The Harbourough forsouthe of them all is featelie disposed in the harte to whom there is a greate familyarity with will whiche either may couet or els eschew if any thing be obiected whiche may seem either to pleasure or domage nature Of loue Cap. iiij LOue is an inclination of will prone to that which is thought good For when as any thinge is profered which either is good in deede or els deliteth with a certain likelyhood of good through that opinion the greedy faculti of the Soule is vehemently inticed to enioy and possesse the same And of the goods which are sought for of men we tolde that there were three kindes Honest Profitable and Pleasant whiche coÌ„monly are coupled together because one thyng both may be honest and profitable and pleasant yet not by and by that which is either profitable or pleasant is honest whereas these now and than may appere to contende with honestie But for all this nothinge is in deed either profitable or pleasaÌ„t which same is not honest Certes what is honest that is onely required for the proper behoofe no consideration had neither of commoditie nor of delectation How greate the power of loue is the verses of Poets do beare witnesse and wee deeme that there be very few whiche can quite them selues cleare of all loue Plato constituted a threefolde loue the first which embraceth and cherisheth only Vertue but this is exempted from the number of affections he appeareth rather to be reckned among vertues because he vseth the iudgemeÌ„t of vpright Reason The other filthie which cloueth to the pleasure of bodie The thyrde whiche mindeth the Soule and Body Nothyng is more noble than the first nothynge more foule than the other The thyrd truly is a companion of bothe but yet he rometh abrode no lesse than the other By reason he reuerenceth the personage of the body and ardenly esteemeth it Vnlesse wee repine this loue resortyng amorously and strokyng the minde with sugred words and except this loue sike soule brought vnto another bayte Feates of Phisick should be practised in vayne when as now the loue shall growe in vse eake shal haue taken deeper rootes Of Desire and Hope Cap. v. DEsire is a luste to enioye that good whiche as yet is not presente If so that be in place it is loued but if it bee out of sight it is coueited Out of this Fountain if the sentence of reason be neglected and the desire bee immoderate and excéede the boundes and Limits of Nature who is apaid with few thinges many vices do arise as Niggardlines Ambicion Sensualitie Riot such other Hope is defined of Cicero an expectation of good to whom dispaire is contrarye a supposed difficultye and mistrust of a good thinge to be atchiued the which shal be Recapitulated heareafter among the fourmes of sadnesse It is the guise of a wise man to hope for those thinges whiche he maye attaine neither rashly to dispaire whither he may atchiue through trauaile And this hope verely by which we wish for good either trewe or shadowed differeth from that whiche is tearmed Theologicall and it is a vertue eke is depainted to be a waytinge for eternall felicitie Vnto whom in like case the repugnant vice is Desperatio despeire Of Gladnesse Cap. vi GLadnesse is an affection which is stirred with the opinion of some present goodnesse wherwith the minde is delited Cicero doth distynguish GaudiuÌ„ and Laetitiam ioye and gladnesse in this wise that the minde should be mooued with ioy paciently and constantly but with gladnesse vainely and prodigally With this affection the Nature is merueilously delighted and the hert enlarged and as it were embracynge that whiche is apparant good doth stirre the minde sweetly and delectably and faustreth life in the hert whiche sorow the contrarie passion doth oppresse And this pleasantnesse and delectacion for the amplitude of the good which is propounded may be greater or lesser and either honest or filthy It shabe honest if it be answerable to the meane of nature and vnto reason what one is gotteÌ„ through the contemplation and studies of commendable thinges But filthy if it be immoderate and dissonant to reason what one is receiued of corporal delites of peruerse exercises and of yll will as if any man should be delited with another mans harme than which vice nothing ought to be more abrogate from a man especially a Christian Of Hatred and anger and like affections Cap. vij COntrarye to Loue is hatred which is defined of Cicero Ira inueterata a longe festred Anger that is to wit of longe continuance This affection is ingendred of the discontenting of the minde detestinge the harme which is vnderstanded damaged either with the deede or sayinge of som man or deming him selfe hurted and sometimes abhorring from anothers freendship through a priuy instinct of nature Euen as perdie by Loue all all men are accorded so by hatred they are vnyoked than whiche nothynge is more pernicious to humaine societie which also by so much is more irkesom by how much more secretly it inuadeth To contempne vices it profiteth but to loue a man Christian charitie commauÌ„deth and to forgeue him whiche offendeth But to hate a man for no cause is very obsurde and most dissonant from vpright iudgement Vnto hatred are ascribed many affection whiche are to be auoyded of a godly man As dispight as anger as Hostilitie Despight whereby any man thinketh another more base then himselfe Whereas truly there is no cause why any one shoulde suppose himselfe to be preferred before his felow by reason that he cannot commonstrate any thinge of himselfe whiche he hath not receiued els where as it ought to be most euident vnto the Christians by holy Scriptures Anger is defined a lust to punish him who may seeme to haue hurted with iniury This affection appeareth to be mingled with sorowe and a greedinesse of reuengemeÌ„t which greeuously racketh a man and sharpely kindleth agaynst him of whome he is thought to be displeasured the moste troublesome of all the affections by which not only the minde but also the whole body is brought into suche a perplexitie that for anger a man can vneth see and moderate his senses and scarcely speake Hereto doth Hostilitie belonge which is defined an anger of punishing obseruynge oportunitie And hither discorde the destruction of the coÌ„mon weale and hither all hatred is referred Iracundia doth differ from Ira because Iracundia is a natiue faculty by which any man is made prone to anger But Ira is a commocion of this vertue and a rage bended from reason Wherby now and than the minde is so turmoyled that the angrie man doth very litle disagree from the Frantike And truly it may be verified of Horace Ira fuâ—or breuis anger is a shorte furie and of Ennius Insaniae principium the originall of Madnesse The bloud is incensed with this passyon and waxeth hotte in the bodie and the Spirites sodenly disquieted doo so
trouble a man and cause him so vnagreable to him selfe that he is sayd to be out of his Wittes neither to become his owne man before that the hot brayned moode shall asswage and the vehemencie relinquisht But not euery anger is lyke contentious for one is easier eake sooner prouoked and haleth a man vnwares but abideth not longe Another is more gentell truly yet more bitter and of greater induraunce and cleuyng to hatred and seekyng auengement Neither ought euery anger appere vicious sithe in sacred Scriptures wee may reade in this wise Irascimini nollite peccare Become you angrie and sinne not Neither vncommodiously of Aristotle the mediocritie of anger betwixt excesse and defect is renowned and moderate anger linked as a companion of worthy prowesse vnto fortitude which the auncient Academikes Cicero bearing record reported to be as it weare the Whetstone of valiaunt courage that is to witte the assistaunte which Seneca geueth in precept to vse not as a Capitain but as a souldiar We must then be agréeued with vngodlinesse wronge and other vices and our mind must be aduaunced when nede is when time and place do require but rest raigned if no such occasion be ministred of anger And by how much more greeuously the minde is solicitated by so much more painfully we shall brydle Choler wee shall maister the brayde and with all meane and might shall oppresse it forthwith the dominion of reason reuoked and that dismounted which kendled the wrath we shall extinguish the feruency or els the punishment differred till another season we shall extenuate the passion Of Sadnesse Cap. viij SAdnesse or heauinesse is a perturbacion drawinge together oppressynge the minde which is defined of Cicero a freshe opinion of present euill wherupon it may seem leifull the mind to be enlarged and contracted And after a bréefer way Heauinesse is a shrincking of the minde reason repining This taketh beginninge through the contemplacion of som euil or els through the wante of some good thing From this Fountaine proceede sundry passions which Cicero numbreth in the end of the third booke of Tusculans Questions and in the fourth when as he had constituted foure sortes of perturbacions had explaned them he recompteth them beyng reckned in these words But vnto ech disturbance more partes of the same secte are adiected as vnto sadnesse enuy emulation backbiting compassion but this we suppose to be a good affectioÌ„ not a greef of the mind vexacion wailing sorow infelicity wofulnesse lamentacion pensiuenesse disquietnesse affliction dispeire of which belowe we shall debate and if any moe be of the same stocke Hitherto Cicero whom reade you your selfe defining euery of the fourmes As euery pleasure is not saide to be vicyous so neither euery sadnesse And as it is a laudable thinge to triumphe at vertue so to be sorrowfull for vice to restreigne the minde immoderatly deliting is profitable neither semeth it an vnhoneste thing measurably to bewaile our wiues children or Parentes Of Feare Cap. ix FEare is a wayting of euill either a carefull remembraunce of pensiuenesse about to ensew as Cicero recordeth and it is repugnant to hope Feare is ingendred of the haling togeather of the hart throughe an opinion of imminent perill Moderate feare is profitable assenting to the counsaile of reason But the vnmeasurable or ouer small is discommended Som are more timorous some more bolde which the Phisicions déeme to be attributed to the Complexion of body but yet in this place their Iudgemente is of no simple importaunce by which timidity either is increased or diminished This perturbacion doth very sore disprofite Nature and cheefely so tormenteth a man â—n sodaine cases