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A38076 Remarks upon a book lately published by Dr. Will. Sherlock ... entituled, A modest examination of the Oxford decree, &c. Edwards, Jonathan, 1629-1712. 1695 (1695) Wing E221; ESTC R17931 28,355 66

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as far as in them lies the growth of any pernicious Doctrines in Religion Some such had bin preached among them which they had reason to fear might in time gain ground if not timely obviated To prevent therefore the infection and growth of such false and impious opinions they thought fit to publish their Decree which as I said before had a particular regard to those persons who were committed to their care eorum fidei curae commissis But this Dean like an Universal Pastor and Bishop sets himself as it were in Cathedra and from thence he dictates to the whole Church He lifts up his voice as if he would say audiat orbis Christianus I do declare and let all persons take notice of it at their peril that the Doctrine of three Persons and one God or one Substance in the God-head which is all one as shall be shewn by and by is Sabellianism is Heresy and nonsence Would not this Dean think you have done well to have advised with some men of skill and learning how far the reputation of his wisdom and modesty not now to mention the Integrity of his Faith which thereby may be justly called in question might be affected by such a bold and presumtuous declaration The next instance of his great modesty may be found in the 11th and 12th pages of this examination where he makes an Apology for the use of new forms of words unusual unscriptural forms of speech in order to explain and declare as he calls it the Catholick Faith several of which as it is very well known this examiner had invented and made use of to this purpose in his vindication of the blessed Trinity and for which he was justly called to an account by the learned Animadverter Now among other things which he offers in vindication of this bold and dangerous practice p. 12. he tells us That the Church tho it never had authority to make a new Faith yet it always had and always will have authority to declare and explain the true Catholick Faith in such words as are most aptly expressive of it and necessary to countermine the Arts and Evasions of Hereticks And this he saith will justify the use of such expressions as these Three distinct infinite Minds and Spirits or three substances how novel soever they may be thought To this suggestion of his I have several things to Answer First he saith the Church hath Authority to use new and unusual forms of words in Articles of Faith But I am apt to think she would be very unwilling to exercise her power and would never do it except when pressed with a great and an unavoidable necessity We have reason to think it would be one of her last remedies when all other methods of preserving the faith had proved ineffectual It is true indeed in the Ancient Church the meaning of certain words which sometime were of doubtful and ambiguous signification were afterwards settled and determined such as was substantia persona 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And some new unscriptural words such as the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 were made choice of by the Fathers and put into their Creeds in order to detect the hypocrisy and Heresy of the Arians But this was not done till after many disputations and great deliberation and afterwards they thought themselves obliged to declare the necessity they were under of settling the sense of one word upon this important subject which was not a new word neither but such as had bin formerly used before they would impose it on the Church So weighty a thing was the faith and peace of the Church in the opinion of those great men in those days But tho they introduced some new words and settled the signification of others they never did attempt to alter and lay aside the use of any which had formerly bin of general usage and universally received among Christians in order to introduce new ones in the room of them On the other hand the Church hath condemned all 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 all new invented terms and hath forbid the introducing any such under the pain of deprivation or Anathematization And for this Decree of the 6th General Council the third of Constantinople the Church in succeeding ages hath preserved so great a veneration that none either Greek or Latin Roman or Reformed have ever since complained of the hardship of that Synodical sentence or have endeavored to reverse it But on the other hand they have declared a high displeasure against all such who have at any time attempted any such innovations As is evident from the fate that attended Abbot Joachim and Valentinus Gentilis the one in his book the other in his person All this the Dean had formerly bin put in mind of by the learned Animadverter and yet notwithstanding this monition he still persists in that presumtuous humor of using and defending these new unusual inconvenient forms of speech and which he himself allows may be liable to an Heretical meaning But 2dly Let it be granted that the Church may alter old phrases but hath she actually made use of that her Authority in the case before us Hath she published any declaration whereby she hath discovered her pleasure in this affair viz. that the old words such as those of persons Hypostasis subsistence should be laid aside to make room for self-consciousness and mutual consciousness Or that one nature one essence one substance must be discarded and in their place the phrases of three distinct minds spirits and substances should be introduced That