exâ—min'd there are some whose Notions are so iâ—â—ricâ—â—e and their expressions so much out of thâ— common Road that many times they do facere intelligendo ut alij saltem nihil intelligant what I here design therefore in these Papers is clearneâ—s and perspicuity for however deep the pit might be wherein the Ancients plaâ—'d Truth yet I never heard that it was muddy so that what is said of the method of Salvation by the Gospel Rom. 10. 8. may be apply'd generally to all things of a moral Nature the word is nigh thee even in thy Mouth and in thine Heart The learned and judicious Author of the Occasional Papers Paper 1. Pa. 4. tells us that it would be of great Service both to Religion and good Manners to have ill Books as they are publish'd consider'd calmly by Men of Temper I would only propound it further to Consideration whether it might not be convenient also somewhat to enlarge the design and not only take notice of ill Books as he calls them such as either directly or by natural and easie consequence tend to undermine our Faith or corrupt our Manners not only I say to take notice of such but also of the more material mistakes even of good ones the best and wiâ—est Men mâ—y â—ometimes be mistaken in their principlâ—s or dâ—duâ—tions â—rom thâ—m and it is no dâ—sparagement â—or any one to acknowledge it There is one thing further wherein I must beg thy pardon theâ—e Dâ—â—courâ—es want one great ornament of all Compoâ—ures Essays themselves not being excepted that is my transitions are not so soft and well connected as they ought to be this I am very sensible of what the Reason hereof may be I know not whether it be my want of Skill which I rather think nobis non licet esse tà m disertis or want of leisure my other employments not suffering me to apply my Self to these thoughts but at certain intervals or my natural but I confess very culpable indifferency both as to Style and Method however it is if this be any satisfaction to thee I do willingly acknowledge my fault herein Nor must thou expect full and just Discourses upon Each of those Points I here mention neither my Ability nor Inclination concurring herein fully to exhaust a Subject I have no other end or design in these Papers but only the search and defence of Truth and if in any thing I be mistaken and who can seâ—vre himself from mistakes I shall think my self oblig'd to any one who shall with candour and calmness show me my Error Mr. Lock 's Epistle to the Reader examin'd so far as concernes the Law of fashion and innate notions in his second Edition of his Essay of humane understanding WHAT benefit or advantage as to the concernes of truth and usefull knowledge the World may receive by that little difference in Dispute betwixt Mr. Lock and me I know not yet herein I hope we have given an instance of the possibility of manageing a controversie without hard words or unhansome Reflections and if even this was more generally observed it would very much advance the interest of truth however of Love and Friendship in the World among persons of different Opinions I do not in the least question the truth and sincerity of what he there professes that he is always ready to renounce his own and receive the opinion of others according as truth appears on either side yet I hope he will pardon me if I take the freedom to say that the Instance he there gives of altering of his opinion in reference to the last determination of the will of Man doth not seem to come up so fully to his purpose seeing he doth not there so much quit any Opinion of his own to embrace that of anothers as to renounce the common opinion of most tho then believed by him to entertain an Opinion I think purely his own Mr. Lock there complains that his meaning is often mistaken and that he has not always the good Luck to be rightly understood This is a common complaint in such circumstances and I think I may also lay a just claime to a share therein but if I have mistaken his meaning in any thing whatever the cause might otherwise be I do insist upon this in my own vindication that it was not out of any wilful designe And I furthâ—r assure that Learned Man that I never did think my self nor went about to insinuate to others that it was my Opinion of him that he absolutely held no reall difference or distinction betwixt Vice and Vertue I did only ask this question there Whether if Men should place their commendation or blame on that sâ—ide which deserv'd it not whether that would alter the nature of things This I conceiv'd might either set the thing in a clearer light in it self or give him occasion so to do I there also farther appeal'd to himself Pa. 17. of his 1 st Edition where I suppose he did not only declare the sense of the Heathen Phylosophers but his own too upon this Subject when he grounds the reason of Mens keeping their word not upon the approbation of the place Men live in But upon the honesty and dignity of the thing it felf I did also read and consider those other places where he doth positively assert the unchangeable Rules of right and wrong only I must confess I did much wonder how so Learned a Man should go so near as I thought to contradict himself in other places where his expressions seem'd at least to me then to infer the the Rules of Vice and Vertue to be of a more changeable Nature perticularly in that place I quoted Pa. 159. Vertue is every where that which is thought praise-worthy and nothing else but that which has the allowance of publique esteem is vertue But instead of is Virtue in the 1 st Edition it is now is called Vertue in the Second therefore I suppose he say's That the 2d Edition will give me satisfaction in the point and that this matter is now so express'd as to show there was no cause of scruple It may be so exprest now perhaps that there is no cause of scruple tho that I much question but it will not sollow hence that â—here was none but rather the contrary because he has alter'd his Expression in such a materiall point But he tells us That he was there not laying down morall Rules but showing the Original and nature of morall Ideas For my part I dare scarce trust my own eyes against his word I shall here quote part of the Paragraph which he here refers to P. 157. § 6. Of these moral Rules or Laws to which Men generally refer and which they judge of the rectitude or pravity of their actions there seeme to me to be three sorts Here he seemes to me to call 'em morall Rules but whether he meanes the same thing by morall Rules here that he meanes in his Epistle that
of their own Club but I wish they had no greater Vices to answer for than this I have heard of a King that was both blind and Lame whereupon it was grown in fashion and a laudable custom in that Court not to appear but with one Eye cover'd and with some counterfeiting at least a lameness These were indeed very complaisant Courtiers but why they should be call'd Vertuous for their dissimulation I know not nor whether they were accounted so even in that Place where the thing was grown so fashionable Thieves live in good Repute and Credit among themselves and no doubt applaud their own Exploits in their own Clubs but yet I much question whether they think violence and rapine to be Vertues or no or do indeed call 'em so They may perhaps employ their wits and fancy's to excuse their way of living but not to justifie it nor to raise it to a degree of Vertue or if we should suppose one among the rest more modest in his apprehensions and not retain such Heroick thoughts of Theft and Murderâ— as the others did yet I fancy his Life would not be so uneasie to him as Mr. Locks Sanction would seem to make it pa. 159. I scarce think that any Christian Nation and the Christian World is a Scene large enough for this dispute doth call that a vertue which either is in it self or by any other Christian Nation is called a vice Whoredome tho' in some Countries permitted and but too much in fashion yet it is not even there call'd a vertue tho' perhaps it may be counted a lesser vice And why should we here in England begin to unhinge and unsettle 〈…〉 whose sense and meaning always was and still ought to be more fix'd and constant 2. this Law of Opinion and