of the soule so as if we should giue the name of passions to the motions of the vnderstanding or of the will it is by a kind of improper and figuratiue speech alluding to the passions of the senses with the which they haue some resemblance The reason why passions are not found in the rationall part of the soule is for that this part doth not imploy any corporeal organs in her actions and that her office is not to alter or bring any change vnto the body the which notwithstanding is an action which doth accompany the passions inseparably But seeing they are not to be found in any other part of the soule but in the sensitiue appetite there riseth heere a great question whether this appetite shal be diuided into the irascible concupiscible or desiring power as into two different and distinct powers or whether it makes but one power of both The common opinion is that as their obiects are diuers so they are two distinct powers whereof the reason is gathered by that which experience doth shew vs in all other things subiect to corruption for we see in other corruptible creatures that they haue not onely an inclination and power to seek after those things which are fit and conuenient for them and to flie those which may hurt or anoy them but moreouer they haue another faculty or power to resist and fight against that which may crosse their actions or destroy their beeing As for example fire is not onely indued with lightnesse to flie vp high but it hath also receiued heate from nature by meanes whereof it doth resist and fight against any thing that is contrary to his action In like manner it was necessary for the good of man that hee should haue two kindes of inclinations the one to pursue those things which are pleasing agreeable to the senses and to auoyde those which may any way anoy him and this we call the concupiscible or desiring power and the other by meanes whereofhee may incounter and vanquish whatsoeuer opposeth it selfe crosseth his inclinations or that tends to the destruction of his being or the decay of his contentment which is that wee call the irascible or angry power This differs from the concupiscible for that the concupiscible tends to the sensible good absolútely considered and without any crosses whereas the irascible doth alwayes aime at the good which is inuironed with some difficulty the which she striues to vanquish to the end shee may take all obstacles from the concupiscible power which crosse her content and hinder her from enioying the good which she desires to attaine vnto so as the irascible is as a sword and target to the concupiscible for that she combates for her content and resists any thing that may crosse her There are many things proue that they are two different and distinct powers For as Mathematicians hauing noted diuers apparent irregularities in the Planets and obserued that they seem sometimes to hasten their course and sometimes to slacke it sometimes they stand as it were fixed and sometimes to returne backe in the Zodiaque sometimes they seem neare to the earth sometimes they appear far off they haue held it necessary to multiply their heauens and to giue them many to auoyd all disorder in these excellent bodyes of the Vniuerse In like manner the diuersity of passions in man the contrary motions desires wherewith his soule is tost haue let philosophers vnderstand that there is in him not onely a concupiscible power but also an irascible for that many times we haue a desire of that which wee striue against and resist with vehemency and if wee suffer our selues to be vanquished wee are grieued as hee who desiring to see the bodies of such as had beene executed suppressed this desire and diuerted his eies from this infamous spectacle yet suffering himselfe to bee vanquished by his curiosity and hauing cast his eyes thereon witnessed his griefe and sorrow which remained to haue giuen so brutish a contentment to his eyes Whereby it appeares that desire and anger are two diuerse faculties seeing that one power is not carried at one instant to contrary desires And we finde in our selues that often times wee are inclined to angry passions are not much mooued with those of the concupiscible or to the contrary In like manner there are creatures which haue desires but no motions of choler as for example Sheepe Pigeons and Turtles make shew to haue impressions of desires and yet there appeareth in them no signe of anger So as to obserue their dispositions well we may call in question that which Aristotle saith that there is no creature but hath some touch of choler finally wee may obserue that sometimes the irascible makes vs to pursue things which are absolutely contrary to the concupiscible as when with the hazzard of life which is so deere and precious to all creatures we seeke to reuenge our selues of a powerfull enemy which hath wronged vs. For this reuenge which puts our life in danger cannot proceede from the same power which desires passionately to preserue it and so the irascible and concupiscible are two different powers And there is no part of passion properly taken but in these two sensitiue faculties which is one of the things wee gather from the definition wee haue giuen It appeares also by the same definition that the passions of our soule should alwayes bee followed with a sensible alteration in the body by the impression of the sensitiue appetite touched with the imaginatioÌ„ of good or euill which presents it selfe And here first we must not wonder if the â—oule doth impart her motions and causeth such great alteration in the body seeing that the body doth impart his paines when as it suffers any violence For if it be laid on the racke broken on a wheele or cast into the fire the soule grones vnder the burden of his torments the which happens for that beeing vnited as forme and matter and making but one body which growes from their vnion of necessity all things must bee common vnto them except those things which repugne and cannot agree with their particular natures and therfore by a certaine contagion they communicate their passions one vnto another But in this subiect there is a stronger reason for the which the soule excites these alterations in the body by her passions that is to say for that the soule doth not onely reside in the body as the forme but doth preside there in quality of the moouing cause by meanes whereof she doth change and alter it at her will For as the intellectuall power which mooues a heauen applying her vertue to mooue it makes it to change place and drawes it from East to West or from West to East euen so the soule which hath a moouing power commanding ouer the body changeth his naturall disposition and by her agitation puls him from his rest wherein hee was before shee troubled him in this
manner Moreouer wee must not wonder if the sensitiue appetite in particular make so great an impression in the body This proceedes from the sympathy which is found in those powers which are gouerned by the same soule which imployes them so as the sensitiue appetite comming to play her part shee doth stirre vp the mouing faculty of the heart the which dilates it selfe or shrinkes vp according to the nature of the obiects which haue made impression vpon the sensitiue appetite whence grow al the alterations which are made in the body of man And here we must remember that nature hath fashioned the heart in such sort as it is in perpetual motion according vnto which it sometimes extendes it selfe and sometime retires of it selfe with a certaine measure and proportion the which continuing within the bounds which nature hath prescribed it as conformable vnto the condition of the creature this motion is wholy naturall but if it once come to breake this law and shew it selfe more violent or more slow then the nature of the creature requires the naturall harmony is broken and there followes a great alteration in the body of the creature Of all the powers of the soule those of the sensitiue appetite onely cause the alteratioÌ„ of this motion whose actions alone may make it more violent or more slowe then the lawes of nature doe allow And hence it comes that none but the actions of the sensitiue appetite are made with a visible change of the body and with a sensible alteration of the naturall constitution Yet as in this change the heart receiues an alteration so the spirits the blood and other humours are agitated and mooued beyond ordinary the which doth wholy trouble the naturall constitution of the creature The which happens after this manner The obiects of the senses strike first vpon the imagination and then this power hauing taken knowledge of theÌ„ conceiues them as good or bad as pleasing or troublesome and importune then afterwards propounds them as clothed with those qualities to the creature which apprehending them vnder this last coÌ„sideration excites the concupiscible or irascible power of the soule and induceth them to imbrace or flye them and by the impression of its motion agitates the spirits which we cal Vitall the which going from the heart disperse themselues throughout the whole body and at the same instant the blood which deriues froÌ„ the liuer participating in this agitatioÌ„ flowes throughout the veynes and casts it selfe ouer all the other parts of the body So as the heart and liuer beeing thus troubled in their naturall dispositions the whole body fâ—eles it selfe mooued not onely inwardly but also outwardly according to the nature of that passioÌ„ which doth trouble it For in motions of ioy and desire the heart melts with gladnesse In those of sorrow and trouble it shrinks vp and freezeth with griefe In those of choler and resolution it is inflamed and all on fire In those of feare it growes pale and trembling A Louers words are sweete and pleasing and those of a cholerick man are sharpe and rough Finally there riseth no passion in the soule which leaueth not some visible trace of her agitation vpon the body of man Lastly wee may gather from the definition of passion that this alteration which happeneth in the body is contrary to the lawes of nature for