The utmost their Hypothesis will allow them to pretend to is That the Humane Nature of Christ is not a distinct Person from the Person of the WORD According to the Schoolmen the Humane Nature of Christ subsists and is a Principium quod of all its own Actions equally with the Humane Nature of any other Humane Person they seem to me to strive to disguise the Heresy of Nestorius by saying That the Humane Nature of Christ is not a distinct Person from the Person of the WORD because it subsists by the Subsistence or Personality of the WORD To explain this a little The Schoolmen who under pain of Heresy assert but one singular absolute Substance in the Trinity found a great and almost insuperable difficulty so to explain the Incarnation that only the Person of the WORD and not the whole Trinity was incarnated or became Man This is an obvious enquiry What it is which was immediately united to the Humane Nature of Christ so as to denominate Christ both God and Man To assert that the singular common Divine Nature was immediately united to the Humane Nature was to assert the Incarnation of the whole Trinity since whatever belongs to the common Divine Nature immediately belongs equally to the whole Trinity it remains therefore according to them that only the Mode of Subsistence of the WORD was immediately united to the Humane Nature This Answer has visibly many difficulties in it which may be considered hereafter Now I am only to enquire how it denies the Humane Nature of Christ to be a distinct Person from the Person of the WORD The Humane and Divine Nature of Christ have say they but one singular Mode of Subsistence Well grant that possible What follows The Schoolmen say that then they are not two distinct Persons I cannot for my life see the Consequence That Maxim of the Law Quando duo jura concurrunt in una persona oequum est ac si concurrerent in duobus may be as I conceive applied here If we suppose it possible for one Personality to constitute two distinct Natures each a Person it is a meer wrangle of a term to deny these two Natures to be two distinct Persons they have all the Properties of two distinct Persons they are two distinct Principia quoe equally with two other Persons The Animadverter does not barely alledge these to me unintelligible Subtilties of the Schools as the only defence of the sacred Article of the Incarnation against Nestorianism but in his third and next Argument to prove that Self-consciousness is not the formal Reason of Personality in finite Persons He unwittingly I charitably presume has endeavoured to overthrow the defence which the most Learned and Orthodox Fathers of the Church have given us of this sacred and mysterious Article P. 73. N. 4. The Soul of man is Self-conscious and yet not a Person therefore c. P. 74. lin 22. If the Soul be a Person then the Body must be joined to it by being assumed into the personal subsistence of the Soul as the Humane Nature of Christ is assumed into the personal subsistence of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whereupon the composition and constitution of a man will be an Hypostatick Union between Soul and Body which I suppose no Body will be either so bold or absurd as to affirm all Divines accounting an Hypostatical Union so peculiar to Christ's Person as not to be admitted in any other Person or Being whatsoever For an Hypostatick Union and an Hypostatick Composition viz. such an one as makes a compound Hypostasis are quite different things and this Author shall in due time be taught so much if he has any thing to object against it The Compiler of the Athanasian Creed has in this spoke the sense of the Catholick Church For as the reasonable Soul and Flesh is one man so God and Man is one Christ that is One not by Confusion of Substance but by Unity of Person I hope no True Son of the Church of England nor indeed Candid Lover of the Article but will pardon my digression if it deserve to be called such to vindicate this Similitude whereby the most Learned Fathers of the Church have endeavoured to illustrate and defend this Article against all its Heretical Opponents The Animadverter first objects That then the Constitution of a Man will be an Hypostatick Vnion Alas Obj. 1. How extremely afraid are some persons of having the Articles of their Faith found agreeable to the common Principles of Reason If by an Hypostatick Union he means that the Soul and Body of Man only subsist by the same singular Mode of Subsistence and that nothing but the Mode of the Subsistence of the Soul is immediately united to the Body I do assure the Animadverter that I believe not a Syllable of this I do not believe that one Mode can modify two Subjects or that a corporeal Body can be terminated perfected by a Mode of an incorporeal nature such as the Soul is Figure is a Mode of quantity and yet to me it seems unconceivable that a Giant should be terminated by the figure of a Dwarf without any alteration of his quantity or that a Dwarf should have the figure of a Giant and yet not altered in quantity Less am I able to conceive that the Humane Nature of Christ should be terminated by a Mode of Subsistence which belongs to a Divine Nature Secondly Obj. 2. If the Constitution of a Man be an Hypostatick Union then an Hypostatick Union and an Hypostatick Composition viz. such an One as makes a compound Hypostasis will not be quite different things then the Hypostatick Union in Christ will be also an Hypostatick Composition and then the Person of Christ will be a compound Hypostasis Well and what follows from all this why nothing but a threatning of the Animadverter's That in due time we shall be taught the Falshood of all this But not to await his due time I answer that to say that the Hypostatick Union in Christ is also an Hypostatick Composition or which is the same that Christ is a compound Hypostasis is so far from being a Paradox that it is the received Language not only of the Greek Fathers but of the Councils Syn. 5a. Constantin Can. 4. Sancti Patres docuerunt unitatem Dei verbi ad carnem animatam anima rationali intellectuali secundum compositionem Theodori autem Nestorii sequaces divisione gaudentes affectualem unitatem introducunt Sancta Dei verò Ecclesia utriusque perfidioe impietatem ejiciens unitionem Dei verbi ad carnem secundum compositionem confitetur Vide Can. 7um hujus Concilii Lib. 3. de Trin. cap. 3. sect 12. p. 232. Hear Petavius's Confession Christi Domini Hypostasin sive personam à plerisque Patribus dici compositam ex naturis duabus ut ab Cyrillo Damasceno Maximo aliis To which add what the Learned Suarez hath observed Suarez de
