Epicurism because the assert the Providence of God and a Future State of Rewards and Punishments Only I would heartily and humbly propound to their consideration whether they being happily brought up in the belief and practise of the Christian Religion and their now falling back from it whether I say this may not be a step naturally leading to that worst sort of Deism little better than Atheisme For what better or stronger reasons will they have for retaining the Natural Religion than they had or might have had for Christianity It is to be fear'd that the Purity of the Precepts and the severity of the Christian Doctrine was the great offence they took at the Christian Religion and may they not after such a breach as it were made upon their Consciences be tempted to renounce even Natural Religion it self for the same reasons Nemo repentè fit pessimus Men â—ommonly by degrees arrive at the height of â—ickedness Mr. Blount in his Letter Pa. 87. â—f the Oracles of Reason Tho' Deisme be â— good manureing of a Mans Conscience yet â—ertainly if sow'd with Christianity it will â—roduce the most profitable crop But 't is reâ—orted that before his Death he fell from that more modest and ingenious temper of mind which he here seem'd to express Vriel Acosta in his Life time was very wavering in his Religion and at last turn'd Deist and shot himself The same Fate attended that unfortunatâ— Gentleman both in his Life and Death I shall make no personal reflections only lay down this great truth worthy to be consider'd by the Immortal Deist as he is call'd Pa. 95 That Christianity lays the best and surest foundation of living and dying well I shall here because of the affinity of the subject to this in hand briefly examine some particulars in the Translators preface to Hierocles upon the Golden Verses of the Pythagoreans Sheet a 4. The proposition he there advanecs is this That it is possible by a due advertency to the light of nature sufficiently to discern betwixt good and evill This is very true unless perhaps there lyes some ambiguity in the word sufficiently that the light of Nature doth or may inform us in the greater stroaks and instances of our duty is certainly true but whether it descends to all the particulars thereof may be justly question'd but then in the proof of this proposition I think he goes further the the nature of the thing reqnired the Heathens might be able by the light of Nature to distinguish betwixt good and evill tho' their Writings did not fully come up to the height of Christianity I do not asserts he says that the Law of Nature was Engraven upon the hearts of Men in as faire Characters as upon the two Tables of Stone for then there would have been little or no use of Revelation Here seems to be some little obscurity both in the proposition he layes down and in the inference he makes from it I shall briefly examine both 1 st It seemes as reasonable to believe that the Law of Nature was Engraven At first in as fair Characters upon the minds of Men as it was afterwaâ—ds upon the two Tables of Stone I do not mean in any gross sense that is Natural Duties might be as well known to Adam in Paradice by the light of Nature as they were afterwards to the Iews by the Promulgation of the Law if the Law of Nature in process of time was so defac'd that it could not be so easily Read this was owing to the vicious principles and practises to the false opinions and wicked Lives of Men afterwards 2 ly As to the inference For then there would have been little or no use of Revelation This may refer either to the Revelation of the Law or of the Gospell to that of Moses or that of Christ. If it refer to that of Moses yet the Revelation of the Law by him might be of great use by seting out as it were a Second Edition of it upon Tables of Stone when it was so miserably defaced before upon the minds of Men. If it refer to the Gospell that also might be of very great use notwithstanding all the clearest Revelations that were made either by the Law of Nature or by the Law of Moses because the Revelation of the Gospell contains in it something that was never designed to be made known at least so fully by either And he will not I suppose say that the method of salvation now revealed in the Gospel is contain'd in the Law of Nature tho' it had been writ in as fair Charâ—cters as that of the two Tables of Stone nor can he say that the Law of Nature fully and clearly Imprinted upon the minds of Men would render any further Revelation particularly that of the Gospel useless But yet he says that in the Writings of the Heathens is contain'd the whole Moral Law and that uot only in the integral parts but in its utmost intention nor is there one Precept of Christianity so exalted and Heroical but may be paralell'd in an Heathen No Man can deny this he says who has read the Morals of Plutarch Seneca Epictetus Cicero to these he also adds Juvenal and Persius I am not in the least willing