distance in their Habitations as in their Customs and Manners From all which it may appear That this Opinion or Belief which is so general amongst men doth not arise from any prejudice or partiality upon their minds But rather the doubting or questioning of these things which belongs but to few There is reason enough to believe that this may be founded in prejudice Nor is it difficult to determine whence their prejudice doth arise namely from the vitious inclinations of men which will corrupt and byass their judgments When once men are immersed in sensual things and are become slaves to their Passions and Lusts then are they most disposed to doubt of the Existence of God Whereas on the contrary the more just and honest any man is the more willing and careful he is to walk up to the dictates of his natural light by so much the more firmely are such persons convinced of this Truth 'T is the Conscience of Guilt which makes it the Interest of some that there should be no God And consequently being desirous to have it so this makes them studious how to find out some doubt and obscurity about it 2. Affirmatively It is a known Rule That the Cause must be as universal as the Effect is If this belief have been one and constant in all places and times then must the cause of it be so likewise And what is there imaginable that hath a fairer pretence to this than the very nature of our minds which are of such a frame as in the ordinary exercise of their faculties will easily find out the necessity of a supreme Being And it seems very congruous to reason that he who is the great Creator of the world should set some such mark of himself upon those Creatures that are capable of worshipping him whereby they might be led to the Author of their Being to whom their worship is to be directed as is observed in a late Discourse wherein there are many other things to this purpose Such kind of Notions as are general to mankind and not confined to any particular Sect or Nation or Time are usually styled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Common Notions 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Seminal Principles and Lex nata by the Roman Orator an innate Law in opposition to Lex scripta and in the Apostles phrase the Law written in our hearts Which kind of Notions though they are of themselves above all other matters most plain and perspicuous yet because Learned men do somewhat differ in their apprehensions concerning the first rise and original of them I
God the King and Father of all under whom there are subordinate Deities his offspring who are admitted to some share of government with him In this the Grecian consents with the Barbarian the Inhabitants of the Continent with the Islanders the Wise with the Unwise 2. But besides the Testimonies to this purpose it may likewise be made evident by Reason That a Plurality of Gods is not only unnecessary and therefore improbable but that it is such a supposition as doth imply in it many inconsistencies and therefore is impossible 1. 'T is unnecessary and therefore highly improbable Those have been always esteemed good Rules Frustra fit per plura c. Entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate It is most suitable to that common analogy to be observed amongst natural things even in lesser matters that there is nothing amongst them superfluous or redundant And therefore much more ought it to be so in the greatest and highest matters of all Now nothing can be more evident than that one infinite Being may be sufficient to all purposes whatsoever for if it had any limits it were not infinite and nothing can be more absurd than to suppose more Gods than are necessary 2. 'T is not possible that there should be two such infinite Beings Because either they must have several Perfections or the same Neither of which is consistent with the most obvious notion of God That he is a Being of all possible Perfections To suppose two Gods with several Perfections some belonging to one and some to another will plainly prove that neither of them can be God because neither of them have all possible Perfections To suppose two Gods of the same and equal Perfections would likewise prove that neither of them can be God i. e. not absolutely perfect because it is not so great a priviledg to have the same equal perfections with another and in a kind of partnership as to be alone and superior above all others And to suppose one of them whether of several or the same kinds of Perfections with the other but only in an inferior degree may sufficiently evince that one of them is not properly God because not supreme 3. The third Attribute to be discussed is the Divine Immutability By which I mean a freedom from all kind of change or inconstancy both as to his Nature and his Purposes And that this Attribute is likewise very suitable to those natural notions which men have of God may appear 1. By Testimony Plato having proposed the Question whether God be mutable and inconstant answers expressly 'T is most necessary that he should be always the same and alike His words are most emphatical 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that he is never in any wise capable of any kind of change whatsoever And in another place he mentions these two things as being the grand