Incarn Q. 2. Disp 6. sect 4. p. 194. Ibid. p. 193. Alii Patres licet non apertè utantur nomine compositionis aliis tamen quoe perinde esse videntur utuntur ut adunationis copulationis ex duobus conjunctionis c. Illa vero particula ex planè designat compositionem The phrase of the Hypostatick Union is most opposite to the Heresy of Eutyches who believed that there was not an Union of Two Natures but a Confusion of One of them But the phrase of the Hypostatick Composition is most opposite to the Nestorian Heresy who asserted a kind of Hypostatic Union that is an Union of Two Persons and denied that Christ God and Man was One Person compounded of Two Natures The Animadverter shews his skill in this Controversy to oppose these two phrases and to condemn that phrase of an Hypostatick Composition which the Church has received As great an Opiniator as the Animadverter is I believe he will scarce have the confidence to say that he can teach these great Fathers of the Church how to speak in this Mystery I promise faithfully to attend him when ever he begins The Soul being a Part cannot possibly be a Person P. 75. lin 4. N. 5. Forasmuch as a Part is an incomplete Being and therefore in the very nature of it being designed for the completion of something else must subsist in and by the subsistence of the Whole But a Person imports the most complete Degree and Mode of Being as subsisting wholly by it self and not in or by any other either as a subject of inherence or dependence so that it is a direct Contradiction to the very definition and nature of the thing for the same Being to be a Part and a Person too And consequently that which makes the Soul a Part does irrefragably prove it not to be a Person I answer That to be a Part and a Person in a simple Person in a Person consisting of one Nature I confess to be contradictious and impossible 2dly To be the inferior part in a compounded Person to be in any Actions an Instrument a Principium quo as the Body in the mixt Actions of Sense is to the Soul is contradictory to the Notion of a Person A Person as such is the Principium quod of all the Actions which proceed from it but to be the superior Part in such Composition is very compatible with the Personality of such superior Nature For such superior Nature may very well retain its own proper Mode of Subsistence if we explain Personality with the Schools such a superior Nature retains all the Perfections all the natural Perfections of a whole and complete Being is a Principium quod not only of its own natural Actions but of the mixt Actions of the whole compounded Hypostasis Such a superior Nature may be a Person and at the same time in a large acceptation of the term a Part that is a Part as Aristotle defines that term Arist 4. Met. cap. 25. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that into which any thing is divided or of which that consists which we call a Whole in which sense of the term Part the Learned Petavius is not afraid to call the Divine Nature of the WORD a Part laxius sumpto partis vocabulo Petav. lib. 3. de Trin. cap. 3. sect 12. p. 232. I must pass over the Animadverter's boldness in determining That a Part subsists by the subsistence of the Whole which is very near asserting an Hypostatical Union of every substantial part Others who embrace these Scholastical Subtleties chuse rather to assert That a Part subsists by a partial subsistence and that the subsistence of the Whole is compounded of the subsistence of the Parts So when the Animadverter tells us that a Person does not subsist in any other as a subject of dependence I must crave his pardon for I thought before that every Creature had subsisted in God as a subject on whom we depended that in him we live and move and have our Being P. 75. lin 16. N. 6. If the Soul in the composition of a man's Person were an entire Person it self and as such concurred with the Body towards the constitution of the Man then a Man would be an imperfect accidental and not a perfect natural compound He would be that which Philosophy calls Vnum per Accidens that is a thing made up of two such Beings as cannot perfectly coalesce into one Mutatis mutandis this is the Great Socinian Objection against the Incarnation of the Son of God That Infinite and Finite cannot perfectly coalesce and unite into One that God and Man 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the name of the most unnatural compound and mixture The same Answer will satisfy both Objections To confound the two Natures of God and Man or of Soul and Body would confessedly make the most unnatural compound and mixture But we maintain an Union in both Cases and not a Confusion The Divine Nature retains all the Perfections of a Divine Person in the Composition and the Human Nature by the Composition loses none of the natural perfections of the Human Nature It cannot indeed properly be called by the metaphysical name of a suppositum as becoming an Instrument a principium quo to the superior Divine Nature but then thereby it becomes capable of being an Instrument in the noblest Acts of the Mediatorial Office which subsisting by it self it was uncapable of So the Soul in the Constitution of Man retains all the Perfections of a separate intellectual suppositum nor did any Philosoper ever assert that an Human Body was more imperfect than a Stone notwithstanding this latter is a suppositum and the former not The Human Body by the Composition is an Instrument a Principium quo to the Soul an Instrument in the mixt Actions of Sense which of it self it was uncapable of And if a Stone could speak it would never complain if God should miraculously change it into an Human Body notwithstanding the compleatness of a suppositum and the incompleatness of an Inferior Nature in an Hypostatick Composition Secondly The Animadverter mistakes that which Philosophers call Vnum per Accidens for that is when two Beings which differ toto Genere as Substance and Accident are united Such an Union say they is accidental and consequently the Compositum not Vnum per se but Vnum per Accidens Or when two Compleat Beings are united as in all Artificial Works where each part is a distinct suppositum which is more properly called Aggregatum per Accidens But the Divine and Human Nature the Soul and Body differ not toto Genere each are Substances and so are capable of a substantial Union which suffices to denominate the Compositum Vnum per se and not Vnum per Accidens Again The Divine Nature is and remains compleat in the Composition the Humane Nature subsists ad modum partis in the nature of a part of an Instrument in the
