doe some things contained in his instructions and that the businesse is not subiect to delay hee shall import it to two or three of the most vnderstanding Seruants that his Maister hath if happily there be any in the Countrey where he resides to the end that the businesse succeeding ill he may auoyd the reproach to haue done it alone and without Couâ—cell There are certaine things that are subiect to disauow as proud insolent words which an Embassadour might haue vsed or threats and practises which he attempts in the Estate where he resides if it be without command And therefore he must containe hinselfe within the termes of his charge and the modestie that is required It is fitting he should maintaine the Dignity of his Maiâ—ter But it must be without contempt or offence to him towards whom he issent And to the end he may discouer all the passages in an Estate hee must be frequent and daily in Court but when as the Prince retires himselfe priuatly for his pleasures For then he should make himselfe suspect or importune And in popular Estates he must assist all dyets meetings and assemblies Or if he sees that this may breed some contempt hee should send some one of his Besides money which discouers the secrets of Princes the entertainment of his Table is ofsome force And although that all the intelligences which come from this sort of people which follow Tables be not alwaies current Yet sometimes he shall meete with good ones Wherefore he must waigh them and attend the progresse and issue before hee Iudge of them and obserue not onely what is sayd but what is done He must for this effect write often and to many parts to the end he may be the better aduertised and neuer respect the charge which cannot be better imployed He must visit the principall Councellors the Secretaries of Estate and amongst others him who hath the diuision of Forraigne affaires he shall doe the like to those which are in credit and fauour with the Prince although but of meane condition applying himselfe in some sort to the custome and manners of the Countrey and how others haue done before him Hee shall informe himselfe discreetly of the present Estate of the Court and how euery Man stands in authority wherein this authority consists eyther in reputation and honour or in effect and contention euery one according to his rancke and degree winning vnto him if he may the domestiques and fauorities of those which haue authority Hauing newes from all parts he shall still find occasions to discourse and parley with the Princes and great men with pleasing subiects to be merry with them or if they be otherwise and concerne them to condole or to aduise them to preuent it He must visite the Embassadours and Agents of other Princes and Common-weales which reside in the same Court but soberly lest he giue them occasion of iealousie Hee must be wary not to discouer himselfe wholy vnto them whatsouer they be but rather seeke to draw from them then to leaue any thing of his owne to the end he may alwayes be the first to send the aduice and pleasing newes And if the affaires which he pursues succeedes not according to his desire hee shall make no shew of it nor seeme to haue any distrust or bad opinion of the Prince and others with whom hee negotiates When he shall be intreated to doe them any courtesie he shall study to value it at as high a rate as may be yet he must doe it speedily and freely letting them know that he desires aboue all things to giue them contentment and satisfaction He shall commend and magnifie the persons the meanes the greatnesse the Countrey the Lawes the manner of liuing and whatsoeuer concernes the Nation yet with such modesty and discretion as there may be no shew of flattery He shall likewise extoll the affaires of his Master with the like modesty and dexterity to the end they may not grow iealous of him When he shall finde some stop in that which he desires to doe hee shall not insist too eagerly vpon it although he had an apparent reason But he shall with dexterity approue the reasons in part and by other meanes seeke to attaine his Designe When it shall be needefull to doe or say any thing contrary to their will or liking he shall excuse it in such sort as they shall conceiue that it proceeds not from the Embassadour but from such as command him and that hee is sorâ—y tâ— doe it considering it doth not please him yet â—ustifying the businesse by the best reasons he may and giuing them some hope of other things which shall be pleasing vnto them If they charge him to carry bad and distastefull words he shall doe better to cause them to giue them in writing rather then to pronounce the words And if he findes that by one meanes he cannot obtaine what he desires hee shall leaue the businesse for a time and referre it to some other occasion which he shall finde they desire of him or shall haue neede of something and then with dexterity he shall renew his demand and so perswade them with grace and mildnesse When he iâ—to obtaine any thing of importance he shall lose no time to cause it to be dispatcht but shall sollicite the expedition yet with mildnesse and modesty And if it conâ—sts in a promise for the future he shall cause them to set it downe in writing and contrariwise he shall be carefull not to oblige himselfe nor his Master but as late as seldome as may be Intreating and contracting he must cause the treaty to be set downe in plaine