principles of Religion 1. That God is the cause of all good and in no wise of any evil 2. That he is constant and immutable and cannot deceive by making various representations of himself So Seneca speaking of the necessity of ascribing this Attribute to the Divine Nature as to his Purposes or Counsels hath this passage Statuerunt quae non mutarunt nec unquam primi consilii Deos paenitet God is always constant to his own Decrees and doth never repent of his Purposes And in another place Necesse est ei eadem placere eui nisi optima placere non possunt nec ob hoc minus liber ac potens est ipse enim est Necessitas sua 'T is necessary that he should be always pleased with the same things who can be pleased with nothing but what is best Nor can this be any prejudice to his Liberty or his Power since he is his own Necessity i. e. nothing from without but his own natutural perfection lays this necessity upon him 2. By reason There is an excellent argument to this purpose in that place before-cited out of Plato which according to his manner he delivers in a more copious way of expression But the substance of it is this All change must be either involuntary and upon necessity or voluntary and upon choice Now God being the most powerful Being cannot by any thing be necessitated to an involuntary change And for any voluntary change whereas it must be either for the better or the worse it is not imaginable that any wise Being should be willing to change for the worse Nor is it possible that any perfect Being should change for the better And therefore 't is necessary that the divine nature should be immutable We esteem changeableness in men either an imperfection or a fault Their natural changes as to their persons are from weakness and vanity their moral changes as to their inclinations and purposes are from ignorance or inconstancy And therefore there is very good reason why we should remove this from God as being that which would darken all his other perfections The greater the Divine Perfections are the greater Imperfection would Mutability be Besides that it would take away the foundation of all Religion Love and Fear and Affiance and Worship In which men would be very much discouraged if they could not certainly rely upon God but were in doubt that his nature might alter and that hereafter he might be quite otherwise from what we now apprehend him to be 4. Infiniteness is another Attribute most natural to the Notion of God By which is meant his not being bounded by place or space or by duration but being Immense and Eternal 1. This Attribute of Gods immensity doth signifie his not being so confined by any bounds of space but that he doth spread himself to all places that we can see or can imagine and infinitely beyond So as we cannot say he is here and not there thus far he reaches and not farther Some have thought that it is not absolutely necessary to believe such a kind of Omnipresence of the Divine substance as to be actually present in every place But this is most necessary to be believed That God is every-where in respect of his Power and Providence whereby he doth influence and govern all things which is hardly possible to conceive without his actual presence in all places And in respect of his Knowledg whereby he doth see and take notice of every thing though never so secret and that he can pierce through all these created things with greater facility than the Light doth through the Air. And that this doth belong to the natural notion of God may appear 1. By the general consent of the Heathen testified by their praying to him at any place or time which shews that they were perswaded that he was always and every-where present at least by his Knowledg and his Power Tully cites Pythagoras affirming Deum esse animum per naturam rerum omnium intentum commeantem That God is a Spirit or Mind which doth pass
of these doth in the essence of it imply comeliness and reward so doth the other denote turpitude and punishment these things being implied in the very definitions of virtue and vice And from hence it will follow That as there is some superiour power who hath put this Law into our natures so will he take care to enforce the observance of it by rewarding and punishing men accordingly This being implied in the nature of a Law If there be nothing in the naked essence of things that makes them to differ but what doth meerly arise from Custom and positive Laws why then Custom and Law would be able to render it a very virtuous and commendable thing for a man to be ingrateful a breaker of compacts a false witness a perjured person which is so monstrous a position that the common reason of mankind will abhor it upon the first proposal Nothing is more obvious than that there is an universal desire amongst men of seeming honest The most impudent and profligate wretch being loth to be esteemed what really he is The very sin of hypocrisie so general amongst men doth give a large testimony to the beauty of goodness and the deformity of vice Nor is there any account to be given why there should be impressed upon the nature of men such a value for the one and dislike for the other if there were not in the things themselves something suitable to those contrary affections We see by experience that there is such a kind of rest