Composition So is the Soul compleat and the Human Body the Instrument or incompleat in the constitution of Man so that according to the strictest Rules of Philosophy both the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Man are Vnum per se not Vnum per Accidens Thirdly As little can I allow the Animadverter that every Vnum per Accidens must be an unnatural Compound According to these Philosophers a Learned Man a Pious Man is Vnum per Accidens ought we therefore to avoid Piety and Learning that we may not become an unnatural Compound Fourthly The Union of a Subject and its Adjunct is according to all Philosophers an accidental Union the Adjunct as I observed before predicated of the Subject more Accidentis This Objection therefore falls strongest upon his own Head who denied the Human Nature of Christ to be a part of Christ and affirmed That it was an Adjunct to the Person of the WORD Cap. 1. N. 10 which is in consequence to affirm that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is Vnum per Accidens P. 76. lin 4. N. 7. If the Soul in a state of Separation from the Body be a Person then it is either the same Person which the Man himself was while he was living and in the Body or it is another Person But to assert either of them is extreamly absurd and therefore equally absurd that the Soul in such a State should be a Person c. This also is a Socinian Objection The Animadverter may be satisfied That no wise Man will chuse the later part of the Disjunction viz. that the Soul in a state of Separation is a different Person from the Man himself or that the WORD before the Incarnation is a different Person from Christ God and Man or the WORD incarnated For the Objection is equal against both Articles as by a small variation of the immediate following words will appear And first it is absurd to affirm it to be the same Person For a Person compounded of Soul and Body as a Man is and a simple uncompounded Person as the Soul if a Person at all must needs be can never be numerically one and the same For that differing from one another as Simple and Compound they differ as two things whereof one implies a Contradiction and Negation of the other A Compound as such including in it several Parts compounding it And a simple Being utterly excluding all Parts and Composition So that if a Man while alive be one Person and his Soul after Death be a Person too it is impossible for the Soul to be one and the same Person with the Man And first it is absurd to affirm it to be the same Person For a Person compounded of the Divine and Human Nature as Christ is and a simple uncompounded Person as the WORD is acknowledged to be can never be numerically one and the same For that differing from one another as Simple and Compound they differ as two things whereof one implies a Contradiction and Negation of the other A Compound as such including in it several Parts and a simple Being utterly excluding all Parts and Composition So that if Christ God and Man be one Person and the WORD before his Incarnation be a Person too it is impossible for the Word before the Incarnation to be one and the same Person with Christ God and Man Now thanks be to God this formidable Objection of the Socinians and the Animadverter is founded upon a mistake in Philosophy viz. That those things which differ from one another as Simple and Compound differ as two things whereof one implies a Contradiction and Negation of the other There may be a thousand instances brought to confute this pretended Axiom A Man learned is the same Man with himself before he was learned and yet in the Confession of all Philosophers A Man and a Man learned differ as Simple and Compound A Man learned is an accidental Compositum an Vnum per Accidens So a Man cloathed is the same Man with himself naked and yet a Man cloathed and a Man naked differ as Simple and Compound A Soul in a state of Separation is the same Soul with the Soul cloathed with an Human Body I am ashamed to be obliged to prove so plain a Conclusion In an Hypostatical Union the inferior Nature is so far an Adjunct to the superior Nature that what the WORD was before the Incarnation or the Soul before its cloathing with a Body the same each remains after the Union or Conjunction It is in some sense a Part otherwise the Union could not be substantial but accidental The WORD could with no more propriety be said to be a Man than a Man may be denominated an evil Angel because he is possessed of such Had the Divine and Human Nature of Christ been confounded or the Soul and Body of Man so mixt as to have denominated the Compositum of a different Nature from the component Parts then the WORD and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 could not be one Person nor the Soul and the Man the same Person But we maintain an Hypostatical Union and not a confusion of Substance or Nature That which has obscured the Analogy betwixt the Union of the two Natures in the One Person of Christ and of the Soul and Body in Man is for that in this latter instance Custom has prevailed with us to say That an Human Person has but one viz. an human Nature Whereas an Human Person properly consists of two unconfounded Natures the Nature of the Soul and Body are not confounded in the Hypostatical Composition of Man The Learned Damascen Vide Damasc lib. 3 de Ortho fide cap. 3. if I remember aright gives the reason of this form of Speech Because we see many distinct Persons possess the same common Nature whence we say That two or more Human Persons are of one and the same nature As also That if the Holy Spirit had been incarnated equally with the WORD we might have said that the WORD incarnate is of the same nature with the Holy Ghost incarnate To conclude All Philosophers assert That a totum differs only ratione from all its parts united if therefore it be possible for the superior part in an Hypostatick Union to retain all the Natural Perfections of a suppositum in the composition and for an inferior part to be united to the superior without confusion of its Nature and yet not as a distinct suppositum but as an instrumentum or principium quo to the superior part It will then evidently follow That the whole compositum is but one suppositum but one Person and the very same Person which the superior part was before the composition and that a simple and compounded Person is in such instance not two Persons but one and the same Person differing not really but modally from himself by such difference by which a Learned Man differs from himself before he was Learned And here I
