Selected quad for the lemma: master_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
master_n	child_n	servant_n	wife_n	7,379	5	6.5654	4	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A43269	A sermon preached before the University of Oxford, December 4, 1687 concerning the obligation of oaths / by Henry Hellier.	Hellier, Henry, 1662?-1697.	1688 (1688)	Wing H1380; ESTC R25426	17,892	36

is due only to him Justice requires that we do not invade the rights and privileges of other men And therefore If a superior hath power of commanding our service in any matter we may not without his consent engage our selves in another that is inconsistent or if we do 't is still to be understood with this proviso as long as he gives us leave The power of a King cannot be limited by any oath of his subject or of a Father by that of his Child or of a Master by that of his Servant Thus in the 30 th of Numbers the vow of a woman being in her Fathers house in her youth is of no effect if her Father disallow her in the day that he heareth thereof and the vow of a wife is of no force if her husband disallow her in the day that he heareth thereof because it were absurd to think that they by swearing or vowing could limit their superiors power or give away that which was not at their own disposal If therefore any Superior by Statute hath reserved to himself or by his prerogative may claim or time out of mind hath had the disposal of any place or office by virtue of his own power then no inferiors oath can be of sufficient force and validity to prejudice that power But if there never were any such power or if that power were given away or if that Superior hath consented to Statutes and in them to oaths whereby men have sworn to certain things which are limitations of the said power then the matter of the oath being just and charitable and encouraged by a lawful Authority there being beside the inferiors oath the superiors own act there is perhaps scarce any pretence 0106 upon which such an oath can be accounted invalid or supposed to imply any father limitation And as an inferior cannot limit his superiors power by swearing so neither can a superior that of his inferior nor any man the rights of any man because it is still contrary to justice For the same reason of justice no one can invalidate an oath by swearing qaite contrary to what he swore before or to what he barely promised for a promise is a transferring of right from our selves to him who receives the promise we cannot therefore dispose otherwise of a thing that is so transferred or load it with other conditions then at first were made for in so doing we endeavour to give away that which is none of our own Also oaths contrary to Charity or Mercy or Humanity are void as if a man should swear not to give any thing to his Children not to alter his Will not to give Alms to the poor never to lend mony never to become surety for any man and afterwards reasonable and pious motives to do such actions do offer themselves it would be many times an uncharitable an unmercifull and inhumane practice to keep such kind of oaths And thus are we to determine in other cases of the like nature taking it always for granted that no oath can oblige any person to commit a sin or privilege him from keeping the Commandments of God according to that old rule Juramentum non potest esse vinculum iniquitatis A 3 d. case taken from the matter of the oath is when it hinders a greater good And here we are first of all to presume that a man was not by virtue of any precept obliged to that good for then this would be the same case with that which went immediately before and in the next place we may affirm that a man ought not to recede from his oath for the sake of doing a greater good for example if any swear to another that he will give him freely a summ of mony he must not afterwards bestow that on the poor upon pretence of doing a greater good because ●asw as said before a promise is a transferring of right and though to give alms be a virtuous action yet we are not allowed to take them out of other mens goods But what if in the 4 th place the matter be purely indifferent There can be here no occasion of difficulty except the matter be also of no moment And he is undoubtedly guilty of great irreverence towards God that will cite his name to a trifle But yet if any man be in such unhappy circumstances if he hath taken an unlawful oath to do an indifferent but not an unlawful thing he is obliged to perform according to what he hath sworn though the Schoolemen think not because the matter it self is but small yet when a man hath bound himself by an oath it becomes a great mattet and so much the greater crime it is to do contrary to such an oath by how much the easier it was to have made it good 5. If the matter of the oath be such as causeth a man to doubt whether it be lawful or no in that case say some juramentum valeat quantum valere potest For the reverence due to an oath he ought if he cannot be otherwise well convinced rather to perform according to that maxime in dubiis pars tutior As if first to swear to and afterwards to do an unlawful thing were not as great a crime as simply to break an oath A doubtful conscience is unfit for action and the best advice at such a time is that a man should use due diligence to informe and satisfy himself seeing God doth not require a duty of any man which he hath not provided methods for him to understand And so much for the cases which concern the matter of the oath 2. There are others relating to the person that swears And here whensoever we shall determine that an oath doth not bind 't will be for want of the persons rightly understanding that he made one If any one therefore swears that knows not what an oath is or is not doli capax either by reason of his years or because he is a natural fool or mad-man we cannot then suppose that he is obliged to rules If a man be disturbed with anger or overtaken with drink we are then to consider whether it were in so high a degree as to take away the use of his reason which if it plainly appear either from the temper of the man or from the gross absurdity of the matter then he is not bound but otherwise namely if the person understood what he was about and the matter be tolerably just and equall it is hard to allow his case to have been so bad as that he shall not be afterwards obliged to perform And much after this way should we answer in the case of fear or any other passion For it is a principle of very ill consequence to hold that oaths and promises are of no force which are extorted by fear though it be limited as Civilianus will have it to fear that may fall in constantem virum For suppose a man justly condemned to dye should offer