mans Country with an Army intending to possess himself thereof must first win all the Castles and strong Holds upon the Frontiers for it were ill advised to advance forwards and leave such places behind them since his victuals may be thereby hindred and he may several waies suffer much damage and be greatly disturbed Moreover to be â—aster of the field leave the Cities and strong Holds unreduced would be but to labor hard to get possession for a few daies which being founded only upon the Forces of a field-Army when that should be worsted all things formerly won must of necessity fall of themselves Hence it is that since much time must be spent in lying before a Fort or Citadel and that many men are requisite to take it and all this often-times in vain the attempts of modern Princes meeting with this difficulty are not so soon nor so sadly compast as they were by the Antients who met not with such obstacles And how can it be expected therefore that many great victories should be won since they meet with so many rubs by means of these strong Holds whereof we see many clear examples in the actions of the aforementioned Princes The Emperor Charls made War several times with numerous Armies against the King of France propounding great matters unto himself which proved all but vain at last by his having met with strong Cities well munited such as required much time and labor to take them wherefore though his success in War was sometimes prosperous yet it came so late as he hardly got any advantage or benefit thereby as was seen when after much time spenâ— and mâ—ny men lost before the Fort of St. Desir which was seaâ—ed in the midst of France whither he was fortunately advanced though he reduced it to his own power yet was he at last forced to come to agreement with the Enemy as finding his Forces much weakened by that acquisition that he might fall upon another Enterprise The same and for the same cause befell Francis King of France who having sent his Son the Dolphin with powerful Forces to the Pyrenean Mountains to the end that he might break into Spain promising himself easier success therein by an unexpected assault and because he had assaulted at the same time other parts of Caesars Dominions with other Armies The Dolphin being at the very first to take Perpignano a Fort placed upon those Frontiers he there met with such and with so many difficulties as this sole encounter was sufficient to keep those Forces from penâ—trating any further Solyman being entred with a powerful Army into Hungarie intending to pass into Austria wasted so much time in expugning the strong Hold of Buda as it proved the safety of that Country and chiefly of Vienna before the which he was in that respect the longer a coming and by this delay afforded the defendants the more time to provide for their own security so as the City being of it self very renable it may be said that she did not onely save her self but by the preservation thereof all Austria and other Provinces of Germany were preserved then and several times since So likewise in the War which was made by the same Solyman against the Venetians though he was come thither himself in person with powerful Forces both by Sea and Land yet his Forces being repulst by the Fort of Câ—rfir which was forcibly but in vain attempted by the Turks he was forced to withdraw from before it whereas without the help and advantage of such a strong Hold both the Island of Câ—rfee and other places belonging to that State must have submitted to so great and warlike a preparation By reason then of these difficulties and such occasions the undertaking of later times have proved less glorious for matter of action then those of former daies When Alexander had overcome in Battel Darius the powerful King of Persia he soon made himself Master of his whole Kingdom and passing further into the Country even to the ocean Sea he found the way so opeâ— as the onely difficulty he met withal was the overcoming of those Fortresses of Rivers and Seas which nature had furnished the Country with Insomuch as those who writ his actions speak but of two strong Holds of any importance about which he was necessitated to spend some time amongst the Indians in his victorious over-running so many Countries But Pompey made such way in following Mithridates and in planting Trophies of victories in all places whereby he past in so many Eastern Provinces amongst people that he had rather march'd over then over-come as it may be easily conceived that he mâ—â— no where with any impediments by strong Holds which were able to stop the course of his victorious Forces Caesar found it somewhat a harder business to subjugate those people of Europe with whom he was to fight but this was more out of the nature of the situations and the savageness of the people then by reason of any stout resistance made by any well fortified Cities yet in the space of Ten years he compleated so many victories as he subjugated There hundred several sorts of People It these though great Princes and most valiant Commanders had been put to the expence of moneths and years in the taking of one only Fort certainly their atchievements would have been fewer and their glory not so much cry'd up This was manifestly known by the example of other Ages For it may be observed that the so great progresses of War have been made chiefly in the Eastern parts where at all times peradventure by reason of the largeness of the Country the use of strong Holds hath been least had so as not only Alexander the Great and Pomâ—ey both of them more famous then all other Commanders but some of the Roman Emperors have by their Chieftains subjugated spacious Countries in a short time And in later times Selymus the Great Turk by the same reason was able totally to subjugate the Soldan of Caire's Empire For having had the better in many Battels and not meeting with any strong Hold to withstand him the whole Country which was under that Empire fell as a prey into the power of the Turks who were Victors and Masters of the Field But such acquisitions as they are very easie to be made so are they but seldom peacefully possest which was the cause why the Roman Emperors could never so govern those furthest Eastern parts but that either by the Inhabitants themselves or by their neighboring Kings â—umults were continually raised So as it behoved them to subjugate the same Provinces several times But if these difficulties of winning Forts and strong Holds did retard the course of Victories certainly they ought not to lessen the praise of modern Princes and Commanders but when they deserve it by their own military worth and industry as great discipline cunning constancie and sufferance is discovered in this sort of Militia and as such acquisitions
overthrow of the Enemy he returned time enough to Rome to lay down his Magistracie Hannibal being withdrawn from the walls of Rome and kept at gaze by Fabius his cunning stayed in Italy expecting succor from Africa to renew the War with greater Force Scipio's advice and actions were only able to draw him out of Italy so as carrying the War elswhere at the same time he freed his own home from the troubles and danger thereof He who should have asked Fabius what the signs were what the fruits of his Victories what could he have shewn No Enemies taken no Cities won no Gold nor Silver brought into the Comon-Exchequer But many things prove the glory and deserts of Scipio So many Prisoners taken amongst which Syphax the great and famous King of Numidia so many Cities subjugated in Africa and in Spain the annual Tribute imposed upon the Carthaginians the rich Pillage brought â—â—me from the Enemy What is there then 〈◊〉 like not to name equal between these two which may make them contend for military glory But certainly it may be affirmed for truth that the one and the other of them are come to the height of glory though they took several ways to arrive at it For each of them shewed wisdom and valor in their actions becoming advised Statesmen and great Commanders Divers accidents concurred in their several actions which perswaded them to proceed after a differing manner For Fabius being to withstand Hannibals violence who being already advanced into the very bowels of Italy and being drawn veryneer to Rome herself had filled all things with fear did not think it fitting in this confusion of affairs to hazard all the fortune of the Commonwealth in a day of battel For the neerness and power of the Enemy did not allow time to recruit and stop the course of Hannibals Victories in case that Army wherein the chief hopes of Romes welfare did consist should have been beaten But Scipio having to do with the same Hannibal when he and his Army were in Africa and neer the City of Carthage knew that if any thing of ill should befall him he should only lose those men that were with him which loss might easily be recovered the condition being considered wherein the Common-wealth then was And it being his fortune to overcome Hannibal he reduced the affairs of the Carthaginians whom he had worsted in divers other battels to the utmost of dangers Wherefore by the victory he got great rewards for himself great glory and increased the Empire of his Commonwealth Scipio had also other reasons which perswaded him to fight his being in a forein Country his keeping of the Enemy from recruiting after their late losses and he being shortly to lay down his command so as to spin out the War in length was to deprive him of his conceived hopes of victory and to lessen what he had already done Scipio therefore had as much reason to engage in battel as Fabius formerly had to refuse fighting This is confirmed by the several ways of proceeding of the same Hannibal an excellent Commander who at first when he was in Italy desired nothing more then to come to a pitch'd battel out of the aforesaid reasons so afterwards being withdrawn with his Army into Africa shunn'd encountring Scipio as much as he might the different condition of affairs advising him differently And it is a general rule That those things ought to be avoided which please the Enemy for the respects being different that which makes for the one must needs be bad for the other It must afterwards be considered that if Fabius had pleased when he was made Dictator after the unfortunate Fight at the Prassemine Lake to lead that Army into Africa which was destined for the safety of the very City of Rome it must have been exposed to apparent dangers of the Enemies victorious Forces with uncertain hope of success in Africa nor would this diversion have been then peradventure a sufficient means to have freed it from danger as it did afterwards when Scipio's counsel was followed in an opportune time when after divers bad successes both in Spain and Africa Hannibal was sent for back to assist the much weakned affairs of his Commonwealth He therefore who will go about to imitate the actions of these two Captains if he will reap good thereby must first very well consider every particular of those things which he goes about and therein accommodate himself either by hazarding battel and hasting on to the end of the enterprise with sudden and resolute Parties or else must harass and overcome the Enemy by drawing things out to a length and by reducing him to many inconveniencies He also who will advise wisely touching the assaulting of another mans Country to keep his own from danger or who will else make good his own affairs only by way of defence must have divers respects in consideration which lead to the knowledg what in his case is fittest to be done and by so doing he may hope for the good success which these two famous Roman Commanders had But howsoever though their affairs fall out less prosperously he will win the praise of being either a wise and circumspect or else a valiant and bold Commander as befell Scipio and Fabius because each of them knew how to manage the War so as the condition of Times the quality of their own and of their Enemies Forces the diversity of the Place and other respects and accidents which in such cases ought to regulate our actions did advise them to do The Fifth DISCOURSE Whether War being to be made against the Romans Hannibals Counsel was good to carry it into Italy HAnnibal a cried up Carthaginian Captain intending to wage War with the Romans resolved to lead the Army which he had already raised in Spain into Italy by land passing first over the Pyrenean Mountains and then over the Alps that he might approach as near as he could to the City of Rome the Seat of the Empire This is thought by all men to be a bold and generous advice but it is much doubted whether it were advantagious for the Carthaginians and for Hannibals own defigns He thought that being to quell the Roman Power he must shake it in those parts where it had taken deepest root That the Romans would be furnished with Soldiers Victuals Moneys and all things else from Italy wherewith they were wont to maintain War against several Nations and to encrease their own Glory and Empire that whilst they were Masters of this they could not be much prejudiced by any thing that could be attempted against them in other parts That usually his advantage was very great who assaulted another at his own door because he keeps the perils and greatest losses of War far from him He increaseth courage in his own men and takes in from the Enemy and makes the way more easie to Victory not onely by Forces but by Reputation and also by the
fear which he infuseth into the Enemy but the farther off the War is catried and the nearer the Enemy is assaulted in the Centre and very heart of his State the more are such advantages got If the Romans who were alwaies wont to molest other mens Affairs should be forced to fight within their own Confines and were to wage War not to inlarge their Dominions but to defend themselves and what they held deerest they would prove less then themselves because their courage would fail them and the splendor of the Roman name would be obscured which did so much help to the atchieving of their Enterprises Therefore the Romans knowing by experience the disadvantage of making War at home and open enmity being professed between them and Phillip King of Macedon fearing least the Carthaginian War being ended he would assult Italy as Hannibal had done but a little before would be the first who should pass with their Army into Greece and carry the greatest trouble and danger of War into the States of others But the longer and more difficult the way was for Hannibal to conduct his Carthaginians into Italy so much greater Honor would he win when he should have overcome these difficulties That without great constancy and worth in the Commander and Soldiers so hard an Enterprise could not have been undertaken such craggy mountainous feats passed over and their way be made by the Sword amidst an Enemies Country To this was added that there were many in Italy who were not pleased with the Romans Empire by whose Colonies sent by them into other peoples Countries they were robbed not onely of their Goods but of their Liberty That the fame given out that Hannibal would free these from the Roman slavery and the whole world from the fear of their ambition and power might alienate the minds of such as were Neighbors to the Romans and reconcile them so much the more to him Hannibal did likewise consider as he whose intention it was not to make Inâ—odes into the Roman Territories to make a sore and long War with them that there were many in the Carthaginian Senace who were not well pleased with this enterprise some being moved by respect of the contrary Faction others by envy to his glory and others by zeal they bore to their Countries quiet That if he should be with his Army in some neighboring Country and that the Romans should be but weakly invaded and not soundly set upon it might in likelihood fall out he should be sent for home and Peace be concluded He feared likewise lest his Army which was composed of divers Nations when his Soldiers should find themselves