by which the Humane Nature of Christ exists in the person of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we shall hardly find a fitter than to say that it exists in it as an Adjunct in the Subject For it is certain that it does not exist in it as a Part in the Whole since by this means the Second Person in the Trinity must till his Incarnation have wanted one part of his person But I shall not be positive in the application of this term here This Sacred Article of the Incarnation of the Son of God deserves a particular Treatise by it self However I could not in the Interim forbear to vindicate it from those Misrepresentations the Animadverter has unwittingly I charitably presume put upon it The Animadverter did not understand or not consider the relation of an Adjunct to a Subject or he would never have made this Application in reference to the Hypostatic Union of the Humane Nature of Christ to the Person of the WORD Where a Substance is an Adjunct the Adjunct is predicated of the Subject more Accidentis after the nature of an Accident This the predicament of Habitus might have informed the Animadverter We say not that a man is his Cloaths but that a man is cloath'd so that if the Humane Nature of Christ be barely an Adjunct to the Person of the WORD we could not say that the WORD was or became Man but only that he was externally cloathed with Humanity Secondly The Animadverter confutes himself when he tells us That the Humane Nature of Christ exists in the Person of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A substantial Adjunct can never exist in its Subject but only an accidental Adjunct as a Quality c. If the Humane Nature exists in the Person of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it must in some sense be a part of the Person of the WORD Thirdly Nor is there any Absurdity in acknowledging the Humane Nature to be a part of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nay very learned persons have not scrupled to call the Person of the WORD a Part of Christ taking that term Part in a large sense and abstracting from the imperfections which are included in the common acceptation of it The Person of the WORD is not an imperfect Part nor the Humane Nature a Part in such Sense that the Person of the WORD wants such Part to complete it In an Hypostatical Composition the Inferior Nature is in some Analogy a Co-part in other respects an Adjunct and of necessity imperfect but to be the superior Nature in such Composition infers no Imperfection But of this more hereafter One and the same undivided Existence P. 34. lin 28. N. 11. as well as one and the same Essence or Nature belongs to all the Three Persons equally whereas yet every Person has his own distinct Subsistence by himself There is not a more intricate Dispute amongst the Schoolmen than this which the Animadverter argues from as a Principle To assert above one singular Existence in the Trinity thô the Sacred Scriptures expresly multiply this Attribute I and the Father are One these Three are One was to give up the Hypothesis of the Schools of the singularity of the common Divine Nature But the Schoolmen were at a loss Probabilius tamen ac verius existimamus illam substantiam singularem quae communis est tribus personis ut sic subsistentem esse ex se essentialiter habereque unam subsistentiam absolutam essentialem tribus personis communem haec enim sententia communiter recepta est à Theologis utriusque Scholae D. Thomae Scoti ab aliis etiam Suarez Metaph Disp 34. Sect. 1. N. 3. when they came to enquire into the Modus of this singular Existence There are but two Modes of a substantial singular Existence incomplete which belongs to a substantial Part complete which belongs to a Suppositum Complete Existence is but another Phrase for Subsistence and so there will be but One undivided Subsistence of the whole Three Persons and this the whole Party of the Thomists and Scotists affirm and call it an absolute essential Subsistence so little did the Animadverter understand these Disputes The acute Petavius could not here keep pace with the Schoolmen all Antiquity knew nothing of this Essential Subsistence he embraces the former and attributes one singular incomplete Existence to the Divine Nature Now certainly this Learned Person strained very hard to ascribe something incomplete to the Divine Nature I will give the Reader his own words Petav. lib. 4. de Trin. cap. 12. Sect. 13. p. 421. Non enim de tali Existentia hîc agimus quoe perfecta completae substantioe propria sit sed quoe formis imperfectis Rebus ex quibus quasi componitur quippiam congruit P. 35. lin 11. N 12. Now whatsoever Being or Nature this Mode of Subsistence does belong to that is properly called a Suppositum And the consequence of this is That as Subsistence makes a Thing or Being a Suppositum so Suppositality makes it incommunicable This is worse Heresy to the Schoolmen than the phrase of three infinite Minds They acknowledge this in finite Beings or Natures but affirm the quite contrary in the Divine Nature Not the Absolute Essential Subsistence renders the Divine Nature a Suppositum but the Divine Relation whether it be Paternity Filiation or Procession according to the Schoolmen constitutes the Divine Nature a Person or Persons Secondly Not the Subsistence with a relation renders the Divine Nature incommunicable but only the Divine Person incommunicable Subsistence in finite Beings renders that particular Nature as well as Person incommunicable but in the Divine Nature only the Person P. 35. lin 30. N. 13. So that as a Suppositum is substantia singularis completa per se subsistens so the Ratio intellectiva being added to this makes it a Person which is a farther perfection of Suppositality I only ask the Animadverter Whether he acknowledges three Suppositums in the Trinity And whether the Objection of three Substances is not as strong against that Confession from this Definition of a Suppositum as himself brings against the phrase of three infinite Minds 2dly Ratio intellectiva is a farther perfection of a Suppositum but not of Suppositality A Beast as truly as perfectly subsists by its self as a Man Rationality is a Perfection a Mode taking that term in a large sense of Animality but not a Perfection or Mode of Subsistence If it be here asked P. 36. lin 3. N. 14. Whether Subsistence or Suppositality added to bare Nature does not make a Composition I answer That in created finite Persons it does but not in uncreated and infinite And the reason is because tho all Composition implies Union yet all Union is not therefore Composition but something higher and transcendental So that in the Divine Persons of the Trinity the Divine Nature and Personal Subsistence coalesce into one
