exceed's him for placing happinesse as he doth in the enjoyment of this world's contentments Epicurus contemne's and despiseth death and will not allow it to be any evill and dispute's most excellently to prove it is not to be feared for saith he that is not to be feared which hurt 's not a true rule for those things are onely to be feared being absent which when they are present will hurt us Now saith he death hurt 's no man for when death come's man is not therefore not hurt by it It hurt 's neither the living nor the dead saith he not the living for whilst men live death is not not the dead for where death is man is not The force of this Argument is necessary because in all Injuries or hurts that come there must be these two Termes the thing hurting and that hurted but these can never be together death and man now herein he excell's Mr. Hobbes for whether Mr. Hobbes make's man's happinesse to consist in the enjoying the world or in a Complacencie or contentment with other men yet when he make's death so fearfull a thing as he doth it is in vaine for that man to look for happinesse who knowe's he must die when he shall lose this happinesse and he may dy this day and suddenly lose it by that which he and such men make their greatest evill death so that Epicurus and his Sect went beyond Mr. Hobbes and spake more justifiably out of these Principles then he did But Epicurus goe's on and deliver's how these sensuall pleasures are to be preserved by Frugality and temperance two vertues which I cannot find in Mr. Hobbes his whole booke which yet necessarily conduce to the preservation of this felicity Frugality that so the stock may be supported which must maintaine his pleasures Temperance which is a moderate use of them that so he may enjoy them the fuller Frugality preserve's the fuel Temperance the fire and as he speake's the enjoyment of a mans pleasure doth not consist in the use of luxurious superfluities but in the proportion the object hath to the appetite or the necessity of the man who enjoye's it So a hungry needy and necessitous man find's as great pleasure in a Crust of bread and a draught of water as any riotous person doth in his greatest excesse of dainties Now I read in Mr. Hobbes nothing of these two which are as necessary as any for the happinesse which sensuall pleasures can bring to a man and therefore although I thinke this Sect erred as much as any in his moralls yet I thinke likewise that these writers did thinke more truly then he wherein the goodnesse of these vertues of which he speake's consisteth that is making men happy and gave better reasons for what they said then he I have dwelt longer upon this Sect both because few men have described it aright which I have read and likewise because it containing as ill or worse opinions then any other hath suffered most justly under the generall Censure of Writers And although it being a doctrine which flattered our flesh and blood and thereby for a while got a great applause amongst men and the readers of this Philosophy like Ranters in divinity were much followed for a while yet in the passages of an age or two it was cryed down and I know not of any late writers who hath so nearly insinuated his worst opinions as this Author with whom I have to doe unlesse it be the Mahumetans who agree with the Epicureans in this that sensuall pleasure is the happinesse of man but here they differ the Mahumetans make that happinesse eteâ—nall hereafter but Epicurus with whom Mr. Hobbes seeme's to shake hands in this world onely Sect. 11. To discourse of the Stoicke Philosophy were needles because the common Authors which are read by the generality of men as Tully Seneca Epictetus doe manifestly shew how they placed humane happinesse in his owne breast and in his power which is the injoyment of himself without the disturbance of passions And to this end they imposed that impossible meanes of rooting out passions as living onely by reason which certainly if it could be done would make man's life like that of the Angels or his bodily life like his spirituall And these Cardinal vertues Prudence Justice Fortitude Temperance to be the supports of all this worke and that man's happinesse hath no dependence upon any thing without him these certainly carried with them much more perswasive reason to induce the end which these vertues aimed at then any thing Mr. Hobbes hath delivered Then for Aristotle who as appeare's in the tenth of his Ethickes Cap. 7. make's first the happinesse of man to consist in action and that in the noblest action of man which is of man's Understanding then in the excellentest Act of his Understanding which is Contemplation and last of all in the perfectest act of Contemplation which is the Contemplation of God I will not discourse his reasons which were worthy his writing this way A man may be happy alone without any reference to a Common-wealth yea the businesse of publique affaires would but hinder and distract this and throughout that book these vertues are taught in relation of this chief Good of man his happinesse in which he may well rest and seek no further but in his Politiques he shewe's how the same vertues conduce to the publike Mr. Hobbes therefore was much to blame when he in generall passed so weake though cruell a Censure upon the universality of morall Philosophers as to say they did not see wherein the goodnesse of these Vertues they wrote of consisted and his instance is as much to blame which is that Sect. 12. Those Writers place them in the mediocrity of passions as if not the Cause but the Degrees of daring made Fortitude or not the Cause but quantity of a gift made liberality He is mistaken almost in every word he writ First that morall vertue called Iustice is not in the passions nor in any thing thâ—t hath not reason So I may say by prudence nor doe Philosophers say it is nor are many of the lawes of nature as he calle's them written in these inferiour faculties but in the superiour nor doe these men who write of these things so foolishly discourse of those vertues whose nature is busied about the moderating of passions as if there were no more to doe but to bridle a mans passions but then finding it necessary for the attayning man's happinesse in this World that men's passions must be curbed without which like an unruly horse these passions will transport a man to a thousand inconveniencies and not be governed by Reason but runne away with it these vertuous habits subdue those passions that they act so far and no farther then prudence and right Reason shall direct them so that mens passions facilitated by Custome to the yoke are made to stop turne or move
the question is whether that Covenant may lawfully be broke this is no satisfaction to say that there was the same reason not to make the Covenant as to breake it for both may be amisse to make it rashly and to break it rashly and one may be well another ill as to covenant to doe any honest thing the Covenant was good the breach ill So likewise the Covenant may be ill and the breach good as in those examples before instanced in not as it is a 〈…〉 of â—aith but of that wicked bond nay I can shew made a Covenant with another may doe it with an orthodox man or with one not apparent to be other and yet the man afterwards turne heretique or discover his heresy in that case it is not possible for the Covenanter to find the same reason in making as was in breaking his Covenants so that although his Conclusion be true that faith is to be kept with all men yet his foundation and ground upon which he built it was faulty Indeed the ground upon which his conclusion is established is that God is the God of truth that Religion destroye's not but perfects morall vertues amongst which veracity Truth-speaking is a principal one and therefore cannot teach to break faith with any one I would have these men who taught that doctrine consider how it had been possible for the Apostle to have enlarged Christian Religion amongst the Gentiles if they had broached such a doctrine so odious to humanity but they taught the quite contrary as is evident I let it passe and proceed Sect. 2. His application of Iustice and Injustice to men and actions is ingenuous but at the bottome of the page 74. he endeavours to shew that sometimes dammage is done to one when the Injury is done to another As when the Master commands his Servant to give mony to a Stranger if it be not done the Injury is done to the Master whom he had before Covenanted to obey but that dammage redoundeth to the stranger to whom he had no obligation this is handsome but a little too fine for I am perswaded that no dammage can be where is no losse losse cannot be where a thing is not had he that hath nothing can lose nothing for his instance the Stranger had right to his Master's kindnesse and the same bond which tyed the Servant to obey his Master in that command obliged him likewise to give it to the stranger and that bounty of the Master so justly entitled the stranger to it as that Servant who defrauded him of it is bound in Conscience to make him restitution afterwards for that injury He hath another instance by which he endeavour's to illustrate this proposition at the top of 75 page In commonwealths private men may remit to one another their debts but not robberyes or other violences whereby they are endammaged how doth this prove that injury may be done to one and the dammage to another any man may forgive or remit any dammage or injury no dammage without Injury so far as it concerne's himselfe but not wherein it concerne's another nor doth his following reason speak any more Because saith he the detayning of debt is an Injury to themselves but Robbery and violence are injuries to the Person of the Common-wealth So then it seemâ—s by him that dammage is not without Injury when the Common-wealth is dammaged it is injured where a private man is dammaged he is injured either of these may remit those dammages or Injuries are done to them and their parts in the same act when one and the same act doth often endammage and injure both but neither can justly intermeddle with the other's interest Sest 3. He proceed's Iustice of actions is by writers divided into Commutative and Distributive This distinction he censure 's I shall censure him for it but before I doe that that my judgement may appeare more cleare when it is applyed to the several particulars I will permit an explication of that division how it is understood by the consent of those he call's writers which are Schoolemen Casuists and Morall Philosophers Thus they discourse of Iustice Iustice of actions is either in the actâ—ons of a particular relating to the whole body of the Common-wealth or of the body or whole to parâ—iculars or of particulars one to anoâ—her The first â—hey call Communis Iustiâ—ia or legalis common or legall Justice Common because it concerne's the community and legall because it hath the same intent with all Lawes which is the publike benefit or else because it is required by the law of that nation or some Aphorisme of the law of nature which dictâ—te's that the whole should be preserved rather then any particular of this sort are the performance of those duties and services which are required by â—he lawes of the Land as the repaires of High-wayes paying publick Taxes in to the Exchequer yea to expose a man's life to danger for the publick good and preservation of either Church or State The second sort of the whole to particulars is that they call Distributive justice which is apparent in the rewarding and punishing of men and in this is required a Geometrical proportion which require's four tearms as thus such a proportion as two hath to four hath three to six it is just half or such as six hath to eight fifteen hath to twenty it is three parts of four thus when a Parish relieve's the poor wâ—th the publick Stock such a family as hath three bed-rid people in it must have treble the relief of that which hath but one out of the publick Stock So in disposing Offices it is justice that he who merit 's accordingly should be exalted to dignity and rewards proportionable he who hâ—th merit for a Captain a Captain 's place a Colonel a Colonel's and so in all professions and it is not justly done in him who hath the dispensation of these Dignities to give the lesse worthy the place of more worth and the more worthy the place of less worth The third kind is of particular men one with another and this they tearm Commutative Justice which consist's in exchanges and the trade and negotiation one man hath with another to this they assign the measure Arithmetical which is so much as the other five for five he who hath right to five shillings must have five shillings and no more he who hath so much dammage must in justice have so much satisfaction and no more without any consideration of merit or demerit vertue or vice a shilling's worth of work must be payd with a shilling this is the generall Doctrine which is delivered by Writers concerning Justice Let us see what he except's What he writ is not true Justice of Actions is not by Writers divided into Commutative and Distributive when he saith Justice of Actions he must understand Justice in its generall notion which by the consent of all Writers is first
should think to perswade a man not onely against his own eyes but all the eyes in the world and all the reason too but his owne Well I conceive this is enough for these two Propositions That colour is not the Apparition of that motion and that colour is a reall thing in this object These two passed Propositions are such wherein I have disputed with Master Hobbes no man that I ever read of opposing my conclusions but himself Sect. 3. In the next I find various opinions among Scholars which if he would have studied although not for truth but to maintain his own opinion onely although against truth which I doubt he unluckily affects he might have found much more probable reasons for what he affirms then any produced by him The conclusion defended by him and denyed by me is That colour and light are the same thing this he demonstrates thus towards the later end of the 8. num where before Their difference being onely this that when the light cometh directly from the fountain to the eye or indirectly by reflection from clean and polite bodies and such as have not inward particular motion internal to alter it we call it light but when it cometh to the eye by reflâ—ction from uneven rough and course bodies or such as are affected with internal motion of their own to alter it then we call it colour colour and light differing onely in this that the one is pure the other perturbed light Although to deny is answer sufficient enough for all is said there being no proof but as if he were another Moses he delivers his Philosophy as authentique coming from his mouth without any arguments although against the opinions of the whole world yet I will in little lay open some weaknesses in these expressions First think what he meanes by inward particular motion internal to alter light certainly unlesse he meanes the causes of colour which must be against himself I know not what it can be and then inward motion internall which should have power to alter light which is external to that body was an uneven and course kind of expression if it express any thing but the weaknesse of the whole appeares to any man that hath eyes for whereas he saith when it cometh to the eye by reflection from uneven rough and course bodies or such c. there we call it colour speaking of light I say let it come from the most even most clean and polite bodies that can be imagined that Nature or Art have made as Brasse Silver Gold yea heaven it self we call it colour as one Star is red another more white and therefore this Gentleman is either mistaken or would deceive in the usage of speech His conclusion it self may be thus overthrown Sect. 4. That which exists when there is no light that cannot be the same thing with light But colour exists where there is no light ergo colour is not the same with light The major is evident because the same cannot be and not be at the same time which would be true if at the same time colour and light being the same colour should be and light not The minor will be proved thus Colours are in the dark where light is not that will be proved because at night when light leaves our Horizon yet the colours remaine the same they were before and that is proved because when light although another light is brought to them yet they are and they apppear the same they were before Now we have an Axiom in nature and to be over-master'd and check'd by nothing but divine power à privatione ad habitum non datur regressus there is no recalling a word that is spoke no making that not done which is once done not making that up individually and compleatly the same which is destroyed no restoring a forme and being once lost now this being the same it was and appearing so at the coming of the second light which it was at the manifestation of the first it is evident that the light did not give this colour its being but onely the manifestation of its being and this colour was something besides light which was made appear by light I know not what can be answered to this any further Again I can dispute thus That which opposeth light cannot be the same with light but some colours oppose light Ergo The major appeares because nothing opposeth it self the minor is thus illustrated because black opposeth light for light hath an affinity with white and black with darknesse so that such Stars which have not something to vary their representation to us appear white and so do candles and these white things amongst us have something of light in them and great affinity to it and therefore are better discerned with a weak and evening light then darker Clouds are So likewise black hath an affinity with darknesse which is the total privation of light insomuch as a shadow which is a partiall privation of light in a particular place is black intentionally black as I shall discourse hereafter It is true that neither black nor any colour can be seen without light no more can a shadow but dark and black colours and shadowes do oppose light which is a kind of white when in reality it is in its own subject as the Sun or Star or Candle This certainly joyned to what went before may serve for my last Proposition But because there are other Opposers of this conclusion besides himself now I am in I will speak something to their arguments CHAP. V. The reality of colour vindicated by intentional colours and species Sect. 1. THe first and chiefest I find is because colours without light are visible only Potentia only indeed visible but reduced into act and seen by being enlightned so that then by this light they are reduced into act and therefore light is their form For answer to this argument we must know that the being and nature of things consists not in their second acts as they are called which are their operations but in their first acts which give them their abilities to work and they are distinguished by their abilities to operate when time and other opportunities and accommodations are offered not by their operations themselves Thus vegetative creatures are distinguished from things inanimate not by their operations of growth or generation for then they should not be vegetable creatures in Winter but by their abilities to grow or generate when their season is offered and as their abilities distinguish them from others so amongst themselves their several species natures or kinds are distinguished by their abilities to produce several sorts of things by those operations not by the operations themselves so it is in all things the abilities to sense not the act of sensation make an Animal the abilitie to discourse not the act makes the man for else a beast should not be a beast when he