termes not ambiguous nor captious according to the termes and clauses of precedent treaties It is certaine that refusing flatly or making a business full of difficulties they offend him whom they refuse Therefore an Embassadour not able to grant that which they demand of him he must eyther giue them other Counsell and direction to attaine to that which they desire or he shall testifie his good-will by other gracious effects and honest speeches which may palliate the deniall An honest man such as he ought to be that executes this charge must not be found a Lyer especially in matters of importance for that there is nothing doth make him lose his credit more He must therefore be wary not to deliuer doubtfull things for certaine nor trust wholy to the word and report of others But hee must alledge his Authour or else say that he had learned it from a good place when he shall not dare to name the person He shall doe the like for things which concerne his Master the which he must deliuer on his behalfe When they are such as there is no great certainty or else may receiue a change he must deliuer them with all discretion and stayednesse lest he be reproached that they are circumuented by this meanes And if it should happen that he could not
condition out of which they will likewise by Lot draw one or two to aduance them to some Office The Lot and choyce concurres together diuersly For either they choose a certaine number by voices out of which afterwards they desire to draw one to bee an Officer or hauing drawne many by Lot they giue them power to choose one amongst them which is held most capable In this difference it is to be obserued that the discontent of those which are not chosen is the lesse when the Lot proceeds the choyce then when the choyce goes before the Lot Wherefore in places whereas hatred is irreconcilliable it were better to make vse of this last kind then of the first Let vs now see what time Officers ought to remaine in the exercise of their charges This is diuersly obserued In some Estates they continue them during life In others they are limmited to a certaine time In some for a yeere in others for two and in others although they were continued in their places during life yet being many in the same charge they made them serue alternatiuely one after another They which haue beene of opinion to make Officers temporary and not to continue them during life had for their principall consideration to abate the insolence and pride which a long command brought with it as also to haue meanes to call Officers to an Accompt hauing giuen ouer their charges fearing they should not bee able to draw them so easily being still in authority In like manner to preuent the impunity of those which had transgressed in their Offices To make many pertakers of the Estate not onely to satisfie the ambitious to cut off discontments but also to recompence many good men to make more capable of affairs to stir them vp to the care of the publique Some also haue beene of this opinion to hinder that the gouernment might not bee vsurped by few men who would make the rest subiect hauing beene often seene by many examples that the continuance of command hath made vsurpations easie not onely vpon popular estates but also in principalities and seignouries the Offices and charges for life hauing beene made hereditary and patrimonicall in many estates They which would perpetuate them haue had other consideration For that making the Magistrates Annall or for a short time they leaue their Offices before they are informed of their duties so as the Estate falls alwayes into the hands of vncapable men and by these suddaine and frequent changes most part of affaires remaine vndecided Warrs begunne left vnperfit Suits and differences laid by and punishments and executions delayed There is another consideration which is that the time being short the Merchants study to doe their businesse speedily and this change brings nothing but new starued hors-leaches which must be filled whereas they which are already full by their offices might giue more ease vnto the people And as from new seruants growes the enuie of Families so from new Magistrates proceeds the fall of Estates which bring new Councells new designes new Lawes new Customes new Edicts new kinds of liuing and new Iudgements Tiberius to withdraw the greate men of Rome from the knowledge of publique affaires and to assure those the more whom he imployed in Offices hee continued them during life Wherefore to auoid the greatest part of the inconueniences which are found in either party you must consider the forme of the Estate and the humour of the subiects Popular Estates are maintained by the continuall change of Magistrates to the end that euery one according to his qualitie may haue his part as they haue in a soueraigntie and that equallitie the nurse of a popular Estate may be the better entertayned by the annual succession of Magistrates least that the custome of commaunding long should cause some one to desire to seaze vpon the Soueraignty the which is a consideration which they ought to haue in Seignouries and Estates gouerned by few persons In Principallities it is not needfull to teach Subiects to Command but to obay And being necessary to retayne them in their duties they cannot assure themselues but of few to maintayne the rest Yet to preuent that the continuance of a great charge should not