magnifies that he exposes them as he finds occasion to the view of his Reader in other Parts of his Works besides those I have to do with witness the Fourth Particular of the First Chapter of his Dioptricks or of Light and the manner of Vision by the Telescope where he has this unintelligible Expression If we consider saies he the distinction that a Man Blind from his Nativity can make betwixt the Colour of Trees Water Stones and the like meerly by the use and touch of the Staff he walks with no less certainly than seeing Men can discern Red Yellow or Blew in any visible Object although their differences could be no other in such Bodies than diversities of Motion or the resistance they make to the Blind Man's Staff It has been an undoubted Maxim That whosoever is Blind is no judge of Colours But by the quaint Philosophy of this Author it seems a resolv'd Point That a Man may see without the use of Eyes So that a sightless Man who cannot make a safe Step without a Guide may if conducted to walk to the end of a Street declare certainly of what Shape Figure or Colour every Post is that he touches with the Staff that supports him I confess as I Read this Particular I expected that he would have somewhat more exalted the Conceit by Affirming That a Blind Man might perfectly inspect through the Glasses of the Telescope he there Writes of and next give an account of the Bigness Diameters and various appearances of the Stars colours of the Rain-bow and other Meteors In Summ he might have as well Asserted that the Ear could perform the Office of Seeing as by feeling it could be executed in any kind by a Blind Man's management Nor less unintelligible is the general Definition he gives in the before-mention'd Head of Colours which he Terms no other than various Modalities by which they are receiv'd in Objects of Colour Whereas they are certain Proprieties inseparably appertaining both to animated and inanimated Bodies as sure as a Brown Horse is naturally different from a Gray or Chesnut And 't were a weak Imagination to estimate Colour otherwise than Nature has appropriated it to particular Subjects And whosoever would fancy the contrary let him try whether he can wash a Blackmoor's Face untill it becomes White Another passage he Inserts in the 4th Chapter of his Dioptricks where he states his Idea of the Soul as a distinct Substance separated from the Senses by supposing that 't is the Soul alone and not the Body that is sensibly concern'd As he would infer from Extasie or distracted Contemplation in which Circumstance he conceives that the Soul is totally abstracted from the Corporeal Parts Whilst the Body remains stupified or bereav'd of Sense no less than when by Wounds or Diseases the Brain is prejudic'd But could be Think that in any such disturbance of Body and Mind the Soul does more than live as well as the Body since in that condition 't is impossible for the Soul to act deliberately of any Thing whilst the Senses are disabled or not assisting her Operations Yet in this plight of Body and Mind he is very inclinable to determine the Soul a separate Thinking Substance but incapable of sensibly executing her Intellectual Faculty which is much the same as to allow her in this Case a nonsensical Existence or not able to apprehend any Object without the concurring of the Senses This Objection is undeniably manifest if pertinently consider'd the main Potentials by which are actually effected and compleated the essential Capacities of the Life of the Intellect and Senses as they animatively conspire in the Body of Man For as there are always Extant a sufficient Quantity of the most refin'd Spirits or Quintessence naturally extracted from the Corporeal Temperament and in a wonderful and indiscernable Method diffus'd into the Cells and Crannies of the Brain by which means as the excellent Lord Bacon observes they are able to Move the whole mass or weight of the Body in the most swiftest Operations and Exercise Yet by no search or anatomical Inspection are these admirable Particles or Quintessences of our Nature at all discernable Tho' not to be denied that they consist of quantitative Parts because nothing but Quantity can operate on quantitative Dimensions as signified by Humane Composition Wherefore the wonderful Being and active Force of the material Spirits or Quintessence of the Corporeal Temper can have no other apter Epithet than was given by Democritus to his Notion of Atoms which he conceiv'd by Reason and Experience to be Things really Existing but not to be perceiv'd by the Sense of Seeing This Notion well apprehended is more than sufficient to convict the Tenent of Des-Cartes whereby he would define the Humane Soul to be a distinct Thinking Substance in the Body of Man where it has Being Action and Life yet discharg'd in point of Thought from the Accomplishment it has in the temperial Excellency that it admirably exerts and partakes so that in that Sense it may be term'd the Soul of the Body's temperature If at any time the Seat of the Intellect in the Brain is perplex'd confus'd or detrimentally wounded or stupified the Soul is obstructed for want of its contiguous Passage in the Nerves Arteries and Sinews however subtile the contexture which they derive from the Brain to the Parts of the Body Which could not be is the Soul according to this Author were in Substance essentially distinct from the most refin'd Operations and Attributes that sensibly emerge from the Corporeal Composition Let a Man Contemplate of any Object or Employment of his Senses he shall find is duely consider'd That in the same moment there is a ready Emanation of the Spirits of the Mind to the same purpose which are most contiguous to the several Uses Parts and Temperatures of the Body tho' not otherwise Spiritual Wherefore the Soul may not be improperly term'd equivalently such as by her imperceptible Essence She has in a manner an ubiquitary Efficacy in the total Body and every of its Parts and Members If the Souls of all Mankind be committed to Bodies by God as so many Thinking Substances it must necessarily follow that they all had a precedent Creation and therefore could lose nothing of their Perfection until joyn'd to the Body But if according to the Opinion of Some the Soul is traductionally produc'd and born with the Body as the disparities and temperatures of Men both in Mind and Person seem to be exerted either from Affinity in Blood or parentally propagated by the Connexion of the Bodily Parts and Senses it must according to that Tenent be materially produc'd Wherefore 't is far more probable if the Soul be granted a Thinking Substance united to the Senses by the Ordainment of the Almighty Than to allow it as does Des-Cartes seperately and actively intelligent in the Body of Man Of what kind of Substance this Author would define the Humane Soul
Tenents and Atheism of others As also to their superlative Glory conspicuously distinguish'd from such numbers of Mankind that no farther imploy their Understandings than by Indulging the sensual Satisfactions and Pleasures of Life Amongst whom may be found such an impious sort of Men that to Varnish their evil Examples and stains of Manners would seem refin'd under the Name of Wits And thereby arrogate to themselves an Arbitrary Decision or neglect of whatsoever they please to disallow or is above their Capacities to value And these for the greatest part are antipathiz'd to all polite Science or determine it as a Point resolv'd by them far inferior to their loose Drolleries Lampoons scurrilous Reflections and Abuses impudently pointed against the ingenious Desert and Performances of others as on the Feet of their ignominious Verse they run in the Nation And strange it is that such ungracious Associators should not only have their ordinary Countenancers and Abetters but also their Leaders Men of Title who as their Captain-Generals command their undisciplin'd Lists As if by their endeav urs Ignorance and contempt of Knowledge might be no less prevalent than when the barbarous Goths and Vandals demolish'd Records of precedent Literature But Heaven be thank'd the present Age does yet abound with such laudable Ingenuities and Patrons of Erudition as enough defeat the Malice and Ignorance of illiterate Opposers The only remaining means and strong reserve by which the value of Philosophy with all its Accomplishments may receive suitable Acceptance and Protection To which worthy Personages next to his Royal Highness the Prince of Denmark together with such of eminent Quality who have Incourag'd the Impression is chiefly presented the confiderable Importance of this Book Not doubting that it may be inspected by a Judicious Eye no less valuable in English where it dissents from Des-Cartes than his did receive Applause when publish'd with the best of his Eloquence and Reasons in French or Latin Notwithstanding 't is very observable That some fantastical Judgments no less propensely value French Authors than the reception they give to the Mode of Cloaths that are devis'd by Taylers at Paris But as to the Productions of the Mind by advancement of Science 't is palyably known That the most Learned and Accurate Productions and Inventions of the French have not been only Equall'd but Improv'd by English Writers To which purpose I will instead of many Insert a few Examples Vieta who is acknowledg'd the first Author of the commodious Use of literal Algebra had he liv'd contemporary with our English Harriot must have granted That the most curious Part or in which consists the main Secret of that profound Science was discover'd and compleated by him And so well perceiv'd by Des-Cartes that he in the manner of a Plagiary derives the most exquisite Part of his Algebraical Skill and Process from our Learned Harriot And so publish'd to the World in the History of Algebra eruditely compil'd by Dr. Wallis To Harriot may be added our famous Oughtred whose deep Mathematical Knowledge and Perfection of Theorems was never exceeded by any French Writer In the Judgment of Vieta it was thought impossible by knowing the simple Anomaly of the Sun or Planets Geometrically to find the Equated the contrary of which is evidently prov'd by the Learned Bp. Seth Ward in his Book Entitled Astronomia Geometrica If the Ingenious Peter Ramus was the first Deviser of the Analysis in Numbers of the Cubick Root the Operation is much facilitated by the accurate Invention of Mr. Joseph Raphson in his Converging Series to his praise now extant And what yet more superlatively Exceeds to the Honour of this Island both Ancient and Modern Inventions is admirably evident in the Structure of Logarithms Compil'd by the famous Lord Napier By which the former Difficulties of Mathematical Computations in every kind are totally wav'd and in their stead facile Calculations by Logarithms resolv'd with ease and delight If Philosophically compar'd French Authors with English or instead of more Des-Cartes be mention'd according to the Esteem allow'd him by some Persons The Works of our Incomparable Bacon may be Instanc'd as an experimental Confutation of the Failings of the other with no less assurance than that probable Truth condemns Fiction Nothing being more gracious in a Philosopher than a natural discovery of Causes and Effects Or indeed when the Parts of a Naturalist and Philosopher are duely joyn'd Which actually elevated the admirable Reputation allow'd to the Georgicks of Virgil because in them he manifestly discloses the Effects and Operations of Nature obviously agreeable to common Observation And I cannot liken any Works more eminently to the excellency of his than the natural manner of Philosophy deliver'd by unparallel'd Bacon Whereas if we confide on the Principles of Des-Cartes we must rely on fictitious Inventions instead of warantable Experience as will appear by the ensuing Remarks on the Parts I Treat of No Man can doubt that any Thing is more requisite or deserv'dly commendable than the Endeavours whereby to fathom such Depths of Science as pertinently contribute to the profoundest Search and Satisfaction of the Humane Mind Amongst which none are more considerable than such as most Emphatically conduce to the Apprehending the wonderful Manner by which the animated Being and Life with all their Proprieties exist in the Body of Man And what Parts of Contemplation or refin'd Literature can so naturally enbellish the Intellect as the rational discernment of the Being of the Humane Soul and how it operatively conspires with its Corporeal Residence The understanding of which if sufficiently acquir'd may be deem'd the Quintessence or Soul of Philosophical Knowledge as it instructs us to comprehend the Nature of the Soul that appertains to our Persons Many are the Opinions of Philosophers not necessary to be mention'd here by which they differ not more from themselves than Des-Cartes does from all of them concerning the Manner of Existence and operating of the Soul in the Humane Body The main of whose Tenent or Idea as he calls it is That the Humane Mind being a Thinking Substance committed to the Body by God may sensibly apprehend Objects without the use of the Senses or being precedently entertain'd by them By which Opinion of his he opposes common Experience together with that noted Philosophical Axiom That nothing is in the Intellect which was not first in the Senses If a Man becomes accidentally Blind there is not therefore with the loss of his Sight any such Curtain drawn before his Imagination that totally obscures the Memorial of Things formerly impress'd on his Intellect by the Senses So that the Maxim of Des-Cartes is far more Blind than a sightless Man as he states his Inference ' Tho' upon this obscure Principle he erects the main Foundation of the first Part of his Philosophy as it relates to Humane Cognition Notwithstanding he is so fond of the New-fashion'd Ideas and Notions which he there not a little