that who is horribly â—stonished may appeare no lesse to fall â—t of his right wittes than he which is â—reeuously displeased Vnder feare be many fourmes comprehended of which all there is one cause the ende perdie and opinion of euil is diuerse Slouth terrour shame feare quaking dismaiyng trouble dreade whose definitions you shall eftsones finde with Cicero in the same fourthe booke of Tusculans questions To these béen adioyned flatterie whiche also is termed Timorous inticement Suspicion a feare through a consideracion of mischiefe at hande dispeyre a low abashement of the minde Pensiuenesse a prickinge care through the expectation of euill and some other mo fourmes Cicero hath descriued shame and hath not defined it The definicion may be absolued that shame may be a feare of dishonesty whome blushing doth follow wherof hereafter we will debate more at large in Chapiter of Sober moode Of Boldnesse Cap. x. BOldenesse is gaged against feare that we may in this place vnderstand a moderate vertu of aduenturing and a confidence of the mind a certain mediocrity betwixt to much and to litle either betweene timiditie and vnmeasurable hope by which any one neither dreadyng mischief like to chaunce nor present doth aduenturously icoperde his ioynctes This is engendred otherwise than feare through the extending of the harte the Spirites augmenting the heat therof through whose force by reason that the mind is gouerned more often than by reason and counsell the appellacion of boldnes is welme taken in the worse parte It is disagreeable vnto true Fortitude which when as prudently the daunger is throughly examined aduentureth the same with a manly courage And doubtlesse hetherto of affections whose moderation is verye requisite for such as contende to the wished end by vertues that also we may enioye a certaine tranquilitye of minde in the Earth which in Greeke is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whiche Democritus defined the bound of good thinges and the â—igure and semblaunce of that vnfained Beatitude to come The which without the benefite of Christ who only is of power to appease the moodes of men through the coÌ„fidence of life which shall happen no wight at any season hath obteined Of Vertue and her diuision and Originall Cap. xi VNto the ende purposed in the beginning all the actions of menne are directed to the whiche they aspire vertue beinge the guide which very breefely may be defined A perfection by which the will is pricked to do agreably to right reason For vnder the appellacion of right reason we vnderstand the law of Nature and the knowledges of those thinges which are ingendred with vs and ingraffed from aboue in our minds that we may iustly determine of things good and bad honest and filthy as that God is to bée worshipped that no man is to be hurted and such like the whiche shall gaily be called the Squire of vertue vnto whiche the operation of the whole life may be directed with whom lesse it doth consente it can not be nominated a vertue Vertue is defined of Saint Augustine Ars bene reâ—â—eque viuendi A science to liue well and perfectly Of Cicero it is termed somtimes Recta ratio a right reason sometimes Animi Habitus a custome of the minde aunswerable vnto humane nature meane and reason sometimes Affectio animi constans
by my simple labour and industry to gratifie and please the good than by suppressing my attempt cowardlie to flee the busie braines of the naughtie and reprobate Certes the wicked are to be abandoned with their wickednesse but the good are to be loued and cherished for their godlinesse The studious sercher of wisdom will more seriouslie pursue the holsom and necessarie instructions for life then the exquisite situation of words and will rather couet fruitfull lessons and good admonicions than sugred sentences oratorial trickes and outlandish termes But the vnstedfast and vnstable minde of the vicious person I will speake of a thinge manifestlie and commonlie knowne had leiffer to espy some friuolous doubte to cauell and Question vpon than to folow any seemelie aduertisment perfectlie staking out the waie to laudable Vertue Such a Reader as hath his good wil fully addicted to pastaunces and vnhappie delites had rather I dare say bothe to see and reade the brutish bookes of VENVS plaies than to spend his time and busie his braine in such a Treatise which may instruct and teache him to liue Prudentlie iustlie valiauntlie and soberlie with the honest Reader I trust I shall purchase fauoure and iust commendation and to the other this little worke shal be sufficient to teache him for to vanquish and bridle his vnfauorie delite in bourding to mittigate his furious braide of reprehencion to asswage the combe of his insolente Arrogancie to appease the rage of his skornefull spirite and finallie to make him not onlie a fitte Disciple or hearer but also a profitable follower of Morall Philosophie Verelie all estates all degrees all ages haue presently laide before their Eies to looke on the Glasse of all Vertue for as in a Glasse they may easelie contemplate what is decent or els vnseemely in their parsonage and apparell so by fastening their mindes and vnderstandinges herevpon they may with no lesse facilitee maâ—ke consider and beare away what is to be folowed in their whole course of life or vvhat is to be eschewed vvhat to be retained as good and profitable or vvhat to be reiected as vncoÌ„modious and hurtefull Such vvhether they be noble or base riche or poore old or yong as haue al their delices and corporall delites as fleshfondinges and paumperinges of the vitall porcion subiecte to the renovvned victorious bondage of REASON such I say haue here to gather aduisements and instructions profitable and expediente to ratifie and confirme their liues and others vvho like EPICVRTENS are vanquished vvith gorgious fare and ouervvhelmed buried and drovvned in the bottomlesse Gulffes of innumerable vanities haue hereby to reform their insestuous conuersacions to amend their notorious faultes to banish their toublesome woodes of minde to expell and put away their accustomed doinges and by adorninge them selues with the flourishinge Braunches of Vertue by litle and litle to creepe to the Fountaine of that greatest Soueraintie For assure thy selfe gentle Reader that no man liuing can attaine vnto the vtterest good as ARISTOTLE the Prince of al Philosophers doth say vnlesse he shall first subdue his apetites bridell his desires Imprison his lusts and confound his mad and bestiall affections through which nature is enfeebled and he withdrawen from the fellowship of goodnesse and honestie And that I may not borowe thy pacience any lenger I doo instantly request that if any part of this my Transacion shall offend thine eares thou wilt courtously deale with me rather considering the proper worthinesse and sence of the Aucthor whiche is moste excellence then my basenesse and tennitie of Stile for the default of Eloquence ¶ Fare well ¶ Holsome Counsell for a Christian man. Geue almes to the poore dayly Endure affliction quietly Remember thy end stedfastly Vtter Gods word manfully In all thinges worke rightfully Serue God and thy Prince duely Call for grace howerly Loue thy neighbours freendly Yeld to the truth meekely Fauour learning earnestly Trust in Christs mercy faithfully Obtaine thou friendship perfectly No man oppresse Wrongfully Cornelius Valerius his Morall Description lately Englisshed Of the ende and Partes of Morall Science Cap. i. EThica Philosophia which in Latin is called De Moribus Moralis the philosophie of maniers Morall is a meane to liue well either a Science to iudge vprightly of conditions and of the Actions and duties of common lyfe The Philosophers onely imitatyng the light of Nature Reason as their Guide haue deliuered it vnto vs diligeÌ„tly adorned whose whole industrie especially either is conuersaunt in the boultynge out and vnfoulding the perplexitie of Nature or els in the Doctrine of life and condicions Albeit perdy as CICERO writeth incontinent after a three parted kinde of Philosophie was receyued of PLATO the one of lyfe and Facions the other of Naturall and diffuse things the third of reasonyng and adiudgyng both what is true and what is false what is honest in talke or euill what is consonant what disagreable yet they haue pursued no member of Philosophy more exactly SOCRATES being the Author and Counsellour than that than which nothyng was more behoueable to passe humaine life delectably which traineth and fashioneth the properties of men and righteth all the operacions of lyfe by the Squire of Vertue that the way to liue honestly may be embraced that the opinions of men might be vprightly infourmed of commodious and hurtfull things honest filthy of matters to be desired auoided of thynges profitable and vnprofitable who oftentymes geuyng Sentence of these peruersly do preise good and euill not accordynge to their valuacion An vpright iudgement of diuine humain matters is the very gorgious reward of God For God both reising vp the brightnesse of our minde also the power of vnderstandinge darkened through the infectiue sicknesse of the body doth polish it with a new light eake redresseth our wil through his clemencie earst piteously depraued Wee being armed with these proppes may assaie to atchiue vnto the knowledge intelligence of trouthe There be some who deeme that the best proporcion of liuing ought rather to be gathered out of sacred Scriptures than out of prophane Philosophie which wee like wise would suppose to be more sure and certaine if those thinges were comprehended in those celestiall learninges vttred by the mouth of the Omnipotent which are descriued of Ethnical writers touching the Ciuill associacion of men among them selues the mainteining of the weale publike without whiche they who obey the precepts of God and the holy men are not of power to leade a peasible life Wherfore because the Philosophers ignorant verily of Christian Religion yet very studious of humain wisdom imitating that law of Nature engrauen from aboue in all mennes mindes haue geuen lawes profitable to leade the life vprightly and right excellent documents concerning maners with a constant and perpetual sentence of iust and wrongfull doinges and haue left vs graue sayings by which we may be encouraged to Vertue and terrified from vices and may
