which Natural Reason appoints all men to use is the Law of Nations saith Theophilus in the Text of the Civil Law and in the second Book of the Instit cap. 1. Jus Naturae is confounded with Jus Gentium As the Civilians sometimes confound and sometimes separate the Law of Nature and the Law of Nations so other-whiles they make them also contrary one to the other By the Law of Nature all men are born free Jure naturali omnes liberi nascuntur But Servitude is by the Law of Nations Jure Gentium Servitus invasit saith Vlpian And the Civil Law not only makes the Law of Nature and of Nations contrary but also will have the Law of Nations contrary to it self War saith the Law was brought in by the Law of Nations Ex jure gentium introducta bella and yet the Law of Nations saith Since Nature hath made us all of one Kindred it follows it is not lawful for one man to lye in wait for another Cùm inter nos cognitionem quandam natura constituit consequens est hominem homini insidiari nefas esse saith Florentinus Again the Civil Law teacheth that from the Law of Nature proceeds the Conjunction of man and woman the Procreation and Education of Children But as for Religion to God and Obedience to Parents it makes it to be by the Law of Nations To touch now the Canon Law we may find in one place that men are governed either by the Law of Nature or by Customs Homines reguntur Naturali jure aut moribus The Law of Nations they call a Divine Law the Customs a humane Law Leges aut divinae sunt aut humanae divinae naturâ humanae moribus constant But in the next place the Canon Law makes Jus to be either Naturale aut Civile aut Gentium Though this Division agree in Terms with that of Vlpian in the Civil Law yet in the Explication of the Terms there is Diversity for what one Law makes to belong to the Law of Nature the other refers to the Law of Nations as may easily appear to him that will take the Pains to compare the Civil and Canon Law in these Points A principal Ground of these Diversities and Contrarieties of Divisions was an Error which the Heathens taught that all things at first were common and that all men were equal This mistake was not so heinous in those Ethnick Authors of the Civil Laws who wanting the Guide of the History of Moses were fain to follow Poets and Fables for their Leaders But for Christians who have read the Scriptures to dream either of a Community of all things or an Equality of all Persons is a Fault scarce pardonable To salve these apparent Contrarieties of Community and Property or Equality and Subjection the Law of Jus Gentium was first invented when that could not satisfie to mend the matter this Jus Gentium was divided into a Natural Law of Nations and an Humane Law of Nations and the Law of Nature into a Primary and a Secondary Law of Nature Distinctions which make a great sound but edifie not at all if they come under Examination If there hath been a time when all things were common and all men equal and that it be otherwise now we must needs conclude that the Law by which all things were common and men equal was contrary to the Law by which now things are proper and men subject If we will allow Adam to have been Lord of the World and of his Children there will need no such Distinctions of the Law of Nature and of Nations For the Truth will be that whatsoever the Heathens comprehended under these two Laws is comprised in the Moral Law That the Law of Nature is one and the same with the Moral may appear by a Definition given by Grotius The Law of Nature saith he is the Dictate of Reason shewing that in every Action by the agreeing or disagreeing of it with natural Reason there is a moral Honesty or Dishonesty and consequently that such an Action is commanded or forbidden by God the Author of Nature I cannot tell how Grotius would otherwise have defined the Moral Law And the Canon Law grants as much teaching that the Law of Nature is contained in the Law and the Gospel Whatsoever ye will that men do c. Mat. 7. The Term of Jus Naturae is not originally to be found in Scripture for though T. Aquinas takes upon him to prove out of the 2. to the Romans that there is a Jus Naturae yet St. Paul doth not use those express Terms his words are The Gentiles which have not the Law do by Nature the things contained in the Law these having not the Law are a Law unto themselves He doth not say Nature is a Law unto them but they are a Law unto themselves As for that which they call the Law of Nations it is not a Law distinct much less opposite to the Law of Nature but it is a small Branch or Parcel of that great Law for it is nothing but the Law of Nature or the moral Law between Nations The same Commandment that forbids one Private man to rob another or one Corporation to hurt another Corporation obliges also one King not to rob another King and one Commonwealth not to spoil another the same Law that enjoyns Charity to all men even to Enemies binds