Selected quad for the lemma: nation_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
nation_n	call_v	church_n	national_a	2,044	5	11.4074	5	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A86680	An addition or postscript to The vindication of the essence and unity of the Church-Catholick visible, and the priority thereof in regard of particular churches. In answer to the objections made against it, both by Mr. Stone, and some others. / By Samuel Hudson ...	Hudson, Samuel, 17th cent.	1658 (1658)	Wing H3263; ESTC R202480	42,930	59

one brick-house and a hundred thousand 〈◊〉 ●ake one tiled roof and a thousand pieces of timber make one timber-house and many individual men be in one family one town one army one Kingdom or Common-wealth So may many individual visible believers be in one Congregation and many Congregations of them bee in one Classis and many Classis in one Province and many Provinces be in one Nation And all the Christian Nations in the world be one universal visible Church and that be an integral When the first gospel-Gospel-Church which might be called general or Catholick in contradistinction to the National Church of the Jews and because then the partition wal between Jew and Gentile was broken down and the cōmission issued forth for teaching all Nations and baptizing them grew too big to meet in one place for all Ordinances it divided it self into many less Assemblies called though improperly and at second hand Churches yet then this division was of an integral into its members not of a genus or general into its species I acknowledge the matter of the visible Church militant universal or visible Kingdom of Christ on earth to be the particular visible believers and the external form thereof to be their joint submitting unto Christ's regiment and laws under his Officers where they dwell but this whole Church when it comes to bee divided it is considered according to the places where those members dwell either in England Scotland Ireland or New-England c and so receive particular denomination from those places but this division is of an integral into its members as the parts respect the whole and of adjuncts into their subject places if they be considered in reference to the places wherein they are contained Look at the Church in genesi saith M. Cawdrey vindic vindiciarum 72. and the single members are the causes thereof as an integral but look on it in analysi in the distribution of it into Congregations and so it giveth essence unto them and they are parcells of that greater integral Though in the constitution of an integral the parts are before the whole as the essential causes thereof yet in the distribution the whole is before the parts Cawd p. 82. And whereas I had proved that the universal 〈◊〉 is not a genus or Church in genere because it doth exist or hath an individual existence of its own which a thing in genere hath not vind p. 79. l. 8. To this argument M. Stone answers by affirming that genus doth exist But when he comes to prove it he proves only that the integral nature of the genus doth exist in the individuals and leaves us from them to abstract the genus which is an universal but proves not that the universal doth exist any where but in the mind of man or Angel Now as it doth exist in the several individuals it is contracted and is an integral and must be loosed from his contraction by abstraction before it can be a logical genus or that thing considered in genere This is as if he should say as it is an integeal it is a genus which he confesseth differs very much There is that which may be abstracted but it doth not exist as abstracted but as contracted So I may in my minde consider a prisoner that is bound with many chains without his chains and so a free-man but I dare not say he existeth a free-man I can abstract a man from his riches learning piety nobility that is endued with them but I cannot say he existeth so Where a thing in genere or general notion or general consideration doth exist but in the understanding I as yet know not Moreover as such a nature doth exist in individuals it is manifold but as I have abstracted it it is but one As it doth exist in individuals each differ from other as M. Stone acknowledgeth ne ratione and by his own Logick all those individuals are opposites and so dissentanies now dissentaneum est quod à re dissentit but one is not a dissentanie much less an opposite to itself Now genus is one because it is totum quod habet partes Therefore you must divest it of existency before you can consider it as a genus or general or thing in genere And to apply it to the whole Church in reference to the members of it the whole Church hath an existence of its own as an integral being individuum as Ames confesseth but as M. Stone 's genus hath no existence but in the species The existence of the whole Church resulteth from the conjoined existence of the members but the existence of a genus is abstracted from the species The whole Oecumenical visible Church hath no species or individual Churches under it whereof it 's the genus but is made up of individual visible believers and then divided into several pieces or parcell which we call particular Congregations Like a piece of ice divided or marked out into many little pieces the great piece of ice is not the genus of them but the integral and they are the members Though the whole Ocean were frozen it would make but a great integral and the several parcels thereof members But it would not be the genus of those parcells for ice in genere is the genus A pail of water is not the genus of the several drops that are in it but is an integral and they are members but water in genere is the genus A heap of sand though there were no more sand in the world but that is not the genus of the particular sands in it but sand in genere So the universal Church is not the genus of particular believers but believer in genere nor of the particular Congregations but Congregation in genere And whereas I had said in my second Argument vind p. 79. l. 30. that Quod habet partes extra partes est totum integrale M. Stone denies it to be a true definition I answer I had it out of Burgersdicius p. 47. and I conceive he defines it so in opposition to that which he calls totum essentiale quod constat ex materiâ formâ for there the parts do mutuo se pervadere loco situ non differunt as the soul and body in man but the parts of an integral quâ integral do differ in both But to make the Argument past his exceptions I shall change onely one word and in that change only express Burgersd his meaning more clearly Quod habet membra extra membra est totum integrale sed ecclesia universalis visibilis habet c. Ergo. The universal Church hath its members one distinct and several beside and without each other whether you consider them to be particular believers which are the prime members or Congregations c. which are secondary And whereas I had said in my third Argument that the whole Church is made up of the visible believers in particular Congregations and of