to the Person of the Son and Procession extrinsical to the Person of the blessed Spirit This naturally and easily defends the Simplicity of a Divine Person this frees us of endless and inextricable Questions which fill up every page of the Scholastical Writers This forces us not to hide our selves in a Cloud of Words which signify nothing A Substance and a Mode says the Animadverter infer not Composition in a Divine Person because in him the Substance and Mode coalesce into one by an Vnion and Conjunction that is in other words they infer not Composition because they are compounded Composition and Coalescing into One by an Union and Conjunction differ no more than Definitum and Definition It is truly therefore incomprehensible and ineffable that a coalescing into one by an Union and Conjunction should not be a Composition Mind Wisdom Power Goodness P. 39. lin 6. N. 15. c. are formally distinct from one another and so not affirmable of one another and in speaking of things the formal differences of them must still be attended to Gods Justice and his Mercy are one pure simple Act in him But he that says His Justice is his Mercy speaks absurdly for all that c. Whatever differs really differs also formally but here by formal difference the Animadverter understands that difference which is only formal and not real Now in this sense of the term the express contrary Conclusion is true That whatsoever things are only formally different are therefore affirmable of one another The Conclusion the Animadverter ought to have deduced from his Premises is That Mind Wisdom Goodness viz. in God are not formally affirmable of one another But it is Fallacia à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter to put the first Conclusion in place of the second to say That Mind Wisdom Goodness are not simply affirmable of one another because it will be acknowledged that they are not formally affirmable of one another Secondly Whereas the Animadverter tells us That in speaking of Things the formal Differences of them must still be attended to We need no other Confutation of this Proposition than his own immediate following words viz. That God's Justice and his Mercy are one pure simple Act in him His Justice and his Mercy are formally or in our way of Conception two distinct nay two opposite Acts it is only in the Reality that we affirm them to be one pure simple Act in him Thirdly If things only formally different are not affirmable of one another there could be no Propositions but identical ones or at most where the Subject and Predicate are synonimous Terms No man could say without absurdity That the Father is God because these two terms Father and God formally differ and therefore according to this wise Rule of our Animadverter are not affirmable of one another Has the Animadverter never heard of the Distinction of Sensus Identicus and Sensus Formalis This Proposition God's Justice is his Mercy is true Sensu Identico tho not Sensu Formali We are cautioned indeed by the Learned that we avoid Conclusions which are only true Sensu Identico when such way of speaking is against common Custom or when the formal Sense carries a formal Opposition as in the Divine Attributes of Justice and Mercy and the reason they give is because in such instances the Propositions lead to a formal Sense in which Sense they are false But if we add Sensu Identico that is in what sense we understand these Propositions then they are true and consequently not absurd unless a Truth can be absurd CHAP. II. I Shall crave leave of the Reader N. 1. to say thus much in general of the Animadverters Third and Fourth Chapter wherein he endeavours to prove That Self-consciousness is not the Formal Reason of Personality in the Divine Persons nor Mutual-consciousness the Formal Reason of their Vnity of Nature That all this is said as I verily believe without an Adversary The Reverend Dean of St. Paul's does not once in his Vindication of the B. Trinity expresly affirm either the one or the other of these Propositions He asks no more of his Reader if I misunderstand him not save to acknowledge That a distinct Self-Consciousness is a firm proof of the Distinction of Persons in this Sacred Mystery and that a singular Mutual-Consciousness is an equal proof of the Singularity of the Divine Nature I conceive That the Reverend Dean never intended to deny that the Distinction of Persons is in order of Nature before their distinct acts of Self-Consciousness or that their Unity of Nature is in the same degree of Priority before their singular Mutual-Consciousness but only intended that quoad nos or in our way of Knowledge or Conception their distinct Self Consciousness proved or was known to us before their distinct Personality and their singular mutual Consciousness in order of our Knowledge before the Knowledge of their Unity of Nature In the Animadverter's Third Chapter N. 2. he endeavours to prepare the way by denying that Self-Consciousness is the formal reason of personality in finite created Persons A Conclusion none affirms who understands the meaning of the terms It is impossible that a personal Act an Effect should any ways be the proper formal cause of its efficient a Person Animad c. P. 71. lin 10. But when he tells us That Personality is the ground and principle of all Action wheresoever it is he is guilty of a great Paradox in Philosophy and a greater in Divinity Personality is properly the Principle of no Action a Person is the Principium quod the Principle which acteth Nature is the Principium quo the Principle by which the Person acts Personality is but a necessary condition of a Being to enable it to act a causa sine qua non which is equivocally called a Cause or Principle Secondly Not the Personality of the WORD but the Humane Nature of Christ exerts the acts of Self-Consciousness Ibid. P. 72. lin 12. and other Humane Personal Acts the Humane Nature of Christ has all the Principles and Powers of Self-Reflection upon its own Acts otherwise Christ would not be a perfect Man P. 72. lin 21. N. 3. That the Humane Nature of Christ is not a Person is no less evident Since it is taken into and subsists in and by the Personality of the Second Person of the Trinity and therefore can have no distinct Personality of its own 1. Never was so obscure an Argument brought to prove so acknowledged a Conclusion Self-Consciousness is not the formal reason of Personality in finite Persons because the Humane Nature of Christ in the Hypostatical Union is Self-Conscious and yet not a Person nay this latter no less evident than the former 2. 'T is a received Article of the Church That the Human Nature of Christ is not a Person but how to reconcile this with the Subtilties of the Schools is above my skill