Princes and States to shew Charity to one another as well as private Persons And as the Common or Civil Laws of each Kingdom which are made against Treason Theft Murder Adultery or the like are all and every one of them grounded upon some particular Commandment of the moral Law so all the Laws of Nations must be subordinate and reducible to the moral Law The Law of Nature or the moral Law is like the main Ocean which though it be one entire Body yet several Parts of it have distinct Names according to the diversity of the Coasts on which they border So it comes to pass that the Law of Nations which is but a part of the Law of Nature may be sub-divided almost in infinitum according to the Variety of the Persons or Matters about which it is conversant The Law of Nature or the divine Law is general and doth only comprehend some Principles of Morality notoriously known of themselves or at the most is extended to those things which by necessary and evident Inference are consequent to those Principles Besides these many other things are necessary to the well governing of a Common-wealth and therefore it was necessary that by Humane Reason something more in particular should be determined concerning those things which could not be defined by Natural Reason alone hence it is that Humane Laws be necessary as Comments upon the Text of the Moral Law and of this Judgment is Aquinas who teacheth that necessitas legis humanae manat ex eo quod Lex naturalis vel Divina generalis est solum
complectitur quaedam principia morum per se nota ad summum extenditur ad ea quae necessaria evidenti elatione ex illis principiis consequuntur praeter illa verò multa alia sunt necessaria in republica ad ejus rectam Gubernationem ideo necessarium fuit ut per humanam rationem aliqua magis in particulari determinarentur circa ea quae per solam rationem naturalem definiri non possunt Ludo. Molin de Just. Thus much may suffice to shew the Distractions in and between the Civil and Common Laws about the Law of Nature and Nations In the next place we are to consider how Grotius distinguisheth these Laws To maintain the Community of things to be Natural Grotius hath framed new Divisions of the Law of Nature First in his Preface to his Books De Jure Belli Pacis he produceth a Definition of the Law of Nature in such doubtful obscure and reserved Terms as if he were diffident of his Undertaking Next in his first Book and first Chapter he gives us another Distribution which differs from his Doctrine in his Preface In his Preface his Principle is that the Appetite of Society that is to say of Community is an Action proper to man Here he presently corrects himself with an Exception that some other Creatures are found to desire Society and withal he answers the Objections thus that this Desire of Society in brute Beasts comes from some external Principle What he means by Principium intelligens extrinsecum I understand not nor doth he explain nor is it material nor is the Argument he useth to any purpose for admitting all he saith to be true yet his Principle fails for the Question is not from what Principle this Desire of Society proceeds in Beasts but whether there be such a Desire or no. Besides here he takes the Appetite of Society and Community to be all one whereas many live in Society which live not in Community Next he teacheth that the keeping of Society custodia Societatis which in a rude manner saith he we have now expressed is the fountain of that Law which is properly so called I conceive by the Law properly so called he intends the Law of Nature though he express not so much And to this appetite of Sociable Community he refers Alieni Abstinentia but herein it may be he forgets himself for where there is Community there is neither meum nor tuum nor yet alienum and if there be no alienum there can be no alieni abstinentia To the same purpose he saith that by the Law of Nature men must stand to bargains Juris naturae sit stare pactis But if all things were common by Nature how could there be any bargain Again Grotius tells us that from this signification of the Law there hath flowed another larger which consists saith he in Discerning what delights us or hurts us and in judging how things should be wisely distributed to each one This latter he calls the looser Law of Nature the former Jus Sociale the Law of Nature strictly or properly taken And these two Laws of Nature should have place saith he though men should deny there were a a God But to them that believe there is a God there is another Original of Law beside the Natural coming from the free Will of God to the which our own Vnderstanding tells us we must be subject Thus have I gathered the Substance of what is most material concerning the Law of Nature in his Preface If we turn to the Book it self we have a division of the Law into Jus Naturale Voluntarium Divinum Humanum Civile Latiùs patens Seu Jus Gentium Arctiùs patens