contrary to all the Maâ—…ims of Sound Philosophy 34. Lastly If All the Ideas or Notions be Innatâ— and there can be no reason why some should be so and otheâ— Eighth Proof not since the Soul is equally capable of All as of Some only then since to be Actually in a Knowing Power is to Actuate or Inform that Power that is to render that Power Actually Knowing it would follow that the Souâ— in that case having in her all those Notions of which her Nature is capable that is All Notions whatever she would either know all things while she is here or else she would have while here Innumerable Ideas or Materials of Knowledge which never come to be Excited and so are perfectly Useless Which makes the Immediate Act of the First Being which Infus'd them Frustraneous and to no purpose For their own Principles must force them to confess those Ideas which shall never be Excited cannot in that case either serve for Reasoning Contemplation nor Outward Action and therefore the Imbuing the Mind with them here is Preposterous Suâ—…ous and to no end 35. 'T is equally Groundless and Unphilosoâ—…cal in many regards to affirm That the Soul cannot Elicit Ideas out of her self from many heads 〈…〉 the Soul has a Power to Eliâ—… or Produce such Ideas in her â—… upon Occasion of such an Imâ—…ssion made on the Senses For â—… the Reasons given above I mean those â—…hich have been produced § 28 29 30 32. â—… in a manner equally disprove such Ideas â—…se which are properly Innate Secondly 〈…〉 impossible to show by their Grounds any Natural Connexion between that Impression on the â—…ve and the Production of such or such an 〈…〉 nor as far as I can see do they so much 〈…〉 pretend to show how this Effect does ex naâ—…a rei spring from that Cause For 't is conâ—… that the Stroke on the Nerve and the Idea which starts up when it is made there are utterly Unlike one another By which lame account any kind of Impression provided it be Unlike may occasion the Production of any Idea whatever and therefore there would be no Reason why 〈…〉 particular Impression more than another made 〈…〉 the Body should concur any way no not so much as a sutable Occasion to the Production of any particular Idea at all Thirdly Hence they make this Impression on the Nerve to be only an Occasion that is a kind of Conditio sine quâ non and not any sort of Cause contrary to the whole Intention and End of all Philosophy which is to refund Effects into their Proper Causes Fourthly They put the Soul which is of an Indivisible nature to Act upon it self and to be the Sole Cause of such an Idea which is against divers Principles confining upon Self-evidence and easily reducible to it Such as are Nothing that is meerly iâ— Power to such an Effect can reduce st self to Act. Nothing Indetermin'd can produce a Determinate Effect Nothing can change it self An Indivisible Entity cannot work upon it self A Thing in Rest cannot move it self Or in a word the Whole Course of Causes consisting in this that One Thing which is in Act it self is to work upon Another which is in Power to receive that Act is by this Extravagant Doctrine made Needless Absurd and Incoherent 36. Corollary XII From what 's Deduc't above it follows that that Position of That the Position which makes the Soul and Body Two Things hinders the Right Explication of Christian Faith the Cartesians which makes the Soul and Body in Man to be Duae Res or Two Things does not seem to sute well with Christian Faith For since Cartesius does therefore make them Two Things because he finds them to be of Different Natures 't is Evident that he does not Distinguish between the Notion of the Thing which has the Nature in it and of the Nature which is in the Thing or is had by it Whence follows that whereever and whenever there are those two Distinct Natures there must also be two Distinct Things But the Second Person of the Trinity will ever retain the Humanity of Christ and the Humanity of Christ will ever consist of the Corporeal and Spiritual Natures call'd Soul and Body therefore there will ever be according to this Doctrine two distinct Things in the Humanity of Christ-Again since these Two Natures in Christ's Humanity which they call Two Things are Individually or Numerically such and an Individual Thing is the same as a Suppositum the Followers of this Doctrine must hold there are Two Suppositums in Christ according to his Humanity Wherefore since 't is a Fundamental of Christian Faith that there is also in Christ the Divine Suppositum they must be forced to put three Suppositums in Christ GOD and MAN which is strange Language in Christianity Nor will it avail them to alledge that the Divine Personality by Assuming Humane Nature sâ—pplies the Subsistence of both those Natures for this takes not away the Distinction of the Two Natures in the Humanity wherefore if whereever there are two Natures there must be Two Things and those in our case Individually such of force there will remain two Individual Things that is Two Supposita in Christ's Humane Nature and consequently Three in all Whence since Verum vero non contradicit the Christian Tenet of but One Suppositum in Christ being True the Cartesian Doctrine that the Soul and Body in Man are two Things because they are of such Different Natures must needs be False and our main Tenet that the Soul and Body in Man do make but One Thing is both Evident to Reason and Consonant to Faith and to the Creed of St. Athanasius 37. Corollary XIII Hence also it follows from this Thesis of the Cartesians that every Individual Man in This Tenet makes overy Man to be a Monstrous Chimera the World is a Perfect Chimera nay a more Monstrous one than a Hircoceruus a Centaur or any other we use to Instance in For since all Created Beings are either Pure Acts or Compounded of Power and Act that is Matter and Form by Ch. 1. § 33. and the Word Thing signifies What 's Capable of Existing and therefore Two Things must be Capable of Diverse Existences and if they exist actually must actually have Two Existences It follows that the Soul and Body even in this State they have here must have actually Two Diverse Existences Again since their Nature the one being Corporeal the other Incorporeal are far more Distant and more vastly Different than a Goat and a Stag or any other Natures amongst Bodies to clap two such Things thus actually distinct under the Notion of Thing and Existing thus Distinct into One Species call'd MAN makes all the Individuals under that Species to be Chimerical nay greater Chimera's than is a Compound made of any two Things in Nature which are of divers Corporeal Species and exist actually by distinct Existences as a