is justly esteemed by all the Moderns who follow the Schools one of the difficultest Objections against the Faith of the Trinity viz. that if three Humane Persons have three singular Humane Natures and consequently are so many Men why three Divine Persons should not also infer three singular Divine Natures and consequently be three Gods And the Answer that the School men and Moderns give is that the case is vastly different that the Unity of three Humane Persons is only Notional the Unity of the Divine Persons strictly real The Animadvertor himself p. 300. can tell you of a better Allusion and Similitude to the Union of the three Divine Persons The Vnion of Vnderstanding Memory and Will as one and the same Soul One simple Being with three Faculties is a nearer resemblance of one simple Being under three Relations than three simple Beings n. 6. But let us hear the Animadvertor himself explain this Argument p. 175. à minore ad majus If several individual Men could not properly be said to have more than one Nature much less could this be said of the three Divine Persons To which I answer First Does the Animadvertor really believe that three Men cannot properly be said to have more than one Nature or not If he believes it What will become of his Objection that a Specifick Unity implies a Multiplication of the said Nature in the several Individuals What becomes of that famous Passage of his P. 270. that Substantiis Consubstantialibus will neither be Truth nor Sense I suppose he will not deny that several individual Men are Substantioe Substances in the plural Number nor yet that Consubstantialibus signifies of one Substance of one Nature I intreat him to answer this Question Are several Men Consubstantial or not Is Christ according to his Humanity Consubstantial with us Men or not Will he dare to say that the whole Catholick Church has neither spoke Truth nor Sense For the whole Church has ever professed a Belief of Christ's Consubstantiality with us Men. If the Animadvertor shall plead that it was the Sense of the Fathers that three Men could not properly be said to have more than one Nature even that is sufficient for my purpose who am now enquiring only into the Judgment of the Fathers This is sufficient ad Hominem to the Animadvertor but for my Reader 's fuller Satisfaction I answer to the Point that so far as this Allegation is true 't is Impertinent and that so far as 't is pertinent 't is false 'T is an acknowledged Truth that the strictest Union that can be betwixt Humane Persons is but a resemblance an Allusion to that inseparable incomprehensible Union betwixt the Divine Persons But this is not the question concerning the Union of the Divine Persons indefinitely but concerning the Unity of their Nature The Fathers maintained that the Unity of the common Divine Nature was of the same kind and degree with the Unity of the common Humane Nature There is certainly a greater Union betwixt two Humane Persons who are dear and intimate Friends than betwixt two who are mortal Enemies There is a greater Union betwixt two Saints in Heaven than betwixt the best Friends on Earth And yet two mortal Enemies have the same Unity of Nature with the Saints in Heaven The Union of the Saints in Heaven is by our Saviour himself resembled to the Union of the Father and the Son John 17.22 That they may be one as we are one But these words no more denote an illimited equality than those other words of our Lord Matt. 5.48 Be ye perfect as your Father in Heaven is perfect denote an equality in Perfection If we suppose three unbegotten unproduced Divine Persons three Fathers I cannot see how we can deny such to be Consubstantial since we acknowledge three Angelical Persons to be of one Nature and Substance yet three unbegotten Divine Persons three Fathers are to all the Ancient Fathers three Gods They did not therefore believe that a Specifick Unity was the only Unity of the Divine Persons that they were one upon no other account but if we can know their meaning by their words they did certainly believe a Specifick Unity And this I perswade my self the Animadvertor's Heart misgave him n. 7. He therefore comes in with a third Salvo p. 176. That he does not in the least deny but several Expressions may have dropped from the Fathers which if we looked no further might be drawn to a very inconvenient Sense That is in plain English several Expressions have dropped from them which assert if we look no further a Specifick Unity What from those Fathers who never alledged this Example as a parallel Instance but always used it by way of Allusion or à minore ad majus It seems the Animadvertor's always and never will bear an exception What Salvoe has he for this He gives it us in the following words But then also it is as little to be deny'd that the same Fathers professedly and designedly treating of the same Points here declared themselves in such terms as are very hardly if at all reconcileable to those occasional and accidental Expressions And therefore since their meaning cannot be taken from both it ought much rather to be taken from what was asserted by them designedly than what was asserted only occasionally Now it is well contrived to take the conclusion for granted he is to prove It seems that the Animadvertor would have things come to that pass that we must take his bare affirmation of a thing for a proof of it Petavius Dr. Cudworth the Reverend Dean of St. Paul's have asserted the quite contrary they have already equivalently denied it and the Animadvertor gives us his own ipse dixit that it is little to be denied Again the Animadvertor pretends no more than a difficulty or a doubt whether these designed expressions may not be reconciled to the occasional expressions The Animadvertor makes an if of it to him these latter are hardly if at all reconcileable with the former which is no great wonder since he believes tribus substantiis consubstantialibus to be neither truth nor sense since he believes a numerical Unity absolutely inconsistent with a Specifick Unity Lastly Why is the conclusion stronger than the premises Why does he make the conclusion positive Their meaning cannot be taken from both is the conclusion whereas the premises mentioned only a difficulty or a doubt They are hardly if at all reconcileable The Animadvertor was I believe n. 8. in some measure sensible of the weakness of these answers and therefore He provides a fourth Salvoe Ib. p. 176. viz. that the Orthodox Writers of the fourth and part of the fifth Century were chiefly exercised with the Arian Controversie And the Arians would not allow so much as a specifick Unity of Nature between the Father and the Son but instead of an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or sameness held only an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