Seu Paternum Seu Herile In the Definition of Jus Naturale he omits those Subtleties of Jus Naturae propriè dictum and quod laxius ita dicitur which we find in his Preface and gives such a plain Definition as may fitly agree to the Moral Law By this it seems the Law of Nature and the Moral Law are one and the same Whereas he affirmeth That the Actions about which the Law of Nature is conversant are lawful or unlawful of themselves and therefore are necessarily commanded or forbidden by God by which mark this Law of Nature doth not only differ from humane Law but from the Divine voluntary Law which doth not command or forbid those things which of themselves and by their own nature are lawful or unlawful but makes them unlawful by forbidding them and due by commanding them In this he seems to make the Law of Nature to differ from Gods Voluntary Law whereas in God Necessary and Voluntary are all one Salmasius de Vsuris in the twentieth Chapter condemns this Opinion of Grotius though he name him not yet he means him if I mistake not In the next place I observe his saying That some things are by the Law of Nature not propriè but reductivè and that the Law of Nature deals not only with those things which are beside the Will of Man but also with many things which follow the act of Man's Will so Dominion such as is now in Vse mans Will brought in but now that it is brought in it is against the Law of Nature to take that from thee against thy will which is in thy Dominion Yet for all this Grotius maintains That the Law of Nature is so immutable that it cannot be changed by God himself He means to make it good with a Distinction Some things saith he are by the Law of Nature but not simply but according to the certain state of things so the common use of things was natural as long as Dominion was not brought in and Right for every man to take his own by Force before Laws were made Here if Grotius would have spoken plain instead of but not simply but according to the certain State of Things he would have said but not immutably but for a certain Time And then this Distinction would have run thus Some things are by the Law of Nature but not immutably but for a certain time This must needs be the naked Sense of his Distinction as appears by his Explication in the Words following where he saith That the common Vse of Things was natural so long as Dominion was not brought in Dominion he saith was brought in by the will of man whom by this Doctrine Grotius makes to be able to change that Law which God himself cannot change as he saith He gives a double ability to man first to make that no Law of Nature which God made to be the Law of Nature And next to make that a Law of Nature which God made not for now that Dominion is brought in he maintains it is against the Law of Nature to take that which is in another man's dominion Besides I find no Coherence in these Words By the Law of Nature it was right for every man to take his own by force before Laws
his Synopsis bears them company and yet this Version of Lambine's is esteemed the best and Printed at Paris with Causabon's corrected Greek Copy though in the rendring of this place the Elder Translations have been more faithful and he that shall compare the Greek Text with the Latine shall find that Causabon had just cause in his Preface to Aristotle's Works to complain that the best Translations of Aristotle did need Correction To prove that in these words which seem to favour the Equality of Mankind Aristotle doth not speak according to his own Judgment but recites only the Opinion of others we find him clearly deliver his own Opinion that the Power of Government did originally arise from the Right of Fatherhood which cannot possibly consist with that Natural Equality which Men dream of for in the First of his Politiques he agrees exactly with the Scripture and lays this Foundation of Government The first Society saith he made of Many Houses is a Village which seems most naturally to be a Colony of Families or foster-Brethren of Children and Childrens Children And therefore at the beginning Cities were under the Government of Kings for the eldest in every house is King And so for Kindred-sake it is in Colonies And in the fourth of his Politiques cap. 2. He gives the Title of the first and Divinest sort of Government to the Institution of Kings by Defining Tyranny to be a Digression from the First and Divinest Whosoever weighs advisedly these passages will find little hope of Natural Reason in Aristotle to prove the Natural Liberty of the Multitude Also before him the Divine Plato concludes a Commonweal to be nothing else but a large Family I know for this Position Aristotle quarrels with his Master but most unjustly for therein he contradicts his own Principles for they both agree to fetch the Orignial of Civil Government from the prime Government No doubt but Moses's History of the Creation guided these two