that as we haue said it transports the heart beyond the bounds which nature hath prescribed it and doth agitate it extraordinarily Hence it growes that amoÌ„g al the motioÌ„s of the sensitiue appetite those only are propâ—â—ly called passioÌ„s which are accompanied with some notable defect For as we call passions of the body diseases wounds paines inflammations incisions and all other violent accidents which happen extraordinarily So wee properly call passions of the soule those infirmities wherewith she is afflicted and troubled as pittie feare bashfulnesse or shame loue hatred desires Choler and the rest For in this subiect the word Passion is not taken in that sense whereas wee say that a subiect suffers when as it receiues some new forme bee it that at the comming of this forme it lose any thing of its owne or not as when the ayre is enlightned with the Sunne beams without losing any thing of her first constitution nor in that sense wherein we say that a subiect suffers when as it receiues a new quality which doth expell another whether it bee concurrent to its nature or contrary vnto it as when water growes cold or is made hot But the word Passion is taken here for a change which is made in man contrary to his naturall constitution and disposition from the which hee is as it were wrested by this change In which sense the Phylosophers say that things suffer when as they are drawne from their naturall disposition to a course that is contrary to their nature In the mean time you must not wonder if we ground the irregularity of the change which these passions breed vpon the disorder which the sensitiue appetite stirred vp by the sensible obiects casts into the heart being a thing which wee must constantly beleeue that this power of the soule bee it the irascible or coÌ„cupiscible hath its se at and mansion in the heart The which cannot be denied in the subiect of feare for that such as are transported therwith call back the blood and heate vnto the heart as to the place where feare doth exercise her tyranny therewith to defend themselues considering also that those creatures which haue the greatest and largest hearts are most fearefull for that their heate is more dispersed and consequently lesse able to resist the assaults of feare Some haue not beleeued that it was so of other passions but haue appointed theÌ„ their seates else-where and haue maintained that some did reside in the liuer others in the spleene and some in the gall as for anger they haue lodged it in the gall whereas choler resides which doth inflame it But they haue giuen loue his quarter in the liuer for that the saÌ„guine coÌ„plexion is inclined to loue for ioy they haue seated it in the Spleen for that melancholy proceeds from the distemperature of this part But notwithstanding this it is most certaine that both the powers of the sensitiue appetite I mean the Irascible and Concupiscible reside in the heart the which beeing the fountaine of life of all vital operations must also bee a lodge retraite to those appetites which nature hath gigiueÌ„ the creature to preserue his life to chase away those perils which may threaten it Wherby we see that the passioÌ„s of desire or anger are felt preseÌ„tly in the heart trouble the natural coÌ„stitution as soon as they rise wherby followeth a strange alteration throughout the whole body for the springs caÌ„not be troubled but the streams wil feele of it And therefore the passions being too vehement and making a violeÌ„t impressioÌ„ vppoÌ„ the hart they cause
mollified for any tragicall accident which happened a thousand yeares since neither do we care much for that which shal succeed after the reuolutions of many ages Wherefore in old time the Romans to moue the Magistrates to mercy striued to make a more sensible impression of their miseries by causing their wiues children and families to come desolately vnto the place of iustice And as for themselues they appeared in iudgement with garmeÌ„ts befitting their fortunes all filthy and torne they opened their breasts other parts of their bodies to shew the wounds they had receiued in the seruice of the common wealth Yea they caused tables to bee drawne where their misfortunes were painted the which they preseÌ„ted vnto their Iudges to the end that hauing before their eies so mourneful a spectacle they might take coÌ„passion of their misery being most certaine that the voice attire carriage countenance gesture and presence of the miserable make powerfull impressions in our hearts and incite men more to pitty The which happens for that these things make vs as it were present by the sight of another mans misery And therefore a bloody roabe as that of Caesar murthered in the Senate being showne to expresse the misfortune of a Prince did not onely wrest forth teares but euen inflame the people to reuenge so pittifull an accident For the same reason wee feele our selues much touched with griefe and pitty when as wee heare the complaints sighes teares and lamentation of these which are opprest by some notable calamity As when we behold the Agonies of those that are exposed to a cruell and shamefull death And we are the more moued to pitty and commiseration when they are worthy and vertuous men whose vertue and glory past makes their ends the more lamentable and tragicall For this consideration moues vs the more both for that the euill is neere vs and that our eyes are spectators as also for that the Image of their vertue and the glory of their precedent liues increaseth the indignity of their punishment Of Indignation CHAP. 3. AS Mercy or pitty is a signe of a good soule so this other Passion which we cal Indignation and which is no other thing but a grieuing repining wee haue at the good Fortune which befalles the wicked who are altogether vnworthy is very commendable in vs. For as pitty is framed of the Griefe which we feele for the miseries of good men or whoÌ„ we iudge worthy of better fortunes so Indignation proceeds from the discontent we receiue to see the wicked flourish and enioy the worldly blessings which they haue not deserued so as either of these Passions is commendable for that as wee should afflict our selues to see vertuous men ouertakâ—n by miâ—fortunes from the which their vertue should exempt them so we should bee greiued to see men execrable for their crimes aduanced to the height of honors and wordly dignities which good men should enioy For whatsoeuer befalls a man contrary to his merrit is full of outrage and iniustice wherefore Aristotle did not forbeare to say that Indignation is a thing which is found euen in the diuinity to the which the prosperities of the wicked cannot be pleasing But to enter into the matter you must vnderstand that as Indignation is a griefe which wee feele a despight which we conceiue at the great prosperity of those whom wee hold vnworthy for their crimes yet this Passion is not framed in our soules for all kind of prosperities which may befall them For that no man hath any reason to bee troubled to see the wicked change their life vnto a better to imbrace piety to become iust valiant moderate wise and adorned with other vertues Yea the most innocent soules reioyce whensoeuer they see a man who was formerly vicious and disordered become vertuous and temperate There being no man liuing that is vnworthy of vertue seeing that vertue by her presence doth extinguish vice and makes man worthy of the blessings of this life whereas they that are destitute of this ornament deserue them not So as if hee who was formerly wicked becomes vertuous by this change hee makes himselfe worthy of all good fortune and therefore if any happen vnto him we should not be grieued as in like manner wee should not take pitty of those who remaine obstinate in their crimes and glory in their vices The goods then which we grieue and disdaine to see the wicked enioy are the goods of the body and those which we call of Fortune that is to say nobility beauty honors scepters Crownes Empires and such like As for example there is no good man but doth grieue and tremble to see the Tyrants of the East the cruell and infidell race of the Ottomans hold the goodliest scepter enioy the richest citties and command ouer the most powerfull prouinces of the world And in like manner there are no vertuous soules that can without griefe Indignation see other wicked men to flourish and abound in all sorts of honor and riches But especially our despight is inflamed when as they are men who haue crept vp to the height of glory in an instant and when they are very prodigies of Fortune being aduanced before they were in a manner knowne to bee in the world or at the least were in any sort respected For as for those which hold their Nobility from precedent ages who are rich by succession and inheritance and who hold all the aduantages they haue from nature although they be altogether vnworthy yet wee endure them with lesse impatiency then we do new men who are risen to a monstrous prosperity in one day The reason is for that they which enioy their glory and riches from their ancestors seem to haue nothing but what belongs vnto them by the right of nature and blood whereas men aduanced to new honors without merite seeme to bee rich with the spoyles of vertue and to enioy the goods which in no sort belong vnto them And for the same reason although that sometimes the goods of the body as beauty health and disposition meeting in men which deserue them not may raise in our soules some clouds of Indignation and despight to see these presents of nature so vnworthily prophaned yet wee do not conceiue so galling a discontent as when we see them enioy the goods which we call of Fortune as charges dignities offices the gouernment of state and the mannaging of great affaires all which things seeme to bee due to vertue For this coÌ„sideration it is an insupportable thing to see a man of the common sort wholy destitute of vertue and full of all vice attaine to the first dignities of a Realm and in the twinckling of an eye to become as powerfull as the greatest Princes And there is no doubt but all good men tremble when they see these prodigious aduancements of persons taken from the scumme of the people without any consideration of merit Yea these sudden changes are as