is asleep nor a man a man when he is either asleep or a child I could instance in all things quantities qualities whatsoever This explains and answers this argument although colour cannot actually be seen in the dark yet that concerns not the nature but the operation of colours their second act not their first they have in them a power of being seen upon occasions and opportunities even when they are in the dark darknesse to them is like Winter to vegetals like sleep to beasts like infancy to man and as well may they say that the springing weather which reduceth the tree to grow is the tree that the stroak or blow which wakened the sleepy Lion is the Lion that act which inabled the child first to discourse is the man as this light the colour because of its awaking it to an actual emission of species or being seen Sect. 2. Another main argument which is urged against the distinction betwixt light and colour is thus formed There is the same reason of all colours as colours as of any but we know that some colours are nothing but light reflected therefore we may conclude the same of all The major it self stands upon its own strength by that word as colours for where there is the same being there is the same reason or cause of that being The minor is exemplified in the colours of Pidgeons necks in those colours made by a glasse of Red-wine set upon a white cloth when a great light or the Sun shines upon the Wine it will give an eye of red to the white cloth which is under it as likewise the Sun shining through the coloured glasse these are real colours but are nothing but light variously reflected therefore there are colours which are nothing but light Sect. 3. For answer to this we may say to the major that there is the same reason of all colours as colours which are reall colours and material but that there should be the same reason and nature with them and intentionall apparent or spiritual colours for by these names they are called there being but a nominal and some outward circumstantive convenience only is very illogically spoken as if one should say that a living and painted or dead horse were the same and had the same nature To shew the convenience and difference of these from real colours observe that they both are the object of the sight that when the eye sees that broken light through the red glasse it sees a thing for what is not cannot be the object of sense and because it is seen it is not unjustly called a colour for colour is the object of sight and in that actual relation to the sight they have both one common nature but here is the difference that to the one light gives its being to the other onely its being seen for the light falling thick in with that species and images sent forth in their first and strongest emission when they come immediately from the object it mingles with them and gives them a lustre from it selfe which is a shining colour but in all real colours the light adds nothing but a making of them fit to be actually seen and that they are one real the other intentional colours appeares by this that the real are inherent in the object which is their subject and so the white of this paper I write upon is inherent in it and is moved with the motion of this paper which is the object of my sight at this time but red which falls from the glasse of wine upon a white cloth or these colours on Pidgeons necks move not with the cloth or the Pidgeon for take the Pidgeon out of the flaring light and you shall see onely his reall colours and remove the white cloth and it retaines onely its whiteness which is the inherent colour and the intentionall colour follows the glass and light not its subject so that here we find the perfect nature of a reall absolute inherent accident in the one and but of an intentional relative adherent accident in the other And here appeares a diverse nature in these two sorts of colours they differ in their reall nature although they agree in the relative and you may see it further illustrated thus The same thing cannot at the same time have two real colours red and white but the white cloth though shadowed with red from the wine is white at that time it is so shadowed which appears because remove the shadowing body onely which is the glasse and there is the same whiteness without any alteration or motion in the cloth and therefore it was the same before but onely received an eye of red from the glasse This may serve for the major that there is the same reason of all colours I say all reall not intentionall and reall Secondly to the minor that must prove that these intentional colours doe not differ from the light which I deny for although light is an ingredient in the constitution of them yet it is not the total no not refracted light but as it mixeth with divers colours so it appears diversly and then as you cannot say a book is nothing but paper or paper inked but a paper written or printed as a medicine cannot be said to be Rubarb although Rubarb be in it when there are many other ingredients and perhaps others more predominant So is it with this matter although these intentional colours have light in them yet they are something else besides light And thus superabundantly this latter part concerns not his book nor indeed had he erred in this conclusion onely that light is colour would I have censured him he had learned men in the same cause engaged with him but when he thought this should countenance these other Propositions that there was nothing but an apparition of motion Secondly that colour was no reall thing in the object which was abhorring to all sense and teason that was ever bestowed upon these things finding it in the lump and thinking it a mistake have wasted this paper about it Sect. 4. But I have not yet finished this businesse in the latter end of his first chapter of his Leviathan he saith That the Philosophy Schools throughout christendome grounded upon some Texts of Aristotle teach another doctrine from him and say for the cause of vision the thing seen sendeth forth a visible species in English a visible shew apparition or aspect the receiving whereof is sight c. This I must censure and say that I think that scarce any Philosophie-School teacheth this conclusion that the receiving the species is sight but the judgment of the soul upon the receipt for receipt is a meer passive thing but all the language in the world makes to see an active verb if receipt of the species should make sight then a Looking-glass would see for that receives the species and truly the eye is a kind of animate Looking-glass as a
Looking-glass an inanimate eye but the difference lies in the activity of the soul which animates the eye but not the Looking-glasse But he is angry with the conceit of species and would have men believe that that opinion so universally held is founded only upon some Texts of Aristotle but I will tell him it is not so founded upon Texts as if his onely authority had gained the general esteem which that truth hath obtained upon mens judgments but the reasons of him and his followers which this Gentleman should have endeavoured to have answered and not have thought that his bare credit with scorning it should prevaile against Christendom But that a Reader may take notice of some of these reasons and not trouble himself to peruse other books I will set down one or two which may suffice Sect. 5. The first reason of Aristotle is drawn from our experience thus We all observe that when we have discerned things by our senses and the act of sensing pardon that word sensing it is unusuall yet significant is done yet there remains in the sensative memory that image which represented the object at the first now it is impossible that that should be any material corporeal thing for then how could so many huge Towers Castles Towns Kingdoms yea heaven it self if a material heaven remaine crowded in so narrow a compass how could such contraries as black and white hot and cold fire and water high and low remaine in that little Ark of mans memory if they were material and reall things they could not but being spiritual intentional and things as Philosophers speak diminutae entitatis they make a shift with their little entities to creep into such a corner And this confounds likewise another Proposition of his that the reception of these species makes sense for these entities are received and retained and kept fast in that box which received them the memory but are not sense any longer then they are hot and fresh from the object well then there must be such things as these species or else there could be no memory of the object which in a material condition could not exist in the memory A second argument may be drawn from another experiment suppose Aristotle looks upon Plato Aristotle cannot see his own face but in Plato's eyes he can how can that come about but that some intentional species and image of him crept into Plato's eye a material thing could not it must be an intentionall for any material thing would be offensive to Plato's eye nor could it be that Gamboll he talks of so much a stroak from the object for then it must have made Plato see Aristotle not Aristotle himself according to his Philosophy A third argument I can frame thus Every object which is distant from the organ must some way or other make it self reach the organ with its own likeness but for a reall passage of colours or such like objects there can be no imagination there are but two wayes either by the propagation of this image intentionally through the whole medium which therefore is not discerned in its passage through the ayr because the motion is extreamly swift like the passage of light instantaneal and because untill it meets with an eye or glasse or something proper to give it a receipt it hath no pause for a consideration This is the most common way of Philosophers or else it must be by some seminal vertue which it sends abroad which when it finds a womb fit to entertain it there is prolifical and produceth this image and therefore in that regard may be called species because it is such in semine Now if it should be objected that if it were the seed of colours like the seed of plants it would produce a thing of the same nature a reall colour not an intentionall It is answered that second qualities are like equivocal agents they cannot produce their own nature like Mules and the Monsters of Nile the furthest they goe is their image a colour doth not get a colour of its own nature as heat doth heat nor can you make one thing white by putting another white thing to it unlesse you add some of that white body to the other This conceit hath much pleased me and I think would meet with all objections but I am not peremptory in it because I cannot afford my self leasure to spend so much time about such a youthfull study but howsoever one of these wayes I conjecture whosoever shall think that the object works upon the sense 〈◊〉 conceive it and therefore these species There are many other arguments used by Philosophers the least of which he hath not touched but controuleth them with only It is otherwise I will now leave this and come to his fourth and last Proposition in his Humane Nature where before numb 9. CHAP. VI. Concerning Echoes production of sounds and external objects c. HIs Proposition is That as in conception of Vision so also in conceptions that arise from the other senses the subject of their inherence is not the subject I think it false printed he means sure the object but the Sentient Sect. 1. This Proposition is delivered in a strange fallacious way for whereas his whole discourse and intent is to prove that sound as well as colour is not in the object but in the sentient as with colour he joyned images So in this Proposition which concerns other senses he leaves out the object and onely names the conception It is undoubtedly true that the conception is in that part which conceives not the conceived but the business which he labours to prove and is in questâ—oâ— betwixt him and me is Whether there be any thing conceived out of the Sentient in the object he sayes no and labours to prove it Nu. 9. Sect. 2. The first argument he proves this by is drawn from sounds and in them from ecchoes A man saith he may heare double or treble by multiplication of ecâ—â—â—es which ecchoes saith he are sounds as well as the oâ—â—ginal and not being in one and the same place cannot be inherent in the body that maketh them This argument receives its answer variously from Philosophers according to their divers conceits of the nature of sounds for such as conceive sounds to be carried in their real nature by the motion of the ayr to the organ of sense these conclude an eccho to be a new sound propagated by the former differing from the first individually not naturally we may call it if you will another of the same as some Psalms of Hopkins and Sternholds Translation So that as we see musical instruments two in the same room one Violl touched the other out of harmony of parts being fitted and prepared for such a motion and sound receives the same and that sound is the first but a little softer which in a whispering place as I have observed at Gloucester Church it would
of it do you think he would believe him But by this Doctrine he hath one evasion which I know not what to say to that is when I shall charge him with it he can reply it was onely an apparition of such an opinion or discourse but no such discourse I can prove it no other way but that these eyes of mine shewed it me in a book under his name called Humane Nature or another called Leviathan Sect. 9. But this being only a negative conclusion he proceeds further to a positive thus The things that really are in the world without us are those motions by which these seemings are caused Surely there was never heard or read so much nonsense and yet it tastes not of folly but a kind of madnesse or else he thinks the world is mad to receive such incredible fancies without colour of reason Is all without us nothing but motion Is the standing still of the earth nothing but motion Is the thing that moves nothing but motion motion moves somwhat that is not motion if so what doth it move whatsoever moves moves something and if that were motion the question goes on infinitely unless we find somthing to be moved which is not motion substances bodies c. are not motion rest is not motion much less are they these motions by which these seemings are caused I discern a stone hard cold heavy by sense are these things yea the stone it self for so they term the things that really involves it nothing but those motions by which they appeare These things confute themselves and yet I may go further many of these representations apparitions seemings are without motion in the object the house standing still unmoved sends forth its image to my eye without motion for all motion is but of six kinds generation and corruption about substances augmentation and diminution about quantities alteration about qualities lation or local motion about place he can find none of these in this house neither in its substance quantitie quality place but the motion is in mine eye no such thing neither mine eye is changed none of these wayes only an image brought to it which is undiscernable by any sense but it self neither is the power of the soul moved which then proceeds to discern the object for it is the same power it was before without any real alteration or change for it hath the same abilities it had neither more nor lesse but it is true there is an internal immament act which results out of that power without any motion or if it may in an improper and forced way be halled into the notion of motion in some unused acceptation yet this must be an internal motion within its self none of those things he speaks of a motion Much of this is needlesse that which sufficeth to shew the weaknesse of his reasoning is to shew that there are hundreds of things discerned by us which are not motions and that is most apparent He proceeds And this is the great deception of sense which also is by sense to be corrected If it were true that this were a deception I should think it a great one yea the most universal deception that ever was in the world but how it shall be corrected by sense that were worth the observing He hath shewed it thus For as sense telleth me when I see directly the colour seemeth to be in the object so also sense telleth me when I see by reflexion that colour is not in the object Sect. 10. First of all observe that if this were true yet being but a particular instance he cannot deduce that generall conclusion out of it concerning all sights much lesse concerning all other senses then observe upon a direct sight he puts onely a seeming to be in the object but upon a reflex peremptorily that it is not in the object when certainly a direct sight shews its object more clearly then any reflex But now to his instance why doth a reflex shew it not to be in the object he sets not down but perhaps he may say in a glass the image may seeme to be in the glasse and not in the object I say the image that which represents the object is there and I have known a Robin Red-breast fighting with his own shadow in a glasse To this I answer that the sight judgeth of colours and therein is not deceived when the distance is not too great nor the organ or medium ill disposed for that is its proper object over which it hath power to judg but in such things as are a common object to it and other senses it is easily mistaken of which kind are figures greatnesse or littleness distance of place and many the like Thus it mistakes the distance of the Moone from the earth the bigness of the stars but then besides these common objects there are other which are objectum per accidens as Logicians an object not out of its own nature affecting that act or faculty in its self but by reason of some other thing to which it is annext or happens to be joyned so we may say we see Socrates or Plato when we see them not but their colour and that colour of theirs is the onely thing by which they are discerned by sight Now there are mighty mistakes in our senses concerning these so when we see one man's cloaths worne by another we think him at the first to be the man whose cloaths he weares so when we see that man to have a red who had a pale face we think him not the same man My opinion of this mistake is because although the vision of the colour is an act of sight yet the applying that colour to the person seemes to be an act of reason a work out of the reach of pure sense This by the way of explication to make all plain that the Reader may the fuller apprehend my answer to this objection punctually then I answer first that there is no such judgment of sense as to say that colour is not in the object for although sense perhaps can onely discern the colour in the glass yet sense meddles not with that question whether the same colour can be in two subjects much less whether this be a real colour in the glasse or whether an intentional or whether it be in the glass or not but if it do meddle with this last yet in that speech which sayes it is in the glasse sense meddles beyond its sphere it judgeth in a cause which belongs not to its Judicature that may be disputed by reason between him and me and sense may give in evidence concerning what it knows circumstantially conducing to the truth but cannot judg of it it is not its proper object so then to say sense sees it in a glass therefore there is no colour in the object is vaine to reason which can discerne that every accident follows its subject remove the glass from the