Philosophers in finding out of this Lineal Subjection deduced from the Laws of the First Parents according to that Rule of St. Chrysostom God made all Mankind of One Man that he might teach the World to be Governed by a King and not by a Multitude The Ignorance of the Creation occasioned several Errors amongst the Heathen Philosophers Polybius though otherwise a most profound Philosopher and Judicious Historian yet here he stumbles for in searching out the Original of Civil Societies he conceited That Multitudes of Men after a Deluge a Famine or a Pestilence met together like Herds of Cattel without any Dependency until the strongest Bodies and boldest Minds got the Mastery of their Fellows even as it is saith he among Bulls Bears and Cocks And Aristotle himself forgetting his first Doctrine tells us the first Heroical Kings were chosen by the People for their deserving well of the Multitude either by teaching them some New Arts or by Warring for them or by Gathering them together or by Dividing Land amongst them also Aristotle had another Fancy that those Men who prove wise of Mind were by Nature intended to be Lords and Govern and those which were Strong of Body were ordained to obey and to be Servants But this is a dangerous and uncertain Rule and not without some Folly for if a Man prove both Wise and Strong what will Aristotle have done with him as he was Wise he could be no Servant and as he had Strength he could not be a Master besides to speak like a Philosopher Nature intends all things to be perfect both in Wit and Strength The Folly or Imbecillity proceeds from some Errour in Generation or Education for Nature aims at Perfection in all her Works 2. Suarez the Jusuite riseth up against the Royal Authority of Adam in defence of the Freedom and Liberty of the people and thus argues By Right of Creation saith he Adam had only Oeconomical power but not Political he had a power over his Wife and a Fatherly power over his Sons whilst they were not made Free he might also in process of Time have Servants and a Compleat Family and in that Family he might have compleat Oeconomical Power But after that Families began to be multiplied and Men to be separated and become the Heads of several Families they had the same power over their Families But Political Power did not begin until Families began to be gathered together into one perfect Community wherefore as the Community did not begin by the Creation of Adam nor by his will alone but of all them which did agree in this Community So we cannot say that Adam Naturally had Political Primacy in that Community for that cannot be gathered by any Natural Principles because by the Force of the Law of Nature alone it is not due unto any Progenitor to be also King of his Posterity And if this be not gathered out of the Principles of Nature we cannot say God by a special Gift or Providence gave him this Power For there is no Revelation of this nor Testimony of Scripture Hitherto Suarez Whereas he makes Adam to have a Fatherly power over his Sons and yet shuts up this power within one Family he seems either to imagine that all Adam's Children lived within one House and under one Roof with their Father or else as soon as any of his Children lived out of his House they ceased to be Subject and did thereby become Free For my part I cannot believe that Adam although he were sole Monarch of the World had any such spacious Palace as might contain any such Considerable part of his Children It is likelier that some mean Cottage or Tent did serve him to keep his Court in It were hard he should lose part of his Authority because his Children lay not within the Walls of his House But if Suarez will allow all Adam's Children to be of his Family howsoever they were separate in Dwellings if their Habitations were either Contiguous or at such Distance as might easily receive his Fatherly Commands And that all that were under his Commands were of his Family although they had many Children or Servants married having themselves also Children Then I see no reason but that we may call Adam's Family a Commonwealth except we will wrangle about Words For Adam living 930 years and seeing 7 or 8 Descents from himself he might live to command of his Children and their Posterity a Multitude far bigger than many Commonwealths and Kingdoms 3. I know the Politicians and Civil Lawyers do not agree well about the Definition of a Family and Bodin doth seem in one place to confine it to a House yet in his Definition he doth enlarge his meaning to all Persons under the Obedience of One and the same Head of the Family and he approves better of the propriety of the Hebrew Word for a Family which is derived from a Word that signifies a Head a Prince or Lord than the Greek Word for a Family which is derived from