maxime in Law is true here in Divinity eodem modo res solvitur quo ligatur The Church hath tyed us to the use of these words I pray who hath set us at liberty why he saith or at least intimates that the Church hath But what Church I beseech you why none that I know of except it be that which is included and which he carries about with him in his own person How comes he to be styled the Church That you must know is by a Synecdoche whereby the Dean of a Church may be called the Church it self Tho others may account it rather a Catachresis or vocis abusio when a word is abused being transferred from a proper to a very improper and absurd signification But sure the Dean cannot so far forget himself as to arrogate to himself the name of the Church He doth not that I know of indeed assume the name but he plainly doth the Authority of the Church And under her name and power he shelters himself For as was said before p. 16. he justifies his own innovations by saying that the Church always had and always will have Authority to use such words as she thinks most expressive of the faith How can this Apology vindicate him except either he be the Church or at least be commissioned by her and invested with her Authority I presume he will not pretend to be formally the Church either
drew it up need not brag much of his skill in Latin having transgressed the plain rules of Grammar in using EORUM FIDEI ET CURAE for SUAE FIDEI ET CURAE And for this that you may not rely only on his word and single judgment he vouches the Authority of some Criticks some Criticks say c. Who those Criticks are we are not able to divine perhaps they may be found in the number of those wise and Learned men whom he mentions in the 6th page and of whom he undertakes to procure a meeting any day in the year to censure the Oxford Decree But whosoever those Criticks were I am sure neither He nor They have any great reason to boast of their skill in Criticism For I would fain know what those Rules of Grammer are which he saith are transgressed by using eorum for suae fidei Some waggs sure pretending to be Criticks imposed on him I will endeavor to set him right And therefore for his better information I would direct him to the Oxford Grammar and to the observations which are there made p. 232. upon the pronouns sui and suus which are called Reciproca quia reflectuntur ad id quod praecessit in eadem oratione But perhaps he may think that book beneath his perusal he may therefore if he pleases consult Gerhard Vossius in his book de Sermonis constructione where in the 56th chap. he will find three Canons or Rules laid down de Reciprocis the last of which being to our present purpose is this Si ob neglectum reciproci nulla oriatur ambiguitas potest aliquando reciproci loco aliud relativum poni This is the Rule and there he may likewise find several examples among the most approved Authors Cic. Philipp 2. Omnes boniquantum in ipsis fuit Caesarem occiderunt Idem 3. de Off. perfuga Fabritio pollicitus est si praemium ei proposuisset c. Id 1. de Off. Si non poterit causas defensitare illa praestare debebit quae erunt in ipsius potestate Quinctil Declam 3. neque ignoravit quae eum manerent pericula More instances he may there find to this purpose out of Curtius Pliny c. Now the Dean I hope will not be so hardy as to say that Tully and Pliny and Quinctilian were ignorant of the rules nay the plain rules of Grammar The Dean I verily believe knew nothing of this matter He hath no better way then that I can think of to come off but to tell the world that some persons under the disguise of Criticks imposed upon him the confession of his ignorance being in this case his best excuse tho at best it is but a very sorry one Having thus finished these previous remarks I come now to consider more particularly the Propositions which occasioned the Oxford Decree and which were condemned by it The Propositions are these There are three infinite distinct minds and substances in the Trinity Item that the three persons in the Trinity are three infinite distinct minds or spirits and three individual Substances These are adjudged and declared to be False Impious c. He desires to know the reasons upon which this Decree was grounded which he saith in the conclusion of his Examination p. 46. had much better have bin thought on at first and then we should have escaped this Decree Intimating thereby what he had in broad words expressed before that it was a rash injudicious Censure neither managed with consideration nor supported by any good reason I must confess for my own part I do not see any just ground why we should comply with this Examiner's expectation For reasons have already bin offered by the Learned Animadverter and those penned with such a strength and clearness as are peculiar to his writings But he saith he cannot perswade himself to read what the Animadverter hath written on this occasion To what purpose therefore is it to offer any new Arguments which must all be lost upon one who superciliously disdains to peruse and consider what either hath or what may hereafter be charitably proposed for his conviction But because he who resolved never to read whatever should be written by the Animadverter may perhaps cast a scornful glance on these papers I shall therefore so far gratify him in his demand as to offer him one Reason against his three Substances in the blessed Trinity but it shall be a substantial one and such as most men I am sure will look upon to be as considerable and as effectual to shew the falshood and impiety of his opinion as if twenty were proposed And that is this viz. That if there be three distinct substances and the same is to be said of three distinct minds and Spirits in the Trinity then