whence retiring them when occasion requires she propounds them vnto the Appetite vnder the apparance of things that are pleasing or troublesom that is to say vnder the forme of Good and Euill and at the same instant the same formes enlightned with the Light of the vnderstanding and purged from the sensible and singular conditions which they retaine in the Imagination and insteed of that which they represented of particular things representing them generall they become capable to be imbraced by the vnderstanding the which vnder the apparance of things which are profitable or hurtfull that is to say vnder the forme of Good and Euill represents them vnto the Will the which being blind referres it selfe to that which the vnderstanding proposeth vnto it And then as Queene of the powers of the soule she ordaines what they shall imbrace what they shal fly as it pleseth her whereunto the Sensitiue Appetite yeelding a prompt obedience to execute her command from the which it neuer stâ—aies so long as it containes it selfe within the bounds and order prescrib'd by Nature quickneth all the powers and passions ouer which shee commands and sets to worke those which are necessary to that action and by their meanes commands the mouing power dispersed ouer all the members to follow or fly to approch or to recoyle or to do any other motion which it requireth And shee obeying suddenly if shee bee not hindred moues the whole body with the Organs which reside in the parts and induceth them to fly or imbrace things according to the command which she hath receiued After this manner Man proceeds in his free operations if he will obserue the order which he ought The which I say for that oftentimes â—ee ouerthrows and peruerts this order either by bad education or by custome or the organs being vnsound or for that his will hath bad inclination so as reason cannot enioy her power subiect the Sensuall Appetite vnto her but contrariwise hee abandons himselfe in prey vnto this disordered Appetite and suffers himselfe to bee transported by his furious motioÌ„s So as suddenly when as fantasie offers to the Appetite the formes which shee receiues from the Sences vnder the shew of Good or Euill he without stay to haue them iudged by the discourse of vnderstanding and chosen by the will commâ—nds of himselfe the mouing power makes it to act according to his pleasure And herein consistes the disorder which the passions cause in the life of man which diuert him many times from the lawes of Reason But wee haue spoken enough hereof let vs now enter into the subiect and beginne by the definition of passions to know their Nature and Essence To his long-lou'd and worthy friend Mr. Edward Grimeston Sergeant at Armes of his vnwearied and honored labors SVch is the vnequall and inhumane vice Of these vile Times that each man sets his price On others Labors And the lasiest Drone That neuer drop of honey of his owne Brought to the publique Hiue distasts all ours And in the worlds wit feeds far worthier Powers T is Noble to be idle Base to be Of any Art Good Mind or Industry Another sort of dull Opinionists Consume their stupid liues in learned mists Yet wold be seene poore soules beyond the Sun But that like Dolon in the darke they run Other Explorers fearing And these men Like Cheaters foyst in false dice to their Den To win mens thoughts of th' onely truly learnd And feede on that conceit before t is earnd To strengthen which their Markeâ—s are the Marts Where sounds and Names of Artsmen all Arts They stuffe their windy memories withall And then when ere their Creditors shall call They pay them with these Tokens all they owe Then Honest men they are then all things know When all employd in priuate conference They count all rude that are of open braines Feare to be fooles in print though in their Cels In Learn'd mens vizards they are little else They that for feare of being cald fooles hide Like hid men more they stir the more are spied Whose learnings are as ignorantly applied As those illiterate Peripaticke soules That all their liues do nought but measure Poules Yet neuer know how short or long it iâ— More then their liues or all their idle blisse In short All men that least deseruingâ— haue Men of most merit euer most depraue How euer friend t is in vs must assure Our outward Acts and signe their passe secure Nor feare to find your Noble paines impeacht But write as long as Foxe or Nowell preacht For when all wizards haue their bolts let fly There 's no such proofe of worth as Industry E merito solers Industria reddat honorem George Chapman A Table of the Chapters contained in this Treaty Of Humane Passions CHAP. 1. What Passion is fol. 1. CHAP. 2. Of the number of Passions fol. 29. CHAP. 3. Of the quality of Passions and whethey they be good or bad fol. 51. Of Loue the Preface fol. 78. CHAP. 1. Of the beginning of Loue. fol. 83. CHAP. 2. Wherein the Essence of Loue consists fol. 103. CHAP. 3. Of the persons to whom Loue extends fol. 121. CHAP. 4. Of the Effects of Loue. fol. 152. CHAP. 5. Of Iealousie whether it bee an effect and signe of Loue. fol. 175. CHAP. 1. Of Hatred and Enmity fol. 184. CHAP. 1. Of Desire and Cupidity and of the flight and horror we haue of things fol 216. CHAP. 1. Of Pleasure and Delight fol. 244. CHAP. 1. Of the Effects of Pleasure fol. 297. CHAP. 1. Of Griefe and Heauinesse fol. 317. CHAP. 2. Of Mercy and Indignation fol. 354. CHAP. 3. Of Indignation fol. 375. CHAP. 4. Of Enuy and Emulation fol. 389. CHAP. 1. Of Hardinesse and Courage fol. 411. CHAP. 1. Of Feare or Dread fol. 428. CHAP. 1. Of Shame fol. 473. CHAP. 2. Of the Effects of Shame 494. CHAP. 1. Of Hope and Despaire fol. 507. CHAP. 1. Of Choler fol. 547. CHAP. 2. Of those against whom wee are angry fol. 575. CHAP. 3. Of the Effects and remedies of Choler fol. 598. CHAP. 1. Of Mildnesse and Gentlenesse fol. 633. CHAP. 1. Of the diuers Passions of men according to their ages and conditions fol. 654. A Table of Humaine Passions CHAPTER 1. Wherein is expounded what Passion is SEeing there can be no better order obserued to expresse the nature of things then to beginne by the definitions which haue vsually giuen vs a full light of their essence wee must enter into this treaty of passions by the definition which Philosophers giue That which is called passion say they is no other thing but a motion of the sensitiue appetite caused by the apprehensioÌ„ or imagination of good or euill the which is followed with a change or alteration in the body contrary to the Lawes of Nature Whereby it appeares that passions to speak properly reside onely in the sensitiue appetite and that they are not fashioned but in the irrationall part
as much as reason may subiect them to her command and prescribe them a Law And in this consideration they may bee good or bad according to the quality of the will that gouernes them So wee see both good and bad feare desire and reioyce alike But the wicked haue bad feares wicked desires bad ioyes whereas the good haue none but good feares good desires and good ioyes for that the branches do alwaies participate of the nature of the roote For although the sensitiue appetite of her owne quality be destitute of liberty yet by reason of the strict vnion that it hath with the intellectuall and reasonable it doth participate as it were with a beame and some kind of borrowed liberty in regard whereof some haue maintained that it is capable of vertues as of temperance and fortitude which reside in this part of the soule If the Stoicks had well obserued this consideration they should haue seene that a wise man by the guide of reason may so moderate his Passions as they may be commendable and worthy the profession hee makes of vertue The which is nothing doubted of by Christian Philosophers seeing that he who was neuer subiect to sinne and whose soule was aduanced to the height of graces and vertues had Passions and humane affections the which could neuer command ouer reason or transport it but receiue a law from it But on the other side wee want no reasons to conuince and ouerthrow the opinions of the Stoickes For first of all vertue how eminent soeuer neuer ruines that which is wholy conformable to reason But what is more reasonable then to see a man moued with pitty and compassion of his like of his friends or of his kinsman what inhumanity were it for a mother to see her child in the throat of wild beastes or exposed to shipwracke or broken vpon a wheele or torne in peeces by tortures or only sicke of some violent infirmity and not to haue her soule sensible of griefe would wee that a vertuous man should not bee touched with indignation to see crimes honored and the wicked aduanced to the height of dignities Shall we condemne the spurres of an honest emulation wherewith he is toucht that reades the glorious exploits and vertuous actions of great Personâ—ges which â—aue gon before him will you haue him that owes his life and honor and whatsoeuer â—ee enioyeth to his friend insensible of the offices of his friendshp would they that the â—eares of an honest wife should haue no power oâ—er an husband that were ready to abandon her All these motions being so iust were it not a great cruelty to seeke to supprâ—sse them as it were in despight of nature But who knowes not that these Passionsâ—re â—re exercises of vertue To apprehend euill to feare punishments to attend recompences with ioy to long after promises are they not so many incourâ—gements to piety temperance and other vertuous actions who is it then that will blame so commendable a thing Nay is it not to quench the fruits of vertue and to deny it the content which is due vnto it in cutting off thus generally all Passions For who knoweth not that shee doth vsually plant in the soules of men an ardent loue of the goodly fruits which she produceth What iust man but feeles certaâ—ne pleasure â—nd sweetâ—nes in the effects of Iustice what sober man but receiues