to lessen the great excellencys that some of the Heathens have attain'd to but yet I kâ—ow no reason why they should be equall'd with the Christians As for those Moralists and Poets he mentions 't is observable that all of 'em except Cicero liv'd after the time of our Saviour and the promulgation of the Gospel and it is certain that the Christian Religion had very much improv'd the Morals of the Heathen world at that time and that they owe a great deal of that light which appears in their writings to the Sun of Rightousness tho' they were not so ingenious as to acknowledge it So that there can be no necessary Argument drawn from these to prove that the Heathens purely as such can vie with Christians in this particular What was said of Seneca may in some measure be said of the rest si Christianus Paganice Si Paganus Christiane Scripsit Then as for those Heathens that liv'd â—befoe our Saviours time I think I shall do 'em nothing but right and justice in these following particulars 1. They had no right notion of original sin that general depravation and corruption of humane nature either as to the true cause or cure of it without which I think there cannot be laid any such firm foundation of Vertue and Piety as Christianity thereby now affords us 2. The Heathens were not alwayes consistent with themselves in their discourses of this nature their Candle did not only burn dim But like one in thâ— Socket it had sometimâ—s its lucid intervals and then somtimes seem'd to be quite extinguish'd they had light enough to shew 'em their own darkness but not sufficient to assure 'em of the right way the light of their understandings was
Religion either by rational deduction or Natural inscription Orall Traditionâ— haveing not found that good success in the World as to Divinity as much to encourage others â—o urge or to prosecute thâ— same in morality But he says that tho' relations of matters of fact ancient customs and difficult articles of Faith may suffer much by â—eing convey'd this way c. But was not Gods instructing Adam in these things matter of fact Or may not matters of Fact done by God be misrepresented as well as those done by Men As for difficult Articles of Faith if he mean such as are of a more complex nature and include a long series of propositions or if he supposes this Tradition to extend to the modes and circumstances of things then this way might be very lyable to mistake and corruption by passing through so many hands but suppose God had taught Adam to believe a Trinity in the God-head the Resurection of the Body with out the respective modes of either I doe not see but that these might as safely and securely have been delivered down to posterity as those other precepts he mentionsâ— but these plain Rules of morality he says such as worship God Honour thy Parents c. Are so natural to the understanding so easy â—o be imbraced by it and appear upon proposal to be so extreamly usefull â—o Mankind c. Here he seemes to relinquish his own principle Tradition and to found the belief and ready reception of these rules of Morallity in their being so natural to the understanding c. That they must be assented to and can never be mistaken or forgot But pa. 33. he tells us that there are some very barbarous People who we are very certain want most of these Moral Notions so that here must have been some mistake or forgetfulness on some hand or other But he says Pa. 37. If Morality was inscrib'd on Mens hearts Parents might with as muh wisdom pretend to teach their Children to eat and drink to love their Children c. So that it seems there is such a Natural Duty or instinct for Parents to love their Children that they cannot but do it But why is not the Duty reciprocal Why may not Children be in the same way bound to honour their Parents as Parents to love their Children and yet he says Pa. 72. That among the ancient Heathens it was a common thing to throw their Children when born into the next ditch they met with No great Argument of such a Natural Love and Affection towards 'em as they could not but show and exercise Pa. 33 he tells us 't is odd to think that these Propositions should come into the minds of Men by such an unaccountable way as that of Inscription and yet he says Pa. 92. That Gods permission of Vice is no sign of his liking it he having otherwise declar'd his will by giving to all Men a Law of Vertue This cannot be understood of the traditionary Law because that has not by some defect or other extended to all Men. Pa. 38. 