near their own houses they might the more easily disband Being therefore onely intent to come with his Forces into Italy he would shun all occasions of trying his men against the Romans in a pitch'd Field when Publius Scipio went to encounter him at the Banks of Rhodanus Moreover it would not satisfie the high and magnanimous end which he had prefixt unto himself of freeing Carthage his Country from the Tribute to the which she was made liable by the Romans to molest them in any part further from the State but he must march against the very City of Rome the Seat of the Empire to allay or at least to weaken much their power Other smaller things might have given some trouble to the Romans and have retarded their greatness but in the same danger and uncertainty of War whereby she had provoked so powerful an enemy against her the reward and the benefit were not equal in both the cases Very great and difficult undoubtedly was such an enterprise but befitting Hannibal who as it was said had through the magnanimity of his spirit proposed unto himself to imitate the deeds of Hercules and had taken up arms against the Romans not out of any hatred he bore them but for the dignity of Empire So as what would have infused fear into another did set his mind the more on fire He thought likewise by force of necessity to infuse into his Soldiers that strength and constancy of mind which was as an excellent vertue in himself whilst fighting should be enforced all occasion of flight being taken away to put all their hopes of safety in their Swords This most expert Commander knew likewise wherein his Forces did exceed and therewithal he would make trial of their worth Wherefore passing with his Army safe over the Mountains he foresaw he should find large Plains in Italy wherein he might fight the Romans upon great advantage his Army abounding in Horse and the Infantry being the Romans chiefest strength Then as this counsel was taken by Hannibal with reason so if this action be particularly considered it may be said that he was very successful therein for the first time that he had to do with the Roman Armies in Italy thought the Armies of two Consuls were joyned together against him that which was first sent against him into France and that which was destined to encounter him when he should have descended the Mountains he came off with such victory as he put Rome into great terror both for that the City was not wont before to hear such bad news from their Captains as also for having so powerful and so victorious an enemy so nigh at hand But what can be added to the victories gotten at the Lake of Thrasymenus and at Cannae places made famous for the calamities which the Româ—ns suffered there to make his glory greater and the good thereof was answerable to the greatness for those of the Empire rebelling every where and flying from the Romans distressed fortune to Hannibals favor and obedience he soon made himself Master of almost all Italy and put the very City of Rome to great danger and confusions So as it was either his noble daring which begot such prosperous effects or else it was thereby accompanied Yet there wanted not other reasons and respects which may make Hannibals advice of leading his Army into Italy appear less useful and less praise worthy and it may be said that if he had passed into Italy with almost all the whole Carthaginian Forces bringing along with him Veteran Soldiers and the greatest strength of the Carthaginian Empire he ought to have considered that undertaking to make War against the Romans a warlike powerful and fortunate Nation the Carthaginian State was not likely to keep unmolested by their Forces Reason not permitting it to be believed that they who formerly not provoked by any injuries but rather excited by a desire of Government had happily waged war with the Commonwealth of Carthage would now stand only spectators of their own misery and repulsers of offence but that they would rather endeavour to carry that fire which was kindled in their own houses either into Africa or Spain to keep the Carthaginian Forces from succouring that part where their own danger was increased And so did the effect ensue for the Romans having
first assaulted Spain and after Africa and finding them both but badly provided of Garrisons fitting to withstand so potent an Enemy they reduced the first under the obedience of their Commonwealth driving all the Carthaginians from thence and did put the other into so great confusion as little more then the bare name of a Republick remained to the very City of Carthage But how could Hannibal hope to tarry long in Italy and to be able to receive such succors and supplies as he must of necessity stand in need of The way was shut up by Land by the craggy mountains and by the Enemy and the Sea was less open to them the Romans not being only masters of the Sea but of Navigation for their Fleet was greater then that of the Carthaginians whence it was that the succor came neither time enough to Hannibal for him to prosecute his Victories neither when it was sent could it come safe to him his brother Asdrubal who conducted it being cut in pieces together with all his men by the Consul Claudius Out of these respects it may be thought that it had been better and safer for Hannibal to have commenced the War against the Romans in Sicily or Sardinia The pretence of taking up Arms against the Romans for the recovery of such things as were granted out of great necessity to them by his Commonwealth was more just Wherefore he might have bethought himself of not provoking the disfavor both of God and man against him as it appeared on the contrary that his breach of Articles and his too bold design of driving the Romans out of Italy their own proper seat and dominion made all things prove cross unto him The business would likewise have proved more opportune and easie by reason of the ill satisfaction which the people of those Islands received from the Romans power which occasioned in them a great mind to rebel as was afterwards found The Carthaginian Commonwealth was strong enough by Sea and though Fortune had not been propitious to them in their Naval conflict with the Romans yet was their experience in Maritime affairs greater and the City was then so well provided of Shipping as we read that they were above five hundred Ships which they were forced to burn by command from Scipio after Hannibals Rout in Africa If Hannibal would then have put his Army into these Bottoms and have turned with powerful Forces upon Sicily and Sardinia and being also assisted with the Peoples inclination he could not almost have doubted to have reduced them in a small time under the Carthaginian power And having won these Islands what way would he have made for the enterprise of Italy He might have made use of this situation and of his Fleet to have kept the Sea open to himself and block'd up to the Romans whereas doing the contrary it happened otherwise for the Carthaginian Fleet being very weak the greater part whereof were imployed in other places it was overcome by the Romans their Navigation and Succor was hindred and finally all Hannibals designs were frustrated But the advantage which Hannibal might have reaped by such an enterprise and by the getting of Sicily may easily be known by what Scipio got who being to pass with his Army into Africa putting in at Sicily he thereby got great assistance and accommodation And the Carthaginians themselves were aware that the War ought to have been handled thus For after the death of Hierâ— Lord of Syracusa they sent their Fleet to regain Sicily but the counsel was too late and unopportunely taken for Fortune beginning now again to smile upon the Romans and the enterprise being undertaken with but weak Forces they did little else but raise Tumults with more of loss to those that had rebelled against the Romans then any advantage to the Carthaginians It seems likewise that Hannibal when he first endeavoured to joyn in league with Philip King of Macedon whose strength by Sea was very great and his jealousies of the Romans likewise very great as also his desire to secure himself therefrom had laid a better foundation for his designs and might have had better success in his endeavours against the Romans which because out of vainglorious ambition he would accelerate he overthrew them Let us then bound Hannibals praises within straiter precincts though his fame sound very gloriously in the memory of all Ages for the greatness of his attempts and his success therein at first since that advantage ceaseth which might first have counselled him to the affairs of Italy And let us only see whether he may have purchased any true glory by his so great daring and by the readiness wherewith he buckled to battel He who will weigh things with reason and experience will find that Wisdom ought to be of greater consideration in a worthy Commander then force of Arms. Which may be seen in Hannibal for the wisdom of Quintus Fabius did that against him with safety which the War waged with much loss and more danger by Flaminius and by Sempronius and afterwards by Gaius Terentius all of them Consuls and Commanders of the Romans Armies could not do who rashly hazarding the doubtful events of Battel were overcome by Hannibal and brought the affairs of Rome to almost utter despair The praise then which is given to Hannibal is great eagerness of mind against dangers which though of it self it may make him worthy some admiration yet such a vertue fals easily into vice and in stead of Boldness may be termed Rashness But if we will consider Hannibals Actions yet a little more narrowly we shall the better discover that Hannibal having undertaken this War unjustly and violated the Articles made between the Carthaginians and the Romans he cannot deserve to be truly named valiant the vertue of Valor not consisting in the maintaining of an unjust Cause And if Hannibal ought to glory of his having routed the Romans his glory will prove the less since the Captains whom he overcame were not so much cryed up and were of lesser experience and worth then many other Romans who never had to do in any great enterprise and that it was not his own worth and the worth of his Soldiers which made way to his Victories more then did the ignorance rashness and chiefly the discord of the Roman Commanders to whom through some unlucky Star it was the misfortune of the Commonwealth at that time to commit the guidance and command of her Forces But when he met with Fabius Marcellus or Scipio the face of affairs altered And yet Hannibal ought to have believed he should have met with these or at least such as these then with the others or such as them For the Carthaginians had experienced much to their loss in the preceding War what the worth of the Roman Commanders was Hannibal might likewise have considered how hard it would be for him to vanquish so many Cities so many Roman Colonies defended by Citizens who did partake
of the Roman name and vilor But this was seen afterwards by experience when he first began to undertake the taking in of Cities and when entring into Umbrid and being incamped about Spoletum he spent much time there to little purpose and finding how strong defence was made by a little Roman Colony he saw how vain his designs would be of stom◠〈◊〉 City of Rome And though many of the chief Cities of Italy fell into his hands this happened through the renown of Victories which he had won which working upon many people who did accommodate themselves to the Victors fortune they gave themselves willingly over to the Carthaginians and rebelled against the vanquished Romans But to besiege Cities required time and time afforded means to the Romans who were at their own homes to recruit their Forces and reduced Hannibal who was a stranger into many inconveniencies and necessities Insomuch as it is aâ—â—rmed by Writers that when Hannibal had the means of fighting afforded him which he so much desired but had little reason to hope for by Terentius the Consuls rashness who was afterwards routed and overcome his affairs were reduced to so great and desperate straits as manifest signs of revolting over to the enemies Camp were discovered and in himself a mind to save himself by flying away into Africa by Sea But let us take the end of War into consideration which we will be better able to judge by then by its beginning And though it is usually said that Event is the fools Schoolmaster yet it often falls out that things are known by the event which would never have been formerly thought upon and the best instruction is that which is learnt by experience Hannibal after having with various and uncertain success but with very great and certain dangers oftentimes tried the event of sundry Battels with the Romans was constrained not so much out of obedience to the Carthaginian Senate as out of necessity to forgo Italy and to lead the remainder of his Army which was already very much lessened back into Africa to relieve the City of Carthage which was by Scipio reduced into great danger and with his like former boldness though not with the like prosperous success come to a day of Battel with his enemy Wherein his Army being overthrown and with that Army which was the strength of the Empire all hopes lost of ever being able to make head against the Romans the War was finally ended upon new conditions and by the agreement but in effect by the ultimate ruine of the Carthaginian Commonwealth And together with the loss of her Liberty she was bereft of all her maritime Forces for amongst other grievous conditions she was injoyned to burn all her Ships whereof she had great store so desirous were the Romans to keep her from attempting any novelty But how can we pass over these great actions without reflecting upon the wonderful variation of humane affairs and without marvelling at the several fortunes of these two powerful Nations For the Carthaginians having as Conquerors over-run all Italy and bereft the Romans of almost all their Forces when it seemed as if their Commonwealth following this her miraculous prosperity was in a short time to mount to a supreme greatness of Monarchy they fell from these high hopes into the extreme of misery being bereft not only of the gallantry of Command but of Liberty And on the other side the Romans who having not many years before her Armies so notably defeated by Hannibal as they were glad to imploy all their care about the safety of the very City of Rome did on such a sudden rise to such a height of reputation and power as driving the Carthaginians out of Spain and having put the affairs of Africa into great confusion they forced them to recieve their Laws from the Romans This victory of the Romans was that which opened them the way to that Monarchy at which they afterwards did in a few years arrive for having quell'd the Carthaginians and increased their own Power by the ruine of the Forces and Dominion of others there was not any other Potentate who could long resist them Other people seemed not to be ashamed to yeeld to them who had conquered the Carthaginians and made themselves Masters of their Commonwealth No truer nor better reason can be 〈◊〉 for this indeed so miraculous diversity of condition and fortune which 〈◊〉 two great and powerful Commonwealths then the excellency of Military Discipline which was better ordered and understood by the Romans then by the Carthaginians For hence it rose that every Citizen being amongst the Romans imployed in the Militia they had greater store of Commanders and Soldiers So as though they were oftentimes worsted by Hannibal they could notwithstanding soon muster other Armies and get new Forces Which the Carthaginians could not do who having had a notable rout at Zama were totally opprest not being ever able to rally again because they had no other Soldiers nor Commanders under whose conduct they might hope for better events But when the Romans were overcome they wanted not Fabius Maximus Marcellus Claudius Scipio and many others who behaved themselves more fortunately in that War and did better service the Commonwealth and they could easily send Recruits unto their Armies and supply the places of such as were slain in Battel out of their own Citizens of Rome Which was caused by the committing of the Government of the War to their Consuls which place of Magistracy enduring but a year occasion was offered to many other Citizens to get experience in military affairs and all others were so obliged to the Militia as after the Carthaginian War was ended they who had not served in the Wars for the space of four years at the least were by the Censors noted of Infamy and blotted out of the publick Muster books But the Carthaginians having through the power of the Barchinian Faction transferred the Supreme Authority of administration of Arms upon some few Citizens as it was formerly upon Hannibal the Father to this man and after him upon this Hannibal and his brother Asdrubal when Asdrubal was slain in Italy in the conflict which he had with Claudius and when Hannibal the Son was abandoned by his former good Fortune and by the reputation he had formerly gotten and the Commonwealth being also wonted to make use of mercinary Souldiers the Army of antient Soldiers being lost in the Battel of Zama they could not recruit it with their own Citizens nor withstand the blow of so dire a mischance These and such like things may be argued concerning this great action of Hannibals and these important successes of War but rather out of probabilities then any certain demonstration Yet these very considerations may serve for useful instructions in hard and difficult resolutions to foresee what end is likely to befall the undertaking of great Princes The Sixth DISCOURSE Whether it was well done by the Romans to carry
