and Poetry yet makes it more fine where all things must be done by measure and sweet sounds So that now we see how these generall Arts are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and that they are not of so great necessitie in respect of the thing as in regard of vs for our good for so as euery thing is made for man so he must see them for his good by that rule that they are created These now though they be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because they are circumstantiall yet they are ab ente primo because there are causes effects subiects adiuncts c. and speech in ente à primo Now the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is eyther quantitie or qualitie the reason is this euery ens à primo is finite ergo must needs haue limits of quantitie if he haue limits of essence Quantitie is eyther discreet or continued for if euery thing be finite then it must be discreet or distinct from any other Againe as it is discreet so it is continued so farre as the forme extendeth the matter whereby wee may see how farre it reacheth and where it reacheth not Now as there is quantitie so also there must be qualitie in euery thing for there is no ens à primo that is pure act ergo it hath a forme acting vpon a matter thence proceed all quantities Againe it being made for an end must therefore act vnto its end Qualitas est natura bonitas euery thing hath nature because it hath a matter and a forme ergo there is nature in euery thing And therefore Ramus saith Forma est praecipua rerum natura and the Philosophers call forma principium actionis and materia principium passionis Now this ens being of this scantling for quantitie and of this nature for act must be good for Gods glory so that euery thing hath a goodnesse in it Againe were all things made for man and must hee see them with his reason Yes ergo they are good for him ergo hee must haue a will to imbrace them as bona as well as an eye of reason to see them as vera and so man also is made for God as his will acts goodnes Now for the order of these actus is before actum for the one is actio the other is passio and actio is before passio and is more excellent then it Againe actus doth concrescere with it selfe and with the actum that is in the thing ergo actus is more generall ergo is before actum Againe because wee doe not giue names to things but with reason from some argument of Logicke in the thing and againe because there must be an actus from the thing to man before there can be an actus from man to man therefore the Logismes in the thing must be before the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in it ergo Logicke is the most generall and first in order of all arts Of those things that are acta quantitie is first because it ariseth nexly from the matter and forme of a thing for first of all the matter and forme limit the thing when they are put together before they act any thing and afterward they act one vpon the other Now qualitie that is the act of the forme vpon the matter ergo it is after quantitie but before goodnesse because that is the end of natures act For seeing quantitie ariseth immediately from the matter and forme of a thing and nature from the act of the forme vpon the matter therefore goodnesse must be the last as being the end of all the former and thus did the Lord make all things first making the causes effects of things then imposing speech on them then number then measuring them by Geometrie how farre their magnitude should reach and where it should not reach before it should act Now this act of Nature was to goe no further vpon externall obiects but onely be acted by the forme vpon the matter whereas the morall act of goodnes was to goe further for that is for God Againe Nature is the next inmost thing to quantitie and Goodnes is last And thus haue we seene all that is in ente à primo which is the ground of all Arts. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 est qua omnes artes comprehenduntur pro subordinatione finium Now wee are come to Arts and first wee are to beginne with Encuclopaidia and the definition of it First for the name it is Orbis ille Circulus Artium The reason of it indeed is as much as Arts quite through as wee vse to say when there are many poore folke to bee serued though they stand in a long row Haue you serued them round But there is a further reason of it A circle wee know is a round line whose beginning and end meet together in a common point therefore this learning in a Circle must be shewed to haue a common point and that wee shall easily finde The proper subiect of Art is Ens à primo because we heard that was made for an end Now then from whence Ens à primo had his beginning from thence must Ars haue his beginning But from Ens primum it had his beginning ergo Againe as Ens à primo hath for his beginning Ens primum so it must haue Ens primum for his last end because Ens primum is not made for any end but is the last end of all things it selfe ergo hee must also be the last end of Arte Then here wee finde as Ens primum is the beginning of Art so also hee is the end of Art because he is the beginning and end of those things that are the subiects of arts therefore there is one common point wherein they begin and end ergo hauing the same beginning and end here is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Now howsoeuer the phrase may seeme otherwise as wee heard before yet here wee see the wisedome of God in this name though the Graecians did not know the reason of it when they gaue it Now the Scripture seemeth to witnesse this truth For the Lord saith I am the beginning and the end that is of things And againe I am Alpha and Omega these belong to Grammar ergo to Art ergo hee is both the beginning and end of things and the Alpha and Omega of the Arts. That this wisedome is round we may also see in regard of the subiect for the World is round and that is the subiect of Art ergo Art is so for Art is an adiunct to it and euery adiunct takes figure of his subiect Againe if we will take Art for Knowledge Knowledge is in a mans head and that is round so Encuclopaidia is euery way in circulo and thus wee see the reason why this name should bee giuen to a Chaine whose linkes are the Arts. Now if Ens primum be the cause of entia à primo then he hath the Idea of them in him for he made them by counsell and not
man shall bring testimony from the word of God we are rather to receiue his else we prefer an humane testimony before a diuine Againe if it bee an humane testimony and a humane testimony that we compare together let not a priuate man stand vp to stirre with his meere testimony against a whole assembly The reason of the Creed being generally receiued in all Churches is this because it hath a diuine testimony ergo next to the testimony of the Church we are to prefer the common testimony and then the priuate as it doth not iarre with the common one Illustris sententia For though it be not a law yet is it generally receiued as notable for truth now he calls it illustris opposing it to obscura which though it may haue truth in it yet is it not so famous to be receiued We say vox populi is vox Dei because all truth comes from him Legis autem non scriptae scriptae testimonium est Pro Milone Est enim iudices non scripta sed nata lex quam non didicimus accepimus legimus verum ex natura ipsa arripuimus c. For there are some lawes that are customes and they are not written indeed in ciuill affaires it so comes to passe that we cannot see all but are faine to leaue some things to custome yet there may bee some lawes written in our hearts which we call naturall This is witnessed that it is lawfull for a man to defend himselfe by the law of Nature Et ibidem Quod si duodecem tabulae nocturnem furem quoquo modo diurnum autem si se telo defenderit interfici impunè voluerunt c. Why a man may slay his aduersary by the Law of the twelue tables which in the night time allowes it Sententiae illustres sunt prouerbia That is old sayes as they call them because they are generally receiued are called prouerbs vt pares cum paribus facillime congregantur birds of a feather will flye together Spartam nactus es you haue an office looke to it This was occasioned thus when they had chosen their King at Sparta they vsed this prouerb to him Spartam nactus es hanc exorna Illustres sententiae are genus to prouerbia and dicta sapientum Sunt item dicta sapientum These were priuate testimonies at their originall but came to be generall afterwards because of the common receit of them Nosce teipsum Socrates was counted the wisest man that liued in his time and whereas the Mathematickes and naturall Philosophy then flourished he was the first that taught ciuility and the subiect thereof is the knowledge of a mans selfe ergo he taught his Schollers this lesson Nosce teipsum He meanes to know Morall Philosophy Ethicks Oeconomicks Politicks c. Ne quid nimis too much of any thing is good for nothing Proprium testimonium est vt Platonis illud 1. ad Quintum fratrem Atque ille quidem princeps ingenij doctrinae Plato c. That State is happy where Philosophers are Princes or where Princes are Philosophers Plato saith it that is testimonium proprium Talia sunt in Poetis 6. Aeneid Discite iustitiam moniti ne temnite diuos Sic Homerico illo versu Aiax autem ex Salamine duxit duodecim naues The Athenians and the Megarenses had fought so long that there was a law made at Athens that none should speake of Salamis Now Solon put a rope about his necke and ranne through the City saying this verse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. by this