nature and naturall are most shamefully mistaken and confounded by some Christians that have treated of this subject to wit concerning vertues and vices naturall which have made them to fall into detestable opinions even such as Civill Heathens themselves would have abhorred in other heathens To instance in one Pontus Hunterus of Delfe in Flanders in his de libera hominis nativitate seu liberis natalibus cap. 2.3.4 hath these words Illud verò liberum populis omnibus exceptis Christianis leges cum Naturâ reliquere uxores è sanguine junctis acciperent Nam haec quoque res Legis est non naturae ac qui haec septa transiliunt non in naturam sed contra leges peccant Nullum enim naturae à rerum Creatore datum est ad animalium generationem impedimentum modo diversi inter se sexus sanis corporibus conveniant Non illa Matrem horresco referens nec Sororem sed pudor verecundia ac honestas legibus ornatae rejiciunt sanguinem non horret c. This man as appeares by what followes takes nature here and so in all this his Discourse for Natura vegetativa and natura sensitiva only as though there were no such thing in rerum natura as natura rationalis His rule therefore how wee may know things that are contra naturam is by the present manifest inconvenience that ensues to our naturall healths or lives by those things So that by him if a man cut his fathers throat or rip his owne mother as Nero did and sleepe not a whit the worse nor have the worse stomacke to his meate for it hee doth not crimen contra naturam committere And this is that Natura which in another place hee cals them prudentes that obey notwithstanding any lawes to the contrarie I must confesse he is not the first that hath taken nature in this sense For by those words Lex naturae some understand in a strict sense that law properly which is common unto rationall and irrationall creatures that is unto men and beasts In this sense they say that Proprium bonum appetere Vim vi repellere and the like is de lege naturae But it is one thing to speake of the law of nature as it is common though in this sense the word Law is not so proper neither to all naturall creatures and another thing to dispute of that Law which is naturall unto man properly who by nature is rationall Iust so some Heathen Nations of old as Herodotus relates thought they might lye together in their temples because they saw that birds and other dumbe creatures that were kept in them for sacrifices did it freely whence they inferred that it was not unnaturall and therefore not displeasing to their Gods and the reason of this their inference Herodotus gives 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because they presumed that men and brute beasts are all of one and the same nature which he for his part thought very absurd And certainely what Saint Iude speakes of some wee may conclude of all men generally that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If men though rationall by nature will confine themselves to that naturall knowledge which is common to unreasonable creatures as well as to reasonable they must needs leade a brutish life I hope I may say without offence that the ancient Stoicks were farre better Christians then so who maintaining that mans happinesse did consist in a life according to Nature have written so many accurat tracts and discourses to proove that all vertues and among them pudor verecundia honestas which this Hunterus doth most falsly oppose unto Nature are naturall unto man They that desire further satisfaction in this point let them read Saint Chrysostome who in divers places of his workes but especially in his Homilies ad pop Antioch handles it at large prooving by many reasons arguments and pregnant instances that the knowledge of the Morall Law or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is by nature Secondly Whatsover commeth within the compasse of reason properly belonging as properly to the law of nature it must needs follow that the law of nature extends of it selfe very farre though men through the naturall or rather to speake more properly and phylosophically unnaturall corruption of their understanding apprehend it not in its full extent Now whatsoever falls within the compasse either of reason or of the law of nature is of itselfe immutable Naturalia jura semper firma immutabilia permanent Soe saith the Civill Rom. Law and so all writers generally Aristotle onely excepted who in a place seemes to say the contrary to wit that Some naturall lawes are mutable His words are Some because they see 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lawes and judgements concerning that which is just and right so different and so variable are of opinion that nothing is right or just in nature but by opinion onely But this is not generally true saith hee but in part it is For however among the Gods it may very well be that that which is naturally just and right is altogether invariable yet among us men 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Some part of that law which is by nature is naturally mutable and some part of it is not Where first it is to be observed that Aristotle doth distinguish betweene Iura naturalia as not being all in regard of men of one nature And so farre we follow Aristotle For it is well observed by Thomas Aquinas that there are some Iura naturalia which may be called fundamentalia or principalia because evident of themselves unto humane reason Others as it were secundaria because not so apparant unto man but elicible or demonstrable from those fundamentals by humane ratiocination The former I suppose are they that Aristotle would have immutable but the latter not so Some interpret Aristotle as though hee had meant no more then this that de facto some Iura naturalia are changed or violated among men though de jure or naturâ suâ immutable because of those words of his though happily in regard of the Gods themselves immutable But that this could not bee his meaning may appeare first because hee saith some onely are mutable not all Whereas there bee no jura fundamentalia but de facto are violated not onely by particular men but also by whole nations as may easily appeare to them that shall peruse the Authors whom wee have before mentioned Secondly by that instance that hee brings of things naturall wherein Nature itselfe seemes to be unconstant unto her selfe The right hand saith hee is by nature the strongest and so it is in most men yet in some it is not so But more of his meaning by and by Thirdly Naturall reason being granted by the fall of man much impaired and vitiated it is no wonder if all men reasonable by nature doe not now agree upon the Iura naturalia and it ought to bee sufficient unto any reasonable man to