all Things of which we can in any manner doubt as also supposing them false we may easily suppose That there is no God no Heaven no Bodies and that we have neither Hands or Feet or any Bodies But not that we who so imagine are nothing because it is absurd to conceive That whatsoever thinks does not Exist at the Time of its Thinking Wherefore he concludes That he is and that he Thinks is of all the most certain Truth that can be acquired by Philosophical Order Who would not judge That so wild an Invention as this in order to Improve Knowledge might not rather proceed from some Person in Bedlam than from Des-Cartes Of whom if Interrogated how he comes to suppose That a Man may point-blank on the account of his Fiction deny the Being of a God together with all the visible Particulars already mention'd As to the Existence of the Deity he that considers the necessity of its Concession as he beholds the wonderful Conduct of the Universe with so many miraculous Objects as are contain'd therein will as soon give credit to any Forgery of Fables as to doubt of the World 's Omnipotent Creator And no less impossible to acquiesce in his other Suppositions there being no Body that has his Eyes to See and Hands and Feet can doubt That he discerns That which is called Heaven above his Head and that he feels with Hands and treads on the Earth with Feet But if you 'l pass the Supposition of Des-Cartes he will assure you That both Seeing and Feeling is not so Intelligible as Ego cogito and Ego sum Whereas in truth I neither can understand That I either Live or Think but as my Senses Conspire with my Intellect If not one may as well conclude That he may live without Thinking of whatsoever he knew before or was sensibly requisite to his Being and Life So nakedly has this Author stript the Humane Soul from the necessity of participating with the Body and This he farther undertakes to Affirm by his next Step where he positively expresses That there is no other Method of defining the Nature of the Mind and its distinction from the Body Adding That it may be done by Examining what we are and supposing all Things false that are diverse from us whence says he we may perspicuously apprehend That no extension Figure local Motion nor any Thing like these Attributed to the Body could appertain to our Nature On which account he concludes That meer Cogitation is more to be preferred in point of certainty than any Corporeal Thing that could be Apprehended To which I Answer That had it been demanded of this thinking Gentleman Whether at the time he writ This Treatise he did not Contemplate of some Bodily Notion For how could he Pen the Wording in any Kind of Extension Figure local Motion or the like and be without Thought of their Being when he nam'd them such Had he been in that Season to have Answer'd This Querie it must have posed his Contemplating in the singular way he proposes And if the Author of this Conceit could not perform what he requires it could not be Doctrinal to others It being as Impossible totally to separate the Mind from the Senses as to think of a Non-Entity or what has no Existence which were a contradiction to Nature and the sensible Impression adherent to the Intellect with the Being of Things and such s cannot be apprehended by it otherwise than as they are Compossed of quantitive and Bodily Parts Could I imagine another World as vast as This with as many Individual Beings and Creatures of all Sorts as are contained within the Compass of the Universe we Inhabit I could think of no other in all its Parts than such a One or in likeness the same with This that had with all its Particulars been the precedent sensible Object of my Understanding So heterogeneous to the Nature of Humane Comprehension is the Principle of Des-Cartes whereby he endeavours to separate the Imagination from the Commixture it has with our Senses These Discussions if duly considered are sufficient to defeat the farther Progress of his Maxims which in Effect will be liable to the same Confutation But to give him the Scope he takes together with the Advantage he can make by it let us admit the Question he makes in his Ninth Particular which he conceives very Emphatical to the purpose and where he has this passage supposing by a kind of Interlude of his Fancy himself to See to Walk and have Being and all these Corporeally performed yet makes no certain Conclusion from thence Because says he I may sleeping think I See or Walk notwithstanding my Eyes be not open and that I move not from the Place I was in and perhaps as if I conceiv'd that I had no Body All which if referred to the Operation of the Mind whereby he Imagin'd or Thought that he saw and walked he determines certain And I Affirm no less if to the Imagination be annexed the Impression made in it by the Senses For so I can Think that I saw or walk'd when I Slept which Imports no more than that there was a Residence in my Intellect conveyed by my Senses of my Seeing and observing of my walking Person when I was really Awake So that it must be a very empty Notion to conceive That I can be Personated meerly by the working of my Brain without Comprehending any concern of the Senses For Example Seeing or Moving must needs have a necessary Relation to my Bodily Parts and the Senses that appertain to Motion as I cannot move on the Ground but as on it I feel I move So that all that can be Implied from this visionary Conceit of Des-Cartes is That the Fancy imaginarily Retain'd what before had been actually performed by the Senses He proceeds to Explicate That misconception by not orderly Philosophizing is the absolute Cause that the Mind is not accurately distinguished from the Body And here methinks he imposes too critical a Task to be practically Discharged by the common Use of Humane Understanding considering how few the World affords that are philosophically Accomplished or sufficiently Instructed to that purpose Or if they were could they be therefore convinced That his manner of distinguishing the Mind from the Body is not a more refined Conceit than can be exerted by any Imagination that resides in Bodily Composition Is it not manifest that Elementary Substances are the Ingredients of our Constitutions as they temper our Flesh and Bloud And can the Soul that resides within their Circumference and Acts by them contemplate her self discharged from them yet at the same time as is acknowledged by Des-Cartes imploy her Imagination in Representing such Objects as could not be known to her but as the Senses had made their Impressions on Things on the Intellect that in their material Proprieties and Shapes had been precedently apprehended by them And it were unnaturally absurd to annex
Thought to any other Method actuated by the Brain of Man It being no less Insignificant to allow the Mind a distinct Exercise within the Body the Region of her Dominion than to suppose a Prince to Govern without the requisite Assistance of his Subjects Thus far I conceive stand sufficiently Taxed the groundless Mistakes if not Fictions of this Learned Author Whose Defects did chiefly Emerge from his attributing to his Abilities as if proceeding from him as the first of Men that by their Grandeur could remove such Difficulties that in their Nature are too perplexed for the Resolution of the eruditest Pen as they relate to the manner of Being and Acting of the Humane Soul Which if considered absolutely spiritual the Question may be How any Thing perfectly spiritual can be Inclosed Actuate and Exist in a Corporeal Substance Since in a Philosophical Construction nothing can act on Body or have Being with it in any consideration but what is composed of Bodily Parts If contrarily the Mind or Soul of Man be deemed a material Essence the Attribute of Immortality conferred on its Dignity by common Opinion will be debas'd by That Definition notwithstanding it may be affirmed That whatsoever its Substance is or manner of being in the Humane Body it is equally facile to the Omnipotent to eternilize its Existence as to Transform by Resurrection the Dust of a rotten Carkass to the material Figure and Parts of the Body that had been so consumed In the next place he takes for granted That the Mind may with that simplicity understand it self as it may doubt of all Things else But how can that bare Intelligence be Attributed to the Mind that cannot by what has been before discussed so much as Ruminate of any Thing of which it does not participate with the Senses The Reason he gives to the contrary is That the Mind finding in its self many Ideas which so long as it contemplates and of nothing without it self either Affirms or Denies it cannot be deceived But can he prove that the Mind at that time he proposes has no Comixture with the Senses The Argument he gives to make good his Assertion is That the Mind being furnished with divers Notions composeth Demonstrations to which so long as it attends it assures it self that they are true And what these Ideas are he Exemplifies by Affirming That the Mind is replenished with Ideas of Numbers and Figures besides common Notions amongst which this that if to Equals be added Equals there shall remain Equals and the like on which ground he proves That the three Angles of every plain Triangle are Equal to two Right Which cannot be denied by any Man that understands Mathematical Certainties But must every Man that Reads Des-Cartes be so skilled in that Science as to be able to Demonstrate That the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two Right Ones which many thousands of Men are not able to perform And if not they will be little advantaged by the Notions here mentioned of this Author However to treat him in his own Method and for satisfaction of such as are mathematically knowing Can it be denyed That taking the half of Four there will equally remain Two And this must properly signifie the Substracting from some Numerical Quantity as it really Relates to its Arithmetical Proportion or Measure it being impossible to take the half of Nothing Wherefore the Maxim must have reference to some substantial Thing or as the Figure of Four had been precedently seen or written to whatsoever purpose it might sensibly Relate and if so the Demonstration cannot meerly proceed from the Mind without the concurrance of the Sense as I cannot tell One Two Three and not be apprehensive that I count Something And he that would determine to the contrary may as well Affirm That a Man can tell Cash without the Use of his Feeling and Fingers or fancy Money in a Bag and be able to compute its Summ by the notional operation of the Mind according as it is applyed by this Author Who to exalt the height of his Ideas tho' far incompatible to what he designs 'em he undertakes to prove That amongst the Troops of Fancy which may be exerted by the Brain there will be found one of that sublime Tendency that the most perfect Existence or Being of a God may be implyed by it together with such a necessary and eternal Being as distinguishes it from the possible or contingent Existence that may be attributed to all other Things If This Doctrine be true I may consequently determine That the Methods of Providence by which the Universe and whatsoever it contains Subsist are but so many Contingencies or that 't was accidental that the Sun did yesterday Ascend to the Meridian if not Deified by an Idea of his Existence Whereas there must be such a determined and necessary Being of Providence by the Decree of the Almighty in the Conduct and Preservation of the Universe with whatsoever it contains that it cannot have a Period otherwise than by a total Cessation of its natural Effects and Operations as so many Bounties conferred from above on the vast Circumference of the World together with every Individual Thing that appertains to it Not that it can be denyed That by the usual Effects of Nature no Minute does pass in which there are not produced Innumerable Alterations as in course Generation and Corruption succeed one another in the various Changes of all Things that have Life and Growth Yet not to be implied That by any Idea of them that can be imagined according to This Author is to be understood that they accidentally subsist or vary in their manner of Being which would by Construction Impute Contingencies to the Incomprehensible Wisdom and Methods of Providence tending to the Conservation and Production of Men and Creatures But to return to the remaining Part of his Fourteenth Particular where he undertakes with ample Assurance to exalt his Idea of the Being of a God by the Proof that is to be made that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two Right from whence as a parallel certainty he concludes the Existence of God supremely Perfect But can it be Affirmed of any Idea as he terms it That because it is a Mathematical Truth That the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two Right that it is sufficient to prove from That Theorem the miraculous Being and Perfection of Omnipotencie And thus he again supposes That all Men must be so far Geometrically Knowing or they will be deficient or without demonstrative Conviction that the Deity does Exist If This Doctrine were true it were no less requisite that all Mankind should have Recourse betimes to the School of Euclid where they might be Instructed as fully of the necessary Proportions of all the Angles and sides of that Figure together with what its Area contains in Feet Inches or the like naturally and usefully applicable to Corporeal Measures