bare Phrase of it self therefore is not inconsistent with a Specifick Unity even according to the Moderns and much less with the Ancients according to whose Philosophy a Specifick Unity implied a strictly Numerical Unity of Nature in all the several Individuals It is an easie thing to say That the Ancients were mistaken in their Philosophy but not so easie to overthrow the learned Damascen's Reason viz. That then properly two Human Hypostases would not be Consubstantial Vrsin Expli Cate. Quest 33 n. 4. p. 196. This Conclusion the learned Vrsinus embraces Duo homines sunt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 qui tamen non sunt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But this is contrary to the Language of all Philosophers contrary to himself who a little before Determins that Christ Ib. Quest 33. p. 183. secundum humanam naturam habet multos fratres ejusdem naturae according to his Human Nature had many Brothers of the same Nature or Consubstantial Again the Definition is justly supposed to contain the Essence of any thing but a true and proper Definition contains only the Genus and Difference that is only the Species If we ask what is James or Peter We answer by the Difinition or Species that each of them is a Man or animal rationale but if according to the proper Rules of Philosophy the Essence of Peter and James is Singular We ought to add Singulare to animal rationale that is We must confound what is Personal in Peter and James with what is Essential the Notes of Singularity with the Genus and Difference A Second Corollary I shall deduce from the Philosophy of the Ancients in this Point is n. 15. That their denying Peter James and John to be properly called three Men is not so great a Paradox as some of the Moderns represent or rather mistake it They never doubted whether Peter James and John had three Souls and three Bodies they never denied them to be three distinct Substantial Beings three 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is three Subjects in which the common Humanity did subsist they believed them properly three Hypostases which is all the vulgar mean by three Men The Debate is solely about a Phrase whether Peter James and John are more properly called three Hypostases in one Human Nature or three Men. The Former Phrase even the Moderns allow as also they confess that all Concrete terms such as Man is do Primarily signifie the Form and Secondarily assignifie the Subject in which such form subsists Thirdly the School-men themselves give this Rule concerning Deus Creator Dominus c. that because the Form signified by those Concrete terms cannot be Multiplied neither Deitas vis creatrix nor potentia Dominatrix are according to the School-men capable of Multiplication therefore neither are the Concrete terms Deus Creator Dominus capable of a Plural Predication Now by the same Rule this term Man ought not to be Plurally Predicated since according to the Philosophy of the Ancients Humanity the Form was not Multiplied in the several Human Hypostases Nor see I what a School-man can reply upon his own Principles save his own ipse dixit that the Ancients were mistaken when they asserted that Humanity was not Multiplied in the several Human Individuals For my own Part I esteem this one Reason why thase terms Deus Creator Dominus c. are not Multiplied but neither the sole nor chief Reason of the Singularity of their Predication nay further That the chief Reason why the Fathers of the Church from before the Nicene Council have Religiously observed a singular Predication of those Attributes is by no means applicable to the term Man in respect of several Human Hypostases so that I can very well comply with common Custom which calls Peter James and John three Men and yet believe that Father Son and Holy Ghost ought not to be called three Gods three Creators three Lords but this belongs to my Second Part of the true Notion of the Unity of God n. 16. A Second thing I shall crave leave to observe is that the School-men themselves that is the chief Leaders of them Thomas and Scotus were not averse to this Philosophy of the Ancients in immaterial Beings they determining that the Angelical Nature was not capable of Multiplication in the several Angelical Persons and consequently that the several Angels differed Specifically and that there could not according to some even by the Omnipotence of God be created two Angels in the same Species This several of the School-men thought more Eligible than to Parallel the Unity of the Divine Persons with Angelical Persons Common Custom Authorising the Phrase of different Angels as well as of different Men. The Foundation of this Assertion of the Schoolmen concerning the impossibility of different Angels within the same Species arose from their belief that Matter was the sole Principle of Individuation which is now generally disapproved However from Hence a fair Reason appears why none of the School-men embraced this notion of the Ancients of the Specifick Unity of the Trinity Si ergo Angeli non sint compositi ex Materia forma sequitur quod impossibile sit esse duos Angelos unius Speciei Aquin. sum Quest 50. they thought such Unity impossible between immaterial Persons and it was down-right Arianism to assert a Specifick Essential difference betwixt Father Son and Holy Ghost and a worse Heresie to assert that Father Son and Holy Ghost had Bodies A Third thing I shall crave leave to observe is That Philoponus the famous Ring-leader of the Tritheit Hereticks was the first of the Ancients who asserted that a Specifick Unity implied a Multiplication of the said Nature in the several Individuals of the same Species n. 17. and that consequently not only three Human Persons had three distinct Human Natures which according to the Antients was an Error in Philosophy But also the three Divine Persons had three distinct Natures For which uncouth Phrase of three Natures in the Trinity and not for holding a Specifick Unity of the Trinity were Philoponus and his followers Stiled Tritheit Hereticks Philoponus himself as I believe His followers more certainly if we may Credit Eulogius were nearer Sabellius than the Faith of a Specifick Unity of the Trinity 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Eulogius Photii Biblioth Cod. ccxxx p. 879. to me has cleared this obscure Part of the Ecclesiastical History These Monophysitae Hereticks these Tritheist Hereticks for both these Heresies are charged upon Philoponus distinguished 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 betwixt Nature and Essence and none but some of the Maddest asserted three Essences in the Trinity but only three Natures But the Othodox esteeming 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as equivalent gave the Name of Tritheit Hereticks to both Otherwise those who distinguished betwixt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 were so far