dicunt quidam saith the addition there quod scientia juris Canonici vel Civilis non est propriè scientia c. Such alterations I know may happen many much different one from another though grounded all upon the same reason But I speake it of such especially as proceed from varietie of opinions and judgements in matter of right and wrong Now the power of custome in all these changes alterations differences according to varietie both of times and places is two-fold First in that most of these differences and alterations have their beginning from custome which by continuance doth not onely get the strength of Law and goes for Law in all places but also commonly begets Lawes properly so called For that is the originall of most Lawes in most places And it was both a witty and a true speech of him that first as I find in Suidas and others defined custome to bee nothing else but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an unwritten Law as on the other side Law to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a written custome shewing thereby the difference betweene Law properly so called and custome very well though it will not hold in all And those Lawes that are thus grounded upon custome are thought by many as the most acceptable so the most naturall and obligatorie Lawes that are as being not the invention of any one single man but of long Time and experience Dio Chrysostomus is very rethoricall upon this subject and more rethoricall then sound sometimes as when hee saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that it is more proper for men that are free to bee governed by custome as for men that serve by Lawes whereas indeed true libertie doth consist in this to bee subject unto reason whether commanded unto us by Lawes or recommended by custome But certainly it is no new thing for any Kingdome to bee governed by custome and of the two it may generally be said that customes were before written Lawes if not in all yet in most Kingdomes Which I observe the rather because some learned men I see are of opinion that jus consuetudinarium and consuetudo in point of Law are phrases of latter ages onely and particularly in England not knowne or used till after the conquest of the Normans But certainely jus consuetudinarium whether wee looke upon the word or thing is of greater antiquitie then so In all Greeke Authors as many as I remember that write of Lawes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Lawes and customes goe still together In the Civill Law you shall read not onely de longa consuetudine as part of the Law in generall but also de consuetudinibus municipiorum of particular customes of places to bee kept and observed as Law But when the word consuetudo came first either more particularly to be taken pro servitio feudali which the Civilians call servitutes praediorum for a certaine right that a Lord may challenge and a Tenant is bound unto by custome Or yet more generally for any Ius or due of what kind soever that a man hath right unto by custome I am not able to say certainely For though this use of the word became most frequent and ordinary since the times of William the Conqueror yet I find in some ancienter Charters Iura consuetudines in this very sense as in a Charter of Knutt de Portu Sandwici in these words Nullusque omnino habet aliquam consuetudinem in dicto portu c. And among the Lawes of King Edmund confirmed by William the Conqueror the title of one is De Baronibus qui suas habent curias consuetudines But whether the title bee as ancient as the Law it selfe may perchance bee doubted I am the more inclinable to conceive the Latin consuetudo in this sense to bee of longer standing then so then the times of the Conqueror I meane or there abouts because I am sure the Greeke 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is as may appeare by the Greeke Lawes and Constitutions as for example where 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the customes are taken and used for certaine fees called also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 due and payable at the Consecration or Inthronization of every Bishop Archbishop c. Soe Constitut Novell Iustin Coll. ix tit vi Nov. 123. c. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. These fees or customes onely we allow as lawfull to bee payed by every Bishop c. and so often in that one Chapter And since wee are treating of custome and have said somewhat of the Latin word consuetudo I thinke it will not bee amisse to examine the originall of our adopted English custome The Latin consto hath two significations to coast and to continue From consto to coast n being changed into u is the french couster of the same signification from consto to continue it may bee that the french coustume might bee derived coustume being in very truth nothing else but a continued or constant use and fashion whatever bee the particular object of it But I thinke it more probable that it came from couster to coast and that coustume at first was properly taken for vectigal tribute tolle or impost money Now because matters of this nature as tributes and imposts are matters which concerne all men generally to take notice of and such as goe by custome too