the War against the Carthaginians into Sicily and Spain and into Macedonia and Greece against King Philip whist Hannibal waged War with them in Italy AS amongst all the Wars made by the Romans none was more long or troublesom then that which they made with the Carthaginians especially when their Commander Hannibal did flourish so from hence chiefly may noble matter of discourse and useful Instructions for matters of State be gathered Whilst Hannibal was in Italy which was for the space 〈◊〉 Fourteen years the Romans made War notwithstanding in other Countries 〈◊〉 Sicily Spain and Africa against the same Carthaginians and against Philip King of Macedon ïn Greece But as War was made against them in Italy so were they the first Authors of these other Wars which affords occasion of no small wonder to him who considers and doth well weigh this their proceeding One would think that the Romans being set upon at home by so powerful Enemies as it was apparent that their whole Forces were not able to resist should not have resolved by dividing the same Forces to make their defence weaker since the main of all their affairs depended upon the success of their Armies against Hannlbal how can it be thought a good advice to hazard with part of their Forces the whole Fortune of their Commonwealth A thing which when forced by necessity is thought a great misfortune to the State wherein it happens And when Italy should be lost as it was in great danger to be whilst Hannibal was there with a puissant Army to what purpose could any acquisition serve which should be made in Spain or elswhere which must of necessity fall of it self And with what courage could the Romans fight in Forein parts when their own Country was wasted with War their houses wealth and all that they had exposed to utmost danger So as whilst fighting against Hannibal and all their minds being inflamed not only out of a military obligation and out of charity to their Country but out of the natural and powerful love which every man bears to his own affairs one man stood for many So when abroad the unquietness and doubt of mind keeping them afflicted and in jealousie by reason of the dubious case wherein they left whatsoever was most dear unto them would not permit many to stand in fight for one Who can praise the suffering of danger to increase at home out of hopes of purchasing abroad Had the Romans Armies been in another Country and imployed about other affairs reason would have advised them to have sent for them back into Italy when they saw so powerful an Enemy upon their backs For Vis unita fortior Force when united is stronger and better able to keep what is harmful afar off Thus we see it falls out by vertue of mother Nature in our bodies when the Heart is ill at ease all the spirits of the body flock thither to defend it as the most noble part and whereupon life it self depends Hannibal was a powerful Enemy formidable for his excellent worth and military discipline and for the many Forces which he brought with him and moreover Italy was as it wereunarmed at this time and wanted her valiantest Commanders and best Soldiers What could the Carthaginians have more desired for Hannibals prosperity then to see the two Scipio's Gnus and Publius on whom only the welfare of the Commonwealth now so much in danger did rest sent into parts afar off so as they could not in her very greatest extremity return to succor her If Hannibal had had a mind to have lest Italy was not this parting of the Roman Forces and the want of their best Commanders a powerful reason to make him stay And what advice was it to provoke other Princes and People to enmity as must needs be done by sending Forces to molest Spain whilst the Commonwealth was in such trouble and danger as she ought to have made friends on all sides By which they incensed that Nation and drew other African Princes upon their backs who were Friends and Confederates with the Carthaginians And the increasing power of the Romans being formerly apprehended by other People and Princes the condition of those times should have rather advised them to have cloaked such thoughts and not to draw hatred and envy upon them For every one must needs hold that if the Romans being in such calamity and danger would vex other Countries with war no Province would have been free from their Forces when they should have been rid of Hannibal Which made the Romans cause worse and Hannibals better with those in Italy who did not much affect the so much greatness of the Commonwealth and much 〈◊〉 forein Nations Wherefore the French who first opposed Hannibal wheâ—â—â—â—â—nt into Italy did for these respects favor his brother Asdrubal afterwards 〈◊〉 he past with succor through their Country nay many of them joined with his Camp and followe the Carthaginian Colors in Italy to maintain the War with them If the Romans did not know themselves to be sufficiently able to withstand Hannibal in Italy where they had all conveniences and he being a stranger wanted all and could only come by them by force what reason could perswade them to maintain War in Spain at the same time which War must be as incommodious to them as it was advantageous and convenient for their Enemies both for that that Province was at their devotion for the neerness of the City of Carthage and for the accommodation the Sea afforded them in furnishing them with all things necessary to make War which certainly may be done better and more commodiously at home Thus the Cimbâ—ians after having given many defeats to the Romans in Gallia were by them overcome in Italy War is likewise made at home with less danger out of the easiness of recruiting an Army when Battels prove unfortunate Thus the Romans being oft-times worsted by Hannibal did maintain and raise up their abject fortune And the Venetians being assaulted at their own homes by those of Genoa by reason of the commodity they had of assembling all their Forces together did not only wiâ—hstand but did overthrow the Assailants who were gotten even into their Washes and were setled in the City of Chioggia But if we will then consider the particular condition wherein the Romans were at that time we shall find all their affairs in great disorder and such as did advise them rather to lessen then to increase new Expences by undertaking new Wars The publick Treasury was sufficiently decreased by loss of the usual Rents of so many places which Hannibal was possest of in Italy for that what they were masters of in Sardinia was to cease paying usual and great contributions for that the people who were subject to the Romans were so much wearied with continual Wars as they were hardly able to maintain those few Soldiers which they had need of for their own defence not in a case to
if the City which was the beginning of so many Wars had been reserved to be the end thereof These and other such like reasons may be alleadged for the War undertaken against the Carthaginians but that which they made against Philip may be said to be caused rather by necessity then choice For Philip for his part being already resolved to follow Hannibals fortune and expecting large recompence had sent his Ambassadors several times formerly to him to conclude a confederacie with him wherefore the Romans thinking it better to prevent the Enemy then to be by them prevented fell suddenly upon him with their whole Fleet and Army hoping to suppress him though they did not wholly effect their design But they continued their War against him afterwards in Greece incited by the commotions already raised in that Province by the Italians knowing that unless they should interpose themselves Greece must either fall into Philips hands whereby the power of a People that were Enemies to the Romans and already very formidable of themselves would be greatly increased or else they must have recourse to the assistance of King Attalus as the Grecians had already protested to the Romans and so they must suffer the neighborhood of another King who was already powerful in Asia and might at another time trouble the affairs of Rome And the wisdom of the Romans was always such as not being cast down by any adversity they never seemed so much to apprehend present dangers but that they had an eye to those which might ensue and in time grow greater And this peradventure was that which did prove the Romans power and worth more then any thing else since when as they were as yet but masters of a small State and that their affairs were reduced into great difficulties both by their so many bad successes in battel against Hannibal and by the risings of their Friends and Confederates yet they resolved to maintain War at one and the same time in four several Countries to wit in Italy Sicily Spain and Greece and they were able to manage them all And certainly such advice was no less useful then generous For he who should overcome the Romans in any one place could not hope quite to subdue them since they had other Armies and valiant Commanders who might make good their fortune and raise it up again So as things formerly alleadged for arguments to asperse this their resolution may peradventure be allowed of in such States and amongst such Princes where there is not that worth discipline or power as was amongst the Romans but in them or such as they they are of no force and very Experience by the issue of those Wars seems to confirm and approve of the Counsels by which they were undertaken The Seventh DISCOURSE Whether the defâ—ruction of Carthage was the rise of the ruine of the Roman Republick CArthage a glorious and famous City both for the command she had in Africa and Spain and for being long Rival in glory with the Common-wealth of Rome being at last to yield either to the great worth or happy genius of the Romans was not notwithstanding made tribuâ—ary to Rome but was burnt and destroyed even to the ground The Carthaginians were oft times overcome in battel by the Romans and had severe Laws imposed upon them yet were those undaunted fierce minds never well quell'd but beginning to heighten their hopes and augment their Forces after the second Carthaginian war they molested those that were friends to the Romans and contrary to their Articles began to sail upon the Sea with Men of War These things being therefore treated of in the Senate of Rome caused variety of opinions Some were for the total ruining of the City of Carthage since otherwise the Commonwealth of Rome could not be free from their injuries and molestations and Cato was very â—tiff of his opinion who bringing some fresh Figs which were gathered in Carthage shewed what dangers they were always subject unto by reason of their Enemies neigborhood But others endeavoring the contrary sought to prove that totally to extinguish the Carthaginians was no good advice and Scipio Nasâ—ica a man of great authority was greatly averse to this resolution being thereunto moved as he said not through any pitty to the conquered enemy but for the advantage of his own Citizens who when they should be free from the fear of the Carthaginian Forces would suffer many evils through Idleness So as it was the common saying and opinion that the destruction of the Carthaginians would hasten on the ruine of Rome And Salust in the beginning of his History of Catilines Conspiracy describing the abusive customs of the City of Rome at that time seems to be of opinion that the overthrow of Carthage did more harm to the Commonwealth by introducing idleness and pleasure then the keeping of her flourishing and in arms would have done Yet there were other considerations which did thwart this opinion shewing that it was not peace and idleness but the continually being verst in Arms and War which was the true cause of the Civil discords and change of Government in Rome This it was which fomented ambition in the Citizens this it was that did too immensely increase their power Finally it was this that divided the City and through discord brought it to utter ruine And how can it be said that the City of Rome was ruined by Peace since she never tasted thereof Insomuch as for the space of Six hundred eighty five years that famous Temple dedicated to Ianus by Numa Pompillius that it might stand open in time of War and shut in time of Peace was onely twice seen to be shut once in the Consulship of Titus Manlius after the end of the first Carthaginian War and once more in Augustus his time after the Naval Victory over Mark Anthony Thus were the Romans and chiefly the most valiant amongst them great enemies to Peace not so much endeavoring to procure greater strength to the Publick Empire as to encrease their own glory and power Therefore one War was made to beger another no time being ever to be found wherein the City was to injoy honest and civil leasure And Provinces and the authority of administring War was oft times confirmed to those who commanded their Armies who either desired to continue in their command or occasion requiring it to be so that they might put an end the Wars begun As it fell out in the second Carthaginian War where the time of tarrying in that Province and the continuing of his command was prolonged to the Consul Scipio who waged War in Spain to the end that he might finish what he had begun The like was done to Fabus in the Wars which he made against Hannibal in Italy and upon other occasions a thing which being done contrary to the rule of Law though it made somewhat for the Publick advantage at the present yet was it cause of great disorders afterwards Thus Marius