content in the actions of sobriety what valiant man but suffers himselfe to bee transported with the loue of braue exploits and a desire to seeke glorious death in combats And who will beleeue that euer vertue like vnto Polipus which eates his owne armes will euer ruine her proper obiects Who doth not know but the Passions of our soules are the obiects of many excellent vertues which doe moderate them and reduce them vnto reason when they seeke to flie out Fortitude is nothing but a mediocrity betwixt feare hardines That is to say it is nothing but a vertue by meanes wherâ—of we do moderate our exceeding feare and our immoderate boldnesse Take then feare and hardines from fortitude and it is no more a vertue And by the same reason you ouerthrow all courage and magnanimity whereof the one makes vs to vndertake the most terrible and difficult things with resolution and the other giues vs a lustre in our greatest actions You shall in like manner ouerthrow all patience and perseuerance whereof the one makes vs constantly and willingly to endure all the miseries of this life and the other confirmes vs against all the crosses of this world so as wee remaine inseparably 〈◊〉 to that which wee hold conformable to reason for all these vertues haue for their obiect the Passions of the Irascible appetite Temperance is no other thing but a mediocrity which wee keepe in the pleasures of tast and feeling and in the griefes and sorrowes which befall vs. That is to say it is a vertue by meanes whereof wee gouerne our pleasures and paines If then you take all pleasure and Paine from temperance you giue it the name of vertue in vaine And withall you put modesty and honesty out of the number of the vertues whereof the one makes vs apprehend infamies and reproches that is to say induceth vs to flie whatsoeuer hath any shew of dissolution And the other filling our soules with goodly things done with a certaine grace makes vs to flie whatsoeuer is filthy and worthy of reproch You shall also put out of the same number of vertues abstinency Sobriety chastity and pudicity whereof the two first moderate the delights of the mouth and the other the pleasures of generation For that all these verâ—ues haue for their obiect the Passions of the concupiscible appetite After all this the sensitiue appetite is a present of nature which God who is the Author hath freely bestowed vpon vs but vertue neuer destroyes nature but addes vnto it the perfection which it wants It must then suffer the sensitiue appetite to act according to his inclination yet moderating his motions and restrayning them vnder the lawes of reason And without doubt it seemes the Stoicks haue not obserued in man any other composition then that of the body and the soule and that they were ignorant of the diuersity of the intellectuall and sensitiue powers of reason and of sensuality For otherwise they would neuer haue suffered the sensitiue appetite to haue bene idle in man as it must of necessity remaine if it bee once freed from all motions of Passions And as for those wonderfull praises they giue to a wise man whom they imagine to bee freed from Passions they are like vnto the stately titles which are giuen to great shipps and to all that rich equipage and furniture wherewith it is adorned and yet it is subiect to the fury of stormes and suffers shipwracke as well as the smallest vessells Wee haue alwayes seene those which haue made profession of this sect grow pale and wanne aswell as
their Authority by the terror of Armes and the terror of punishment yea they haue alwayes detested the furious words of him that said I care not to be hated so I may bee feared It were good among bruit beasts but men must be managed and gouerned by mildenesse And they willingly embrace such as they may trust and whose power is not fearefull vnto them Behold the persons to whom the Loue of men doth commonly extend In the meane time the true means to purchase Loue is to bind those whose friendship we affect by all sorts of benefites and good offices And to this end they must do good before it be demanded or that they bee forced to discouer their wants vnto vs for that were to put them on the racke to make them confesse our magnificence bounty Moreouer he must be carefull neuer to reproach the fauours which hee hath done them nor proclaime them to others with a vanity which seems to turne to their contempt He that obserues this mean in the benefits and fauours which hee bestowes seemes to haue propounded vnto himselfe the onely good of him whom he hath bound without any other particular interest In regard whereof he is also bound to acknowledge and Loue his freedome and bounty Of the Effects of Loue. CHAP. 4. AS the Ancient Romanes obseruing of the one side the conquests victories triumphes and glory which Caesar by his valour had purchased to their Empire and on the other side weighing the ruines miseries massacres and slaughters which he had caused in their Estate they were wont to say that it was difficult to iudge whether his birth had bene more fortunate or fatall to their Common wealth Euen so it is hard to say whether that Loue causeth more good or euill in the world It is true when as this Passion containes it selfe within the bounds of honesty it is a liuely spring and fountaine of all good things in the life of men It is also true that the author of nature hath ingrafted in vs the first motions and beames and it is true that it is borne with vs that it increaseth with vs that it doth alwayes accompany vs so as it cannot subsist without vs nor we Loue without it It is an immutable law which men haue not â—â—â—nd out lawgiuers haue not prescribed neither doth it depend vpon the examples or customes of nations but was grauen as we may say by the hands of nature in our Soules But when like a wild and vntamed beast it exceedes the bounds of reason there is no misery which it brings not into the world nor any disorder which it causeth not in our liues It is as it were a fatall source from whence flow all kinds of horror vncleanenes adulteries incests sacriledges quarrells warres treasons murders parricides cruelties and violences besides the particular torments it giues vnto the soules of such as giue themselues to be surprized filling them with enuies iealousies cares melancholies terrors yea and madnesse drawing them many times to despaire and to do things whereat heauen and earth blush and are ashamed wherein it is the more to bee feared for that as the first heauen by his motion doth violently draw whatsoeuer is beneath it so Loue prescribes a law to our other desires to all our other Passions so as we may tearme it the key and beginning of our thoâ—ghts of our words of our actions and of whatsoeuer wee do in this life So it makes the first impression in our soules where it excites the desire of that which we resolue to pursue then it fortifies this desire by hope which inflames vs to the pursuite of that we desire and if there appeare any obstacle it imbraceth Choller and hath no rest vntill it hath vanquished and surmounted all lets wherein she settles her coÌ„tentment rest And as the thunder breakes whatsoeuer resists it so this furious Passion being once inflamed striues to ouerthrow whatsoeuer opposes it selfe against her rage and violence Yet as the winds fill the sailes of Pyrats shippes but are not the cause of the murthers and thefts which they commit at sea But all these miseries proceed from the bad inclination and couetousnesse of these infamous Pyrats So although that Loue bee an assistant in many villanies which men commit yet it proceedes not from the malice of this Passion which contrariwise is framed to bring all good to the society of men but it growes from the liberty and excesse of men who peruert the vse of all things and conuert the causes of their felicity into instruments of their misery Let vs then see what bee the proper effects of Loue not staying at those which rise from the meere malice of men We will reduce them to three or foure heads the explanation whereof will giue sufficient light to the rest of the subiect The first effect they attribute to Loue is that it hath an vniting vertue by meanes whereof it causeth him that loueth to aspire to vnite himselfe to the thing beloued whereunto we may refer the fable of Androgenes where of Plato doth so much triumph but we must swallow so many fopperies before wee shall come to the mysteries of this fiction as it were better to passe it ouer in silence then to spend time to explicate it So it is that prophane and vnchast Loue seekes the vnion of bodies which is found euen among brute beasts and for this reason may be called brutish if it bee not sought with an honest intent by a lawfull marriage But chast and honest Loue seekes the vnion of affections and wills and exceeds not that which is decent and vertuous They which loue sayd Aristophanes would passionately desire to be traÌ„sformed chaÌ„ged one into another of two bodies to become one But for that this transformation cannot be without the destruction of their being they striue to recompence this defect by a ciuil and honest vnion which teÌ„ds not to the ruine of their nature but contents their affections that is to say they conuerse continually together entertaine their Passions and are as little absent as may bee one from another Moreouer they haue the same thoughts the same desires the same affections the same wils the same delights the same distastes seeme to be but one soule in two bodies So as that which is pleasing to him that loueth is in like manner to the party beloued what he affects the other imbraceth and what hee reiects the other flies and doth abhorre So as their willes being thus strictly vnited all their actions and carriages conspire to the same end and propound vnto themselues the same obiect For when as we haue graft the sience of one tree vpoÌ„ another stocke the fruits which grow follow the nature of the graft and sauor nothing of the stocke so the will of the louer being transported into that of the party beloued takes the tincture and doth not any thing but what is conformeable to