In omnibus vectigalibus ferè consuetudo spectari solet idque principalibus constitutionibus cavetur D. 39. tit 4. l. 4. f. 2. for the most part it can bee no wonder if custome from that more proper signification came afterwards to signifie consuetudo or coustume as wee now used it in common speech So the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Hebrew which signifies a measure commonly and sometimes tribute is by the Rabbins at this day as it was by the ancient Hebrewes for ought wee know though wee have no examples of it in the Scriptures commonly used for mores or consuetudo And that of this Hebrew middah not onely the Latin modius for a certaine measure but also modus used for fashion or custome in generall is derived is out of all question And therefore Aristotle where he treates de jure naturali positivo Ethic. l. v. c. 7. that right or Law which he cals 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is that hath no ground in nature but wholly depends of mens customes and ordinances according to the variety both of times and places hee very appositly compares 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to measures 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. And since Grammarians cannot agree about the derivation of the word mos some deriving it from meo some from modus some from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and some from the Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I know no reason why I may not more probably maintaine that mos the rather because it is a monasyllable is the pure Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mas
which signifies tribute But to returne to our English word againe this is observable of it that when it is taken for impost or tolle it is expressed in Latin not by consuetudo but custuma properly as for example Registri p. 259. in a Breefe concerning forreigne Merchants where nevertheles I must acknowledge that I doe not understand the difference betweene Telonium which the marginall note saith they are free from and custuma which the Breefe itselfe charges upon them For otherwise I should have thought that telonium and custuma had beene all one but telonium the more common And this the rather because I find in the Lawes of Scotland where the word custuma is more frequent telonium and custumam for the same thing And thus much concerning the words both English and Latin though much yet not too much I hope in a Discourse concerning Custome Secondly whatever bee the beginning or occasion of these severall changes alterations and differences whether custome or any thing else yet herein appeares the power of custome to be no lesse strange and marveilous in that in processe of time it makes all these differences and alterations though never so contary to appeare in the eyes of men not onely justifiable but even best so that all men of all Countries doe generally like their owne Lawes and customes when once they have beene used unto them best of any other and are ready if need be with great confidence and eagernesse to maintaine them to be so against any gaine-sayers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith Agathias the Historian to this purpose 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This is apparantly common to all the nations of the earth that what law or custome soever they have beene long used unto they preferre before any other and deeme them very excellent Which made Herodotus that ancient Historian to blame Cambyses King of Persia very much not as uncivill onely but even as a mad man in that hee so freely and tartly derided the customes and fashions whether Civill or sacred of other Countries which were deare unto them and in their judgement very plausible And why any man or nation should arrogate so much unto themselves as to condemne and deride so freely and peremptorily whatsoever was contrarie to their owne customes eo nomine because contrary to their owne though practized and approoved by other men and Nations by nature equally reasonable Herodotus it seemes saw no reason Now that men generally thinke best of their owne fashions and customes be they never so contrary Herodotus doth shew by relating a triall that Darius made of it to satisfie himselfe which was this The Indians those that were properly called Calatians had a custome to eat their Parents and friends after their deaths whereas the Graecians did use to burne them both these being equally contrary to the Persians who of the two probably would soonest have beene perswaded to eate their dead then to burne them which could not bee without prophaning that which they accounted most holy to wit fire Darius therefore first sends for some Graecians and asked them by themselves what they would take and he was well able to give it though they had asked many thousands to eat their Parents when they should bee dead They answered they would not doe it for the wealth of the World Then hee sent for those Indians and proposed unto them likewise upon what terme they would bee content to burne theirs The very mooving whereof offended them so much and seemed so prodigious that in stead of an answer they humbly besought he would forbeare such horrible speeches unto them and so were dismissed Soe true is that of Pindarus addes Herodotus that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is custome is an Vniversall Monarch or King of all This of Herodotus puts mee in mind of a strange custome once practized and in great request among the great ones of Europe which was this If a Prince dyed out of his Countrey they would chop his body in severall pieces and boyle them in a kettle or some such vessell till all the flesh came from the bones and so send his bare bones to bee buried in his owne Countrey Bonifacius the eight speaking of it cals it detestandae feritatis abusum morem horribilem Deo abominabilem hominibus abhorrendum immanem impium crudelem c. and if it were so indeed a man might wonder