Reputation as it is made to Constitute a distinct Law is not well grounded for a Law is always suppos'd to bring men under an obligation now the things in fashion among men if they be contrary to the Law of Nature let mens opinions of 'em be what they will yet they are no Law to any one and if they be agreeable to the Law of Nature then they do so far coincidere with the Divine Law and do not constitute a new Species of Law But I must remember what Mr. Lock reminds me of that he only relates what others say not what he defends But if so then I can mention several other rules which men sometimes make Lawes to themselves viz. their respective tempers and humours and the prejudices of Education which are as much Laws to these men in their respective Clubs as opinion and reputation are to others in theirs But he goes on whatsoever Authority he says I place in my old English Dictionary it no where tells me that the same action is not in credit call'd and reputed a vertue in one place which being in disrepute passes for and under the name of vice in another But with submission I must tell him that what ever Authority he places in his new way of speaking yet tho' our English Dictionarys his as well as mine no where say that the same actions are not variously reputed so or so in various places for that is not their business yet they no where say that they are For both our Dictionarys and Moral Philosophers I appeal to both tell us that vice and vertue are much what the same with good and evil sin and duty and by consequence that they did not at least in those times so much as receive their denomination from Custom but if he had instanc'd in one perticular action in the whole Christian World which in one Place was counted a vertue and in another a vice it would have added much light to the whole and better explain'd his meaning The taking notice that Men bestow the names of vertue and vice according to the rule of reputation is all I have done or can be laid to my charge to have done towards the making of vice vertue and vertue vice Here I would only ask whether this of Mens bestowing the names of vertue and vice according to the rule of reputation be in it self a just well grounded and reasonable action if it be why doth he not assert and defend it if it be not why doth he found a Law viz. of opinion and reputation upon the unwarrantable and ill grounded actions of Men. But he seemes to commend me upon what account I know not for taking the alarm as he calls it euen at expressions which standing alone by themselves might sound ill and be suspected I know not what he means by expressions standing alone by themselues I hope he will grant that several expressions standing alone by themselves that is at certain distances yet all upon the same account justly exceptionable may be taken notice of and I suppose he now understands that it was not only one single expression dropt as it were by chance from his Pen that I found fault with but with his whole way of arguing upon that perticular 'T is to this zeal allowable in his Function Some think this to be a reflection upon my Function as if its proper business was to be employ'd in impertinencies but I am willing according to my Function to put the most favourable interpretation upon things that they are capable of bearing that I forgive his Citing my words as he there does c. 'T is my happiness that I find that some Men as they are great so they are also merciful I also thank him for the respect he seems to show to the Function but Zeal without knowledge as he must suppose mine to be for otherwise I should never have found fault where there was no ground for it is no more pardonable in my Function than in others pâ—rhaps less But no one they say refuses Gods and the Kings Pardon I will go a little further and not only accept but humbly beg his Pardon too if I be in the wrong but I hope I may contestari litem He blames me for not taking notice of those words immediately preceding those of his The exhortations of inspired Teachers c. But it was not much material to my Purpose nor any way Prejudiâ—ial to his Cause whether I did or no as I hope will appear in the Sequel He also blames me for quoting that Place of St. Paul Phil. 4. 8. Whatsoever things are lovely whatsoever things are of good report if there be any vertue if there be any Praise c. In a sense he us'd it not Truly I am not yet convinced that I quoted it in any other sense than the Apostle spoke it and if he us'd it in any other I cannot tell how to help it he must look to that but he says he brought this passage of St. Paul to show that for reasons he there gives Men in that way of denominating their actions do not for the moâ—t part much vary from the Law of Nature which
indeed nothing has a necessary connexion with nothing is certainly true but then it seems to border too near upon those Propositions which add no light to the understanding which bring no encrease to our knowledg that is trifleing Propositions P a. 307. of Eâ—say Mr. Norris blames Mr. Lock because he has not given us a just and real difinition of an Idea and may â—ot Mr. Lock blame Mr. Norris his difiâ—iâ—ion Pa. 30 of his reflexions upon Mr. Lock 's Essay when he tells us that an Idea is a partial representation of the Divine omniformity or the omniâ—orm Essence oâ— God partially represented eitâ—er as in it selfe unintelligible or as not so agreeable to the honour and dignity of the Divine â—ssence I could have wish'd that Mr. Lock had further explain'd what relation those opperations of the mind which he calls Ideas of reflexion have to the precedent impressions made upon the sense Pa. 44. § 24. That seems to suppose sensible impressions alwayes to preceed the reflexions of the mind But on the other hand Intuitive knowledge viz. of the existence of our Souls doth neither suppose nor is it self any operation of the mind about any sensible impressions going before Mr. Lock charg'd me with some kind of a inconsistency of expression in one place saying that the Soul exerted those notions in one another that they exerted themselves But t is a great sign that matter and Argument run low when Men thus meanly carp at words I hope I have sufficiently vindicated my self as to that particular but if I should follow the example of so great a Master and be thus severely critical it perhaps would be difficult for himself to avoid the like censures pa. 323. of his Essay § 14. 1 st Edit Knowledge is the consequence of the ideas that are in our minds what ever they are and produce generall certain pâ—opositions I dare not be over confident that I rightly understand the period but if this be the sense of it which seemes to be so that the ideas produce these generall certain propositions I humbly conceive it the more proper way of speaking to say that the Soul by the aids and assistance of these ideas produce those propositions than that the ideas themselves should do it I do not speak this as if there was here any just occasion of exception but only to show how easily men may be ill natur'd if they pleas'd I am sorry I have not the concurrence of Mr. Becconsall's opinion in this point too of innate notions I shall therefore briefly examine some passages of his relating to this subject first I do not well understand why he should grant the Law of nature to be innate or implanted in the minds of Men as he tells us Pa 2 d. That â—he Gentiles had a Law of action implanted in â—he very frame and Constitution of their Natures and Pa. 6. The Law of Nature is implanted in the minds of Men as rationall beings And yet at the same time to reject the Doctrine of innate inscriptions as he calls ' em Pa. 75. Whereas I humbly conceive that the Law of Nature is either the same with these naturall inscriptions or innate notions or the one so Founded in the other that they must both stand or fall together if by being implanted in the minds of Men he mean only a power or faculty in the Soul of collecting those truths by rational disquisitions then I think he has not done right neither to himself nor his Reader by so expressing it But he says Pa. 75. that the frame and order of things both within and without us with the exercise of our