and acquiescence in the mind upon the discovery of truth and the doing of virtuous actions as belongs to natural bodies when they are in their proper places which may argue these things to have some peculiar suitableness to the soul of man and that the opposites to them do offer violence to some natural principle belonging to it 2. This principle is most suitable to those natural hopes and expectations which the generality of good men have concerning a state of future happiness From whence doth arise that confidence and courage whereby those of meanest quality and abilities if otherwise virtuous persons can support themselves in their sufferings for that which is good which doth necessarily supposâ— in them a strong and even a natural belief and perswasion of such a future state wherein their sufferings shall be considered and rewarded Besides that there is a strong aversion amongst men against a dark state of annihilation which no man can think of without great regret of mind And likewise a natural desire in all men after a state of happiness and perfection And no natural desire is in vain All other things have somewhat to satisfie their natural appetites And if we consider the utter impossibility of attaining to any such condition in this life this will render it highly credible that there must be another state wherein this happiness is attainable otherwise mankind must fail of his chief end being by a natural principle most strongly inclined to such a state of happiness as he can never attain to as if he were purposely framed to be tormented betwixt these two passions Desire and Despair an earnest propension after happiness and an utter incapacity of ever enjoying it as if nature it self whereby all other things are disposed to their perfection did serve only in mankind to make them miserable And which is yet more considerable the better and the wiser any man is the more earnest desires and hopes hath he after such a state of happiness And if there be no such thing not only Nature but Virtue likewise must contribute to make men miserable than which nothing can seem more unreasonable to those who believe a just and a wise providence 3. This principle is most suitable to those fears and expectations which the generality of wicked men are possessed with concerning a future state of misery Witness those natural suggestions of conscience in the worst of men that upon any wicked actions though never so private are oftentimes startling of them with the apprehensions of another Judicature and Tribunal before which they shall be called to an account for the closest sins All that secret regret and those inward smitings Laniatus Ictus which are so often felt in the minds of men upon the commission of any great sin do argue some common intimations even in the light of Nature of another Judgment after this life wherein they shall be accountable for such actions as men do not punish or take notice of And these natural fears do usually seize upon all kind of men promiscuously Even those who are most potent who by their own Will can give Laws to Nations and command mighty Armies yet cannot they avoid these checks and lashes of conscience but that they will seize upon them and shake them as well as the poorest meanest Subject Nor can such as are most obstinately wicked who with their utmost study and endeavour apply themselves to the suppressing and disbelief of these notions so wholly stifle them but that they will be continually rising up in their minds and pursuing of them Now as there is no man whatsoever that is wholly freed from these fears of future misery after death so there is no Creature below Man that hath any fears of this kind And if there be no real ground for this then must it follow That he who framed all his other Works with such an excellent congruity did yet so contrive the nature of Man the most noble amongst them as to prove a needless torment and burden to it self If it be said That these notions may proceed from such principles as men have derived from Institution and the teaching of others but that they do not imply a necessity of any such natural impressions To this it may be answered That it is sufficient to denominate them Natural notions if they have such a suitableness to the minds of men as makes them to be generally owned by all those who apply their thoughts to the consideration of them And that they have such a natural suitableness may appear because Institution cannot so easily eradicate these notions as it can fix them Now if the meer teaching of others were it self sufficient to impress these notions without any such peculiar congruity in the things themselves it would be as sufficient to deface them again Especially considering the advantage on this side from that natural repugnancy which we have to any thing which brings disquiet to our minds And nothing is more troublesome in this kind than the fear which follows upon guilt But now though there have been several men of no mean abilities in several Ages who have made it their business to root out of the minds of men all such troublesome notions about a future state endeavouring to perswade themselves and others That as there was a time before they were born into the world when they were not so at their dying or going out of it they shall exist no