how Princes and Great men of that age came to bee so farre in love with it as to take order before hand as we read of divers and particularly of one of our Edwards King of England in Froissard in their life time that they might bee so used after their death but that the same Bonifacius tels us plainely that it was vitio consuetudinis that they were bewitcht to that mind and opinion of theirs And not to goe from this very subject of the dead who would not wonder that Ancient Heathens having forborne and detested I may say of many of them the ripping of humane dead bodies as inhumane cruell and barbarous which is the reason that neither Hippocrates Aristotle nor Gallen though great yea incomparable naturalists otherwise never saw as many learned men are of opinion any dead bodies dissected that now in our dayes the same thing amongst us Christians is ordinarily practized and is neither matter of wonder nor of scandall unto any though sometimes it bee done in a most unbeseeming manner and all manner of persons admitted unto it without respect at all of that Divine fabrick which Saint Chrysostome as I remember saith in one place is much reverenced by the Angels of heaven themselves in honour to Christs body and his blessed Incarnation The power of custome then by these and the like instances as in things naturall so in Civill also being granted to be very great the next thing that wee are to consider is Whether wee shall grant it such power as that it can make if not all things yet any thing at any time which is right in reason or by nature to become wrong actually in point of practice and on the other side that which reason and nature of themselves are against to become if not laudible yet allowable and justifiable sometimes that is in effect whether right and wrong are by nature truely and so absolutely immutable and invariable or otherwise To this we answer First That as there is nothing truly naturall that is not in some sort rationall if not as capable of reason yet as the effect of reason in summo gradu that is God and so rationall Soe there is nothing truely rationall that is not as truely naturall both in regard of God the eternall and infinite cause of all things and in regard of men whom God by nature hath made rationall Whatsoever therefore is grounded upon reason is truely and absolutely naturall And so is the morall Law which treates of humane vertues and vices and therefore altogether and indubitably naturall These words
no wonder if consuetudo rationabilis bee granted to be aequivalent to reason right or truth This if it bee well considered will rather puzzle the more then satisfie For the Custome of men which they live and are guided by being different according to differences of places and nations yea so changeable and variable I speake it of Customes in point of right and Iustice as well as of others in the same place as wee see they are in all places if it shall bee said of all such generally as of particulars it is commonly by them that are used unto them that they are rationabiles will it not hence necessarily follow that what is right in one place is in another wrong what at one time is reason and Truth at another time is both false and absurd And what is this but to make Truth changeable Protheus like and appliable to all times and places That is in effect to say with Archilaus that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that nothing is right or wrong but by custome and the ordinances of men onely or with Epicurus that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that righteousnesse of its selfe is nothing but that whatsoever is expedient for the present as long as it is expedient it is just and no longer just then it is expedient Besides these and the like arguments taken from the things themselves some thing may bee inferred even from the words whereby those things are usually expressed For words have usually some foundation in the nature of things and therefore as wisest men Aristotle and others have thought in all disputes of the true nature and use of things much observable Now in most Languages right and custome are expressed by the same words As for example to instance in the three chiefest in Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies properly judgement but it is as often used for custome So that Interpreters are sometimes put to it not knowing or at least not agreeing among themselves by which of the two it should bee rendred As for example Sam. 8.9 shew them the manner c. and v. 11. This will be the manner c. In the Hebrew it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which some with the Vulgar and the Septuagint render jus others as we rationem the manner or custome The Chaldey paraphrase expresses it by the Greeke word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is ambiguous both in the Originall Greeke the ambiguitie whereof hath caused errors and mistakes of Interpreters not a few in divers ancient Greeke Authors and in the derivative Chaldey for either right or custome Hence are varietie of opinions as amongst the Iewes so amongst the Christians about the true meaning But I meddle not with that Only this I observe that Homer upon this very subject speaking of Kings useth the very word but that the one is Greeke and the other is Hebrew that Samuel doth This also as ambiguous in the Greeke as the other is in the Hebrew His words are Odyss iv 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Where the Scholiast hath noted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But Eustathius Arch-Bishop of Thessalonica more fully 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aemilius Portus translates it quod tamen Licet divinis Regibus And certainly in those words of the Poet in another place 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gallen did understand by the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 somewhat more then custome as should seeme by him in his de Valetudine