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies a House Nor doth Aristotle confine a Family to One House but esteems it to be made of those that daily converse together whereas before him Charondas called a Family Homosypioi those that feed together out of one common Pannier And Epimenides the Cretian terms a Family Homocapnoi those that sit by a Common Fire or Smoak But let Suarez understand what he please by Adam's Family if he will but confess as he needs must that Adam and the Patriarchs had Absolute power of Life and Death of Peace and War and the like within their Houses or Families he must give us leave at least to call them Kings of their Houses or Families and if they be so by the Law of Nature what Liberty will be left to their Children to dispose of Aristotle gives the Lie to Plato and those that say Political and Oeconomical Societies are all one and do not differ Specie but only Multitudine Paucitate as if there were no difference betwixt a Great House and a Little City All the Argument I find he brings against them is this The Community of Man and Wife differs from the Community of Master and Servant because they have several Ends. The Intention of Nature by Conjunction of Male and Female is Generation but the Scope of Master and Servant is Preservation so that a Wife and a Servant are by Nature distinguished because Nature does not work like the Cutlers of Delphos for she makes but one thing for one Use If we allow this Argument to be sound nothing doth follow but only this That Conjugal and Despotical Communities do differ But it is no consequence That therefore Oeconomical and Political Societies do the like for though it prove a Family to consist of two distinct Communities yet it follows not that a Family and a Commonwealth are distinct because as well in the Commonweal as in the Families both these Communities are found And as this Argument comes not home to our Point so it is not able to prove that Title which it shews for for if it should be granted which yet is false that Generation and Preservation differ about the Individuum yet they agree in the General and serve both for the Conservation of Mankind Even as several Servants differ in the particular Ends or Offices as one to Brew and another to Bake yet they agree in the general Preservation of the Family Besides Aristotle confesses that amongst the Barbarians as he calls all them that are not Grecians a Wife and a Servant are the same because by Nature no Barbarian is fit to Govern It is fit the Grecians should rule over the Barbarians for by Nature a Servant and a Barbarian is all one their Family consists only of an Ox for a Man-Servant and a Wife for a Maid so they are fit only to rule their Wives and their Beasts Lastly Aristotle if it had pleased him might have remembred That Nature doth not always make one Thing but for one Use he knows the Tongue serves both to Speak and to Taste 4. But to leave Aristotle and return to Suarez he saith that Adam had Fatherly Power over his Sons whilst they were not made Free Here I could wish that the Jesuite had taught us how and when Sons become Free I know no means by the Law of Nature It is the Favour I think of the Parents only who when their Children are of Age and Discretion to ease their Parents of part of their Fatherly Care are then content to remit some part of their Fatherly authority therefore the Custom of some Countreys doth in some Cases Enfranchise the Children of suferiour Parents but many Nations have no such Custome but on the contrary have strict Laws for the Obedience of Children the Judicial Law of Moses giveth full power to the Father to stone his disobedient Son so it be done in presence of a Magistrate And yet it did not belong to the Magistrate to enquire and examine the justness of the Cause But it was so decreed lest the Father should in his Anger suddenly or secretly kill his Son Also by the Laws of the Persians and of the People of the Upper Asia and of the Gaules and by the Laws of the West-Indies the Parents have power of Life and Death over their Children The Romans even in their most Popular Estate had this Law in force and this Power of Parents was ratified and amplified by the Laws of the Twelve Tables to the enabling of Parents to sell their Children two or three times over By the help of the Fatherly Power Rome long flourished and oftentimes was freed from great Dangers The Fathers have drawn out of the very Assemblies their own Sons when being Tribunes they have published Laws tending to Sedition Memorable is the Example of Cassius who threw his Son headlong out of the Consistory publishing the Law Agraria for the Division of Lands in the behoof of the People and afterwards by his own private Judgment put him to Death by throwing him down from the Tarpeian Rock the Magistrates and People standing thereat amazed and not daring to resist his Fatherly Authority although they would with all their Hearts have had that Law for the Division of Land by which it appears it was lawful for the Father to dispose of the Life of