meanes the Athenians rising together got Salamis from the Megarenses and it was belonging to Athens because of the King thereof Viuorum testimonia non sunt non tantum cum quaeritur de fundo aut caede c. He doth not make a distinction of testimonies to bee dead or aliue but he meanes by mortuorum those when they were aliue that are now dead he makes many kinds of priuate testimonies as obligations confessiones iusiurandi c Obligationis exemplum est 5. Philip. Audebo etiam obligare fidem meam P.C. vobis populoque Romano c. Augustus Caesar was yet a young youth who went to schoole when his father Caesar was slaine and Antony made great stirres thinking he should be in Caesars place Now the Romanes offer the souldiers this Augustus to be their Captaine that they might set him vp against Antony telling them that he would both ouercome their enemies and also that he would be a good gouernour Pignus autem obligatio quaedam est vt apud Virg. Elog. 1. Vis ergo inter nos quid possit vterque vicissim Experiamur ego hanc vitulam ne forte recuses c. So a pledge or a pawne is a speciall kinde of obligation they that put out money to vsury can tell that a pawne is an obligation Confessio est libera vel expressa tormentis quae propriè quaestio dicitur Tale fuit argumentum contra Milonem quod a Cicerone deridetur Age vero quae erat aut qualis quaestio Confessio is when a man is a witnesse against himselfe and it is either voluntary or expressa tormentis quae propriè quaestio dicitur that is a commission How did the commission goe out where is Ruscio and Casca did Clodius lay waite for Milo he did Then when it was answered that they should be hanged for saying so they answered again that Clodius did not lie in wait for Milo hoping for liberty Hunc etiam referri potest argumentum quo vtimur cum affirmationis nostrae approbationem experientiam proponimus That is this may be added to confession when by experience we tell a thing Would any body lend Volcatius twenty shillings let him trie tecto recipiet nemo no man will so much as receiue him to house If you were in my case you would finde it Iusiurandum etiam testimonium est 6. Aeneid Per superos si qua fides tellure sub ima est Inuitus regina tuo de littore cessi This is the last and is humanum because it is his witnesse that sweares it Obiect But is not that Diuinum when God sweares by himselfe Ans No because it is in respect of our weaknesse Secondly because we here consider God as if he were man If there be any faith vnder the earth now there is none Reciprocatio hic obscurior est vt quia testatum verum sit testis sic etiam verax Here is a reciprocation in a testimony but it is more obscure then that which we heard of before in the doctrine of a distribution and definition vt quia testatum c. the reason is here because that whatsoeuer the witnesser shall be such shall the witnesse be if he be prudent vertuous and beneuolent his witnesse will bee prudent vertuous and beneuolent that is as if he should say if the testis bee true then will the witnesse be true Obscurior est Because
vs here that to argue is accidentall to an argument and disposition to so that their mistaking makes him here to demurre and stay vpon it Now indeed there must of necessity bee a simple consideration of argumentum for though things in nature are disposed together yet they were seuered at the first and againe we are to consider them to still though they be together Consideratae he vseth this word because thought inuention and iudgement are ioyned together in nature yet he would here tell vs that wee are too seuer them by our consideration as thus I can see heat without fire cold without water c. So that singulae rationes are solae et per se consideratae non in vsu for so they cannot be but they are solae et per se consideratae in consideration for so they be he saith quales because argumentum was defined from his quality or property of affection and properties are qualities Argumentum est artificiale aut inartificiale This affection or glue is artificiale or inartificiale as if he should say argumentum hath this affection ex sese and it is in artificio rei or it is not ex sese but from some other thing so that euery argument is affected but two wayes one as an artificiall argument the other as an inartificiall now the reason of this distribution is this God hath made all things for man and at the beginning for one man and they are to conduce to one but all things cannot come vnder one mans eye of reason therefore that he may be better furnished herein God hath prouided these two the one whereby he may see by himselfe the other whereby he may see by another mans eye Againe that which we are to see is either in artificio rei or not in artificio rei so that all things are seeable but not to be seen with one mans eye but by many This word artificiale teacheth vs these things first there is no artificiall argument but you shall see it in fabricarei therefore belongs to some Art because Art deliuers the frame of the thing therefore there is no axiom that consisteth of artificiall arguments but it belongs to some Art Now though we heare no arguments in Arts but the causes and properties yet notwithstanding we haue all arguments indeed for there is no quality but is proton in some generall thing as heat in fire cold in water now this giues vs great light yet effects must be there if they be proper and the effect belongs to that rule where the property is taught and dissentanies belong to art too as nature is constans or inconstans argumentum est artificiale aut inartificiale so that there are no axioms affirmed or denyed true or false but we shall find them in some Art either as a first rule or a deduct by consequence necessary so that hence is the greatest light that can be to a Scholler to analyse all his example and bring euery thing to his Art where he shall see it in causa so that if one would make a common place booke let him make the Rules of Arts his heads and let him take any example and see whether argument is more speciall and so cary the axiom to that Art and to that rule of the art whither it belongs As homo est iustus homo belongs to nature iustitia to morall Philosophy ergo this axiom belongs to the doctrine of iustice so that morall Philosophy borrowes man from nature to deliuer it selfe The vse of this is vnspeakable I cannot deliuer it vnto you the vse it selfe will better testifie it for thus may a man try euery thing whatsoeuer yea though it be a contingent axiom as audentes fortuna iuuat audacia belongs to Ethicks fortuna to Logicke and in audacia we shall finde this for it is that which thrusteth a man desperately and here we may see what a true predicament is not the predicaments but the arts are the storehouses for whatsoeuer is in artificio rei we may see there not onely genus species c. but all other argument for they are too narrow and false too for that distribution substantia est creata or increata will not faile in any art and the three first predicaments as we heard before are nothing but practices of method Now if it be obiected we must not haue those things before we see them no we must first see them that we may lay them vp in store We haue our eye first and then things appointed for vs to see Artificiale est quod ex sese arguit Now here is that affection that is in this kinde of arguments that glue that was before is here quod ex se so that this makes that more speciall which before was more generall so that we shall still see what our eye of reason sees we heard before that we see the thing as it is an argument here we see it as it is affectioned to argue ex se Ex se what is that as if he should say looke into the artificium of the thing there shall you see his artificiall arguing ex se that is it argues natura or it is causa natura of its arguing so that these arguments concurre for the being of the thing So wood is affected to argue a chest ex se that is it is in the artificio of wood to argue a chest made of wood ex se so then this artificiall argument ariseth from nature from a vis ingenita that is in artificio rei so the efficient argues ex se as if I should say if there were not that cunning in the efficient of a chest to make it it would not be one So that it is thus defined quod ex sese arguit Argumentum was the next genus and he doth not expresse it but vnderstand it here because we heard of it so lately before then againe he hath it here but after another manner because he could not deliuer the forme of it without the genus for arguit is not here taken for act but for potentia as wee say animal vidit though he doth not actually see but haue the faculty of it so we say Does he eate or drinke meaning can he eate or drinke For if it were taken for the act of arguing then it should not be no where but in iudgement so that quod arguit is as much as argumentum and ex se is the forme if he had said artificiale est argumentum ex sese he had said the same that ex sese arguit but it had not beene so plaine to a young Scholler and he had also newly done with argumentum before so that this is the second thing that our eye of reason is to looke at namely an artificiall argument which can ex sese arguere Now fallaces may be in euery rule In the first as if any abuse it to deceiue and abuse reason for the second if any goe about to iudge before