conservanda where hee quotes them more then once Now as in these words both Hebrew and Greeke right is taken for custome so in the Latin is custome taken for right or Law Witnesse not onely the word consuetudo in latter ages whereof wee shall have occasion to speake more afterwards but also mos of old So Virgil. Aenid vi pacisque imponere morem i. Legem pacis saith Servius As also in the Civill Law jus and mos are often joyned together to expresse right though sometimes opposed I know Neither are these two Latin words mos and consuetudo used in Latin for right and Law onely but also for nature her selfe custome as it seemes pretending as much to nature as it doth to right So mos by the best Latin Authors often and so consuetudo by sacred authors sometimes As for example Gen. 31.35 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which by the Chaldey paraphrase by the LXX and the Vulgar is rendred consuetudo the custome of women Which word consuetudo made Augustine the Monke a very pardonable mistake in a Monke to thinke worse of women then they had deserved imputing that unto them as a fault or voluntary vice which is their nature At least hee was so understood by Saint Gregorie who therefore both by many reasons and divers examples prooves unto him at large that that consuetudo mulierum though called consuetudo is in very truth infirmitas naturae or naturae superfluitas rather and therefore not culpa quia naturaliter accidit no voluntarie thing in women but hapning by necessitie of nature and by consequent no sinne no more then either to eate and drinke or to bee weary cold and the like Greg. Epist lib. xii Ind. vii Epist 31. ad August resp 10. By these things that have hitherto been spoken it should appeare that custome of it selfe hath no small affinitie with Truth and right and it is but too apparant that they are by most men taken for one and the same thing as hath already beene said But on the other side wee shall find in ancient both Philosophers and Fathers as Iustin Mart. Cyprian Greg. Nyss and others many serious caveats and admonitions to them that seeke the truth to beware of custome and to this purpose Tertullian would haue us to remember that Christ called himselfe veritatem non consuetudinem truth not custome be it never so generall or so ancient Having therefore oftentimes not by way of curiositie but as one that thinkes himselfe bound to propose unto himselfe right and reason to the utmost of his power in all his actions had occasion to meditate upon those things viz. of the power varietie validitie of custome in things either naturall civill for all those have some relation and mutuall dependance neither can throughly bee understood if separated or Divine and what in all those is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as an ancient Philosopher speaketh 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the speculation of Truth I have here put most of those things that did offer themselves to my consideration together perswading my selfe that if men spent lesse time about particular Questions as concerning the right or truth of sundry particulars in point of either Religion or Philosophy and more time in the due and rationall consideration of those generall either helpes or hinderances that offer themselves unto men in the search of what is Truth and right that there would be both farre lesse
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Polybius in a place very elegantly and fully 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And therefore that men must not start backe from the prosecution of any thing that is good and profitable by reason of those seeming difficulties but betake themselves to the power of use and custome by which all that good is and laudible is made possible unto man Now in all these it is apparant that custome is rather supra naturam then contra naturam directly We shall therefore in the next place consider the power of it even in those things wherein it is directly opposit unto Nature The discussion of these things at large I leave unto profest Naturalists and Physicians Some few instances will serve my turne and will sufficiently afford unto them that are both capable and curious I take it in the better sense matter of further speculation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 all excesse is against nature So Phylosophers and Physicians Yet what excesse so unnaturall that a man by custome may not bring himselfe unto Yea if a man have once used himselfe unto excesse it is dangerous for him to returne unto nature and mediocritie because hee hath used himselfe unto excesse For even things naturally and of themselves hurtfull through use and custome become expedient and necessarie Therefore saith Hippocrates 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Those things that we are used unto though worse of themselves use to bee lesse dangerous then better things that we are not used unto And Aristotle doth instance in Dionysius the Tyrant who in a dangerous siege having forborne for a while his ryot fell into a consumption of which he could not be cured untill he returned unto his former custome What more contrary to Nature then poyson which therefore among other names is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the greatest enemie of Nature Yet by custome in divers ages both men and women have beene knowne to bring themselves to this passe as not onely to take most dangerous poysons without hurt but also to feed upon them and to receive nourishment from them Wee read of some that have lived upon nothing else Whereof you may read in Gallen de Simpl. Med. lib. 3.18 Sennert lib. iv c. 3. And lib. iii. de Febrib And although in some of these there might sometimes concurre some secret of Nature in the proper constitution whereof see Libavius de Venenis and Gallen 3. de Sim. Med. who shewes a reason in Anatomie why that poyson which killeth men is a food unto the Stares or otherwise