his Child contrary to the Will of the Magistrates or People The Romans also had a Law that what the Children got was not their own but their Fathers although Solon made a Law which acquitted the Son from Nourishing of his Father if his Father had taught him no Trade whereby to get his Living Suarez proceeds and tells us That in Process of Time Adam had compleat Oeconomical Power I know not what this compleat Oeconomical Power is nor how or what it doth really and essentially differ from Political If Adam did or might exercise the same Jurisdiction which a King doth now in a Commonwealth then the Kinds of Power are not distinct and though they may receive an Accidental Difference by the Amplitude or Extent of the Bounds of the One beyond the Other yet since the like Difference is also found in Political Estates It follows that Oeconomical and Political Power differ no otherwise than a Little Commonweal differs from a Great One. Next saith Suarez Community did not begin at the Creation of Adam It is true because he had no body to Communicate with yet Community did presently follow his Creation and that by his Will alone for it was in his power only who was Lord of All to appoint what his Sons should have in Proper and what in Common so that Propriety and Community of Goods did follow Originally from him and it is the Duty of a Father to provide as well for the Common Good of his Children as the Particular Lastly Suarez Concludes That by the Law of Nature alone it is not due unto any Progenitor to be also King
his Subjects by the same or other like Restriction of such indifferent things and it is to be presumed if he had not been hindered would have commanded the same or the like Laws OBSERVATIONS Concerning the Original of Government Upon Mr. HOBS his Leviathan Mr. MILTON against Salmatius H. GROTIUS De Jure Belli Mr. HUNTON'S Treatise of Monarchy Arist Pol. Lib. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 THE PREFACE WITH no small Content I read Mr. Hobs's Book De Cive and his Leviathan about the Rights of Sovereignty which no man that I know hath so amply and judiciously handled I consent with him about the Rights of exercising Government but I cannot agree to his means of acquiring it It may seem strange I should praise his Building and yet mislike his Foundation but so it is his Jus Naturae and his Regnum Institutivum will not down with me they appear full of Contradiction and Impossibilities a few short Notes about them I here offer wishing he would consider whether his Building would not stand firmer upon the Principles of Regnum Patrimoniale as he calls it both according to Scripture and Reason Since he confesseth the Father being before the Institution of a Commonwealth was Originally an Absolute Sovereign with Power of Life and Death and that a great Family as to the Rights of Sovereignty is a little Monarchy If according to the order of Nature he had bandled Paternal Government before that by Institution there would have been little Liberty left in the Subjects of the Family to consent to Institution of Government In his pleading the Cause of the People he arms them with a very large Commission of Array which is a Right in Nature for every Man to war against every Man when he please and also a Right for all the People to govern This latter Point although he affirm in Words yet by Consequence he denies as to me it seemeth He saith a Representative may be of All or but of a Part of the People If it be of All he terms it a Democraty which is the Government of the People But how can such a Commonwealth be generated for if every man Covenant with every man who shall be left to be the Representative if All must be Representatives who will remain to Covenant for he that is Sovereign makes no Covenant by his Doctrine It is not All that will come together that makes the Democraty but All that have Power by Covenant thus his Democraty by Institution fails The same may be said of a Democraty by Acquisition for if all be Conquerours who shall Covenant for Life and Liberty and if all be not Conquerours how can it be a Democraty by Conquest A Paternal Democraty I am confident he will not affirm so that in conclusion the poor People are deprived of their Government if there can be no Democraty by his Principles Next If a Representative Aristocratical of a Part of the People be free from Covenanting then that whole Assembly call it what you will though it be never so great is in the state of Nature and every one of that Assembly hath a Right not only to kill any of the Subjects that they meet with in the Streets but also they all have a Natural Right to cut one anothers throats even while they sit together in Council by his Principles In this miserable condition of War is his Representative Aristocratical by Institution A Commonwealth by Conquest he teacheth is then acquired when the Vanquished to avoid present Death Covenanteth that so long