if by the Enlightning of our Minds he means the Conviction we have from the Works and Operations of Providence that conspicuously assure us That Omnipotence is their Supreme Cause and Author But if he explains fully his meaning as he seems to do by what follows in his next Particular his Sense is That if we have a clear and distinct discernment of any Object by the Faculty of Knowing given as from God we cannot be deceived Insomuch that he Affirms That God were a Deceiver if he had bestowed on us a perverse and false Conception of Things instead of a true One If This Opinion of his were sound and that God had so impowr'd the Humane Mind that it could of it self serenely distinguish Truth from Falsehood What Reason can be given why All Men should not equally be perspicuously Intelligent as most suitable to the Capacious Munificence of the Almighty And consequently every Man's Reason and Senses irresistably compliant Since 't is not Imaginable That such a Gift Authorized by God could be less than Universal and perfect as it must needs affect the Understandings of All Mankind and next compleat an Equality of Knowledge and Goodness with all other requisite Endowments of the Soul The possibility of which is strenuously asserted by this Author in his 30th Particular where he Affirms That these admirable Gifts may be accomplished as well Sleeping as Waking if duely adverted how our clear Thoughts may be distinguished from such as are confused Which Direction of his if rendered practicable would amply tend to Humane Felicity by cleansing the Minds of Vicious Persons Fools and Knaves nay abrogate the use of Bedlam by a Recipe from the Pen of Des-Cartes Who Affirms That 't is but being thoughtfully Industrious and Imaginatively separate either Sleeping or Waking the Purity of Thoughts from such as are confused But were it Interrogated Whether any Sorts of Men before mentioned since none are excepted by him might not Affert with as much Confidence as he undertakes to direct them That they had either Dreaming or Waking a clear Idea of Truth in one Kind or other which could not be mistaken if avowed by them that the Notion was clear and distinct and therfore perfect Because not otherwise as he alledges the Gift of God whereby the Mind of Man is Enabled to separate by pure Imagination Truth from Falshood If Distinction of Thought from Thought by any Power of the Mind can be termed a certain Representation of Truth and principally meant of God or whatsoever is ordain'd by him it must as has been already proved be grounded on some admirable Prospect of the Works of the Omnipotent and thence conclude as a mighty Truth That he wonderfully Exists or it could fix on nothing In Summ should a Man endeavour to Refine the clearest Conception that he could possibly have of a Spiritual Existence his Imagination might not be so Immensely dilated as to meet with no Corporeal Stop from the prone Concurrence of the Intellect with the Senses and the familiar Admittance that is yielded by the Mind to their Objects Yet such a Man might assure himself That he as certainly discerns the Truth of Bodily Objects Entertained by his Imagination as can be pretended by any Method of Thinking prescribed by this Author And thus ' t is too commonly the Fate of many to be seduced by the over-curiosity and search made by particular Persons who would build their Esteem on the Novelty of their Tenents the usual allurements of Inconstancy in the Humane Soul Till rejected by Time they are held no farther useful than Almanacks out of Date Whether the same Success may not be expected relating to some Parts of the Writings of Des-Cartes where he undertakes to Improve Knowledge by Methods more Consonant to Fiction than Science not a little to the disrepute of otherwise his vast Abilities I leave to the Reader to determine In his 9th page he gives us this Caution That notwithstanding God can be no Deceiver yet frequently it happens that we deceive our selves which is no less Divine as to God then certain that Mankind are diversly Erroneous as more or less their Frailties are incident to their Dispositions and Natures But if granted according to his often repeated Maxim of Humane Knowledge That Perfection of Thought is so clearly applicable to the Humane Mind that the cumber of sensible Objects may by Idea be totally emptied from it and nothing remain but perfect Intelligence How according to that Tenent can he Affirm That the Mind does admit Deception If suitable to his common Notion not seldome Instanced by him the Mind may be so notionally and wonderfully Illuminated that it cannot be without Certainty because its perfect Apprehension must be given from something more perfect which is God And no Body can think otherwise if the means that God has Ordained by his Works be regardfully considered On which account 't is not to be understood how his manner of Thought can have else any contiguity with our Reason or Senses And which I suppose has been enough before Confuted In his following Words he endeavours to be plainer understood by granting That in the Intellect is Volition as well as Imagination which by its Impulse on the Humane Mind renders it erroneously obnoxious But can it be consistent with the Notion so much applauded by him of a perfect Idea of Truth essential as he defines it to the Humane Mind and notwithstanding that Perfection to admit the possibility of being Imposed on by the Will Is in effect to acknowledge That there is no such perfect Determination in the Mind whereby to distinguish Truth from Falsehood or if there were how can it be supposed That the Certainty of the Imagination when filling of the Mind would not subject the Will to the reality of Truth conceived by it Which to deny were no less absurd than to Assert That the Soul by its own consent did Rebel against its main Prerogative and Renounce the highest Propriety of its Dominion So that no Notion of Truth in a Natural Course can have any stedfest Assurance in the Mind if lyable to the Refractory Contradiction it may have from the Will Insomuch That had he named the Notional Idea he so much contends for an Irresistable Inspiration he must have been more Divinely understood by his Reader By which he might have inferred That by a zealous Contemplation of the Mind there would have been wanting no perfect Certainty or Conception of all Matters tending to Holy Religion and Life Things very necessary and exceedingly conducing to Universal Satisfaction and Repose of the Soul if such an agreeable and unerrable Idea could manifestly have Issued from the meer Result of Thought without being beholding to any Intermediate Work or Conduct of Providence to sublimate the Speculation But enough has been before Inserted in Opposition to the manner of Thinking prescribed by his Pen and for which as his main fund he requires no more
than that a Man should Imagine That there is something in being more Perfect then himself All which he assures might be accomplished by all Mankind as a Gift from above conferred on the Soul did not the peremptory Sway of the Will resist the clear discernment of Truth Inherent in the Mind For whose single and unconfinable Perfections notwithstanding he had averred them before he soon afterwards acknowledges their Limitation in these Words The Intellect saies he extends its preception but to few Things offered unto it What he would mean by Things offered unto it unless actual Objects is not to be understood neither does he signifie how he would otherwise be apprehended by the Epression which can have no numerical or specifical Construction except he had Nominated any real Thing or Object represented by the Imaginary Faculty of the Mind From whence it may be concluded That he does in this Place in his own terms however dissentaneous to what he had formerly Asserted enough concede That there can be no other than a limited Idea to Things consisting of Matter Form and Bodily Parts It being no less Unnatural than Impossible That the Intellect should at one Time be conversant with Objects of Sense and at another be wholly intent on meer Speculation without them Yet he undertakes to Inform How this unnatural repugnancy of Thought may pass on the Authority of his Tenent by Impeaching of the Humane Will for Arbitrary Compelling of the Mind to be Confused and Finite whereas it would otherwise distinguish by clear and distinct Certainty whatsoever was imagined by it And yet he could not but know that it is Inconsistent with the Essential Method of Rational Understanding to averr That the Judiciary Part of the Mind can be so compulsively managed or streightned by the Will Notwithstanding that the contrary is far more Intelligible in respect that there can be no actual tendency of Thought in the Soul of Man but must have a necessary Consent of the Will It being absurd to Imagine That a Man can Think of any Thing without its Assent and Concurrence which were no better Sense than if one could be said to Think and not be a voluntary Thinker If duely considered the Faculties by which the Understanding is compleatly Executed 't is very demonstrable that the Mind is not more Annexed to the Will than furnished by the Memory whose Office is to keep the main Records of the Soul and from their numerous Catalogue present such Memorials as are occasionally proper to Attract the complyance of the Understanding and Will There being no real Thought on whatsoever Object imployed other than what has been in Substance or Similitude by the Memory precedently retain'd And therefore unwarrantably Asserted the Supposition of this Author whereby he would Inferr the separate Actings of the Faculties of the Soul or the possibility of clear Perception without their Concurrence True it is that Humane Understanding is too frequently Sway'd Impedited and Corrupted by the impetuousness of the Will as it conspires with the Appetite and Senses which by their plausible and importunate Temptations so prevail on the Understanding that its Rational Excellence is in many Kinds debased as it allows their Sensual Admittance but still no otherwise than as it consents with the Will And therefore not truly inferred by this Author that the Intellect is so wildly guided and imposed on by the Will that it absolutely resigns or deserts its Rational Throne or any clear Intelligence that by the Gift of the Almighty is naturally Inherent in the Mind of Man But rather betrayed by the Treachery of the Will and Senses to impare by its frail complyance the requisite Intelligence and Prerogative that ought to be inseparable from its Supreme Dominion Wherefore this Learned Monsieur after he thoroughly labour'd the most concise Criticisms of his Brain by endeavouring to prove That the Faculty of clear and distinct Perception was Inherent in the Mind He does notwithstanding acknowledge in divers Passages of the Treatise I deal with That the Mind cannot so exert its Jurisdiction as not to be Perplexedly or Confusedly prevailed on by the Will Which he fully Attributes to the Inveiglement of the Understanding caused by the Conspiring of the Will with the Senses and the natural Freedome by which it Operates on the Intelligent Capacity of the Humane Soul Which is in Substance the compleat Sense of several Particulars Written by him but most especially in his 38 Head where he grants That the perspicuity of Discernment conferred on the Soul by Divine Appointment is no farther Absolute than as it meets with a voluntary Assent by which it is either made our perfect Apprehension or on the contrary evaded by the Actual Freedome of the Will For which he gives this Instance in this manner Embellish'd The Will saies he together with the Senses ought to compleat the Allegiance they owe to the Sovereignty of the Humane Intellect as God's select and natural Vicegerent over the Body and Members which being frequently violated by the irregular Conduct of the Will and prevalent Complyance it obtains from the Appetite and Senses the genuine Duty is renounced that ought to be perfectly paid to the native Monarchy of the Mind and instead thereof a Foreign and Sensual Usurpation raised by the confus'd Mobile of the Senses This Paraphrase may be Emphatically allowed on his Words nor can it be denyed That the excellent Faculty with which the Understanding is imbued is not by innumerable Depravations erroneously misguided by the proneness of the Dispensation it gives to the Importunate Sensualities Incident to Humane Constitutions Which is very manifest in the different Qualifications and Tempers of the Body and Mind as by common Experience some Individuals of Mankind excell in Prudence and Moralities of Life the Dispositions of others Insomuch that it may be questioned Whether or no from a Natural Course of Providence the different temperatures of Body and Mind do not proceed And therefore more prevalent if not hardly to be Resisted All which upon the Matter is precedently acknowledged by himself where he confesses That notwithstanding the Soul of Man is Enlightened by God with clear Perception it is lyable to the depraved Conduct of the Will and Senses But how he can exempt the Understanding from such a contiguous Depravation and require its separate Intelligence yet grant as he does That the Humane Body and Soul are Conjoyned and Exist as all Things do by the Ordination of God tho' no one Body and Soul but operatively different from others and no less various than Corporeal Features are ocularly distinguished So that the Soul tho' given by God has no absolute assurance of unerrable Perfection notwithstanding that according to his Doctrine it cannot be destitute of perfect Discernment tending to all requisite Certainty in whatsoever it Determines But had he been ask'd Why every Thinking Man who grants that he Exists and all Things else by the admirable Dispensation of the