closer fight and then whole bodies of fresh and well armed Soldiers succeeded in the Roman Armies For their bodies were covered with their Bucklers which were very large ones and the short but very sharp swords and finely tempered used by the Romans were of great advantage to the Soldiers who might wield them in a long fight as well to defend themselves from their Enemies blows as to let flie upon them which was not practised in other Militia's of those times particularly not amongst the French with whom the Romans had often and dangerous fights for they used very little Bucklers and long heavy swords very sharp at the point so as they were easily wrested and made unuseful Therefore the routs which the Roman Armies received were very few in comparison of those they gave their Enemies and being but seldom worsted and often victorious the state strength and reputation of the Empire did still increase so as when some adverse fortune happened it was not sufficient to extinguish no nor so much as long to weaken the greatness of that Commonwealth Divers particular good rules observed in the administration of War were likewise of great moment for the carrying on of the Roman affairs Amongst which the diligence which was used by publick constitutions in dividing of the prey may be numbred for one for they used to place the prey or booty first in publick and did then so divide it amongst the Soldiers as those who were upon the guard shared as well thereof as those that were forwardest in the action and who had sackt the Enemy Whereby occasion was not given for those notable disorders which have been observed to happen in these latter times wherein upon such an occasion the loss of the whole Army hath ensued The faith also which was so exactly observed and the fair proceedings with such Cities as were subject to that Dominion won the Romans the good affection of the people by whose favor Empires are usually more upheld upon any adverse accident then by any other thing Of these we read of many notable examples it being as far from that good Military Discipline to bear with the insolency of Soldiers as it is introduced in these our last Ages to the great prejudice of people though friends and subjects For such faults as these were severely punish'd the which is observable amongst so many other actions for what the Romans did to those people to whom they did not only restore the goods and liberty which had been by the Soldiers wickedly taken away and so their grievances were redrest but those were severely punish'd who had committed such things To this may be added that the Romans to the end that the power of the Commonwealth might still prevail and might upon any occasion be made use of endeavored as soon as they bent their minds to greater matters to accompany their Land-forces with Maritime-aids so as the one might help the other and the one not only be made more powerful by the other but more secure as it fell out and as it may be observed in many of their actions but chiefly when seeing their affairs succeeded but ill with the Carthaginians who prevailed by reason of their antient Maritime profession and had likewise great advantage in their Land-Militia by their use of Elephanâ—s which the Romans had not as yet well learned how to resist they bent themselves wholly to Naval preparations wherein they did afterwards behave themselves with such valor and prosperity as they overcame these their so fierce and cruel Enemies in a Naval fight and raised their fortune Let us in the next place observe that the greatness and generosity of the Romans was such as not content to secure their neer neighboring dangers and out of a desire of quiet to leave the sparkles of those Wars unquench'd from whence another fire might soon be kindled they always endeavored to see the last sparkle quite put out The Roman Army was overcome and much endamaged by the Galli Gessati after the death of Consul Aâ—ilius where their liberty being exposed to much danger upon this so sad accident the Romans would once more try the fortune of battel wherein they had good success and cutting in pieces above Forty thousand of that Nation they did vindicate their former injuries Nor yet did they then lay down their Arms though they were freed from that their greatest danger but knowing that there remained yet other powerful Armies of the same Gauls is other parts of Italy they would continue war against them and of assailed become assailors which afforded them occasion of those Marcellus his notable victories and of making themselves masters of the chiefest Cities of Lombardy which were possest by the Gauls The Commonwealth of Rome was never in greater danger then when Asdrubal passing over the Alps with a numerous Army entred Italy whilst his brother Hannibal was there likewise with another powerful Army They fought Asdrubal and to their great joy their Consuls were victorious which notwithstanding they forbare not to continue war in Spain though they were free from their greater and neerer dangers but with the Forces they had there went to find out and to fight other Enemy-Armies of the Carthaginians which were in that Province for they knew if those Armies should remain entire the War might easily be renewed and other impediments being removed Hannibal would be the more easily succored with necessaries which he wanted and so might still molest the Romans in Italy Thus not allowing of any Peace then what might be purchased by either having totally quell'd or at least very much weakened the Enemy the Romans never laid down Arms but when they were entire Victors which other Princes not being able to do have deferred their ruine for a short time but have not totally kept it off Many other things might likewise be thought of by which it might be evidently proved that the Romans did always prove victorious at last and did perpetually increase their State and strength But what we have already said may suffice to teach such Princes and Nations as shall aspire to the highest degree of glory whither it is that they ought to bend their thoughts and which are the best means to arrive thereat And when all other necessary accidents shall correspond those who shall imitate the excellent worth and discipline of the Romans will not find themselves any whit deceived The Thirteenth DISCOURSE Whether the City of Rome could have maintain'd herself longer in the glory and majesty of her Command if she had preserved her Liberty and Form of Commonwealth then she did under the Government of Emperors AFter that Caesar had robb'd his Country of her liberty and changing the antient form of Government reduced the Commonwealth of Rome into a Monarchical form she continued therein in a continued series of many Emperors safe and entire or at least without any remarkable alteration or declining for the space of about four hundred years till
and Forces on all sides The City of Rome stands on firm land or Terra firmâ— but so neer the Sea as she may reap the commodity thereof without being thereby endangered she is apt to breed up Armies and to nourish men in the exercise of the Militia not is she inconveniently seated for the transportation of her Forces by Sea into other far off Provinces This diversity of situation hath begot diversity of inclinations in the Inhabitants Thus doth Nature always adapt mens minds to those Arts which they are to exercise themselves in or else Custom doth inform the Habit and turns it into Nature For as the Romans following exercises conformable to the situation of their City were more inclined to Land-war and in Peace to husbandry So the Venetians invited to other things according to the diversity of place applied their studies otherwise to defend their Liberty and to increase their wealth using the Sea Militia for the one and Traffick and Merchandising for the other Which whosoever shall upbraid our Citizens withall seems not to know that without these a City could neither have long preserved it self nor increase in state and wealth as it hath done For not having any particular Territories whereout to extract their livelihood she would have been always poor and weak and wanting other imployments she would have been destroyed if not by forein Forces by her own Idleness as many other Cities have been the Citizens wanting wherein to imploy their thoughts and to exercise themselves in quiet times But if the Citizens of Rome were much commended for their husbandry insomuch as of this day many famous men of that Commonwealth are as much celebrated for having been good Husbandmen as good Commanders as were Curtius Dentâ—tus Quintius Cinciâ—â—tus Attalius Collatsinus Marcâ— Regulus Scipio Africâ—â—ons and others wherefore should the Venetians be upbraided with their Merchandising this being an exercise as fitting and requisite for the situation of Venice as was that of Tillage and Husbandry to the like of Rome If the care of cultivating the Earth did not abase the minds of those antient and reverend Romans who have left so evident examples of worth to all other Cities and Nations why should the industry of Merchandising redound to the opprobry of the Vâ—â—â—tians seeing to the contrary with how much glory and how much publick benefit they have for so long a feries of years govern'd the Commonwealth The studies and actions of the Romans and Venetians have then been different but notwithstanding alike in this that they aimed at the same end though they took several ways there unto to wit aâ— Glory at the Grandeur and Liberty of their Commonwealth Many famous examples of Fortitude of love to their Country and of all other sorts of worthiness have been seen in each of them so as in our men nothing was more to be desired unless 〈◊〉 and more frequent occasions wherein to have imployed themselves that the greatness of their actions might have corresponded to the magnnimity of this minds Yet do not we Venetians want 〈◊〉 of many 〈◊〉 who have been very famous for fortitude of mind and military worth and he who stall examine the life and actions of many Princes of the Commonwealth will find them to be such as deserve praise and celebration Such have Ordelâ—so Fallerâ— Viâ—â—l◠〈◊〉 Micâ—â—li and Hâ—â—â—rico Dandule 〈◊〉 bastione 〈…〉 Cantarem Pietre 〈◊〉 Andrea Gritâ—i Sebastiano Veniero and divers others been whose words might be 〈◊〉 to that of the Fabriâ—â—i Marcelli Fabii 〈◊〉 and others of their so much 〈…〉 then if they had had a larger field to exercise themselves in or had the 〈◊〉 of their Common-wealth afforded them same equal to the merit and valor of those 〈…〉 But let us now come to consider those 〈◊〉 important 〈◊〉 of the condition of Times and their Neighbors qualities The City of Venice 〈◊〉 her beginning when Italy was possest by the wild Northern Nations and when being perplex'd with all other sort of miseries she fell finally into the slavery of Barbâ—â—ians wherein she lived for the space of many years How then could a new City aspire to Empire while the Forces of the Barbarians were so powerful in that Province as the most powerful Roman Empire was not able to withstand them which was shook and destroyed by their fury It rather seems a wonder that a City in her first and weak beginnings was able to manage so great a War and withstand as she did afterwards the violence of two fierce and potent Nations to wit the French and Huns The French when their King Pipin being entred Italy with puissant Forces to drive out the Lombards and being scandalised that the City of Venice had leaned to the friendship of Nicephorus Emperor of Constantinople turn'd his Forces upon her to subjugate and destroy her And the Hâ—ns when parting from Pannonia which took from them the name of Hungary having overcome a very powerful Army of the Germans and kill'd their King Lodovicâ—s they fell to 〈…〉 again their fury was withstood by the 〈◊〉 which 〈◊〉 a powerful Prince was forced to give way unto But afterwards the Forces of these Western Barbarians being in time weakned by Châ—â—â— the Great the State of Italy fell again in to the Western Emperors who being then very powerfull and masters both of Germany and France the Forces of a weak Commonwealth were not likely to contest with so great Princes with any hope of acquiring 〈◊〉 These difficulties being added unto by the Cities situation withheld the Venetians a long while from thinking how to enlarge their Dominions in Terra sirms in which opinion being for a long time confirmed and having very 〈◊〉 imployed their studies and Forces in Sea enterprises though the 〈◊〉 of times did counsel them to the contrary giving them hopes of noble acquisitions on Land they either despised or knew not how to make use of the occasions which afterwards were offered Thus when the German Emperors troubled with the domestick troubles of that Province did forgo their possessions in Italy the Venetians not minding then that opportunity left the advantage to others which they might easily have reaped whereupon other Cities of Italy purchasing their 〈◊〉 from the Emperors at low raâ—es framed a peculiar Government unto themselves as did Florence and others were possest by others powerful men as 〈…〉 and other Cities of Lombardy when if the Commonwealth of Venice whole power was already much increased had been minded to have 〈◊〉 themselves of any of the Imperial Territories it is not to be doubted but they might in a short time have made notable acquisitions But when they began very late and more provoked by injuries then by ambition of dominion to think upon Territories by Land they found divers other Princes become very powerful both in 〈◊〉 and Authority and confirm'd in the States which they 〈◊〉 under 〈◊〉 a shore lawful 〈◊〉 Wherefore they met with many difficulties and amongst the
test the Wars proved very heavy unto them which they were forc'd to 〈…〉 did not joyn against them because they saw that if that Dukes State fell into the power of the Venetian Commonwealth the way would be laid open to her for much greateâ— matters in Italy whereupon a noble Victorie which was already almost gotten was impeded Hereby it may be then conceived how much the condition of the times was averse to the Commonwealths inlarging her Precincts by Land partly by reason of her self and partly through other various accidents which though they were somewhat more favorable unto her in what concerned the Sea yet met she not with small interruptions therein to her enterprises For the Eastern Emperors being Masters of Greece and of other States and Countries wherein the Commonwealth was to have inlarged the Confines of her command by Sea she could not make any great acquisitions whilst they preserved themselves in such reputation and strength as became their State But afterwards when that Empire began to decline she began to increase and flourish gloriously and her worth was waited upon by much prosperitie as was seen when the Venetians went in companie of the French to the business of the Levant and after many noble warlike actions they took the City and Empire of Constantinople of which acquisition the Commonwealth had so great a share as that their Dukes did then assume the title of Signoridella quarta parte é Mezza di tutto L' Imperio della Romania And soon after with the like prosperous success they did by sundry means reduce many Islands and chief Maritime Towns under their obedience and the Commonwealth marched on apace to greater power and command But this course of glorie and victorie by War was much slackened by the original Customs and Orders of the City as has been said which related more to Peace and Merchant affairs then to War Insomuch as the Venetians seemed for a while to make use of these new acquisitions rather for the better accomodation of their Navigation and Traffick then for any occasion of other enterprises Their business did therefore infinitely increase at this time insomuch as there was not any City famous for merchandizing in the Levant whither the Venetian Ships and Merchants did not flock Nay a great number of men of that Nation did usually remain in those Cities through whose hands the most precious Merchandise of those Countries past to the great advantage of the City and of her private Citizens So as the Genoeses plying the same places at first a certain rivalship and emulation arose amongst them as well for the profit of merchandizing as for the expertness and glory of Sea affairs till at last they came to open and cruel War which kept the Commonwealth so busied and perplexed by disturbing Navigation and even private affairs as for a long while they had no leasure to undertake other enterprises though they had met with opportuity for it and that they had been thereunto disposed For the Venetians having sundry times hazarded their Fleets upon the doubtful event of Battel they tasted both prosperous and adverse fortune insomuch