doe it with my nature not from it So in a clocke the leade goes downe by a rule in nature because it is heauy and that pulls the rope and the rope pulles the wheeles c. all these moue with their natures though not from them Ventorum naturalis efficientia est In this example Vna Eurusque Notusque ruunt creberque procellis Affricus vastos tollunt ad littora fluctus Here these three Eurus Notus and Affricus are naturall causes of tempests on the Seas they are also causae cum alijs and each of them is as principall as the other Consilii exemplum est illa Ciceronis de se confessio Suscepto bello Caesar gesto etiam magna ex parte c. those things that fall vnder Logicke them doth hee define as causa per se he defines to be quae sua facultate efficit but if he should define what nature and counsell are he should run into naturall and morall Philosophie for counsell belongs to Pollicy yet for the modus of it in working an effect it belongs to Logicke for a man may take counsell of himselfe without counsellers as Kings haue Suscepto bello Caesar c. iudicio meo ac voluntate in these words lies the modus which hee proues à disparatis nulla vi coactus c. Fallaces here are very common as when we take that for causa per se which is causa per accidens contra Now the reason why hee giues these modi to the efficient and not to the effect is because they are modi mouendi and doe not belong to the thing moued Per accidens efficit causa quae externa facultate efficit vt in his quae fiunt necessitate vel fortuna Causa per accidens is that which worketh an effect but non sua facultate but is moued by some other thing and yet notwithstanding it workes after a sort sua facultate but not sua facultate if wee respect the effect as fire drieth a cloth by remouing the moysture and so leaues the cloth dry which drought is in the cloth Vt in his quae fiunt necessitate vel fortuna Necessitate cum efficiens vi cogitur ad effectum Here wee see a necessitie in inuention which is all one with coaction By fortuna we are to vnderstand the speciall prouidence of God or ignorance of the next cause for ignorance of the prouidence of God in all things and of the next cause hath caused that men say what fortune had I when they are crossed in play or such like Now necessity answereth to nature cum efficiens cogitur so that this necessity here is a coaction and yet is it efficiens though vi cogitur cogitur when as the worke of it per se is rather of some other thing now the same thing in one respect may be causa per se and in another respect causa per accidens for they are but modi vi externa ad effectum so that it doth it not natura or consilio Obiection Why saith hee effectum rather then res Answer All comes to one for he meanes res neither doth he define effectum here Here he meanes violence not that vis in causa this vis doth not worke the effect but workes vpon the cause and is that facultas whereof he spake before Qualis est Pompeianorum excusatio At mihi quidem ait Orator si proprium verum nomen c. Before he said hee was causa consilio of going with Pompey against Caesar he saith he was compelled fatali necessitate and hither belongs fatum Schooles Fortuna est causa per accidens quando praeter c. Our author before did tell vs of fortuna in the ablatiue case here he puts it in the nominatiue because fortune is a principall cause of that effect that another doth per accidens the arguing we ascribe it to fortune and say fortune did it so that our author would haue vs consider first that it was fortune did it secondly that it takes away the title of doing it from him that did it Per accidens That is working externa facultate now whereas hee saith he doth it per accidens he meanes fortune as it is commonly taken when wee make her blind not seeing what she doth for hence it doth arise when we doe not a thing by counsell but hab nab as they say that causeth vs to make fortune blinde Quando aliquid accidit That is happeneth for here it is principall the improuidence as it were he neither sees himselfe a cause neither doth he see who is the cause and therefore he saith accidit not efficit for hee saith I did it not so againe aske him who did it and he will say know not so that accidere is the speciall efficere of this modus Praeter scopum efficientis Fortune may seeme to be opposed to counsell which euermore hath a scope whereat it leuels now when any thing happeneth praeter scopum it is fortuna wee say Now things in nature may haue a scope which is beyond their nature and then it is fortuna so that praeter scopum is as much as if he should haue said praeter scopum fortunae if it bee causa fortuna or praeter scopum naturae if it be causa natura Sic Pheraeo Iasoni profuit hostis c. here his enemie going about to kill him healed him In hoc genere causarum imprudentia connumerari solet Imprudentia is one modus of fortune as here Cur aliquid vidi cur noxia lumina feci Cur imprudenti cognita culpa mihi est c. I vnawares haue seene that which hath done me harm Then Ouid was causa per accidens of working that effect he should not So Acteon was causa inscius of seeing Diana washing her selfe and here Ouid reasons a simile as Acteon was torne in peices of his dogs for seeing Diana vnawares so am I banished for seeing that I would Scilicet insuperis etiam fortuna luenda est c. He meanes Augustus So if a man goe forth and a tile fall from an house and breake his head this is causa fortuna it is natura as it brake his head being harder then his head and fortuna as it hit him and consilio it breakes his head if it be flung for it hath a scope true it is nothing but counsell hath his end in its intendment yet there is no cause but hath his end of the effect it worketh Hinc sumitur deprecatio c. For our author said before accidit therefore wee are causes ergo it ought to be pardoned deprecatio is from this manner of working fortuna so they will say hee is a proper man but hath no lucke Fortunae autem nomen ignorantia causarum confinxit c. Here Ramus doth commorari in the name lest he should be mistaken it is an vnchristian word it is ignorance not onely as it is opposed to counsell but as it is vnknowne
predominant in the mist so much more the neerer you shall come to see the forme ingenerated if wee speake of the formes of the elements they were extrinsice and were ingenerated in the matter againe if we shall speake of the soule of man this is extrinsice infused but the formes of other things are within and are educed out of the matter but there is nothing new in this for the matter is so too Ingeneratur True thus farre as the forme is not made but by composition of the elements when the formes are not made but in nature there is that misture or in Art that composition that there is a new forme as in a stone by the misture is made one forme arising from the formes of the foure elements by their action and passion So in artificiall things the forme is a compound forme made of the formes of the parts and because that thing is now that which it was not ergo this forme must needs be that now which it was not ergo ingeneratum and the whole worke of the efficient whilst he doth dolare or hew a thing is nothing but his preparing of it together with the rest of the matter to make a new thing Forma is diuersly ingenerated if it be by composition then it is composed if it be of simples then it is made by shauing or cutting it Now whilst he saith simul at once it may seem by this that the forme and effect are together he meanes not together in nature for the forme must bee before the effect because it constitutes the effect and the constituter is before the thing constituted therefore how are they simul he meanes forma simul ingenerat thus I suppose two goe together yet one of them goeth before the other here is a priority and simul too he that is before goeth first the other followeth yet both moue together and as two hands laid together doe moue together and yet one before the other so is it with the formall cause and effect the formall cause moues and the effect also but the effect followes it in euery step and the finall cause followes the forme as the shadow followes the body and the effect comes last againe this is a property ergo an adiunct ergo is after the subiect for the forme is an effect before it be a subiect so that the efficient doth as it were make the forme and the effect still followes as we may see in artificiall things so that so farre forth as the forme is ingenerated so far forth the effect is accomplished Anima rationalis est forma hominis c. Here our author doth commorari and stay vpon the doctrine of forma for it is so deepe and subtill as that it can hardly bee perceiued This example is not true because anima rationalis may subsist from the bodie now as there can be no matter without a forme so there can bee no forme without a matter therefore this example will not serue his turne yet he brings that hee could get many in Schooles haue stumbled at this and haue gone about to mend it but indeed they haue marred it Some say ratio belongs to Angels ergo it is not the proper forme of homo and therefore they haue added mortale and say homo is animal rationale mortale Now if they ioyne mortale to ratio it is not mortalis Againe animal ratione mortale doth detract from man vnlesse we speake of his bodie Et distinguitur a caeteris omnibus naturis That is not so for the Angels though they bee animae and so haue not animam rationalem yet they haue rationem againe doth not the body of man distinguish him from other things so I suppose we admit of the Pythagorians metam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A mans soule in a bird will not make it a man Geometricarum figurarum in triangulis quadrangulis sua forma est He brings such examples as hee could finde and those whereof greatest question might be made it hath beene a question among Logicians that this forma is peculiar to