Omnipotent should not be proportionably compleated by his Understanding and Senses whereby there might result an unerrable Perception or Notion of Things evident from such as are confus'dly understood The Quere would doubtless pose as Learned a Thinker as was this Author As also if supposed such a positive Certainty in Humane Understanding as he undertakes to Assert Why it should be thought to be so insufficient a Gift of God that it should not at all Times be able to over-rule or not absolutely suppress the Imperfect Assaults and erroneous Temptations of the Will and Senses Notwithstanding that Experience assures That there is no Universal Humane Perfection either known or practised And as certain it is That he would not have presented the World with so many Inventions of his Brain whereby to explain the Principles he Avowes if he had thought That every Man's Intelligence or Capacity of Thinking had been evident or not wanted the Instructions of his Pen It being absurd to conceive That the Soul should be sufficiently Capacitated from God to distinguish betwixt certain and uncertain Cogitations and want any Advertisement from Man more Methodically to advantage its Intelligent Faculty Of which he amply concedes That no Man can be assured of its perspicuous Execution by reason of the powerful Reluctancy and Impediment it receives from the Will and Senses To as little purpose does he offer his Distinction betwixt the Act of Volition and the Assent to be deceived that proceeds from the Inclination that the Understanding has to be swayed by the Senses But how any Man can be said to Assent without the voluntary Freedome and Concurrence of his Will is more like a Contradiction than rationally to be Apprehended And must in his own Phrase tend to the defeating of the Amplitude of Knowledge bestowed by God on the Humane Mind if rendered conditional or subordinate to our voluntary Complyance By which manner of Discussions he has confusedly Involved the Serenity he would allye to his Principles in order to the unerrable Perception Attributed by him to the Intellectual Faculty Yet after several Passages of this Nature he seems to Recant them in his 43 Particular where he peremptorily Affirms That it is as impossible to the mistaken if we yield our Assent to such Things as we clearly understand as to believe That God is a Deceiver If this Tenent were true the Brain of every Man would as it were by Divine Decree be filled with Certainties But how assured of this Infallible Discernment the Answer that must be given from the Principle of Des-Cartes is by clearly distinguishing of Things by the perspicuous Faculty of the Humane Intellect Because saies he it rarely happens That any Man will yield his spontaneous Aslent to any Thing of which he has not a veritable assurance from his Understanding But if duely considered how numerously the World is Replenished with Mankind of all Ages and Complexions that give up their Assents to the Dictates of others as they conceive them to be more Intelligible than themselves and yet in so doing however they erre may not be less confident of direct Perception than any of their Tutors To be plain were there such an absolute Gift conferred on the Soul by Divine Appointment 't is not to be denyed That Men Women and Children would be equally Gifted and accordingly distinguish by the undeniable Clearness of their Intellects all Notions of Things certainly to be apprehended or dubiously to be rejected Because God as he Affirms Has endued the Soul with a separate Jurisdiction and perfect Determination without the Assistance or Concurrence of the Will and Senses and therefore as a compleat Donative from Above might have a ripe Discernment before the Bodily Parts grow to Perfection And if so there is more Reason to expect That it should Actuate alike perspicuously the Intellectual Faculty in the Youth Age and Sexes of Mankind than that they should be differently Judicious or disagreeably subject to the Imbecillities of their Natural Compositions as they appear to common Observation Yet this Conclusion has as near a Resemblance to his Premises as Grass to Grass This Reflection may well have a pertinent Allowance if considered with what confidence he Averrs That God has so disposed the Soul in the Body of Man that it can exactly distinguish of Truth and Falsehood in every Consideration Whereas the contrary is rather manifest as our Corporeal Existencies are providentially sustained By which it appears that in Course of Nature the Life is no otherwise Ensouled in the Body than as it is Complicated with the Affections and Tinctures of the Senses And from whence the Actâ—ons of the Mind suitably Exert their Operations And this is very apparent from the Natural Concourse of Elementary Ingredients that mix with our Dispositions and Moralities of Life So that 't is not to be doubted That by a Natural Conduct and Capacity appropriated to their Bodily Constitutions some Men are more Scientifically Intelligent Discreet and Temperate than others As contrarily the vast Numbers of Inconsiderate Imprudent Idiots and Frantick Persons in several Kinds are every where Evident which can have no other Cause than Issuing from the Irresistible Sourse of their Corporeal Tempers together with the Tides of Commotion and Disturbance on which the Soul as on so many Impetuous Billows is more or less perpetually Fluctuated Wherefore 't is not a little bold in this Author who peremptorily Affirms That there is a clear and distinct Perception on all Accounts Resident in the Understanding if as he requires the Prejudices we have from our Constitutions and Bodily Imperfections were distinctly avoided by separating the Intelligence of the Mind from all Intermixture of the Senses as a Faculty conferred by God on the Humane Intellect Which to deny according to his Notion were all one as to term God a Deceiver I call'd this his Tenent bold before and I may add to it Presumption and Ignorance beyond expectation in so Learned a Writer Might he not as well have Affirmed that a Man can have an unerrable Prospect and Conception of the manner of the Existence of the Omnipotent as also of the Original Being of the Universe together with Mankind and every Individual Animal and Thing within its total Extent had there been such a Divine Gift bestowed on the Intellectual Faculty And must have been far more Infallibly manifest in the Uniting of Religion tending to the Worship of God which doubtless as the most necessary Intelligence would have been Conferred by the Almighty whereby he might be more unanimously Adored by all Mankind But this is not so Decreed by God nor in the Power of Man to accomplish by Resisting as he Insinuates the Prejudices and Incapacities incident to our Innate Tempers of Body and Mind Not that I deny that there is a constant visible Conviction palpably discernable in the Works of the Almighty by which the total World is Miraculously Constituted from whence may be fully
concluded without any help of the Method or Idea of Thought delivered by Des-Cartes that God does Exist and is to be Worship'd And he that otherwise Inferrs must Repine against the Measures of Knowledge Providentially Ordained which were all one with the Incongruous and Exorbitantly absurd Assertion of this Author That implyes a Deceptiom in God if in effect he did not deceive the determin'd Progression of his Providence in its Natural Conduct and Operation by dispensing to All Mankind an unerrable Apprehension of every Truth that ought to be most requisitely understood however disproportion'd to the Tempers of Mind and Body or experimentally repugnant to the Ordain'd Course of Nature differently manifest in the Faculties of the Soul Science and Gifts as they are variously specified and proportioned in Humane Persons Not that the Intellectual Capacity is thereby so generally or naturally Disproportioned as not palpably to discern all requisite Truths expanded in the Miraculous Works of the Omnipotent which otherwise had been Impertinently exposed to the sensible Conviction of our Understanding Insomuch that every vulgar Sense if not Slothful or Regardless or not naturally deprived of their Intellectual Faculty or not made so Happy as to be induced by proper Instruction and Teaching cannot but acknowledge from the Facts and Conduct of Providence that they are the Effects of an Infinite Cause and consequently no other than so many Infallible Convictions that the Deity does Exist and ought to be Ador'd And whosoever Affirms to the contrary does in effect Arraign Providence or term it a Deceiver together with such visible Wonders as are Externally manifest and whereby we receive sensible Apprehension of the Being of a God tho' Invisible to our Eyes Wherefore the Tenent of this Author That there is a Power in the Mind of Man to distinguish by meer Idea Truth from Falsehood must be a very Imperfect Notion there being nothing more difficult if not Impossible than for the Humane Soul to be so far Disrob'd of its habitual Impediments the Senses as clearly to discern at all Times the most requisite Truths Because if at any one time the Idea of the Mind as he defines it be less Perfect than at another it is impossible for any Man by that manner of Speculation to be secure That he does not Erroneously Contemplate by not effectually separating the Purity of meer Imagination from all the Defects Incident to Humane Nature Notwithstanding if you will rely upon the Notion of Des-Cartes he tells you That God were a Deceiver unless the Soul of Man given from above were not by Executing his Manner of Idea an Infallible Discerner of Truth from Error Which he is no more able to prove than if he had undertaken to convince the World That by Imagination the Soul may discharge it self from its Co-habitation with the Senses or that in a Notional Conception both Parts of a Contradiction may be determined true Which is the same with his peremptory Contradiction of the open and powerful Truth of God's Existence manifest in the Being of the Universe and all it contains by Affirming That 't is possible by meer Thinking to apprehend that there is a Deity without the wonderful Objects and Means of Providence evidently conveyed to the Eyes of our Reason and Senses True it is That the Intelligible Faculty has a fervent and Indefatigable Desire of apprehending in the most Spiritual and divinest Conception such Things as might sublimely accomplish the Understanding Which restless Endeavour in the Humane Soul is no less apparent than endlessly continued in various Searches and Inquisitions whereby to Determine on the most considerable Accounts whatsoever the divided Tenents and Notions of Men would most satisfactorily Reconcile But such is the Infelicity of the Soul that as it is Incumbered or Clogg'd with the Senses it cannot by its best Conceptions be absolutely divided from them and therefore uncapable of acquiescing in agreeable Concord otherwise than as the Soul is United with them in the most sensible and familiar way of Conviction Had Des-Cartes been asked Whether or no it was not far more facile to Demonstrate the Geometrical Measure of so many Acres of Land than Mathematically to Compute the Immense Distance from us of the Sphere of the fixed Stars He would soonhave granted That an Account of the Former was much easier to be performed than of the Latter How much more