their soules fight for her honor and hold it a punishment to offend her But these are not the effects of Iealousie which contrariwise violates the honour which is due to the party beloued and by a prodigious manner to blind the world will haue her fauour by wronging her treading her merits vnder foote We must then put a difference betwixt a respectiue feare which always doth accompany those that loue perfectly and Iealousie which is neuer found but with an imperfect passion which cannot iudge of the perfections of the party beloued They which know that these things are diuerse and as remote one from another as the earth is from heauen wil easily passe on this side and yeelde that Iealousie is neither competible with Loue nor is any signe thereof Yet if wee shall yeelde any thing to the opinion of the Vulgar we may freely confesse that Iealousie in truth is a signe of Loue but as the feuer is an argument of life It is vnquestionable that a feuer is a signe of life seeing the dead are not susceptible of this bad quality But as a feuer shewing that there are some reliques of life in the patient that is tormented accompanies him to his graue so Iealousie is I know not what signe of Loue seeing they which loue not cannot haue any Iealousie But it is certaine that if wee expell it not it will in the end ruine Loue like vnto a thicke smoake which smothers the brightest flame This is all we can yeelde vnto the Vulgar so as according to this opinion which we haue held the most probable Iealousie is to Loue as thicke mists are to flowers haile to haruest stormes to fruites and poison to our liues Of Hatred or Enmity CHAP. 1. AS the Lawes of Loue and Hatred are directly contrary by that which wee haue spoken of Loue it will be easie to iudge wherein Hatred consists and how farre her effects extends Hatred then is An auersion and horror which man hath of all that seemes contrary to his good or preiudiciall to his contentment Or else Hatred is an horror which the appetite hath of that which seemes pernicious vnto it so as the sheepe hate the wolfe as the enemy and persecuter of his life But wee must heere obserue that as all that is befitting Nature is put in the rancke of good so on the other side whatsoeuer is opposite vnto it must be placed in the rancke of euill Wherfore as the good is the obiect of Loue so the euill is the obiect of Hatred To vnderstand this we must remember that whether it be in the minde or in the body there is a befitting estate and as it were a naturall harmony which makes vs to abhorre that which may dissolue this consort This harmony considered in the body is no other thing then the good constitution by meanes whereof we enioy a perfect health the which being impayred our nature receiues pain as when we indure great hunger and thirst or when as wee receiue any hurt or wound As for the soule this same harmony may bee considered first in the senses as well externall as internall cōsist in the proportiō they haue with their obiects which is such as they hate whatsoeuer puls them away or which diuerts them by any kinde of violence As for example the eyes hate darkenesse and obscurity and our imagination is terrified and troubled by the fearefull apprehensions of dreames which it frameth during our rest This same harmony considered in reason either it regards the simple knowledge of the truth which our vnderstanding conceiues with pleasure or the vse and execution of things which depend on wisedome which wee doe with content In regard of the first our spirit is enemy to lying although at some times it takes delight in the art wherewith they colour a thing to giue it some shewe of truth So as the wisest are delighted in the reading and report of fables when as the intention hath any grace And as for the second there is such diuersity of iudgements in humaine actions which are as it were the Element of prudence as it is a thing in a manner incredible for hardly shall you see two persons which haue the same feeling and apprehension of affaires in regard whereof this life is full of Hatred and factions which grow from these diuerse opinions As for that which concernes the will her harmony consists in the proportion Loue which she beares to the good which makes her detest and abhorre whatsoeuer presents it selfe vnto her vnder the shew of euill as pernicious and hurtfull to her content and rest And therefore the harmony of the sensitiue appetite consisting in the familiarity and concurrence it hath with the good of the sences it doth abhorre and beares an irreconciliable hatred to whatsoeuer shall offend them hence it comes that wee so much abhorre whippes tortures punishmēts hunger thirst wounds such like which tend to the destruction of our being This Passion was ingraft in vs by nature to the end that at the first approach at the first taste and imagination of euill wee may retire our selues and flie it lest wee runne into ruine This kind of hatred then is proper to the concupiscible which is offended at diuerse things yea at small things and many times at those which haue no subiect of offence for you shall see some which cannot suffer the presence of certaine creatures others cannot endure the sight of certaine fruites though otherwise they be exceeding pleasant Finally there is no creature so fantasticke in his Appetite nor so sudden in the motions of Hatred and distastes of things which present themselues vnto his senses as man who not able to endure any thing makes himselfe insupportable in a like manner to all creatures but principally to his like But to giue more light to this discourse we wil obserue that there are diuerse sorts of Hatred and Enmities which may bee referred to foure chiefe heads for there is a natural Hatred and a brutish Hatred a melancholy Hatred and a humaine Hatred The naturall Hatred takes her beginning from a certaine antipathy and contrariety of nature which is found in creatures the which as it were abhorre one another and cannot frequent or conuerse together although the subiect of this Hatred appeare not and that shewes it selfe more in the effect then in the cause whereof wee haue prodigious examples in nature in plants in beasts and in men Brutish Hatred is rather a rage then a Passion for that it seekes a furious destruction of that it hates and to see the last relliques consumed so as it is more fitting for rauening wolues or for monsters then for men Such is the Hatred of those who not satisfied to haue slaine their enemies make their bodies to feele their fury practizing a thousand cruelties vpon their carcasses and making them to suffer after death all the indignities their rage can deuise This detestable Hatred sometimes passeth
in the company one of another as Eagles loue Eagles Lions take pleasure to bee among Lions and men loue to see themselues among men and for that euery thing loues that which resembles it All men loue themselues althogh some with more vehemency then others and by consequence they commend their owne workes they esteeme their discourses they loue commonly flatterers who praise them they are passionate for glory for their friends and for their children who are as wee may say their owne workes And by the same reason they are pleased to finish that which they haue begunne which is to giue perfection to the labour of their hands Wisedome which consists in the knowledge of many excellent admirable things procures ioy to him that is adorned for that it raiseth him aboue the ordinary of men and giues him a kind of power ouer others which man desires naturally and for that men are naturally ambitious of honor they take delight to shew their authority in commanding others and in reprehending them they make demonstration that they cannot allow of their actions Moreoue rman hath a singular delight to practize those things wherein he thinkes to excell for he is neuer tired to shew his industry doth willingly spend dayes and nights to become more perfect and to exceed himselfe The which we haue seene in Apelles Zeuxis Protogenes and other excellent Painters of antiquity Finally for that the sports and recreations of the minde are pleasing and that wee take delight to laugh and to spend the time Iouially it followes that all the things which may ferue to that end as iesters their actions and words giue vs content and procure delight to behold them These in some are the obiects of Pleasure which wee feele in this life we must now see what kind of Pleasures are allowed and which are iustly forbidden For the explaining whereof we must vnderstand that there haue beene Philosophers who not knowing how to set a difference betwixt the vnderstanding and the senses and imagining there were no other Pleasures but those of the body haue condemned them generally as detestable and pernitious But they had no reason for their assertion seeing there is not any man that can liue without some kind of sensible and corporall Pleasure seeing the author of nature hath vnited this kind of Pleasure and sweetenesse to the actions of this life to the end wee might with more courage indure the toyles and paines and that they might bee as salt which seasoneth meate and which makes it more pleasing to our taste Wee must then know that Pleasure being a rest of the soule which she hath gotten by some kind of operation there are some which being conformable to the rules of reason and to the eternall law which God hath established among his creatures cannot be held bad but are meerely innocent as those which God hath tied to the procreation of children when as they are tasted in a lawfull marriage such as hee hath ordained for the preseruation of mankind Yet we must confesse that the discordes of men do commonly peruert the vse not keeping theÌ„selues within the bounds of reason nor of the law of God the which is visible in the excesse they commit in drinking and eating in women perfumes play dancing and other Pleasures of the body which are seene at this day to be no other then subiects of offence whereby we may see how infamous the opinion of the Epicures was from the