there must unavoidably be three Gods This hath bin so plainly and irrefragably already made out by the Learned Animadverter that if the Dean would have vouchsafed to have spent that time in reading and examining the Animadversions which he hath mispent in examining the Oxford Decree it would have spared any farther trouble or pains in this affair Now for a farther proof and confirmation of this reason I shall lay down some observations which carry such a plainness and evidence along with them as cannot I think be gainsaid or resisted but by such who are before-hand resolved to persist in their errors and are hardned against all conviction Such as 1st That the Existence and Unity of the Godhead is the first and Fundamental principle of all Religion both revealed and natural And consequently that there cannot be more Gods than one in any sense whatsoever if the word God be taken in its proper and not in a Metaphorical and Figurative signification That therefore which I affirm is that there are not more Gods than one either Superior or Inferior Coordinate or Subordinate Numerical or Specifical Ancient or Modern Hear O Israel the Lord our God is one Lord Deut. 6. 4. The Lord he is God and there is none else besides him Deut 4. 35. But this is the dictate of nature as well as the language of the Scripture Reason I mean where it is not corrupted and depraved and Revelation both conspiring to teach us this Lesson 2dly That there being but one God from thence it must follow that in God there must be but one nature one essence Because essence is that by which every thing is constituted that which it is it is the ratio formalis of that thing be it what it will primo de re concipitur being the first thing that offers it self to our thoughts when we form an Idea of it One essence one nature constitutes one thing Two natures two or more essences constitute two or more things Where there is one human or Angelical nature there is but one man one Angel Where there are two or more there are two or more men or Angels Peter and John Michael and Gabriel And so for the
they are so abused they often prove very hurtful and mischievous I find it therefore joined with two other qualities for the sake of which possily he may speak disrespectfully of it The first whereof is Warmth p. 2. where he represents a certain member of the University under the character of a warm Zealot which to be sure he did not design to be a commendation but rather a Title of contempt and disgrace The other is Orthodoxie or soundness in the faith p. 24. where in the same slight and contemptuous manner he styles some persons our modern Orthodox Zealots to which he joyns an other ornamental Epithete of Heresy makers It may not possibly then be bare naked Zeal but zeal thus qualified which he thinks fit to condemn As to the first Epithete of Warm if zeal found in conjunction with Warmth be blame-worthy than I would fain know of him where he can direct us to find out any kind of zeal which will not come under the same condemnation In all his great reading did he ever meet with any Author who furnished him with the notion of a cold zeal or in this case did he ever meet with any medium between hot and cold i. e. a luke-warm zeal Doth this great critick in languages know whence this word is derived Perhaps he will say that it was not the bare Warmth but the Excess of it which he disliked in this Zealot But I do not hear that he did promote any petition or use any endeavors that the Sermon should be burned but that the propositions delivered in it which gave great occasion of offence should be condemned However let the warmth of this zealot be what it will the reflexion made upon it by this examiner can never be excused in him who in many of his writings discovers such an intemperate heat as hath bin disapproved by his friends as well as enemies Nay there is one peculiar circumstance of his warmth for which I think no tolerable excuse can possibly be made by any person tho never so much byassed in his favor and that is the fervor which he hath discovered on both sides of the question having discoursed pro and con and with equal violence appeared in defence of quite contrary opinions It is true indeed it is no disparagement to any man to alter his opinion provided that that change be attended with modesty and supported by reason But whoever shall maintain both parts of a contradiction and then with equal fury shall think to bear down all opposition it is plain such an one can have no sincere concern for truth but only for his own opinion and thereby gives too great occasion to call in question either his judgment or sincerity which are hereby brought under a just suspicion But 2dly Supposing that a warm zeal may be excused yet I find a zeal for the Faith is not like to meet with the same fair quarter for an Orthodox Zealot is a pernicious creature and never to be endured who will be sure either to find or make Heresies and thereby disturb the quiet and peace of the world But where I beseech you can a man employ his zeal more commendably than in the defence and maintenance of the truth especially when it is of great importance As it certainly must be when the opposite error is such as plainly overturns the foundations of our Religion and this is plainly the case before us But it seems a zeal for errors for false and impious opinions may be warranted tho attended with all the warmth nay with all the rudeness and scurrility imaginable but we must not lift up a finger to support the faith nor open our mouths in defence of it but presently they must be stopped again with such dirty foul language as this examiner thinks fit to fling in our faces This is not just and equal dealing 3dly The next thing that