distinctly understood will be signally Useful to defeat almost all the Arguments drawn from Reason by the Deists and if well reflected on clears many Objectionâ— brought against the B. Trinity by the Sociâ—ians and other Anti-Trinitarians opposing the Christian Tenet of the Unity of the Divine Nature in Three Persons and to confute as far as it impugns that Tenet it self that Treatise Entituled A Letter to the Reverend the Clergy of both Universities concerning the Trinity and the Athanasian Creed Which tho' it seems to be the utmost Effort of those Parties and has a very plausible Appearance to those who either are not well skill'd in or do not well reflect on the Laws of Predication and the Use of Humane Language in parallel Cases yet it is easie to show that that piece of Wit and Fancy is utterly void of Art and good Sense and that the Christian Thesis it self if rightly represented is perfectly consonant to the Nature of the Subject the DEITY and to Right Reason and that there is no more show of Contradiction that that most Simple Being should verifie Sending and being Sent Generating and being Generated and such like tho' they be Opposites than it is that the same Infinite Being when GOD knows himself which themselves grant should notwithstanding it 's most perfect Simplicity verifie that he is the Knower and thing Known which are as much Relatively Opposite as are any of the Others Lastly it may be shown very evidently that all the while they oppose the Doctrine of the Trinity those witty Gentlemen do quite mistake the whole Question by confounding what the Deity is in it's self abstracting from any order to our Conceptions or rather as it is above our Conceptions according to which consideration we cannot think or speak of it at all with what GOD is as conceiv'd by us or what as He is the Object of our Understanding His Infinite Essence obliges us truly to conceive and affirm of Him All which may perhaps particularly and at large be shown hereafter 25. Corol. VI. The same Doctrine clears the Mystery of the Incarnation Which clears Objections against the B. Trinity and against the Mystery of the Incarnation also from the least semblance of Contradiction and shows how not only Possible but consonant to right Reason it is that the Humanity of our B. Saviour may be Assum'd by the Second Person of the B. Trinity and yet not be Assum'd by either of the other Persons As also how that Person may supply to it or be united to it immediately according to the Subsistence or Personality and yet not be thus United to it formally according to it's Nature or Essence And the same may be said of the same Doctrine in order to some other Revealed Mysteries of Christian Faith which I here forbear to mention 26. Corollary VI. Hence is clearly discern'd what is the Difference between Logical and Metaphysical ABSTRACTION The Difference between Logical and Metaphysical Abstraction and that Logical Abstraction is of the Generical or Specifical that is of more Common Notions from the Inferioâ—â— ones which is done by taking from these later that precise Consideration iu which they Agree leaving out those in which they Disagree that is by taking meerly what belongs to the Genus or Generical Notion and leaving out or Abstracting from the Differences Whereas Metaphysical Abstraction regards only this that the Notion Nature or Essence of the One is not the precise Notion Nature or Essence of the Other or that both the One and the Other are different Respects or Considerations of the Thing tho' they do both of them stand upon the same Level and neither of them be Higher or Lower in the way of Predication or in the Extent of their Notion than the other In which later Sense of the word Abstraction we use to say that our Soul works or knows things by Abstract or Inadequate Notions 27. From what is said above 't is manifest that there can be no Actual Parts in any Ens whatever whether we conceive That Excellent and Useful Maxim That There are no Actual Parts in any Compound whatever Defended and Explicated it under the Notion of Ens or of such an Ens call'd Body or as affected with such an Intrinsecal Mode or Accident v. g. Quantity or any of the rest For since to Distinguish cannot belong to the Power it being of it self or of it's own nature utterly Indistinct or Indetermiâ—â—te it follows that to Distinguish must properly and only belong to the Act. Wherefore in case those Parts were Distinct Actually they must have Distinct Acts and by consequence the Power or Subject must be made Distinct by having those Distinct Acts in it that is the Subjects must be More under that Notion Therefore Unum being the Property of Ens in what Sense soever the word Ens be taken as is shown § 22. there would in that case be no Unity nor consequently Entity under any Notion left in the World To explicate this more â—…y and show it particularly In case the First â—â—rt of Power call'd Ens and it's Act Existence â—â—d each of them it 's Proper Act which constitutes a Thing and so were Two Things nothing in the World that Exists would be One