And as for such whom we have obliged by all imaginable kindness they may deal deceitfully with us and prove like winter brooks which in wet seasons when there is no need of them will run with a torrent but are quite vanished in a time of drought Whilst we are in a prosperous condition they will be forward to apply themselves to us with great professions of kindness and zeal but if our condition prove any way declining they presently fall off and become strangers forgetting and renouncing all obligations of friendship and gratitude rather than run the least hazard or trouble to do us a kindness That man hath had but little experience in the world to whom this is not very evident But now the mercy and goodness of God is over all his works and more especially extended to such as are in a state of misery the fatherless and widows the prisoners the poor and the stranger He is the helper of the friendless That which amongst men is usually the chief occasion to take off their affection and kindness namely misery and affliction is a principal argument to entitle us to the favour of God and therefore is frequently made use of by good men in H. Scripture to that purpose O go not far from me for trouble is nigh at hand and there is none to help me I am in misery O hear me speedily 3. He is of infinite Power for our relief and supply in every condition being able to do whatsoever he pleaseth both in heaven and in earth and in the sea and in all deep places He is the first cause of every thing both as to its being and operation We depend wholly upon his power not only for the issues and events of things but likewise for the means And therefore 't is in Scripture made an argument why we should not trust in riches or in any worldly thing because power belongs to God And 't is elsewhere urged for a reason why we should trust in the Lord for ever because in the Lord Jehovah is everlasting strength And upon this consideration Abraham is said to have hoped against hope being fully perswaded that what God had promis'd he was able to perform 4. He is everlasting whereas all other helps and comforts which we can propose to our selves are transient and fading As for our fathers where are they And do the Prophets or Princes live for ever Their days upon earth are a shadow that fleeteth away their breath goeth forth and they return to the earth and then all their thoughts perish Whereas he is from everlasting to everlasting God blessed for ever and his righteousness extendeth to childrens children even to all generations We see by daily experience persons of great hopes and expectations when their Patrons dye upon whom they had their dependance to what a forlorn and helpless condition they are reduced But now this can never befall the man who trusteth in the Lord and whose hope the Lord is And 't is one of the greatest priviledges of Religion that it doth furnish a man with such a sure refuge and support against all kind of exigences whereby he may bear up his spirit under those difficulties wherewith others are overwhelmed 'T is true indeed it cannot be denied but that God doth expect and the nature of things doth require that men should be suitably affected with joy or sorrow according as their conditions are but yet with this difference that those who believe the Providence of God should not be so deeply affected with these things as other men they should weep as not weeping and rejoice as not rejoicing They should not upon any occasion fear or sorrow as men without hope but should demean themselves as persons that have an higher principle to be acted by and to live upon than any of these sensible things I cannot omit to suggest one Observation concerning this duty of Affiance which I have now been insisting upon That though this particular virtue and others of the like affinity be evidently moral duties our obligation to them being clearly deducible from the light of nature and the principles of reason and consequently must be owned by the Heathen Philosophers yet they do in their Writings speak but sparingly concerning those kind of virtues which are of a more spiritual nature and tend most to the elevating and refining of the mind And on the other side the Scripture doth most of all insist upon the excellency and necessity of these kind of graces Which is one of the main differences betwixt the Scripture and other moral Writings And for this reason it is that in speaking of these graces and virtues I do more frequently allude to Scripture expressions CHAP. XIV Of the Love of God SEcondly As for those perfections belonging to the Divine Will namely his Goodness his Justice his Truth and Faithfulness The due apprehension of these should excite in us the virtue of Love with all the genuine fruits of it By Love I mean an esteeming of him and a seeking after him as our only happiness So that there are two ingredients of this virtue of Love Estimation and Choice 1. An Estimation of the judgment a due valuation of those excellencies which are in the Divine nature whereby we look upon God as the supreme Being in genere boni From whom all created goodness is derived and by conformity to whom it is to be measured And this notion is the proper importance of the word Charity whereby we account a thing dear or pretious