as they were to fight in their own Gulf not more for Empire then for the safety of the City Thus whilst the Commonwealth spent her best years partly in these private affairs and merchandizing business partly in the so long and troublesome Wars against the Genoeses another Power arose in the Levant much greater and more formidable then was the Grecian Empire For the Ottaman Lords beginning by divers accidents but chiefly by reason of the discords among Christians to make notable and successful progress in their rising Empire grew quickly very great and powerful not onely by Land but also by Sea having reduced the City of Constantinople into their hands a very fit place for Sea enterprises whereby the Commonwealth of Venice was not onely bereft of all hopes of further increasing their Dominion by Sea having so great and powerful an â—nemy to near at hand but even what they had already got was exposed to hazard so as being to maintain a bitter and difficult War and to manage it with unequal Forces against this their sore and perpetual adversarie she had more reason to think upon her own defence then by force of Arms to win what belonged to others Let us in the next place consider the conditions of the nearest neighboring people amongst which she was to inlarge her Confines whereby we may also know what difficulties the Commonwealth met with for at the very first she was to overcome the Dalmatians a Nation not onely very valiant but of a quick wit given to sedition and desirous of novelties Whence how great her difficulties were in quelling these may be conceived by this that the Commonwealth of Rome having so many and so far distant Nations yet could she never handsomely put the yoke upon Dalmatia which never was under the Roman Empire until the time of Qctavius Augustus but had still before notably indamaged the Roman Armies It is then no wonder that the state of a Commonwealth should be less which had to contend with such Enemies and who may not know by the actions of this Commonwealth that she rather wanted occasion then worth for the further encreasing her State and fortune Let us now likewise consider the condition of the times wherein the Common-wealth of Rome had her happy beginnings and made the first progress to her Empire Which we shall find to differ much and to be free of the so many difficulties which the Venetians met with Rome had not at her first rise any powerful neighboring Prince for the Assyrians had then the Monarchie whose confines did not extend beyond Asia and after the concourse of many years it was carried by Cyrus amongst the Persians with whom it remained for about Two hundred years till it was destroyed by Alexander of Macedon who though he made greater conquests and made his Forces be felt and dreaded much further off yet dying young in the height of his Victories he could not get into Europe nor afford the Romans occasion of making trial of their Forces with a powerful and valiant Prince And by his death he having left no issue either legitimate or illegitimate behind him that Monarchie was soon destroyed and his Empire was divided between his chief Commanders so as several Kingdoms were thereout framed with which severally the Romans did afterwards much to their advantage make War So as Asia having then been the chiefest Seat of the Empire the Provinces of Europe were not at that time any waies annoied by the power thereof and those that were further from thence as was Italy less then the rest But Greece which was then in high esteem for the excellencie of her Inhabitants genius for what concerned both Civil and Military vertues was divided into many several Peopledoms who contending within themselves for the dignitie both of the soveraigntie of that very
easiness wherewith they were done can walk hand in hand with those of the Antients amongst whom we see one only Alexander one Pompey one Caesar to have subjugated many entire Provinces and conquered many Nations And not to go further in search of the like examples since one Age alone very neer this of ours can easily furnish us with them Were not the Emperor Charls the Fifth Francis the First King of France and if will pass by the errors of Religion Sultan Solyman Emperor of the Turks Princes great and valiant in all acceptations in whom so many endowments both of Nature and Fortune did concur as hardly any thing remained to be desired in any of them to make and constitute a potent Prince and an excellent Commander fit to undertake any action how great or difficult soever What was it that Charls with his undaunted and dreadless spirit did not undertake Who was ever known to be more ambitious of praise and military honor then Francis never weary nor satisfied with toiling in Arms and in leading Armies Solyman was so fervently bent upon purchasing glory in the Waâ—s as his age though very great was not able to asswage it for he dyed in the Field amongst Soldiers when he was eighty four years old These great Princes were so puissant and so remarkable for the number to Soldiers which they led to Battel for military Discipline and for all that belonged to War as their Age had no cause to wonder at nor to envy any preceding times which were famousest for such affairs Yet he who shall particularly examine their actions will find they come far short of the famous acts of the Antients and that they correspond not with the fame and opinion of such Princes and of such Forces For if we we shall consider the deeds of those few aforesaid not to mention so many others what and how many were the things done by Alexander the Great who having in so short time vanquish'd the powerful Persian Empire victoriously overran the whole East and made the terror of his wâ—apons known to People almost unknown till then and yet died whilst he was very young How many Cities and Provinces did Pompey and Caesar bring under the Roman Empire The first conquered and subjugated Pontus Armenia Cappadocia Media Hiberia Syria Cylicia Mesopotamia Arabia and Iudaea things which though done seem incredible And the other though he did not overrun so great a space of Land did no less admired things if we will regard the condition of the conquered He quell'd the warlike Switzers French and Dutch and made so many and so fortunate expeditions as by his means only above eight hundred Cities were brought under the Government of Rome What can be alleadged on the behalf of these modern Princes which may compare with these for military glory Charls the Emperor led sundry times puissant Armies upon several undertakings but what was the fruit that he reaped by his most famous Expeditions The greatest and most victorious Army which he ever put together was that wherewith he withstood Solyman when he came to assault â—ustria yet he never departed with it from before the walls of Vienna so as all the Trophy of Victory which he got there for so much expence and labor was only not being overcome for his Army never saw the Enemies face The Wars of Germany were very difficult in this behalf yet therein he contended not with any Prince whose Forces were of themselves equal to his nor were they made out of election or hope of glory by new acquirements but out of necessity and for the defence as well of his own person as of the Empire and all the good he got thereby was only the restoring the affairs of the Crown to the former condition so as the Empires authority might not be lessened The Wars made so long between Charls the Emperor and Francis King of France with no less hatred then force did oftentimes weary both their Armies but though Caesar had several times the better yet at last the power of France was not diminished nor the greatness of Charls his command made any whit the larger so as he was master of so many and so ample States rather by his right of inheritance then by means of War thâ— enterprises of Tunis and Algier in Africa might have some greater appearance of generosity the business being very difficult and attempted with great courage and much danger and wherein the glory appeared to be more then the advantage yet the unhappy success of the one did much lessen the honor and praise won by the other and these undertakings did finally produce no greater effects then the acquisition of one or two Cities and those none of the chiefest of Africa whereas one onely Scipio subdued Carthage the Head of so great an Empire and brought all those Regions under the Roman Eagles The Acts done by Solyman were somewhat greater then these but not to be compared to those of old nor peradventure will they appear to be very famous if we shall consider his power and the long time that he lived Emperor He consumed much time and many men in Hungaria making many expeditions against it and yet got but one part thereof which was none of the greatest Provinces neither He wan the Island of Rhodes but what glory could redound to so mighty a Prince by overcoming a few Knights who were weak of themselves and who were not succoured by others And yet he was therein assisted more by fraud then by force He past with his Army into Persia but though he might say with Caesar venâ— vidi yet could he not add vici for as he with great celerity over ran a great part of the Persian Empire and came to the City of Taâ—ris so not being able to fix in any place or establish any conquest he retreated to within his own Confines having lest the greatest part and the best of his men in the Enemies Country routed and defeated by divers accidents These things then and many other the like give just occasion of wonder and incite curious wits to search out the truest causes of such diversity of successes Amongst which nay in the primary place the different means of warfaring in those times and in these may come into consideration wherein if we come to more particulars we shall meet with the use of Forts and Strong Holds which are become more frequent in these our Ages then they were in former times the art of building being doubtlesly in greater perfection with us then it was with them There is hardly any State or Country now adaies wherein there are not many Towns and Cities either assisted by natural situation or else by art reduced to much safety by many inventions found out by modern Professors of Fortification so as almost every place is so fortified as it is able to hold out with a few men against many and he who will in these times enter into another
are more stable and less subject to the various fortune of War so the fewer actions of these men may for glory and praise be justly compared to the many of the others wherein perhaps they would have equall'd them had it not been for the concurrence of such differing accidents and respects But if we shall continue to examine other parts appertaining to the Militia we shall find that the diversity of effects hath proceeded from the diversity of other things The invention of Guns is so new and so miraculous a thing so out of the way of all War-Engines which were known and used by the Antients as it may well be belâ—eved that this must needs have made a grert alteration in the managing of the Militia and the use and invention of Gunpowder is so increased in these times and so variously multiplied and perfected as it may be said that men make not War now a days with steel and iron as they were wont but with fire Then this formidable Instrument of Artillery which makes so great and irreparable havock is the reason why Commanders proceed with more caution in giving Battel and seek to spin out the War in length to reduce the Enemy to some necessity and that â—sing more Art and trusting less to Fortune they spend more time in bringing their enterprises to an end but do it with more security Wherefore we seldom hear of piâ—ch'd Fields in these days wherein whole Armies sight with all their Forces And hence it is that the Forces of such as defend an assaulted Country not being to be vanquish'd nor much weakened but with time unless they want fitting defence no great pâ—ogress is made therein which is not done more by time and industry then by open force Where likewise it is to be weighed that the necessity which is now adays put upon Armies of bringing along with them a great Train of Artillery all their proceedings must be much more slow and without them they can neither keep themselves from being offended by the Enemy nor yet can they undertake any enterprise wanting such Instruments without which no Town nor place of importance can be taken Let us wind about a little and see what hath been done by the Antients What a voyage did Pompey the Great make in the pursuit of Mithridates He wiâ—h his Army overran abundance of new Countries continually conquering and subjecting them with as much ease as if he had gone to visit them upon pleasure and not to wage War with them When Alexander the Great would go into India he made his Soldiers leave all the Booty which they had got in Persia and all their Baggage behind them and choosing out some of his nimblest men be with them made that long and difficult journy and sent many back thinking that a few but those valiant Soldiers would suffice him for that purpose for in that Age t was only worth and power which bore away the weightiest affairs So as such Princes and Conductors of Armies as had a strong and able Militia as was that of Alexander the Great and that of the Romans not meeting with any strong Holds to withstand them nor with any Soldiers 〈◊〉 worth and experience as they were not which could withstand their assaults they suddenly bereft the Countries which they assailed of all defence by worsting their Armies wherein their sole security lay and so made themselves easily masters of them and by the reputation which their men won and the terror which they caused in their Enemies who had no where whereunto to flie or to have refuge they made one Victory make way for another so as they might in a short time lay the ground-works of those great Monarchies which the World doth now so much wonder at To these things it may be added That the chiefest strength of the Antients and that wherewith they atchieved their chiefest actions lay in their Infantry which could easiliest and with greatest expedition winde about every where and be made use of at all seasons But changing their custom afterwards so as those that commanded great Armies would have their Foot aided continually and back'd by good store of Horse they could neither begin nor finish great enterprises as made best for them being to consider the Season the Country and other conveniencies and their Horses being to have meat which they could not always nor in all places come by Wherefore now that by reason of the greatness of their Empire the Turks Confines are so separated and so far distant one from another it may be hoped that other Princes may rest the quieter and the more secure from their â—ncursions for that their Land-forces consisting much in Cavalry they cannot move so suddenly nor lead on their numerous Armies so easily nor so commodiously nor do such notable things by Land and which the self-same respect may make it be doubted that they may bend their studies more to Sea-affairs Together with all these respects the condition of Times and of Potentates is not slightly to be considered if therein we meet with a generous Prince and one that is desirous of military glory For if he chance to make trial of his arms and worth with a Prince of equal or not much inferior state valor and military discipline he cannot hope by any power he hath to make any great acquisitions because he will meet with a just counterpoise to his worth and power For though he may peradventure be puffed up with some good success yet is he not sure but that he may have some adverse fortune whilst his Enemy is still strong thouâ—h as yet woâ—sted What did Francis King of France leave unattempted to get footing in Italy how many Armies did he lead thither how much treasure did he spend in those attempts when was he ever weary or satisfied with warfaring Yet being withstood by the Emperor Charls the Fifth who was of equal force and worth and was resolute to keep the French out of Italy all his endeavors proved vain finding it very hard to get any thing and impossible to keep what he had gotten that State being befriended and back'd by too great Princes Whence it was that by reason of the resistance which each of these great Potentates made against the other knowing that they could not much exceed one another and each of them having an eye upon the affairs of Italy they both of them did still much endeavor friendship and consederacie with the Princes of Italy and chiefly with the Common-wealth of Venice For what neither of them could effect of themselves which was to keep the others Forces suppressed in Italy they thought they might the easilier do it by joining with some other Italian Potentate so the many Wars which happened between them and chiefly in Savâ—y and in the State of Milan must at last be ended by agreement without any advantage to either party both their Forces being weakned but neither of their hatreds or emulations slackned