Thing â—or consequently Unum being the Property of Ens A Thing or Any Thing Also if the Second fort of Power Matter and it 's Act or Form that constitutes Body were Two Things there would be no One Thing of that Sort or no one Body and consequently there would be No Body in Nature And since as will be prov'd hereafter L. 2. § 16. the Complexion of Accidents is the Essential Form which constitutes Body were those Accidents Distinct Things from the Matter and the Matter from them or were they Distinct Things from one another and therefore each of them were Capable of Existing alone or properly Entia there would be no One or No Individual Body in the World but every such Thing would be a Multitude or Many and perhaps Innumerable Or were the Parts that compound Quantity or which is the same the Parts of Body as precisely having Quantity in them Actually Distinct as many Schoolmen hold then each of them as was lately prov'd must have a Distinct Act of that sort to make them Distinct Actually whence they would be in that case Diverse Quanta or Things having divers Quantities in them Wherefore it being Demonstrable that Quantitas est Divisibilis in semper Divisibilia there could be no Quantum or Thing of that Kind in the World but would contain many Lesser Quantums in it and therefore there could be no One or No Quantum and consequently No Thing that had Quantity in it found in Nature Add that those pretended Distinct Actual Parts must be distinguisht by § 17. from others by some Act and yet most of them could have no Act iâ— them to Distinguish them from their Comparts For the Second Power
〈…〉 labour for our own True Good pursue that bestâ—…isht Food which connaturally nourishes our Soul in it's way and comply with the Best Intentions and End of our Creation CHAP. IV. Of the Essence of MAN 1. MAN is One Thing made up or Compounded of a Corporeal and a Spiritual Part which we call BODY and SOUL For were the Body and Soul iâ— MAN is One Thing made up of Soul and Body Man Two Distinct Things those Two Things they being of such Different Natures could not possibly have any Coalition nor any kind of Union 〈…〉 as to make up One Compound more than can 〈…〉 Angel and a Brute Nor could they be in 〈…〉 Manner or according to any Mode of which wâ— have a Notion cemented together Not according to that Mode or Accident call'd QUANTITY the Unity of which kind of Parts is Continuity because the Spiritual Part the Soul is not Quantitative nor can it be thus Continu'd or Joyn'd to the Body Nor consequently according to the Notion of Quality For first Quality supposes tâ—… Thing which it Qualifies already constituted and only superadds some Perfection or Imperfectiâ—… to it's Nature Secondly Because all the Qualities of One of those Parts are Corporeal ones aâ—… all the Qualities of the Other Part are Spiritual that is they are Quantitatiâ—s and Not-Quantitativâ— which can no more unite than a Body and a Spâ—… could Nor according to Relation or to speâ—… more properly according to the Things themselves as they are consider'd to be Relata or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For this Notion is of the Thing it self as it gives us the Ground or Reason of our Relating or Comparing it to Another in such a Respect which presupposes the Things and is so far from giving us a Ground of conceiving them to be One that it obliges us to conceive them as some way or other Two and moreover Relatively Opposite to one another and Opposition cannot be the Formal Reason of Unity And if we take the word Relation not Fundamentally but Formally for the very Act of Referring 't is clearly a Spiritual Mode peculiarly belonging to One part of Man the Soul and therefore for the Reason lately given it cannot unite both those Parts together Nor can they be United according to any of the Four last Predicaments for These as is shown in my METHOD can only belong to Bodies Nor lastly can those Parts were they Two Things be United according to Action and Passion in which the Cartesians â—â—ce this Union for these besides their being Extrinsecal Considerations do most evidently presuppose the Whole Thing or Suppositum only which Acts oâ— Suffers constituted and therefore cannot be the Formal Cause or Reason of constituting that Whole or Compounding those Parts together but are the Exercise of that Essence and 〈…〉 Existence already Constituted such It is left â—â—en that those Two Parts can only be United 〈…〉 make One Compound according to the First Predicament or according to the Notion of Ens Thing or Substance But to be United or which â—…the same made One precisely under the Notion or Respect of Thing is out of the force of the very Words to be One Thing Therefore this Compound of SOUL and BODY call'd MAN is truly and necessarily One Thing 2. Therefore the Soul and Body in Man are only Potential Parts of that Compound Therefore the Soul and Body are here only Potential Parts and neither of them while in the Compound is Actual For it has been already Demonstrated Ch. 1. § 27. that there can be no Actual Parts in any Compound whatever Moreover were they Actual while in the Compound each of them would have it's oâ—â— Act there and consequently it 's own Essence and this not only Distinctly from the Other but Independently of it since every Act in the Line of Substance as both these Parts are determines the Substance to be This fits it for Existence and makes it capable to Subsist alone wherefore each of those Parts when separated would retain it's Act and Essence and exist or actually remain such as it was whereas 't is manifest that a Human Body does not exist or remain so much as a Sensitive or Vegetative Thing but becomes a meeâ— Dead Carkass 3. Therefore neither Part while in the Compound can Act or Operate Alâ—… Therefore Neither Part can Operate Alone For 't is Demonstrable that Whâ—… ever Acts must Be