before kept them from their natural places And thus natural bodies of Animals expell those hurtful poysonous things which the strength of their natural constitution can master and thus all things when they are beset with any ill which they can overcome change themselves Thus it appeares that as his Conclusions were erronious so his Reasons and Foundations upon which he built them were weak that nothing can change its self What he adds of mens measuring other things by themselves must be affirmed of Fools for I dare say he never read Philosopher write so CHAP. VIII Of Appetite and Knowledge how wisely methoded by God in all creatures to the effecting his ends ENough I think is said to that but in the latter end of this Introduction I conceive it such he seems to scorn that received Opinion That heavy things move downward out of an appetite to rest and to conserve their nature c. ascribing saith he appetite and knowledge of what is good for their preservaion which is more then man has to things inanimate absurdly Thus he Sect. 1. This Proposition I censure and shall shew first that there is such a thing then answer his objection Appetite may be distinguished into Natural and Rationall Natural is the bent the disposition every thing hath to the preservation of its self as it is a particular body or the generality of the Universe as it is a part of the whole Rational appetite is that which a thing hath out of the knowledge it hath of the goodnesse and fitnesse which a thing hath for him who doth desire it Now that there is such an appetite which we call natural in every thing which hath not reason is apparent in every such thing so that no man can give any account of such actions but by the appetite As Why should the Foxes have holes and the Fowls of the Air have nests wherein they may lay up and preserve their young but this that they have an appetite to preserve them so likewise to come lower to his instance Why do heavy things fall downeward after they have been forced upwards but that they would preserve themselves nay to see these two appetites in the same man will make it more evident Every man findes in himself besides those politique designs which he hath upon study and arise out of reason natural desires and appetites of Meat and Drink and this against his reasonable appetite for when his Reason upon grounds of Physick directs him not to eat and upon the controul of Reason he denies himself Meat yet he cannot choose but by his natural appetite desire Meat so likewise he hath a natural appetite to live even when Reason shews him it is fit for him to dye and to fall downwards even when he would mount upward Thus we see there are appetites in irrational things and the irrational part in man which is not rational and these cross appetites make great contestation in man about his actions and sometimes the subjâ—ct natural Appetite doth so powerfâ—lly take up Arms against its supreme the reasonable Appetite that it conquers the reasonable Appetite according to that famous Speech of Medéa so much honoured both amongst Schools Divines and Philosophers Video meliora proboque Deteriora sequor I see what is good and in my reason approve it but act what in reason I detest This invincibly shews this Appetite and that there is even in Natural things which have not the use of reason an appetite to satisfie themselves in what some way or other is good for them Now then I will come to the Answer of that Objection of his which he makes with scorne that saith he they ascribe appetite and knowledge to things inanimate which is more then man hath Sect. 2. The negative piece which saith which is more then man hath is very false for although by reason of his corrupt will Man sometimes mistakes ill for Good Good for ill and prosecutes these things accordingly yet he doth not this as a Man but as a depraved man and either in things which belong to his Election having an indifferent nature or else out of some predominant passion within him which as it draws his Will so it blinds oftentimes his Understanding or else when there is a disguise put upon the Objâ—ct which makes it appear other then it is but Man as Man hath abilities both to know and prosecute what is Good and he alwayes doth desire what is Good at the least apparent nor can he do otherwise Sect. 3. For the affirmative part that they ascribe to inanimate things appetite and Knowledge c. I could answer out of my former distinction that they do not ascribe a rational but a natural appetite which many times is agaâ—nst reason as I have shewed but because we see in unreasonable Animals Swallows not only building but fortifying their nests with such choise and selected Materials and those so artificially plastered together as although Man may imitate yet he cannot equal the ingenuity of the work because we observe Bees with such Wonderfull industry gathering and in such a constant method contriving the disposure of that harvest they lay up against the hard time of Winter with multitudes of such things which may amaze and draw the wit of man to admiration rather then to contention to compare because in the inferiour things we find such a consent and cooperation to the general good of the Universe as can be parallel'd by no heroick vertue of any Roman or Romance that constantly the very Plebeians of the world the meanest creatures do expose themselves to a certain ruâ—n for the publike good as water ascends air descends to its own destruction to avoid vacuity when we shall consider how as in Noahs aâ—k for the preservation of their species the wolf and lamb the lion and the bull the horse and the beare the hawke and the Partridge live in peace so for the same intention fire and water heat and cold the greatest enemies in the World meet and inhabit and live quietly and harmoniously together in the same body I cannot chuse but adde that there is the same hand and providence disposing one as did the other and so will inlarge my answer to an exposition of this businesse Sect. 4. First then consider that when God the Great Natura naturans as the Philosopher calls him at the first made all the creatures in the world he gave each of them their several beings and natures which were the principles of all their operations which according to those beings they produced not as he in his Introduction to his Leviathan began with somewhat too high a line Nature the Art whereby God hath made and governs the world certainly if it were lawfull to call that infinite wise counsel of Gods Will whereby he worketh all things and made and governs the World an Art yet we could not call that Art Nature for Nature is a thing made
betwixt the motion of the water which stayes a little while after the stone is stopt and this remaining of the Image that motion of sense is nulled and therein a quiescence of that act but as in all other Causes which are not necessary to the preservation as well as the producing their effects so here when the cause is gone the effect remains the Image apprehended in sense and then it hath no other convenience with that Motion then any other Cause Sect. 3. I râ—jâ—ct not his Etymologie but deny his Deduction Therâ—fore saith he Imagination is nothing but decaying Sence For although Imagination may be derived from Image yet it is something besides sense in its full notion for sense is the meer judgment upon a present Object but Imagination works upon an absent every Sense judgeth of a particular sensative Object so sight of Colours hearing of Sounds c. and no other but Fancy so here I involve the common sense with it because he excludes it and I will multiply no controversie judgeth of all senses and distinguisheth them This is visible this Audible yea conjoynes them together and makes a Composure sometimes for pleasure sometimes for grief of divers of them which sense cannot do sight cannot judge or act any way upon sounds or the ear upon colours as is evident a deaf man though seeing cannot hear yet if ever he did hear his fancy can imagine sounds So that imagination must needs be somthing besides decaying sense which operates where and when Sense cannot and is an act upon that which is the relick of Sense when Sense hath done its work there remains the Species which the Object sent forth and upon this Species the power of imagination works its proper operations Decaying Sense supposeth Sense to be but imagination works when Sense is not as upon Colours when the man that hath seen is blind afterwards there is not the sense of seeing but there is in that man an imagination of colours which he hath but cannot now see So in the dark men imagine colours but can see none I conclude therefore that imagination is something beside sense which exists when sense faileth Sect. 4. He goes on The decay of sence in man saith he waking is not the decay of the motion made in sence but an obscuring of it This I apprehend most untrue for when the Organ ceaseth to judge that motion which he calleth sence ceaseth and is no longer but those Species lie lockt up in the Memory and there is no act of sensation concerning them no not a decayed one That Philosophy which he delivers concerning the Sun and the Stars to illustrate this by I grant that the Stars do emit and send forth their Light when the Sun shineth but the excess of the Suns Light obscures that of the Stars yet his Application of it to this purpose is utterly vain for there both the Objects work like Natural Agents according to their utmost and the greater by its force masters the lesse but here in our businesse the Object is removed or the Organ and there is no operation of one upon the other at all the species being crept within the Organ the eye cannot judge of it and the object or Organ being diverted or indisposed cannot produce such an act any longer it is as if the Stars were removed out of the Heaven not shining with the Sun so that we fancy colors in the dark when no strength of another Object more powerfull doth work upon our sense and sometimes in the dark we do not imploy our Imaginations about colours and yet in that dark we have no vehement Object to obscure our fancy so that it is not the suppression or weakning of sense by another Object which maketh us not see but the cessation of sense by the removal of either Organ or Object one from another And again we may observe that although the Sun shine and the Objects external move never so powerfully yet the fancy is busied about some internal conceit or other things absent which could not be if only the vehement stroakes from the object did produce this act for then that being the fancy should likewise be Sect. 5. After this weak Discourse he draws a conclusion thus From whence it follows that the longer the time is after the sight or sense of any object the weaker is the imagination This hath some Truth in it but is not absolutely true for many instantly upon sight or hearing of a thing have no apprehension of it as we say it comes in at one eare and goes out at another men carelesly taking notice of it like a thing not heeded or cared for lose it presently we conceiving the memory like a Box which keeps these Images may apprehend attention like a Key to it which locks them up in that Box. Or apprehending the memory like wax we may imagine attention like that force which presseth these Images into it but without attention any sensitive object though discerned is lost immediately and doth not stay for time to weaken or wear it out when contrariwise it often happens that a thing long time forgot and not thought on may be reviv'd and quickned again and remain more lively in the fancy then things of a much later birth as I remember Seneca speaks of himself and I think most men may find in themselves to be true that the things which he learned when he was a child did stick faster and fresher in his memory then those things which he learned but a little before so that although there may be some truth in this that often it happens out that time wears out the sense or conceit of a thing yet because there are many other things conducing to the preservation and destruction of conceptions besides time therefore this is not universally true as he proposeth it yet should not have been censured by me but because it seems to conduce to the illustration of what went before which was an Errour not to be swallowed down Sect. 6. I let pass what is between and come to the upshot This decaying sense saith he when we would expresse the thing it self I mean fancy its selfe we call Imagination This that he calls decaying sense I confesse we call Imagination but I have shewed it not to be sense therefore not decaying sense But saith he when we would expresse the decay and signifie that the Sense is fading old and past we call it Memory Here are dâ—vers words of most distinct nature hudled together to confound the Reader old and past many things are now past yet not old and those past things although but just now are remembred although not old Then saith he Imagination and Memory are one thing which for divers considerations hath divers Names I deny that they are the same thing and prove it thus Sect. 7. They who have divers acts which cannot be performed by each other are not the
same thing for powers are distinguished by their Acts and Objects but imagination and memory are such therefore they are not the same The major hath its proof and illustration already the minor shall be thus confirmed first imagination is busied about and acts things which come not into the reach of memory as â—oyning two things together a horse and a man it makes a centaure this presently after he applyes to imagination which he calls compounded imagination now these two although in their parts they were discerned by sense before and wrapt up in the memory yet conjoyned together having been never in the sense cannot be in the memory unlesse after they were framed by the fancy the sensitive memory but are the fruits of imagination only so likewise we may say that there are many things in the memory which are not imagined when they are in the memory as thus The memory is like a Book in which those things which are attentively perceived by sense are by that attention ingraved or lockt up as was before exprest or written in it imagination is that internall eye which reads this book and sometimes reads one word somtimes another Now as it happens out that there are many things in the book which the eye sees not yea it cannot see all things at once so it is in the memory it is impossible that the Fancy should read half those things which are writ in the Memory many things are there which cannot be looked upon all at once and perhaps sometimes will never be fancied again or imagined yet are in the Memory and therefore certainly where there are so distinct acts and Objects the things themselves are distinguished for we never say a man imagineth any thing of which he hath not an actuall conception nor that he remembreth any thing by a sensative Memory of which he hath formerly had no sense so that those are as much distinguished in and by their Acts and Objects as any two Faculties can be Sect. 8. What he saith presently after That much memory or memory of many things is called Experience is not true in those general terms which he proposeth for Memory of many things maketh not Experience but Memory of many things alike so that he that shall remember that fire burnt his hand water washt it that this lump of lead felt heavy teat Bladder of Air Light makes not an Experimentall conclusion from such remembrances of either heat or weight or lightnesse but when he shall find that this Air and all he meets with this Lead and many others are such then he hath Experience and by Experience he knows that it is so with all other if he shall reply and produce common language that we usually say that we had once Experience of such or such a passage and therefore one tryal and sense with remembrance of it makes an experience I answer That experience in a late way of acceptation is so used for a particular apprehension with remembrance but because experience is the mother of knowledge and one Swallow assures us not of a Summer nor doth one Conception give us the certainty of any Science therefore the proper way of taking experience is from the particular knowledge of many individuums of the same nature and in that sense he must take it because else in vain he defined it the Memory of many things and should have rather said It is the remembrance of any thing And yet give me leave to interpose my conceit which is that Experience is not rightly termed Memory of one thing or many for Memory contains many things at quiet in it which yet are not experiments until applyed to something else either in speculation or practice so that when we call precedent examples for rules of future practice we rub up our memories to see what provision is in that Storehouse to furnish us with directions in our businesse at hand and when we find things of like nature these are called Experiments But this being but a nominal discourse as much of that which follow I might have saved as I shall do such things and have suffered him to beguile any man with it for it is not material whether true or false only I have hinted out the commonest way of speaking concerning experiments and the usefullest I skip now to the 6 pag. of the 2. Chap. CHAP. X. The origine of Dreams their variety c. WHerein impertinently I think to his maine purpose in that Chap. he entreth into a long discourse of Dreams which because it seems to squint at other matters besides this in hand I shall with brevity censure as most unsatisfactory and very erroneous First then he saith there That because the Brain and Nerves are so benummed in the sleep as not easily to be moved by the action of external Objects there can happen in sleep no imagination and therefore no dreams but what proceed from agitation of the inward parts of a mans body Sect. 1. This I conceive erroneous in that latitude of terms which he useth for no doubt there are many Prophetick Dreams concerning which the Scripture both the Old and New Testament are full of Instance as Gen. 40. the Butler and Baker had Prophetick Dreams so likewise Gen. 41. Pharaoh had a Prophetick Dream such another you may find Dan. 2. of Nebuchadnezzer In the New Testament we may observe in the 1. Chap. of S. Mat. v. 20. How an Angel appeared to Joseph in a dream so likewise S. Paul Acts 16.9 Now these and many more which the Scripture and story furnish us withall and we are bound to believe do shew us that there are dreams which arise not from the agitation of the inward parts there being nothing in them that could prognostick any such thing and therefore this Universal Proposition Thâ—re can be no dream but such was a fault not to be pardoned He spake much better in his Humane Nature Cap. 3. Num. 3. where he saith That the Causes of Dreams if they be natural are the Actions or Violence of the inward Parts That Parenthesis if they be natural stopt a great gap for these instances were not natural It was much he should correct the first Copy making it more erroneous error it had before but the rent in his Leviathan was made wider then in his first piece of Humane Nature Sect. 2. Error it had before it was not true to say that all natural dreams come from the agitation of the inward parts for as the greatest Philosopher that was meer man Solomon expresseth it Eccles. 