though Charls the Fift by the unexpected death of Francisco Sforza did at last reduce that State to his Dominion Hence it was also that Charls and Solyman greatly fearing to encounter each other did very much shun the having to do together and to hazard that glory to the uncertain events of War which they had â—â—th so much labor arrived at And this was the cause why Charls though he was a bold and valiant Prince when his Brother Ferdinand was in great danger by reason of Solymans Forces resolved importunately to pass into Africa for being resolute that he would not march against Solymans Forces nor contend with them he would witness to the world that it was neither labor nor danger that kept him from turning to the defence of Hungary and Austria which were then assaulted by the Turks but because he esteemed the business of Africa very necessary And when a greater necessity wrought it so that they were to take up Arms one against the other and that numerous Armies had taken the field yet they kept still aloof off the fear and apprehension which each had of the others power and fortune being alike so as at last so great an accumulation of Soldiers disbanded neither party having seen the face of an Enemy whilst Charls would not give way that his Army should go from before the walls of Vienna to go find out the Enemy not would Solyman advance further to meet him though he had at first publickly given out that he went from Constantinople to fight with Charls the Emperor before his own doors So as you may clearly see that it was the counterpoise of these two great Princes of one and the same Age which kept their Forces confined within certain bounds which for their valor and other respects might have carried the Trophies of victory into the furthest remote Countries Now on the other side let us examine the condition of Times and Potentates with whom those famous Commanders of old had to wage War Alâ—xâ—nder the Great found the Kingdom of Persia wherein he successfully made his first expeditions for extent of Empire very rich and powerful but wherein was an ill disciplined Militia and commanded by unexperienced Leaders and men of no valor wherefore exceeding the Persians in worth and discipline though he came short of them in numbers he may be said to have been better then they for matter of War and therefore willingly imbraced all occasions of joyning Pattel with them And for what concerns the Eastern Kings and Nations which he afterwards brought under his power who knows not how unfit they were for War of themselves weak not joyned in confederacie for common defence nor sustained by strong holds nor by the strength of a well ordered Militia Insomuch as the greatest glory that can be attributed to Alexander is for the generosity of his mind which moved him to venter upon so many enterprises in desert and almost unknown Countries rather then for that he overcame great difficulties in fight and brought them to an end The same almost may be observed by the things done in the Eastern parts by Pâ—â—pey the Great It is true that Caesar met with greater difficulties in the things he did in France and in Spain for he waged War with people who knew how to manage their Arms and who were till then thought unvanquishable wherefore he spent more time there Yet these Provinces were divided into many Kings and Popularities none of which were very strong of themselves nor were they very secure by the assistance of others to make them able to resist an Army of veteran and excellently well disciplined Soldiers as was that which was commanded by Caesar So as it seems we may with reason conclude that if these cried up Commanders had met with powerful and valiant Armies able to be compared with theirs and that these had been guided and upheld by the experience and worth of great Commanders their fames would certainly have been less not would they have so easily have assubjected so many Countries and erected their Trophies of victories in so many Regions as they did But besides all these considerations we may perhaps with reason weigh the arts and waies which these anâ—ient Warriers made use of to boot with what belonged to the Militia to make their acqusitions and glory the greater for he who shall consider their actions may therein discern so inflamed a desire of praise and glory as it seems this was the onely thing which they propounded to themselves for reward of all their labor and danger and for the end of all their undertakings for they have left many noble examples behind tâ—em not onely of military valor but of equity clemencie temperance and of other glorious vertues which â—ssisted them very much in winning favor and affection with the people and likewise the love of many of those very Princes who were overcome by them Thus we read of Alexander that he confirmed their Kingdomâ— to many Indian Kings whom he overcame and did incâ—ease them to some others and being contented with obedience from them and recâ—iving such things as were necessary for his voyage he seemed rather to aspire after the glory of new acquisitions then to reap any advantage by what he had already won But Pompey not like a victorious Chieâ—tain in War but rather like a Friend and Arbiâ—rator composed the differences between those Princes of the East restored the antient Lords to their Kingdoms and gave new States to such others as did deserve them Insomuch as it was from his lib ralâ—ty that Pharâ—â—ces was to acknowledge the Kingdom of Bosphorus Antiochus that of Sileâ—tia Tygranes the Kingdom of Armenia Ariobarzanes that of Cappadocia Diotarus the liâ—e of Galitia and did onely reduce such Countries into Provinces and made them imâ—edia ely subject to the Senate and People of Rome wherein he found no legitimate Lords and Masters as it fell out in Syriâ— Iudea and some other Regions It was by reasâ—on of these procâ—edings that many People and Prâ—nces did voluntarily submit to the Empire of Alexander and of the Romans Wherefore Darius when he was overcome by Alexander admâ—â—ing his great Continencie and Humanitâ—e prayed the gods that if the fail of that Empire was destined the glory and succession of the Kingdom of â—ersia might fall upon Alexander All â—istories are fâ—ll of such examples of worth and vertue in things done by the Romans But now adaies Princes and Commanders do but little mind the imitation of these men and wage War not out of a desire of glory as did those magnanimous Artients but onely out of revenge and cruelty or else to turn all the fruit and benefit of Victory upon themselves leaving nothing safe nor intire to the conquered Whence it ensues that they who fears these extreams desperately resolve to do their utmost and hazard all rather then to submit themselves to the power and discretion of those on whom they 〈◊〉 their
it yet more questionable whether strong Holds be a greater safety or weakening to a State and where there are many and very great ones the doubt is made the greater since so many Soldiers must be imployed in their defence as if the Prince be not very powerful he shall hardly find Forces sufficient to keep several Armies as they may be termed on foot some within the Forts and some in the Campagnia Nor can it be made good that strong Holds are of themselves sufficient to secure the whole State for though they may entertain the Enemy for a while and stop the first brunt of an impetuous assault yet at last unless they be back'd with Forces from without and timely succored and relieved being overcome either by power length of time or necessity they must yield and fall into the power of the Enemy which cannot be denied no not by the very Professors and Favorers of Fortification And yet it cannot be denied but if a Prince have sufficient Forces to keep the Field in his own Country he may thereby keep himself from being injured for men do not easily put things to hazard where they think to meet with stout opposition and the only opinion and reputation of such Forces is able to keep off the greatest dangers For the Enemy who did design to assault such a State becomes jealous and doubtful nor is he bold enough to enter far into such a State as is guarded by a good Army and chiefly in situations such as are almost in all Countries as are naturally fortified by Hills Vallies or Rivers where it is hard to enter and harder to retreat And if any well experienced Captain command over such Forces he will be likely enough to defeat the Enemy without endangering himself by keeping him from victuals and so imployed and busied in sunâ—ry ways as he shall neither be able to keep long in the Country nor much less imploy himself in the taking or sacking of any Cities since he knows he is hourly subject to surprisals and to be ruâ—n'd and strong Holds securing nothing but those quarters where they are situated they do not secure the State if they be but a few and if many they require all the Forces for their own defence and leave the Enemy master of the Field to the Prince his prejudice and the Peoples despair So also if they be but little ones and incapable of such Works and so many men as are requisite to make them hold out long they and the Soldiers which defend them are lost and if they be great and contain large plots of ground as is most in fashion in these days they may be more perfect in themselves but they need so many men to defend them as those Forces which ought to be imployed for the safeguard of the whole Country or a great part thereof are bounded within a little compass in defence of some City or Ciâ—adel And yet these very Soldiers when drawn out into the Field may do much better service for being fashioned into the body of an Army they become as it were a moveable Fort which secures at once many Cities and a great Tract of Country nay by these the Enemy is much â—â—damaged and the troubles and danger of War are kept far from a mans own home For as hath been said diversions and preventions may be made by these Forces they may be carried into another mans State and set another mans hoâ—se on fire before it take head in ones own house but he who placeth his safety in strong Holds puts himself into a condition of being at his Enemies disposal in whose will it lies to choose what shall make most for his advantage with great prejudice to the opposing party For he may either pass by the Forâ—s over-ruâ— the Country enrich his Soldiers by booty impoverish the Subjects of that Country which is assaulted and cannot be releived by reason that the Forces thereof are disperst and imploid in the defence of the strong Holds or if he will make any certain archievement he may sit down before any Fort and without indangering his own men whilst he shall live upon the Enemies Territories he may in time take it by siege and effect his own desires for as hath been said no strong Hold can promise it self long safety where no succour is ready at hand But let us come a little closer to the business and let us suppose that these strong Holds may be brought to such a condition as they may be assuredly able to resist any open force which shall come against them and not be deceived in that their beleef as often times they are How can they secure themselves from treacherie and from such dangers as they may be subject unto by the negligence of Soldiers or falsehood of the Commanders that have the custodie thereof in which case the Princes danger is so much the greater and more irreparable for that his Enemy is in the Dominions in a well munited seat from whence he cannot hope to drive him without much labor and difficultie But in greater Cities wherein are a multitude of people and where these cautions and suspitions are not to be found others no whit inferior to these do arise for such quantities of victuals is requisite to feed the many men that are therein inclosed as no Prince is able to provide for so as may serve them for a long time and if this fail to what end serves Walls Weapons or Soldiers To this may be added that the safety of such strong Holds does in a great part depend upon the pleasure of the people who being of themselves naturally fickle do often favor forein Princes out of very slight reasons and sometimes out of a meer desire of noveltie and plot by sedition and by open force against the present State and deliver themselves and the City into another mans power And though they may afterwards repent themselves of their folly they know not how to mend it when a powerful Army is within the City Walls nor can this be done by him who defends the State because he cannot keep so many Forces together as are able to defend several places at â—nce and because loving his Subjects as a legitimate Prince ought to do he is loath to destroy a City of his own though whole Armies be therein But if the State be open and not pestred with Fortifications though it may the more easily be lost by sudden assaults or by ill affected Subjects it will be the more easily regained and as soon as the Prince who is deprived thereof shall have means to rallie his Forces which by misfortune may have been beaten he soon makes head again and recovers what he had lost the Enemy not having any safe hold wherein to abide And of this there are many apparent examples If the Commonwealth of Venice in the times of her greatest calamitie had had her State in Terra firma so well provided of strong