And in this sense doth our Saviour oppose despising to loving Either he must hate the one and love the other or he must hold to the one and despise the other Now these perfections of the Divine nature may be considered either absolutely or relatively 1. Absolutely as they are in themselves abstracting from any benefit that we our selves may have by them And in this sense they can only produce in us an esteem of our judgments without any desire or zeal in our will or affections The Devil doth understand these absolute perfections of the Divine nature that God is in himself most wise most just and powerful And he knows withal that these things are good deserving esteem and veneration and yet he doth not love God for these perfections because he himself is evil and is not like to receive any benefit by them 2. Relatively with reference to that advantage which may arrive to us from the Divine goodness When men are convinced of their infinite need of him and their misery without him and that their utmost felicity doth consist in the enjoyment of him This is that which properly provokes affection and desire namely his relative goodness as to us There is scarce any one under such transports of love as to believe the person whom he loves to be in all respects the most virtuous wise beautiful wealthy that is in the world He
repentance to forgive us all that we offend And to whom much is given or forgiven they should love much To love them that love us is a duty but of a low attainment the Publicans and sinners do the same nay the very Beasts will do it The Oxe knows his owner and the Ass his masters crib That person must be void of the reason of a man who will not admire and love God for his Excellencies but he that doth not love him for his kindness must be more stupid and senseless than the brute creatures 3. We are utterly undone without an interest in his favour So that if the apprehension of his absolute goodness cannot work upon our reason nor the sense of his relative goodness or kindness upon our ingenuity and gratitude yet the consideration of our undone estate without him ought to prevail with all such as have not forfeited the first and most universal principle of self-preservation The not having him for our friend and much more the having him for our enemy putting a man into an absolute incapacity of all kind of happiness 'T is a question proposed by St. Austin why we are so often in Scripture enjoyned to love God and our neighbours but have no-where any precept commanding us to love our selves To which he gives this answer Fingi non potest major dilectio sui quà m dilectio Dei The highest and truest self-love is to love that which can alone make us happy Men do not need any motive or argument to perswade them to love themselves 'T is a natural principle rather than a moral duty they must do so nor can they do otherwise Only this is that wherein they stand in greatest need of direction how to set this natural principle on work upon its due object Felicity must be every mans chief end there is no need of perswading any one to that all the difficulty is to convince men wherein this happiness doth consist And there is no rational considering man but must needs grant it to be in the fruition of the first and supreme good so that to love God as our happiness is to love our selves beyond which there is nothing to be said or fancyed by way of motive or perswasion 'T is a duty this upon all accounts so plain and reasonable that no man whatsoever can pretend to any kind of doubt or dispute about it And therefore I shall add no more by way of proof or confirmation of the necessity of it I shall only offer two considerations which should engage mens utmost diligence and caution in this matter 1. 'T is a business of greatest consequence to know whether we truly love God 2. 'T is a matter wherein we are very liable to mistake 1. 'T is a business of unspeakable concernment to understand whether we love God or not It being the same thing as to enquire whether there be any thing in us of true Religion or not 'T is not a question about the fruits or the branches but about the root not about the degrees but about the very essence of grace and holiness There being no medium betwixt loving God and hating of him He that is not with me is against me saith our Saviour Luke 11. 23. 2. And then 't is a matter wherein men are liable to mistake There is naturally in all Nations of men who dwell on the face of the earth a kind of confused inclination towards God whereby they seek the Lord if haply they might feel after him and find him as the Apostle speaks And men are apt to mistake this natural propension for the grace of Love whereas this is rather an inclination than a firm choice and resolution rather a natural disposition than an acquired or infused habit None could have more confident perswasions of their love to God and their zeal for him than the Jews had and yet our Saviour tells them But I know you that you have not the love of God in you 'T is not an outward profession though accompanied with zeal that is a sufficient argument of our love Though there are many in the world who both live and dye under this delusion Mat. 7. 