5.3 A Dream cometh through the multitude of businesse not onely when the inward parts of a man are unquiet and violent but even then when they are in the best Composure if a Man have his Fancy disturbed with earnestnesse of thoughts about any businesse in the day in the Night when he takes his rest and both the Outward and Inward Senses are lockt up by Sleep his Fancy being
And each of these besides that general nature of a sensitve soul in which they all agree must have some particular soul or substantial difference in that soul by which each of these is distinguished from the rest Now this whatsoever it is which I find not named by Philosophers but whatsoever this is it must be the Author of those actions which belong to each and these peculiar fancies which do appear in some with a great resemblance of wit of ingenuity of docibility of stupidity and blockishnesse in others and this quality as natural is propagated throughout the whole kind or species failing in very few particulars in some degrees onely And when the peculiar property of any Animal advanceth the condition of it to act like those of men this in them is called by Philosophers as I remember Sagacity and will appear in divers actions of Elephants Dogs Birds which fill the stories of those who write their lives but all these are wrought not by reason but by that principle of Nature which dictates Eschew evil and get good and is directed by the several kinds of Sagacity which in every kind of Animals hath some addition to the general condition of a sensitive creature but attains not the height of understanding but because it may be objected here how can we discern understanding in man concerning these simple terms from that of a beast I will answer this by experience for man understands these simple terms in their proper notion but a beast onely in general I have seen a dog running fiercely at a horse a woman rebuke him by this Word Out which in its genuine signification imports Go abroad and if that Word Out had been used to a man he would have answered I am out but the Dog knowing it onely in generall to be a phrase of Rebuke ceased from his barking and went his way although other more menacing words by other men which were present prevailed not with him they being as it is likely such words which had not been used in his ordinary correction did not yet this which likely was the Word which had brought him smart did prevail to the appeasing him Perhaps some man not satisfied in this may instance in some of those famous Stories of Beasts which seem to express an apprehension more particular but I beleeve if they were examined there can be no other further knowledge of simple terms then this of pleasure and pain to his particular which may be easily conceived to arise out of that Sagacity which is in every kind of Animals in several and distinct wayes What he adds that understanding which is peculiar to man is the understanding not only his will this should be a Parenthesis and a most unnecessary one but his conceptions and thoughts by the Sequele and Contexture of the names of things into Affirmations and Negations I can agree with him that this is peculiar to man and yet as much may be cavil'd against this as that went before and the sagacious actions of many Beasts would perswade us as soon that they make Propositions and syllogise as that they apprehend understanding the simple terms NOTES UPON THE Twelfth Chapter of Leviathan CHAP. 12. Of Religion the feigned Gods Ghosts and the soul of Man HAving done with his Two first Chapters for this present I will pass over his Third concerning the consequence and traine of Imaginations in which are many things very obnoxious to Censure his fourth of Speech likewise I passe over for the present and his Fifth with his Sixth which is nothing but an Exposition of easie terms which have been better discoursed upon by a hundred several persons and I skip to his Twelfth Which begins Pag 52. and is entituled Of Religion wherein as in many other places he is to blame not to expresse what Religion is that so it might appeare how pertinent and reasonable his Dâ—scourse is which if he had done he might have spared much which he hath written or otherwise disposed it That I may proceed therefore the more confidently take the definition of Religion which is most received which is Sect. 1. That Religion is a vertue by which Men give God the worship and honour due to him And this is the reason why Divines do make Religion a part of Iustice and handle it as a Species or part of it though an imperfect one because Justice gives to every one as much as is his due exactly but that cannot be done by man to God and therefore it is imperfectly a part of Iustice but yet because in Religion we after our weake and imperfect manner doe it therefore it is reckoned among the duties of Iustice we doe by it give God worship and honour Worship as the supream Honour as the most excellent Those who are over us we worship as our Governours although they have not Excellencies to be honoured for Those which are our Inferiours or equals if they have Excellencies in them and extraordinary parts we honour although not worship them But these two Excellencies of perfection and supremacy of Authority over us being acknowledged by every religious person to be in God he renders him both those duties in the highest measure as in Iustice is due to him for them Thus we briefly discern what is the Subject he writes of let us now consider what he writes of it 2. First he saith rightly that there is no cause to doubt that the seed of Religion is onely in man for certainly the Seed of Religion is the assurance that God is infinitely excellent and hath the highest and most unquestionable authority over us by the right of Governing us This apprehension I conceive to be the seed of Religion and this can be in no Creature which hath not reason and understanding as Man hath for certainly if they have not understanding to apprehend those divine excellencies they cannot have Religion and unlesse they have liberum arbitrium which without understanding they cannot have their actions can be no more pleasing to God then the fire pleaseth him when it burneth 3. He labours to give reasons for his Conclusion others then that I have set down with this Phrase First Second but look upon them they are so incomposed and disjoynted that none of them can produce this Conclusion That only Man hath the Seed of Religion But in Page 53. in the beginning he urgeth an Argument from the Chaine and Origination of Causes acknowledged to be of an absolute force for the Causation of a God and so of the apprehension of the Object to which our Religion is directed But in all that discourse let a man consider whether it be any way pertinent to Religion any otherwise then to shew there is a God and to illustrate that saying of his that fear made the heathen Gods Sect. 4. 4. He saith That feare gives occasion to feigne as many Gods as there are Men that feigne them And
will not meddle with what concernes not my present business but remit the madness of the worlds infinity in magnitude as not pertinent to my purpose and apply my self to that which is in his following words about Eternity Sect. 8. Preterea etsi ex eo quod nihil potest movere seipsum Moreover saith he although out of this that nothing can move it self may be right enough inferred that there is some first moving thing which shall be Eternall yet that cannot be inferred thence which men doe use to inferre to wit an eternal immoveable but contrariwise an eternall thing moved for as it is true that nothing is moved of its self so it is true likewise that nothing is moved but from a thing moved He is a most unhappy man in his way of reasoning this contradicts wâ—at went before for if from that conclusion which he holds true nothing can move its self may be deduced a first mover which is Eternall it necessarily follows that men ascending from effects to immediate causes thence to others may arrive at that which is eternall which was denyed not six lines before and hath been confuted by me Againe observe that that inference which he censures must be true and his inference false For if there be a first mover and every thing moved is moved by another then that which moves must it self be unmoved for if it move then that was not the first mover but rather that other thing which moved that he said was the first moveable for a first can have nothing before it but that moveable according to his Philosophy must have another moved thing which moves it And for the two Propositions out of which he draws his inference he saith they are alike true I that they are a like false that which saith nothing moves its self For the nature of every thing as Aristotle defines it is the Principle of motion and rest of each natural body that is the natural motion and rest and therefore moves every natural body naturally And therefore the other Proposition is like false which saith that every thing which is moved is moved by something which is moved it self which can be affirmed of none but violent motions they are forced by something without but neither natural nor animal motions And this Philosophy he might have known to have been delivered by many of his friends the Schoolemen who disavow Aristotle in that Argument I will leave his discourse in the middle which is a proud contempt of such as labour to prove the beginning of the World and close with him again towards the latter end of 237. Pag. where he endeavours to answer an Argument somwhat like that which I urge but how weakly let the Reader judge The Argument it self is not so strong as mine and shall together be both examined Sect. 9. He begins thus Quis enim hoc modo demonstrantem laudet Who saith he will praise a man after this manner demonstrating if the world be Eternal then the number of dayes or any other measure of time infinite hath preceded the birth of Abraham but the nativity of Abraham preceded the nativity of Isaac therefore one infinite or one eternity should be greater then another which is absurd thus farre he Consider first the affinity this Argument hath with mine in the place to which this should be inserted his Argument is drawne from the number of Dayes mine of paternity which overthrows one of his Answers at the first view as will appear in its place But that whâ—ch he seems to apply his strength against is that Axiom one Infinite cannot be greater then another This is used concerning infinite in number the reason of this is because whatsoever is infinite is boundlesse it cannot be out-gone but its self out-goes every thing of its kind now what is greater then another containes that and exceeds it so foure exceeds three and therefore gives it bounds a hundred and every number is bounded it is not 100. and one it is bounded in its self and therefore every number hath its internal bounds and if it be exceeded it hath external bounds Minimum quod non as his friends the Schooles speak so well as maximum quod sic it hath the least terme of that it cannot extend to as the greatest it can exist in Sect. 10. Well let us consider his answer Similis demonstratio est It is a like Demonstration saith he as if he from thence that there is an infinite number of equall numbers therefore he should conclude that that there were so many equal numbers as there are numbers equal and unequal together taken I find a mighty errour run through his whole work which doth not become a Mathematician is evident in this Answer that he disputes Ex non concessis his Answer is drawn from a supposal that there is an infinite number of equal numbers which is false there is no infinite of either equal or unequal numbers for suppose the world made of Atomes with Democritus although they are called Infinite because mans eye cannot discern them nor his wit apprehend them yet they being bodies that have dimensions must have a finite nature and therefore a certain number of them must goe to the constituting another bigger body suppose a Million to make a barly corne what number you will yet it is a number and that number may be reckoned by unities every one for a Million and so every million of Millions may afterwards be reckoned by unities as one may goe for a Million or Millions and a million of sheets or papers may be filled by these or more greater numbers may be united yet they are and will be a certain number of them and the things of this world are made in number by GOD Almighty aswell as measure and weight as the Son of Sirak Wisdom 11.20 Well then there is no infinite number he answers from an impossible supposal but now hence doth he inferre If I should grant there were an infinite number of equall numbers then that should be equal to all numbers even equall and unequall yes it must for there cannot be an infinite number of unities but must be equall to infinite twoes threes twenties hundreds for 〈◊〉 which is infinite hath no bounds if it had not infinite twenties infinite Millions indeed infinite infinites it had some bounds it is not infinite whatsoever by any reckonings even by myriads can be bounded is not infinite can be exceeded therefore it is absurd to say the world was infinite in duration for if we conceive it infinite as I argue there must be as many paternities of Adam as of Robert and all that number of paternities betwixt Adam and Robert are no addition A drop in the Sea is an addition because the Sea is bounded and finite but if it were infinite there could be no addition to it The greatest number that is may have addition because it is