substances not accidents and hence haue made a distincti of forma to be substantialis or accidentalis but they are deceiued for Logicke is a generall Art and euery thing that is made hath causes ergo may be defined ergo hath matter and forme for otherwise wee could not haue a perfect definition in Grammar Rhetoricke and Arithmeticke or in any other Arts that haue accidents for their subiects ergo accidents behold a forme as well as an efficient ergo he saith in Geometry take a triangle it consists of three lines with three angles which by their vnition in their angles make vp one forme as well as one matter Phisicarum rerum coeli terrae arborum piscium sua forma est He doth commorari here long for two causes first in respect the forme is deepe and needes illustration Secondly to confute other Logicians that say accidents haue no formes vnde praecipua rerum vt natura est c. if it be causa per quam res est id quod est then it is praecipua rerum natura Nature properly is res nata that is that springeth principijs that is matter and forme so that the whole nature consisteth of them and this is the proper signification of it afterward it comes to signifie the principia themselues hence is materia and forma called naturae so that in naturall Philosophy when you read of nature they tell you commonly some tale of materia or forma then againe by a metonimie of the adiunct for the subiect it signifieth the qualities naturall in things all this shewes forma to be praecipua rei natura Praecipua first because it makes the thing to be id quod est so doth not the matter againe forma why it is principium actus from whence the qualities principally arise for as the Philosophers teach though not truly in euery point materia is principium passionis forma actionis and actio is better then passio ergo the forme more excellent then the matter but both matter and forme doe agere for they are causae yet the formes begin and the matter is but the sustentation of it and the formes act is the stronger by the matter not onely as it acts internally but when it acts vpon externall things by resistance by the way Now as it hath chiefe interest in esseficating the effect so it is praecipua rei natura so also there is of it praecipua rei explicatio si possit inueniri Si possit inueniri He saith it neither can be found out nor that it cannot be found out Si possit inueniri sure it is findable I proue it thus it is lyable to Logicke if it be obiected to the eye then the eye may see it it may but hardly be found because it doth not descry it selfe to the outward senses by qualities as bodies doe againe the forme in nature is so subtill
that we can hardly finde it but see as it were the shadow of it ergo diuers haue thought the formes of things to be diuine Some haue gone so farre as to thinke them to be influences but subtile it is indeed and harder to finde out then either the efficient or matter ergo wee commonly call that the matter which containes the forme too because it is rather seene as it hath a materiall cause then as it hath a formall Vt in artificiosis rebus facilius occurrit That is the reason why he that makes natures is more cunning then any man can trace his wisedome as wee may see in the elements ergo no man can make a thing in nature man may further nature but he cannot make any thing againe the parts are so fine in the mixture of things as it is beyond the acies of mans eye to see them In artificiosis rebus facilius occurrit Why because artificiall things are the workes of men one man may trace another though euery man cannot Caesar 7. Muri autem omnes Gallici c. As for example in artificiall things this very description will declare how hard a thing it is to finde out the forme but we vse to point at it by the matter and by the position of it There stood great beames all along two foot asunder put into the earth and the distances betweene them were stuffed with great stones when these were so fastned then there was a new order begun where they layd the beams against those stones that were laid before and filled likewise the distances with stones which were against the first lay of beams but what hath he told vs now why sayth he I am a Frenchman and I will tell you the forme of a French wall where if you doe but looke at the formes of euery part and of them you shall see a composed forme so that the Logician doth not looke at the outward face of a thing but at the inward essence here he is faine to deliver the forme by many other arguments and indeed it is a description of forma Est in secessu longo locus insula portum c. Here he hath by the position of the parts of the hauen told vs the forme of it CAPVT 8. De fine Finis est causa cuius gratia res est WE haue gone through the esse of a thing we haue but heard of three when the fourth comes that makes vp the perfection of the thing namely finis Finis for the name it is borrowed from Geometry for that that is terminus there is here called finis and it is brought hither to signifie that finall cause that serueth to make vp the effect so that it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 if we keepe the proportion of the esses but it is not the last part and member thereof as they make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the last member of some whole as Method is the last member of Logicke Finis is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the esse of a thing not of the members of it Now it is called finis because it limits the thing for his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and for his essence and it is the last thing that limits it ergo it is called finis Est causa Because with force thereof the thing is and the end though it doe not enter into the essence of the effect by it owne essence yet by it vertue it doth efficere as doth the efficient Cuius gratia Therefore the finall cause is that that graceth the effect and thence hath the thing his commendation cuius gratia for whose grace for gratia here signifieth not onely for whose sake but for whose grace as if the finall cause were that which doth grace the effect and so indeed it doth For as bonum quo communius eo melius so communior finis hath more grace then finis specialior for that cause that which is next the chiefest end is more noble and excellent then that which is more remote Hence man is more excellent then any other creature because he is made immediately for God So then the end graceth it euermore and the more excellent the end is the more excellent is that effect This then is the esse that the finall cause doth giue to the effect namely that which is good for that effect so that the goodnesse of a thing is that vis in the effect that it hath from the end As in a knife the efficient may be a slaue the matter likewise naught the form though that be something yet were it not for the end neither the efficient matter or forme would moue ergo the finall cause is said to be the happines of the thing so that a thing is not to be accounted happy till it be seruiceable to that end for which it was made A garment well made as touching the skill of the efficient and of good stuffe for the matter and fit for a garment so of a good forme yet not fitting him for whom it was made it wanteth his end or happinesse and so is not perfect Againe this shewes the difference betweene the formall cause and the end for the forme may be as we see and not the end Againe wee know there are many things that haue not their perfection but growth and yet haue all the causes yet notwithstanding the end presently followes after the forme so man was made by God here God is the efficient earth the mat er reason the forme yet here is not his end namely fitnesse to serue God And thus we haue heard the doctrine of the causes which are the foundations whereon the effect is builded Physicis rebus finis homo propositus est homini Deus Of naturall things man is the end the grace of man is God and God makes him good not as an efficient but as an end Omnium artium est aliquod summum bonum finis extremus That is that end which they reach vnto but that is not the summum bonum of all things for Logicks end is bene disserere Grammars bene loqui c. these are the furthest ends of Logicke and Grammar but not the furthest end of all they are indeed the proper end of them but not the summum bonum so that he meanes by summum bonum the outmost or farthest end of them and the end of Logick lies in the precepts of it as they act bene disserere This is the difference betweene the end and the effect A house is made to dwell in though it neuer be dwelt in so for a garment to be worne is one thing and to be fit to weare another So if I goe forth to speake with one and he be gone yet I obtaine my end they commonly say he was frustrate of his end but not frustrate of finis quatenus finis but quatenus effectum Iuno primo Aeneidos connubii finem assumit cum Aeolo Deiopeiam pollicetur solatii