as his Life and the liberty of his Body is allowed him the Victor shall have the Vse of it at his pleasure Here I would know how the Liberty of the Vanquished can be allowed if the Victor have the Vse of it at pleasure or how it is possible for the Victor to perform his Covenant except he could always stand by every particular man to protect his Life and Liberty In his Review and Conclusion he resolves that an ordinary Subject hath liberty to submit when the means of his Life is within the Guards and Garisons of the Enemy It seems hereby that the Rights of Sovereignty by Institution may be forfeited for the Subject cannot be at liberty to submit to a Conquerour except his former Subjection be forfeited for want of Protection If his Conquerour be in the State of Nature when he conquers he hath a Right without any Covenant made with the conquered If Conquest be defined to be the acquiring of Right of Sovereignty by Victory why is it said the Right is acquired in the Peoples Submission by which they contract with the Victor Promising Obedience for Life and Liberty hath not every one in the state of Nature a Right to Sovereignty before Conquest which only puts him in possession of his Right If his Conquerour be not in the state of Nature but a Subject by Covenant how can he get a Right of Sovereignty by Conquest when neither he himself hath Right to Conquer nor Subjects a liberty to Submit since a former Contract lawfully made cannot lawfully be broken by them I wish the Title of the Book had not been of a Commonwealth but of a Weal Publick or Commonweal which is the true word Carefully observed by our Translator of Bodin de Republica into English Many ignorant men are apt by the Name of Commonwealth to understand a Popular Government wherein Wealth and all things shall be Common tending to the Levelling Community in the state of pure Nature OBSERVATIONS ON Mr. HOBS's LEVIATHAN OR HIS ARTIFICIAL MAN A Commonwealth I. IF God created only Adam and of a Piece of him made the Woman and if by Generation from them two as Parts of them all Mankind be propagated If also God gave to Adam not only the Dominion over the Woman and the Children that should issue from them but also over the whole Earth to subdue it and over all the Creatures on it so that as long as Adam lived no man could claim or enjoy any thing but by Donation Assignation or Permission from him I wonder how the Right of Nature can be imagined by Mr. Hobs which he saith pag. 64. is a Liberty for each man to use his own Power as he will himself for Preservation of his own Life a Condition of War of every one against every one a Right of every man to every thing even to one anothers Body especially since himself affirms pag. 178. that originally the Father of every man was also his Sovereign Lord with Power over him of Life and Death II. Mr. Hobs confesseth and believes it was never generally so that there was such a jus naturae and if not generally then not at all for one Exception bars all if he mark it well whereas he imagines such a Right of Nature may be now practised in America he confesseth a Government there of Families which Government how small or brutish soever as he calls it is sufficient to destroy
the whole people but to the supream Heads and Fathers of Families not as they are the people but quatenus they are Fathers of people over whom they have a supream power devolved unto them after the death of their soveraign Ancestor and if any can have a right to chuse a King it must be these Fathers by conferring their distinct fatherly powers upon one man alone Chief Fathers in Scripture are accounted as all the people as all the Children of Israel as all the Congregation as the Text plainly expounds it self 2 Chr. 1.2 where Solomon speaks to All Israel that is to the Captains the Judges and to every Governour the CHIEF OF THE FATHERS and so the Elders of Israel are expounded to be the chief of the Fathers of the Children of Israel 1 King 8.1 and the 2 Chr. 5.2 If it be objected That Kings are not now as they were at the first planting or peopling of the world the Fathers of their People or Kingdoms and that the fatherhood hath lost the right of governing An answer is That all Kings that now are or ever were are or were either Fathers of their People or the Heirs of such Fathers or Usurpers of the right of such Fathers It is a truth undeniable that there cannot be any multitude of men whatsoever either great or small though gathered together from the several corners and remotest regions of the world but that in the same multitude considered by it self there is one man amongst them that in nature hath a right to be the King of all the rest as being the next Heir to Adam and all the other subject unto him every man by nature is a King or a Subject the obedience which all Subjects yield to Kings is but the paying of that duty which is due to the supream fatherhood Many times by the act either