'T is further remarkable that Parents Deut. 6.6 are commanded by God to teach their Children these Moral Dutys But what then Did ever any body assert that this Natural Inscription doth superâ—ede the necessity of other Instructions or the use of those other means which God and Nature have made requisite in order to the more perfect knowledge of our Dutys But after the recital of the Ten Commandments viz. The Moral Law Moses adds and these words which I command Thee this day shall be in thy heart and thou shalt teach them diligently to thy Children c. But these words were not introduc'd immediately after the recital of the Ten Commandmentsâ— The ten Commandments were recited about the middle of the 5 th Chap. and v. 31. God there speaking to Moses says Stand thou here by me and I will speak unto thee all tâ—e Commandments and Statutes and Iudgments which thou shalt teach them that they may do-them in the Land which I give them to posssess it Now these words Commandments Statutes and Iudgments are generally understood to signifie all the Precepts of the Moral Ceremonial and Judicial Law and certainly the Jewes were oblig'd to observe some other Laws besides the Tenâ— Commandments in the Land which theâ— Lord gave 'em to possess it The like words are repeated Ch. 6. 1. Whereupon â— 6. it follows These words which I command the this day shall be inâ— thy heart He proceeds 'T is further remarkable that what Moses here says shall be in the Iewes hearts the Apostle says Rom. 2. 15. was written in the Gentiles hearts so that unless there can be a substantial difference evinc'd between being in the heart and written there all the Doctrine of inscrib'd Propositions falls to the ground I perceive that those who are any ways concern'd for the Doctrine of Inscrib'd Propositions must either now speak or else for ever hereafter hold their peace But to this I answer 1. That if that expression of Moses of Being in their hearts relate only to the Ten Commandments viz the Moral Law Why then may not Moses be as well explain'd by St. Paul as St. Paul by Moses and so Natural inscription be understood by both 2. I know not whether I can show a substantial difference betwixt â—â—ose expressions or no yet I hope I shall sâ—ow such an one as may be sufficient to satisfie any impartial and considerate Reader 1 Moses and St. Paul do not speak Secundum idem or ad idem Moses speaks of the Precepts of all the three Laws Moral Ceremonial and Iudicial St. Paul only of the Moral 2. They do not speak Eodem modo Moses's expression of being in their hearts according to the best Interpreters signifies no more than being in their Memory 's and affections St. Pauls being written in their hearts signifies something more as supposing the Gentiles naturally conscious of the observation and breach of the Moral Law So that I humbly conceive there can be no Argument drawn from the comparing those two places of Moses and St. Paul in prejudice to the Doctrine of Natural Inscriptions rightly understood Pa. 129. No body says that God reveals these Natural truths to us but only gives us facultyes of discerning them And may not the same be said of some Moral truths which we commonly call Natural Religion that God does not reveal these truths to us but only gives us facultys by vertue whereof we may either find or frame such propositions as are agreeable to the morral as well as to the Natural frame and constitution of the Soul I cannot too often remind the Reader that I never asserted these Natural ot Innate notions to be imprinted upon the mind in any gross or litterall sense upon which mistaken Ground and perswasion only I am apt to believe that they are oppos'd by some Pa. 83. Of my former discourse there speaking of the Archetypall formes and
exâ—min'd there are some whose Notions are so iâ—â—ricâ—â—e and their expressions so much out of thâ— common Road that many times they do facere intelligendo ut alij saltem nihil intelligant what I here design therefore in these Papers is clearneâ—s and perspicuity for however deep the pit might be wherein the Ancients plaâ—'d Truth yet I never heard that it was muddy so that what is said of the method of Salvation by the Gospel Rom. 10. 8. may be apply'd generally to all things of a moral Nature the word is nigh thee even in thy Mouth and in thine Heart The learned and judicious Author of the Occasional Papers Paper 1. Pa. 4. tells us that it would be of great Service both to Religion and good Manners to have ill Books as they are publish'd consider'd calmly by Men of Temper I would only propound it further to Consideration whether it might not be convenient also somewhat to enlarge the design and not only take notice of ill Books as he calls them such as either directly or by natural and easie consequence tend to undermine our Faith or corrupt our Manners not only I say to take notice of such but also of the more material mistakes even of good ones the best and wiâ—est Men mâ—y â—ometimes be mistaken in their principlâ—s or dâ—duâ—tions â—rom thâ—m and it is no dâ—sparagement â—or any one to acknowledge it There is one thing further wherein I must beg thy pardon theâ—e Dâ—â—courâ—es want one great ornament of all Compoâ—ures Essays themselves not being excepted that is my transitions are not so soft and well connected as they ought to be this I am very sensible of what the Reason hereof may be I know