with diuine excellency as the minde The other is yoked to the body as apâ—etite or desier and anger The higher â—s a receauer of Reason The lower is â—gnorant it is hir parte to rule and it â—elonges vnto this to obey But this oftentimes as an Horse waryng fierse not regarding the will of the Carter is whirled with a violent brayde vnto those thinges which him liketh whether they be honest or filthy yeldyng a deafe eare to reason and not hearyng the mynde and intelligence whiche is a copartner of those knowledges whiche by nature are planted in vs or rather ingendred of God and at all times incourageth vnto honest mattiers whether they be pleasant or lamentable For there is a triple good Honest profitable and pleasaunt Honest is which agreeth with the streight sentence of Reason Profitable is which succoureth nature and lyfe Pleasaunt is which deliteth naturall appetite as the drynke the thyrsty And out of these Fountaynes procede all actions It is the duety of the minde and Intelligence to determyne but to the other parte it belongeth to execute the commaundement of the minde and to labour The minde hath two principall Intelligences entalied of nature the one of debatinge truth and falshoode the other of discerning good and euill For al men through a certaine secret sence do discerne what thinges are iust and wrongfull so that this light of nature be not pesterd for nature hath geueÌ„ to vs as it were litle sparkes and seedes and a certayne procliuitie of minde and facultie to labour This affection doth stirre Operacion succeedeth the affection and by often operacions there is gotten a perfectnes either of vertue if it be trayned vnto a â—ood end or els of vice if vnto an euill â—nd this is the grounde of all humaine â—ctions Of Affections Cap. iij. SIth perdie euery fourme of vertues and vices doth spring as it were out â—f these Fountaines hability affection operation and perfection we wil compendiously manifest these And certes those few things which are said concerning faculty shall suffice And let that difference be obserued betwixt the natiue readines of the minde the braide or affection of this procliuity As choler doth moue the nature of an ireful man so dooth the coueting of glory force the couetous of honour Henceforth then we haue to breake our minde of affections Affection is a commocion of the minde disquieting the tranquility therof which in Greeke is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and of Cicero Perturbatio a Perturbation and it is defined a troublesom and a violeÌ„t moode of the soule bended from reason an enemye to the minde and quiet life The Stoikes when as they saw a man to be turmoyled hither and thither with many and wicked desires and falsly supposed the very nature of man to be vncorrupted and not defloure dthey gainsaid affections to be naturall but graunted them to be only opinions eyther of good or yll and in theyr kinde euery one to be vicious and to be rooted out of the nature of menne from which they would a wise man to be fre yet they are easily conuicted of errour For first of al that they are Natiue and ingendred by that it is lightly confirmed because motions and certayne inclinations are ingraffed in liuyng creatures by nature as the Zeale of parentes towardes theyr Children And who seeth not som men to be more enclined to anger or loue to ioyfulnesse or heauinesse than other som Farthermore that all are not faultye thereby it is apparant inough by reason the very law of God geueth vs in charge to beare loue towarde him towarde all men towardes our wife children and parentes And enioyneth vs mercy hope confidence ioye and some other affections very profitable and expedient to encourage the minde For what is more commodious for the life of man than the hope of glory and rewardes and the feare of rebuke and punishments And so doubtles affctions may be handsomly diuided that som may be called good by nature which agre with reason or els with the prescript of nature as good will compassion Some euill which do disagrée as Hatred Enuy Pride Dispere Som betwixt bothe as anger hope boldnes feare desire loue merinesse sorow which that they may not swarue from â—ertue they are to be ruled by the briâ—ell of reason and to be Iudged by mediocrity But neither is that to be commended which som construed that affections are naturall not also voluntary For whereas our will onely subiect to God may apppeare to haue a free Originall to worke it is to be thought the very redinesse perdie vnto these or them and likewise the first motion to be naturall but theyr vexacions to be voluntary and able to be chastised by th' authority of reason lesse they should run headling and be plucked with violence eake inforce a man immediatly welny vnwillyng vnto naughtinesse Albeit truly at that time the will coueting doth range at liberty and by some meanes may reteine it if so she woulde inuocate God the helper For put case it be feeble yet there is some libertie whiche when shame feare are set out to the show may be of power to bridle the affections And that they can be corrected by discipline those wordes deliuered of God do manifestlie denounce Sub te erit appetitus tuus tu Dominaberis illi Vnder thee shal be thine apetite thou shalt beare rule ouer it Wheras also a man consisteth of two partes a Soule and a bodie and there is a double force of the soule one a copartner of reason the other void she is stedfast and quiet this wandring and tormented with affections whiche moste commonly doth disquiet her where by it insueth that a man if he doth pursue the aduise of reason and intelligence he may want perturbacion But if he had rather to become Subiecte vnto the concupiscence of the body he may be diuerslie prouoked The Fountaine then of affections is that part of the Soule voide of reason and that is double 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 waryng angry and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 very desirous of a thinge The which if refusinge the Empire and Yoke of the minde and reason it be caried with his proper vehemencie it is needefull that forthwith one or other of the perturbations bee incensed and plucked throughe the opinion or similytude of good or yll sometimes bither and somtimes thither eke nowe and then be broughte all oute of frame with pleasure or luste and one while with timidity or hatred For vnto these twoo sortes it appeareth that any one of the affections may be referred because all mocions proceede from a suspicion of good or euill whether it be present or absent Out of the Iudgement of good floweth pleasure and out of the conceit of euill commeth sorow Vnto pleasure are referred loue desire gladnesse whiche succoure nature and among these especiallie ioy Vnto sorow appertaine anger hatred feare sadnesse which discommoditie Nature most painfully
conueniensque a stedfast and a conuenient affection of the mind makinge them commendable in whome it persisteth But of Aristotle it is defined Habitus animi iudicio susceptus in mediocritate positus A custome of the minde enterprised through reason situated in mediocritie In these definitions this worde Constans expoundeth what manner of thinge Habitus is that wee vnderstand him to be procured through vse and exercise That it is saide Ratione susceptus enterprised or receiued through reason that is to wit through election or aduise that signifieth that the operation of vertue is voluntarie That it is called Habitus animi a custom of the minde that doth commonstrate the habitacle of vertue That it is in mediocritate positus placed in a competent degree that is expressed in these wordes of Horace ¶ Vertue is a meane in middes degree Closde in both sides as thou mayst see That we may conceiue all vertues to be made moderated by a certaine measurable rate which should be approued of wise persons and skilfull in many cases and good But when we affirme that the operacion of vertue is voluntary either taken in hande through a frée Iudgement that is to be considered that we being furthered by the secret benefite of God and succoure of the holy Ghoste withoute whom wée are of strength to worke nothing obaying the right sentence of the minde indeuoring with voluntarie will may procure the perfection of vertue through diligence and frequent vse For these be the two principall efficient causes of vertue a minde iudgyng rightly and a will obeiyng him which iudgeth and commaundeth not amisse Whiche yet are very much succoured through learnynge the which may make brightsom the vnderstandynge of those sentences who are within vs by nature and the light geuē of God oftentimes obscured throughe wonderfull darkenesse as the booke of holy Scripture conteining the .x. Commaundementes and through an encouragyng of natiue procliuitie through Discipline or obseruacion of manners and peinfulnesse in gouernynge operacions as the shūning of Idlenesse and of these thinges which minister an occasiō of offending Plato writeth in his booke Meno vertue to be geuen of God not to be ingendred in vs of nature as the Stoikes would neither to consist only by practise as the Peripatetikes reported Certes it is to bee thought that true vertues do not chaunce vnlesse through a celestiall benefite that also there be other some with lesse peines to be mollified of nature notwithstandinge to be ratified by reason and custome Touchynge viciousnesse there is no doubte that it is voluntarie Very aptly then it seemeth to be graunted that humaine operations are without compulsion and that all vertues and vices are voluntary For what is done by coaction that meriteth neither prayse nor disprayse but is esteemed worthy of forgeuenesse Vertue is sundred of others into two partes Iustice Fortitude and of others into un Prudence Iustice Fortitude and Temperaunce Some suppose vertue as the whole to consist of members whiche beynge applied to sundry actions may be of efficacie to constitute diuers fourmes whereas of all one perfect vertue may be absolued neither is there any one of them foure vertues whiche may want the felowship of the residew Aristotle in only prudencie supporteth all vertues to be knitted together Wee approuynge the diuision of olde Philosophers will distribute vertue into them foure braunces whiche euen now wee haue placed of whom the first doth gouerne the intelligence the rest the wil to which may be annected whatsoeuer vertue els where may be traced out And first and formost we will minister talke of Prudencie in whose rehersall also Domestical and Politique affaires shall compendiouslye be remembred which hereafter if we shal thinke good shall be debated more at large