calls for our observation is that strange vein of pride and haughtyness which runs through this paper To give an account of all particulars of this nature would be in a manner to transcribe his book which ought not to be honoured with too many Editions I shall therefore confine my self to two particulars in which a vanity and arrogance which are insupportable are too plainly discovered The first is the charge of Heresy which almost in every page he lays at the doors of all them who differ from him in his notion of three distinct minds and substances in the blessed Trinity the denyal of which he over and over calls Sabellianism and in the conclusion of these papers he dubbs with the honourable titles of Heresy and nonsense But I would fain know how this Dean comes to be thus invested with this large Authority and prerogative of adjudging and declaring Heresy which he saith and saith rightly ought not to be entrusted with any single person nor any body of men less than a National Synod I do not know that he is his Majestie 's High Commissioner for Ecclesiastical affairs Perhaps it will be said that he did this by way of retaliation the Heads of Houses declared his notion of three minds and substances to be Heretical and he adjudges their opinion of three persons and one substance to be so too Here he doth but recriminate and therefore is on the same level with these Decreeing Heresy-making Heads If this be a fault it is a fault on both sides and they are alike equally criminal To which I answer 1st That the Heads of Houses by the judgment and declaration which they made were very far from designing to assume to themselves an illegal and extravagant power of adjudging or declaring any matter or cause to be Heresy which was not as they thought adjudged and declared to be so before by a competent Authority and allowed for such by the Laws of this Land The Doctrine of one substance was Decreed in the Council of Nice confirmed afterwards by all the other General Councils to which the contrary opinion of three substances as was said before is diametrically opposite and therefore by the whole Church hath bin in former ages accounted and adjudged Heretical On the other hand the examiner declares the belief of one substance in the Trinity to be Heresy not only which had never bin declared so before by any Council either general or particular but quite contrary to the plain meaning of the Canonical Scriptures to the express determinations of General Councils to the established Faith and Doctrine of the Catholick Church to all which he hath with unparallel'd pride and presumtion bid defyance and thereby brings himself within the compass and condemnation of the Law But 2dly The judgment and declaration of the Heads of Houses was made with a particular regard to the Members of their own Body over whom they are entrusted with a just and legal Authority They have reason to look upon themselves to be under a strict and sacred obligation to prevent
eternal Son and by the Father and the Son to the eternal Spirit without any division or separation And that which is communicated whole and entire without division or separation makes no number for it is but one still Here he is as sound and orthodox as Athanasius but when he comes to explain himself and therein to give us his true sentiments for all the former expressions are but an artificial disguise of his errors then he uses such a shuffing ambiguous deceitful way of speaking that you would think that Ursacius or Valens or Eusebius of Nicomedia were risen from the dead I confess I have bin beyond measure astonished when I have perused his writings on this subject to find such plain and gross contradictions so often and so boldly uttered by him Sometimes he will make a good and laudable confession of the Faith and by and by he spoils all by a very fraudulent and treacherous explication And indeed hereby he hath laid the foundations of such a sophistical and deceitful way of writing that if it should be countenanced in him and thereupon imitated by others it would render it almost impossible either to vindicate the truth or to confute any Heresy This charge will be made good by considering these following particulars Such as are 1st his manifest and manifold contradictions with which his books written upon the subject which is now before us do every where abound Whereby he affirms and denys the same thing almost in a breath and what he erects in one place he presently kicks down in another To make out this I shall confine my self to one instance of it relating to the Unity of the divine nature p. 21. He saith the Divine nature is whole and entire in each divine person and the three divine persons whom he very falsly and very dangerously there calls three divine minds have the same one divine nature and are but one and the same infinite nature p. 29. There is but one and the same divinity or Godhead in them all speaking of the three persons The same one divinity or Godhead is entirely and indivisibly in three distinct persons p. 30. The same one divine nature is wholly and entirely communicated from the Father to the Son c. See p. 45. where you have the like expressions by which he affirms that there is but one and the same nature one Divinity one Godhead in the three Persons And yet in other places he is as confident that there is not only one singular nature and substance in God p. 16. To say that there is one singular substance in the Deity is the fundamental Article of the Sabellian Creed p. 17. If there be but one singular divine nature and substance in the Deity tho men could find a Trinity of Persons in this one divine nature which yet p. 16. he represents as a ridiculous imagination yet from thence he saith