not whether it be my want of Skill which I rather think nobis non licet esse tà m disertis or want of leisure my other employments not suffering me to apply my Self to these thoughts but at certain intervals or my natural but I confess very culpable indifferency both as to Style and Method however it is if this be any satisfaction to thee I do willingly acknowledge my fault herein Nor must thou expect full and just Discourses upon Each of those Points I here mention neither my Ability nor Inclination concurring herein fully to exhaust a Subject I have no other end or design in these Papers but only the search and defence of Truth and if in any thing I be mistaken and who can seâ—vre himself from mistakes I shall think my self oblig'd to any one who shall with candour and calmness show me my Error Mr. Lock 's Epistle to the Reader examin'd so far as concernes the Law of fashion and innate notions in his second Edition of his Essay of humane understanding WHAT benefit or advantage as to the concernes of truth and usefull knowledge the World may receive by that little difference in Dispute betwixt Mr. Lock and me I know not yet herein I hope we have given an instance of the possibility of manageing a controversie without hard words or unhansome Reflections and if even this was more generally observed it would very much advance the interest of truth however of Love and Friendship in the World among persons of different Opinions I do not in the least question the truth and sincerity of what he there professes that he is always ready to renounce his own and receive the opinion of others according as truth appears on either side yet I hope he will pardon me if I take the freedom to say that the Instance he there gives of altering of his opinion in reference to the last determination of the will of Man doth not seem to come up so fully to his purpose seeing he doth not there so much quit any Opinion of his own to embrace that of anothers as to renounce the common opinion of most tho then believed by him to entertain an Opinion I think purely his own Mr. Lock there complains that his meaning is often mistaken and that he has not always the good Luck to be rightly understood This is a common complaint in such circumstances and I think I may also lay a just claime to a share therein but if I have mistaken his meaning in any thing whatever the cause might otherwise be I do insist upon this in my own vindication that it was not out of any wilful designe And I furthâ—r assure that Learned Man that I never did think my self nor went about to insinuate to others that it was my Opinion of him that he absolutely held no reall difference or distinction betwixt Vice and Vertue I did only ask this question there Whether if Men should place their commendation or blame on that sâ—ide which deserv'd it not whether that would alter the nature of things This I conceiv'd might either set the thing in a clearer light in it self or give him occasion so to do I there also farther appeal'd to himself Pa. 17. of his 1 st Edition where I suppose he did not only declare the sense of the Heathen Phylosophers but his own too upon this Subject when he grounds the reason of Mens keeping their word not upon the approbation of the place Men live in But upon the honesty and dignity of the thing it felf I did also read and consider those other places where he doth positively assert the unchangeable Rules of right and wrong only I must confess I did much wonder how so Learned a Man should go so near as I thought to contradict himself in other places where his expressions seem'd at least to me then to infer the the Rules of Vice and Vertue to be of a more changeable Nature perticularly in that place I quoted Pa. 159. Vertue is every where that which is thought praise-worthy and nothing else but that which has the allowance of publique esteem is vertue But instead of is Virtue in the 1 st Edition it is now is called Vertue in the Second therefore I suppose he say's That the 2d Edition will give me satisfaction in the point and that this matter is now so express'd as to show there was no cause of scruple It may be so exprest now perhaps that there is no cause of scruple tho that I much question but it will not sollow hence that â—here was none but rather the contrary because he has alter'd his Expression in such a materiall point But he tells us That he was there not laying down morall Rules but showing the Original and nature of morall Ideas For my part I dare scarce trust my own eyes against his word I shall here quote part of the Paragraph which he here refers to P. 157. § 6. Of these moral Rules or Laws to which Men generally refer and which they judge of the rectitude or pravity of their actions there seeme to me to be three sorts Here he seemes to me to call 'em morall Rules but whether he meanes the same thing by morall Rules here that he meanes in his Epistle that