yet generally which sufficeth us that this is adscribed unto custome as the cause I appeale unto the forenamed Authors and divers others that have treated of it What more naturall unto man then to live upon the Earth the naturall mother both in regard of their beginning and of their ending of all men Yet we reade of some who by custome of often swimming and conversing in the waters have made the waters so naturall unto their bodies that they could hardly endure the land and not without present danger of their health Iovianus Pontanus writes of one Colon of his times as I conceive a notable Vrinator or diver who could not indeed continue long together out of the sea and would swimme a hundred miles together and above from one shore to another and from one Countrey to another with great speed and at all times of the yeare But this I must confesse I take upon trust for I have not read it in the Author himselfe but in our learned Iohn Barnes a Benedictine in his contra Aequivoc 35.323 Neither doe I know whether hee had brought himselfe to this by custome onely or no. But if this storie bee not to my purpose this other is I am sure which I shall now produce out of a certaine Commentator upon Aristotle his Axiomata who upon that saying of Aristotle Consuetudo est altera natura hath these words Alibi quanta sit vis consuetudinis explicatiori sermone proditum est Illis tamen hoc velim additum quod prae sua novitate infrequenti similis rei eventu pene incredibile erit hominem quendam patria Syculum à puero ita natandi consuetudine usitatum ut deinceps piscium more sub aquis longo tempore versaretur quibus cum exiret ut communi hominum usu frueretur tanto ventriculi dolore angebatur ut valetudinis nanciscendae causa ad aquas esset redeundum Quibus rursum immersus ludi recreationis gratia si quando naves mari volarent in eas saliebat atque post sumptum cibum iterum descendebat ubi ad multam usque aetatem vitam protraxit Whether hee meanes it of the same as Pontanus doth because I have not Pontanus at this time I cannot tell To some such kind of men it is not unlikely that Saint Chrysostome did allude in one of his Homilies the sixteenth as I remember upon the Epistle to the Hebrewes where hee tels rich men of their unmercifulnesse and want of compassion whose curiositie to satisfie with strange spectacles among other inventions poore men were driven 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to search and ransacke the deepest parts of the Ocean that some way or other they might extort somewhat from them But Seneca directly speaking of the strange inventiōs of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or wonder-workers of his dayes reckons among the rest in immensam altitudinem mergi ac sine ulla respirandi vice perpeti maria and againe not long after penetrare in imum mare which may give much light to that passage of Saint Chrysostomes And among the sundry kinds of exercises Artis Gymnasticae I find that one was continere spiritum to hold and keepe in their breaths it being one of those things it seemes which use and custome can doe much in as well as in other things But it would bee infinite to treat of the power of custome from all particular examples and instances that occurre in divers writers Historians Philosophers and others both old and late The truth of some of them perchance may bee questioned I deny it not though I read not scarce any thing in any of them so strange in this kind but might be averred and paralell'd if not as certainely true at least as possible by manifest experience either in the same kind or very like even in our dayes Yet it is not granted by all men that custome is of such power and efficacie in things naturall Aristotle seemes in some place to bee one of them that will not grant it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith hee in a place 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 One custome may be remooved and taken away by some other custome but nothing can ever prevaile against Nature And againe in his Ethicks Lib. ii c. 1. as peremptorily 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nothing that is naturall can bee altered by custome Others though they speake not so peremptorily of it yet they restraine the power
ac plane ejusmodi qualem verisimile est fuisse in ipso aetatis flore descripsimus vero heic quod invenimus in alio libro simili de causa nobis allato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Robertus Constantinus Baro Gymatius Professor Graecarum literarum in Academia Montalbanensi Idemque assertor audibilis coelestisque harmoniae experientiâ quotidianâ plusquam viginti annorum Haec raptim exaravi in gratiam amiciss viri atque eruditiss D. Iohannis Davini Montalbani 24. Febr. Anno 1605. Robore constantia Hic est Rob. Constantinus qui olim apud Iulium Caesarem Scaligerum vixit postea Lexicon publicavit Caeterùm de hac longaevitate ipsius haud satis fidem illi habeo nam video ipsum non planè affirmare Quare more senum indulget sibi annorum suorum numerum nisi fallor aliquot supra fidem adauget So farre those written Adversaria Of this Constantinus you may read in Thuanus tom v. of his great age and good worth as a schollar and that hee was summus Bezae amicus one of Beza's chiefest and dearest acquaintance But of this pretended sensible knowledge of the Coelestiall Harmonie not one word there which hath made me the more willing to insert here and make publique what I had else-where in my private possession about it And so much shall suffice at this time concerning the power of custome in things naturall historically Now Philosophically and speculatively wee thus proceede First that it is not without danger nor according to exact Truth to say that Nature is alterable For what is Nature properly but the Order of God If that bee mutable and violable then is no more this World a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or orderly peece but a masse of confusion and that is it