own facultys upon 'em will present us with a Scheme of moral duty and a true measure of action and that too as clearly as if it was imprinted upon the mind with the first lineaments of its being I do not deny the great use and advantage of our naturall faculties in order to that end that is to those whose circumstances are such that they have abilitys and opportunities to employ 'em so that is Christians may possibly do it but a great part of the Gentile world cannot But how does he prove that this Scheme of duty will thus be as clearly presented to us as if it was imprinted with the First lineaments of our beings This seemes to be barely asserted without proof Whereas the contrary seemes more probable that the double evidence of natural inscription and Rationall deduction would add to the cleareness of the thing And therefore he says There seemes to be no visible necessity for haveing recourse to innate ideas or inscriptions Those who assert innate inscriptions justly suppose themselves on the defensive part and they who write against 'em can challenge no other than that of opponents Now barely to plead the no necessity of a thing is no necessary argument against him who positively asserts the matter of fact that it is so for many things may be and are so of which perhaps there is no necessity that they should be so And this seemes sufficient to abate the force of the Argument If nothing further could be added for what if God has given us greater assistances than perhaps were absolutely necessary in a thing of so great concernment we have no reason to take it ill But then why may we not assert if not a necessity yet a great conveniency of these naturall notions viz. In respect of that part of the Gentile world who have neither ability nor inclination to make such profound disquisitions into the nature of Man and the reason of things as are necessary to attain to the naturall knowledge of duty And if Mr. Becconsall had more fully consider'd the Barbarous state of the greatest part of the Heathen World t is probable he would have found 'em subjects not capable of such rationall enquiry's as his way of Arguing supposes ' em But he goes on If innate ideas be serviceable to Mankind they must be so in order to supply the defects â—f reason and consequently they seem to be exempt from the disquisitions of reason These natural notions of truth and goodness are some of the greatest strokes wherein consists the Image of God imprinted upon the minds of Men in order to make them what they are rational and Religious now if this Learned Author or any else call this a supplying the defects of Reason I shall not much oppose it only I should rather call 'em the fundamental principles of all Reasoning And consequently they seem to be exempt from the disquisitions of Reason I do not understand the necessity of this consequence at all for how can these things be fit and proper aids to supply the defects of reason if they themselves cannot or dare not undergoe the most exact trialls and disquisâ—tions of reason He gives his reason in the following words For if innate ideas are to be examined and judged on by the working of reason What then We might have
Epicurism because the assert the Providence of God and a Future State of Rewards and Punishments Only I would heartily and humbly propound to their consideration whether they being happily brought up in the belief and practise of the Christian Religion and their now falling back from it whether I say this may not be a step naturally leading to that worst sort of Deism little better than Atheisme For what better or stronger reasons will they have for retaining the Natural Religion than they had or might have had for Christianity It is to be fear'd that the Purity of the Precepts and the severity of the Christian Doctrine was the great offence they took at the Christian Religion and may they not after such a breach as it were made upon their Consciences be tempted to renounce even Natural Religion it self for the same reasons Nemo repentè fit pessimus Men â—ommonly by degrees arrive at the height of â—ickedness Mr. Blount in his Letter Pa. 87. â—f the Oracles of Reason Tho' Deisme be â— good manureing of a Mans Conscience yet â—ertainly if sow'd with Christianity it will â—roduce the most profitable crop But 't is reâ—orted that before his Death he fell from that more modest and ingenious temper of mind which he here seem'd to express Vriel Acosta in his Life time was very wavering in his Religion and at last turn'd Deist and shot himself The same Fate attended that unfortunatâ— Gentleman both in his Life and Death I shall make no personal reflections only lay down this great truth worthy to be consider'd by the Immortal Deist as he is call'd Pa. 95 That Christianity lays the best and surest foundation of living and dying well I shall here because of the affinity of the subject to this in hand briefly examine some particulars in the Translators preface to Hierocles upon the Golden Verses of the Pythagoreans Sheet a 4. The proposition he there advanecs is this That it is possible by a due advertency to the light of nature sufficiently to discern betwixt good and evill This is very true unless perhaps there lyes some ambiguity in the word sufficiently that the light of Nature doth or may inform us in the greater stroaks and instances of our duty is certainly true but whether it descends to all the particulars thereof may be justly question'd but then in the proof of this proposition I think he goes further the the nature of the thing reqnired the Heathens might be able by the light of Nature to distinguish betwixt good and evill tho' their Writings did not fully come up to the height of Christianity I do not asserts he says that the Law of Nature was Engraven upon the hearts of Men in as faire Characters as upon the two Tables of Stone for then there would have been little or no use of Revelation Here seems to be some little obscurity both in the proposition he layes down and in the inference he makes from it I shall briefly examine both 1 st It seemes as reasonable to believe that the Law of Nature was Engraven At first in as fair Characters upon the minds of Men as it was afterwaâ—ds upon the two Tables of Stone I do not mean in any gross sense that is Natural Duties might be as well known to Adam in Paradice by the light of Nature as they were afterwards to the Iews by the Promulgation of the Law if the Law of Nature in process of time was so defac'd that it could not be so easily Read this was owing to the vicious principles and practises to the false opinions and wicked Lives of Men afterwards 2 ly As to the inference For then there would have been little or no use of Revelation This may refer either to the Revelation of the Law or of the Gospell to that of Moses or that of Christ. If it refer to that of Moses yet the Revelation of the Law by him might be of great use by seting out as it were a Second Edition of it upon Tables of Stone when it was so miserably defaced before upon the minds of Men. If it refer to the Gospell that also might be of very great use notwithstanding all the clearest Revelations that were made either by the Law of Nature or by the Law of Moses because the Revelation of the Gospell contains in it something that was never designed to be made known at least so fully by either And he will not I suppose say that the method of salvation now revealed in the Gospel is contain'd in the Law of Nature tho' it had been writ in as fair Charâ—cters as that of the two Tables of Stone nor can he say that the Law of Nature fully and clearly Imprinted upon the minds of Men would render any further Revelation particularly that of the Gospel useless But yet he says that in the Writings of the Heathens is contain'd the whole Moral Law and that uot only in the integral parts but in its utmost intention nor is there one Precept of Christianity so exalted and Heroical but may be paralell'd in an Heathen No Man can deny this he says who has read the Morals of Plutarch Seneca Epictetus Cicero to these he also adds Juvenal and Persius I am not in the least willing to lessen the great excellencys that some of the Heathens have