remote from the most accurate Prospects of our Understanding are the Infinite Attributes of the Omnipotent Or not possibly to be discerned by any Idea of Mind otherwise than as they are effectually Published to our Useful and Holy Admiration in the Miraculous and Immense Consistency of the Total World The next considerable Undertaking of this Author is briefly to deliver such Notions of which All our Thoughts are most especially produc'd or compounded And how by them are to be distinguished such as are Clear from others Obscure or by which we are deceived To which purpose his main Maxim in his 48 Particular he thus expresses Whatsoever they are saies he that Relate to our Perception are to be considered as Things or as certain Affections of Things or as eternal Verities having no Existence without our Cogitation Of those that are to be considered as Things the most general are to be comprehended by the Denominations of Substance Duration Order Number and the like as they may be understood to appertain to All other Things And these he annexeth unto two Generalities the One of which he defines in reference to Things as they are only conceived by Thought of the Mind or as he terms them wholly belonging to a thinking Substance the Other as it respects Materiality or Body But Perception Volition with all their Modalities he refers to what he calls the Substance of Thinking either as to Magnitude or Extension as they may be considered in Length Breadth Height Figure and Motion Situation Divisibility and the like Other Things there are which by experience we find that do neither solely appertain to the Mind nor to the Body and which proceed from the strict Intimacy and Union that the Mind has with the Body as the Diversities of our Appetites and Passions which have no Consistence with sole Cogitation And this is the full Sense of the Place I treat on as near as his Words can be properly Englished The first Remark that ought to be Judiciously tender'd on this Part of his Treatise is Whether according to sound Reason or essential Rules of Philosophy he has duly defined what he calls Substantial Thinking by the Epithet he gives it appropriated to the Mind But if to a Thinking Substance be annex'd according to him the Essence or Propriety of Thought the Quere may be How any Thing that is Substantial can be genuinely supposed to Imploy Thought otherwise than on something that is also Substantial And if so why not likewise Corporeal Except he could sensibly make it appear That Substance can be separated from Corporeal
an Argument in order to the Grandeur of the Matter he would prove by his Affirming That we can have no absolute Assurance unless the Intellect be immediately Impower'd by God that Bodily Substance and Extension have other than a possibility of being such Which has so very opposite a disparity to natural and sensible Conviction that it appears no less Irrational than if he had undertaken to Argue Mankind into the Belief That it is possible to have Senses and yet be destitute of their Use. Can a Man live and not be sensible That Substance in its Bodily signification has a proper Being Or can he feel and eat the Food that nourishes his Corporeal Composition and not be Knowing otherwise than by meer Cogitation that he subsists by it or that there is any such Thing but in possibility Existing Yet so determin'd by the Dictates of this Author however Contradictory to common Sense or as Unsound in his Way of Reasoning as if he had declar'd That a Man might have Corporeal Life but be dead as to all Bodily Consideration whilst by sole Ccogitation in the Mind he may have only a living Notion of the possibility of the Being of Substance and Body as they may be distinguish'd by their natural Capacities Which Opinion of his he would Confirm as he presumes with no greater difficulty Than as any Man may judge that he is a real Thinker and by that Thought exclude from himself all other Substance either Thinking or Extended On which Supposition or Consistency of Thought as he intends it he certainly concludes That every Man may distinguish himself not only from every Thinking Substance but also from all others of Corporeal Denomination Had a Poet been Author of this Conceit he had not farther surpass'd the Excesses of Fiction than this French Writer has done by the liberty he allows to his Invention deviated from Principles of Reason and Philosophy For what is more preposterous to Both than to conclude as he does That it is possible for a Thinking Man to separate himself by meer Thought from the substantial Similitude he has to all others of Humane Nature as also from whatsoever can be said Corporeally to Exist And may not the same Person by as good consequence Determine That he is a Thinker in Body without being sensible that any Bodily Life Composition or Parts appertain to him Which requires no plainer Confutation than what has been already observ'd on Passages of this Author precedently tending to the same purpose as may be discern'd by whomsoever shall heedfully inspect these Papers All which in effect is conceded by himself before he comes to a Period of the Head I Treat of where he thus Expresses That although we suppose That God has so strictly Joyn'd to the Cogitative Substance other Corporeal Substance that they cannot be more firmly Connected and from their Conjunction Constituted their Union Notwithstanding they may remain absolutely distinct because God may reserve a Power to separate their Beings tho' Corporeally Inclos'd Or to confer Conservation on both as United or separated however they participate by Existence with the Extent of the Body These words in Summ can have no other Signification than what may be conster'd a Distinction without an apparent Difference and therefore Logically Unintelligible there being no Notion more perplex'd than his manner of Uniting Substance to Substance in a Corporeal Figure and yet expect that they ought to be requisitely distinguish'd The Reason he gives in Summ is That it may be so Ordain'd by God That whatsoever are Conjoyn'd by him takes not from his Power to disunite their Conjunction by capacitating their Separation or as the Soul may singly Act without any Assistance or Concurrence of the Senses appropriated to the Body If this be the best Argument that he can Alledge by which he would heighten the Notion so much Celebrated by him of the Minds operating by a distinct and clear Idea from all Corporeal Concomitancy it is more than Intricately in this Place urg'd by him who grants the firm Union Constitated by God of Soul and Body yet will needs Imagine that their Separation is also determin'd by God And thus by Des-Cartes the Act of God is render'd contradictory to it selt Bâ—… now does he undertake to Explain his Proposition Why verily by no better Assurance than that it is possible for the Almighty so to dispose the Humane Mind that it may operate divided from the Body and sensible Parts tho' naturally United to all of them Which in effect does annex Contradiction to the Act of God it being palpably evident That the Understanding Faculty does actuate its Intelligence with the Concurrence of the Senses But no such manifest Assurance that by any separate Power of the Mind the same can be Effected Let a Man Imagine by his utmost Force of meer Thought That by the Speculative Act of the Mind is represented the Shape Proportion Likeness and Colour of any Object whether it be Moving Standing or Lying 't is not in his Power so perfectly to discern all their several Proprieties as if they were visibly perceiv'd by him and consider'd as proper Objects to entertain all other requisite Parts of his Senses But very Impossible to Contemplate of any of these by any separate Act of the Understanding distinct from Sensation Because there could be no Idea or Notion of such Things that had never been convey'd to the Intellect by the consent of the Senses as by Seeing Feeling Smelling Tasting and Hearing are occasionally compleated the useful Appurtenances to the Humane Intellect Wherefore it might be well admir'd Why the useage of Eyes Hands and Ears with other of the Senses should be naturally Incident to the Bodily Parts and Composition of Man if the Mind could solely be perfectly apprehensive without them And doubtless these Excellent Gifts had been Insignificantly conferr'd on Mankind if Thought abstracted from Sensation might be alone exactly apprehensive Nor can sufficient Reason be given Why the Mind should not have been solely bestow'd however Ordain'd to Exist if by its single Intelligence it could have perform'd the divers Operations and Actual Capacities that are joyntly Exerted by the Soul and Senses 'T is not to be deny'd that the Existence of the Mind unconfin'd to Body had been as easily accomplish'd by Providence had it been so determin'd as it is now Resident with the Society of the Senses And questionless if so establish'd had exalted Humane Felicity to a paramount degree Nothing tending more to the detriment of Mankind than the complicated and prone Inveiglement of the Soul by the Allurement of the Senses So that could the Mind have been exempted from Corporeal Conjunction it had certainly by a glorious Act of Providence been discharg'd from its Bodily Confinement together with the exorbitant and wicked Temptations it receives from the Appetites and Senses But this being repugnant to it s Decreed and natural Station in the Body of Man no room is
to be found there for the Idea of Des-Cartes by which he does incompatibly infer That the Humane Soul is of a distinct Substance tho' Co-herent to the Body of Man and actually concomitant with Corporeal Operations In his 64 Particular he farther attempts to Explain what he would mean by his Definition of a distinct Thinking Substance his Allegation is That Cogitation and Extension may be understood as one and the same Mind may have diversity of Thoughts or as one and the same Body retaining its own Quantity may be diversely Extended at one time in Longitude at another in Latitude or contrarily less in Latitude than in Depth and the like by which they may be distinguish'd as also consider'd as Modalities of the Substance to which they belong Can this be Judg'd a proper Method in order to the Improving of Humane Understanding according to the undertaking of this Author as he Defines the varied Proprieties of Substance whether in Length Breadth or Depth no other than different Modalities applicable to the same Substance Whereas the contrary is Mathematically certain because the Extent and Proportions in one and the same Body must necessarily have a Commensurable Alteration If the Basis of a solid Substance be suppos'd to be lengthened one Foot more than it was before the Latitude and Depth of the same Body cannot but have as to its Proportion an Essential Variation Which evidently proves That what he Terms meer Modality or accidental Change of local Parts in the same Substance is neither Arithmetically or Geometrically true It being no less absurd to Affirm That the half of a Number is all one with the whole or that the different Situation Measure and Being of Substance were neither a quantitative or formal Alteration in reference to the reality of Place Figure or Motion as they ought to be apprehended in all their Capacities On which consideration the Idea of this French Writer is fo far from tending to a significant Modality as he would apply it that it rather vanishes as a fictitious Comment or Shadow of his Brain To be plain should a Man Collect a numerous Summ of Refin'd Notions with the most Artful Curiosity that could imploy his Imagination whereby he would dignifie the Humane Intellect he might find the Undertaking no less difficult to the finest Thread of his Reasoning than to Invent a more wonderful Passage into an obscure Labryinth than could be ever attain'd by rational Conduct There being no passabler or clearer Prospect by which the Soul of Man may discern the Manner of its actual Being and Exercising of the Intellectual Faculty than as it is operatively Conjoyn'd with the temper of the Body and Senses To whose united Concurrence may be Attributed more or less the qualified Abilities of the Understanding in every Consideration Do we not Experimentally know That Judgment Wit Passions Affections vertuous or vicious Inclinations with all the Moralities of Life are Influenc'd by the Mind as it does participate with the Elementary Composition Inherent in the Body and Senses Insomuch That their several Inclinations may be term'd the Effects of Heat Cold Moisture or Drought as they adhere to our Natures Is not a Wise Man distinguish'd by the Judicious Temper of his Thoughs the vain by their Levity and insipid Conversation No less discernable than one Man's strength of Mind or Corporeal Vigour has a natural Variation from another To which may be Emphatically added the experimental Observation as it respects the Intellectual Faculties of which some are Impower'd with a more considerable vivacity of Apprehension Judgment and Wit in Age than was manifest in Youth But in others contrarily a Decay or Withering of their Understandings no less apparent than the Wrinkles