that the Atheists and the opposers of a Providence would have Neither can there be any truth properly in those things the nature whereof is altogether uncertaine therefore uncertain because unconstant And where there is no Truth there can bee no knowledge As to the World therefore confusion so to the understanding ignorance from this uncertaintie and inconstancie must necessarily ensue As for Miracles though above nature yet are they not properly against nature since they are his proper worke who is the Author of nature and therefore originally and sutably to his Nature did reserve unto himselfe a power to dispense with his owne lawes whensoever hee thought fit All Gods workes of themselves and in regard of God are equally naturall though not in regard of us Wee say therefore that custome is not alwayes to be considered as opposit unto Nature since it is the nature of sublunarie things to bee altered by custome And when custome hath once through continuance naturalized her selfe into any of them then custome to speake properly is no more custome but Nature according to that of old Evenus in Arist 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that long use and exercise becomes at last nature Nature then we say by the ordinance and appointment of its first Author is two-fold originall and secundarie or adventitious and so Gallen plainely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 custome is a kind of adventitious or adscititious nature Neither is custome when it is once become naturall though adventitious lesse naturall in regard of the common Nature of the Vniverse from which at first it received the power and proprietie to turne in time into nature then that originall nature though in regard of the particular subject that it hath wrought upon it bee but adventitious When therefore it is commonly said that such or such a thing hath lost its nature it must bee understood of that particular nature and proprietie which it had at the first not absolutely as though it had departed from the law of Nature in generall since that Nature it selfe hath made it so alterable As of death wee say vulgarly that it is against nature though it bee as properly and truely the worke of Nature as birth or generation is and as naturall to the nature of the Vniverse And so is that true of Aristotle which wee have spoken before that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nature cannot bee driven away being understood of Vniversall Nature Gallen a great admirer of Nature and much to bee admired himselfe for his painefull travels in the search of it hath another way to reduce custome unto Nature His opinion is that any mans nature may bee known or at lest probably guest at by those things that he is used unto And therefore prefers those Phycsiians that allow unto their patients whatsoever they have been used to though cōtrary to art before them who keepe them strictly to the generall prescripts without respect to their proper constitution 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith hee 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That is Most men that use themselves to any thing whatsoever it bee they must be conceived to pitch upon such things as are most sutable to their owne Nature for that finding hurt by those things that are contrary unto it they are forced to forbeare them speedily Yea plainely that none can 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 long continue in an evill custome contrary to their proper constitutions who are not extremely madde and senselesse By this custome and Nature should bee all one or at least custome for the most part nothing else but the fruits and effects of originall Nature For my part I should easily grant that any mans present constitution which you may call his Nature for the time though improperly may not unlikely bee judged of by those things that are customarie unto him But that a mans originall temper and constitution which is it that Gallen there speakes of may so bee knowne except we shall extend madnesse and senslesnesse very far common experience will disproove For what generally more naturall unto all men then temperance and sobrietie And what more generally practised in the World among all sorts of men then excesse and ryot and intemperance in some one kind or other if not in all But by the way If in the judgement of Gallen a heathen all such are to be reputed as mad men because they respect their health and corporall welfare no more what would hee have said of them had hee beene a Christian for their wilfull casting away of their soules so much more precious then the body by how much Heaven doth excell the earth by the said courses Certainly madnesse is a far more generall evill then most men thinke But this by the way onely When Phylosophers dispute as many doe whether Nature or education that is custome be more powerfull to frame and fashion a mans life it would be but an absurd question scarce fit to be proposed by any sober man much more unfit to bee so seriously disputed of by learned Philosophers if nature and custome in this sense come all to one But I shall here appeale from Gallen unto Gallen himselfe whose words in his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