they have endeavored to have taken some of the Towns or Forts which were held by the Turks by assault and carry the perjudice home to him who would have brought it to them in the defence of another man Let us examine all these things by considering the last proposition In what place should the Imperial Army have incamped which would not have been very incommodious for them and far off they were not yet absolutely possest of divers Cities upon the Frontiers of Hungary as they were afterwards But let us argue the business in general if the place were weak which they should assault what honor should they win thereby Or would the advantage of such an acquisition have been answerable to the expence and to the expectation had of such an Army Besides such purchases are to little purpose for such places are soon regained by him who is master of the field and if the Imperialists would have attempted the taking of any strong place and should not have effected it soon and easily to how great danger did their Army expose it self they must either raise their siege with loss of honor and with those other bad consequencies which follow in such like cases or else they must keep their station and be cut in peeces when a powerful Turkish Army should come and find the Imperialists scattered and busied about the taking in of strong Holds as afterwards fell out upon the like occasion of Buda which might teach Commanders with what temper they are to proceed when they fall upon such affairs and when they have to do with a potent Enemy But it may be yet more strongly urged that whilst the Turkish Forces should keep themselves safe and inire the Imperialists had but little hopes of keeping what they should happily have gotten Were not Modonâ— and Corone recovered from the Turks by the Imperial Forces under the Ensigns of the same Charls yet these very Towns were soon after abandoned and forsaken because they knew they were not able to maintain them against the Turkish pussant Forces Have not the Imperialists and Spaniards made oft-times many attempâ—s in Africa and had good success therein Yet in whose possession are these very places now which were gotten with so much charge and danger Did not the Turks soon repossess themselves of those places from whence they were driven The League made against the Turks in the year 1537. wherein the same and forces of the same Emperor Charls were interessed did it not 〈◊〉 Castel 〈◊〉 a Fortress fit for their greatest designs But how long were we able to keep it though it were strongly garrisoned These experiences may serve to shew that the good gotten by such cost and labor hath not at last proved any thing save dishonor in forgoing what was gotten But to fall upon the other head If the Imperial Army should have continued incamped in any strong situation of the Enemy which they might have taken without attempting any thing more how would it have been in any better condition then it was when incamp'd before Vienna rather on the contrary the danger was greater and more evident of falling into mighty disorder especially for want of victuals by their going from the Banks of 〈◊〉 from whence alone they could have been safely and opporâ—â—â—ely furnished therewithal for they were to provide for the victualing of a great many and the Enemy did abound in Horse whereby their succors might have been cut off It may peradventure be alleadged that they might have preserved a great tract of Country from the inrodes plunder and firing made by the Turks But first they were not certain to make this advantage the Country being large and exposed to such accidents as these nor were they able without dividing their Forces to supply all places And the Turks seeing this place well guarded if they should have taken their way above the Danubius as they did beneath it towards the Alps finding the fields more large and open in those parts in Moravia Silesia and Austria they might have made larger inrodes and with less danger whereas having quartered themselves in the mountainous situations of Stiria and Carinthia they might at least revenge the injury and in some sort preserve their honor by killing many of them who being disbanded were gone to pillage the Country It is commonly advantagious to advance towards the Confines of a State where the Passes are narrow and difficult either by the ruggedness of the situations or by reason of â—orts upon their Frontiers so as the Enemy may be by these advantages kept afar off But what was there in King Ferdinands States which could perswade him to take this course the Country being large open and where many Armies would not have been sufficient to have kept out an Army which was resolved to enter as these did But it may be said again that this was not a loss which would counterpoise as might very well have happened by reason of their own inconveniencies the breaking up of that Army whereon the defence of King Ferdinands States did relie and which was of so great a concernment to all Christendom And it may be also added that the further the Imperialists had advanced whereby they might the better have met with the Enemy and have fought him if they should not afterwards have done it their fear would have appeared to have been so much the greater and that they had repented to have proceeded so far whereby they should not only no have increased but have lessened the reputation of the force and worth of that Army But for what concerned their marching forward to encounter the Enemy with a resolution of giving him battel at his own home at which the Considerations made to the contrary do seem chiefly to aim it is business of so weighty and so numerous consequences as it deserves to be well examined It is a general Rule That it is requisite the Assailant should have greater Forces then he who is assailed or at least equal Forces And is there any one so blinded with desire as that he does not see the Imperialists disadvantage in this behalf Solyman brought with him an Army consisting of One hundred and forty thousand fighting men and almost as many men more for other Camp-occasions furnished with Artillery and all other Requisites for War an Army verst in Victories and which was then to fight in the sight of their Lord and Master a fortunate and valiant Prince and who are promised by their Law that whosoever dies fighting for his welfare and glory shall be eternally rewarded in heaven An opinion which hath much advantaged the Turkish affairs in point of War Entire obedience excellent military discipline patient undergoing all wants and great toil and labor are things whereunto the Turkish Armies are accustomed in vertue whereof it is and not by chance that they have had so many victories And it was the opinion of all men that these things did at this time
though in great parties to pillage the Enemâ—es Country the business not being any thing alike the Turks had the disadvantage of the Countries situation of being loaded with prey of being in disorder as commonly befals those who go to plunder not to fight and of other accidents But besides all this he who relates this business mentions not any baseness in the Turks but saies That notwithstanding these disadvantages they defended themselves generously to the utmost of their power But what did the same Solyman who cannot be denied to have been very valiant and greatly experienced in matter of War though he had all the advantages that have been mentioned he did not advance with his Army as near as as he might have done nor did endeavor to enforce others nor to be enforced himself to fight but rather went out of his direct way which he had taken to come to Vienna and kept for the most part in strong and commodious seats as between the two Rivers of Sava and Drava and iâ— a powerful and van glorious Prince who professed that he had undertaken that War meerly out of a desire of glory would make use of haesitatious counsels where the consequences were so great and so heavie how would it have becomed Charls a Prince no less wise then valiant and who was necessituted by many other important affairs of some other States of his to leave Germany suddenly as he did to have put himself upon the dubious events of Battel whereby to indanger almost his whole Fortune When Marius was sent against the Cymbrians who were faln down into Italy which was thought to be as considerable a War as any that the Romans had made the same circumstances concurring thereunto whereby to infuse terror as do now to make the Turkish Forces so formidable as crueltie barbarism the great number of the Enemy and the fame of the victories which they had won the wise Commander would not though many occasions had offered themselves and that he was taxed by the unexperienced of timerousness come to a pitch'd field with such an Enemy till for many moneths space he had kept the Army accustomed to the performance of duties and to Military actions and chiefly till he had acquainted them with the aspect of the Enemy and how to have the bettâ—r of them in light skirmishes which were not notwithstanding attempted but upon great advantage And if Caear used to prevent the Enemy and to be the first that should assault it is to be considered that he commanded a veteran Army of whom he had by long Wars had much experience So as the same example is not to be made use of in a new and tumultuous Army and of so different conditions But let us likewise consider what were the reasons which made these two Princes take up Arms for by the first rise of Wars the reason of their administration and the good means whereby to conduce them to a good end is best known The War was offensive on the Turks behalf undertaken with great surquedrie and with great hopes of victory and glory Solyman having propounded unto himself to revenge the injuries done by Ferdinand then King of Bohemia to Iohn King of Hungary who reigned under his Guardianship and protection But whether this was his true intention or no or but pretended that he might possess himself of the Kingdom of Hungary as afterwards he did it was most certain that he could not compass his end of beating the Forces of these two Austrian Brothers Charls and Ferdinand Caesar on the other side being usually distracted and busied as now in particular in other Wars had betaken himself to this to defend the assaults which were threatned his Brothers Territories as also the honor of his family or rather that of all Germany or to confine ones self to narrower bounds it may be said that this contention of War did paâ—ticularly concern the oppugning and the defence of the City of Vienna Soâ—yman who had formerly little to his honor been driven from before the walls of that City professed to return thither with greater Forces being firmly resolved to reduce it to his power and to challenge the Emperor to a pitch'd Battel Charls on the contrary having brought his Forces about that City had propounded unto himself the keeping of it and to frustrate this so great furie and boasting of Solymans Now then whilst Vienna was preserved and that she was kept free from all dangers and that Solyman was so curbed and frightned by the Imperialists Forces as that he duâ—st not advance or make good his word which he had publickly professed did not the Imperialists effect the business they had taken in hand without the effusion of blood Did they not preserve their own honor and do service to all Christendom If this Army as the success of Bittel is more uncertain and dubious then any whatsoever other humane action had received any noâ—able defeat when would this wound have ever been cured The afflicted body of Christendom must have its wounds long kept open and have still ulâ—â—cerated more and more How would Caesars particular Enemies have been encouraged to fall upon his Territories and to have endangered and molested his own particular affairs whilst he should have shewed courage enough but little good counsel in defending another mans right which did not immediately concern himself Had the Tâ—rks in former times been made retreat to their own Confines as now they were without having made any acquâ—sition they had not been masters of so many Christian Kingdoms as now they are And had their Forces proved still vain their Militia would have been imbased and they would have been discouraged from troubling others without any good to themselves which peradventure would have been the safest and securest way of weakning so great a power as that by temporizing affording them thereby occasion of growing idle and of falling into domestick disorders so as they might the more easily have received a blow and have been overcome both by cuning and force Nor will it avail to affirm the contrary as if the future dangers and troubles had been certainly to have happened or that they might have been made greater by a new commotion of War for it was more answerable to reason that when Solyman should have done his utmost with his whole Forces assisted by his own presence he would have suffered the Estates of Austria and of Germany to have remained quiet if King Ferdinand had rested content with his own Patrimonie and with the Kingdom of Bohemia together with the hopes of succeeding in the Empire without intricating himself in new troubles by obstinately maintaining his pretences to the Kingdom of Hungary drawing thereby the fury of the Turkish Forces upon him as he often did So as King Ferdinando and his Councellors are more to be blamed for those many mischiefs which ensued afterwards and for those which we are still threatned with by the so near neighborhood of
those which are commended and practised by those who walk in the waies of the world But how far different from these are Gods waies Patience Humility Poverty Obedience Self-denial and the giving over of all worldly care are things which are abhorr'd by the worldly wise but otherwise to God How badly do the fallacious rules of worldly wisdom agree with the instructions of true Christianitie especially those of this corrupt Age wherein heavenly and divine things are often troubled and confounded with a certain vain name of Reason of State Crowns Empires Kingdoms and all power is given by God and though the weakness of our reason be such as it cannot penetrate into the infinite abyss of his wisdom yet does he dispose and order all things with certain and infallible ends though unknown to us Therefore unless that great and omnipotent Lord God by whom Kings do not onely reign upon earth but the earth it self is sustained and held up with a miraculous equality of weight do not keep the City how vain is all this your learning O ye wise men of the world and you Princes how vain are all your Forces to maintain your Lordships and States Thou whosoever thou art who dost manage the weightiest affairs of Principalities put thy heart into the hands of thy God and he will infuse worthie and becomming thoughts into thee He will give thee true Wisdom and true Fortitude The World builds nothing but Towers of Babell nor is it aware thereof till its desigâ—s and many years labors being overthrown by its own confusion it sees its rashness laid low and those thoughts which aimed at Heaven thrown down to Hell But I return again unto my self I see that these many years past wherein I approach to old age I imploy my time in studies thoughts and imployments of differing natures in themselves but all conformable to what tends to my prejudice For they robb'd me of my rest have still oprest me with many cares and led me astray from more holy desires to which if I had bent my mind in time I might hope now to sit and feed at the Table of those true good things which now I want What do I then do What do I think What do I expect Why do I not change my thoughts and exercises if I know that those wherein I have hitherto spent my time do me no good nor for all the labor I have taken have made me ere a whit more happy then I was at first Nay I may say they have made me more wretched since I have consumed the greatest part of my life wofully and without any profit Do I peradventure hope that whilst I my self do not change the nature of those things wherein I am verst should alter That trouble should turn to delight That the Affairs of the world so full of anxious cares should turn to the peace and solace of the soul That worldly good shall assume a new vertue of makeing their possessors well apaid and satisfied That these brackish waters of the pleasures of the Age of which the more we drink the more we are athirst should become sweet and savory and afford any true delight or content Men who are blind in what concerns their own good are wont to pervert the nature of things to make them their Masters who are given to them to be servants Such are the goods of Fortune as the common people call them because they know not how to raise themselves up to the knowledge of that mystery whereby their supreme Author and free Donor doth dispense them But what greater misery is there then this humane felicity The true Lord and God is made known unto us and yet we continue to adore the Idols of Avarice Ambition and Vain glory Look but upon those huge â—eaps of â—uine which thou maist every day see in the City of Rome who was once the Queen of the World where are now her immense treasures Where the majesty of her Empire Where the pomp of so many Triumphs the memory of so many victories all these being made the prey of time and death 〈◊〉 buried in these ruines But thou who livest by other precepts and who hast a truer knowledge of thy eternal life and eternal death consider better what the nature of these goods are to which thou hast been sometimes â—arâ—ed with a less moderate affection by the torrent of continual custom If they be not of great worth as truly they are not why dost thou so much love them Why endeavorst thou so much to be master of them Why dost thou dread the loss of them so much And if they have any thing of good in them why dost thou not call to mind how soon thou art to forgo them How comes it to pass this our happie worldly man is not aware that if the increase of these goods could make him happy he makes himself miserable whilst through overmuch loving them he is more intent upon purchasing the little which he lacks then in injoyâ—ng the very much which he possesseth whilst the fear of loosing it doth continually molest his mind a greater vexation then which the soâ—l hath none because it hath no bounds We look upon their outside onely and are enamored of a certain handsome but vain appearance which is in them taking them for the guids of our life But if we would consider their infide and discover the deceipt and cousenage which is woven therein we would shun them as some holy men have done least we be by them and with them hurried down into Hell and damnation We have our happiness within us and seek for it elsewhere He who will search his own house well what wealth shall he find there whereby to inrich himself with precious treasure which is hidden from us because the darkness of our affections lead us astray If thy heart be fraught with pure â—houghts if thy soul be purged of all earthly passions so as the raiâ—s of that true and lively Sun which is alwaies reâ—dy to illuminate thee may penâ—trate thereinto thou shalt soon discover there jâ—wâ—ls of such vertue price and worth as thou maist thereby purchase the worlds peace and heavens glory Thou shalt find those affections which now rage tumuâ—tuously within thee become quiet and obedient to reason and those dissonant sounds which do so perturb thy mind will agree with so just proportion as they will make a sweet harmonie in thy soul and will prove a refreshing to the troubles of the world a figure of heavenly mâ—lodie and of the glory of Paradice O you Fathers you good and holy Fathers who being within your Closter live in peace and quiet fâ—r from the World and the cares thereof not onely in your person but in your very thoughts if there may be any affection found without affection and envy without sin I do assuredly envy in you those your leasure times wherein you givâ— your selves wholly to prayer and meditation an idleness which is