by an incomprehensible ineffable kind of Union and Conjunction And if this does not satisfy as it rationally may I must needs profess that my Thoughts and Words can neither rise higher nor reach further This difficulty is not peculiar to the Asserters of a Trinity of Divine Persons They who acknowledge but one Divine Person in the Godhead are equally concerned in this question Whether the Subsistence of one or more Divine Persons added to the Divine Nature infers a Composition in a Divine Person The Animadverter confesses That in all finite Persons Subsistence and Nature infer a Composition he means a modal Composition a Composition of Substance and Mode This manifestly increases the difficulty how a Substance and Mode should not be a modal Composition in a Divine Person He tells you indeed it does not if we please we may take his word if not his thoughts and words can reach no higher But by his leave I shall consider this point more carefully All Composition is Distinctorum Vnio so as to constitute some whole that is in Composition there must be an Union and also the several things united must in some sense be component parts otherwise we could not distinguish Composition from a bare local Union Now according to the Animadverter the Divine Nature or Substance is one thing and the Mode another a Mode is to him a thing added and a Divine Person a whole so that it is manifest according to him that there must be a modal Composition in a Divine Person in God in a pure simple act which is void of all Composition Nay further those Schoolmen who assert these real Modes reduce some of them to Substance some of them to the accidental Predicaments Those Modes which intimately adhere to Substance as Existence Subsistence they reduce to the predicament of Substance those Modes which complete Substance it self cannot be any thing accidental of a different kind and nature from Substance and yet they cannot be perfect Substances for then they would want other Modes to perfect them but they suppose each of these Modes a substantiale quid a substantial thing tho not so perfect as Substance So again those Modes which perfect an Accident are each of them accidentale quid something accidental tho not a perfect Accident Now I freely profess that I have no Notion of this substantiale quid which is not a perfect Substance nor of an accidentale quid which yet is not a perfect Accident However from this Explication of these Philosophers minds it is manifest that a Substance and Mode in finite Persons infer a Composition of a Substance and a distinct substantiale quid To apply this to the Opinion of the Schoolmen concerning the simplicity of a Divine Person The Subsistence as I have already declared they believed to be one absolute Essential the Divine Relations which they call Modes of Subsistence because according to them they constitute the Divine Persons and render each Person incommunicable which a Mode of Subsistence does in finite Persons I say the Divine Relations of Paternity Filiation and Procession they first declared to be no predicamental Relations for then they must have been esteemed proper Modes Modus non potest non esse quid imperfectum cum non attingat absolutam rationem entis Suarez lib. 4. de Trin. cap. 4. N. 11. p. 410. and the Schoolmen were never so silly as to believe there was any thing so imperfect as a Mode in God they never believed a substantiale quid which was not so perfect as a Substance in God They call the Divine Relations transcendental Relations which in our imperfect way of Conception are but as so many substantial Modes perfecting the one absolute Subsistence of the Divine Essence they believed each distinct Divine Relation to be not a bare substantiale quid but a most perfect infinite Substance with a Relative Form or as they often speak a Relative Substance And here I must again acknowledge that I am as little able to conceive a Relative Substance as a substantiale quid before J am substantia non erit substantia quia relativum erit Absurdum est autem ut substantia relativè dicatur omnis res ad scipsam subsistit quanto magis Deus St. Austin lib. 7. de Trin. cap. 5. But will not this Notion of the Schoolmen infer an higher Composition in a Divine Person viz. of two Substances an Absolute Substance the Divine Nature and a Relative Substance the Relation They answer That the Absolute and Relative Substance are not united but identified one with another this being an Axiom to the Schoolmen Suarez lib. 4. de Trin. cap. 2. N. 3. p. 407. In Divinis omnia sunt Vnum ubi non obviat relationis oppositio but there cannot be pretended relationis oppositio betwixt an Absolute and Relative Substance and by the same Axiom they endeavour to shew how these three Relative Substances may be one absolute Divine Nature one God But then comes the grand Difficulty of all If each distinct Relative Substance be the same or identified with the one singular absolute Divine Nature are not the three Relations from thence identified one with another Is not this an infallible Axiom in reason Quae sunt eadem uni tertio sunt eadem inter se This is the Gordian Knot which almost every Schoolman gives a different answer to but at last they are generally obliged to cut it and deny the truth of the Axiom in the Divine Nature I thought it necessary to give this account of the Opinions of the Schoolmen to shew the Animadverter how little reason he had to lay so great a stress upon the Metaphysicks of Modes Nothing was farther from the thoughts of the Schoolmen with whose Names he flourishes so often than to believe that there were true Modes in God The Divine Relations according to them were only Modes in Name or in our imperfect Conception of them As for my own private Opinion with all submission to better Information I conceive That Existence in a finite Person or Being much more in a Divine Person is only the actuality of a Person or Being That Subsistence adds only a Negation of incompleteness to substantial Existence even in finite Persons and consequently infers no sort of Composition in them and therefore much less infers a Composition in a Divine Person Again I do believe that all predicamental Relations amongst the Creatures are no positive Modes but only external Denominations the same which the Schoolmen are obliged to affirm of the Relations of the Divine Persons to the Creatures Nor can I see any Absurdity of extending the same conclusion to the Internal Relations as the Schoolmen call them As for instance The Relation of Paternity may justly as I conceive be stiled an extrinsical Denomination extrinsical I say not to the sacred Triad but to the Person of the Father who is denominated by it and in the same sense Filiation extrinsical