it must follow that the whole Trinity must be incarnate p. 23. Now to affirm that there is but one Godhead one and the same divine nature in the three Persons and yet to deny that there is one singular divine nature and substance in those persons I think amounts to a very plain contradiction I know it will be said that he affirms and denies the Unity of the divine nature but it is not in the same respect when he saith it is one he means that the same specifical nature is whole and entire in the three Persons but when he denies it to be one he means that there is not one only singular or numerical divine nature for this were by so saying to revive the Heresy of Sabellius I Answer this will not save him from a contradiction For let him make choice of which of these terms he pleases to express the Unity and sameness of the divine nature by it is certain that what he affirms in one place he denies in another When he saith it is one one and the same doth he mean one singular numerical nature if he means so then this he doth at other times in plain downright terms deny not only as a thing that is false but as Heretical impossible contradictory as was seen before Well when he asserts the Unity of the Godhead and saith that one and the same divine nature is in the three Persons wholly and entirely communicated from the Father to the Son as he expressed himself p. 30. doth he mean a specifical Identity I suppose he doth for p. 10. he tells us that to assert three substances in the Arian notion that is three distinct minds and species of substance or three natures and essences specifically different this is false impious and Heretical Therefore to affirm three natures of the same kind must be a true religious orthodox acknowledgment This he must mean if he means any thing Otherwise if he shall say that when he affirms there are three natures or substances he means that there are three but yet which are neither of the same kind nor of a different kind that is neither numerically nor specifically different Then I say that he advances an absurd and an inexplicable position which neither he nor any man else can possibly understand But on the other hand if he affirms or means a specifical Unity in the Godhead then I am sure he doth as plainly as words can make it in other places contradict his meaning For p. 19. He hath these words Tho the Ancient Fathers frequenty make mention of a specifick Unity of nature in the Godhead yet they did not confine the Unity of the divine nature to this And p. 33. This specifick sameness doth not answer the complete notion of the divine Unity Nay he doth not only say this but gives a very good reason for it p. 19. The divine nature is no species for it is but one If there be any force in this consequence it must be this viz. That the divine nature is but one singular individual nature which is incapable of plurality or multiplication and therefore it cannot be a species because a species can be multiplied and therefore is capable of being affirmed and predicated de pluribus of more things of the same kind He proceeds The Unity of the Godhead is the most real essential indivisible unity Very right Therefore say I it is not a specifical Unity the former assertion being a clear an unanswerable proof that it is not so For 1st The Unity of the Godhead is a real Unity but a specifick Unity is only a Logical and Notional one 2dly The unity of the Godhead is an essential unity the unity of one nature and essence the specifick is only an unity of several natures which are really and essentially à parte rei distinct from each other and are only united in the understanding Lastly The unity of the Godhead is the most real and therefore the most perfect unity but a specifick unity is not the most real but of a lesser sort
consequently they must be three Gods to all intents and purposes when united as much as if they were separated But 2dly A specifical sameness of the Godhead is by no means to be allowed because it destroys the true and fundamental reason of that unity viz. the infinite perfection of the divine nature which renders it absolutely incapable of any multiplication and places it upon another weak and unstable foundation viz. the operation of the mind and understanding So that the unity of the Godhead according to ths hypothesis doth not result from the nature of God but is owing to and dependent upon the operation of some intellect drawing one common notion from the agreement which it observes in several individuals Which to affirm would certainly be both a monstrous and a Blasphemous assertion ss the Animadverter hath very judiciously observed p. 183. From all these observations I think it is as evident as any truth in nature that to assert three substances in the blessed Trinity is plainly to imply and in other words to affirm that there are three Gods which assertion therefore in the judgment not only of all true Christians but even of Jews and Mahometans and some sober Pagans would be accounted and adjudged false and impious as it is declared to be by the Oxford Censure But against this the Dean will urge in behalf of his three distinct substances the plurality and distinction of persons in the Trinity Are there not three Persons in the Godhead Yes Are not these three Persons three substantial Persons Yes we acknowledge they are Tho by the by this epithet of substantial when added to Person is superfluous and is no better than a plain tautology because the very notion of Person imports the perfection and complement of substance so that it receives no addition to its signification by the word substantial But to pass this by and proceed to his questions Are not three substantial persons three distinct substances I answer