Plato non est homo in genere c. Put many sticks together and you may make a faggot or cart-load of them but not make wood in genere yea put all the wood in the world together and you may make a great heap and integral of them but you cannot make wood in genere but by mental abstraction and that a man may do from a little as well as a great deal Genus is another thing then all the individuals gathered together Genus is not by conjunction apposition or aggregation but by abstraction Peter or Paul may say this is my entity my substance my body mine animal my humanity as well as my Petriety or my Pauliety It is true a man may abstract and as it were cut out a genus or general nature out of the individuals and consider that alone because there is a foundation for it and a potentiality so a workman when he seeth a piece of Timber may conceive in his mind that if such and such parts were hewen and plained or carved away there would be an Image of the Virgin Mary or a crucifix c. yet no man wil say that there are any such existing Images there for then it were fit to be burnt So the Chimist saith that Sal Sulphur and Mercury are in every thing and boasteth that he can extract hony out of album graekum but they are not formally there but may possibly be extracted by the dissolution of those things so by mental dissolution or abstraction a man may fetch a genus or general out of individuals but it is not formally in them It cānot be denyed but the object of the understanding precedeth the act of it but it never findeth it existing but it is contracted by an individual and to draw forth the general nature the understanding pareth off the contracting differences by abstraction precision or denudation Apprehenduntur universalia non apprehensis ullis particularium differentiis Fonsec Metaphys But I conceive that there is a great difference between animal genus and animal in genere between an existing genus and that thing considered in genere The individual animal existeth but animal in genere existeth not but in the understanding There is existence in every thing but where dwells existence in genere Concretes exist but where do abstracts exist I will not contend whether universals be entia realia or entia rationis because there is a foundation for them in ente reali but they are not formally one but by abstraction Indeed in reference to other genus's a genus is capable of numerical unity Ens is one genus and substance is one genus c. but in reference to particulars existing under them you cannot say there is one genus in Socrates and another in Plato for numerical unity in the strictest sense is proper to individuals as integrals But I will not contend with M. Stone about these notions of existing or extracted genus's I shall leave it to younger heads which have been more lately versed in those studies But if you take genus for the existing physical political mathematical or artificial genus's as M. Stone doth then it is impossible to deny any thing in the world to be a genus for it is of one kinde or other And by that notion every integral is nothing else but a cluster of genus's bound together by the last individual form and so we may make every thing not onely a genus but a heap of genus's and so a man hath more genus's in him then he hath limbs sences and faculties For there is Ens substance body vivens and animal besides humanity and then every limb and sense and faculty have limb and sense and faculty kinde in it There is head kinde and foot kinde and arm kinde and leg kinde c. and after his constitution he is dressed up with nothing but genus's from head to foot And by the like reasoning every thing should be as full of genus's as ever it can hold M. Stone could not think that I did deny this sort of genus to be in the universal Church for I clearly expressed so much Vind. p. 82. Indeed if you consider this society or religion it is a distinct kinde in regard of the Authour laws qualifications of members but in reference to its members it is an integral If this be all that is meant by totum genericum existens it may passe without any dammage to this question So the several companies in London are distinct from other companies yet in reference to their own members they are integrals and in reference to the whole City they are parts i. e. members But all this dispute on which side soever it be cast hurts not my question at all though it may seem to strike at this Chapter of arguments which were taken from grounds which were granted by him against whom I then argued we both by genus meant a thing in genere or general consideration and to that sense I framed my arguments and then comes M. Stone and disputes from an existing genus in actu exercito that hath neither the genus nor form of a genus in it and he strikes at my aguments by that which is not ad idem If M. Ellis's genus and M. Stones were put into a syllogism there would be four terms for they are not the same and had I argued with M. Ellis from an existing integral genus he would have thought me wilde And therefore this is but a logomachy about the word genus one takes it in one sense and the other in another I clearly layd down my meaning in the explication of the question for chap 1. sect 3. I gave different senses of Catholick or general First the Orthodox Churches were called catholick Churches Secondly the Patriarchs Vicar general was called catholick Thirdly Catholick is taken for a logical second notion abstracted by the minde comprehending diverse different species under it in which sense M. Ellis took it Fourthly it is taken in the same sense that we use to take Oecumenical and I took the latter sense and therefore put Oecumenical into the terms of the question and said there that in the question in my sense the Church-catholick existing on earth at the same time is compared with particular Churches existing at the same time also pag. 11. 12. And in denying this Catholick Church to be a genus I took genus in the third sense as M. Ellis did And I shall a little more plainly set it down now The question is Whether the whole company of visible believers in the whole world which is the one visible Kingdom of Christ on earth and is usually called the Catholick or universal Church being considered in respect of the particular visible believers in the particular Nations Towns or Congregations be the genus of them or a great integral whereof they are but members Here was the hinge of the question handled in this chapter And the thing that made the