Plato of these foure vertues doth name some perfecte who haue fired there restynge places in the minde of whiche suche is the societie emonge them that one being taken away all do fall vnto corruption but some vnperfecte of which certaine others being exempted notwithstandinge maye bee able to remaine Ther is an other particion of Vertues by which they are diuided into politike Purgatory and of the soule clensed and into them as are like Paternes and examples which Macrobius dooth copiously depainte in the eight Chapiter of his former booke of Commentaries on the dreame of Scipio The firste Salomon teacheth in his Prouerbs the others wee reade in Ecclesiastes the third in the Ballets the fourth in god The politique do rule humayn life eke maintayne the outward society of life The Purgatory doo scoure the spots of the soules and do contend vnto victory But the vertues of the soule clensed are collocated in him which the vices now quite troden vnder foote doth constantly perseuer in the loue of vertues which S. Augustine when as he confirmed the other three did not alow They are commonly termed Exemplares paterus and examples which are as it were Ideae as the Greekes do call them or els fourms and figures in the diuine mind sith God is the counterpaine of all good thinges Vertue is defined of Cicero as it is declared somtimes Recta racio a right reason somtimes Natura in se perfecta ad sumum perducta a nature sounde in it selfe and brought vnto the vtmost Otherwhiles Rationis perfectio a perfection of reason which definition Seneca imitatinge doth◠recorde Vertue is none other than an vpright reason vnto which as a rule all the doinges of life are directed And feately euery Originall of vertue proceedeth from perfect reason neither is vertue any other thing then as Cicero minionly descriueth a right affection of the minde from whom as it were from som Fountaine all vndefyled operations which are nominated dewties do proceede of which Cicero hath excellently written And thus I suppose it bee vnderstanded because manie haue affirmed that ther is one onely vertue that perdie there is one office either an action appointed to euery man of vprighte reason which accordinge to the multiplicity of the mater which it handleth inclined to sundrie affayres may procreat these foure vertues which we haue remembred aboue For ther is in very déede onely one perfect affection of the minde the mother of all vertues whose chaungeable appellations bee Prudence Iustice Fortitude Temperaunce of whiche wee will reason in order if first wee shall géeue this in Lesson not onely these whiche are called the giftes of the holy Ghoste but likewise all true vertues as Plato deuoutely supposed in that Dialogue which I haue recited afore to chaunce vnto vs by no meanes vnles by an heauenly benefite vndoubtedly if we embrace the goodnesses of God and labour to attaine to the ende hee beinge oure guide Of Prudencie Cap. xij PRudencie as it weare the Maistresse and iudge of other vertues of which none can be destitute is fitly placed in the first degree as the Capitaine of operacions and the science of liuing which is defined of Cicero the experience of desiring
and eschewinge thinges that is to wit a right affection of the minde by which it is perceiued what is to be done or shunned in humayn actions Of Cornificius in bookes of Rhetorik vnto Herennius it is termed Calliditas a sâ—ines which through a certaine reason maye obtaine a choise both of good and badde because all the facultie of wisdom is apâ—rooued in the election of good and euill â—â—ings of them as be neither good nor â—â—â—ll He vnderstandeth a wilynesse not 〈◊〉 vicious who oft times boroweth 〈◊〉 same appellacion but that subtility â—ch priuyly vndermineth with a cerâ—ne honest and profitable dissimulaâ—n Vnto the which craftie sayinges â—d deceiptfull doynges which in warâ— are called Stratagemes are referâ— Of the same writer also prudencie â—ermed Multarum rerum memoria 〈◊〉 memory of many matters and the 〈◊〉 of plentifull affaires Although perâ—â—isdom as other vertues is conuerâ—nte in humaine actions Notwithâ—nding especially trouth is Subiecte â—erto as the mattier which it handâ—h And certes the inquisicion and â—arche of soothe seemeth to be peculiar 〈◊〉 man Vnto the out finding of veritie â—ue vertues comprehended vnder Inâ—elligence are adioygned of Aristotle Science Arte Prudence Sapience vnderstanding of which Science Sapience and vnderstandynge require a a definite knowledge cake an absolute vertue Art and prudencie a probable one Science is defined a sure and an established knowledge and learninge of some matter through the cause whiche is perceaued withoute any ayde by naturall motions of the minde or els it is atchiued through demonstration of argumentes and it is of those thinges whiche may not otherwise exist or els be transfigured as diuinity Arte is said a perfection to dispatche those things by reason which otherwise may be as all humaine craftes Prudency is defined A qualitie to perfourme those thinges by reason which are either commodious or hurtfull to man Sapience verely is a most exquisit knowledge of those matters whiche are able to bee learned of man who compriseth the experience of diuine and human affaires Vnderstanding is called a qualitie perceauing the principles out of which confirmations are deducted Vnto Prudency he annected Art Science Intelligence and Sapience that althoughe verely he gainesaieth Vertue to be a Science yet he supposeth that shee is not of power to perseuer without this For althoughe onely goodnesse is purposed to vertues and trouth vnto Disciplines yet wheras to the searche hereof a greedinesse of good is coupled Science Sapience Art and Intelligence appere that they may not absurdely be nominated vertues if they serue for the operations of Prudence succoure the outfindinge of that which is good They ought not attende verelye to the contemplacion of causes only sithens all the commendacion of Vertue consisteth in dooinge and in gouerning the life vndefiledly Prudency then may take vnto her as waytynge mates vnderstanding for to know matters Science truly to conceiue them Arte for the generall vse of life Sapience for the out tracting of diuers things that by these props she may passe to the knowledge of trouth and may comprehend the verie Soueraine good and the liuely Fountaine of all wisdome flowing with Heauenly waters rushinge forth moste swiftly into eternall lyfe Now wheras vnto euery vertu certain seats in the soule from whence they issue are attributed A place is graunted to Prudencie in the minde to the remnaunt in the will sith it belongeth to prudencie to bolt out what is honest or wicked in matters to be handled and to debate of the same with iustful senteÌ„ce Which thyng doubtlesse is adepted not only by wit although sharpe but by a greate knowledge of sundry matters And very pretely it is sayd Longo prudentia surgit ab vsu Prudence ariseth through longe practise that we vnderstand the perfection of the minde whence creepeth this dexteritie of triynge out the truth to be termed prudencie who desireth a longe life and the handlynge and memory of diuers matters and the science of present cases to leuel vprightly the interchaungeable operation of men Moreouer it is requisite that a prudent man be polished with a certain natiue faculty of through seyng and adiudgyng the trouth by whiche he may contemplate thinges present and diligently discusse them may call to remembrance matters past may foresee sequels through whiche he may excell in takyng aduise and in outfindyng wittily through which he may passe in perceauyng clerely what is true in ech matter and what is to be attempted through which he may florish in proposinge sentence iustfully eake in ratifiyng subtely and wisyly what is decent what filthie what profitable For there are three partes conteined vnder wysdome 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a facultie of ministrynge holsom counsell good aduise 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a perfect sight and cunnyng in finishinge of that whiche is excogitated through profitable counsell and Gnome a sentence and iust verdit of matters to bée perfourmed and a stedfastnesse in that which is leyfull It is the duty than of a prudente wighte that I may driue my tale at his marke in few wordes to remember those thinges which are past to be skilfull in many matters to flowe in counsell to be quicke witted and to Iudge well and farthermore to leade not only an vndefiled conuersacion but also as place and oportunity in this coÌ„mon life shall craue to becom somwhat more charie and circumspecte And truly concerning the charge of Prudencie who should be kept in humain operacions we haue treated hitherto And by reason the variety of doinges apperteining to men is seuored in three sortes that some should be of peculiar persons which be Coincident to euerie one and generall som Domestical which serue to the order of Family others ciuill which we muste put in vre for the preseruacion of the Publike fellowship of menne a three parted force of wisdome likewise may be gathered the one common to all sortes which is named Monastica solitary the second Oeconomica belongyng to householde the third Politica which is thought to be the excellentest of all others because first and formost it is busied in common vtilitie vnto whiche yet wee must clime by degree For he shall not well gouerne either a family or els a weale publike who is not a good man and informed with the rules of condicions and fashioned vnto euery vertue and shall come prepared to the common wealth and shall wit perfectly to nurtur an householde The two latter of these three members of Morall Philosophie Although they be seuerally debated of Aristotle yet in this place likewise because they are ruled of prudencie which as Cicero telleth in his particions oratoriall in her proper affayres is accustomed to be termed domesticall and in coÌ„mon cases politike we shal descriue Of Domesticall goueruernance Cap. xiij WEe haue spoken of that part of wisdom which is tried in the operacions of euery man Now we muste intreate of that which is comprehended in the houshoulde duties whome the Greekes tearme 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