no. For these three persons have but one and the same substance or nature that is common to them all which nature hath three different ways of subsisting in the three persons From which different ways of subsisting as I said before do result distinct properties and relations belonging to each of those divine persons and which are incommunicable to the others All these questions so often and so impertinently proposed by the Dean are easily resolved by proposing the like questions in other words but such as are perfectly equipollent Are not the Persons in the Trinity three distinct Divine Persons Yes Is not every divine Person truly and properly God Yes Is it not then as plain that if there be three distinct divine Persons there must consequenty be three Gods I answer no. Because tho each of them distinctly is a divine Person and therefore God yet they have but one and the same Divinity or Godhead in common to them all so that they are distinguished only by their personalities but are united in one divine nature or Godhead And therefore as the Athanasian Creed tells us tho we are compelled by the Christian verity to acknowledge every Person by himself to be God and Lord yet we are forbidden by the Catholick Religion to say there are three Gods or three Lords Now of all this I would defire no greater or plainer acknowledgment than what I find in the writings of this examiner and particularly in the papers before us p. 18. he hath these words That there are three Persons and one God is the Catholick Language and therefore three belongs to the Persons and one to the Godhead This is right but in the words immediately succeeding he quite overturns the Catholick Faith and Language by saying That therefore whatever is essential to the notion of each Person may be numbred and distinguished with the Persons From hence he would have it follow as indeed it will if this be allowed that spirit and substance being included in the notion of a Person it must be multiplied with it so that as there are three Persons so there must be three spirits three substances in the Trinity Now this is extremely false for by the same way and for the same reason that there are three substances or three spirits there must be three Godheads He saith no adding that this will not affect the unity of the Godhead for three he saith belongs to the persons which are three not to the Godhead which is but one very right And must it not be said for the same reason that when we affirm that there are three substantial Persons three is to be applied to Persons and not to substance because substance when we speak of God being equipollent to Godhead as was said before is but one and therefore cannot be multiplied But cannot what is essential to the notion of a person be numbred and distinguished with the person No by no means for tho it may and must be so in finite persons it is not so when we speak of the divine infinite persons in the Trinity Because there is something in each of those persons which in common belongs to them all such is the divine nature substance Godhead which is so in each as to be whole and entire in all three and therefore tho residing in and applied to each person yet it may not it cannot be numbred or distinguished with the persons who are distinguished by their properties and relations which arise from three different ways manners of their subsistence but not by their substance and Godhead which is but one and the same in all three without division distinction or multiplication The same orthodox acknowledgment we have p. 21. tho tacked by him according to his usual method to an egregious contradiction There he saith that the divine nature is whole and entire in each divine Person and that infinite and infinite and infinite when applied to the Persons are but one and the same infinite nature Very right but then with the same breath in a manner he puffs all this away by telling us that each of the divine Persons is a distinct infinite mind and yet that these three infinite distinct minds can have but one and the same divine nature Which is a plain contradiction making one to be three and three one in one and the same respect And is no better than if he should say in three Gods there is but one and the same Godhead for infinite mind and spirit is but the same thing in other words with God as he himself elsewhere acknowledges Lastly to mention no more p. 29 30. He repeats the same orthodox expressions The Scripture-notion of the Unity of God is not such an Unity as is only in one Person for then it could not enjoyn the Faith and worship of Father Son and holy Ghost But such an Unity as can be between three when the one same divine nature is wholly and entirely communicated by the eternal Father to the
between man and man which by this means or such meaning if you please is entirely destroyed By all that hath bin said upon this Head I think it will appear plain to every unprejudiced person that there was great reason to condemn the Propositions mentioned in the Decree which plainly overthrow the Unity of the Godhead and therefore are justly styled false and impious Of them it is farther affirmed in the Decree that they are contrary to the Doctrine of the Catholick Church and particularly to that received here in the Church of England And so they are as opposite to it as truth is to falshood and faith to infidelity It hath bin the belief and profession of all good Christians since the first planting of Christianity in the world that as there is but one God so there is but one nature and essence in the three persons of the Trinity of which they are all partakers This was upon a particular occasion Decreed in the Council of Nice confirmed afterwards by all the other General