Actually Bâ—… in our case neither Part Is actuaâ—… but are both of them only Potential by § 2. Wheâ—… fore 't is manifest that Neither Part can work Alâ—… but concomitantly with the other that is in all 〈…〉 Operations of Man as he is Man 't is the Wâ—… Compound or that Ens Thing Substantia Priâ—… or Suppâ—sâ—â—um which only can Act or Operâ—… sâ—nce It only Is actually 4. Corollary I. Hence is seen on what Evident Ground that most Useful and Solid Maxim Actiones Which Groundâ— that Excellent Maxim Actiones Passiones sunt Suppositorum Passiones sunt Suppositorum which all seem to admit but Few I fear duly reflect on is built viz. on those most Evident Truths Nothing can Act but what is it self in Act or Is Actually or Nothing can Act in such a manner unless it Bee such and No Parts in any Compound singly consider'd Are Actually With which notwithstanding it well consists that The Whole may act more chiefly and Peculiarly according to This Part than to That as we also experience not only in Man but in every Compound whatever 5. Corollary II. How Useful this Doctrine is to explicate the Incarnation or the Subsistence of Two Natures Hence the Christian Tenet of the Incarnation is Agreeable to Right Reason in One Divine Person and the Different Operations of Christ our Saviour as he is GOD and MAN will easily appear to Reflecters and will more fully be seen when we shall have occasion to show the Conformity which that Fundamental Article of Christian Faith has to the Principles of True Philosophy 6. Tho' the Peculiar and Immediate Form or Act of that Part call'd The Seat of Knowledge be that Spiritual Of the Form or Act of Man as he is Man Part we call The Soul yet the Act or Form of Man as he is Man is the said Spiritual Part together with that Complexion of Accidents in his Body which contribute to fit him for his Primary Operation For since Man is One Thing which has in it both a Corporeal and a Spiritual Nature § 1. and every Thing acts as it is his Operation peculiar to him as he is Man must also be Corporeo-Spiritual and consequently his Total Form which constitutes him such an Individual Acter must likewise partake of both those Natures 7. Corollary III. Hence in every Operation of Man as he is Man the Operations peculiar to the Soul Both â—arts concurr to every Operation of Man as he is Man cannot be produced without the Immediate
Nature or makes it a Potential Part or an Informing Form but it supposes the Humane Nature constituted and only supplies it's Subsistence or Personality 't is evident then that this neither alters nor depresses the Divine Nature from it's Higheâ—â— Dignity of being still in it self a Pure Actuality but is rather Agreeable to that Attribute since it only exalts Humane Nature by thus Assuming it or Uniting it to a Divine Person Hypostatically that is according to the Notion of Suppositum to which of it's self it could not otherwise aspire To do which also the Wisest and Best Ends of the Incarnation being well reflected on is as Divines show no way Derogatory but in every respect Agreeable to the Divine Attributes And all the Objections that the Antient Greeks and Modern Adversaries can bring to show â—â— Foolish and Misbecoming GOD seem grounded on this that GOD is Infinitely GREAT which makes the greatest Esclat in their Fancy without considering at the same time that he is Equally that is Infinitely GOOD Which resembles those men'â— way of Arguing who are only sollicitous of magnifying GOD's Power and his Will without considering his Wisdom which according to our manner of Conceiving determines the exercise of those other Attributes 31. Notwithstanding this Hypostatick Union of those two Natures in Yet those Natures and their Properties will remain Unmingled and not Confounded as some Eutychians imagin'd Christ each Nature retains it's own Distinction Essence Properties and Attributes For â—â—â—ce this Union of these two â—â—tures in one Suppositum or Person supposes those Natures Distinctly and Essentially constituted and the giving them meerly to Subsist superâ—â—â—es to the Nature already constituted and therefore can be no part of it's Essential Constitutive consequently it neither alters the Divine Nature noâ— affects the Humane Nature at all by making 〈…〉 Subsist such as it is which is a Notion evidently Extraneòus to the Notion of the Nature and â—ifferent from it Wherefore each of those Natures remains in it's own precise Essential bounds and not Mingled or Confounded with the other as some Eutychians fondly imagin'd 32. Yet all the Actions and Passions of this Subsistent Thing to which soever of those Natures they properly Yet all the Actions and Passions must be attributed to the Suppositum tho' according to such in Nature contrary to what Nestorius fancy'd â—â—long are justly attributed to Christ GOD and Man For â—ince the Suppositum of those two Natures are but One and that Suppositum is Christ's and all Actions and Passions belong to the Suppositum and are attributed to it 't is consequent that the Actions of this diverse-natur'd Suppositum do belong to Christ who has those Distinct Natures in Him Moreover since every thing doâ—â— connaturally Act and Suffer as it is and Christ he having Two Natures or Essences in One Suppositum is truly GOD and Man it follows against Nestorius that all the Actions of Christ are Divine-Human or Theandrical With which yet well consists that some Actions and Sufferings may belong to his Suppositum according to or by reason of the one Nature and not by reason of the other 33. Hence also there can be no show of Contradiction in saying the Divine Nature is Three according to the Hence lastly there is no shew of Contradiction that GOD should be Three according the Notion of Person and yet but One according to the Respect of his Essence or Nature Notion of Subsistence and yet but one according to