recieved so sore and so irreparable blows from the Barbarians it was brought to such weakness in the Eastern parts by reason of the many great disorders which were in the Head and in all the Members which were now become incureable â—s it was not able to sustain the force of the fierce and warlike Northern Nations And beginning once to fall when its worth was but little it could not get up again as it had done at other times Now if we will apply these more general considerations to some particular chances of this Empire the true cause of its declination will the more easily be known The Affairs of the Empire were almost at all times greatly molested by divers of the Northern People many of which were never reduced to the obedience of the Empire some of which had not been known till they took up Arms but of all the rest the Goths proved the most famous for the ruine of the Empire and for the so many calamities of Italy and of many other Nations and he who shall consider their beginnings and their progress must needs wonder very much and through confusion lose the discourse of humane wisdom To think how this barbarous people and so far remote from our Regions and unknown by them insomuch as at this day their original is not by Authors agreed upon without or Kingdom or Military Discipline falling down tumultuously at first to possess themselves of other mens Countries should soon become so powerful and formidable as that they should overcome the Romans who had overcome the world Who could have imagined that a new and unknown people were to come from forth the utmost Northern parts to destroy so vast an Empire by which so many powerful Kings and famous warlike Nations were subjected The most general opinion is That these men who destroyed the Empire came from Scythia into Europe where they were possest of many large Regions differing amongst themselves in name and habitation those who lived more towards the East being called Estern-Goths and others more Western-Goths But they were thought to be but new Inhabitants of that Country into which they were first come from certain Islands in the Sarmatian Ocean and that being worsted by some of their neighboring people after many contestations had with them their Country being moreover of two smal a circuit for their abounding numbers they betook themselves to seek out new seats and other habitations And thus they passed over very many times in very great numbers into the Provinces belonging to the Empire possessing and indamaging many Countries The things a little before mentioned being the cause why these evils and the greater ruines which ensued were not remedied For the Empire being of a very vast extent was continually troubled with sundry commotions in sundry parts The Princes who commanded were of little worth and the former antient valor and discipline was no longer found in their Armies which were given over to licentiousness Hence it was that whenin the time of Philip the first of that name but in order the Nine and twentieth Roman Emperor the Goths fixt themselves in Mysia and Thrace such forces were not sent against these novelties as might appease them and quell the then but small strength of these tumultuous people For there being no loyalty in the Commanders nor valor in the Soldiers those who were sent by the Empeor against such enemies intended their own particular interest more then the service of the Empire Insomuch as Macrinus and Decius being sent the one after the other to be chief of the enterprise made themselves be cried up Emperors by the Army having first permitted much licentiousness in the Soldiers that they might win their good will And when the same Decius was truly possest of the Empire after the death of Macrinus and of Philip also joyning battel with the Goths he found the effects of nourishing sedition in Armies and in winking at their disobedience and at the non-performance of their military duuties for his Army was routed and put to flight by the Goths and he seeking to save himself by running away was drowned in a marrish ground And when after these losses the Empire ought to have been restored and the honor thereof vindicated by the Successor with new Forces Gallus who had obtained this supream dignity by the Souldiers rashness and who was a poorly spirited man and had come by the Empire by indirect means That he might enjoy his leasure time in Rome which he leudly spent he was easily perswaded to make a shameful peace with the Goths not onely permitting them to â—arry in the Provinces which they were possessed of but obliging himself to pay them a certain sum of money yearly Thus the City of Rome which was Mistress of the whole World became tributary to a Barbarous people who knew not till then what belong'd to Imperial dignity to Wealth nor to Military glory This base Agreement gave a great blow to the reputation of the Roman Empire so as in Galienus his time who soon after succeeded in the Empire so many mutinies and insurrections arose as Italy it self was hardly kept in obedience and the Goths grew so insolent as breaking the Peace which they had made with the Gauls they took many Cities in Bythinia in Thrace and in Macedonia By which prosperous successes others of the Goths being encouraged who had tarried all this while at home where they lived in narrow precincts they sent to the Emperor Valens to demand abode in the Provinces of the Empire with whom fear prevailing more then the antient honor of the Empire and the Roman generosity gave way to their request allotting Bulgaria and Servia for these new Inhabitants to live in suffering the Northern Nations thus to get footing and to increase in strength which had always been the greatest Enemies to the Empire and from whom the Emperors had received such injuries and shame These easie acquisitions and the hopes of greater matters made Alaricus King of the Goths march not long after with a numerous Army from his own Kingdom towards Italy demanding that a place of residence might be allowed him by the Emperor Honorius in France and receiving a denial did in his fury do greater mischief But the same Emperor Valens soon felt the harm of this his ill-taken advice For the same Goths increasing through the baseness and negligence of others and the Huns Alani and other Northern people conspiring together with them they besieged the City of Constantinople and other noble Cities were endangered which made Gratianus choose Theodosius for his Companion in the Empire for the great repute which was had of his valor though he were a Spaniard by Nation But though he behaved himself gallantly against these Enemies and wan some brave victories yet since they had already got great strength and were governed in obedience under their valiant Masters and Commanders and for that the Empire was still busied in other Wars it was
thought expedient to come to peace with Alaricus King of the Goths leading him and a great number of his men under the Empires pay to make use of them in other undertakings For the Goths being kept in continual pay by some former Emperors amongst other Soldiers which served the Empire and being of themselves conversant in many Wars they were become a valiant People and had learn'd the Roman discipline though not the corruption which overthrew it in the Roman Camp Which though it might be good for the present occasions it did certainly prove very pernicious afterwards For though by this Peace Theodosius was safe from any fear of this Nation whilst he governed together with Gratianus and also afterwards when he held the Empire alone by himself he being a person of singular worth and one who by his industry had somewhat renewed the antient discipline amongst the Soldiers yet after his death the Forces of the Empire beginning again to flag and the Empire falling into the hands of his two sons Arcâ—dius and Honorius who succeeded their Father whilst they were but young and proved not to be of such gallant parts as the condition of those times required many of those who commanded under Theodosius in several parts rebelled who were all of them cryed up Emperors by those Armies wherein they commanded by which occasions being invited the Goths did not only return to rise up in Arms against the Empire but also other Northern Nations who did then inhabit Germany as the Alani Franks and Vandals took up Arms and did at one and the same time assault the States of the Empire in several parts many of them marching more particularly towards Italy and against the very City of Rome which after divers passages remained in prey to these Barbarians the antient Roman worth being so decayed as there was not any one who did so much as provide for the welfare of so stately a City which was the Queen of the World And the Emperor Honorius a thing which is not to be mentioned without much marvel whilst Italy and other Countries were wasted with War and the very City of Rome was reduced to the utmost extremity remained in Ravenna an idle Spectator of his Subjects so great calamity and of the ruine of his State in so base and stupid a manner as being told he might do well to provide for the preservation and safety of so many of the Empires Provinces which being miserably torn in pieces were falling into the power of the Barbarians answered That he could live without them After the ruine of Rome these victorious Barbarians past into France and into Spain where being recruited with other people of their own Nations and the Roman Armies being busied in Civil seditions and in maintaining those Emperors which each of them had chosen they had leisure to fix themselves there and to take possession of those noble Provinces the greatest part of whose antient Inhabitants being extinguished they setled themselves there and did long govern those Dominions and others of them passing into Africa and having won large Territories did with the same Fortune and same thoughts institute their proper Kingdoms But on the other part other People called the Huns fell into Pannonia called now by their names Hungaria and possessing themselves likewise thereof fixt their abode and dominion there So as there was hardly any Western Province of the Empire which was not at this time troubled by this fury of War the Roman Princes and Soldiers not having sufficient worth to withstand them Insomuch that when Attila marched with a furious Army to destroy Italy the Empire not having any Soldiers that they durst confide in to impede his passage the Romans were forced to take King Theodoricus with a good number of his Goths into their pay by whose assistance that cruel Enemy was at that time kept off But the Empires weak Forces being at last tyred and some Commanders being lost in whom there remained yet some worth and discipline the greater and almost fatal ruines of Italy began whereinto when these cruel Barbarians entred they put all to fire and sword bringing total destruction to many noble and populous Cities Which according to the natural order of all things mortal wherein Corruptio unius est generatio alterius gave occasion to the birth of the City of Venice whereunto the remainder of the Italian Nobility had recourse and saved themselves The Twelveth DISCOURSE Why thâ— Commonwealth of Rome though she suffered many Defeats in divers Battels yet did still prove Victorious at last HE who shall narrowly consider the great actions of the Romans will still discover new things therein not onely worthy of praise but of admiration Their prosperity was certainly very great but proceeding as it is to be beleeved from their worth and from certain and ordinary causes The People of Rome made more Wars then ever any Potentate hath been known to do but that which occasioneth the greatest wonder is that their success in all of them was prosperous And that though the Roman Armies were in many Battels overcome yet still in the conclusion of every War the Victories sided with them It will then be worth the while to seek out the truest or at least the most truth-like causes thereof by reasoning thereupon The City of Rome waged continual Wars from the first foundation thereof till Augustus his time which was for above Seven hundred years The gates of that famous Temple of Ianus which were never to be shut but in time of Peace stood always open unless it were once in the Consulship of Titus Manlius nor was there almost any Nation known in those daies with whom the City of Rome hath not at some time made trial of her forces and worth That Commonwealth in so many and so long contentions of War was likewise sometimes favored sometimes frowned upon by fortune so as sometimes she was brought into very great danger yet still she prevailed at last and triumphed over her formerly victorious enemies Long and heavy was the dispute which in her very beginning she had with so many people of Italy and chiefly with those that were nearest who singly by themselves and joyntly with others did conspire against the Romans and did by all their best endeavors seek how to keep the powea of the Empire low which was ordained as was afterwards seen to the height of all greatness Nor was the Commonwealth of Rome secure from the efforts of foreign Nations nay many times she was to withstand the fury of the French who assailed her with great Forces that they might totally subdue her and possess themselves of her Territories as they had done of so many other parts of Italy The Commonwealth made trial of her Forces even in the beginning of her greatness with other Kings till beginning with the first Carthaginian Wars to wage War further from her Confines she proved at last a terror even to the most remote foreign