of their Brows and Cheeks Which could proceed from no other Cause but as the Vigour of the Mind does naturally Impair in divers examples of Age with the Strength and Temper of the Arteries Nerves Members and Senses that appertain to the Body Yet not universally so because not seldom observ'd That some Persons who have liv'd to Antiquity of Years have rather been compleated in all Kinds by their Intellectual Abilities for which there can be given no better Reason than that notwithstanding they have some Corporeal Deficiencies incident to Age yet none in the Principal Assistants of the Brain and its Contiguity with the Senses All which is far more evidently demonstrable than a suppos'd Thinking Substance separately acting in the Body of Man according to the Tenent of Des-Cartes together with his Imaginary Modalities by which he would insinuate a distinct Thinking Faculty to the Humane Soul without any specifical Assistance receiv'd from the Senses A Notion no less absurd than 't is impossible to Think and not be exactly sensible of the Thing or Object Thought on Either as it had been at the same time convey'd to the Understanding by some One or more of the Senses or their Impression by the Memory before retain'd Which fully Confirms the Philosophical Maxim That nothing is in the Intellect but what was before in the Senses Yet not so to be Apply'd or Instanc'd here as might in any respect derogate from the Excellency of the Humane Soul or its Immortal Estate when Life departs from the Body it being in the Power of the Almighty to Eternalize its Being howsoever it was Compos'd or the manner of its Existence when Resident in the Body of Man I find no other Discussions in this Treatise of Des-Cartes that require a more pertinent or accurate Observation than may be Imply'd from what is already Written Wherefore to avoid unnecessary Repetition I descend to his Conclusion where he briefly Summs the most considerable Principles on which he had founded his precedent Arguments committing them as very advisable to the perusal of his Reader The First of his Counsels is That we should be very cautious how we adhere to Former Opinions that have not been strictly Catechiz'd and found true by a subsequent Examination Which I confess is plausibly Advis'd But how does he make good these Admonishments Why by heedfully regarding as he prompts us such Notions we have in our selves by which he would suppose We are enough enabled to arrive to clear and distinct Knowledge Here he Epitomizes the main Force and Application of his Former Ideas in order to erect perfect Understanding in the Humane Intellect and by which he undertakes so to Cleanse it that the Senses may have nothing to do with its orderly Perception As if the Determination made by the Intellect with the Assistance of the Senses were no less detrimental to the Principality of the Mind than the loose Advice of a City-Mobb would be to their Monarch Whereas by a surer Inference the bare Idea of the Mind introduc'd by Des-Cartes if duely consider'd does Imply such a License of Thought as is no way consistent with the orderly Rule of Man's Understanding It being possible That the Body-Politick of Reason or perspicuity of Thought
thought a Deceiver This Passage can have no excusable Defence if judiciously Examin'd The Question he offers being so ill Stated or Inconsistent with the accurate Part of Reasoning That it cannot amount to Refin'd Sophistry For however he might conceive That the Soul together with its Mental Idea might be placed in the Body by God it could not be without assurance that the World is replenish'd with Corporeal Beings that cannot be Denominated such but as Length Breadth and Depth Colour Taste and Smell are their natural Proprieties So that where the Intellect and Senses are joyntly Illuminated in whatsoever Method by the Act of God they must be far more certain than to admit any room for Misconception or the If or Quere Inserted by Des-Cartes by which he would Infer That could a Man Ensoul'd by God Imagine by any other means that there is no such Thing as Longitude Latitude Depth and the like appertaining to Corporeal Substance he might call God a Deceiver Which were all one as to suppose That a Man duely apprehensive of any Object should by the Will of God voluntarily Determine that he is not which is no less Irrational than Impossible to all of competent Understanding But no disallowable Tenent if apply'd to other Particulars of Mankind whose Intellects are not of sufficient Ability if not naturally stupid or accidentally unsound or phrenetically distemper'd as is the condition of such as are Distracted and in a manner totally destitute of the Use of their Rational Faculty And who can doubt that not a few of these want Capacity to define Length Breadth and Depth as Inseparable to Bodily Existence Which could not have been if Mankind were Universally endu'd by an Impartial Course of Nature Ordain'd by God and so committed to the Humane Body Where it must have had a more excellent Residence than could be impedited or debas'd by Corporeal Attributes and must have likewise been compleated with as perfect an Idea in every respect as this Author endeavours to prove But not being perform'd his manner of Argument turns the point of a Dilemma against his Assertion by which he would annex a more general and perfect Idea to the Soul of Man than is experimentally Certain and whereby in effect he Terms God a Deceiver because according to his Doctrine every Soul within a Humane Body has not a patallel Idea of exact Knowledge A Blessing much to be wish'd or rather Implor'd by Prayer were it not repugnant to the Methods of Providence omnipotently determin'd by which the Intellectual Faculty is differently Impowr'd as its Corporeal Dominion is more or less Absolute either as it commands or is weaken'd in Rule by the Conspiracy of the Senses Which cannot be otherwise the Mind being surrounded and continually endanger'd by the frail Composition and Temperatures of the Bodily Parts in which it operatively Resides On the contrary were there such a clear Idea from above infus'd into the Soul of Man as is Instanc'd by Des-Cartes by which every requisite Notion or Truth might be perfectly apprehended It were not consistent with the Justice of the Almighty if every Individual of Mankind were not equally Intelligible on which account one Man might be as wise in every Consideration as any other And if so there would be less necessity for Superior Magistracy or Rule could every Man be alike Discreet in governing of Himself In the mean time Des-Cartes has introduc'd a new Character on the Stage of Philosophy more compleat in Thought than is univocally Consistent with the Figure of Humane Composition by which is Personated the Dress and Mode of the Mind as it is Cloth'd by the Senses From whence 't is apparently manifest That the Powers of the Rational Soul are frequently exerted suitable to the diversity of Tempers that sensibly Exist Improve or Decay in the Body of Man And this as Naturally Certain as Animal Creatures of the same Kind vigorously Grow or Impair or are more Subtil Active and Strong proportionable to the Elementary Mixtures by which they Subsist And therefore as highly presumptuous as to Argue against the Methods of Providence if discuss'd Why Men and Creatures are so Constituted in their Several Capacities of Being and Life Which is above the search of Man's Reasoning and only known to the Omnipotent Disposer of whatsoever the Universe contains All which if duely consider'd sufficiently explodes the Novel Scene of this Part of the Philosophy of this Author together with the Actual Character he gives to Mankind in his Modalities of Intellectual Apprehension as 't is Personated by his Pen. His Second Particular begins with a Truth but ends with a Falsehood Where he grants That the Mind or Soul of Man is more strictly United to its peculiar Body than to all other Bodies The Reason he offers is Because we have an Apprehension of Griefs and other sensible Advertencies that happen unthought on by us of which the Mind he conceives could not be Intelligent as it is meerly Cogitative but as it is Conjoyn'd to a Certain extended and moveable Substance call'd the Humane Body The Antecedent Part of this Head is undoubtedly true which signifies no more than that our Souls have more to do with our own Bodies than with any other And who could have expected that Des-Cartes could have presented his Reader with so vulgar a Speculation Which has no other Tendency than that every Man is as far apprehensive as the Compliment of his Soul and Senses will extend and thus are Griefs Passions Affections sensibly distinguish'd by us when Appertaining to others Because the Rational Faculty sympathetically complies with the Senses in Conveying their Intelligence to Things of that Kind without us as he that has felt a Wound or Pain in any of his Corporeal Parts will judge of the same in others But how to think of any Thing that appertains to our selves and not to perform it by help of the Mind as a sensible Thinker is a Riddle not to be unfolded by the Writings of Des-Cartes In his Third Particular he attempts to clear the Point but in effect weakens it by this Feeble Proposition of his The Perception of the Senses does not direct us to Discover what is really in Things but as they are render'd profitable or detrimental to Humane Composition Unless sometimes or by accident we are Taught by the Senses what those Bodies are and how they Exist And therefore saies he we must Depose the Senses and solely Judge by help of the Intellect according to the Ideas that are Incident to it by Nature Whosoever is Master of a Grain of Reason must be convinc'd That a Contradiction is Imply'd by the manner of Argument here urg'd by this Author Who grants That by the Conjunction of the Soul and Senses we perfectly Discern what is Beneficial or Hurtful to us but in that Act do not certainly apprehend what those Things are Which is all one as to Affirm That we may be Intelligent yet not undoubtedly
assur'd of what we understand Unless the Intellect be Refin'd by Idea after his manner as the most natural Way of being clearly Apprehensive and with such disparagement to the Senses That they may be in his Opinion neglected Tho' common Experience might have convinc'd him that they are by Nature Constituted Assistants and real Proofs of whatsoever is openly and demonstratively understood But it seems he omitted these Considerations And therefore in his next Particular which is his 4th he positively directs as he would intend the Use of his Idea by which he Argues That the Nature of Matter or Body does not Consist in that it is Hard Ponderous or any other Manner affecting the Senses but only as it is a Thing extended in Length Breadth and Depth And for durition or hardness the Sense discovers it no farther than as the Parts of a Hard Body Resist the Motion of our Hands meeting with it Here he would exalt his Idea to the height of Dominion in the Mind and level the Senses below the Capacities that Nature has allow'd them Nothing being more Philosophically Irrational than the Supposition he Inserts That the Nature of Body is only to be understood as it has Longitude Latitude and Depth and why not also as it is Weighty Hard and Colour'd Is not Air as much a Body as Iron and yet perfectly distinguish'd by the compact Durition of the Latter as its Essential Propriety And as absolutely different in Colour could the diaphanous Substance of Air be as visible to the Eye and although it be not we may conceive the Distinction much surer than we could by intruding on the Mind a conceited Idea because we are sensibly Assur'd That no Corporeal Thing can have Being in Nature without its colourable Property And this as familiarly Certain as that a Bay-Horse cannot be Denominated a Horse if his natural Colour could be separated from his Substance There are many Things that may be said to have Colour that are not genuinely their own And so a painted Cheek whether in Man or Woman is no Dye or Complexion of Nature but Artificically Colour'd And we Judge of Pictures as they Resemble the Life by the Colours apply'd to them by the Skill of the Painter And 't is no less evident that Des-Cartes has presented his Reader with a very Fictitious Varnish of his Pen if he meant no other distinction of Colours Relating or Apply'd to Material Substances than in this Place he mentions And in Summ concludes That Weight Colour and such like Corporeal Qualities may be separated from their Inherence in Matter so that the Nature of the Substance to which they belong does not depend on any of them And is not this a concise Manner of Idea in this Author by which he would have us believe That Bodily Substance may have Existence and be sensibly perceiv'd without being discern'd by its genuine Shape and Figure If Colour Hardness and Weight with other Qualities appertaining to Matter are defin'd Accidents in a Philosophical Sense yet allowable such as when natural are inseparable Proprieties from Bodies to which they appertain And 't is some wonder that this Learned Monsieur should forget on this