merits of the cause nor comes to dispute that which was most material in the Controversy I wonder why he shoâ—ld lay so much stress upon Children and Foolâ— and debaucht Persons to make their aâ—sent or dissent so availeable one way or other I am no friend to Dogmatizing yet I humbly conceive that no one has any just reason to think the worsâ— of any Opinion merely because such Persons do not assent unto it Neither do they who plead for this general consent make it so universal as to include every particular Pa. 24. § 20. I desire these Men to say whether by Education and Custom these Notions can or cannot be blurr'd and blotted out Since he is so Positive in his demand why may not we be aâ— positive in our answer and say that they can And what then Why then truly he drops that part of the disjunction and only says If they may suffer â—ariation by adventitioâ—â— Notions which is a very gentle way of blotting out but what then follows Why then we must find â—â—em cleâ—rest and most perspicuous nearest the Fountainâ— in Children c. We must he says but he never yet prov'd the necesâ—ity of that consequence And then as for Illiterate Persons if he mean plain honest illiâ—â—â—atâ—â— Heathens such as are less Learned â—â—t less corrupted by â—â—lse Principles and wicked Practises I doubt not but these Notions will appear clearer in such But however we still remain in the full and undisturb'd possession of that side of the disjunction that these notions may by bad Custom and Education be blotted out which ground thus gain'd will be of great disadvaâ—tage to his cause As for what he says Pa. 18. of the wicked Practices and Atheistical Opinions of some Heathen Nations some think that his Authors were not so exact in their observations as they might have been but suppose they were it makes nothing to the advantage of his cause unless he had prov'd before that these Notions cannot be blotted out of the minds of Men. Neither will it follow hence that they are of no use to Mankind if they may be thus defac'd For 1 st It may be in some measure oweing to these that all the Nations of the Heathen World are not sunk lower into wickedness than indeed they are 2 dly 'T is probable these Innate Notions will be instrumental in the Conviction and Conversion of these People when God in the wisdom of his Providence shall think â—it to do it and I doubt not but the Apostles in their Preaching did appeal to these and make use of 'em for this pâ—rpose Rom. 2. 14 15. Pa. 21. § 14. Here speaking of these Moral Rules he is very urgent with us â—o tell which they are if he means that we should give the exact determinate number of 'em I think this is a very unreasonable demand however I shall at present instanâ—e in those whichâ— Mr. Nye mention◠〈…〉 f His naturall Religion 1 st A tenderness for and care of our Children 2 d. A commiseration of the oppressions and wants of such as are distressed and not by their own fault but thro' mishap or the iniquity of others 3 d. A propensity to favour worthy Persons and actions And here I would only give him this caution that in his reply he do not draw his Answer and Arguments from Children and Fools for such Evidence will be excepted against nor from such as by Vicious customes have blotted these notions out of their minds for no one thinks the worse of the Belief of a God because the whole Club of professed Athests denys it Here give me leave to add one thing further tho' out of its proper place as for those that assert these innate notions I know noâ— how they can well otherwise express it than by saying that the Soul upon occasion exerts 'em and as for that other wâ—y of exerting themselves if it wanted any defence I have very good authority for it Mr. Locâ— P. 13. of his Essay § 27. 'T is â— great presumption that these geâ—erall maâ—imes are not innate since they are lâ—ast known to thoâ—â— in whom if they were â—nnate they must neâ—ds 〈◊〉 theâ—selves with most force and vigour That there is a reall and unalterable distinction betwixt good and evill is a very great and important truth and such as ought to be fixt upon the best and surest foundations but I cannoâ— think Mr. Becconsalls Argument pa. 194. so â—ogâ—nt as the nature of the thing requires Moral good he says always inâ—ludes a nâ—turall good and naturall good is evidâ—ntly establish'd in the frame of created naturâ—â— and consequently if the frame of nature be unalterable mâ—ral good must be sâ— too Here if by moral good always including a naturall good he meâ—nes that moral good is always attended with some râ—al advantage naturally accruing from the practice of it this I grant is generally true but then may we not say here as he says of pleasure pa. 188. In respect of Natural good that it seemes to be a consequencâ— â—ather then a measure and constituent principle of morall good so thiâ— naâ—â—râ—l good which he says iâ— always included in morall good seemes to be the consequence rather then the measure and constituent principle