easely espied as when craftinesse or subtiltie is gaiged agaynst wisedome cruelty against Iustice lewdhardinesse agaynst manlinesse an outragiousnesse in despising of pleasures agaynst temperance Prodigalitie against liberalitie Obstinacy agaynst perseuerance For as Ouide saies And mischiefes are of kinne to good for vnder that deceiptfull weede Vertue oftetimes hath borne the checke for vices rootes who bringe the seede Of Iustice Cap. xvi CIcero calleth Iustice Dominam ommum reginam virtutum The Lady and Princesse of al vertues and defines it a perfection of the minde whiche the common vtilitie beyng maintened yeldeth to euery one his statelinesse and he calleth it an affection of the minde whiche geueth to eche one his due and defendeth the societie of humain felowship bountifully and egally Moreouer it is discribed of the same author An euenesse geuynge euery one his right accordyng to the dignitie and desert of euery person Aristotle calleth it an affection of the minde wherby men are fit to worke iustfully and by whiche both they will and do such thinges as be rightful after the same sorte we may manifest iniustice by which men exercise wronge and are voluntarily inforced to vnlawfull matters The Lawiers terme it a constant and a perpetuall will ministryng to euery man his right For Iustice is conuersant in distribution of equitie as in the mattier that the equalitie whiche the law doth procreate may be preserued There be vices repugnant to euery one to this iniustice to the other iniurie To Fortitude and Temperance more Nothing is more expedient than this vertu to mainteyne the societie of humaine kinde nothing more agreable to nature who hath fashioned vs vnto al humanity and natural beneuolence If so be wee are borne for this felowship as mini-only Cicero confirmeth in his first bake De legibus we must confesse that we in like case are ingendred for Iustice with out whiche that societie and felowship cannot consiste and that the same is naturally engraffed in vs as a Torche caried before one to work rightful matters to eschew the contrarie through the opinion of vndeceiuable reason geuen by the consent and benefit of God whiche if it be ratified with the vse of operation then at length a custome a perfection of vertue shal be procured wherof Nature hath geuen as it were litle sparkes Touchyng that which is called in question concerning the mediocritie of Iustice she is verely as Aristotle deemeth a meane but she is placed betwixt both extremities after another sorte than the residue of the vertues Morall who is referred vnto right and euennesse in preseruacion of which she is conuersante euen as iniustice and iniurie the disquieter of egall dealing and rightfulnesse is busied in vnequalitie Of the partes of Iustice Cap. xvij THE partes of Iustice be two the one common and vniuersall which is occupied in preseruacion of the right of humane societie and it considereth a common good and learneth vs to reuerence right and equity the other priuate which is verified in restoring to euery man what is duetiful And this is double One which reteineth equality in fourmes of choppinge and chaunging together and in affaires which vsually is called Commutatiua Another which is occupied in distribution of honoures accordinge to ech mans worthines which they tearme Distributiuam The charge of common Iustice is to maintaine law and equitie whervpon he is called a iust manne who sheweth him selfe obedient to all customs Law is defined of Cicero a reason engraffed of nature whiche commaundeth those thinges which are to be taken in hand and forbiddeth the contrary And in like sorte a right reason and deriued from the mighte of the Gods charging such matters as are honest disanulling the contrary Hether all decrées may be referred statutes manners ordinaunces expedient for the sauegarde of the weale publike in obseruing of which Iustice is tried in violating of which iniustice Equitie coupleth her selfe to the law who folowinge the righte sentence of reason doth gouerne the lawe written and as the worthiest interpretoure of al lawes doth wittily asswage rigorous sharpenesse according to the place oportunity and dispositions of men That member of priuate Iustice which is Tituled Distributiua perteaneth cheefly vnto magistrates who not only is occupied in grauntinge Offices and rewardes but also in appointinge punishments that with an equal lawe the citizens may be ruled both the vertuous beneficed and the naughty corrected This perdie is the charge of a Magistrate but the intelligence of this vertue is necessarie for all men that euery man may vnderstande his place whiche he should keepe in the common wealth and the dutie whiche he should execute and should attribute and leaue vnto euery one bothe place and dutie and should knowe him selfe nor should glory ouer much in his proper conceite This vertue by reason especially it studieth to succour equality is compared to Geometricall proporcion in which a like consideration is had of greater and lesser numbers But that parcel which they terme Commutatiuam is occupied in bargaininges of men and teacheth to yéelde vnto euery man his owne that ware for ware the value for the chaffer be geeuen perfecte equality beinge kepte and this hath a care rather to render home debte than to distribute promocion to the worthier Wherfore in like case it is clogged with Arithmeticall proporcion because in this the numbers in the other an indifferency of reason is respected This is conuersaunt in contractes which the Lawyers do display the other in Dignities and penalties which are appointed of Magistrates And hetherto of al kinde of Iustice and her partes But because vnto these other sixe members are subuected defined of Cicero in his bookes De Inuentione Religion Pietie Reuerence Trouth Reuenging Thank to whiche shal be adioyned liberalitie magnificence frendship and vices disagréeable to euery one of these also we must expresse our opinion These vertues by reason they consist through the equality of reason they seeme to be adiected vnto distributing Iustice like as euerye varitye of bargaines to the exchaunging Of the six partes of Iustice constituted of Cicero and their vices and of som other vvhich be vvelnie of the same nature Cap. xviij CIcero in his second booke De Inuentione hath rehearsed thrée partes of Iustice the law natural vsual and the law leiful And the law natural he defineth which opinion may not bring to vs but a certaine instruction naturall wherof he nūbreth six members which euen now I haue declared Religion is one a rightfulnesse towardes God either a piety wherby we adore him so called as Lactantius writeth in his fourth booke A religando of sure binding by reason for this cause we are engendred that we may exhibite iust and dutifull seruyces vnto God begetting vs that we shuld him onely acknowledge that him we should folow We are linked and fastned vnto God with this bonde of godlinesse Plutarchus doth interpreate Religion Scientiam rerum Dominarum a science of diuine matters wee
shall it be leifull also to seuour Iniustice First and formoste into common and priuate and this into distributinge and chaunging Secondly as we haue tolde the partes of Iustice religion godlynes and others so may the members of iniustice be repeted supersticion impiety and moe which briefly we haue descriued Only in presence we wil make manifest the percels and common and priuate wronge Common Iniustice compriseth two formes One which resisteth ordinaunce the other whiche repungneth equitie the lawes are violated when as either through niggardlines or the contempt of men or els for som other occasion holsom decrees and statutes are inuerted or abrogated or vnrightfulye wrested and weakened with counterfet interpretacions Equity is defiled when as not onely the wordes of law are recited and writhed subtilly but the vnderstandinge and euennesse the very soule of the law is neglected and the Prouerb winneth place SumuÌ„ ius summa iniuria extreme law extreme wrong as if the Iudges or Lawyers shoulde be corrupted with gifts or distempered with the affections of loue or hatred These matters also are debated of Rhetoricians in the Chapiter De statu scripti et voluntatis There are two parts of priuate iustice against whome likewise two maye be layde â—niustè distribuens and iniustè commuâ—ns wrongfully distributinge and vnâ—ustly exchaunging Wrongfully distributing doth fauour the wicked doth not defend the good them she exalteth these she presseth downe she preferreth flatterers and lewde personnes before the simple and honest she more estéemeth nobility and riches than vertue and sapience Vniustly exchaunging doth not restore what is due she deceiueth them with whom she ioigneth in byinge selling and in concluding other contractes especially in guage and confederacie she deuiseth titles of possessions she taketh pleasure by long practise in things procured by couine she trauaileth to â—minish common and publike commoâ—ies and out of these to adde somwhat her selfe To conclude she leaueth â—t vnto euery man his owne Doubtâ—e of all these partes of Iniustice Iniurie is the mother which is don either to the common wealth or els to al men either in violatinge the lawes or els either in distributinge or exchaunginge vniustly Of Fortitude Cap. xxix WE haue disputed of wisdome and Iustice it ensueth that mencion bee made of Fortitude Fortitude may be defined A custome or els an affection of the minde whiche taketh in hande premeditated daungers and laboures and susteineth what euer incoÌ„modities do chaunce repelling timidity and anger Of Cicero it is defined an affection of the minde pacient in aduenturinge peril and in trauell and sorow whose principall duties he wil that there be two a contempte of death and sorow because all valiante courage is tried either in wofulnesse or in labour or in daunger and in the vndertakinge and putting to flight of dreadefull matters The Stoikes define Fortitude a vertue contending for equity Chrisippus an affection of the minde in sufferinge and susteyning yelding vnto extreame law without feare Manly courage séemeth to bee ingendred partely of will partly of the faculty of the angry soule because the operacion of Fortitude requireth some commocion hereof who notwithstanding her selfe is voluntary and is busied in the suffering of sorow and in aduenturing of perilles and the will ought to rule but that rage ought to be obeysant vnto desire and counsell Fortitude is conuersant in restreining of fearefull matters both causing timiâ—itie of som daunger aboute to hurt and also the expectation of perill as it were in the matter wherin she is exercised whether it be in Marcial prowes or els in Domestical