attain'd to but yet I kâ—ow no reason why they should be equall'd with the Christians As for those Moralists and Poets he mentions 't is observable that all of 'em except Cicero liv'd after the time of our Saviour and the promulgation of the Gospel and it is certain that the Christian Religion had very much improv'd the Morals of the Heathen world at that time and that they owe a great deal of that light which appears in their writings to the Sun of Rightousness tho' they were not so ingenious as to acknowledge it So that there can be no necessary Argument drawn from these to prove that the Heathens purely as such can vie with Christians in this particular What was said of Seneca may in some measure be said of the rest si Christianus Paganice Si Paganus Christiane Scripsit Then as for those Heathens that liv'd â—befoe our Saviours time I think I shall do 'em nothing but right and justice in these following particulars 1. They had no right notion of original sin that general depravation and corruption of humane nature either as to the true cause or cure of it without which I think there cannot be laid any such firm foundation of Vertue and Piety as Christianity thereby now affords us 2. The Heathens were not alwayes consistent with themselves in their discourses of this nature their Candle did not only burn dim But like one in thâ— Socket it had sometimâ—s its lucid intervals and then somtimes seem'd to be quite extinguish'd they had light enough to shew 'em their own darkness but not sufficient to assure 'em of the right way the light of their understandings was
Religion either by rational deduction or Natural inscription Orall Traditionâ— haveing not found that good success in the World as to Divinity as much to encourage others â—o urge or to prosecute thâ— same in morality But he says that tho' relations of matters of fact ancient customs and difficult articles of Faith may suffer much by â—eing convey'd this way c. But was not Gods instructing Adam in these things matter of fact Or may not matters of Fact done by God be misrepresented as well as those done by Men As for difficult Articles of Faith if he mean such as are of a more complex nature and include a long series of propositions or if he supposes this Tradition to extend to the modes and circumstances of things then this way might be very lyable to mistake and corruption by passing through so many hands but suppose God had taught Adam to believe a Trinity in the God-head the Resurection of the Body with out the respective modes of either I doe not see but that these might as safely and securely have been delivered down to posterity as those other precepts he mentionsâ— but these plain Rules of morality he says such as worship God Honour thy Parents c. Are so natural to the understanding so easy â—o be imbraced by it and appear upon proposal to be so extreamly usefull â—o Mankind c. Here he seemes to relinquish his own principle Tradition and to found the belief and ready reception of these rules of Morallity in their being so natural to the understanding c. That they must be assented to and can never be mistaken or forgot But pa. 33. he tells us that there are some very barbarous People who we are very certain want most of these Moral Notions so that here must have been some mistake or forgetfulness on some hand or other But he says Pa. 37. If Morality was inscrib'd on Mens hearts Parents might with as muh wisdom pretend to teach their Children to eat and drink to love their Children c. So that it seems there is such a Natural Duty or instinct for Parents to love their Children that they cannot but do it But why is not the Duty reciprocal Why may not Children be in the same way bound to honour their Parents as Parents to love their Children and yet he says Pa. 72. That among the ancient Heathens it was a common thing to throw their Children when born into the next ditch they met with No great Argument of such a Natural Love and Affection towards 'em as they could not but show and exercise Pa. 33 he tells us 't is odd to think that these Propositions should come into the minds of Men by such an unaccountable way as that of Inscription and yet he says Pa. 92. That Gods permission of Vice is no sign of his liking it he having otherwise declar'd his will by giving to all Men a Law of Vertue This cannot be understood of the traditionary Law because that has not by some defect or other extended to all Men. Pa. 38. 'T is further remarkable that Parents Deut. 6.6 are commanded by God to teach their Children these Moral Dutys But what then Did ever any body assert that this Natural Inscription doth superâ—ede the necessity of other Instructions or the use of those other means which God and Nature have made requisite in order to the more perfect knowledge of our Dutys But after the recital of the Ten Commandments viz. The Moral Law Moses adds and these words which I command Thee this day shall be in thy heart and thou shalt teach them diligently to thy Children c. But these words were not introduc'd immediately after the recital of the Ten Commandmentsâ— The ten Commandments were recited about the middle of the 5 th Chap. and v. 31. God there speaking to Moses says Stand thou here by me and I will speak unto thee all tâ—e Commandments and Statutes and Iudgments which thou shalt teach them that they may do-them in the Land which I give them to posssess it Now these words Commandments Statutes and Iudgments are generally understood to signifie all the Precepts of the Moral Ceremonial and Judicial Law and certainly the Jewes were oblig'd to observe some other Laws besides the Tenâ— Commandments in the Land which theâ— Lord gave 'em to possess it The like words are repeated Ch. 6. 1. Whereupon â— 6. it follows These words which I command the this day shall be inâ— thy heart He proceeds 'T is further remarkable that what Moses here says shall be in the Iewes hearts the Apostle says Rom. 2. 15. was written in the Gentiles hearts so that unless there can be a substantial difference evinc'd between being in the heart and written there all the Doctrine of inscrib'd Propositions falls to the ground I perceive that those who are any ways concern'd for the Doctrine of Inscrib'd Propositions must either now speak or else for ever hereafter hold their peace But to this I answer 1. That if that expression of Moses of Being in their hearts relate only to the Ten Commandments viz the Moral Law Why then may not Moses be as well explain'd by St. Paul as St. Paul by Moses and so Natural inscription be understood by both 2. I know not whether I can show a substantial difference betwixt â—â—ose expressions or no yet I hope I shall sâ—ow such an one as may be sufficient to satisfie any impartial and considerate Reader 1 Moses and St. Paul do not speak Secundum idem or ad idem Moses speaks of the Precepts of all the three Laws Moral Ceremonial and Iudicial St. Paul only of the Moral 2. They do not speak Eodem modo Moses's expression of being in their hearts according to the best Interpreters signifies no more than being in their Memory 's and affections St. Pauls being written in their hearts signifies something more as supposing the Gentiles naturally conscious of the observation and breach of the Moral Law So that I humbly conceive there can be no Argument drawn from the comparing those two places of Moses and St. Paul in prejudice to the Doctrine of Natural Inscriptions rightly understood Pa. 129. No body says that God reveals these Natural truths to us but only gives us facultyes of discerning them And may not the same be said of some Moral truths which we commonly call Natural Religion that God does not reveal these truths to us but only gives us facultys by vertue whereof we may either find or frame such propositions as are agreeable to the morral as well as to the Natural frame and constitution of the Soul I cannot too often remind the Reader that I never asserted these Natural ot Innate notions to be imprinted upon the mind in any gross or litterall sense upon which mistaken Ground and perswasion only I am apt to believe that they are oppos'd by some Pa. 83. Of my former discourse there speaking of the Archetypall formes and