which notwithstanding many great Personages did beleeue that Epicurus himselfe much dissented affirming that hee made no account but of the Pleasures of the mind who with a visible reproach to humaine nature haue placed the soueraigne good of man in the Pleasure of the senses which notwithstanding are common with bruite beasts In like manner wee may gather what wrong they did vnto vertue who by a notable effeminacy represented the image of Pleasure sitting in a throne like a great Queene which had vnder her the vertues as slaues to attend her commandements As if a man in the course of this life should haue no other obiect in all his actions yea in the most vertuous then the satisfying of his Pleasures and the contentment of his senses Our resolution then is that we must not imagine that all the Pleasures of the senses are to bee reiected as pernitious neither all to bee imbraced as beames of our soueraigne good But as Pleasure is a rest and contentment to the soule which enioyeth some good whereof she tastes the sweetnesse if it bee an absolute good without exception the Pleasure is innocent and allowable to man But if it bee a good pleasing only to the senses and contrary to the rules of reason and the law of God as the Pleasures of the flesh out of a chast marriage the effect is pernitious and the enioying damnable But for that we haue formerly sayd that Pleasures regard either the remembrance of that is past or the enioying and feeling of a present good or the hope of a future it shal bee fit to shew which makes the most powerfull impression in our senses and delights vs most We must then know that Pleasure taking her beginning in our soules by the presence of a good which incounters our senses or which vnites it selfe vnto vs by some other meanes this presence or imaginary good is framed by the simple knowledge and the only Idea which wee haue of this good so as the obiects wherof we haue knowledge make an impression of their formes in our soules or else this presence consists in a real vnion of the good with our senses whether that wee do actually enioy it or that wee haue a certaine hope to get it Wherefore as the reall vnion of the obiect with the power is greater and more strict then that which is but imaginary and as the actuall vnion is stronger then that which is but in power wee must necessarily conclude that the sweetest Pleasure is that which proceeds from the feeling and actuall enioying of the good which is really present with our senses But the ioy which springs from hope is greater and the Pleasure more sweete for that in this kind of ioy there is an vnion bâ—twixt our soule and the good which pleaseth vs Not only according to the imagination which represents vnto vs the perfections but also with this condition that the possession is in our power for that otherwise wee could not hope for it Wee put in the last rancke the Pleasure wee feele of good things which are past as the least of all for that those good things not being vnited to our senses but by the imagination and memory which is the weakest vnion that can bee betwixt our senses and the obiects which delight them the ioy which we receiue must also be lesse sensible Of the effects of Pleasure CHAP. 2. THe effects which arise from the Pleasure we conceiue of the obiects which are delightfull to our sense may
a violent Passion of the Soule entertained by some sensible discontent Or else Griefe is a torment of the mind and body Or againe Griefe is a Passion of the mind afflicted by some kind of euill which presents it selfe Or to describe it more particularly Griefe is a Passion of the Soule which riseth from a discontent she receiueth from obiects contrary to her inclinations which present themselues vnto the senses and afflict them But wee must obserue that there are two kinds of Griefe The one which resides in the sensuall Appetite and the other hath his seate in the rationall This last which afflicts the minde is properly called heauines and differs from the other for that a sensible Griefe is alwayes accompanied with a visible alteration and change of the body which is moued whereas the Griefe of the mind hath not alwayes an agitation of the body but most commonly containes it selfe within the bounds of the power where it is framed in regard whereof it is sometimes attributed to God and the Angells These two kinds of Griefe differ also one from another for that the cause of the sensible Griefe resides in the body which suffers some violent impression that alters it But the cause of the intellectuall Griefe resides in the rationall part and in the mind which represents vnto it selfe the euill which she receiues from the obiects which present themselues vnto her thought They differ againe for that the apprehension and knowledge which the exterior senses haue of things they do only regard the present obiects which make an actuall impression in them but the vnderstanding not only conceiues things present but euen those that are past and which may happen or fall vnder the imagination of man Hence it comes that corporeall Griefe which followeth the apprehension which present things make in the senses growes onely from the presence of obiects contrary to their inclinations Whereas the Griefe of the mind following the knowledge of the vnderstanding may grow from obiects that are present past or to come and from those which man doth presuppose may succeed vnto him So as the noblest powers of our soule and those which are the richest ornaments of our nature as the vnderstanding imagination and memory helpe to increase our paines and to augment our afflictions As if the presence of heauen which giues vs some prerogatiue ouer beastes should make vs more miserable For the most sauage beastes flie dangers when as they present themselues vnto their eyes But being escaped they remaine quiet and assured whereas we not only torment our selues for the euill which doth oppresse vs but euen for which is not yet happened But you must vnderstand that to speake properly Griefe which is one of the Passions of the soule is that which is framed in the sensitiue appetite with a visible alteration of the body which is agitated and moued exteriorly by the euill or paine which it suffers So as the cause doth reside in the body which receiues some kind of outrage But the motion of Griefe is alwayes framed in the soule for that the body is not capable but by the presence of the soule Wee must also remember that as to excite Pleasure in our senses the pleasing obiect must not only be vnited but also knowne and perceiued by the senses as we haue formerly obserued so to cause Griefe the afflicting obiect must touch our senses so as by the impâ—â—ssion it makes thâ—y must pâ—rcâ—iue at it 〈◊〉 painefull For it is certaine that as there is no good but that which is sensibly present can cause Pleasure to the senses so there is not any but a present euill can procure a sensible Griefe But vnder the obiect of Griefe we comprehend not only the euill which afflicts vs but also the good which we haue lost For euen as the weight of bodies causeth that not only they haue an inclination to rest in the center but also is the cause that they are neuer farre remote without suffering a visible violence in their nature So men are naturally carried not only to Loue but with a sensible Griefe of their losse So the couetous man torments himselfe for the losse of his wealth The voluptuous is grieued to see an end of the obiects of his content The mother afflicts her selfe for her only son we see many who after good cheare great feasts and dancings hauing spent the time in all kind of Pleasures suddenly grow heauy and pensiue and yet can giue no reason of this sudden change which proceeds only from the disquietnesse of our minds which grieues at contentments past and afflicts it selfe the which makes him heauy and this heauinesse conuerts into melancholy which augments his anguish and torments him without any other forme of euill that presents it selfe vnto his senses As for the causes of griefe and Heauinesse being consisidered in regard of their subiects where they incounter we obserue three For first of all our Cupidities and Desires do many times cause great vexation and discontents as when any one is surprized with the Loue of a pleasing obiect if they hinder the enioying or but only delay the possession they are so many thornes of Griefe which pierce his soule For as the hope to obtaine the possession causeth Pleasure and Delight so the despaire to attaine vnto that we passionatly desire giues cruell afflictions and insupportable torments Moreouer the Loue wee beare to the preseruation of our beiâ—g doth oftentimes cause sorrow and 〈…〉 for that we apprehend the destruction euen as wee see all creatures afflict theÌ„selues for that which offends them and are very carefull to shelter their bodies from all outrage Wherefore wee may say that Griefe is no other thing but an apprehension and feeling of the destruction of our good which makes vs impatient Thirdly the soule helpes to afflict herselfe whether that melancholy workes this effect or that the continuall afflictions oppresse her in such sort as she doth nothing but sigh vnder the burthen of sorrow and like vnto a bad Pilot which abandons his ship to the waues and storme shee suffers her selfe to be so ouercome with Griefe as she augments her owne paine and increaseth her misery For we often see men who in the middest of their afflictions and discontents do nothing but sigh and powre forth teares and will not yeeld themselues capable of any kind of consolation But although wee shew our selues more sensible of the Griefe of the senses then that of the mind yet it is most certaine that the interior Griefes which afflict the soule are much greater then the exterior paines which torture the body For that the apprehension of the mind and imagination is much more powerfull and more noble then that of the senses and especially then that of feeling which hath the greatest share in corporeall paines For proofe whereof wee see great courages to auoyd inferior Griefe expose themselues voluntarily to the exterior paines of torments and punishments