troubles that at last she may obtaine that vtterest good This vertu as likewise the residew is a mediocrity betwixte ouermuch and to litle that is to witte betweene timidity and boldnesse whiche vices after what fashion they may be eschewed Horace expoundeth in these Verses In neede appere stoute and stronge be thou vvise To shrinke in thy sayles beginning to rise The dutie of Fortitude is double to aduenture and to sustaine daungers aduersities with that minde that it maye content God and obay his commaundements for whose sake all things ought to be done and doubtlesse to enter on them and to abide them not only couragiously and manfully but also prudeÌ„tly is the parte of a valiant man for neyther should he take in hande any thynge vnaduisedly and harebraynly and with no consideration lesse he may seem rather to be allured with violent moode than with perfect reason Vnto Fortitude true and sincere adorned with other vertues Aristotle hath annected in his thirde booke Ad NicomachuÌ„ other fiue fourmes not absolute yet as of kinne The first of Citizens fighting for their countrie The seconde of Souldiours who by Marciall policie do aduenture perils the thirde of them whiche trust vnto experience the fourthe of them which trauell through an hope to winne the fifte of such as haue al their affiaunce in Fortune neither sufficieÌ„tly examininge the daungers whom ignorance causeth sturdie Verely it is no lesse the parte of Fortitude to suffer calamitie to susteine iniurie to bridell the moodes of minde with an vpright and constant courage than to hazarde the life to contempne death and doubtlesse with harte and will to die if so he shall purpose to please god And because Fortitude is conuersant either in the receiuyng of daungers or els in the enduring vnto this vertue foure fourmes are subnected Confidence magnaminitie whiche perteine vnto receiâ—ing Pacience and Perseuerance who â—e referred vnto enduring The two â—t belonge as it were to the first moâ—n of Fortitude the latter to the sufâ—ance and stablenesse and constancie of euils Of all these perfect manlinesse doth consist Of Confidence and Magnanimitie Cap. xxx COnfidence saith Cicero is a sure trust of minde either by which the minde hath planted in her selfe much beleif in weightie and honest matters with a sure hope And vnto this Boldenesse appeareth to be of aliance and yet it is a vice sith it is led not with counsell and iudgement as Fortitude vnto whom Prudency is a perpetuall companion but with violence and temeritie not taking sufficient aduise before it geue the assaulte on daungers whether it may ouercome and how it may and whether it be honest to vndertake the same But confidence doth not aduenture ieoperdies stoutely and with a great trust vnlesse diligently premeditated afore For they are not to be iudged stronge men who dare to aduenture lesse but they which commonstrate a moderate vertue of minde whom reason ought to rule and make agreeable to vertue Contarie to confidence is mistrust a lowe abashmente of the minde the same which dispeire is which aboue we haue compendiously touched in the chapiter of desire and hope Magnanimity is an amplenesse of a noble and an vnconquerable stomacke and a might and stoutnesse to commit valiaunt actes This supporteth confidence and as an helper dothe fortify her being of kinne Vnderstand you a noble corage not a proud neither an
arrogant but a modest and keepinge vnder foote insolencye very noble and contemninge worldely vanities For this vertue is principallye tryed in the contempte both of those great matters whiche the gréedy common people hath in wonderfull admiration and also in the repressing of perturbations that all ambicion niggardlinesse and concupiscence may be resisted with a triūphing courage that al aduersities may be constantely endured Cicero in his firste booke of duties doth teache that there are two partes of the greatnesse of courage of the whiche one is tried in prosperity the other in aduersity because neither tribulation is of strength to discourage a noble stomack nor the riches of fortune of power to make him presūtuous Contrary vnto Magnanimitie be two vices 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 superfluous hautines either a proud and swelling mind and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a want or defect of courage In the first vice is conteyned an auaunting extolling it selfe insolentely and foolyshly and a minde strouting out vnwisely what one is of Thraso in Terence a vaine and peeuish personne and blind with ouermuch loue of him selfe than which nothing can be excogitated more foolish whome no good and modest man may be able to abide This sect of companions is odious vnto all sortes saue only vnto parasites Repugnant to this vice is that other which is called Demissio animi lacke of corage vsually tearmed Pusillanimitas cowardise that is to say a foule and an vnseemely faintnes of courage fléeing imminent daunger and vilainously languishing in large and wonderful exploits what one hath béene of Effemynate personnes as of Sardanapalus who verelye not resistinge bannished from his Empire concluded hs owne destruction through a preuented despeire as of Heliogabalus as of others who beinge enfeebled with pleasures haue led a slouthfull and a beastly life To them which wente afore may be adioyned a desire of good estimacion of which in like manner theare are two vices the one inordinate sute the other a contempt of Fame and reputacion Of Pacience and Perseueraunce Cap. xxxi PAcience Cicero defineth a voluntary and a longe permission of hard and difficulte matters for honesties sake or profite that is to witte a stable and a constante sufferaunce of humian thynges through which wée sustaine what euer aduersity shall chaunce vnto vs with a pacient minde He called it voluntary because this vertue as also Magnanimity is situated in will which that angry faculty of the Soule doth helpe That it is added of him for honesties sake hee propoundeth the ende of this vertue which also is apperteining vnto all the rest For if laboures be susteyned not for Vertue but either by reasō of hatred or riches or honoures he termeth it an horrible asperity which imitateth pacience But of vs at al seasons the marke is to be appointed that our doing please God vnto whom vertue is acceptable The charge of pacience is double One in abidyng Iniuries receiued The other in suffringe all casualities of Fortune with an vpright minde Hee ouercommeth who beareth Iniury by reason bothe he vanquisheth him selfe and his aduersary sithe he repelleth the affection Hee is broughte in bondage who doth iniury because he yeeldeth vnto affections and is surmounted of anger and gréedinesse He is iust this fellowe vniuste It is the parte then of a paciēt man both to conquere iniury by contemninge and not to take reuengement of it to him selfe but to commit it vnto God vnto whom it belongeth to chastice Iniquities and to receiue all chaunce with an egall minde to endure pouerty bannishment barrennes wéeping and wailing reproche despite seruitude gréeuous diseases blindnes and if any thing also be more wretched neuer to despeire neuer to be discouraged through calamities For whereas the life of man is ful of miseries and distresses who had not some whiles rather to leaue his life as certaine cursed Imphs dastardes haue dun eake at one time to close vp all his cares then alwaies to leade a peineful life except he being Haruaised with the brest plate of pacience would valiauntly gaineset a redy and an vnuincible courage to abide all thinges to the ende and would recken any life well to be passed ouer vertue being his guide Som haue falsly supposed them to be strong who in desperate cases haue wilfully murthered them selues eschewing either beggery or ignominy or captiuity or bondage or not sustaining loue or els auoydinge any other calamity whome Aristotle more rightfully iudged to be nise and womannish sithens it is the guise of a stedfast and a valiaunt person to take any Fortune in good worth but the property of a timorous and a sluggish to mistruste and to be dismaide with laboures and shamefully to faint in courage Impacience may be saide a vice repugnaunt to pacience an eschewinge of an honest peine and sorrowe whose nature it is not a perplexed matter to vnderstande by those things which presently are declared There are some vnsufferable who feare trauels others who flee wofullnesse and thinke them intollerable which paciēce learneth to be sustained They do yeelde vnto turmoiles these are crucified with passions and cares do abide iniury hardly and gréeuously There be some likewise who are not able moderatly inough to vse their prosperity whose mindes are to much puffed vp with the insolencie of their good estate as muche to be discommended as they because it is a thing no lesse vnséemely to be discomfited then péeuishly to triumphe Perseueraunce is defined of Cicero a stable and a perpetuall abode in reason vprightly examined This is a faithfull companion for pacience and an ayde in bearing aduersity and in moderatinge prosperity with equalitie and in brideling all the surges of the mind and bringing them in subiection to the discourse of reason For a puissaunt stomacke as he saieth without constancie and honest moderacion of minde is nothing worth waueringe or lightnesse and an vnstable gouermēt of humaine affaires is a Vice contrary vnto perseueraunce which either for a womanlines of mind doth vnaduisedly geue place vnto difficulties nor is of efficacie to endure vexacions or elles by reason of an obstinacie continueth in his opinion arrogantely and stubburnely which reason cōmaundeth to chaunge Of the Vyces betvveene vvhich Fortitude is placed Cap. xxxij FOrtitude is the meane betwixt two vices boldnes and timidity Boldnesse is an vnaduised enterprise of perils or els a rashe confidence by which any man not paysing his hability dothe aduenture daunger with a blinde inuasion either through the ignoraunce of the difficulty or through the loftines of stomacke and desire of renowne or through dispaire or els doutles through a dastardlinesse and madnes ransacking the mind This vice is farre dissonant from Fortitude because it geueth not reason and counsell This also is reposed aboue among the affections by reason it stirreth vp the rage of the minde to worke Hairebrainely and aduenturously To this mischiefe the repugnaunt vice is Timidity through which any one without occasiō is perced with