of moral good But then if he makes moral good only a part of as indeed he seems to make it the same with naturall good only distinguish'd by the accession of a free choice pa. 186. and so included in the frame of created nature this will only prove that moral good is what God at first Creation made it and so not in the highest Sense eternal and immutâ—ble as depending merely upon Gods free and Arbitrary will and positive determination and thus this Learned Author will fall in with P. Poiretts opinion in this particular vide former discourse of humane nature pa. 95. Whereas I am willing to carry the reasons of good and evill higher founding them in that relation they bear to the essential wisdom purity and holiness of the Divinâ— nature which relation is in some measure made known to us by those native notices and naturall impressions upon the minds of Men. And whereas he tells us pa. 192. That the proper measures of morall good muâ—t be taken from the original frame ends and intrests of our beings I am afraid that all these in respect to each individual and abstracted from all Law to direct us would be found so variable and uncertain that morall good would upon this hypothesis prove a much more unfixt and unsettled thing then God and Nature ever made it vide pa. 72. Of humane Nature So that I humbly conceive it would not be a sufficient asserting the eternall and immutable nature of moral good to say that it is as immutable as the frame of created nature for we know that this has in some particular instances been changed and may be so againe but the reasons of good and evill never were never can be
standing Rule to direct 'em for those first Ages of the World soon degenerated into Idolatry and this and worse would be the Fate of the present Age if God in judgment â—â—ould remove the Gospel from us But to return the Deist must 2 dly prove that it is a thing contrary to the Divine Nature to make any further Declaration of his will than what he has made known by the light of Nature he cannot say that this is contrary to the free and positive determination of the Divine Will for how can he know this seeing he doth not suppose any outward Declaration of Gods will ever made to Man If he say that God never made any but only this viz. That he would make no more but what he had discovered to Man by the Light of Nature I hope he will prove what he says and show where ever God made any such Declaration If he say that there was no need of any further This is a very weak way of argueing against matter of fact If I should say that there is nothing writ in a certain Book call'd the Oracles of Reason in defence of Deisme because there was no need of it there was enough writ of that before I believe he would not grant the Argument to be of any force Some are of Opinion that that Book call'd the Oracles of Reason is not worth the taking notice of by way of Answer it being they say such as would soon dye of it self I must confess I have no great opinion of the performance therein viz. Of the Letters of those Gentlemen one to another I do not speak of the Translations not that I here reflect upon the abilitys of the Persons but of the weakness of the cause that was not capable of a better defence Si Pergama dextrâ Defend si possint Etiam hâc But because some are apt to look upon this as an argument of the strength of a cause when no one vouchsafes an answer to it tho' perhaps the true reason is because they think it does not deserve any I shall therefore briefly consider that part of it which is writ in favour of Deisme if not for its own sake yet for the sake of those who are too apt to overvalue every thing that may seem to gratify their own private inclinations and if some think as meanly of this as others do of that I am very well satisfy'd if they should dye both together The Summary account of the Deists Religion examin'd pa. 88. I Shall not need to advertise the Reader that the Deist here meant and so often mentioned in this and the like discourses is not one barely that never heard of Divine revelation but being born and living several years in the outward prâ—fession of Christianity having now at last taken some distaste at it has in effect renounced it or at least the necessity of believing the fundamentals of it Chap. 1 st He here tells us that whatever is adoreable amiable or imitable by Mankind is in one supreme infinite and perfect being that is they believe one infinite supreme perfect being and do adore love and imitate his imitable perfections The worst of Spirits believe the one and the best of Heathens practise the other and if the World has liv'd it self back again into Genâ—ilism it may thank the Deists for it Chap 2 d. That God is not to be worshiped by an Image we willingly grant 2 d. Nor by Sacrifice I know the Deists now are for no Sacrifices at all but here I would propound it to consideration whether they do not owe this truer notion and righter