make some one dream of the vsurpation of the Estate they may in continuing other Officers in their places ballance the power of great men in giuing them companions as great as themselues or after the expiration of some time to cause them to passe from one charge to another which hath more honour but lesse power Wherfore some haue held it fit to distinguish the charges whereon the force depends from those to whom they wil giue authority and to make others aboue them who shall haue more honour then authority or power This course is obserued by the Pope and the Seignoury of Venice The gouernments depending on the Church the authority is giuen to a Clergy-man for the gouernment but the force is committed to another who depends immediatly on the Pope yet hauing charge in that which shal concerne the gouernment to assist the resolutions of him that hath the authority In gouernments depending on the Seignoury of Venice a Gentleman of the Common-weale commaunds and for the Forces a Captayne of the Seignoury who hath charge to assist him But in neyther of these Estates the Gouernour and he which commands the Forces are not linckt together as the one would fauour the vsurpation of his Companion For as the Gouernour would not allow of his vsurpation that commaunds the Forces for that it cannot be done but against his authority so he cannot expect and assistance from him fearing that hauing made this ouerture and the other making shew to yeeld vnto it being Master of the forces the authority of the Estate and gouernour being weakned by this enterprize he would chase him away and make himselfe Master of the gouernment And these charges being not the most honourable in an Estate but there being others more eminent those which enioy them ayming at the honour of the others study not to settle themselues there but contrariwise some affect to be made Cardinals and to be drawne from those places and the others to attaine vnto the chiefe Offices of the Seignoury Kings who haue but one sort of people to imploy in gouernments make vse of other meanes some make gouernments triennall and not onely the gouernments of Prouinces but also of Cittadels and Forts causing that these depend not on the others but in certaine things and accompany the Gouernour with forces which are not particularly at their deuotion but onely â—o farre forth as the Gouernours shall contayne themselues in the Princes seruice But if the Gouernours cannot be changed they may change the forces which ought to assist them But forasmuch as the Prince ought to be Master and dispose freely of great places it seemes that hee might giue them for a certayne
well excuse a contrariety yet he must couer and disguise it with some pretext in regard of his Master by all meanes possible and for himselfe likewise purging and iustifying himselfe that he had neuer any intent to doe a bad office nor to make a bad report nor to be authour and instrument of deceit The which must take place when he is constrained either through the necessity of affaires or by the commandement of his Master to deliuer one thing for another The which hee may not doe often lest he lose all his credit But it sometimes falls out an Embassadour lies without thinking of it For that when one Prince meanes to deceiue another he first deceiues the Embassadour whom hee sends to the end that deliuering that which he holds to be his Masters intention his reasons may be more forcible assuring that which he speaks more boldly hauing lesse intention and assurance of that which is dissembled Wherein the Embassadour is not onely excusable but worthy of pitty in that they are distrustfull of him and meane to make him carry the Bable and to serue as an instrument of deceipt Moreouer he must not rely too much on those with whom he negotiates neither yet wholly despaire for those things which happen for that affaires change easily and affections likewise according to occurrents And many times that which seemed impossible at one time growes easie afterwards and so the contrary But one of the principall points whereof and Embassadour takes care is to maintaine the ranke and dignitie of his Master especially with the Embassadours of other Princes For Princes doe not subsist but by the greatnes and opinion they haue of them It argues a conteÌ„pt if their ranke be contested and an Embassadour must must rather loose himselfe then quit any thingâ— And if the Prince with whom he remaines fauours him that makes the attempt after that he hath made instance to be maintayned in his ranke he ought to retire And for this point it is vsually obserued in many places among Embassadours that they which come first goe to visite those which came last although that the first commer goe before them in ranke Let vs come to the priuiledges which the Embassadours haue in a strange Countrey The principall is that by the Law of Nations they are inuiolable that is to say in all freedome and safety But it is in their Countrey to whom they are sent For that if they passe through the Countrey of one that is Enemy to their Master although allied to the Prince to whom they are sent yet it would be necessary to take this pasport being not in that regard respected as an Embassadour if he practiseth any thing against the Estate or the Princes person with whom he resides For hee cannot defend himselfe by the Law of Nations And wee must not doubt but hauing violated his Faith