terrour and feared with any creaking and dreadeth those thinges which are valiantly to be enterprised for vertue A dastarde an effeminate person and one not able to abide honest toyle who whiles he is ouer carefull for his life he shunneth not shame and disworshippe which especially is to be auoided Of either vice otherwise it is debated in the explicacion of affectioÌ„s thaÌ„ in this place in which not the affection but a vicious property contrarious to manlinesse is to be vnderstanded Of Temperaunce Cap. xxxiii TEmperaunce is a vertue which subdueth plesures vnto the dominioÌ„ of reason The same is defined of Cicero a firme and a temperate rule of reason ouer luste and other euil braides of the minde It is also termed a moderation of desires obedient to reason and in another place the gouernesse of all commocions it is conuersaunt in refusing of pleasures as the same Aucthor agreeth with Plato and Aristotle In Gréeke 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whiche our countryman calleth both Temperaunce and Modestie and also Frugalitie For it is occupied in refraynynge delices and desiers as in the matter whereof it intreateth And because some pleasures are naturall and common to all liuynge creatures others consisting in opinion and they bothe either of the minde or of the body of which some are good whiche are referred vnto a good ende others vicious whiche are directed to an ill this vertu is familiar with good and honest men it absteyneth froÌ„ the contrarie verely it bridleth al concupiscencies with the iudgement of reason whiche Seneca confirmeth in these wordes Temperance ruleth pleasures some it hateth and driueth away with others it dispenseth trayneth to an holsom fashion By whiche wordes it is to be vnderstanded that this is a vertue very well acquainted with Prudencie Sith than Temperaunce is busied in measurynge of appetites her first charge is to contemplate what the necessitie of nature may postulate for to passe the life commodiously that she may satisfie her who is contented with few thynges whereby the superfluous vse of thinges naturall may be eschewed and may be reteined within the bounde of Nature The other is that when as now she â—ath vnquisshed the delightes of the bodie she conquere also the passions of the minde strugling agaynst reason that she keepe vnder arrogancie that she know her selfe that she stifely repine sensualitie and indeuour by little and little to brynge it in seruitude to Reason Thrée partes are annected of Cicero vnto Temperance Continence Clemencie and Modestie Of whiche the first doth gouerne Lust through the rule of Counsell The other remitteth Hatred The thirde preserueth honest shamefastnesse and demurenesse without whiche nothinge can be accompted â—ight Of Continence and Abstinence Cap. xxxiiij BEtwixt Continence and abstinence that appeareth properly to bee the difference that Continence doeth guide affections and kepeth a meane in al order of liuing and trimming and especially as Cicero beareth witnesse in ouerslippinge of pleasures vnto whom Incontinence is repugnant Abstinence represseth the handes from other mens goods vnto whom Rauenie is apposite This is in an innocent man the in a teÌ„perate Continence is defined of him a vertue by which the greedinesse is ruled through the gouerment of counsell It is coÌ„trary to desire to pleasure to lust For the charge hereof is to moderate all appetites lust riotte drunkennesse gluttuous deuouringe of meates and to cause all sences and delices obedient to reason This vertu not only maketh men commendable rulers of desires but also vncorrupted and iocant and also neate to conclude verye excellentâ— matters But contrarywise of intemperancie growe many kindes of diseases the paunche burdened with ouermuch meate and drinke doth both pester the minde and darken the reason But yet that scope euermore oughte to bee proposed vnto all men that they restraine them selues therfore because they ought to know by so doing to please God whom they must serue not by reason it aduauntageth the healthe For if any man dothe auoyde incontinencie only for health or els for vtilities sake be meriteth not guardon vnto contineÌ„ce may be referred al those vertues whatsoeuer appellatioÌ„ they may haue which do moderate pleasures apparel liuing meate drinke which make chaste modest and sober personnes which bridle those abhominable destructions superfluity vnleyfull appetite greedynesse drunckennesse and suche like throughe which voluptuous Lecherous effeminate gourmanders drunken men and worse than beasts are made Through Continence we come vnto the praise of Temperaunce She is perdie rather an vnperfecte vertue than an absolute as liketh Aristotle yet very necessary for the duty of Temperaunce a vertue fully accomplished Celius Calcaguinus hath intituled in his inquisicions that Aristotle doth declare in his Ethikes and Plutarchus in his Commentarie of Morall Vertu what difference there is betwixt the continent man and vncontynent Temperate and vntemperate For the Continent person contendeth with affections and vanquisheth them the vncontinent perdie doth repine but beyng ouercommed doth lament Contrarywise the temperate hath no struglyng but vseth appeased affections as the calme Sea whiche is tossed with no wynde But the vntemperate without resistynge graunteth vnto perturbacions take professeth himselfe willingly consenting to all delices The contrary vice vnto Continence is incontinence spreadyng abrode her braunches egally She may be defined An immoderate desier of pleasures which is not gouerned with the Empyre of Reason either it is a superfluous vse and repugnant to reason of lust gluttony drunknesse and other vnseemely pleasures Nothynge is more filthy and vile than this vice which maketh a man a bounde seruante and despoyleth him of al libertie whom it deliuereth in bondage to moste wanton rulers as to Desiers Lustes Fleshfondynges Wrathe auarice and suche other stewardes of reproche deformitie as elegantly it is disputed of Cicero in his first Paradox Of Clemencie Cap. xxxv EVen as Continence is tried in the restreigninge and moderating of desiers so is Clemencie in the bridlyng of anâ—er For there are two partes of the Soule as before it is declared the desiâ—ing and the angry out of which all afâ—ections do proceede Clemencie is defiâ—ed of Cicero through which the minds â—naduisedly enforced to hate one are â—epressed with gentlenesse Seneca alledging sundry definitions of the same Vertue sayeth Clemencie is a temperance of the mind in power to reuenge either a gentlenesse of the superiour towardes the inferiour in ordering of punishementes either a bendinge of the minde vnto fauourablenesse in exaction of punishment For it is called the same pleasantnesse or méekenesse and Clemencie by which the braide of anger is repelled with reason and a modesty is shewed in reuenginge and chastising But wisdom doth so rule her that neyther all should be pardoned nor any maÌ„ corrected For both of them rather doth answere vnto cruelty than Clemencie yet notwithstaÌ„ding it is better to offend in the more fréendly poynte than in the contrary vnlesse perhappes they who beare office in the common wealth shal suppose an
example néedeful to be practised on some whom Cicero wisheth to be like vnto the lawes who are trained to punish not through anger but equitie It is the parte of Clemencie to searche out the causes of fauouring Certes no priuate person oughte to feare to bende him selfe to the more Courtious parte nether ought to deuise at any time how to requite the Iniury inferred to him but ought to beare vnder foote the incensinges of choler ought to vnderstande this to be the excellentest victory of all others and chéefely conuenient for a Christian man Cruelty and fiersnesse or els stoutnesse of the minde in reuenging and punishing is repugnaunte to Clemencie whose companion is Brutishnesse that is to wit a besticall hostility Than which two vices nothing is more diuerse froÌ„ the nature of man vnto whome appertaineth Humanitie and Clemencie and compassion ioyned hereto with an amiable bonde whiche maketh menne gentle and courteous than whiche no vertue may be more acceptable to God whose mercye is vnmeasurable vnestimable Softnesse seemeth to be of kinne to Clemencie but it is a vice whiche is belonginge to an â—iotte not to a man fauourable Of Modestye Cap. xxxvi MOdestia Modestie so called because it keepeth a certaine meane and moderation Cicero defineth it in his second boke De Inuencione throughe whiche honest shame doth gette a worthie and a stable authority and in his firste booke of Offices of all thinges whiche are done and which are saide an order and a meane and a knowledge of an oportunity of fit seasones to accomplish a thing The Stoykes a Science of settinge those thinges whiche shal be done or sayde in their proper places The first definition commendeth vnto vs Honest shamefastnesse whiche Cicero termeth a certaine natural Timiditie and a bashfulnesse whiche is a certayne reuerende â—eare towardes men whose propertie â—s to offende no man as it belongeth to Iustice to violate no man whiche is â—efined of him in Particions Oratorye the warde of al vertues eschewing disworship and chiefely séeking for praise And Aristotle calleth it a feare of reproche infamie And these definitions verely seeme not to declare one certain vertue shamefastnesse but a certaine generall vnited together with all vertues whiche by another appellacion is called Decorum Comlynesse Shame is rehersed of vs among the affections where wee couet a sodayne commocion to be vnderstanded through which any man is troubled vnwares but in this place an affection limited to vertue coÌ„firmed by vse which through the feare of reproche and infamy calleth vs backe from vices if we acknowledge it not as Vertue her selfe yet verily yoked with Vertue Diogenes named the rednesse ingendred of this affection Virtutis colorem the coloure of Vertue declaringe that kinde of shame to proceede from a good disposicion which yet in this place wee will to be moderate that it bee a mediocrity which is proper to vertues betwixt ouermuch shame and timiditie a counterfayter of bashfulnesse and impudencie Of shame a shamefaste or a bashful man is called by the title of vertue vnto whom is contrarious an impudent and an vnshamefast person This feare of dishoneste matters is commendable and in the younger sorte it signifieth a towardnesse of Vertue besides the especiall ornamente of women But Impudency