in publique assemblies We are also ashamed to shew our defects before those whom we thinke wee haue offended and are not our friends For that we know they will not faile to publish our imperfections Finally wee blush when as any thing vnworthy of our condition befalls vs in the view of such whose fauour friendship wee seeke ambitiously apprehending that this misfortune will bee an obstacle to our pursuites and a subiect to make vs be reiected As in like manner we blush to see our selues surprized in some notable fault by such as had vs in good esteeme especially if they be our familiar friends or of our owne family which discouer the error into which we had neuer before fallen or had alwaies cunningly concealed it There are also diuerse other subiects which make an impression of Shame and for example at our first speech to any one whom we know not well we blush for that being ignorant what account hee makes of vs or how hee is affected to vs wee are in suspence betwixt hope feare and know not how hee will entertaine our discourse And in like manner we are surprized with Shame when as wee are to speake before a great multitude and a concourse of people For that in this great diuersity of minds and humors we thinke it impossible but there is some one who hath no great disposition to fauour vs. Moreouer when as we are to speake before a person of eminent quality of exquisite knowledge or of exact iudgement wee blush and are amazed by reason of the great respect wee haue of him which makes vs feare to fayle before him and this feare fills vs with Shame and makes vs blush Wee are also not only ashamed of our defects but euen of all the signes and tokens of our vices and bad inclinations As wee blush not only at vncleannesse but also at all the signes of wantonnesse especially we are ashamed at licentious words which offend chaste eares Wherefore Alceus hauing opened his mouth to speake to Sapho then staying himselfe and pretending for his excuse that Shame had hindred his speech she answered If you had not had some bad desire but had meant to speake that which was honest and not licentious Shame had not appeared in your eyes neither had it tyed your tongue but you would haue deliuered your thoughts freely By all that we haue sayd it followeth that men are not ashamed to do or say any thing whatsoeuer before such as they do not esteeme but contemne Whereby it followes that they neither respect nor feare the eyes of children nor beasts But those before whom wee are most ashamed to shew our selues in our misfortune are our enemies to whom wee know our miseries are a sweete and pleasing spectacle As Caesar seeing himselfe a prisoner in the hands of Pirats said That his enemy Crassus would be glad of the misfortune which had befallen him To cōclude mē are ashamed to see thēselues defamed publikely as to be led to execution in the midst of a multitude of people to bee witnesses of their ignominy And yet the Poet Antiphon being condemned to dye with many others by Denis the Tyrant when as hee saw his companions going to execution passing before a great multitude to hide their faces as being ashamed beeing come out of the City he said vnto them What my friends d ee you feare that some one of these Gallants will see you againe to morrow and reproach you with your misfortune But doubtlesse euery man hath not this resolution nor so great a courage in the last indignities of life CHAP. 2. Of the Effects of Shame AS there are certayne Plants whose roots are venemous and mortall to such as vse them but their leaues are indued with excellent qualities and proper for the preseruation of the health of man So there are Passions of the soule which on the one side serue man as a spurre to vertue and on the other side precipitate him to vice And this is particularly incident to Shame the which doth sometime induce men to decline from wickednesse and sometime shee diuerts them from commendable vertuous actions by the apprehension of an imaginary dishonour Timoleon conceiuing that all the world did hate him for that he had consented to the death of his brother who was a plague to his common Wealth wandred vp and down the fields twenty years together and could not resolue to embrace the defence of his Citizens generously Others beeing ashamed to abandon their Countrey in publike calamities haue carried themselues couragiously to vndertake things for the which they knew they shold bee vnworthily recompenced by the ingratitude of their Citizens But before wee come to the effects which Shame produceth in the soule let vs see what impressions shee makes in the body for it seemes shee stirres vp an effect farre different from the cause from whence it proceedes Shame say the Philosophers Is a kinde of feare which ariseth for that man doubts some blame and some censure of his actions As Feare then retires the blood and makes it descend about the heart how comes it that Shame should cause the blood to ascend vnto the countenance and make the face to blush Whereunto they answer that men may be threatned with two kinds of miseries whereof the one is not onely contrary to the inclination of their senses but also tends to the destruction of their nature and being as extreame dangers and perills of death Others are onely contrary to the desires of the senses but doe not threaten man with death or the decay of his being As for example the blame and dishonour which wee apprehend for something we haue done When man then propounds vnto himselfe the forme of these first kindes of obiects that is to say of those calamities which tend to the dissolution of his being Nature beeing amazed by the impressiō which she receiues from the senses striues to succour them and drawes the blood and heate vnto the heart which is as wee haue said the fountaine of life whereupon the countenance being destitute of blood man growes pale in these great terrors But when as he apprehends onely the calamities of the second kinde that is to say those which tend not to the destruction of his beeing but onely to the decrease of his glory Nature is not so powerfully mooued by the senses for that the ruine of her consistence is not directly in question but leaues the griefe in the senses whose amazement doth not send the heat and blood into the body but causeth it to mount into the face which becomes all red and sanguine Some beleeue that this blushing is as it were a veile which Nature extends before her to couer her shame as wee see commonly they that are ashamed carry their hands before their faces and eyes for that those parts are most afflicted with shame in regard they are the most noble And the impression is particularly made in the eies
the heauens makes his motion vppon the two Poles of the world which are as it were the two points where it beginnes and ends So it seemes that all the Passions of our soules depend vpon Pleasure and Paine which grow from the contentment or distaste which we receiue from the diuerse obiects which present themselues vnto vs in the course of this life If we loue it is for that wee finde a sweetnes in the subiect that doth rauish vs. And if we hate it is in regard that wee imagine the obiect which presents it selfe vnto our imagination is full of griefe contrary to our apprehension The pleasure wee take in the Idea of a good thing which we enioy not and yet promise to ourselues the possession in pursuing it constantly begets hope as contrariwise when we think it is not in our power to obtaine it the griefe wee haue afflicts vs and leades vs to despaire Desires in like manner are framed in vs by the imagination we haue of a benefit which may giue vs content and the distaste wee haue of things which we flie is for that we imagine they may cause our discontent and vexation So as in all the other Passions wee still finde Pleâ—sure and griefe intermixt in regard whereof wee may rightly tearme them the two springs and fountaines from whence deriue and flow all the other Passions Yet they haue their particular reasons and considerations which giue them their rancke and put them in the number of other Passions duly exactly considered Wherefore Pleasure or Delight is a Passion motion which is framed in our soules with a certaine sweetnes which filles our senses with contentment and ioy when as they receiue the impression by the enioying of a good which is pleasing vnto them Or else Pleasure is a Passion which proceedes from the sweetnesse which our senses receiue from the obiects which delight them Or to vse Aristotles definition Pleasure is a motion of the soule which putts it suddenly and sensibly in an estate fit for the nature of man Whereupon wee must first obserue that as things meerely naturall tend to their perfections by those meanes which nature hath prescribed so all creatures striue to attaine vnto those which are proper vnto them by the meanes which the same nature hath made subiect to their power But there is this difference betwixt inseÌ„sible creatures those which haue sense that the inseÌ„sible hauing attained to the height of their perfection feele no ioy So as it seemes the Sun is vnhappy in that respect that being indued with such a shining brightnesse and such perfect beauty yet it hath no feeling nor knowledge of his glory whereas creatures haue a feeling of their good when they haue gotten it So as this feeling filles their senses with ioy and causeth pleasure which makes their nature coÌ„tent let vs now see what conditioÌ„s are necessary to frame this delight to beget in vs the pleasure of things which touch our senses First of all the good must be vnited to our senses be it really in effect or in thought and imagination For wee must remember in all this Treaty of Humaine Passions that it imports not for to stir them vp that the obiect which incites the motions be really in the nature of things or simply in the imagination for that there are some men which suffer themselues to be more transported with the images which Fancy frames in their braines then by the true