when it is considered with another thing in agreement yet still seuered in respect and againe when one thing is not another by common opposition that it makes with another that is a disparate then againe it is a contrarie by some peculiar nature in him directly against some other thing so in a man we consider his causes flesh nerues sinewes bones c. then his complements then we respect him as one diuerting or turning aside from another thing then we looke at his common nature whereby hee is opposed to many things at once in the same nature and so he is a disparate a diuers he is as when I say though a man was there yet his horse was there also againe there is that whereunto he is opposed directly as he is not brutum and so hee is a contrarie Now though there was not in one thing any thing to make it more plaine yet set them together and the one will make the other more manifest therefore this opposition is either where one fighteth against many and these are disparates or where the fight is more strong and those are called contraries Contraria by reason here is but one to one ergo these stand contra that is face to face when one did fight with many some stood aside some behinde but these face one another so that if the one turne away the other will turne to him againe Sunt opposita that is they haue barres in their nature namely ratio and res Quorum vnum vni tantum opponitur So that this battle is a duellio a battle of one against one and so they fight that the one things force is bent only against the force of the other thing Vnum vni tantùm for disparates may be vnum vni but not tantùm vnum vni because they come to communicate in one next nature as homo and brutum in animal or else the one so denies the other that it takes away the entity of the thing affirmed Vni but we shall heare afterward that contraria negantia are nothing in themselues Answer They are something gratia entis and our reason giues something to it and apprehends it as some thing in respect of the contrary and here we may see the force of our reason that can make of nothing something Now some thing is made of nothing diuers wayes first by our reason secondly by our fancie or by the hallusination of the eye Logicke makes onely two kinds of nothings the contradicent and the priuant Homo is a contrarie to brutum but to Leo and equus he is a disparate because hee is opposed to equus in the same nature that hee is opposed to Leo. Contraria sunt affirmantia vel negantia This distribution of contraries runnes on as the former did for as the least dissention began first so wee still proceed to the greater now by affirmantia and negantia he meanes things positiue or priuatiue for there is either a thing opposed to a thing or a thing opposed to nothing and the fight betweene something and nothing is stronger then the former for when one thing fights with another thing let them fight as long as they will or can yet they leaue something behinde them but the other leaues nothing at all so that contraries are where both are things in nature or where the one is nothing and are called negantia of the latter part as the other are called of both parts affirmantia Affirmantia as if he should say they are things in nature or things positiuè as a Father a childe c. Affirmantia quorum vtrumque affirmat c. Hee doth not say affirmatur but affirmat because hee would willingly describe them from their act for hee would deliuer the nature of the arguments vt relata aduersa There is likewise among these a difference of contrariety for there are some affirmantia that may bee reconciled and made to agree there be some also that will neuer agree but perpetuo aduersantur The first if you set them face to face will be very good friends but set them backe to backe and they will be foes but set them aduersa how you will and they will be foes so then relates haue not so strong a fight betwixt them as aduersa Now they are called relates by reason of a certaine reference they haue one to another continually yea indeed they are by reason of their reference for the causes of the one relate are in his correlate for the cause of the fathers relation is not in him but he receiues his whole relatiue being from the correlate so that in Diuinity we know there is nothing added to the Godhead by giuing to it the persons mutually Sunt contra here is one to one for though a father haue many children yet the relation is but one namely betwixt fatherhood and sonhood and though many stand on the one side yet there is but one relation so in the high mystery of the Trinitie there is a double relation first betweene the Father and the Sonne secondly between the Father and the Sonne on the one side and the holy Ghost on the other side So when I say Aristotle est discipulus Platonis these are relates yet when I say Aristotle est discipulus this is subiectum and adiunctum so cousen and cousen are relates if we respect the relatiue qualitie and not the men Now that terme of relates is vsed confusedly as we say he is his father meaning his procreant cause quorum alterum constat Quorum alterum constat è mutua c. Constare is to stand together of causes è mutua alterius affectione so that these relates haue not their causes from the thing in whom they are but from their correlates as when I define a husband to be him that hath a wife or a wife to be her that hath a husband these are definitions è relatis and so è causis But what causes doe relates containe all the causes both efficient matter forme and end E mutua è is a signe of the effect quod è causis existit so that this is their nature Atque inde nominanda sunt relata They are called relates in regard of the reference they haue one to another so that wee may here see what relates are and how they belong hither they that thinke all arguments are relates why they are so as the cause and effect c. but so I cannot call them species of argumentum consentaneum for here they are examples ergo lowest of all Againe if I say argumentū est artificiale aut inartificiale so goe on thinking that all these are genera to causa and effectum I deceiue my selfe as they are relates but if all arguments should be relates as the arguments are taught in Logicke then all the examples of all arguments should be relates as God and the world but when I make them relates I analise Logicke euen as I may make the
comparata be taken for paria or imparia c. Quae comparantur So that this word deliuereth the reference that one thing not being another hath to it by way of reference Inter se That is the one thing compared with the other and the other with that and both comparates the cause was of the effect the subiect of the adiunct contra dissentanies had one denomination too but comparates though they haue the same denomination yet we doe not consider them absolutely as dissentanies are but as they are layd one to another and the other to it Quae tamet si ipsa comparationis natura aeque nota sunt attamen alterum altero c. Here hee tells vs that comparats are like vnto dissentanies in this that they are aeque nota natura as dissentanies are aeque manifesta but though they be so yet herein they dissent from dissentanies that the one in respect of one man may bee more knowne and more notable then the other so that though they be aeque nota natura yet quoad nos the one may bee better knowne to a man then the other ergo here we must alwaies take heed that when wee make comparisons which doe not conclude but illustrate as they say that we take our comparison from a thing as well or better knowne to him to whom it is made then the thing we goe about to proue otherwise wee teach sophistically and breake this rule Saepeque notis breuius iudicantur aliquando partibus plenius distinguntur Againe this is generall to all comparats iudicantur that is declared shewed pointed ergo he saith rather iudicantur then demonstrantur Notis He meanes this comparates vse is double they are either shorter with notes or made full with parts Quae propositio redditioque nominantur The parts of a full comparison are these where the proposition is the argument arguing and the redditio the aliquid Atque omnino comparata etiam ficta arguunt fidemque faciunt Whereas a fainged cause cannot argue a true effect aut contra a faigned subiect a true adiunct and so in dissentanies why in comparates we may faine one and will argue another true one and here is the ground of all fables which are full comparisons similia hence we say comparates doe magis illustrare then concludere so that these are the three properties belonging to comparates in generall Comparatio est in quantitate vel qualitate He doth not say comparata are quanta or qualia but comparatio est in quantitate vel qualitate looking at the categoria or arguing now it is not quantitas or qualitas but in quantitate or qualitate as if he should say things that are compared are layd together in their quantity or quality for we are not to vnderstand any Arithmeticall or Geometricall quantitie or quality here which is alwayes the same but it is a logicall quantity and quality that is that quantity and quality which wee consider in one thing with another so that if you would know what this logicall quantity is it is nothing but equality or inequality In quantitate That is when things are compared in their equality or inequality for parity and imparity similitude and dissimilitude belong to Logicke now comparatio in quantitate is first because quantitie is by nature before quality for this parity and imparity must needs be considered in the thing arising from the nature thereof before we consider the qualitie in nature arising from the quantity as for example I must first consider the greatnesse of a wall then I shall see that quality whitenesse to be extended according to the greatnesse of the wall Qua res comparatae quantae dicuntur Qua that is it is that affection of things that are laid together for that he meanes when he saith qua Res comparatae c. Quantity is an affection logicall to res now in that he thus defines them he doth not meane quantae in respect of the word but in respect of the nature of the thing for this it is we know euery thing hath this logismos or logicall affection whereby it may be called quanta so qualities may be compared together and bee made greater or lesse by reason