the Notion of Essence For since as has been shown here § 17. the Respect or Notion of Subsistence is quite different from the Respect of Essence and there can be no Contradiction where Opposites are Affirm'd and Deny'd of the same according to a Different Respect It follows that neither can there be any show of Contradiction in saying the Divine Nature is Three according to the precise Notion or Respect of Subsistence and yet not-Three but One only in respect of the Notion of Essence 34. Advertisement For the clearer understanding some parts of these late Discourses and to render some A large Explication of some Grounds very Useful to take oâ—f all Shadow of Contradiction from divers Chief Mysteries of Christian Faith and to show how Consonant they are to the most Exact Rules of Right Reason Terms we have us'd more distinctly intelligible I take leave to re-min'd my Reader here of what I have frequently inculcated in my former Books viz. first That all our Knowledge which is Solid is of the Thing and taken from the Thing Secondly That we cannot know the Thing Clearly and Distinctly any other way than by having several Partial or Inadequate Conceptions of it which therefore are Knowledges of the Thing in part only Thirdly That hence when ever we speak of Act Power Essence Ens Form Matter Existence Subsistence Quantity Quality or of any other Intrinsecal Mode we neither can nor ought mean any other by those words but the Thing according as it is the Object of those several Abstracted Notions or Considerations we make of it and which are Verify'd of It and consequently since all Verification is made by the Copula Est which signifies Identity which are truly It. Fourthly Hence when we speak of Metaphysical Parts of the Thing according to the meer Notion of Thing we mean that they are Parts of the Thing Metaphysically consider'd or as it is the Object that verifies or has in it what answers to those Conceptions or Notions which do properly belong to ENS or BEâ—â—G because the Supreme Science Metaphysicks does only or chiefly regard or concern her self with such Notions as belong to Being â—â— it's Proper Object In the same manner as the Notions of Length Breadth and Thickness which belong to Quantity as it abstracts from Natural Motion are the Parts or Partial Conceptions of Bodies or of that Thing call'd Body consider'd Mathematically and those Notions which regard Quantity as affecting tâ—â— Thing in order to Natural Action or Passion â—â—â— Rarity Density Divisibility c. are Parts â—â— Partial Conceptions of Body Physically consider'd As likewise are Matter and Form for the same reason if taken under the same consideration of Grounding Natural Action or Passion For as they meerly relate to Being or as they are consider'd precisely as Parts or Partial Conceptions of Ens they belong to Metaphysicks and are there call'd Power and Act. Fifthly Hence the Ens or Thiâ—â— properly so call'd that is the Individuum â—â— call'd by us a Whole because all those Partial Conceptions objectively consider'd are Contain'd and Involv'd in the Individuum anâ— are Verify'd of it as is shown above which being only Inadequate in respect to the Whole Thing they are hence said to be only Parts of It and It a whole in respect of them Sixthly Tho' theâ— be only Different Conceptions of the same Thing yet thus Aparted and Abstracted by our Understanding we can discourse of each of them
singly as if they were so many Distinct Essences or â—â—stinct Things tho' in re they be but One Thing variously conceiv'd And thence we can consider what or how great a Complexion of Aâ—â—dents is requisite to constitute the Essences of â—â—â— of those Superiour or Inadequate Notions anâ— what is requir'd to constitute Another as is seâ—â— Ch. 2 3 4. Hence also we can truly say that One of them is not Another viz. Formally or Distinctly taken tho' Materially or as in â—â— they are but One and the Same Thing in the same manner as we can say The Hand is not the Foot which are Integral parts of a Man and not â—â—stinct Things from the Man materially but â—…fy'd with him in re Seventhly Hence â—… we can say with Truth that the Thing â—â—y be Chang'd according to One of these Conâ—…tions or Respects and not-Chang'd according â—â— another That the Determination to be This â—…de immediately by Second Causes the â—istence not but given by GOD That a Thing â—â—â—ording to the precise Notion of Essence or â—â—ture may be Two and yet not-Two but One â—â—â—ording to the Notion of Suppositum or may â—â— Three as to it's Suppofitality or Personality and â—â— but One according to it's Essence or Nature â—â— which sayings are properly Verify'd because â—â—â—â—â—â—â—mation and Negation are only made in â—â— Mind where One of those Notions is not the 〈◊〉 or which is the same where the Thing â—â— â—â—â—ceiv'd THUS is not the Thing as conceiv'd â—â—HERWISE And the same is of the Things 〈◊〉 United or Assum'd according to the Noâ—â—â—â— of Person and yet not-United according to â—â—â— Notion of Essence Lastly 't is to be noted â—â—â— as Conception Apprehension Proposition Disâ—â—â—â— c. are Metaphorical Expressions tranâ—… from Corporeal to Spiritual Natures by 〈…〉 of some Analogy Proportion or Resemâ—… to those other so likewise are those â—…ds Substratum Suppositum Subjectum Inheâ—… Accident and such like And the Literal meaning of those words is this that As those things which cannot subsist or stand by themselves or by virtue of any Firmness of their own â—â— re or in Nature must and use to be underâ—â—â—â— and sustain'd by Another which is more Substantial as we use to say or more strong than they so neither in our Mind can the Notion of Mode Manner or Accident stand alone unless we conceive Some Thing of which it is a Mode or speaks the Manner HOW it is or Some Thing to which it advenes or is superadded whereas on the other side