is a detestable Vice by whiche the comelinesse and all the honesty of life is neglected and an entraunce vnto vices is opened because they are not feared The other definitions of Cicero which euen now wee haue putte do sufficiently declare what Modestie is that there be an order and meane conningly to be obserued of those thinges which are don and saide wherby euery matter may bee excecuted in his proper place and time decently For the duty hereof is so to asswage the troublesom moodes that a certaine harmony of all doynges be obserued That nothyng which is foolish scarce séemely either be doone or sayde that nothing be coÌ„mitted couetously through Enuie Loue Lust Arrogancie Ambicion and other vnlawfull appetites Vnder Modestie be placed Lowlinesse of minde a desier to learne pleasantnesse either delectablenesse or ciuilitie of talke and furniture of body Lowlinesse of minde which they call Humilitie is the very notable vertue of Christian men by whiche any man doth so presse downe the malipertnesse of courage that by how much the higher he is by so muche the more lowly he shuld behaue himselfe Christe himself would that we learne this vertue of him who called himself meeke and of an humble and lowe spirit that wee likewise accordyng to his example shoulde extenuate our goods if there be any whereas wée can obtaine no good thyng whiche is not geuen vs by the will and gift of God that there shoulde be no occasion to any man of braggyng of himself sith euery perfect gift commeth by inspiration from God the Father who lighteneth the mindes of men through Iesus Christe our Sauiour through whome men haue receiued perfect wisdom authorised by the benefite of the holy ghost Therefore this vertue teacheth that especially which in times past was said to fall downe from Heauen Nosce te ipsuÌ„ know thy self that no man perdy shuld attribute ouermuch to himself sithens he hath nothyng whiche he hath not receiued This also is the charge of a prudent person whereby you shall vnderstande Modestie and Temperance at al seasons to be very straightly ioyned to Prudencie wherof also she is tearmed of the Greekes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it were the Fortresse of wisdome The contrary vice is arrogancie throughe which any man blinded with the loue of him selfe faineth many notable thinges to bee in him which are not in him and greater than may be in him either an insolent and vayne bostinge and wantynge the iudgement of the minde This vice of foolish persons by ouerwéening in them selues to well is hatefull both to God and men The other parte of Modestie is coupled to the former with greate affinitie the desier of learnyng by which any man acknowledgyng his ignorance is holden with the loue of Science to the procuring of whiche he frameth his minde He doeth easely learne many thinges who is studious of wisdom and vnderstandeth that he is ignorant in many matters what fellowes were the Philosophers whose whole life hath béen nothing els than a certaine perpetuall studie of knowledge and wisdom Contrarie vnto these be suche who mought attayne to greate learning vnlesse they did suppose themselues alreadie to haue stored their Pouches the whiche chiefly repugneth this vertue whiche proceedeth from Modestie and confessyon of proper ignorance This vertue is situated betwixt two vices Curiositie and carelesnesse either negligence of learnynge and knowledge Curiositie is a superfluous paine or an immoderate greedines to know things either pernicious or vayne and littel auayleable contrarie to the laudable and natiue and vehement desier and indeuour to learne ingendred in al men naturally For the serche inquisicion of truthe is proper to man And as
vnderstande that we ought to liue well and honestly selfe Nature being our leader eake discerne the rewardes whiche are prepared of God for the good and punishmentes for the reprobate and that conscience bearing witnesse by which euery wight is either accused or excused why should we be afraide to vse these especially which nothing impugne Christian Religion and profite not a little we therfore borowing of the very best Philosophers the conuenientest rules to liue ordinately oughte to measure them accordinge to the precepte of holy Scriptures The summe of all Philosophie Morall consisteth in these three points that the end of man and felicity may be vnderstanded that troublesome moodes may be asswaged that vertues and contrarious to these may be diligently considered that them we may embrace eschew these and may gouerne our life with vertue godly and iustlie lesse we should conceiue a peruerse opinion of Catholike religion or lesse we would charge another with that which wee would not our selues For that is the chiefest regarde of well minded Philosophers that the will of men may be shaped to vertue and to all humanity amiable concord that the life may be guided both priuatly and openly and be obedient vnto the determinacion of nature This discipline of life trinely to be instituted although it be one and the same notwithstanding being seuered in three partes after a diuers consideration it is distributed into Monasticen into Oeconomicen and into Politicen that is to wit into solitarie Domesticall and Ciuill of which the first apperteineth to fashion the conditions of singuler men the other to gouerne the Family well The third rightly to rule the common Wealth The first furnisheth euery mans minde and allureth it to vertue and is the seedplot of an householde as the multitude of households be the fundacion of a Citie And first and formost verely that shal be made apparaÌ„t which bewtifieth the guises and minde of eche person with the lessons of honest liuinge For first of all others he is to be learned who may be able to trade either the family or els the Citie well Afterwardes compendiously the householde prouidence eke the politike shal be touched which perhaps it shal be lawfull to comprehend vnder that place of the solitarie member of philosophy by which Prudencie is handled except any one had rather to wrest it vnto common Iustice that there may be an equitie domesticall and ciuill Because then the mattier in which all this Philosophy of Maners is busied are humaine actions which she teacheth to order discretli for al they are adiected to some final scope I thinke it conuenient wee say nothing in this place before that briefly wee debate of the ende and greatest good vnto whiche the operations are directed Which beyng vnderstanded immediatly wée shall dispute somewhat more abundantly of Actions by which an entraunce may be made vnto that soueraintie Of the end of man and the Soueraine good Cap. ij ONely men by reason they are endewed with knowledge do not onely somwhat for som end but also purpose som vtmost marke of all theyr labours hit most commodious for them selues But all other liuing creatures are caried to that onely which is present thorough the blind sweigh of Nature Because euery end verily if it be to be wished for of a man is good the latter end shal be the soueraine good and to be desired of it selfe for whose sake all things are constituted and through adeption of whiche men are made Fortunate and blessed Yet what maner of thing that is whiche may seeme to be accompted last and one alone eke the greatest good it is doubted of philosophers and a long time inquired for in vayne and after sundrye facions called in Question of which som haue placed felicity in pleasure others in knowledge som in honor others in other matters Plato more deuine then the rest collocated the same in vsing the contemplacion of the chiefest goodnesse either of the good Idaea or els of God and heauenly wisdom Vnto whom by how much any man may be made more like by so much he thought him more happy and the rather a copartner of be atitude But this felicity not to chaunce in this life because no man may be said happy before his dying day Aristotle in his first booke Ad Nicomachum esteemed felicitie to be situated in a perfect action answerable to perfect vertue that is to wit whiche may be framed by the rule of wisdome because she did appeare to transporte very commendable and suffycient perfection to man Whereas also the Peripatetikes do commonstrate a blessed lyfe to be concluded by vertue Which yet if it be garnyshed with the gooddes of body and Fortune should be moste blessed for he graunted blessednesse to consist of a tryple sort of goods but in his tenth Booke he dyd suppose it to be pytched in delectation contemplatiue that although that actiue felicyty may be referred to thys contemplatiue yet in her proper kinde she may be the finall end As who say truly that whiche is one soueraine good may be double Plato more better and more agreable vnto christian religion without doubt more truly did define it thus that accordinge to his opinion also a soueraintie should be appoynted for vs very coÌ„modiously an eternal pleasure of seynge hauing the fruition of God to be wyshed for of it self the which who that obtayâ—eth is rightly named blessed who now wanteth nothyng vnto perfect felicity so deliteth therin that he may request no whit more sith he is dispatched from all calamities and enriched with euerlastyng life which no man can compasse but through the benefit and gift of god lesse any one should glory in his owne opinion For that is not of him that is willyng nor yet purueying but of God hauyng compassyon and the peculiar dowry of the Holy Ghoste graunted through Christ our Lorde vnto whom no man can attaine vnlesse the heauenly father shall draw him the Author of all felicity in whome knowne by the Sonne the confidence of immortality is reposed for vs whiche are borne for no other intent then that we should acknowledge him to be the builder that we should attribute all glory vnto him that wee shoulde loue him with all our mynde and shoulde worship him as he hath geuen in commaundement Because wee must passe vnto this marke by the operacions of vertue it foloweth that first of all wee reason of these But where as the Actions are voluntary and good wyll it selfe is ingrassed in the mynde of man which beyng subiect to God only hath a free originall of doyng but is so disturbed with diuers mocions that humane operacions most comonly do roue from the streight pathe of vertue Wee wil in few wordes comprise the beginnyng of affections and of vices and vertues The soule of man locked in a mortal corps is as it were sundred in two partes of which one is heauenly like a certayne beame glistering