first wherein the Law of Nations doth chiefly consist but the Prince neare whom he remaines and against whom he hath attempted may cause him to be punished Yet for that it may be that the commandement to attempt proceedes from the Master and that punishing the Embassadour it were to fall vpon the stone and not on the Arme that cast it Some Princes haue vsed it more discreetly contentâ—â—g themselues to seaze vpon these vndertakers expecting â—he avow or disavow of the Master And being vnable to draw eyther of them from him to presuppose a confession and then send them to their Master Moreouer if the Embassadour commits any priuate outrage against one of the Princes Subiects with whom he resides vnlesse it be to defend the dignity of his charge or of his Master many haue held him iustifiable before the Prince where he liues For there is a great difference betwixt the Dignity and Authority of a Prince in the Countrey of another Soueraigne Hee may well retaine his Dignity but not his Authority But the most safe and the more seemely were before he doe reason to the party to demand it from his Master who in that case would not deny it him so soone as in matters of Estate and it is a meanes to free the Prince from slander of Iniustice towards the Ministers of another Prince As for his Domestickes there is no doubt but they may be punished if they doe ill And if they or any other hauing sayled retire into the Embassadors house he may be summoned to yeeld them and to suffer Iustice to search his house Otherwise after this deniall the Iustice may doe it for that the house of an Embassadour ought not to serue for a retreat and Sanctuary to the wicked Yet this search may not be done by simple Sâ—rgeants no more then the Summons But it must be executed by the Iudge of greatest Authority in the place accompanied with men of honour with excuses intreaties and courteous words as well to testifie the respect which they beare to the Dignity of the Embassadours Master as to preuent the insolency and indiscretion which doevsually accompany Archers Sergeants and such other sorts of Ministers But in stead of punishing the Domestickes of an Embassadour after they haue made their processe vnto condemnation and caused the Ciuill party to be satisfied some haue pardoned them in his fauour whose Subiects they are sending them backe with the processe Or if there be no such intelligence betwixt the two Princes as the one will not be beholding to his cópanion they may procure some common Ally vnder-hand to make the demand To whom the Prisoners being deliuered he may send them to the Prince whose Subiects they are Some Embassadours haue perswaded themselues that they had all iurisdiction ouer their Domestickes euen to put some to death But this is not grounded vpon a reason if the Prince with whom he resides doth not giue him leaue as they say the Turke tollerates it with the Embassadours of Christian Princes Yet they may detaine those Prisoners in their house which practise against the seruice of their Master vntill they haue aduertised him and receiue an answer prouided that they whom they detaine be not admitted as Embassadours by the Prince or Estate where they are For in that case they are in freedome and safety Behold how Embassadors ought to gouern themselues with strangers in a strang CouÌ„try We must now see being in those charges how they ought to carry theÌ„selues to their Masters to whom they serue as eyes and eares Some haue held that an Embassadour ought to giue aduice to his Master of all that is spoken indiscreetly against him for that the aduertisment may come from some other then from his Embassadour who in such things ought to be carefull not to be preuented wherein we cannot giue any certaine Rules Yet if the word hath escaped either in â—hoâ—ler or from a passionate spirit were it the Prince himselfe being not spoken publiquely it were more discreetly done to conceale it from his Master then to deliuer it For the Master
in the which absolute commaunds are supported by force It may likewise be sayd that a Principallity is maintayned better in a great Estate consisting of persons of diuers qualities and a small Estate is more fitting for a Seignoury or popular Gouernment for that in a great Estate being necessary to trayne vp the Subiects to Armes to defend it it fals out vsually that he which is master of the Forces makes himselfe likewise master of the Estate as it hath hapâ—ed at Rome and in many other Common-weales Contrariwise a Prince in a small Estate is many times forâ—ed to become a Tyrant and so much the greater and sâ—uerer Tyrant as the extent of his Tyranny that is to say of his Country is the lesse hauing no meanes to draw from his Subiects without great oppression so much mony as he shall haue need of for his defence to the which all his Subiects would contribute willingly their persons and meanes if they were reduced to a republique or popular Estate CHAP. 6. Of the dependance of Estates one of another THe forme of Estates is diuers according to the dependance of those which commaund For although we treate onely of Estates that haue all soueraignty ouer their Subiects yet there are which depend in some sort of another and others which doe not hold as they say but of God and their Swords hauing no dependance of any man Estates depend of another by tribute duty honour protection or pension By tribute when as besides