we have the Notion of Being or Thing without apprehending such a Transcendental Relation to the Mode or Manner how it is Whence the Notion of Thing has a kind of Priority in our Minds to the Accidents or Modes under the consideration of Standing in our Intellect without them and the Notions of the Modes or Accidents has a kind of posteriorily in our Mind and a Dependence on them for their Being these because the former has Being one way or other in it's Notion the others as Length Whiteness Roundness â— have in their Notion no express signification of Being at all Whence I cannot but think Mr. Locke should not have apply'd his Ingenioâ—â— Raillery of Supporting and Underpropping and of an Elephant supporting the Earth and a Tortoise the Elephant to those Authors who were forced to use those words in case they did not take those Expressions in that Gross and too-Literal Sense And I conceive he might with equal Justice have apply'd them against Grammarians who tell us that a Noun Substantive can stand by it's self aâ—â— a Noun Adjective cannot without it's Elephant and Tortoise the Substantive to support it MEDITATION WE have seen formerly in what consisted our Essence as we are of that Species call'd Mankind This was a fair Step towards the Knowing our Individual How impossible it is to know perfectly all that belongs to our Individuality Self which we have here to â—â—r power attempted But alas How lamely and imperfectly have â—e reacht it We experienc'd no great difficulty to find our way amongst so many Common Kinds of Things tho' in a manner Strangers to us but we have lost our selves at home A Few Abstracted Modes twisted together â—…y by Nature did oft times satisfie our Enquiry â—â—ile we discours'd of the former but when we came to consider that numerous Complexion of them only which can serve to constitute our Individual Body â—â—d to distinguish our single Self from every other Particular Thing whether of our own or of any other Kind we are at an utter loss and seem bewilder'd â—â—â— pathless Wood Such a Concourse of various Acâ—â—ents and as it were Thrums-ends of Being are requisite to weave our Particular Texture so to make up This Thing which we are that to endeavour to comprehend them all seems the same as to go about to fathom at once a great part of Nature and in stead of enlightning us stuns our Understanding Our Primigenial Composition in the last minute of our Embryo-state which was the first Instant of our being This Man is so admirably Deliâ—ate and the Stamina of it so finely spun by the most wise Contrivance of the Author of Nature that we may break our Eye-balls by bending our Sight â—re we can gain a Glimpse of it Nor can the help of Microscopes which as Modern Virtuoso's tell us can show tho Outward Shape of the Tree in it's Seed discover to us those imperceptible Particles their Natures Mixture Order Proportion Situation c. that make up the Individual Composition of our Body which gave the Particular Degree of Excellency and Nobleness to our Soul Dull Artificers must see all the parts of the Matter they are to work upon that so they may measure proportion and place them but the Architect of the World needs no reflected Rays of his own Sun to discern them but sees them by the Creative Light of his own Wisdom or rather by seeing them makes them tho' they be meer Darkness to us Non est occultatum os meum a te quod fecisti in occulto substantia mea in inferioribus terrae Imperfectum meum viderunt oculi tui and every part of all thy Creature in libro duo scribuntur Ps. 138. But alas Who can read so abstruse a Manuscript much less the Original from which 't is Copy'd Let us then vail our over-weoning Pride bewail our Ignorance and lament with the Eagle-sighted Evangelist that No Man is found worthy or able to open the folded and Sealed Book even of Created Nature nor read the Contents of it wrapt up in the shady leaves of an incomprehensible Providence But how large a Field of Contemplation is open'd to us when we come to consider the Infinite number of Causes which By what wonderful and Untraceable Ways GOD's Providence has brought about our Individuation were order'd to make this Complexion of Accidents that constituted This Body of ours and Distinguisht
very Notion of Succession is in the Soul Permanently or Unsuccessively which is directly contrary to it's Nature as it passes in the Material World 13. Demonstration XI The same may be said of Discrete Quantity or Number There is nothing in Nature but Dem. XI Because the Soul can tye together as many Singulars as she pleases in the Notion of One Number of which the Fancy has no Material Resemblance Individuals each of which is properly an Ens and consequently Unum and therefore if we put a Multitude the Unity they had in Nature is lost since One cannot be Many nor Many One and this is all the Unity we find among Individual Beings as they are in Matter or out of the Soul Now when the Soul takes Many or More of these together she bundles up even those Incommunicable Actual and perfectly Distinct Individuums at her pleasure and tho' they were never so many she pâ—â—ches upon what Quantity of them she lists to take notice of and gives even their Singularitâ—â—s a new sort of Unity in her Notion which Nature never gave them and calls this Notion which comprizes them all Three Ten or a Hundrâ—â— or what she pleasâ—s Which since it depends on her Choice how many she will take of them 't is Evident that this Union was not given them by the Being which they had in Material Nature Or out of the Soul where they were altogether Distinct and one of them has nothing to say to the other And let it be noted that this Union is not made as Universal Notions are by Abstraction or our leaving out the Particular Considerations belonging to the Species or Inferiour Notion and only taking in one Common Consideration