of the finite nature of them Estque parium vel imparium Now because there are more things then degrees of quantity for that cause it comes to passe that some things are equally matched and some vnequally so then when we compare things together and they be matches those are paria this parity is of those things which chance to be equall Paria sunt quorum est vna quantitas First he calls them paria as if hee should say matches or fellowes or as we call them paires as a paire of gloues or garters c. else it may bee they are imparia or dissimilia for so sometimes that word imparia is vsed for dissimilia quorum quantitas est vna Hee doth not meane that the things are one but their quantity is parity ergo he saith quorum quantitas est vna hee doth not meane that their quantity is one but it is called paritie Argumentum igitur paris est cum par explicatur à pari This followes from the definition by explicatur hee meanes arguitur but hee saith explicatur because it is the nature of those to vnfold one another Eiusque notae sunt par aequale aequare c. Because others haue not taught these kindes of arguments before ergo he pleaseth to stay a while vpon them and would teach vs to iudge of them by the phrase as it were but we must looke at the matter Par leuibus ventis Here Crusa Aeneas first wife is compared to the winds Et nunc aequali c. Here the age of one is compared with the age of another Againe the Empire of Rome shall be equall to the whole earth and their courage to the height of heauen Cuius res gestae atque virtutes c. Now followes full comparisons his gallant deeds are compared with the whole course of the Sunne the proposition is here with what limits the earth is confined with them is the earth limited Littora quot conchas quot amaena rosaria flores c. Here are many propositions to one reddition as many shells as are on the sea shore c. so many are mine aduersities quae si comprendere coner c. againe his repeating of them would bee as if hee should tell the drops of the Icarion sea Huius vero loci sunt consectaria illa è contrariis quidem orta c. These kindes of arguments though they seeme to haue in them contraries yet by laying them together and seeing their contrary consequence they come to bee comparates As Sosibian is a seruant to his father because his father is his master Ex aduersis sunt frequentiora For the former examples were onely true in relates and priuants but ex aduersis sunt frequentiora If one accuse him
vi arguit WEE haue heard of artificial arguments and there can be nothing that shall be in the artificio of any thing but wee haue heard it so that if wee looke at any of the creatures of God to see the root the causes of it and then the whole circumference and limitation thereof wee may by these arguments taught before see it throughly Now whereas one man cannot see all things though at the first all things were made for one man the Lord hath in wisedome ordained that wee should receiue some things by reports from others for as the world was to increase both in men and other creatures it was impossil e that one man should see all things intus in cute so that whereas at the beginning all things being made for one man and he afterwards could not see them yet still it is so farre forth true whilest all men see all things It is called inartificiale for the contrary reason that artificiale was so called namely of being in the thing whereas this is not in the nature of the thing but externè altogether so that we may see his force by this hauing no farther to doe with the thing then onely by witnessing of it Exposito artificiali argumento c. This transition containes the conclusion of all that went before and the proposition of that which followes and here againe wee may see how artificiall arguments goe before inartificialls because inartificiall arguments haue no ground but as they are backt with artificialls And this doctrine we may see to be true by the practise of common people for if a man giue testimony of that hee knowes not others will say he doth he knowes not what for as no man can giue testimony of that he knowes not so no man ought to receiue a testimony but as it is backed with artificialls otherwise he knowes not the thing sufficiently as hee should and if hee first heare a testimony of a thing and afterward come to see the thing hee will then say he knowes it not because one testified so much but because himselfe saw it to be so it is called argumentum inartificiale because it neuer comes into Art to make vp a rule though it may come in as a commoration to proue a rule syllogistically but method is the disposition of axioms not of syllogismes now a testimony of a thing belongs to that Art to which the thing witnessed doth belong as Aristotles authority against the Creation of the world belongs to Diuinity there to bee confuted in the doctrine of the Creation Argumentum inartificiale sequitur It is an argument for it is effected ad arguendum but after a new manner for it is externè but as it is grounded vpon the artificials so is it affected to argue Argumentum inartificiale est quod non sua natura sed assumpta alicuius artificialis argumenti vi arguit It is of power to argue as we heard before but not vi sua For when a man beareth witnesse of a thing we receiue it presuming that hee is familiarly acquainted with the thing that hee witnesseth so that arguit but not sua natura for alas what harmonie is there betweene the witnesser considered in his owne nature and the thing witnessed considered in its owne nature none at all so that we must looke at either of these for their natures Sed assumpta c. So that by the force of some artificiall argument taken vnto it it doth argue ergo this teacheth vs not easily to receiue euery testimony hand ouer head but first to looke whether the testis be well acquainted with the thing witnessed otherwise as it may be an errour in him to giue testimonie of a thing he knowes not so may it bee no lesse errour in vs that receiue such a testimony this wee see reproued in common matters among men and it teacheth vs to receiue the testimonie of a man not so much because ipse dixit but because wee are sure he knowes the thing throughly Vi assumpta Not that it is ortum argumentum for orta did argue with the same force that the first did from whence they did arise but a testimonie doth not argue with the force of an artificiall be it primum or ortum though it be backed with artificiall The cause effect should be in the witnesser but they are not in the witnesse if the testis haue seene any one argument we are so far to receiue his testimony and no farther if hee haue seene more arguments or all of them then are we much more to receiue his witnesse Itaque cum exquisita rerum veritas subtilius exquiritur perexiguam vim probationis habet This being the nature of an inartificiall it hath little force to argue of it selfe for all his strength is aliunde Veritas Truth belongs to an axiome here he meanes if wee would see it to be ens or the entitie of it surely this argument can stand vs in no great stead the testimonie onely swimmes in our braine but we doe not see the thing in its subtle parts as if hee should say the artificiall arguments doe argue subtlely the inartificiall more grosly In ciuilibus autem humanis rebus plerumque hoc argumentum praecipuam fidem è moribus arguentis efficit si prudentia virtus beneuolentia adfuerint He staies vpon the vse of an inartificiall argument In the matters of the common wealth or in matters concerning priuate men this argument hath his speciall credit because in this kinde they are most receiued we know all the matters in our Courts passe by writings or testimonies of men and in these ciuill matters we looke more after the men then after the thing there are artificialls here in these matters but we looke not at them still wee are to vnderstand that the witnesses know the artificialls the reason is because they are things done in time long before which therefore cannot be desided but by writings or mens testimonies Praecipuam fidem habet That is it doth vrge most in respect of the subiect whereto it is vsed E moribus arguentis efficit si prudentia virtus beneuolentia adfuerint This inartificiall argument hath not this praecipuam fidem from it selfe but as it proceedeth from him that is prudent vertuous and beneuolent Prudentia is that skill a man hath to bring his rule or any deduct from his rule to practise that is if he be not simple and silly to tattle and prattle he knowes not what then praecipuam fidem habet so that prudentia doth require discretion and iudgement to know and deliuer a truth That Commandement Thou shalt not beare false witnesse is here taught Againe if he haue not vertue ioyned with his prudentia that is if he make not conscience of witnessing the truth when he knoweth it we ought not to receiue it so that as he must be able to iudge of the truth so must hee haue conscience to vtter it Lastly