occasion That noted Logical Maxim Quod omni sola et semper accidit subjecto So that the Idea of this Author as it is here Apply'd by him is so far from a Weighty or indeed a Colourable Notion That 't is as surely Confuted as a White Plum may be distinguish'd by the Act of Nature from a Black one The next Step he takes is to present his Reader with the Doubts of some Persons who Determine That Bodies may be so Rarified or Condens'd that they may have by Rarifaction more Extension than when Condens'd To which Number of Dubitants I desire to be added Because I conceive nothing more clear than the doubt he Delivers Is it not very evident That Snow when dissolv'd by Rarifaction into Water is substantially Extended farther than before as it may be observ'd falling from a Hill into a River And is it not as manifest That some Parts of Wood when Thinn'd and Rarified by Fire convert to Smoak So that 't is impossible to deny that Corporeal Alteration is not Incident to Rarifaction which gives it a variable and different Extension if compar'd to the space it Precedently fill'd and this amounts to Demonstration instead of Opinion But he that will be Proselyted by the Doctrine of Des-Cartes must in this Case be such a compliable Sceptick as to Renounce his sensible Conviction and accord with him where he contends to Argue That whosoever will attentively Think and admit nothing but what he clearly understands will Judge That no more is Effected by Rarifaction and Condensation than Change of the Corporeal Figure And this in few words is the summ of what is contain'd in his Fifth and Sixth Particular that is worth a Remark The Reason he offers is That Rarified Bodies having many Pores are there Replenish'd with other Substances and by that means become Condens'd This Conceit of his is as distant from Proof as Fiction is from Truth And nothing more obviously Answer'd since 't is Philosophically Certain That Condensation is added to Bodies which are made more or less Solid as their thinner Parts are proportionately expell'd by Rarifaction And thus a tenuous Substance is gradually render'd more compact and harden'd by the Fire as is in divers Kinds Experimentally Observable Which however producing Alteration of Figure in their Corporeal Extent 't is as they receive Solidity or Durition from the Capacity that their tenuous Parts have in order to Rarifaction So that 't is not as this Writer Infers from any Intervals or Cranies in Bodies fill'd with other Bodies that causes Condensation but so much of the Tenuity of their Compositions as being vanish'd by Rarifaction leaves them more compactly Harden'd Suppose he had been ask'd Whether the thin Substance of Air or Fluid Body of Water did Exist with any such Pores or Inlets in them that might be Receptacles for other Bodies He could not probably have solv'd the Question notwithstanding 't is very apparent That Air is Thicken'd by Moisture that exhal'd by the Sun is mingled with it But Water being a grosser Substance is Condens'd as its Thinner Parts are by Heat extracted from it and this may be discern'd in every standing Pool or Puddle All which is Equivalently acknowledg'd by him in his Entrance to his Seventh Head Where he grants That there are no Pores in Air or Water that may add to their Amplitude by giving Reception to other Bodies whereby they may be more Replenish'd Yet would have it pass in being suppos'd for a Rational Fiction but I expected his Proof and therefore must be excus'd if I reject his Fable As for Corporeal Extent caus'd by Rarifaction he seems to allow none otherwise than as he would a new Body so Extended Which is not Universally true and may be so understood from the Example
given already of Snow Dissolv'd by Rarifaction to Water which when Snow was but Water Congeal'd So that it cannot be properly said to have a new Body but alter'd to the Fluid Substance which it had before The like may be Affirm'd of Lead or other Materials that when melted and enlarg'd by Extension do not lose the Denomination of the same Corporeal Substance in which Sense Lead when Dissolv'd is as truely Lead as it was in its precedent Existence Examples might be added on this Subject did the Reply that I have made require farther Illustration wherefore I proceed to his next Point which he thus States Quantity and Number differ only in Reason from the quantitative or number'd Thing This Position he procceds to Explicate by Affirming That the whole Nature of Corporeal Substance may be consider'd as contian'd in the space of ten Feet altho' we attend not the Measure of any such Number of Feet And by Converse saies he the Number Ten may be understood as well as a Quantity of so many Feet although we are regardless of its Determinate Substance Here the gentile Monsieur renews his Address to his Mistress of Thought under the Notion of Idea Which he endeavours to Compleat by such a refin'd Mode of Philosophical Courtship That like a Platonick Lover he separates Sense from the Motives he Endears But I presume that his Amour has met with divers coy Reprimands from Reason the most Celebrated Mistress and Beauty of the Understanding And 't is no presumption I conceive if I Attribute a rational Success to my Pen which has more than often refell'd the Cartesian Idea in divers preceding Discussions Wherefore I might refer my Reply to what I have already Written Did not the respect that I have to the Abilities of this Author tho' none to his Mistakes oblige me to prolong my Inspection together with an earnest Desire of being convinc'd might I find Cause from his Proposals But instead of meeting with any Motives of his sufficient to reconcile me to his Assertions I may justly observe an Erroneous Relapse to his former Principles And thus in his 8th Particular that occasions my Debate He supposes That the whole Nature of Corporeal Substance contain'd in a space of Ten or any Number of Feet may be understood without any Computation of it as locally Commensurable and this to be accomplish'd by a sole Idea of the Mind in his Opinion But is it possible to promote meer Thought by an Insensible Act suitable to the purpose he intends it Can a Man that never understood how a Plain Superficies may contain Body or is produc'd according to his Example to a space of Ten Feet Conceive or Delineate such a Figure without knowing that it is Compleated by Multiplying of 5 by 2 Should a Mathematical Tutor Inform his Pupil That it would be sufficient for his Instruction if by Mental Speculation he Imagin'd that there was in Nature such a Thing as a Plain Superficies tho' he did not apprehend that Longitude and Latitude were its Numerical Proprieties Could Science be Improv'd by such an Impertinent and Idle Idea that can signifie nothing either to Theory or Practice On the contrary every Man must be as competently Intelligent as was this Author of the Qualifications of Lines that appertain to superficial Content and as certainly too as the Dimensions of any Number of Acres may be figuratively Included in a Square or Parallelogram or he will profit little on this Question by Reading of Des-Cartes Who next proceeds to inform us That notwithstanding 't is a certain Truth and so I think too that nothing can be taken from Quantity or Extension but the Substance to which they belong must also be Leslen'd And convertibly not the least Part of Substance can be exempted but as much of Quantity and Extension will be taken from it This Opinion of his he alledges as opposite to the Tenent of others of whom he saies there are some that consider Corporeal Substance as distinct from its Quantity Which Conception of theirs causes them confusedly to think that the same Substance may be term'd Incorporeal Whether there was ever Man of such a wilde Imagination may well be question'd Since nothing can be more absurd than to Imagine That Substance might remain in any Kind Substance without its proper Quantity and next notwithstanding that Contradiction or as he calls it confusion of Thought to suppose the same Substance Metamorphos'd by a mysterious Way of Thinking to Incorporeal which is no less contradictory to the natural Being and Definition of Substance than if a Man should determine that Body could cease to be Body Because Substance is inseparable from Quantity as its Corporeal Propriety and therefore by no Notion or Object of Sense can be deem'd Incorporeal But notwithstanding that the Incomprehensible Idea of Incorporeal Substance is reprov'd by Des-Cartes as Notionally Confus'd the Sense that he delivers in the 64th Particular of his First Part or Treatise of Humane Cognition is ally'd to the same Absurdity as may be observ'd from my Remarks on that Head Where he supposes That Cogitaion and Extension may be consider'd as Modalities of Substance because as he Affirms The Humane Mind may have diversity of Thoughts by which the Cogitative Substance as he Defines it may at one time Imploy its Idea of Things clearly distinguish'd without the Assistance of the Senses at another operate in Conjunction with the sensible Parts of the Body Is not this such a manner of Idea as would render the Thinking Substance of the Mind with or without Quantity as pleases the Thinker Which little differs from the Irrational Notion of Incorporeal Substance if any Thing by excluding of Quantity might be possibly Imagin'd substantial From whence it may be inferr'd That the Criticisme offer'd by Des-Cartes in this Place in order to refell the Opinion of others does considerably reflect on his own And thus I proceed to such of his Particulars as occasion my Remarks which I shall Insert no oftner than the Subject requires In his 11th Head he reminds us of the Idea that we may have of Body by the Example he gives of a Stone from which we may reject all that is not Essential to the Nature of Body As if a Stone be melted or pulveris'd it does not therefore cease to be Corporeal We may also reject Colour because we frequently observe Stones that very pellucidly shine as if they were without Colour And so we may reject Gravity Lightness Heat and Cold with All other Qualities because they are either not consider'd in the Stone or being Chang'd the Corporeal Nature of the Stone is not alter'd with them Here methinks he makes a great Pudder to little purpose or no other than to prove that which no Man ever deny'd If there can be any Thing more Experimentally manifest than That Substance by what means soever varied or Chang'd will still retain Quantity as its Corporeal Propriety not to be separated
Spaces and such as contain Corporeal Substances indefinitely Extended Against which I offer a brief and obvious Exception by sensibly proving That as we cannot Imagine any Indefinite Extension or Space in the World in which we have Being so were another World equally Vast and Contiguous to this it were impossible to apprehend a boundless Corporeal Space within its total Continent By reason that uncircumscrib'd Space cannot be the Receptacle of Material Substance because whatever includes Body must have commensurable Attributes or such as in a Geometrical Sense may be defin'd a Superficies terminated by Length and Breadth Which demonstrably profligates his pretended Idea of Indefinite Space or Extension So little is in this Case the Doctrine of Nature beholding to the Philosophy of Des-Cartes His next Conception produc'd by his fruitful Idea is That Heaven and Earth are of one and the same Matter and that there is no possible Being of more than one World The first of this Head he no otherwise proves than as he takes it for granted That if there were Infinite or Innumerable Worlds they would be all of the same Matter wherefore he concludes there can be but One. The Objection that may be made against his Affirmation that the Matter of Heaven and Earth is the same is because Heaven can be no otherwise understood than as it has a Select and Primary Distinction from all Bodies of Elementary Composition Which is apparently manifest in its Figure Motion and Height absolutely different and far more Excellent than can be compar'd with other Substance Wherefore Zanchius writing of the Works of God gives to its most Sublime and Refin'd Perfection a spiritual Epithet to which purpose the Learned Pena in his Preface to Euclid defines it an Animated Spirit universally diffus'd To these may be added the Authority of Jamblichus a very considerable Author who in admiration of its Substance allows to its Perfections the nearest Attributes to Incorporeal Existence And who can doubt that the Judgment of any one of these erudite Persons in being more speculatively Refin'd and naturally suitable to the wonderful Objects Immensly distant from the Earth we tread on should not have a deference from our Understandings highly Superior to the gross Definition given them by Des-Cartes Who determines That the Substance of Heaven and Earth alike proceeds from the Heap of Nature's common Materials And whereas he Asserts in the latter Part of this Head That it is not possible to Imagine more Worlds than One. I think the contrary may be as certainly Affirm'd as that the World we reside in has a natural Confinement A Truth no less facile to Thought