Stoicks were tolerable in comparison of some both of old and of late too who have proceeded further laying this for their foundation that vvords and syllables are of great power and efficacie and have some say I know not what affinitie and hidden correspondence with starres and planets Hereupon some by a certaine art which they call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 undertake in the name of every man to read his fortune and to foretell great matters I could not but mention such comming so in my way but I will no more then mention them their opinions being so apparantly absurd But vvhy then doth Aristotle vvho determines it so peremptorily that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that no words are by nature in many places stand upon vvords so much himselfe and examine their Etymologies so carefully To this I say that though generally vvords goe by custome yet sometimes they may bee said to bee from nature or naturall in some sense that is set of purpose to set out unto us the nature of such and such a thing There be many vvords of that nature it cannot be denyed in some languages more then others but in all some and in this case to understand the right Etymologie of a vvord conduces much to the understanding of the thing itselfe Of the nature of it I meane but not to foretell or foresee by it any thing future not more then can bee knowne by the naturall knowledge of the thing itselfe Some vvords againe may bee called naturall because they doe when they are uttered and pronounced imitate the nature of the thing itselfe which they signifie So for example when wee say in Latin aeris tinnitum equorum hinnitum ovium balatum tubarum clangorem stridorem catenarum Perspicis saith Saint Augustine haec verba ita sonare ut res quae his verbis significantur So most of them that they call voces animalium propriae for the most part both in Greeke and Latin are naturall Againe custome doth make some words naturall in that it gives unto them the power and efficacie of things that are naturall to produce some naturall effects Such are those words and sounds whereby dumme creatures are governed which though of themselves they be but invalid words and sounds yet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Plutarch of them in a place through custome and skilfull education become so powerfull that what can bee done upon dum creatures with blowes or whips or any other kind of violence may bee done with them and sometimes more So a man may use himselfe to tremble or weepe or laugh and the like at certaine words and sounds which in time shall have that power over his body that it shall not be in the power of his will to forbeare Even as the sight of whips and scourges as wee read in ancient stories hath beene more powerfull upon slaves in warres then the sight of more dreadfull and mortall weapons because the smart of those which they often felt as slaves made them in time to abhorre naturally and irresistibly the very sight of them so words also Long use and custome may turne them into charmes to make them operative upon nature though of themselves they have no naturall power at all All these things granted whereof to discourse at large is not my present purpose it holds still neverthelesse as we affirmed at first that generally and for the most part words are words that is are significant by custome Secondly all difference of words and phrases in point of elegancie or barbarisme is altogether from custome Hence it is that those expressions which in some language are most proper and elegant in another are most ridiculous and barbarous neither is there any reason at all for the most in nature either for the one or for the other but that use and custome hath so determined it whose will and pleasure stands for reason in these cases It is true that Grammarians have taken great paines to reduce ordinarie words and speeches to some certaintie of analogie without which Grammar is no Art and somewhat it is that they have done in this kind for the easier teaching and learning of languages Yet doth custome herein maintaine the power of her soveraigntie upon words and speeches in that when shee pleases she breakes the rules and strictest bonds of best approoved Analogie and suffers no rule of Grammar to passe without an exception All matter of elegancie then or babarisme being but a matter of custome as it is no wonder to see silly people for want of knowledge either to vvonder or to scoffe at the expressions of other languages vvhen they heare strangers speake the vvords of the Countrey perchance but use their owne phrases and expressions So I cannot but wonder that in all ages men that have beene most ambitious to be thought learned have stood so much upon elegancie as I find they have done The ancient Heathens Philosophers and others did object many things I know against the Gospel of Christ but I doe not find that any thing generally did in very truth make them so averse from it as the language most of the New Testament being vvritten in Greeke words indeed some few excepted but for the most part in phrases and expressions that are meerely Hebrew and the Latin Translation being a mixture of both both of Hebrew and Greeke phrases rather then Latin that was Latin truely according to the custome of those times So hard a thing it vvas for them that had beene used to Plato and Aristotle and the like to relish such a style much lesse to reverence it A style nevertheles vvhich they would have thought elegant enough had they beene used to it as on the other side that of Plato or Aristotle but course and barbarous had not the power of custome interposed and disposed their eares and palates to it A late writer of Essayes treating of the power of custome after many strange instances brings this as I remember among others as one of the strangest That some certaine people of the World should bee governed by Lavves that are written in a strange unknowne tongue Certainly if the use of a strange tongue in one Countrey in point of Law vvhich would not be much better understood though it were in the vulgar tongue bee a thing so much to bee admired I thinke he might have found somewhat that is done in a strange tongue in many Countreys against all grounds of sense or reason much more to bee wondred at But whereas some others to increase the wonder deride and defame the said tongue as barbarous they rather make themselves an instance of the power of custome that makes them thinke so strange and speake so scornefully of a tongue once thought very sweet and elegant by them that were used unto it then perswade us to wonder at others that make no wonder of it Thirdly custome advanceth or abaseth words at