22. Many will say unto me in that day Lord Lord have we not prophesied in thy name and in thy name have cast out Devils and in thy name done many wonderful works And then will I profess unto them I never knew you depart from me you that work iniquity 'T is not the being gifted and called for these extraordinary works of prophesying and miracles 't is not an ability to undergo the flames of martyrdom and the giving our bodies to be burned Neither gifts nor priviledges nor some particular acts of duty though of the most noble kind and greatest difficulty can be a sufficient evidence of this love So that 't is a matter wherein men are very liable to mistake and where a mistake will prove of infinite consequence And therefore will it concern us to be very considerate and cautious in our enquiry about it There is one kind of affection seated in the rational part of the soul the understanding and will and another in the sensitive the fancy and appetite The one consisting in a full conviction deliberate choice and firm resolution the other consisting more in some sudden impetus and transport of desire after a thing The first of these may be styled the virtue the other the passion of love Now though a man should in some fits of devotion love God with as great a degree of fervor as to passionate sensitive love as some Martyrs have done yet were it possible for him in his judgment to esteem any thing else but equally or never so little more than God such a kind of affection though it were sufficient to make the other a Martyr yet could not preserve him from being an Apostate and renouncer or blasphemer of Religion as a learned Author hath proved more at large nay I add further from the same Author though a man should love God with an equal degree of affection yet because the objects are so infinitely disproportionable and 't is the nature of moral duties to be measured from those motives by which we are to be induced to them therefore of such an one it may be affirmed that he doth not love God He that makes him but equal to any worldly thing may be said infinitely to despise and undervalue him For the further explication of this I shall suggest to you a distinction not commonly if at all taken notice of by others betwixt natural principles and moral duties The misunderstanding of which is the occasion of many difficulties and confusions about this and some other points 1. By natural principles I mean such kind of impressions as are originally stamped upon the nature of things whereby they are fitted for those services to which they are designed in their creation the acts of which are necessary and under no kind of
the Commandments themselves and likewise of our knowleldg and approbation of them namely the practice of holiness and virtue in the conduct of our lives whereby we are to be advanced unto that state of happiness wherein the perfection of our natures and our resemblance of the Deity doth consist And because the best of men do frequently fall short of that obedience which is due to the Laws of God therefore in case of transgression natural light doth direct men to repentance which is an hearty sorrow for our neglects and violations of the Divine Law accompanied with a firm and effectual purpose and resolution of amendment for the future Which though it do suppose the Commandments of God not to have been duly observed yet is it the only remedy left in such cases Some have questioned whether there be any obligation upon us for this by the light of nature partly because the Stoicks deny it and partly because reason will tell a man that it cannot afford any compensation to Divine justice To which I should say That the Stoicks indeed do deny this because it implies passion which their wise man must be without yet they will admit a man to be displeased with himself for any error or mistake which is much the same thing with sorrow though under another name And though this be not enough to satisfie infinite justice yet it is that which reason doth oblige us to We expect from those who offend us that they should profess their sorrow and shame beg pardon and promise amendment And the men of Nineveh did upon a Natural principle betake themselves to this remedy and with good success though they were doubtful of it Who can tell if God will turn and repent This conformity to the Law of God requires a twofold condition Universality Regularity 1. Universality both as to the time and the duties themselves without any such picking and chusing amongst them as may bend the Laws to make them suitable to our own interests and humours 2. Regularity in the due proportioning of our love and zeal and observance according to that difference which there is in the true nature and consequence of the things themselves preferring mercy and obedience before sacrifice and the weighty matters of the Law before tything of mint and cummin righteousness and peace before meat and drink 'T is true the least commandment is not to be neglected as having stamped upon it the autority of the great God But then we are to consider that the same autority by which that is injoined doth oblige us to prefer other things before it So that a man doth disobey in doing a good thing when upon that account he neglects what is far better And the mistake of men about this is the true cause of that which we call Superstition which is one of the opposites to