obiects of things which subsist really As we reade in Histories that a certaine Athenian called Thrasillus had a certaine foolish conceite that all the shipps with their loading which came into the Port of Pyrea were his But when as his friends had caused his braine to be purged and had brought him to his right senses he complained of them and blamed them for that they had depriued him of an infinite content Moreouer it is requisite in Pleasure that the obiect of good which makes an impression in our senses should be agreeable to our nature The which cannot be if it be not in some sort agreeable vnto their capacity Wherefore there must bee such an agreement and proportion betwixt the senses and obiect as there may bee betwixt them a certaine resemblance and affinity so as that which caused the Pleasure must neither bee too strong nor too weake to make his impression Wherefore a moderate light is more pleasing to our eyes then that which is more glistring And in like manner a sweete sound coÌ„tents the eare more then that which is loud And we take more delight in a speech which we vnderstand then when wee vnderstand not the words for that this intelligence wee haue of the words frames a kind of conformity betwixt them and vs whereby the speech doth insinuate sweetly into our eares and makes a more pleasing impression in our soule Thirdly it is requisite to breed delight in our senses that wee haue knowledge of the good which breeds the impression and that we find it is fit for vs that we enioy it either in effect or by imagination For that we cannot receiue any ioy of a thing vnknowne or which we find not that it is good for vs or are ignorant that it is in our power So a hidden friendship doth nothing touch vs and yet if we had any perfect knowledge we should be rauished with ioy and burne with desire to imbrace it Finally it is requisite to beget Pleasure in our soules that our Appetite from whence desires do arise should receiue an alteration or change by a sweet impression which the obiect being the cause makes in our senses For this sweetnesse is of the Essence of Pleasure which cannot subsist without her wherefore shee consists rather in the end of the motion then in all the rest of her progresse therefore Aristotle tearmes it not onely a motion but also a rest of the soule In the mean time there are two kinds of appetites in man that is to say the intellectuall which is the reasonable will and the sensitiue which is diuided into the Irascible and Concupiscible as we haue said the intellectuall reioyceth at good things which are conformable to reason whereof the vnderstanding is iudge And the Sensitiue takes delight in things which concerne the senses We also obserue this difference that those things which delight the senses cause a sensible alteration in the body As in ioy wee feele our heart open and dilate it selfe especially if this ioy proceede from an vnexpected thing which concernes vs much it may be so mooued and agitated as death may follow As it happened in those women of Carthage who hauing newes that their sonnes had beene slaine in battaile when as they saw them liuing before their eyes this ioy happening contrary to their hopes they dyed suddainely But the pleasures of reason cause no other thing then a simple motion of the will which reioyceth the minde without any alteration of the body
vnlesse it extend vnto the senses Wherefore some affirme that this kinde of ioy is found in the Essence of God and in the nature of Angels And they are accustomed to propound a question vpon this subiect which be the greatest pleasures and delight most whether those of reason or those of the senses But the answer is easie for that vndoubtedly the intellectuall and those of the minde if we consider them in themselues are more delightfull then those of the senses And this made Aristotle to say that the sweetest and most pleasing content wee can haue in this life is that which proceedes from the exercises and actions of wisedome which is spent in the contemplation of the first causes The reason why the pleasures of the minde haue an aduātage ouer those of the body is for that to cause pleasure or delight in vs there must concurre three things that is to say the obiect vnited to the power the power to the which it is vnited and the actuall vnion of the one with the other which presupposeth knowledge of this good As for example to beget the pleasures of our taste there must bee delicate meates a taste well disposed and moreouer the vnion of these two things must bee made by the naturall organs with his knowledge that must receiue the impression of this pleasure For if the most exquisite meates were put into the mouth of a man that slept hee should receiue no pleasure for that hee had no feeling nor knowledge And first of all the goods of the minde in the enioying whereof consist the intellectuall pleasures are more noble and more louely then all the goods of the senses and body whereof we haue a notable proofe in that wee see men yea most abandoned to vice depriue themselues of the sweetest pleasures of the body to purchase glory which is a good of the mind So they sayd of Caesar who in his great inclination to loue and women renounced all his pleasures to get the honor of a Triumph Moreouer the power of the will in which is made the impression of these kinde of Pleasures being intellectuall and much more excellent then the senses which are corporeall the actions which she produceth and which are followed by these Pleasures are also more noble then those which deriue from the senses And by consequence the vnion which is made of spirituall obiects with the will is farre more strict more worthy and more durable then that which happens betwixt the senses and the obiects which they pursue It is more strict for that the senses regard onely the superficies of things and doe not busie themselues but to consider the accidents which inuiron them as colours smelling noyse sweetnesse and the like whereas the vnderstanding pierceth into the Essence and substance of the obiects It is more worthy for that it is made without any alteration or corporeall change whereas the obiect pleasing to the senses cannot be vnited with them but it will cause some kinde of change which is full of imperfection It is more durable for that the obiects of the sēses are of perishable goods which soon faile whereas the obiects of the minde are of eternall felicity which continues for euer Yet it is true that the obiects of the senses make a more violent impression in our soules and that the pleasure which we receiue toucheth vs much more then that which the spirits gathers from the obiects which are pleasing vnto it The which happens first for that the goods of the body are borne with vs encrease with vs and are preserued with vs· So as handling them daily and hourely we haue a more exact knowledge then of the goods of the vnderstanding which are remoued from vs. We haue said that knowledge is necessary for the enioying of pleasures wherefore where this knowledge hath least power there the pleasures are least sensible This also happens for that we vse pleasures as remedies and cures against the crosses troubles and cares of this life which are sweetned and as it were charmed by their presence But most men being either indisposed or not capable to raise themselues vp to spiritual consolations seeke and tye themselues to pleasing obiects which present thēselues easily to their senses The which is fortified for that the sweetnesse of obiects which delight our senses are suddainely tasted and doe not much trouble vs to seeke them It is an infallible Maxime in Philosophy that the obiects by their presence make a more powerfull impression in our soules then when they are absent And those things which giue vs least paine are most sweete in their acquisition so as for all these considerations the Pleasures of the body seeme vnto vs greater then those of the minde We may say in a word that those of the senses are more sēsible but these more perfect more excellent In the mean time all the wise men of the world exhort vs to set a careful guard ouer the Pleasures of the senses which they call the poyson of the minde For the which wee must the more carefully prouide for that these Passions are accompanied with a certaine sweetenesse which flatters vs at her first approach and surprizeth our iudgement and charmes it in such sort as it helpes to deceiue it selfe So as in this subiect wee must imitate those wise old men of Troy who counselled Priam to send backe Hellen to the Grecians and not suffer himselfe to be any longer abused with the charms of her great beauty for that keeping her within their City was to entertaine the siege of a fatall and dangerous warre and to nourish a fire which would consume it to ashes The euent did shew that it was wisely fore-seene and pronounced as an Oracle for in the same manner wee should chase from vs the obiects of Pleasures lest they be the cause of our ruine To which purpose an Ancient said That nature had engrafted no such pernicious Desires as those of the Pleasures of the body for that these desires growing vnbridled doe so enflame the courages where they get possession as they leaue nothing vndone to content their Passion Whence spring treacheries and treasons which make men to sell their friends and countrey from thence proceedes ruines and defolation of Estates the conspiracies against Common weales As it appeared in that of Catilyne who practized the ruine of Rome from thence the murthers violences burnings and all the miseries of this life take their spring and beginning The reason is for that pleasures quench the Iudgement and smother all the seedes of vertue and wisedome in man the which they effect more powerfully when they are most violent as it appeares in those which are transported with Loue who are not maisters of themselues but suffer themselues to be wholy guided by their Passions wherefore a wiseman of the world was wont to say that he had rather fall into frenzy then suffer himselfe to bee surprized with Pleasures for that