apprehension of things to that clearer light which they have received from Divine Revelation tho' they are not so ingenuous as to acknowledge it for why should they now abstractedly considered from all communication with Christians oppose the constant opinion and practise of their great Patriarchs and Apostles the Heathen Philosophers in this particular I know indeed the Stoicks tell us that it is below their wise Mâ—n to repent and by consequence that there is no need of Sacrifices But these were a sort of Fanaticks in their Religion and dream'd of I know not what kind of perfection which their State was not capable of their discourses many times contradicting their practises I grant also that the Heathen Poets and Philosophers about the time of our Saviours appearance in the World began to speak very meanly and undervaluingly of â—acrifices but then they may thank the Christian Religion for this Sâ—criâ—iceing was a thing early prevailing in the World and it will be very difficult for the Deists according to their principles to give any tolerable account hereof Indeed Christians are divided in their opinions herein some asserting a Divine positive command and Revelation of God to Adam tho' not mention'd in Scripture neither is this say they any Argument that there was no such thing because Scripturae silentium non est semper argumentativum Others suppose Sacrifices founded in nature tho' this say some is not altogether so reasonable because they cannot conceive how naturall reason abstracted from a Divine command could suggest that God could be acceptably worship'd by the destruction of his Creatures Others distinguish betwixt Typical and Eucharisticall Sacrifices these latter they say may be founded in Nature tho' the same cannot be so easily granted of the other What the reall truth herein is perhaps is not so easie to determine However the Deists seem here to have a particular notion of their own Viz. That Sacrifices were only Typicall of repentance and sorrow for sin but this without any ground either from reason or authority Having premised this in generall I shall come now more particularly to examine what he says upon this subject God is not to be worshiped by Sacrifices he says because Sponsio non valet ut alter pro altero puniatur Here he seemes to reflect upon the Sacrifice of our blessed Saviour But why should any such maxim be of more authority than those of St. Paul Neither doth this when rightly understood any ways contradict that commutation of punishment asserted by Christianity For we commonly say that volenti non fit injuria and that truly too with the concurrence of these two conditions 1 st That the Person so undertaking may lawfully do it that is if he be not under any moral or political obligation to the contrary 2. If the Person be not imposed upon by want of a full and true understanding of the thing so undertaken Now both these conditions did concur in our blessed Saviour 1 st He had power to lay down his Life and he had power to take it up againe 2 It would be profane to think that the Son of God did not well understand what he did when he undertook the work of Mans Redemptiom However no such sponsion can be made with a brute Creature Here he seemes to reflect upon the Iewish Sacrifices But 1 st He should
agreeable to the Office of Baptism I then recall what I have said upon that particular only I could have wish'd that he had not given that oâ—â—asion to others of misapprehending him Some Remarks upon Monsieur Malebranch his Opinions of the non-efficiency of Second Causes and of seeing all thingâ—s in God THE true liberty of Phylosophizing and the free and ingenuous use of â— Mans own Reason is certainly a very great perfection of a Rational creature a just freedom of thinking together with that of â—hoice being two great prerogatives of humane nature but the best things may be abused and perverted to bad purposes thus Men sometimes under the plausible pretence of free thinking give their fancyes leave to Rove about for new Opinions and then presentlyâ— are so enamour'd of their own inventions that it is very difficult if at all possible eveâ— to convince 'em of the conâ—rary and that which more confirms them in their own way is that they fancy themselves the only Men that enjoy the true genius of contemplation and those who differ from em and cannot assent to their way of reasoningâ— they look upon to be Men whose understandings are crampt by the prejudice of an unhaâ—py Education Here I shall propound these two things to Considerationâ— 1. No Opinion in Philosphy is either to be rejected oâ— imbraced merely upon account of its Antiquity or novelty but only as it comes attended or noâ— attended with the Evidence of reason and probability at least of truth thus a more true genius of Philosophysing may appeaâ—â— in the defence of an old truth than in the asserting of a new error 2. In things purely Physical relating to things meerely of a