Religion and so destructive to the true nature of it Men being apt to think themselves priviledged for their neglects and failings in some greater matters by their zeal about lesser things Now nothing will contribute more to banish this Superstition out of the world than a sober enquiry into the nature and causes of things whereby we may be able to take a just estimate of their evidence and importance and consequently to proportion our zeal about them I mention this the rather because it hath been by some objected that humane Learning and Philosophy doth much indispose men for this humble submission to Divine Laws by framing their minds to other notions and inclinations than what are agreeable to Religion But that this is a false and groundless prejudice may be made very evident The true knowledg of the nature of things being amongst natural helps one of the most effectual to keep men off from those two extremes of Religion Superstition and Prophaneness 1. For Superstition this doth properly consist in a misapprehension of things placing Religion in such things as they ought not for the matter or in such a degree as they ought not for the measure which proceeds from ignorance 2. For Prophaneness this doth consist in a neglect or irreverence towards sacred things and duties when such matters as ought to have our highest esteem are rendered vile and common And this likewise doth proceed from ignorance of the true nature of things Now one of the best remedies against this is the study of Philosophy and a skill in nature which will be apt to beget in men a veneration for the God of nature And therefore to those Nations who have been destitute of Revelation the same persons have been both their Philosophers and their Priests those who had most skill in one kind of knowledg being thought most fit to instruct and direct men in the other And if we consult the stories of other places and times we shall constantly find those Nations most solemn and devout in their worship who have been most civilized and most philosophical And on the contrary those other Nations in America and Africa whom Navigators report to be most destitute of Religion are withall most brutish and barbarous as to other Arts and knowledg It cannot be denyed indeed but that a slight superficial knowledg of things will render a man obnoxious either to Superstition or to Atheistical thoughts especially if joined with a proud mind and vicious inclinations He that hath made some little progress in natural enquiries and gotten some smattering in the phrases of any Theory whereby as he conceives he can solve some of the common Phaenomena may be apt to think that all the rest will prove as easie as his first beginning seems to be and that he shall be able to give an account of all things But they that penetrate more deeply into the nature of things and do not look upon second causes as being single and scattered but upon the whole chain of them as linked together will in the plainest things such as are counted most obvious acknowledg their own ignorance and a Divine power and so become more modest and humblé in their thoughts and carriage Such inquisitive persons will easily discern as a noble Author hath well expressed it that the highest link of Natures Chain is fastened to Jupiter's Chair This notwithstanding it be a digression I thought fit to say by way of vindication and answer to those prejudices which some men have raised against humane Learning and the study of Philosophy as if this were apt to dispose men unto Atheistical principles and practices Whereas a sober enquiry into the nature of things a diligent perusal of this volume of the world doth of it self naturally tend to make men regular in their minds and conversations and to keep them off from those two opposites of Religion Superstition and Prophaneness CHAP. XVII Of Passive Obedience or Patience and Submission to the Will of God THus much may suffice concerning the nature and duty of Active Obedience I proceed to that of Passive Obedience or patient
commandements is a matter of so great consequence to Humane Nature that 1. The Essence or Being of man may be said to consist in it 2. The great Business or duty of man is to be conversant about it and to labour after it 3. The Happiness or well-being of man doth depend upon it These particulars I shall endeavour to make out by such clear Principles of Reason attested to by several of the wisest Heathen Writers as may be enough to satisfy any serious man who is able to understand the reason and consequence of things and will but attend and consider First Religion is of so great importance that the Essence of man may be said to consist in it Man may be considered under a twofold notion 1. In his single capacity according to that principle whereby he is constituted in such a rank of creatures 2. In Society for which man seems to be naturally designed and without which he could not well subsist Now Religion will appear to be Essential to him in both these respects 1. As considered in his single capacity according to those principles by which he is framed That which doth constitute any thing in its Being and distinguish it from all other things this is that which we call the Form or Essence of a thing Now the things which distinguish Humane Nature