than 't is easie to delineate a Circle that in any Point shall touch another and yet leave betwixt them no Intervening Space that is not substantially repleted But this Speculation however readily exerted cannot be the proper Entertainment of the Mind unless I imagine a Similitude of Things and Beings Correspondent to the World in which I am As by the diligence of Thought I might observe in a devis'd World the same Persons Creatures Trees and Fields with such other Objects that had been visible to me in this Wherefore I take liberty to think contrary to the Opinion of this Author That the Intellect strengthned by the Senses is sufficiently enabled to Transport its Prospect to the plurality of Worlds To avoid which Imaginative Power of the Mind he annexes to his Idea of Matter undeterminate Extent A Notion absolutely Inconsistent with the Nature of Substance in all its Capacities which cannot have an Indefinite Being And therefore no less absurd than if suppos'd that Matter or Substance could be actually Infinite In some of his following Particulars he bestows many Words on the Motion of whatever may be deem'd Matter or Substance but finding nothing of Consequence to observe in most of them or that occasion any considerable Remark in being Dissentaneous to what he delivers I pass to his 25th Particular in which he Comprehends the main Fund of what he intends by Corporeal Movement the Instance which he gives is That any one Body or Substance in his Sense may be said to Move out of the Vicinity of other Bodies that were contiguous to it before and as at rest into the Vicinity of others By this Definition he proclaims an endless War in the Campains of Nature where the opposite Commotions and Powers of Individual Bodies endeavour to possess the natural Beings of their quiet Neighbours From which Problem could it be prov'd might be deduc'd a better Disciplin'd Argument in behalf of Exorbitant Potentates when Molesting or Intruding into the peaceable Vicinities and Provinces of others than has as yet been urg'd on their Part Because it might be dextrously grounded on the Toleration and Conduct dispens'd by Imperial Nature amongst her subordinate Dominions This War of Nature denounc'd by so Eminent a Philosophical Herald as Des-Cartes could not but Incense many Combats in the Schools of Science But how far prosperous there or disallow'd is not requisite in this Place to Discuss I shall therefore Imploy the Force of my Understanding without being oblig'd to the Assistance of any Tribe or Scholastical Association to attack his Arguments where they deserve the most Emphatical Opposition My first Assault on this Head shall be against the main Fort of his New-Modell'd Fortification where to defend his Principles he Exerts the Artillery of his Idea which according to the Level of his Notions must batter to pieces the entire Confederacies of Nature and so separate their Societies and Rooms in the Universe That unless a more pathetical Expedient can be found than what he offers Towns and Countries with whatever they contain may as soon be Remov'd out of this World and Situated in another as one Corporeal Substance can Usurp the Province or Being of another Because no quantitative Matter but must if Mov'd into the Place of any other possess the Space that naturally appertain'd to its Existence And whether could he suppose That a Bodily Thing could Remove that is by any means Expell'd by the Motion of another Substance from its proper Appartment Since neither his Brain or any other Man's can by an empty Idea so diminish the World as that any Particle of it might be conceiv'd to vanish to Vacuity Nor less Intolerably opposite to the Proprieties of Nature is the Maxim he Inserts of the Translation of Material Things into the proper Residence or Place of others Not that 't is deniable that Bodies are alterably Mov'd or Chang'd by Effects of Rarifaction or Condensation and other ordinary Methods of Nature as to their manner of Extension and Figure but not as to the Space that Circumscrib'd their Substances because it is Impossible for them for Reasons before mention'd to be naturally provided for by any other Room for their Existence And thus if any Receptacle or Vessel be suppos'd fill'd with Earth or Water and those Materials afterwards Remov'd the Air
Person as if with the Point of a Weapon I should wound the same Part of my own Body And did not the Soul and Senses thus apprehensively Conspire there would not be that Reluctancy Defence and Prevention us'd by us for the safety of our Corporeal Parts nor should we be so actually sensible that Mortality is the inevitable consequence of unsupportable Violence Wounds and Maladies that surrender our Bodies to Death And this clearly invalidates the Allegations and Instances that he gives on this Head together with the Example he mentions of a Sword that may so hurt or dismember any Part of the Body that we may in Mind be grievously apprehensive of the local Motion of the Force or Blow as it wounds the Part tho' the Motion of the Sword and Body hurt be very different From whence he concludes That the Humane Mind by a bare speculation of local Motion together with its forcible onset made on the Body may judge of all Corporeal Afflictions and Sensations whatsoever And is not this a pretty kind of Quibble in Des-Cartes by not considering That it was not the Motion of the Blow or the wounded Part that represented to the Intellect or Mind the hurt receiv'd but as the Pain of the Member or Part assur'd the Imagination unto which it was inseparably united It being very possible for a Man to be sensibly apprehensive of a Wound or Blow tho' he does not conceive or see the Motion of the Weapon that gave it But as he is sensible of the Pain he could not doubt that it was effected by forcible means tho' no otherwise relating to the Wound or more diversified from sensible Conception than on this occasion this Author does render the Mind or what he calls a Thinking Substance by a modality of Thinking without Sense Nor is it Imaginable how any Thing that is not Elementarily Compos'd can operate on the Humane Body that is so constituted Wherefore the Word Substance applied to the Soul cannot be understood Incorporeal by the determination of Des-Cartes who wheresoever he treats of Substance appropriates unto it quantitative and dimensive Parts both in a Plilosophical and Mathematical Consideration And particularly in the last Page of this Fourth Part of his Philosophy condemns the Doctrine of Atoms deliver'd by Democritus because he allows them no Commensurable Quantity Had it been demanded of this French Philosopher What kind of Substance must be the Essence of the Soul when separated by Death from the Body in whose Elementary Composition it did precedently Exist He could not define it otherwise than quantitative as every Thing call'd Substance is by his Opinion allow'd to be and therefore the same after the period of the Body's Life And consequently no less agreeable to his Doctrine if Affirm'd That the thinking Substance call'd by him the Humane Soul must have when separated from the Body a Circumscrib'd or Elementary Being suitable to the Nature of Substance as it may be conceiv'd quantitatively Dimensive Which Objection should a Cartesian endeavour to evade by Affirming That the Soul separated from the Body is progressive to the Sphere of Spirits or Things superlatively refin'd and stripp'd from Matter and unto which some allow Definitive not Circumscrib'd Beings he must next grant That the Soul cannot have Existence there otherwise than in a Material Superficies proportionable to its Substance and there eternally Circumscrib'd where Spirits and Immaterial Beings are without such Limits which were all one as to reside temporally amongst spiritual Existencies To avoid which Absurdity he cannot be thought to mean otherwise than that the Soul upon its immediate departure from the Body is Metamorphos'd into a Spirit And next that it has a spiritual Passage through all Elementary Bodies that intervene betwixt it and its immaterial Residence appointed by God But here may arise a Querie Whether Motion can be Attributed to any Thing without Body Or in what manner it can Move where Bodies are or be in Motion without removing of them Which in that Circumstance would render a Soul however deem'd spiritual Commensurably Moving as by Parts of Time it might have an intermixt Progression with other Substances as its temporary Measure Certain it is that Stars the Luminaries of Heaven if duely consider'd their wonderful Motion unalterable Essence and continuation may be allow'd our most visible and perpetual miraculous Objects or somewhat more than in Nature can be properly worded But should those Etherial Beings be suppos'd in any Place where Elementary Substances might Exist it were impossible they could move uncommixt with Things of different Nature from theirs Wherefore it must be granted That the Orbs above together with the Stars and Planets are of one simple Essence or Manner of Existence and therefore cannot Mingle or Move with other Matter distinct from their own Tho' by Divine Appointment as Parts of the same miraculous Substance they are only Illuminated But should the Soul of Man be Assimilated by any refin'd Contemplation to the Nature to the Etherial Luminaries for want of a more obvious or excellent Comparison 't is not easie to conceive how in its Passage from the Body when Life departs it should remove to its appointed Residence separated from Intervening Substances which in their Temperatures and Parts are of the same Elementary Composition with the Humane Body that had been actuated by it Which Objection was doubtless consider'd as causing some Hesitation in the Thoughts of Des-Cartes who notwithstanding the pretended curiosity of his Imagination in reference to the Soul dispos'd according to his Method into the Original Formation by God as he delivers the Operation of the Humane Body He does not at all express the Manner of its departure from its Corporeal Station at the period of Life Or by what means transferr'd or remov'd to its Immortal Residence which was to be expected from the process he delivers Who having determin'd that the Humane Soul is a thinking Substance and notionally Active in the Conduct of the Living Body he might as well have Inserted the Method of its Progression after Death from its Bodily Habitation and how being a Substance it arriv'd to its Immortal Abode without being Complicated Mov'd or Moving in its Passage with any material Thing by any resemblance to what it perform'd when acting in the Inclosure of the Body of Man All which according to the liberty he gives to his Invention might have been as successfully deliver'd by him as the dispatch he gives to his Globuli and Vortices by variety of Schemes and Diagrams that have no better proof than the Suppositions of Des-Cartes But it seems he thought it safer for his Pen to Inscribe his Imagination of the Soul primarily convey'd by the Act of the Almighty into the Humane Body than by what subsequent Means or Pasport from above its Substance arriv'd after the Death of the Body to its determin'd Existence Of which I find no mention in any of his Works other than that he leaves the Manner of the Soul 's passing from the lifeless Body together with its Journey to its Immortal Residence to the miraculous Conduct of the Almighty And I think it devoutly Judicious if according to his Example I silence my Querie on this Incomprehensible Subject Since by the Will of the Omnipotent Disposer and Conservator of the Universal World together with the Being of Mankind in Soul and Body our rational Abilities more aptly tend to admire than determine the Manner by which we are Ensoul'd to live or after Death to remain Immortal A Contemplation sublimely incumbent on the Humane Mind that is enough Capacitated to understand its Intellectual Dignity however its Essence and Operations within us are superlative to our Apprehensions or exact Definitions to be given of them Wherefore I doubt not that my Discussions on this great Particular are no less valid where I differ from him than what I have Remark'd on not a few of his main Principles Maxims Notions Hypotheses and Schemes or demonstratively wav'd or rejected the Insufficiency of others on whatsoever account So that I dare Affirm that I have not omitted any significant or useful Animadversion And had I more particularly insisted on any Speculations or Matter seemingly varied and Instanc'd by him I had in effect but encreas'd Words to one and the same tendency And therefore where in Substance my Observations on some Things include other I desire that my Reader would ingenuously consider them as they ought to be understood And tho' this Author is very inclinable to Celebrate his own Esteem by frequently Affirming That his Assertions and Tenents are Philosophically and Mathematically certain I will boast of no Success of mine to the contrary farther than is Equivalent with the Proofs I have made and to which I refer the Judicious Peruser And thus I conclude the Fourth and last Part of my Remarks on the Plilosophy of Des-Cartes FINIS