material Nature wâ— may indulge a greater liberty of thinking but in things that terminate more immediately upon God as this Opinion of Monsiâ—ur Malbranch does in seeing all things in God in such I conceive we ought to be more wary and guide both our Thoughts and Words with greater caution There are some positive Moralists if I may so call 'em such who tell us that there is nothing good or evill in its own nature but that things are so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 only because of the positive decree and determination of God that they should be so Monsieur Malbranch seemes in some respect to be the same in Natural Phylosophy that those others are in Moral that is he grants no Natural efficiency to 2 d. Causes and that they are only signes and occasions upon which God will and without which he will not produce such effects Thus what Mr. Norrisâ— Pa. 59. Of his Remarks upon the Aâ—henian Society says concerning sensible impressions in respâ—ct of Ideas may be said of all other causes thaâ— God has established a certain Order or connexion betwixt such impressions made upon our sences and such Ideas not that these impressions doe cause or produâ—e these Ideas but that they are conditions upon the presence of which God will raise them or to speak more properly exhibit them to our mâ—nds Now according to this Hypothesis if God had ordered things so at first or shall hereafter do so then the running of a feather tho' never so lightly over a Mans hand might have caus'd the most exquisite pain imaginable then Tentâ—rden Steeple might have been as much the cause of Goodwins Sands as any second cause is of the effect which yet seems to follow from it But then if we consider what he sayes pa. 116. of his Illustrations he there seems not much to differ from the common Hypothesis ad deum seu ad causam Vniversalem â—bi effectuum specialium ratio postulatur recurrendum non esse fateor but withall he says naturae inestigatio fallaâ—eâ— omnino vana ubi in eâ aliae verae causae quaeruntur quà m voluntates omnipotentis Again in the same place si fieri possit effectuum de quibus agitur causa naturalis specialis est explicanda but again he says actio istarum causarum consistit duntaxat in vi movente quâ agitantur illa vero vis movens nihil aliâ—d est quà m ipsa dei voluntas But it is no great sign of truth or of a good Cause when its Patron seems as it were thus opprest by its weight and thus operosely labours in the explication of it But it s observable that he himself grants that itâ— would be more agreeable if it could be done to assigne special natural causes of particular effects But now would it not be more Phylosophical to say that there are such particular causes in Nature tho' at present we are not able to assign 'em then thus to run to the more immediate power of God for the salving of every ordinary Phaenomenon of Nature I grant that it is very difficult to assign the just limits betwixt Natural and Supernatural power to determine justly where the one ends and the other begins or indeed fully to explain all the modes of Natural Phaenomena's but yet methinks it is not altogether so Philosophycal to ascribe these commonly reputed ordinary Phaenomena's of gravitation for example or the growing of a pile of Grass to the constant efficiency or Supernatural influence of almighty God I do not say that we are able to give a full solution of these things as to all the minutest circumstances of 'em nor would I ascribe too much to Natural causes but yet I think presently to have recourse to Divine power for the solution of all things this would damp all our further enquirys into Nature which is an employment very worthy of a rational Creature provided it does not extend too far I mean to the excluding of providence out of the World besides to ascribe all things immediatly to God exclusively of second causes might perhaps seem to detract from the trâ—e Notion and nature of providence it self in that just and wise order of things in that exact harmony betwixt the Naturalâ— and moral World which God has constituted in the Universe And it would be difficult to give any tolerable account worthy of the wisdom of God of those things commonly call'd second causes if they be but bare signes or conditions of those things which they seem to have some causal influence upon But he tells us Pa. 124. Of his Illustrations which I should have mentioned before â—â—m voluntas mea determinaâ— voluntatem dei certe brachium meum movebitur non voluntate meâ quae inessicax est perse sed voluntate dei quae effectu suo nunquam frustratur But why should he call the will of Man Inefficax when at the same time he tells us that it determins the will of God Might not Mans will if God had so pleas'd as well determine the motion of his own Arme as determine the will of God And I do not yet see how he has prov'd Gods pleasure to be otherwise Neither will those words per se do him any service for no