agreeable to the Office of Baptism I then recall what I have said upon that particular only I could have wish'd that he had not given that oâ—â—asion to others of misapprehending him Some Remarks upon Monsieur Malebranch his Opinions of the non-efficiency of Second Causes and of seeing all thingâ—s in God THE true liberty of Phylosophizing and the free and ingenuous use of â— Mans own Reason is certainly a very great perfection of a Rational creature a just freedom of thinking together with that of â—hoice being two great prerogatives of humane nature but the best things may be abused and perverted to bad purposes thus Men sometimes under the plausible pretence of free thinking give their fancyes leave to Rove about for new Opinions and then presentlyâ— are so enamour'd of their own inventions that it is very difficult if at all possible eveâ— to convince 'em of the conâ—rary and that which more confirms them in their own way is that they fancy themselves the only Men that enjoy the true genius of contemplation and those who differ from em and cannot assent to their way of reasoningâ— they look upon to be Men whose understandings are crampt by the prejudice of an unhaâ—py Education Here I shall propound these two things to Considerationâ— 1. No Opinion in Philosphy is either to be rejected oâ— imbraced merely upon account of its Antiquity or novelty but only as it comes attended or noâ— attended with the Evidence of reason and probability at least of truth thus a more true genius of Philosophysing may appeaâ—â— in the defence of an old truth than in the asserting of a new error 2. In things purely Physical relating to things meerely of a material Nature wâ— may indulge a greater liberty of thinking but in things that terminate more immediately upon God as this Opinion of Monsiâ—ur Malbranch does in seeing all things in God in such I conceive we ought to be more wary and guide both our Thoughts and Words with greater caution There are some positive Moralists if I may so call 'em such who tell us that there is nothing good or evill in its own nature but that things are so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 only because of the positive decree and determination of God that they should be so Monsieur Malbranch seemes in some respect to be the same in Natural Phylosophy that those others are in Moral that is he grants no Natural efficiency to 2 d. Causes and that they are only signes and occasions upon which God will and without which he will not produce such effects Thus what Mr. Norrisâ— Pa. 59. Of his Remarks upon the Aâ—henian Society says concerning sensible impressions in respâ—ct of Ideas may be said of all other causes thaâ— God has established a certain Order or connexion betwixt such impressions made upon our sences and such Ideas not that these impressions doe cause or produâ—e these Ideas but that they are conditions upon the presence of which God will raise them or to speak more properly exhibit them to our mâ—nds Now according to this Hypothesis if God had ordered things so at first or shall hereafter do so then the running of a feather tho' never so lightly over a Mans hand might have caus'd the most exquisite pain imaginable then Tentâ—rden Steeple might have been as much the cause of Goodwins Sands as any second cause is of the effect which yet seems to follow from it But then if we consider what he sayes pa. 116. of his Illustrations he there seems not much to differ from the common Hypothesis ad deum seu ad causam Vniversalem â—bi effectuum specialium ratio postulatur recurrendum non esse fateor but withall he says naturae inestigatio fallaâ—eâ— omnino vana ubi in eâ aliae verae causae quaeruntur quà m voluntates omnipotentis Again in the same place si fieri possit effectuum de quibus agitur causa naturalis specialis est explicanda but again he says actio istarum causarum consistit duntaxat in vi movente quâ agitantur illa vero vis movens nihil aliâ—d est quà m ipsa dei voluntas But it is no great sign of truth or of a good Cause when its Patron seems as it were thus opprest by its weight and thus operosely labours in the explication of it But it s observable that he himself grants that itâ— would be more agreeable if it could be done to assigne special natural causes of particular effects But now would it not be more Phylosophical to say that there are such particular causes in Nature tho' at present we are not able to assign 'em then thus to run to the more immediate power of God for the salving of every ordinary Phaenomenon of Nature I grant that it is very difficult to assign the just limits betwixt Natural and Supernatural power to determine justly where the one ends and the other begins or indeed fully to explain all the modes of Natural Phaenomena's but yet methinks it is not altogether so Philosophycal to ascribe these commonly reputed ordinary Phaenomena's of gravitation for example or the growing of a pile of Grass to the constant efficiency or Supernatural influence of almighty God I do not say that we are able to give a full solution of these things as to all the minutest circumstances of 'em nor would I ascribe too much to Natural causes but yet I think presently to have recourse to Divine power for the solution of all things this would damp all our further enquirys into Nature which is an employment very worthy of a rational Creature provided it does not extend too far I mean to the excluding of providence out of the World besides to ascribe all things immediatly to God exclusively of second causes might perhaps seem to detract from the trâ—e Notion and nature of providence it self in that just and wise order of things in that exact harmony betwixt the Naturalâ— and moral World which God has constituted in the Universe And it would be difficult to give any tolerable account worthy of the wisdom of God of those things commonly call'd second causes if they be but bare signes or conditions of those things which they seem to have some causal influence upon But he tells us Pa. 124. Of his Illustrations which I should have mentioned before â—â—m voluntas mea determinaâ— voluntatem dei certe brachium meum movebitur non voluntate meâ quae inessicax est perse sed voluntate dei quae effectu suo nunquam frustratur But why should he call the will of Man Inefficax when at the same time he tells us that it determins the will of God Might not Mans will if God had so pleas'd as well determine the motion of his own Arme as determine the will of God And I do not yet see how he has prov'd Gods pleasure to be otherwise Neither will those words per se do him any service for no
he himself is best able to resolve Vid Mr. Becconsall P. 199. 200. c. But I must confess that if I was mistaken in any thing it was in what he tells us immediately after that in that place I there quoted and if so then by consequence in all those other places which in the same Chapter may seem liable to the same exception That he only reported as matter of fact what others call Vertue and Vice c. I shall therefore here briefly lay down the reasons why I did not so apprehend him and then leave it to Mr. Lock 's own candour to pass judgment I shall not need to Premise that it is only the 1 st Edition of his Book that I am concern'd in without taking notice of any alterations or explications he has made in his 2 d. my discourse being writ before his 2 d. Edition was Printed and therefore 1 st Besides what I have already mentionedâ— there are some other passages in that Chapter wherein he seemes to speak his own opinion rather then mere matter of â—act what others call vice or virtue 158. P. § 7. By the relation our actions bear to the Divine Law Wee judge whether they be sins or dutys by the 2d The Civil Law whether they be criminall or innocent By the 3d. By the Philosohhicall Law whether they be Virtues or Vices So P. 160. § 14. There having resolved the complex Idea we signifie by the word Murther into its simple Ideas he proceeds this Collection of simple Ideas being found by me to agree or disagree with the esteem of the Country I have been bred in and to be held by most Men there worthy praise or blame I call the action vertuons or vicious Now I had thought that