this in-bred principle this which abides so much demonstration à Posteriori to the learned so much perswasive illustration to the meanest capacity to call this barely Opinion but he labours throughout the Book covertly to insinuate as much as he can a disgracefull conceit of Religion which I meane to Observe in my travailes through it Sect. 2. He proceedeth and affirmes that that can never be abolished out of humane nature but that new Religions may again be made to spring out of them by the culture of such men as for such purpose are in reputation This Proposition is delivered in such universal termes as makes it exceeding difficult to understand what he meanes by it He talkes of and censures the Schoole-men for a mystical way of writing but certainly their language is Significant Logical Gramatical which his is not for first what doth he meane by humane nature the Species or kind of man as we call it Mankind I am confident then it is true but if he meane that particular nature of Socrates or Plato although it cannot be so extirpated out of it as that it cannot be introduced againe yet it is many times so abolâ—shed as it is not introduced by those he names But then marke what follows but that new Religions may be made to spring out of them Consider at the beginning he spake of Seeds in the Plurall number then he made those many Seeds but one now againe in this Terme Them he makes many againe For the Terme Them can relate to nothing but the former Seeds or Seed specified He writes most perplexedly and because not cleere expressions to the understanding therefore not perspicuous to have Observations made upon any thing in his writing but the confusedness yet I will proceed with him Sest 3. For saith he seeing all formed Religion is founded at fiâ—st upon the Faith which a multitude hath in some one person whom they beleeve not only to be a wise man and to labour to procure their happiness but also to be a holy man to whom God himself vouchsafeth to declare his will supernaturally Consider how this Gentlemans language contradicts himself first he made the Seed of Religion only an Opinion of a Diety that was for taking Opinion in a large Sense now he makes it to be the beliefe men have of some man But yet I can answer for him somewhat that in the first place he spoke of Religion now he speaks of it as a formed Religion by which I think and only think for that Phrase formed Religion is an unusual Phrase yet I think he means some set form of worship by which in such or such a manner men expresse their duties to God now as Averroes said to sacrifice to God was dictated by nature but whether to Venus or Diana was the direction of man so it may be he meanes by this word Formed some particular restraint of Religion to this or that particular way and the Seed of this is the Beleef c. I have made out the sense as well as I can to make it hold together Well then I will take Formed Religion for such which in a several sort of men is allotted to Divine worship Seeing then saith he all formed Religion is founded c. This Phrase seeing then should relate to some former proof or illustration of this Proposition but I can find no such thing attempted nor this Proposition any where else delivered by him This is a strange kind of jugling to make the Reader beleeve that he hath proved that which he never spoke of before Well we will examine the Conclusion All formed Religion is founded at first upon the faith we will first examine this Terme founded at first that may be understood that Religion is bottomed upon this beleef as a building which is raised upon a rock is said to be founded upon it which is the last and lowest support of it Now this beleefe which he speaks of cannot be such for the foundation of Religion as he spake before is the assurance of a God which is either had by nature or by those demonstrations and illustrations spoke of before but perhaps he will say this is the foundation of Religion in general as Religion but not as a formed Religion as this particular that is only that Beleefe which he speaks of I will therefore examine it in those two most remarkable Religions and evidently to be discerned the Jewes Religion and Christian in both which we may observe two principal things in the forming them for Religion and a most reverential worship due to God is apparent out of nature and the demonstrations before spoke of but then the forming it consists in these two things who this GOD is whether Jehovah or Baal Christ or Iupiter and then what manner of worship is to be performed to these and both these formings I affirme are formed bottomed supported by something much more firme then that beleef he speaks of First then for the forme of the Iewish Religion in the first motion whether Jehovah or Baal any heathen god be the God to whom Religion is to be paid this was not founded upon the faith which the multitude had in some one Person as he fancieth CHAP. XVI What Religion before the Floud What meant by that Invocation Gen. 4.26 The sinnes and punishment of them that perished in the Floud The prevalence of Religion whence Sect. 1. THe Conditions of Religion before the Floud hath so little spoke of it in Scripture as it hath bred dispute amongst Divines whether there were any Idolatry either Worship of Idols or false Gods in that long tract of time that which perswades me to think there was none is that although the time was long yet the Ages of men were so vast that there must needs be a Memorial of the Creation for there was little more then half a mans life not above five or six hundred yeares betwixt Adam and Noah which must needs be continued in that long-living age by such as were Contemporaries with them both and then besides this there is no mention of any false God worshipped or any Idolatry in that whole Story Wherefore in the silence of Scripture which records other faults of that Age but not this we may collect from the former reason justly that there was no probability of any such forgetting of God whose great work of making them was so fresh amongst them Sect. 2. Some Arguments are objected against this Conclusion that in the last verse of the 4th Chapter of Genesis it is said that Adams sonne Seth begot Enos and then men began to call upon the Lord so that because men are never without some Religion and it seems the Religion to the true God was forgot so quickly it seemes necessary that then they should have some Religion to a false God For the understanding of this place conceive with me that it cannot be understood
mine and thine you may reade a most excellent passage in the 23. of Gen. with what civility of discourse and reciprocal courtesies Abraham bought the field in Machpelah of Ephron the Hittite First I collect thence that Abraham judged there was a legall interest in Ephron for else he would not have payd such a round price for it as foure hundred shekels of Silver and then you may observe how sacred amongst all people the preservation of interest was for in the last of Gen. you shall find that Jacob when he died in Egypt a great way off in another Nation having both he and his left the Land neare two hundred yeares after the purchase when he and his without doubt were not known scarce remembred Iacob gave order for the burying of his body there and it was performed without any disturbance so sacred did those people without any positive law but the principles of nature observe the particular interest of particular men even such who at the time of the Purchase were but sojourners among them and at the time of the last usage were not so much as cohabitants but strangers in another Country and Nation so that we see as men have had alwaies Consciences which directed them in their actions so those Consciences have had a sense of intruding upon another's interest and Abraham was assured that it was such amongst them for upon that presumption he paid so great a price for that field Sect. 11. If it should be asked how men should come to get these interests I will not here scan all wayes one is evident that is Occupancy taking possession of it first for all the things in this world being but Bona utilia and the profit they have is their service to man he who first gets possession of them is Lord of them thus Fowles and Fishes even in planted Nations which are no mans possessions being caught by any man are his to make profit and when one man hath caught them that they are his possession it is thievery to rob him of them I speak not here of Deere Conyes Hares nor Fishes in ponds c. which are impaled and so for their habitation by our laws are made to pay their host with their lives nor such things which our lawes indulging the pleasures of Gent. and men of quality have appropriated to certain persons and places as Pheasants and Partridges and the like but whatsoever no nationall particular Law hath given to another that the law of Nature gives to the first possessor and this law men find before any positive law of Nations in the practise of the world so that then it is apparent that without positive laws or an outward humane coercive power the law of Nations hath alwaies given a propriety in this world's goods to the sons of men Thus I have passed my opinion upon his 13. Chapter and I think have given reasons for what I spake but if this be not enough let the Reader consider what I shall speake to the next Chapter and that will the more fully discribe the mist of his opinions and confirm mine more stronger Censures upon the 14 th Chapter of LEVIATHAN which is entituled The first and second naturall Lawes and of Contracts which thus begin's CHAP. XXII Concerning the pretended necessity in Nature for the preservation of life The prospect of an happiness beyond it Death represented more terrible than it is c. Sect. 1. THE right of Nature which Writers commonly call jus Naturale is the liberty each man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature that is to say his own life and consequently of doing any thing which in his own judgement and reason he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto Here is a description of the right of Nature which is that he saith Writers call Jus Naturale I believe this Gentleman never in his life read Jus Naturale so described in any Author It is true to preserve a mans own life is a branch of the right of nature but it doth not contain the whole nature of it as if the right of nature extended to nothing else but the preservation of a mans own life there are many other things which the right of nature enables us to doe but because I find this question in my opinion more methodically and Schollarly delivered in his Book entituled De Copore Politico Cap. 1. I shall therefore consider that first and having cleared that discourse apply my self to this description and I will begin with his 6. Number That number begins thus Sect. 2. Forasmuch as necessity of nature maketh men to will and desire that which is good for themselves and to avoyd that which is hurtful but most of all the terrible enemy of nature Death from whom men expect the losse of all power and also the greatest of bodily paine in the loosing The phrase which I here censure first is that necessity makes us do this I know this word Necessity is often used for what we terme want or poverty because such a man need 's somewhat therefore we say he is in necessity and in this sense there may be some truth in that Proposition for because men's lives have lack of supplies and according to this Gentleman all the world are his enemies or what is the truth no man will have so much care to supply him as himself therefore he must doe it but then take necessity as it opposeth contingency which is the common logical sense it is absolutely false for many men throw and take away their own lives now that which is necessarily done cannot be otherwise men cannot choose but doe what they doe out of necessity the phrase were much more proper to say that the law of nature enjoyne's them to provide for themselves for the great Natura naturans God as I said before know's our necessities and like a wise law-maker makes lawes to provide for them and so infinitely wise are those laws that what he hath not by some law or other provided for it is not necessary for any man whatsoever and certainly therefore where is no lawfull and honest way to preserve it life its self is not necessary he seem's therefore to expresse himself better in Corpore politico then in Leviathan because in Leviathan he restrain's this right of Nature only to the preservation of his own life but in this I now write against he saith not only but most of all his own life other things he may have a right unto but most of all or chiefly the preservation of his own life or rather the avoyding of death Sect. 3. What he saith that necessity of nature makes us desire our own good and avoyd that which is hurtful is true in that generality but applyed to any particular is false for there is no particular but may appeare to some men good and to others hurtfull even
there is a necessity of nature which maketh men in generall avoid death in generall as the thing by which he must needs expect the greatest paine for it often happens that there is little paine and people that have dyed with a sense of deaths ugliness and so with some impatience I have found complaining of common accidents and such which had no participation of death in them and no cooperation to the dissolution of soule and body by death as Aches in particular parts sometimes they were galled and that troubled them sometimes that there were clods or hardness in the Bed c. All which shewed that these paines not those of Death were more sensible then even death its selfe Sect. 9. He proceeds It is not against reason that a man doth all he can to preserve his own body and limbes both from death and paine had he put in that little word and esteemed a little thing by him justly and honestly he had said truth but alas else how unreasonable a thing it is that a man to save himself from a little pain should act things prejudiciall to the glory of God the publique good or else some greater good of his own any man who hath sense of any thing but sense and unworthy ease cannot choose but apprehend that the greater good should be chosen before the lesse such are those before specified Therefore in such Cases that they for paine or death its self are relinquished is against reason What he adde's And that which is not against reason we call right c. I agree to for certainly there is no wrong which is not against reason but his deduction It is therefore a right of Nature that every man may preserve his own life and limbes with all the power he hath This deduction by what is already said cannot be true but when his life and limbes are not opposed by some greater good CHAP. XXIII Of using or misusing meanes in order to their end The regulation of mans judgment in it The preservation of life and estate when necessary Of right and wrong Law c. Sect. 1. 1. I Come now to Number 7. which begins thus And because where a man hath right to the end and the end cannot be attained without the meanes that is without such things as are necessary to the end it is consequent that it is not against reason and therefore right for a man to use all meanes and doe whatsoever action is necessary for the preservation of his body How vile and illogicall is this had he proved that the body were the end of man or instead of body had he said for the preservation of that end his axiome explained thus might have borne him out in it but as it is puâ— there is no connexion for suppose a man hath right to the end his own happiness and by that right likewise to all meanes which conduce to it yet unlesse this body can be proved to be that end his application of it to the body is of no force Well I will examine his Aphorisme First he who hath right to the end hath not right to all meanes of getting it is apparent for he who hath right to an estate or an house hath not right to take it by force he must onely use legall meanes for the obtaining and preserving it and so though a man have right to his body or life yet he hath no right to preserve it by unlawfull actions It is a most just rule of law that a man must so use his owne as he must not hurt another a man hath right to water and a Meadow but he must not so use his water and his meadow as by overflowing his meadow he should drowne his neighbours Corne. So although a man have right to his life yet this right is not of such a transcendent power as to enable him for the preservation of that life to hurt others and destroy their lives But once again for further and clearer explication of that rule he gives concerning an end let us observe that it hath no truth but concerning the last end and in that it hath for since all mens actions are for an end that is his summum bonum his happiness every man out of necessity of nature doth what he doth for it and the utmost he can for it but this life or body is not mans happiness and for any second end there being no necessity of the end it self there is much less of any means which conduce to it and therefore of such ends of which nature mans temporall life and body are there is no manner of truth in it no more then if we should say it were right for a man to doe what he can any thing to obtain pleasure or profit upon which he sets his heart Sect. 2. His 8. Numb must be likewise examined which saith Also every man by right of nature is judge himself of the necessity of the meanes and of the greatness of the danger This hath some truth in it and yet not to be so understood that by right of nature a man may judge what he will and accordingly act and what he acts is right as he seems to imply here from hence enforces afterwards for as in our judicatures there must use be made of Judges and the decrees of those Judges will regulate and govern our possessions yet those Judges have rules by which their judicatures should be regulated and what they act contrary to those rules or Lawes although it may be effected yet it is wicked so it is in those no doubt but every man will in such an impossible state as he supposeth man judge of the meanes and necessity but yet there is a law of nature in every man by which his judgement should be guided and what he judgeth though never so congruent to his will contrary to this law is not right so that as a Judge though what he judgeth must be performed and he hath power to judge what he thinkes fit yet he hath right to judge only according to the law of that Nation which gave him the power of being a Judge all other judgement is by power but not by right so is it with this man he may act against the law of nature for the preservation of his life or Limbe but if not right it is wicked to doe so The Argument he brings for proofe of this Conclusion convinceth not me For saith he if it be against reason that I be Judge of mine own danger my self then it is reason that another may be Judge c. It is reason say I that in such a Case I am Judge but it is reason likewise that I judge according to Law and make my will be guided by reason not my reason regulated by my will because it is mine it is not therefore right but because mine according to the law of nature and right reason of which he himself afterwards