of an Usurper himself or of those that set him up the true Heir of a Crown is dispossessed God using the ministry of the wickedest men for the removing and setting up of Kings in such cases the Subjects obedience to the fatherly power must go along and wait upon God's providence who only hath right to give and take away Kingdoms and thereby to adopt Subjects into the obedience of another fatherly power according to that of Arist 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A Monarchy or Kingdom will be a fatherly government Ethic. l. 8. c. 12. However the natural freedom of the People be cried us as the sole means to determine the kind of Government and the Governours yet in the close all the favourers of this opinion are constrained to grant that the obedience which is due to the fatherly Power is the true only cause of the Subjection which we that are now living give to Kings since none of us gave consent to Government but only our Fore-fathers act and consent hath concluded us Whereas many confess that Government only in the abstract is the ordinance of God they are not able to prove any such ordinance in the Scripture but only in the fatherly power and therefore we find the Commandment that enjoyns obedience to Superiours given in the terms of Honour thy Father so that not only the Power or right of Government but the form of the power of governing and the person having that power are all the ordinance of God the first Father had not only simply power but power Monarchical as he was a Father immediately from God For by the appointment of God as soon as Adam was created he was Monarch of the World though he had no Subjects for though there could not be actual Government until there were Subjects yet by the right of nature it was due to Adam to be Governour of his posterity though not in Act yet at least in habit Adam was a King from his Creation And in the state of innocency he had been Governour of his Children for the integrity or excellency of the Subjects doth not take away the order or eminency of the Governour Eve was subject to Adam before he sinned the Angels who are of a pure nature are subject to God which confutes their saying who in disgrace of civil Government or power say it was brought in by sin Government as to coactive power was after sin because coaction supposeth some disorder which was not in the state of innocency But as for directive power the condition of humane nature requires it since civil Society cannot be imagined without power of Government for although as long as men continued in the state of innocency they might not need the direction of Adam in those things which were necessarily and morally to be done yet things indifferent that depended meerly on their free will might be directed by the power of Adam's command If we consider the first plantations of the world which were after the building of Babel when the confusion of tongues was we may find the division of the Earth into distinct Kingdoms and Countries by several families whereof the Sons or Grand-children of Noah were the Kings or Governours by a fatherly right and for the preservation of this power and right in the Fathers God was pleased upon several Families to bestow a Language on each by it self the better to unite it into a Nation or Kingdom as appears by the words of the Text Gen. 10. These are the Families of the Sons of Noah after their generations in their Nations and by these were the Nations divided in the Earth after the floud Every one after HIS TONGUE AFTER THEIR FAMILIES in their Nations The Kings of England have been graciously pleased to admit and accept the Commons in Parliament as the Representees of the Kingdom yet really and truly they are not the representative body of the whole Kingdom The Commons in Parliament are not the representative body of the whole Kingdom they do not represent the King who is the head and principal member of the Kingdom nor do they represent the Lords who are the nobler and higher part of the body of the Realm and are personally present in Parliament and therefore need no representation The Commons only represent a part of the lower or inferior part of the body of the People which are the Free-holders worth 40 s. by the year and the Commons or Free-men of Cities and Burroughs or the major part of them All which are not one quarter nay not a tenth part of the Commons of the Kingdom for in every Parish for one Free-holder there may be found ten that are no Freeholders and anciently before Rents were improved there were nothing near so many Free-holders of 40 s. by the year as now are to be found The scope and Conclusion of this discourse and Argument is that the people taken in what notion or sense soever either diffusively collectively or representatively have not nor cannot exercise any right or power of their own by nature either in chusing or in regulating Kings But whatsoever power any people