Councils and they who have opposed this determination have in all times heretofore bin adjudged and declared Hereticks For some time indeed the words Substance Person and Hypostasis were of ambiguous signification but that was afterwards settled and the Language of the Church ever since hath bin Three persons and but one Substance Nature Essence Divinity In this all the Fathers agree both Greek and Latin even St. Hilary who styles the Father Son and Holy Ghost three substances yet in the very same place where he is cited by the Examiner he explains himself and vindicates the Synod of Antioch and tells us p. 37. Tres substantias esse dixerunt subsistentium personas per substantias edocentes by three substances they meant three persons But as to the substance it self when placed in opposition to person he acknowledges that to be but one and that the Father and son unius recte ambo creduntur esse essentiae Again Credamus dicamus esse unum substantiam p. 39. and p. 40. Deus unus ob indiscretae in utroque naturae indissimilem substantiam praedicetur Which the Examiner thus renders into English The Father who begets and the Son who is born are to be acknowledged one God upon the account of the same nature in both without the least difference or variation and therefore say I without the least distinction except the Dean can find out a distinction without a difference which I confess he hath done in some other cases before mentioned But this is his peculiar talent to find out that which no body before him ever dreamed of The like observation is to be made with relation to the Alexandrian Synod under Athanasius which one would think he would never have mentioned if he had not in a manner bin forsaken by his reason at the same time that he abandoned his Religion For nothing could have bin produced which is more apposite and pertinent to overthrow his new notion of three minds and substances For there happened a dispute between the Catholicks concerning 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which was meerly a contention about words when they all agreed in the same thing those who asserted three Hypostases thereby meaning three Persons but yet but one Godhead and one substance in the Trinity those who denied there were three Hypostases thought that by Hypostasis was meant substance and they dreaded nothing more than to affirm there were three substances in the Godhead Take it in the words of the Examiner p. 43. They owned but one Hypostasis or substance for they believed but one ' Divinity or Divine nature by reason of the Identity of nature between Father and Son And they having given their several Explications were all found to agree in the Catholick Faith and then afterwards three Hypostases and one nature was the Catholick Language Can any thing be more directly opposite to his notion than this Determination of the Synod One cannot but think he was Infatuated when he produced it But still he hath a shift in reserve to save himself and his three substances For in that same place he renders Hypostasis by substance and saith that when they said three Hypostases they meant it still in the notion of three substances A very false and perfidious suggestion making the Catholick Language as he himself acknowledges it wherein Catholicks expressed their consent in the same Faith to consist in a ridiculous contradiction For according to him when they said three Hypostases and one nature they meant three substances and one nature that is three substances and one substance three natures and one nature these being two words that signify but one and the same thing But the true Language of the Church was that there are three Persons truly and really distinct and yet but one nature essence substance And this doctrine hath bin constantly uniformly and without any alteration conveyed thro all the Ages of the Church to our days this being the Faith and these the words of all Christian Churches Greek and Latin Eastern and Western that are at this day in the World And particularly of our own Church who in the first Article of our Religion teaches us to profess that there is but one God and that in the Unity of this Godhead there are three Persons of one power substance and eternity And in our most solemn addresses to Heaven she directs us to make the same acknowledgment viz. upon Trinity Sunday and to give glory to God in these words Who art one God one Lord not one only Person but three Persons in one substance For that which we believe of the glory of the Father the same we believe of the Son and holy Ghost without any difference or inequality And if there be not any difference in the substance there can be no distinction as was said before And now at length being quite tired with following this Examiner thro that maze and Labyrinth into which he commonly leads his Readers it is high time I should take leave of him after I have committed him to the mercy of God and his writings to the censure of the Church The former I hope he will partake of the latter perhaps he and they may escape tho he stands in great need of it especially since he so obstinately and pertinaciously persists in his errors after so plain a discovery and so clear a confutation of them But I cannot fairly part with him without enquiring into the reasons which induced him to publish this Paper wherein he treats the Governors of the University in so rude and insolent a manner falling foul upon persons whose Character Profession and Station he ought to have considered and from whom he never received the least personal injury or provocation that ever I could yet hear of Among other Reasons he hath suggested one in the last page of this Book which I shall only take notice of viz. That it was