found in them all there being a fair Ground in Nature to consider them on that fashion But this Colligation of many into One Number is a kind of Union of those whole Individuums in despite of the multitude of their Singularities and a Reducing those Things which are ultimately Determin'd Distinct and stand aloof from one another as they are in Material Nature to a Close Unity compacted so Indivisibly and Indissolubly that the least part added or detracted that Unity is specifically alter'd and presently becomes another kind of Number Lastly which makes this Point yet more Evident We can have a Material Resemblance in our Fancy of Four Five or some small number of Natural Things and have in our Heads a kind of Picture of them as it were standing all on a Row But 't is impossible for us to have such a Lively and exactly-Just Picture of a Hundred a Thousand a Million c. so as to see clearly there is not one more or less and yet we experience that we can have most Clear Distinct and Exact Notions of These as well as we can have of Two or Three Nor do we look upon those Great Numbers by the Eye of our Understanding as a Confused Heap or Multitude as it happens when we see a great Croud of Men standing together but with a clear and perfect Discernment that they are just so many not one more or less and this as easily as we can know Four or Five Since then in the way of Matter nothing can resemble a Thousand but a Thousand for the Resembler must be some sort of Number otherwise it is not at all Like it and neither One more nor less that it is must it self be a Thousand it follows that the Distinct and Exact Notions we have of very great Numbers is Immaterial and consequently the Soul their Subject is such also 14. Demonstration XII Come we now to these Notions which belong to the Head of Quality which because Dem. XII Because Sensible Qualities tho' Innumerable and contrary to one another are in the Soul without Disordering her in the least they are Innumerable we will instance in Two of them Sensible Qualities and Figure As for the First of these If when we have the Notion of a Sensible Quality v. g. Dry or Moist the Thing or Body thus affected be in our Mind and consequently the Nature of those Qualities we have gain'd our Point and prov'd it is in us Immaterially it being evidently impossible a thing should have two Material Manners of Existing Nor can these Qualities be there by some Material Representation or Resemblance For what can resemble Dryness or Moistness Whatever it be it must be some other Sensible Quality for otherwise it would be utterly Unlike it and the same would happen were it a Sensible Quality belonging to some other Sense than that of the Touch v. g. were it Whiteness or Fragrancy which belong to the Sight and Smell 'T is Evident then that nothing but Dryness it self can represent Dryness materially Wherefore it must either be said that Dryness it self is in the Soul Immaterially or not at all and yet that we have iâ— in us we are satisfi'd in regard we have it in our Notion and can discourse of Dryness it self Again if Dryness Moistness and all other Sensible Qualities be in the Soul materially when she knows them then as they did in Material Nature affect their other Material Subject according to the peculiar Genius of each by Ch. 6. § 6. so they must affect the Soul too after the same Manner and make her materially Dry and Moist And moreover since no Notions are ever blotted out of the Soul she would also be at once Moist and Dry Hot and Cold White Black Blue Green and of all Colours Rough and Smooth Fragrant and Stinking Diaphanous and Opacous and imbâ—'d with a thousand other Contrary Qualities which finee they could not be all of them Agreeable to any Material Nature each of them having a peculiar Constitution of it's own they must needs Disorder Distemper and Corrupt it the Effects of which the Man must necessarily experience if the most Frincipal Part of him the Soul were made of Matter and they would render the Compound affected with many Diseases whereas yet none ever found himself in the least Distemper'd Griev'd or Pain'd by having in his Mind the Notions of all these Opposite Qualities and ill-agreeing Dispositions 15. Demonstration XIII This is farther enforced because were the Soul which is confest to be our Knowing Dem. XIII Because those Sensible Qualities do not fight and expel one another as they must were their Subject made of Matter Power Material all these Opposite Qualities when they are in that Power or Known must be perpetually Fighting Contrasting and Expelling one another out of their Subject at least they would Refract one another's Nature and make it otherwise than it was to some Degree as they do in Material Things or Bodies Whereas we experience that they amiâ—ably cohabit in the Soul and are so far from â—â—pelling one another out of the Knowing Power that they draw their Contraries into it and each â—â—tters one another as an Object and makes it more distinctly Knowable according to that â—â—â—axim