Sect. 7. He proceed's From such reasoning as this Successeful wickednâ—ss hath obtained the name of vertue Here begin's to confute that conclusion of the foole that there is no such thing as Iustice this sentence is his foundation and he thus argue's If there be no injustice but all men are to doe what is most reasonable that is most conducing to their owne good that is worldly pleasure or profit then succesfull wickednesse may be called Vertue which is abominable and most odious for certainly vertue is not measured by the event but the nature of the act and the naturall tendence of it to that is good This argument of his against the foole is strong but let us examine it doth not this and all he speaks against the foole fight against himself in the 13. Chap. of his Leviathan concerning which I have discoursed before He deliver's that men naturally have a right to all things and any one may rightly doe any thing to any man for the securing of his life or contentment and that men are in a state of war before they are incorporated into a Common-wealth with all the world that in that state fraud and force are the Cardinall vertues so then in this state any successefull wickednesse must needs be called Vertue because a man in such meanes according to his doctrine act's nothing but what he hath right to do and therefore was just and acted according to reason and by such meanes obtain's his end 's which are his own preservation and contentment Againe he hath delivered Chap. 14. that no man can renounce his right of delivering himself from wounds and chaines and imprisonment or indeed of any such thing as may make his life wearisome to him well then let it be considered if a man have naturally right to all those things which may secure and preserve them then let his Compacts or Covenants be whatsoever yet they are invalid which infringe this right which a man hath no power to alien from himself then in order to these whatsoever a man act 's after he hath covenanted himself into a common-wealth be it never so wicked must be cloathed with the specious name of vertue because according to reason and right so that let him say what he will this unlucky foole disputed most unanswerably against his principles and the main hinges upon which his policy move's though nothing against mine Sest 8. He goe's on And some that in all other things have disallowed the violation of faith yet have allowed it when it is for the getting of a Kingdome I doe not remember that I have read the violation of faith for the getting a Kingdome justified by any man but Machiavell who indeed approve's any means to bring a man to what he aime's at but certainly no man esteemed for Christianity or morality It is said of Julius Caesar that he would often repeat out of Euripides that Sentence which he rendred Quod si violandum est jus regnandi gratiâ Violandum est aliis rebus pietatem colas But let the Reader consider that it is here with if if right be to be violated and what Tully saye's of him that he was captus Imperii consuetudine ensnared with the custome or habit of commanding which in his infancy he had coveted and from thence would use that speech and did practise it as unluckily as other usurpers but sure every man who is mastered with any habit of wickedâ—â—sse the fruition of which he viciously covet's will say as much for that as Caesar for governing but none as I know of hath delivered it for a practique conclusion but onely Machiavel therefore that word some might have been spared by Mr. Hobbes Sect. 9. Page 73. He comes to make particular answers which are not satisfactory to the foole 's argument and therefore must be examined in the second line he state 's the question certainly not punctually to the purpose for whereas the fool's conclusion was that there was no such thing as injustice he saith lin 2. that The Question is not of promises mutuall where there is no security of performance on the other side as when there is no civill power erected over the parties promising for such promises are no Covenants This is a most hatefull parenthesis as I have shewed he goe's on but either where one of the partyes hath performed already or where there is a power to make him performe so that here is a great restraint to the fool's conclusion and a limitation of the fool's argument which I am perswaded if he had disputed with Mr. Hobbes he would not have allowed for he was bred up in Mr. Hobbes his principles and dispute's shrewdly out of them but although this be not pertinent to the foole yet let the fool grant that this shall be the question as Mr. Hobbes put 's it Whâ—ther it be against reason that is against the benefit of the other to performe or not Here the poore foole is abused mightily for the fool's conclusion was about justice Mr. Hobbes put 's the question concerning benefit onely certainly many high Injustices have been beneficial as he call's benefit that is profitable for this life's advantages but yet see by what fraudulent steps he steale's into the change of these Tearmes first he hath said that Iustice is not against Reason Reason is not against the Law which looketh onely at the happinesse of this life to that particular man therefore justice is whatsoever any man act 's for his own good all which expressions have beene before shewed not to be depending one upon the other but let us examine his argument I say saith he it is not against reason from Iustice he went to reason from reason to benefit and now from benefit to reason againe for the manifestation of which he hath a long discourse to shew that the wisdome of actions is not to be measured by the events but the forâ—sight and dâ—sign which shall be granted him Secondly in that refuted imagination of every man 's being at war with every man for want of a common power to keep them in awe no man can hope to defend himself by his own power strength and wit c. Therefore he who declare's he think's it reason to deceive those that hâ—lp him can in reason expect no other meanes of safety then what can be had from his own single power This is the force of what he there write's But consider Reader with me that this is not to the purpose for the foole 's Conclusion was concerning the justice and honesty of a thing he onely out-wit's the foole and discourseth of cunning or craft or worldly profit of those actions what is most profitable for the advance of the Agent'â— ease and pleasure but then consider further and see if this answear of his satisfy that doubt The Question according to his own framing is whether it be profitable to deceive or not his answer is
satisfaction of the powers but a curbing them which yield's but a half enjoyment such as may be proper for a Viator a Traveller to it not a possessor of happiness in hope as the Prophet David say'th but God is our portion in the land of the living we are here in the land of the dying where others and we die dayly and our happiness here is God but God in hope when we come to the land of the living God will be our portion and possession to conclude men may have a begun happiness here but noâ— perfect untill hereafter man perhaps may have content here but felicity onely in heaven after life A Traveller joye's his heart to see at a distance that happy Palace where he hope 's for comfort but he is not satisfied untill he come there so it is with us in our Journey to heaven the happiness we have here is our hope of it but hereafter our possession The next Objection may be That this future Felicity is an Article of our Faith the Conclusion of all the Twelve The resurrection of the body and the life everlasting Now if it were demonstrable thus by reason an act of Faith is not necessary to it I can here bring the first and last Articles of our Faith together that which concern's God's creation and this which concern's man's salvation man's beginning and end which are both from God and say That for both of them there is abundance of reason but those Reasons cannot be easily argued by every man and yet though every man cannot Philosophize in high points of learning every man can believe these Conclusions which are proved by learned men and that belief is requâ—red of every man and surely belief hath great force to fasten men to that which they upon good grounds believe no man know's who is his Mother but by his belief of very easie people to deceive and to be deceived and yet this belief is constantly adhered unto by all sorts of men so that men dare depose that such a one was this man's Mother and such this man's none of us that are not travelled in those parts know that there is a Constantinople yet we are assured by hear-say and are most confident there is such a City and stronger than all these may our Faith be of this Tâ—uth as I have shewed Faith and Reason doe not destroy but help one the other for it is with our way to heaven as to other places when a man hath shewed us one way we can by that guess at another which hath proportion and convenience to that like lights when you have kindled one Candle you may easily light others at that when the Soul of man is enlightened by Faith it can with much more ease afterwards inlighten Reason which perhaps else it would never have thought upon and Reason sometimes assist's Faith for when the persons we believe deliver to be believed nothing but that is reasonable it is with comfort swallowed down and entertained and the work of Faith hath less labour when it imposeth no unreasonable thing Thus you see the same Conclusion may be the result of Faith and Reason and therefore although proved in one yet exalted as an Article in the other I could now insist upon the Article of Faith how confirmed by Scripture but that is done by an hundred men before and is evident too to every one that looke's upon the New Testament I could further enlarge upon that I have already touched concerning the Credibility and Fitness to believe those men which delivered it to us that certainly as Festus said to S. Paul not he onely but all the rest were mad with learning or something else who did endure so many afflictions yea death for Religion if there were no reward hereafter and the Story of their sufferings was sealed to us by the blood of thousands in divers immediate Centuryes and continued by the most universally consented Story in the world so that for certainty we have not so much reason to believe any Article of the Faith I speak of reason nor any Conclusion delivered by relation as this one That there is a Blessedness hereafter for God's servants because this is the reason and chief reason why these men durst dye for Religion this made Shadrach Meshach and Abednego Dan. 3. despise the fire for Gods cause the Heroick Sons 2 Mac. 7. contemn Tortures with a most noble Constancy because they looked for a better and happier life so as it is phrased Hebr. 12.1 We are compassed about with a mighty cloud of Witnesses or indeed a cloud of mighty Witnesses to evidence the Truth Mr. Hobbes therefore did not doe this noble heavenly Conclusion right when he say'd It is received onely upon a belief grounded upon other mens saying that know it supernaturally or that they know those that knew them that knew others that knew it supernaturally which was a disgracefull expression and I can justly fear intended to that purpose to disparage this Article for let a man consider his Conclusion which follows Breach of Faith cannot be called a Precept of Reason or Nature This he saith was opposed by some who held killing of Sovereigns lawfull this seemed out of his premisses to be argued for thus That which conduceth to future felicity ought to be done but the breach of faith in killing of Sovereigns conduceth to future felicity therefore c. what need had he any way to have disgraced our hope of heaven it might have served his turn much better to have shewed how the God of Truth love's Truth and hate's Falshood how unpossible it is that Error and Falshood should be the way to Truth how inconsistent they are these things would abundantly have served his turn and have contented the Reader but to leave that and fall foule without occasion upon our hope of heaven was very ill done of him CHAP. XXIX Of Covenants and keeping faith Of dammage and injury The exercise of justice in its several kinds Arithmetical proportion is that call'd Commutative What in it and distributive may be due without Covenant The justice of an Arbritratour Mr. Hobbes's mistakes about justice merit c. Bodin's harmonical proportion The old Philosophers unjustly censur'd by Mr. Hobbes Of Epicurus and his Philosophy The Stoicks c. Fortitude and Liberality stated better by them then he pretend's Sect. 1. I Leave this now and on with him Others saith he that allow for a Law of Nature the keeping of Faith doe neverthelesse make exception of certaine persons as hereticks c. I condemn this with him but doe not approve his reason for it which is If any fault of a man be sufficient to discharge our Covenant made the same ought in reason to have been sufficient to have hindred the making of it I allow not this answer because it destroye's that supposition upon which it was grounded which is that men have made a Covenant now
that abominable Aphorisme before refuted that all men are naturally at war one with another untill I come to the last Clause where he fall's foule againe upon all manner of writers page 80. where he saith that the Science of Vertue and Vice is Moral Philosophy This so far is true that it is a good piece of moral Philosophy to treat of the Law of Nature and to shew how all vertuous actions are deduced out of it and agree with it but this is not all the Office of a moral Philosopher he is first to teach the end which is man's Summum bonum his chiefe good his felicity happinesse then to teach the meanes which are those vertues deduced out of the Law of nature and to shew how they conduce to the end so that he confined moral Philosophy in too narrow bounds when he restrayned it to Virtue and Vice which are only the meanes and are handled by a moral Philosopher onely in order to his end Now he come's to his high strain againe censuring the world Sect. 9. But saith he the writers of moral Philosophy though they acknowledge the same Vertues and Vices yet not seeing wherein consisteth their Goodnesse nor that they come to be praised as the meanes of peaceable sociable and comfortable living place them in a mediocrity of passions as if not the cause but the Degree of daring made Fortitude or not the Cause but the quantity of a gift made liberality There are many things in this Period to be cenâ—ured First I blame him for accusing the whole Company of the Philosophers of ignorance in so weighty a businesse not so much as pardoning any one when for my part who have turned over hundreds of bookes in this businesse I know no one so blind as himselfe in this particular point I say no one either Christian or other for first he committeth a mighty fault in forgetting that famous distinction betwixt a good man and a good Citizen acknowledged by multitudes of Philosophers and must needs be by any man who consider's that a man may be discoursed of either concerning himselfe in his owne nature and the wayes of perfecting it or else in relation to others in the first consideration that Science which perfect's him is called Ethicke or Morall Philosophy for the second which referre's him to others it is either to a family then it is Oeconomick or else to a State or City and then it is Politick Now the writers of moral Philosophy discourse which way a man should perfect himselfe so that they give Ruâ—es which way he should be happy in a desart in the midst of the most unhappy state in the world in the midst of worldly plenties miseries such surely are perfect in this world and such onely and this is the foundation of all Oeconomicks and Politicks no man can be either Oâ—conomically or Politickly vertuous who is not so in himselfe and being so in himself having neither family nor City to dispose himself to he may not be such to other men Mr. Hobbes dedicate's a mâ—n wholly to others in this place as in others he make's a man dispose all things to himself and consider's not the divers shâ—res which his Parents his friends I may adde his Children and above all his God is to have out of him as well as his Country Now Mr. Hobbes placeth the whole relation of man to be towards others when in this period he saith in effect That Sect. 10. The Philosophers did not know that humane vertues came to be praised as the meanes of peaceable sociable and comfortable living which are things onely in respect of others but I may tell Mr. Hobbes that in their politicks and Oâ—conomicks they teach this relative perfection as fully and much truer then hd as will appear but in Ethicks they teach how these vertues are excellent in themselves and doe perfect the owner this is done by all sorts of Philosophers to begin with the Epicureans whose Philosophy doth in many things agree with his although in some things he consent's with the Stoicks in mine opinion he chooseth the worst pieces in both first Epicurus agree's with him in this that he makes pleasure the happinesse the chiefe good of man as Mr. Hobbes doth in many places and I know Lactantius favour's Epicurus so much as to say he meant the pleasures of the soule yet surely it seemes to be the sensuall part of the Soule only for in that Epistle he writes to Menoeceus which is the chiefe we have of his moral Philosophy he seeme's to me to doe otherwise and places man's happinesse as Mr. Hobbes doth elsewhere in the enjoying sensuall Contentments now Mr. Hobbes in those other places did better then in this where he placed man's happinesse within himself and the use of his vertues conducing to himselfe but here in relation to others which is so extrinsecall a thing as it is impossible for a man 〈◊〉 be happy in for it is possible a man may lack these accommodations of other men to converse and be sociable and affable with and then he is not happy who can be miserable which Epicurus himself denied to be possible to a vertuous and prudent man so that in respect of the end although Epicurus make the same happinesse as Mr. Hobbes in other places yet Epicurus and Mr. Hobbes in other places speake righter then Mr. Hobbes in this Then consider the meanes of obtaining this end Epicurus first writes against the fear of the Gods as he call's them a thing which Mr. Hobbes countenanceth although he let 's fall in one place as Mr. Hobbes now and then will that God doth punish wicked men and blesse the honest and vertuous yet he after speake's against man's feare of any such thing because saith he nothing must be spoken of the Gods but eternal felicity which they could not have if they were concerned in humane affaires therefore denies prayers or any religious duty to have any power with the deities as I remember Mr. Hâ—bs out of his Stoical principles of the fate or necessity which belong's to all things and actions Cross principles produce the same wicked conclusion in both like as Herod and Pilate joyne together in nothing but crucifying Truth To the same purpose Lucretius a follower of Epicurus speak's in his first fifth and sixth books and diverse times make's it the greatest piece of happinesse to abhorre Religion and contemne it and make's man by that act to be the greatest Conquerour Quare religio pedibus subjecta vicissim Obteritur nos exaequat victoria Caelo And one of Mr Hobbes his Principles of religion is made by him to be the chiefe the ignorance of second causes Thus doe men who conspire against Religion meet likewise in the meanes But Epicurus and Lucretius spake out fully Mr. Hobbes darkely thus they joyne in one Principle by which happinesse may be acquired but in another Epicurus farre