Wee and I especially being joyned with such Words as these Wee judge and I call together with this expression found by me had included a Mans selfe Chap. of Identity § 20. Vrbem quam dicunt Romam Melibaee putavi Stultus Ego hunc nostroe similem Truly I imagin'd that in things of this nature Men had generally spoken after the same manner all England over About the Year 1284. There were some Grammaticall heresies that is some false Latin and false Grammer condemn'd by Arch Episcopal Authority such as these Ego currit nullum nomen est tertiae personae far be it from me to impute any such Sollaecismes to this Learned Author however I think that I had very good reason to apply these expressions to the 1 st Person rather than to any third 2 ly 'T is observeable that he pleads for this 3 d. Law and that with all the force of reason perhaps that the thing is capable of now when Men relate things as mere matter of fact what others either do or say they usually leave 'em to stand or fall by their own evidence I question whether ever any did so much towards the giving Mens actings according to custome or opinion the formality and grandeur of a Law before and as for the sanction with all the Elaborate circumstances he has annext to it I think it is perfectly his own P. 159. 160. § 12. But I must beg leave here to say that the most Hetrodox writer absit verbo invidia might perhaps thus take upon him only the same character of a Relator after he had used and urged all the Arguments that either reason or Authority could afford him for his particular opinion I do not here say he so far pleaded for this Law of custom or opinion as to make it the standing Rule of Vice or Vertue truly so call'd or of right and wrong as he some times calls 'em but only that he espous'd the cause and pleaded for that Law further than the thing would well bear And these are the reasons that did more especially induce me to think that he did not there take upon him the bare Offâ—ce of a Relator To which I might also add if it was necessary what he says P. 159. § 12. If any one shall imagin that I have forgott my own notion of a Law when I make the Law whereby Men judge of Vertue and Vice to be nothing else but consent of private Men c. This is not spoken like one who barely relates matter of fact Others indeed may and that justly too act in obedience to that rule of decency and common repute yet I think he was one of the first that made it a Law especially such where by Men judge of Vertue and Vice I shall only add one or two considerations more upon this Subject before I leave it 1 st It seemes a peculiar way of speaking not yet grown common in the World when he assignes the Names of vice and vertue to such actions as are agreeable or dissagreeable to common reputation and for that reason because they are so whereas it always was and still is the more usual way not only of judging what things are in their own nature but also of denominating actions vertuous or vicious rather from theire agreeableness or disagreeableness to the dictates of reason and the law of Nature rather than from the custom of the Place I grant indeed that what ever is truly vertuous is generally counted laudable but it is not therefore vertuous because laudable but therefore laudable because vertuous Now I think that neither Names nor the grounds and reasons of 'em ought more to be alter'd than the Ancient Landmarks in Publick Fields ought to be remov'd for nothing but disorder confusion and needless disputes will arise from both I cannot pretend to be acquainted with all the perticular Modes of speaking throughout the World yet I much question whether this be the most common and general acceptation of that word Vertue that it is taken most commonly for those actions which according to to the different opinions of several Countrys are accounted laudable pag. 23. § 18. or however not under that formality because they were so counted I do not here dispute concerning the true and proper acceptation of the word Vertue as Mr. Lock has rightly stated it in the very next period but only as to matter of fact even what apprehensions other Nations generally had of it I grant indeed that we shall sometimes find different practices in different places about the same thing and all abounding in their own sense and pleading for the fitness and decency of their own perticular way Thus some thought it the most Decent and Honourable way of burying their Dead by eating of 'em others by Burning others by Enterring and no doubt all thought their own Method the best But these are matters of indifferency and so do not strictly come up to our present case but however it may be further ask'd whether or no these several sorts of People did count themselves only Vertuous herein and all the rest Vicious Quakers are very rude and uncivil in Thouing People as we call it especially those that are not
merits of the cause nor comes to dispute that which was most material in the Controversy I wonder why he shoâ—ld lay so much stress upon Children and Foolâ— and debaucht Persons to make their aâ—sent or dissent so availeable one way or other I am no friend to Dogmatizing yet I humbly conceive that no one has any just reason to think the worsâ— of any Opinion merely because such Persons do not assent unto it Neither do they who plead for this general consent make it so universal as to include every particular Pa. 24. § 20. I desire these Men to say whether by Education and Custom these Notions can or cannot be blurr'd and blotted out Since he is so Positive in his demand why may not we be aâ— positive in our answer and say that they can And what then Why then truly he drops that part of the disjunction and only says If they may suffer â—ariation by adventitioâ—â— Notions which is a very gentle way of blotting out but what then follows Why then we must find â—â—em cleâ—rest and most perspicuous nearest the Fountainâ— in Children c. We must he says but he never yet prov'd the necesâ—ity of that consequence And then as for Illiterate Persons if he mean plain honest illiâ—â—â—atâ—â— Heathens such as are less Learned â—â—t less corrupted by â—â—lse Principles and wicked Practises I doubt not but these Notions will appear clearer in such But however we still remain in the full and undisturb'd possession of that side of the disjunction that these notions may by bad Custom and Education be blotted out which ground thus gain'd will be of great disadvaâ—tage to his cause As for what he says Pa. 18. of the wicked Practices and Atheistical Opinions of some Heathen Nations some think that his Authors were not so exact in their observations as they might have been but suppose they were it makes nothing to the advantage of his cause unless he had prov'd before that these Notions cannot be blotted out of the minds of Men. Neither will it follow hence that they are of no use to Mankind if they may be thus defac'd For 1 st It may be in some measure oweing to these that all the Nations of the Heathen World are not sunk lower into wickedness than indeed they are 2 dly 'T is probable these Innate Notions will be instrumental in the Conviction and Conversion of these People when God in the wisdom of his Providence shall think â—it to do it and I doubt not but the Apostles in their Preaching did appeal to these and make use of 'em for this pâ—rpose Rom. 2. 14 15. Pa. 21. § 14. Here speaking of these Moral Rules he is very urgent with us â—o tell which they are if he means that we should give the exact determinate number of 'em I think this is a very unreasonable demand however I shall at present instanâ—e in those whichâ— Mr. Nye mention◠〈…〉 f His naturall Religion 1 st A tenderness for and care of our Children 2 d. A commiseration of the oppressions and wants of such as are distressed and not by their own fault but thro' mishap or the iniquity of others 3 d. A propensity to favour worthy Persons and actions And here I would only give him this caution that in his reply he do not draw his Answer and Arguments from Children and Fools for such Evidence will be excepted against nor from such as by Vicious customes have blotted these notions out of their minds for no one thinks the worse of the Belief of a God because the whole Club of professed Athests denys it Here give me leave to add one thing further tho' out of its proper place as for those that assert these innate notions I know noâ— how they can well otherwise express it than by saying that the Soul upon occasion exerts 'em and as for that other wâ—y of exerting themselves if it wanted any defence I have very good authority for it Mr. Locâ— P. 13. of his Essay § 27. 