Continetur For Inuention did handle arguments seuerally but in axioms they are laid together with a cyment or verbe Ob. Why doth he call it a verbe we haue not heard of Grammar yet doth he meane that verbe which is taught there Answ No but his meaning is that the parts of this axiome are tyed together by that which if it be vttered is a verbe so that verbum here is a metonimy of the adiunct from the subiect verbe being put for that whose name will be a verbe If a man would lay brickes with brickes to haue them hold together he must haue morter and if he would fasten two peeces of wood together he must haue a naile or a pin of wood for as the morter is to the brickes and the naile or pin to the wood such is this vinculum here spoken of to the arguments Vinculo He calls it vinculum because the vinculum holdeth the arguments together in a kinde of composition imitating God therein who hath tyed things in nature with an affection and indeed to speake the truth it springs from the affection that is betweene the two arguments disposed Itaque affirmato vel negato verbo affirmatur vel negatur Before we heard in an axiome that affirmatum was quando vinculum eius affirmatur negatum contra why then a simple axiome hauing the band affirmed must bee affirmed contra so that this is nothing but a speciall application to this kinde of axiome of that which was before taught generally to all axioms and that which is speciall here is that it is the verbum that is denied or affirmed which was vinculum before and this commendation indeed is chiefly for contradiction for if there be contradiction here the verbe must bee affirmed and denyed vt ignis vrit ignis est antecedens vrit consequens here he calls the argument going before the verbe antecedens and the argument following the verb consequens others call them subiectum and praedicatum but he is not pleased with their names because subiectum is properly an argument in inuention therefore if it should bee vsed here it would breed confusion and not onely subiects and predicates are disposed here but all other arguments therefore hee rather keepeth the generall termes shewing so much againe they are fitter because here we are in disposition ergo there must be an argument to goe before the vinculum and another to follow Now we vse these terms also in a composite axiome but they are more proper here The Aristotelians vsed their termes subiectum and predicatum onely in a simple axiome for they had no composite axioms but a connex as we shall heare afterward Atque hic prima est inuentarum rerum dispositio causae cum effecto vt in primo exemplo c. Prima by nature not otherwise because wee cannot make a composite axiome of more arguments with more but there will be more lines here in a simple axiome there is but one line and in a syllogisme there will be a triangle the demonstration may be this A simple axiome A composite of one to more A composite of more to more ▵ A Syllogisme Quomodo argumentum quodlibet enunciari potest exceptis plenis comparationibus distributionibus consentanea quidem affirmando dissentanea negando Ramus doth commorari in telling vs the vse of a simple axiome and hee tells vs all arguments may bee disposed therein but plenae comparationes and plenae distributiones for so he meanes else homo est animal is a distribution and yet a simple axiome but otherwise these will euermore bee a composite axiome Consentanea quidem affirmando dissentanea negando Not but that consentanea may be denied and dissentanea affirmed for we heard before that the same axiome might bee affirmed and denied but thus they ought to bee disposed consentanea affirmando dissentanea negando now here by consentanea he doth not meane only causa effectum subiectum and adiunctum but also those that doe arise from them euen all that may any way agree as in like sort by dissentanea he meanes also all them that doe arise from them or that doe any way disagree but here we are to know that this is not any rule of Art but onely a commoration applying that here in speciall which he taught before Now this disposition is easie but here sometime the band and the consequent part grammatically vttered will be the same as ignis vrit now we come to the affections of a simple axiome which belong not to a composite Axioma simplex est generale aut speciale This is a distribution of the subiect into the adiuncts and though a composite axiome may be generall or speciall yet there we doe not looke after it so that composite axiomes in a syllogisme may make a simple syllogisme being considered not as composite but as the arguments are simply disposed Generale This terme comes of genus not that this axiome consists alwayes of those arguments genus and species but hee meanes that commune which we heare of in Grammar and yet notwithstanding the antecedent part may be common and the axiome may be proper ergo he rather keepes that terme generale then commune though it be a hard trope Now in a generall axiome wee are to obserue these three things first an antecedent that is common secondly a common consequent thirdly a generall attribution of them for else it might be a speciall axiome so that generality and speciality belong to an axiome and are not to be sought for in the doctrine of arguments Atque hic contradictio non semper diuidit verum falsum sed contingentium vtraque pars falsa potest esse He is carefull to teach vs contradiction because there is a meane matter because there is no dispute where there is no contradiction ergo he teacheth vs the contradiction of a simple axiome and now of a generall axiome which will not alwaies diuide truth and falshood sed contingentium vtraque pars c. that is when we contradict a generall by a generall Item non contingentium Why saith he non contingentium because these non contingentia are such as fall out peraduenture impossibilia as in this example Omne animal est rationale nullum animal est rationale he could not well call them necessaria nor possibilia because they may be denyed whereas an impossible axiome should be affirmed Axioma speciale est quando consequens non omni antecedenti attribuitur hic contradictio semper diuidit verum à falso It is called axioma speciale not in respect it hath a species alwaies disposed in it with a genus but in respect it is more speciall then the generall quando consequens c consequens indeed is the chiefest part in an axiome and is commonly the argument that is brought to argue not the antecedens he doth not say consequens commune because it may be either common or proper it is no matter whether
may also see that axioma probabile as they call it and axioma subtile belong hither so that all third arguments are not vsed to make the things more true in themselues but to make the truth more manifest to vs ergo Cardan whilst he argued against Scaliger that he that disputed of subtilty might dispute of all things was in the right but when he would goe about to proue that all things were to bee taught in subtilty there he was out for after wee haue discoursed a point syllogistically wee are faine to goe backe againe to the rule of an axiome to iudge the truth or falshood thereof ergo here we may see that axiomes and syllogismes are confederate and not syllogisme and method Now the same axiome may be manifest to one man but darke to another ergo syllogisticall iudgement waits vpon man and if the truth or falshood bee nice or fine that it cannot bee seene with one act of our eye then we must vse a third argument and subtill if we define it aright is axioma non adeo manifestum Sequitur dianoeticum Dianoia signifies reasons discourse the laying about by our 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for when at first she doth not see a truth then she commands cogitation to coagitare that is to looke after it so that dianoia is nothing but the running about of our reason for the finding out of truth Some Logicians haue compared axomaticall iudgement to a calme sea for there our reason is quiet being satisfied with the truth and syllogisticall iudgement to a troubled sea that is full of stormes winds and tempests for there our reason beats euery corner to conclude that which is doubtfull and from this act it is called dianoia and the iudgement of reason in such an Art is called dianoeticum it running after this or that but our author diuides it afterward into syllogismus and methodus which how it should bee true I see not namely how method should be dianoia for the three internall senses in nature are distinct ergo these parts ought to be distinct according to them as wee heard before Now method makes all things one and so we remember all things as one and the things be iudged before I come here here I onely lay things together to remember them Dianoia est cum aliud axioma ex alio deducitur estque syllogismus aut methodus This very definition tells me that dianoia is nothing but syllogismus and they are both one so that here are deductions of axiomes out of axiomes which surely belong to syllogisticall iudgement onely for I doe not meane that it is ordering of one axiome before another but a drawing of deductions from their first rules true it is that a former axiome giues light to that which follows but that light is by vertue of syllogisticall iudgement so that method placing axiomes doth indeed need axiomaticall iudgement as that also needs inuention before it can place them but it doth not therefore follow that the doctrine of axiomes should be in method Syllogismus est dianoia qua quaestio cum argumento ita disponitur vt posito antecedente necessario concludatur Syllogismus signifies properly the summe of an account in the species of numeration especially in Addition and summa and syllogismus are the same and the Logicians haue borrowed it of the Arithmeticians because though Logicke be the first Art in order and nature yet Arithmeticke was obserued by men before Logicke ergo Plato set ouer his Academy 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for it was taught amōg them as Grammar is now taught among vs for as for Logicke Grammar and Rhetoricke they had them by nature ergo they studied the Mathematickes first ergo they called them Mathematickes for the word is generall to all Arts and indeed that was the reason that Aristotle in