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it is true they have and those two in Greek and Latine are by the use of speaking most strictly in these two Languages appropriated to signifie this which we call person in English there were other words often used to the same purpose The Grecians used 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the Latines Suppositum which in time for words juvenum ritu florent modò nâ—ta vigentque grew out of esteem and now signifie other subsisting substances and those two former have gained in the language of Divines the expression of that which we in English call person and there was reason for it because the latter have been frequently used by Divines and Philosophers in antient times for other things besides persons and so now to avoyd equivocations or tedious Descriptions both Divines and Philosophers speak both of suppositum and hypostasis in a general nature as belonging to all other substances but persona and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as peculiar to reasonable substances so that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a reasonable 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and persona a reasonable suppositum He goe's on with which 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie's the face as persona in Latine signifie's the disguise This is true consented unto by all Grammarians but use of words in divers matters and divers arts is divers First in the Art of Grammar we find but three persons I thou and he Secondly in Civil Law we sometimes find it the quality of a man as rich or poor In Canon Law a Dignity Bishop called person c. in Metaphysicks and Divinity a reasonable subsistence which is totally neglected by Mr. Hobbes as some other acceptations so that when he had so debated in such a large Discourse upon the sense of the word he was to blame in dwelling onely among the Players to have omitted the use of this Word in so many Sciences Consider the result of this horrid Criticism Sect. 4. So saith he that a Person is the same that an Actor is both on the Stage and in common Conversation and to personate is to act or represent himself or another This is it I foretold you of that although a feigned thing cannot be a true thing yet he make's the feigned onely the true and the representor onely to be the true person not to be who is represented and although in his Definition he sayd That a Person is he whose words or actions are considered as his own c. and in his following division there was a natural and a feigned person yet here he make's all persons feigned and their words and actions to be others If he answer that his words were represent himself or another then if he act himself it is enough to constitute him a person I reply that what it is to act himself he hath expressed in the words immediately preceding a Person is the same that an Actor is both on the Stage and in common conversation Now no man can properly be say'd to act himself or represent himself for the Actor and the acted the Representor and the represented are two He proceed's and he that acteth another is say'd to bear his Person or act in his name very true but if he beare's another's person the other is the person not he that beare's it The Constable beare's represent's the person of a King but is not his person so doth a Player this make's all against himself and so doth that which followe's In which sense Cicero useth it where he sayes Unus sustineo tres personas Mei Adversarii Judicis I bear three persons Mine own my Adversaries and the Judges and it is likely he might say so truly but he doth not say I am three persons but I bear three or act them they were the persons whose parts he acted at that time not he who acted them the persons which he bare and he who bare them are divers thus he overthrowes himself when he labour's to shew that the Representor is the person but his Argument prove's onely the represented to be the person and this we shall find in the antient Tragedyes and Comedyes put out The Critick which putâ—s them out calle's the persons those which were represented not the Actors as is to be seen in Seneca and Terence c. not that I deny this word hath sometimes been used by Writers as Mr. Hobbes expresseth it but I deny that that is the universal acception of that word or that Mr. Hobbes his Argument doth shew that it was ever so accepted but rather clean contrary the person is he who is represented not the Representor But now it will become me to shew the right use of the word and how it may and must be used otherwise than Mr. Hobbes direct's Sect. 5. A person then taken in the most received conceipt that Divines and Philosophers acknowledge is defined by Boethius de duabus naturis to be rationalis naturae individua substantia An individual substance of a rational nature This Definition is most generally received and I doubt not but it will abide the Test when it is clearly explained which I shall endeavour to doe only Richardus de Sancto Victore gave it a rub and make 's men pause a while to explain it for he in his fourth book de Trinitate cap. 21. object 's against this that it is too large because it agree's to that which is not a Person as the Divine Essence for saith he this Divine Essence is the Trinity which is not one Person In â—is 24 cap. he give 's another Definition Persona est per se existens solùm juxta singularem quendam rationalis existentiae modum A person is a thing existing by its self onely according to a single manner of a reasonable existence if he had expounded what this singular manner of a reasonable existence is by which we might have discerned how the manner of existing had been divers from others he had acted somewhat that we might have understood his meaning but as it is will be very hard and this learned man I see but little followed onely his Countrey-man Scotus in 1 mum senten distinc 23. quaest unica with his Sect make other Objections against this Definition because saith he by this Definition the Soul of man separated from the body should be a person for it agree's to that Soul but that the Soul separated is a person is denyed by him as indeed by most although affirmed by some very learned as the Master of the Sentences himself and others again saith Scotus by this Definition there would be no Person in God because individuale cannot be where is no Dividuum a dividible thing which cannot be affirmed of God Again this phrase rationalis naturae onely agree's to man not to God or Angels whose knowledge is after a more excellent way than by ratiocination and discourse These are the main
Objections of Scotus and his followers which I would answer immediately in their order but that I think the bare explication of Boethius his Definition will doe it without more business which thus I doe Sect. 6. First a person is a substance by that Term it is opposed to all accidents and things onely imaginary it is an individual substance by that Term it is opposed to those are called second substances the general or spâ—cial natures of substances which are dividual into many of the same nature as a Man a Lyon there are many of the same kind under each of these notions but there are no more the same as one person yet if perhaps that Term of Richardus de Sancto Victore might seem more fully expressing this business which is it is incommunicable he may use it and by that may be denyed that the Soul of man separated is a person because although it is incommunicable ut quod as the Scotists speak yet it is not absolutely for it is communicable ut quo which distinction may be thus explained that thing is communicable ut quod which communicate's its self wholly and in recto as they speak so that it communicate's in such a manner as a man can say another is this so doe general or special any universal natures as we can say Socrates is a man a sensitive thing and the like but there are other things communicate themselves ut quo when by them a thing receive's an addition of some nature yet not such as that we may say another thing is this but that it hath this or is made such or such by it so whiteness heat coldness or any form the Soul of man the form of any thing these communicate themselves ut quo by which that thing to which they are communicated may be say'd to be white or have whiteness to be hot or have heat not to be whiteness or heat to be animated or have a Soul but not to be that soul and the like thus they say that the Soul of man separated is communicable ut quo though incommunicable ut quod it hath in its self an aptitude to inform the body again though it be now separated but a person is absolutely incommunicable The last Term in this Definition is that it is rationalis of a reasonable nature this word reasonable must be understood of any intellectual nature whether by discourse or else and so it comprehend's all Divine Angelical or whatsoever and if I am not deceived this mere exposition will satisfie all the Objections which have been made that of Richardus who saith this agree's to the Divine Nature which is the Trinity No saith my Definition that Divine Nature is Dividual communicable to three persons Scotus his first Argument that it agree's with a Soul separated No say I that is communicable ut quo His second which saith that individuum must be of that is divisible I think I might deny that Proposition howsoever to that which followe's that God cannot be divided I say not into Beings or Natures but he is into Persons and that without all Composition His third that this phrase Rational cannot be understood of God is true in a gross sense as no words we use can yet reason may be affirmed of God in a superexcellent manner which excell's our knowledge or Discourse and Angels although they discourse not as most think yet they have an Angelical reason which discern's in a finer manner those things without Discourse which we doe by Discourse nor is it necessary that rationality should be bound up onely in the notion of Discourse but may well be extended to all manner of knowledge beyond beasts Thus you may discern what a person is esteemed to be amongst such as know how to define and Mr. Hobbes if his hatred to the School and common Philosophy be not such as will not suffer him to read their Books might easily have discovered this amongst them and have not suffered himself to be transported with the imagination of how this word is used upon the Stage onely for which Valla and some such are called Pedagogues and Players rather than Philosophers in words we are not alwayes to consider their Etymologie but how they are used yet if we should goe to the Etymologie of this word the most commonly received amongst the Schools is significant of the true use which is per se una a person because it is by its self one nor are we to consider onely how words have been used but how they are now in our English formerly a Knave signified a servant now a dishonest man Bawdery signified onely bravery now obscenity with hundreds of the same nature So that since the Exposition which I have given of this word Person is that which you shall find alwayes to be the meaning of it when it is used amongst Philosophers when he give 's another sense of it he ought to have shewed more reason for it then he hath But he hath a Design in it I will therefore consider that Sest 7. Page 81. about the top of the leaf he saith Of persons artificial some have their words and actions owned by those whom they represent and then the Person is the Actor and he that owneth his words or actions is the Author I am of another mind not the Actor but the acted is the person as will appear manifestly A Constable hath his actions and his words legally spoke in the King's name owned as the King 's yet he is not the person of the King but the King in his own person act 's by him he beare's the person represent's the person of the King but the King is the person he the Actor or Representer the Author according to his phrase is the person not the actor I commend his observations upon Authority and what followe's in that page onely I can by no meanes approve what he saith in the middle of that page Sect. 8. When the actor doth any thing against the law of Nature by command of the Author if he be obliged by former Covenant to obey him not he but the Author breaketh the Law of Nature This is very erroneous or else it make's an impossible supposition for this supposition if he be obliged by a former Covenant must either be understood that some former Covenant had power to bind him to doe this act against the Law of Nature and that is impossible for no Authority but that of the God of nature can have right to crosse the Law of Nature and then it is most consonant to the Law of Nature to obey him contrary to all Covenants made to any other by any authority yea even of God himself and upon this ground the obedience of Abraham to sacrifice his onely Son which was as cross to Nature as any thing could be was most honourable or else must be understood that some Covenant of one man to
see it is not to the purpose for this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his own is not in the Text but if it were yet it might be so used because our body and Spirit are expressed to be his by purchase that is God-Christs and in the Text which I treate of the blood of Christ whom he terme's God is said to be the purchasing price so that then man's body and Spirit are God's but his purchase and that which they were purchased with was the blood of God Christ his own blood in a most peculiar and proper acception That our blessed Saviour was God then appeare's from this place of Scripture This Theâ—me hath been handled by abundance I love nâ—t actum agere my designe shall be to examine those great and chiefe names by which he is called in this relation Sect. 4. The first is the Son of God which Mr. Hobbes allowe's him to be and therefore I might be briefe in it but because that this Terme Son is variously used by Writers I will somewhat insist upon that acceptation which is most common to explaine what is intended by it there is an adopted and there is a natural Son a Son which is indeed and a Son taken into the roome of him that is such a one legally made a Son the one is a Son begot the other is made such the real truely begotten Son is it which we affirme of our Saviour he is such a Son of God we are adopted made Sons To know this we must first apprehend what a Son is A Son is an intellectual substance produced naturally of the same nature with the producer the generall nature is a Substance produced but yet that very generall Terme distinguisheth a Son from a Father for although amongst created things there is no Father which had not a producer yet the notion of a father intimate's no such thing and in the holy and blessed Trinity the Father hath no producer nor origination from any the rest is the difference first an intellectual substance this distinguisheth it from the generation of beasts plants mettalls fire water or the like which properly cannot be called Sons of their producers but if any one will desire that they be called Sons I will not much contend or gainsay it it will no whit hurt my designe The next Terme is produced naturally This put 's a difference betwixt a Son and arte facta such things as are made by art of the same nature with the producer This is the last terme and by this it is distinguished from all equivocal generations and therefore a Worme cannot be said to be the Sonne of the Sunne for although it be produced naturally by the Sunne yet it is of another nature and by that reason is not a Sonne Sect. 5. Thus the nature of a Son explained let us examine how it may be applyed to our blessed Saviour the Son of God first it is evident and no man will deny that our Saviour was an intellectuall substance and that he was produced the chiefe querie will be upon these two last Clauses whether produced naturally and whether of the same nature and first that he was produced naturally that will appeare out of this that being produced by God the Father as all agree he must be either a Creature or else naturally produced indeed taking naturally in a large sense for whatsoever opposeth violâ—nce a man may say that a Creature is produced naturally by God because that no violence can force the omâ—ipotent to doe any thing and the Creatures have imprinted in their very natures a passive obedience to God by which they submit themselves to his sacred will but in this place we understand naturally in a more strict meaning as it opposeth not onely violence but arte facta things made by art for those things which are done by the nature of any thing are done primò et per se not per accidens of the nature bent and disposition of the agent not because of any accidental addition which happen's to it this is principally discerned bâ— the constancy of that action or motion for when things are accidentall they appeare seldome and many times are not such but things or actions that flow naturally from any are so constantly and when opportunities are offered are alwayes such so it is accidental to me that I write at this time I doe not alwaies do so no not when I am provoked by reading or studying an untruth no not this selfe same untruth which I write against but that I should eat meate at dinner is a natural action I alwaies doe it unlesse some accidentall thing intervene to hinder it and then the not eating is accidental but the eating were natural because this last ariseth out of the disposition and temper of my body the former not eating from some accidental distemper Sect. 6. Now then to shew that our Saviour's generation according to his divinity was such I shall handle that one place Mic. 5.2 But thou Bethlehem Ephratah though thou be little amongst the thousands of Judah yet out of thee shall he come forth unto me that is to be Ruler in Israel whose goings forth have been from of old from everlasting My observations upon this Text are first that it is spoke of our Saviour this is evident out of that Mat. 2.6 where this Text is applyed to him And thou Bethlehem in the land of Judah art not the least amongst the Princes of Judah for out of thee shall come a Governour that shall rule my People Jsrael So likewise Iohn 7.42 Hath not the scripture saâ—d thaâ— Christ cometh of the sâ—ed of Dâ—vid and out of the Town of Bethlehem where David was This is consented to â—y all here then leâ— us consider that that saying cometh forth is understood of his being borne at Bethlehem this likewise is unquâ—stioned for ought I find then let us meditate upon the last Clause whose going forth have been from of old from everlasting there is no â—eason to think but that as his coming forth in the precedent part of the verse did signify hâ—s birth according to his humanity so this going forth from of old c. should signifie his birth according to his divinity for these cannot be understood of that birth which was at Bethlehem which the Prophet saith shall be which was acted long time after the Prophet's writing but of something that was acted long before which those words inforce from of old and from everlasting Faustus Socinus in his answer to Wicâ—us and Bellarmine Cap. 7. pag. 394. thus answers hujus ipsius rationis vì concludi non solùm de vera nativitaâ—e utrobique agi sâ—d etiam de eadem c. That the foâ—ce of this reason doth not onely evince that this is mâ—ant of a true nativity but the same nativity observe his reason for saith he the latter words by which he means come forth coming from the same