'T is â— great presumption that these geâ—erall maâ—imes are not innate since they are lâ—ast known to thoâ—â— in whom if they were â—nnate they must neâ—ds 〈◊〉 theâ—selves with most force and vigour That there is a reall and unalterable distinction betwixt good and evill is a very great and important truth and such as ought to be fixt upon the best and surest foundations but I cannoâ— think Mr. Becconsalls Argument pa. 194. so â—ogâ—nt as the nature of the thing requires Moral good he says always inâ—ludes a nâ—turall good and naturall good is evidâ—ntly establish'd in the frame of created naturâ—â— and consequently if the frame of nature be unalterable mâ—ral good must be sâ— too Here if by moral good always including a naturall good he meâ—nes that moral good is always attended with some râ—al advantage naturally accruing from the practice of it this I grant is generally true but then may we not say here as he says of pleasure pa. 188. In respect of Natural good that it seemes to be a consequencâ— â—ather then a measure and constituent principle of morall good so thiâ— naâ—â—râ—l good which he says iâ— always included in morall good seemes to be the consequence rather then the measure and constituent principle of moral good But then if he makes moral good only a part of as indeed he seems to make it the same with naturall good only distinguish'd by the accession of a free choice pa. 186. and so included in the frame of created nature this will only prove that moral good is what God at first Creation made it and so not in the highest Sense eternal and immutâ—ble as depending merely upon Gods free and Arbitrary will and positive determination and thus this Learned Author will fall in with P. Poiretts opinion in this particular vide former discourse of humane nature pa. 95. Whereas I am willing to carry the reasons of good and evill higher founding them in that relation they bear to the essential wisdom purity and holiness of the Divinâ— nature which relation is in some measure made known to us by those native notices and naturall impressions upon the minds of Men. And whereas he tells us pa. 192. That the proper measures of morall good muâ—t be taken from the original frame ends and intrests of our beings I am afraid that all these in respect to each individual and abstracted from all Law to direct us would be found so variable and uncertain that morall good would upon this hypothesis prove a much more unfixt and unsettled thing then God and Nature ever made it vide pa. 72. Of humane Nature So that I humbly conceive it would not be a sufficient asserting the eternall and immutable nature of moral good to say that it is as immutable as the frame of created nature for we know that this has in some particular instances been changed and may be so againe but the reasons of good and evill never were never can be
patterns of all truth in the Divine intellect These I say are communicated to the soul in a way and proportion suteable to such a being that is they are either made Naturall propertyes of its being as such or the necessary and immediate result of its faculties in the right use and exercise of em ' For it is not easie to conceive how either any senfible impressions from without or any reâ—lections of the Soul upon its own operations about those impressions can be connatural causes of morall truths I grant indeed that vertue has a natural tendency to promote both publick and private interest but yet I think the Soul finds as it were an intrinsick sutâ—bleness of these truths to it selfe and of it self to them antecedently to any such external considerations Some Remarks upon Mr. Chauvin de Religione Naturali ONE designe of his Book he tells us was Orthodoxarum Ecclesiarum fratres ad concordiâ—m vocare An excellent design this and worthy to be prosecuted with all the prudence and pious Zeall that the thing is capable of but it is to be wish'd that he had brought a more humble and modest temper of mind to such a work as this it did not become him to reflect unhansomly upon the constitution and government of that Church which both as to Doctrine and Discipline comes the nearest to that of the Primitive of any in the Christian World It is not for private Persons much less for Strangers and Forraigners to prescribe new formes and methods to a Church that has been so long and so well constituted as this has been when this Gentleman has more fully considered and better understood things of this naâ—ure he wâ—ll be better satisfy'd with some of our â—â—cleâ—iastical constitutions than at present he â—eems to be I shall not presume to take notice of any thing in his Epistle Dedicatory because it is to a learned and Reverend Bishop of our own Church tho' withall I believe there are some things in it writ without his knowledge or approbation But least my charge here against him might seem too general and so groundless I shall instance in one particular pa 419. Where he unhansomly and rudely reflects upon our Convocations But these are things above my sphere but under the carefull and watchfull Eye of our Superiours My deâ—ign here is of a lower nature Pa. 131 Nobis jam ostendendumest quâ viâ illa lex quae naturalis dicitur in corda nostra irrepserit utrum nempe naturaliter sit menti nostrae inscripta quod vulgoasseritur nos vero Evidenter asserimus illud esse falsissimum A little more Evidence in the proof tho' less in the assertion might do very well But here it will be very difficult to reconcile this Author either to Scripture or to himself St. Paul tells us Rom. 2. 15. That the Gentiles show the work of the Law that is the Naturall Law written in their hearts Now it must be granted that this Natural inscription even à primo ortu is the most plaine and obvious interpretation of the place and where that may be reâ—tained we ought not to look for another And tho' t is true that the Natural Law is agreeable to the dictates of reason it self when come to perfect maturity yet if this had been all the Apostle designed to express I am apt to believe he would not have thus worded it by being written in their hearts for by thus doing he did almost inevitably and invincibly confirm Men in that false opinion if it be one which was then more generally received in the World Nor can any argument be drawn from the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the following part of the Verse in prejudice of this opinion of Natural inscription Dr. Hammond here tells us that these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are practicall 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 common notions of good and evill which are among the generality of Men even Heathens without any light from the Mosaicall Law c. I shall now see how difficult it is to reconcile him to himself in other places pa. 5. There speaking of the belief of a Deity he tells us Consentanea utique est illis connaturalibus rationis principijs quae nobis insunt paulatim augescunt Pa. 38. quid nobis esse debet antiquius quam religio quae si verum fatearis insculpta fuerat in hominum mentibus Pa. 45. speaking of the belief of the Unity of a God haec opinio demonstrat naturae rudera quae in imis illorum medullis infixa sunt nec ullâ de causa possunt amoveri I might easily tyre my self and Reader too in citing places to this purpose in favour of these natural principles which seem â—ven at first implanted in the minds of Men tho' it cannot be expected they should show themselves before the actual use of reason I shall now briefly examine the reasons he gives of his opinion if says he the Law of Nature be writ by the finger of God upon the hearts of Men à primo ortu then it must be either to direct us to good or to deter us from evil but it cannot serve for either