of Being amount but to one still-Present Now. Nor can this seem Incredible to any Christian since we all hold that Spiritual Natures are Capable of seeing GOD's Essence as in it self which as is Undeniable infinitely surmounts all the whole Machine of this Material World We have seen that all Physical Qualities do enjoy when in thee another manner of Being and affect Thee their Subject after a quite different way from what they had when they were in Material Nature The most Opposite ones which are perpetually contrasting and restlessly striving to expell one another do by thy Soveraign Power remain at peace in thy Steady Essence which is of 〈…〉 High a Dignity to be mov'd or disturb'd by their Petty Quarrels We have seen that thy Abstracting Power can â—…de these Lower Beings more Subtilly than can the Operation of Fire or any Chymistry of Nature assisted by Art and can take in pieces their very Essences and the Essences of their several Modes by cutting them into their Metaphysical Parts which are too delicate for our Bodily Sight tho' assisted with the best Microscopes to discern or make Observations how they differ Each of which Parts too tho' naturally Impartible have a Distinct Being given by Thee and can be wrought upon by thy Understanding as if they were so many Wholes and this with that most perfect Distinction that they do not in the least interfere in thee tho' they â—â—â— All of them confusedly blended as they stand in Rude and Unpolisht Matter We have seen how by the cement of Existence exprest by the short Monosyllable is thou dost iâ— thy Comparing Power the Laboratory where Truths are fram'd re-connect those thus-divided Parts into Propositions and this with an Union so Close that 't is absolutely Indissoluble by the utmost Force of all the Causes in Nature Nay that thy Spiritual Essence can in some manner Create by giving a kind of Being in Thee to Not-Beings or Nothings In a word we have seen that all the whole Material World and every Part of it that ever came to thy Knowledge do enjoy a New sort of Being in Thee and such a one as is contradictorily Opposite to the Being they had in their Material State All these high Prerogatives dilating thy Essence and Duration to a kind of Infinity above this Narrow World we The most Important Use we ought to make of this Doctrin That our Soul is Immortal have found clearly to be no more but thy Just Due however Unreflecting Atheists whose groveling Souls immerst in Matter cannot or will not raise themselves above Fancy do use their misemploy'd Foolish Wit as the World calls it to devest themselves of their own Dignity and like so many worst Feloes de se by maintaining their Soul is Mortal do give themselves to be Guilty of Eternal Death or which is worse than Death of Annihilation by granting their Souls incapable of Surviving But let us to whom the Providence of our Good Makeâ— has indulg'd these Clear Informations make oâ—â— Right Use of them Since these are Great Truths let Truth have it's Due Effects 'T is so Gross at Errour that it is below Confute to imagine that any Truth is an Idle and Fruitless Speculatiâ—â— The Knowledge of Truth in Particular things does of it's own Nature tend to direct our Outward Actions and Universal Truths such as these are do naturally conduce to enlarge our Soul raise â—â— to High Contemplation and to breed in us Conformable Affections Since then we have the best â—…rance Clear Demonstration can give us that this Material World is below our Essence 't is most fit we should esteem it to be also below our most Serious Thoughts and our Best Affections Let us â—â—ancipate our selves then from the Slavish Adoration with which Worldlings devote themselves to that Dull and Senseless Idol And seeing Evident Reason has perfectly convinced us there is no shadow of Likelihood that our Soul is Mortal let us bend all â—â—â— carefullest Endeavours to provide she may be Happy in her Eternal State when she comes to be â—â—â—â—â—dg'd from her terrene habitation and has got clear of her Body and this World nay is got above it which is the only True Wisdom To the Consideration of which State of hers we advance in our next Discourse Transnatural Philosophy OR METAPHYSICKS BOOK II. Of PURE ACTS VIZ. Of the SOUL SEPARATED and ANGELS CHAP. I. Of the State of the Soul Separated from the Body and what Dispositions in her when the Man Dies will make her Eternally Happy or Miserable 1. THE Soul does at her Separation The Soul at her Separation receives some Change according to her Manner of Existing and Suppositality receive from GOD as he is the Author of Nature some Change according to her Existence and her Subsistence or Suppositality For since in her former State of Union with her Body she was the Form of that Body and therefore Form and Matter being the Parts of every Compound Ens only a Part of Man and a Part of an Ens is not an Ens or Individuum nor consequently capable of Existing much less of Subsisting which as is shown above B. 1. Chap. 5. § 17. superadds some Perfection to the Notion of Existence It follows that seeing the same Soul when separated from the Body she being by Book 1. Chap. 7. Immortal does Exist and also Subsist in regard she Sustains her own Nature and as will be prov'd shortly her Modes too she must be made apt to Exist and Subsist which she was not while in her former State that is she must be Chang'd according to those Considerations or Respects and made an Existent and Subsistent Thing and consequently a Kind of Suppositum And that it belongs to GOD as he is the First Cause to give the Soul this highest Perfection of Being is hence demonstrated For it belongs to an Infinite Actuality or an Infinite Goodness to give to his Creatures all the Goodness and Natural Perfections they are capable to receive especially such as the very Nature he has given them makes them require Now 't is evident that the Nature of the Soul she being Immortal is capable of and requires still to Exist and also to Subsist and be a Suppositum because she had while in the Body Power to have in her as in their Subject that is to Sustain or be the Suppositum of innumerable Accidents Notions or Knowledges which they being Spiritual or Indivisible could not be received in a Divisible Subject the Corporeal part of Man and therefore could only be peculiarly in Her Whence it follows that since 〈◊〉 Ordain'd the Dissolution of the Man or the 〈◊〉 Separation from the Body and had also mâ—de the Soul Immortal it became His Goodness to give her when separated Existence which her Immortal Nature requir'd and also the Power of Subsisting and of being the Subject or Suppositum of those Accidents â— How this is done we may learn by this