prosecution of it and to none other Sect. 11. And in this St. John giveth the Son of God no new name but such as men knew him by long before Saint John's time The Philosophers in all ages when their Soules soared so high as to contemplate the essence of God his creation and government of the world they said he had a Son or mind which proceeded from him like Light from the Sun that is a simile they are frequent in and they termed that Son his word and they say that that Word made the world and gave Life and being to all things thus Trismegistus in the first Chapter of his Poemander and Section 4. according to the edition of Flussus he saw in his rapture an indefinite Light then in the fifth Section he enquired 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 what comes out of the light the answear was made The holy word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the holy word then in the sixth Section when Trismegistus had begg'd an expression of this vision I saith Poemander I 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 intellectus mens I a Spirit I translate it or as is commonly amongst those Philosophers the Supreme Spirit of God I that Spirit thy God am that light and presently after that bright or resplendent Word which thou didst see come out is the Son of God I could shew much more to this purpose out of him but this is enough to shew that this which St. John deliver's here when he calle's the Son of God the word internall is according to the language of this Philosopher if there could be any farther doubt let any man read that whole Chapter he shall find his expressions extremely full the same may be found up and down in Plato the Sibylls Zoroaster and many more which I need not name because the observations out of them are made by many and as well as this acknowledged by Socinus as I shall shew presently Sect. 12. But this one thing more may be worth the marking that not onely those Philosophers which writ before St. Iohn had these expressions but those who lived after him as Plotinus Porphyrius Iamblicus Proclus but Amelius who lived after him about two hundred years more or less observe's this concordance of St. Iohn with them it is true he call's him a Barbarian as the pride of the Grecians did all that were not Grecians but that by the Barbarian he mean't St. Iohn is evident because he set's down the words of this Text I treat of and some following verses and approve's the Consent of that Barbarian well then this being a language of learned men before St. Iohn to call the Son of God the Word of God in respect of his Divine nature and it being observed by Philosophers who had no by-end but onely the apprehension of this Evangelist I see no reason why we should be forced to give it a violent sense not used by any and most unconsisting as will appear by the examination of every word with the rest Sect. 13. This consent of these Philosophers Socinus foresaw and therefore pag. 37. of this Treatise he handle's this Sentence The word was made flâ—sh he saith Si ea non addâ—dâ—sset If he had not added these words the word was made flâ—sh some man might and that by right have fallen into that errour c. that he should think that word of which Iohn write's to be another thing or sometimes to have been another thing from the man Iesus and perhaps endowed with Platonical Philosophy when he should see him here called God and in the beginning to be wiâ—h God this is pag. 38. to make the world c. he should presently believe that our Evangelist was conformable to Plato who hath writ of God some things out of which this opinion of the Trinity did flow and presently after he saith that other Philosophers had it from Trismegistus and acknowledgeth Iamblichus so that he yield's that some before and some after St. Iohn understood this phrase of St. Iohn's according to our exposition but I think that he can shew me no writer before or after unless Photinians and themselves which are the same that expounded this Text of the humanity of Christ what concern's that verse which Socinus apply's that discourse to I shall meet with in its proper place but what concern's me now I cannot but think it reasonable that when so many learned Authors had philosophized with such learned discourses concerning God his Word and Spirit under that language and notion I cannot but imagine it most congruous to reason that those divine Speculations of theirs so far as true should be countenanced by one Evangelist one infallible Writer of Divine Truths that every man might hear God speaking to him in his own language Sect. 14. I am sure the first fathers almost all because they had to do with philosophical men made use of those conveniencies they had with Scripture and so did Saint Paul and I may say of our Evangelist that he did frequently make use of their language and expressions never bâ—ulking them but chusing them before other where they were fit for his purpose and especially Plato I could instance in very many of this kind which any man who is acquainted with these Authors know's but I will select two or three which have not as I know of been used to such purpose and the first shall be out of Plato's Epistle to Hermias Erastus and Coriscus these three in that Epistle he invite's to have a kindness and friendship one with another and to avoid all differences he adviseth to establish a kind of Covenant and Law one with another and confirm that even by an oath in which Oath they should call God to witness who is the Captain of all things present and future and the Lord who is father of that Captain and cause whom saith he if we truly philosophize we shall know clearly all of us so far as the nature of a happy soul can attain unto in this speech we see he clearly set's down the Son of God to be the cause and governour of all things as in an hundred well-nigh other places then he saith such as are vertuous shall see him clearly as a happy soul can do what is this but which holy Job who was before him too said I know that my Redeemer liveth and that in my flâ—sh I shall see God Job 19.25 26. and the same that St. John relate's our Saviour to express in his prayer this is life eternal that they might know thee the onely true God and Iesus Christ whom thou hast sent John 17.3 life eternal that is the felicity Plato speak's of it is true Plato could not say Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent because in his humanity our Saviour was not yet seen in the world but Plato spake of him according to his Divinity that felicity consisted in the clear vision of him and I may truly say I was extremely
stand's upon in the Book before specifyed contra Pasno but in his Comment upon this Text he insist's upon that Text 1 Cor. 8.5 For though there be that are called Gods whether in Heaven or Earth as there be Gods many and Lords many ver 6. but unto us there is but one God c. now saith he this shewe's that there are many Gods besides the great God of one of which this Text ought to be understood and to confirme this he in the Chapter before alleadged contra Pasn page 74. urgeth that the Apostle to shew that he mean't not the great God left out an Article here at 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which he put before and this is much insisted upon by Smalcius Valkâ—lius and the rest I shall take these in order and endeavour to answear them I think that this same Term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or God in our language signifye's God in his essence throughout the New Testament which is the onely Authenticke book we have to give any undoubted assent unto for any Term there used for although it may sometimes be otherwise used yet there is alwayes some Comment some words added to it which do illustrate it in such a manner as any reasonable man may discerne that it is applyed to an extrinsecall Sense in this piece I shall apply my self principally to Crellius who hath a Chapter of purpose against it being the 13. Chapter of the first Book de Deo ejus Attributis not avoiding any thing I find other where Sect. 20. This Doctrine of mine Crellius allowe's in such cases where this word God is spoken of such powers quae ne imperia quidem sunt propriè sed similitudinem tantum cum eis habent which are not truly Empires but have a likenesse onely to them so saith he Sathan is called the God of this Word 2 Cor. 4.4 where we see it so explained as any man may know the true God is not mean't so likewise the Prince of this World John 12.3 so likewise the belly Philip. 3.19 whose God is their belly in all which he that runneth may reade this Word God is a Metaphor so applyed to other things by the very Context that he cannot choose but discerne it to be used out of its proper sense but this is it I contend for that out of the New Testament no man can shew that this Word in the singular number without a Comment to expound it in a diverse Sense is used for any but for the great God as it is put here in this I have bestowed much pains to examine all places used by this Apostle either in his Gospell Epistles or Apocalyps and I can find none so that undoubtedly it is not his language that Criticisme which is so much stood upon by Crellius Socinus and all of that opinion that where there is no Article put to a Word there it may be understood in a large Sense but where an Article in a more strict for which he tightly produced St. Cyrill I answer That neither with Article nor without can they shew me any place where this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or God is used in the singular number absolutely without some addition to expound it otherwise for any but the true and great God if there had been any sure after so much paines as they have taken in this Theam they would have found it so that then this Word God being put absolutely the word was God without any limitation or exposition it must be understood of the true and great God those Instances of Socinus will give no denyall to my conclusion that of John 10.34 where it is said of men that God had said they were Gods consider here the plurall number which one onely thing is enough to distinguish them from the true God who can be but one but then reade the next words ver 35. he called them Gods to whom the word of God came observe here that these Gods were not such by their nature but by the power of the word of God and therefore must be of another nature from him so likewise that in 1 Cor. 8.5 there are Gods many and Lord many that is many which by Gentiles are worshipped for Gods and Lords ver 6. yet to us there is but one God c. a man may say of these either they are true Gods or false if true they are Gods to us if false we have nothing to do with them though others magnify them and adore them for Gods yet to us they are not Gods so that here we have the Context teaching the Sense of these phrases clearly but in my Text it is put absolutely without relation to any particular and therefore ought to be allowed in its proper sense and for the rule of St. Cyrill I may justly say of it that it is to be understood of such words which in their genuine and proper signifiation have such a double sense a large and a restrained sense but such Words which do naturally and properly signâ—fie one and by a Figure signâ—fie other things when they are used for other things they ought to have some Circumstance to expound that they are applied to those other things of which nature this word God is it properly signâ—fie's that Divine excellency but when it is affirmed of other things it is out of some resemblance or participation of his Divine Excellencies which are in them and then for what I can find either from them or mine own Study there is some Circumstance or other which demonstrate's that application to us as may appear out of all these instances before Sect. 21. But Smalcius in his Refutation Libelli de divina verbi incarnati natura cap. 8. pag 94. urgeth against our Conceit thus Si in principio c. If in the beginning with God or in God as Smiglecius would have it none can be but God and that which is in God is God certainly he who say's of another that he is in God say's likewise that he is God nor may he adde that he is God but by a Tautology therefore because St. John had said before that he was with God and added that he was God he did not before affirm that he was God when he said he was with God This is his discourse and it is somewhat perplexed but the meaning I guess is that this were a Tautology in St. Iohn if the Antecedent were true but I will answer all in a word although it be true that whatsoever is with God eternally must be God yet this truth being not so apparent to every man's understanding it was most useful for the instruction of men about these divine Truths that there should be some expressions made of it But pag 50. Smalcius proceed's with another objection whereas Smiglecius had said that in this place God is put absolutely and properly which is never said of any man and had
Wisdome but that this Wisdome should be a person that this person should be the Son of God without some other Light then he hâ—th naturally a man cannot perceive it for although it be a most received Axiome in the School that Omnia opera Dei ad extrà sunt indivisa that all the outward workes of God are wrought by the whole Trinity yet they are done by such an unity of the Trinity as is not observed out of those vestigia's as they speak those partiall representations which are in the Creature of it and therefore I am perswaded that Trismegistus Socrates Plato and such others who have such lively expressions of these mysteries either had some revelations made to them from above or else had met with some Prophet or prophetick writing upon which they confiding were bold out of tâ—em to make these expositions to this which I have said I cannot discerne any thing answered because I have not known it urged to that height by others nor do I know what they can object unlesse it be that St. John seeme's to upbraid the world with ingratitude that they should not take notice of so great a goodnesse of God's who made it but this cannot be justly urged against them who could not know him whom as it seem's by discourse the world could not to this I answer that for any thing I see such an intention of the Text is yielded to by writers on both sides but I discerne nothing in the Text that enforceth any more then an historiall narrative of the nature and condition of the World that he was undiscerned in the world untill some supernaturall blessing enlightned men I cannot discerne any such upbraiding as they speak of but if there be any morall intention besides the history there is nothing can be deduced more naturally then that men who have this light are bound to a gratefull acknowledgment of all they have to arise from God both naturall and spirituall things and to use them to his glory or if men will apprehend such a thing as upbraiding be it that they may think it consisted in this that the generality did not know him as they might men did not apprehend so much as was apprehendible of him but I choose rather the first exposition although the second be the common road and I proceed to the next Verse He came unto his own and his own received him not this and the two next Verses yield a great many heavenly meditations which I could delight to discourse as well as thinke of but they are not pertinent to this businesse I have in hand to shew that our Saviour was the word of God which was God Sect. 14. I therefore let them passe and come to the 14. Verse where we find opposition from them with much art which we render thus And the Word was made flesh and dwelt amongst us there are two propositions in this particle And the Word was made flâ—sh that is the first Here by the Word the Socinian understand's the same Word as before Christ as by preaching and Miracles he manifested the will of God to men but that this could not be made flesh is evident because it was flesh alwayes and nothing can be made that which it is but this Word was alwayes such if it had been that flesh was made the Word there had been some sense in it because then we had understood that that man who at the first was not the Word by preaching c. was made the Word but this sentence the Word was made flesh abide's no such construction to avoid this therefore they fly to that other Term was made of which I have treated before when it came in my way at the sixth Verse this word say they with one consent signifye's to be and it should be read the word was flâ—sh this I have examined before and shewed that I can find no place in St. John where 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is so used that necessarily men must understand it in their sense so that that place in the sixth Verse was so read for the smoothnesse of the Latine or English Language which would not abide the verball translation of the Greek now I will adde thus much in these 14. Verses 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is used for was or being at the least nine or ten times and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 five or six times for made what reason can we imagine that the style or language should be altered here but then let us consider what the sense would be if the Text were read as they would make us believe the Word was flesh as much as if we should say the preacher was a man which were a most ridiculous speech and therefore to avoid this they fly to this Term flesh and say that that Term doth not signify flesh its self or a man cloathed with flesh pars pro toto which is often in Scripture but the humble estate of a man and here they bestow much Rhetorick to shew that the Evangelist having spoken so great things of the Word that it was with God was God that all things were made by him c. lest men should enter into this vain Conceipt that he was the great God he pluck's him down to consider that he is but a weak man flesh subject to many miseries and misfortunes death and injuries c. observe here that this word Flesh in its naturall and proper meaning signifye's a part of man in a figurative manner by a Synechdoche it signifye's the whole but for any thing I can discerne in Scripture it is not used for any base or miserable condition of man but onely in generall Terms to shew that man whilest he live's in flesh is subject to the infirmities of it the places produced by Socinus speak no more the first is Psal. 78.39 he remembred that they were but flesh here is a speech concerning the Israelites in their generall State as men and as frail and weak but no particular dejectednesse of their Condition but that they were no better then men His second place is Isaiah 40.6 All flesh is grasse and all the goodlinesse thereof as the flower of the field suppose I should yield that here by flesh is reprepresented a low and mean Condition yet here is such a Comment joyned to this word flâ—sh as enforceth that conceipt but in my Text there is no such thing so that still I may say that this Term flesh teacheth us no such thing without an addition of such other language as may render it of that sense but then again all the expression of any lownesse or dejectednesse of estate that is here made is nothing else but the generall condâ—tion of mankind no particular humiliation mean't by it and that is evident out of that phrase all flesh is grasse c. this sign all shew's it to be mean't universally So