of these Not the first nam ubi omnia sunt turbata c. Where all things are disturb'd and out of order by reason of the tenderness and weakness of Age altogether unfit for prudence there the Voice of the Law cannot be heard But will he argue barely from the Laws not being heard that therefore there is none We commonly say that in war the Laws are silent or howsoever cannot be heard and yet they are Laws even there too If he supposes us in the state of Infancy beforâ— the use of reason what should he talk of the rules of good and evil to such â—s know neither If he supposes us in the State of juvenility tho' our passions be strong and turbulent yet methinks there should be more need at such a time more especially of a Law to direct us Nor 2 dly Says he can it deter us from evil because there is no actual sin in Children before the use of Reason but would it be in vain to have this Law imprinted upon the minds of Children because they cannot yet make use of it May not the the Soul of a Child properly be call'd a rational Soul tho' as yet it cannot form a Syllogism may there not be natural inclinations and dispositions to truth and holyness Some semina vitae moralis tho' these do not show themselves until such prefixt times as Providence and the nature of things have appointed for ' em And till this be prov'd either absâ—lutely impossible or highly irrational the opposers of these natural Principles do prove nothing to their purpose nor gain any strength or credit to their cause 2. Another ground of his Opinion is drawn from a parity of reason betwixt faith and this Law of Nature there being he says the same reason for both quoniam
of one question and Answer in the Catechism Dost thou not think that thou art bound to belâ—â—ve and do as they have promis'd for thee Ans Yes verily and by Gods help so I willâ— and I heartily thank our Heavenly Father that he hath called me to this state of Salvation throâ— Iesus Christ our Saviour Now a state of Salvation is certainly something moreâ— than a mere faederal Relation And I pray unto God to give me his grace that I may continue in the same to my Lifes end â—â—t this learned Author says â—hat all Caâ—â—châ—mens are not Converted oâ— Râ—generated and some by â—heir own faultâ— never will be but certainly it would be the greatest curse imaginable to teach a Child to pray that he may remain in a state of unregeneration The Reverend Dr. doth not take the least notice of this part of that Answer in his explication of it so that I do not certainly know what his particular sentiments are herein It is to on purpose to tell us that it is not easily conceiveable how Children can be regenerate in Baptism since the Scripture doth warrant it and the Church affirmâ— it perhaps it would be dfficult for them to explain the manner how adult Persons are Regenerate Iohn 3. 8. The wind bloweth where it listeth and thou hearest the sound thereof but thou knowest not whence it come thanâ— whether it goeth So is every one that is born of the Spirit But to return from this digression He urges further cuj tandem bono indulgebitur nobis illa naturalis lex c. Is it that there might be some previous dispositions in the Soul by degrees to dispose it to better obedience to its precepts Let us suppose this for once and see what Answer he returns unto it He tells us that these previous dispositions to virtue are things altogether as unintelligible as Aristotle's substantial forms which lye hid no body knows how in the bosom of the matter till at last they show themselves in their proper shapes But here he seemes again Eâdem Chord â— oberrare before heargu'd from supernatural things to Natural now he argues from Physical to things of a moral and more immaterial nature Aristotles substantial forms are unintelligible ergo the Law of Nature is so too for they are as like one annother as ever they can look for like as substantial forms lye hid in matter till they find or take occasion of coming out â—o these Natural principles do just the same in reference to the Soul This indeed is evident affirmation but I see little of proof in it There are indeed real difficulties and absurditys urg'd against substantial forms but I know none against these Natural notions in the sence before asserted All that seems to be materially objected against this natural inscription is that there is they say no need of it in order either to the knowledge of truth or obligation to duty these they say may be accounted for other ways But supposing this for once to be true but not granting it to be so this is no argument against what is here asserted viz Natural Inscription for what if God should afford us more ways in order to the coming to the knowledge of truth and goodness then we fancy to be absolutely necessary have we any reason to blame providence for it But he tells us Pa. 336. c. That the Soul doth make certain Aphorisms or generall Rules for the direction of humane Life Post maturam tandem experientiam After mature experience Such as these Honestum vitio ac libidini esse praeferendum c. Which afterwards he calls genealis norma de honesto apud homines stabilita But I would only ask him in what place and in what Age it was that Men thus generally met to determine and fix the Rules of right and wrong by a general consent For a further answer hereto I shall refer my Reader to my former discourse of humane naâ—ure Pa. 54. There is one thing more wherein this Gentleman seems to affect some kind of peculiarity tho' I think it is rather in expression than in notion That the Christian Religion especially as to the Dutys of it are no ways contrary to Natural reason but highly agreeable thereunto is certainly true and tends much to the honour and reputation of Christianity But then why we should so far strain the common sence and acceptation of the word Natural as to apply it to all the misteriâ—s and miracles of our Religion I do not understand We have sufficient reason from the nature of God and from Divine Revelation to believe all the instituted parts of Christianity but I know no reason why we should asâ—ert the Naturalness of em ' if I may so speak But he designs here to advance a seeming paradox pa. 263. Quoniam res videtur ardua firme inaudita pa. 248. grandia suscipimus cum omnes quâ—tquot vidimus sunt huic opinioni oppositi ut qui maximè He makes use indeed of a peculiar way of speaking but when he has explain'd what he means by it and in what sense he understands it the notion is common and ordinary per naturam intelligo rectam rationem usum morem hominum communem tandem traditionem receptam Pa 264. a very large acceptation of Nature If God has adapted some of his institutions either to the custom of former Ages or to the apprehensionâ— of Mankind we have so much more reason to acknowledg his condescension to our infirmitiesâ— but we have none from hence to call em ' Natural Pa. 271. nec communi usui aut rerum naturae adversantur seu miracula seu prophetiâ—â— Iesu Christi One might almost think here that he asserted Spinosa's opinion that miracles were not above nor contrary to Nature but his meaning is more innocent he only means that Miracles were pretended to by other Religions and that they were made use of by Christ in naturae restaurationem for the benefit of Mankind and the support of humane Nature Pa. 286. There he tells us that even Evangelical Faith it self doth no way interfere with his former Doctrine But his Reason seems very strange and not much for the honour of Christianity sed si nos ipsos consulamus comperiemus corda nostra spontè paâ—ere anilibus fabulis ut qui credulitati naturâ nostrâ obnoxij simus c. It were to be wish'd that Men would â—xpress common thoughts in a common and ordinary way But some Men think to gain to themselves the Reputation of great Notionalists by dressing up common and ordinary Notions in a new form of words thus seeming to speak something great and aboue the oâ—dinary pitch of other Men when many times there is vâ—ry little or nothing in their pompousâ— ways or speaking If the learned Author of the Catechetical Lectures hath in any other part of his Book which yet I have not met with explained the point before mentioned in a way