his Logicke brings demonstrations out of the Mathematicks so that this metaphor syllogismus was à priore to them This syllogismus est dianoia qua quaestio cum argumento c. it is indeed a contract of larger discourse and here in this rule obserue first a question secondly an argument thirdly a disposing of them together fourthly a set or constant position of the arguments and the question Lastly a necessary conclusion from them first if it bee a cleare truth that ought not to be a question else it should Qua quaestio What question shall hee goe aske any body yes a third argument if he will but quaestio here is a law terme signifying a commission so that if he doubted hee might see at the Law for the truth so that this iudgement is a Courtly kinde of seeking out truth with two arguments before the iudgement seat of a third argument and it is not quaestio which is made with an interrogation which whilst some Logicians did not consider they fell so in loue with quaestio as that they made it the subiect of Logicke and diuided it into simplex which is the same with argumentum and compositum which is the same with axioma Then there must be an argument he doth not call it tertium argumentum here as he doth afterward but onely argumentum though there are alwaies three arguments because here he considers it in respect of the whole question not looking at the parts of the question as they are in Inuention and argumentum must be brought indeed as an euidence or witnesse rather then as a Iudge for I my selfe am the iudge thereof Cum argumento Therefore here saith Kickerman must argumentum come in yea here indeed it must come in but it must ergo be taught before for it must be before it can come in ergo to say it must be here taught because it comes in here is fallacia accidentis so that an argument belongs to iudgement as it may be disposed not as it may be in it selfe But saith Kickerman further here is a question before an argument ergo the doctrine of a question must goe before the doctrine of an argument indeed it so falls out here but yet the parts of a question are not before an argument without he will make pigges fly with their tayles forward Disponitur He would haue further rules of consecution from the third argument that he might know how to vse them but indeed the rule of syllogismus is the rule of consecution ergo those maximes as they call them are consecutions from the rules of inuention and are prosyllogismes Now here is a disposition whereof Kickerman was not aware whilst he would distribute Logicke into a simple conceit a double conceit and into discursus for if disposition bee generall both to his double conceit and to his discursus then he leaues out two rules the definition and distribution of disposition ergo let vs hold the right Ita disponitur because in a simple syllogisme there is the disposition of the part of the question with the third argument consequens in propositione antecedens
of the thing and for want of fit names we may borrow the same often if so be the definitions shew the difference of them in a simple axiome there is one argument simply disposed with one in a simple syllogisme there is also a simple disposition but of the consequent part of the question in the proposition of the antecedent in the assumption ergo from the breaking of this question thus as there is a simple disposition it is called simple but in a composite syllogisme the whole question and the third argument are disposed together ergo according to these two kindes of disposition there are these parts of a syllogisme now the reason why there is this disposition in nature is this the third argument which is well called so here because here the parts of the question are broken the truth must either be such as is so doubtfull as we must be faine to pull the parts of the question in sunder to see it and then we make a simple syllogisme or if the question bee not so doubtfull but that we may soone perceiue it then we make but a composite syllogisme hence it is that the common Logicians neuer dreamed of a composit syllogisme but only of a simple desiring to make all things more cleare but there are often more fallaces lye lurking vnder a composite syllogisme then vnder a simple one hence in schooles we say dispute catagorice for in a composite the third argument being disposed with the whole question doth not so cleare it as in a simple it doth yet none is to except against it the composite syllogisme cleares the whole question the simple cleares both the parts of the question Simplex vbi pars consequens quaestionis disponitur in propositione pars antecedens in assumptione This then is particular first in a simple syllogisme that the consequent part of the question is disposed with the third argument in the proposition now whether before or after we shall heare hereafter for that is more particular before in the definition of a syllogisme it was quaestio cum argumento then quaestionis saltem consequens here it is pars consequens in propositione pars antecedens in assumptione and whether this be before or after wee shall heare hereafter so that is generall to euery simple syllogisme Consequens in propositione because that euermore is the more generall part of the question as wee heard before and the continent should hold more then the contentum and the assumption assumitur è propositione ergo the consequent must be there and the antecedent therefore in the assumption hee doth not say consequens disponitur cum argumento for that is generall before in the definition of a syllogisme Estque affirmatus è partibus omnibus affirmatis Ramus now teacheth vs the common properties of a simple syllogisme which agree not to a composite but quatenus the proposition thereof may be simple affirmation and negation we heard of in an axiome but here the syllogisme is not so nominated from the band as before but from the propositions affirmed or denyed generall speciall or proper so that affirmation is here when euery part proposition assumption and conclusion are affirmed Negatus è negata antecedentium partium altera cum complexione Now we are here to obserue that in these generall properties come in all those modi Barbara Celarent Darii c. for they are nothing but generalis affirmatus negatus c. so that if we obserue but these rules we shall swallow vp many rules such words or modi as wold make a man afraid to reade them lest there should be some charming in them Negatus è negata c. for ex omnibus negatiuis nihil concluditur for if the third argument disagree from both parts it will neuer glue them together but here in generall this is a certaine truth that the conclusion will follow the worse part particularity cannot indeed hold in a contract but for negation it will now followeth another property Generalis è propositione assumptione generalibus This is not as the generality of an axiome quando commune consequens attribuitur generaliter communi antecedenti but here it is when the proposition and assumption are generall Specialis ex altera tantùm generali Because the other part may be either particular or proper if he had said ex altera tantum speciale it had not been so conuenient againe whilst he saith ex altera tantum generali he tells vs there cannot be a concluding ex meris particularibus because the conclusion would not follow for in the particular axiome there may be a separation as aliquis homo est doctus aliquis homo non est doctus here would be foure termini Proprius ex vtraque propria Here marke that as in the speciall syllogisme so in the proper he makes no mention of the conclusion because howsoeuer the parts be generall c. the conclusion will be particular now by the rules following I will presently know in what mood any syllogisme will be concluded Simplex syllogismus est contractus partibus vel explicatus Our Author brings in a distribution here that hath not any warranty from any other but himselfe hee thought long how he might make a dicotomy which hee might haue done thus a simple syllogisme is more single or more composite this hee thought of but if he should haue brought it in then there would haue beene confusion for then he had seuered the explicates because there the third argument followes twice whereas there are certaine properties agreeing to them both which haue nothing to doe with a contract Againe I haue seene in some of his additions a tricotomy into contractus explicatus primus and secundus but this also would breed confusion for by this meanes those properties that are generall to both the explicates would be left out but in the end he settled in this though Machelmeneus a french man who saith he was his master reports that Ramus desired him to mend this distribution and I am sure though he were his master the scholler was better then the master Ramus saith it is contractus or explicatus which we are to iustifie thus hee followes vse and vse contracts this kinde of Syllogisme more often then it explicates it not that it is alwayes contracted but sometime it is explicated as Ramus tells vs yet this is alwayes true that when it is explicated it may be contracted Paul contracts it hath God forsaken all Israel God forbid I am an Israelite this is it Paul is not forsaken Paul is an Israelite ergo all Israel is not forsaken so that contractus is a species of syllogismus because vse doth most commonly contract this kinde of syllogisme therefore because it is true more often then it is false therfore let the truth be taught generally and the exception come more afterward because that is more speciall in vse the explicate is neuer contracted ergo this opposition of