from all other things are the chief principles and foundations of Religion namely the Apprehension of a Deity and an expectation of a future state after this life Which no other creature below man doth partake of and which are common to all mankind notwithstanding the utmost endeavours that can be used for the suppressing of them As for what is commonly alledged in the behalf of Reason it may be observed that in the actions of many brate creatures there are discernable some footsteps some imperfect strictures and degrees of Ratiocination such a natural sagacity as at least bears a near resemblance to reason From whence it may follow that it is not Reason in the general which is the Form of Humane nature But Reason as it is determined to actions of Religion of which we do not find the least signs or degrees in Brutes Man being the only creature in this visible world that is formed with a capacity of worshipping and enjoying his Maker Nor is this any new opinion but what several of the antient Writers Philosophers Orators Poets have attested to who make the notion of a Deity and adoration of him to be the true difference betwixt Man and Beast So Tully Ex tot generibus nullum est animal praeter hominem quod habeat notitiam aliquam Dei ipsisque in hominibus nulla gens est neque tam immansueta neque tam fera quae non etiamsi ignoret qualem habere Deum deceat tamen habendum sciat Amongst all the living creatures that are in the world there is none but Man that hath any notion of a Deity and amongst mankind there is no Nation so wild and barbarous but pretends to some Religion whence it should seem that this is the most proper difference betwixt man and beasts And in another place he makes this to be the Character of that Reason which is the Form of man that it is vinculum Dei hominis which imports both name and thing Of the same sense is that of the Satyrist who speaking of Religion and a sense of Divine things saith this of it separat hoc nos A grege mutorum atque ideo venerabile soli Sortiti ingenium divinorumque capaces 'T is this saith he which doth distinguish us from brute creatures That we have souls capable of Divine impressions There are abundance of expressions to this purpose in several other of the Heathen Writers That in Plutarch where he styles irreligion a kind of stupor whereby men are as it were deprived of their senses And in another place he asserts it to be an exceeding improper thing to ascribe true reason to those who do not acknowledg and adore the Deity So again Tully esse Deos qui negat vix eum sanae mentis existimem I can hardly think that man to be in his right mind who is destitute of Religion And in another place of the same Book Quis hunc hominem dixerit c. Why should any one style such an one a man who by what he sees in the world is is not convinced of a Deity and a providence and of that adoration he owes to the Deity Non modo non philosophos sed nec homines quidem fuisse dixerim saith another Men that are destitute of Religion are so far from being learned philosophers that they ought not to be esteemed so much as reasonable men 'T is true nothing is more ordinary than for such persons as are sceptical in these first principles to entertain great thoughts of themselves as if they had considered things more deeply and were arrived unto a higher pitch of reason and wit than others But yet the plain truth is they who have not attained to this conviction of placing their chief interest in being religious they are so far from exceeding others in degrees that they come short of the very nature and essence of men as being destitute of those first Notions concerning truth and falshood good and evil wherein the essence of a rational Being doth consist Besides their palpable deficiency in such plain consequences and deductions of Reason as would become those who in any measure pretend to that principle So that by what hath been said it may appear that the Definition of Man may be rendered as well by the Difference of Religiosum as Rationale As for that inconvenience which some may object That Atheistical and prophane persons will hereby be excluded Why so they are by the other Difference likewise such persons having no just pretence to Reason who renounce Religion And it were well if they might not only be reckoned among Beasts as they are by the Psalmist where he styles them brutish but driven out amongst them likewise and banished from all humane society as being publick pests and mischiefs of mankind such as would debase the nobility of our natures to the condition of brute creatures and therefore are fit only to live amongst them Which brings me to the 2d Consideration of Man as a sociable creature Religion is essential to him in this respect also as being the surest bond to tye men up to those respective duties towards one another without which Government and Society could not subsist There is a remarkable passage in Plutarch to this purpose where he styles Religion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the cement of all Community and the chief Basis of all Legislative power And in another place he says That 't is much more easie to build a City in the open Air without any ground to found it upon than to establish Government without Religion A City saith he may make