the tribute which they owe to some other Soueraignes the other markes of Soueraignty remaine By duty when according to some obligation they owe succours to some one be it in money or men By honour when as some Soueraigne owes fealty and homage to another yet with out preiudizing the other rights of Soueraignty By protection when as some one hath put himselfe into the protection of another to defend him whereby he is sayd to depend on his protector As for a Pensioner he seemes to depend no more of him that giues the pension nor to be inferiour to him then the other is to him For although he seemes inferiour receiuing the pension yet the other in giuing it makes shew that hâ— hath neede of his succours And when as Hâ—norius treated with the Gots and made them his pensioners Lampadias opposing himselfe sayd that it was a paction of Seruitude by the which they made the Emperour tributary to the Gots Yet I hold that this ought to be iudged by the quality and power of the Estates and by the particular conâ—entions For the succours may be so great in regard of the pension as we might easily discerne who had the aduantage in this treaty and in like manner if there were any necessity in the one to doe that which they had stipulated from him and that what they desired of another were left to his free will wherevpon knowledge of the cause the first shall be inferiour to the last The markes of Soueraignty which remaine not withstanding these dependances are to giue a law to all in generall and to all in particular without the consent of any that are greater equall or inferiour To institute the principall Officers to make leuies of money and men to dispose of the principall affaires not yeelding an accompâ— to any man to giue pardon to condemned persons aboue the rigour of the Law To iudge definitiuely and without appeale to hold this power of himselfe and from no superiour To declare Warre and treate of Peace to dispose of the Treasure to coyne Money to cast Attillery to build Fortresses and such like CHAP. 7. Of the forme of Estates according to the right of those which commaund them THe forme of Estates is likewise diuers in regard of the right of such as commaund and accordingly their commaund is called lawfull or vnlawfull as well iâ— a Principality Seignoury as a popular Gouernment The lawfull is that which belongs vnto vs be it by the bounty of him which hath power to giue it or by a iust conquest or else that wâ—ich is deferâ—â—d by the Lawes the which hath eyther followed Succession Election or Lots The Lot is more proper for a popular Gouernment for that all things are equall and they seldome make vse of it in the Gouernment of a Principallity or a Seigâ—oury Yet Saul was made King by Lot And Alexanders Successours after his death diuided his Empire by Lot At Venice they draw them by Lots which are to choose the principall Magistrates But such establishments are not ordinary Succession and Election are the most ordinary meanes to attayne vnto a Principallity and Seignoury wâ—ereof it is necessary â—o know the aduantages and inconueniences which we may hope for or feare CHAP. 8. Aduantages and disaduantages of an Election in a Principallity THe Election in a Monarchy or Principallity is dangerous for the miseries which the interim or vacanâ—y doth vsually breed whilest they are about to choose a King the Estate remayning in an Anarchy without Lord or Gouernour Like vnto a Ship without a Pylot which owes his shipwracke to the first Wind. For in the meanetime Theeues and Robers vpon hope to obtayne their pardon from the new King commit a thousand Villanies as is often seene the See being voyd at Rome or as in Poland so as the punishment ought to be doubled for the excesse which is committed during that time Besides this in the pursuit of the Election you see many factions whereof the least is sufficient to â—uine the Estate the which not able to be reconciled they frame parties which delay the Election and continue the intâ—reigne with the disorders which accompany it But if eyther party choose whom they thinke good then growes a Ciuill Warre which continues long after This hath bin seene in the Election of Popes and Emperours and the Empire hath bin voyd eighteene yeares after that William Earle of Holland had bin slâ—ine For although â—hat Alphonso the tenth King of Spaine were chosen yet he refused this quality for tâ—e apparent danger to take the charge of aâ— Estate exposed to the will of Subiects to the enuy of Princes and to the violence of the stranger And in the meane time the wicked exceeded in all villany Moreouer in the Election an ouerture being made of many if they fall to force the most cunning and rash would carry it and the most vertuous would not hazard themselues If they make themselues Competitors and will containe themselues within the ordinary bounds he shall neuer be chosen against the hot pursuit of others who at need know well how to free themselues And be the Election made of one of the Country or of a stranger yet there are great inconueniences of either side Among those of the same Country there wil be alwaies icalousie and the one will neuer obay the other And although they be not all equall in Wealth and Vertue yet they will still presume themselues to
follow the debts which I place next to the necessary charges for the safety For that if by the meanes of these charges the Estate be not secure the debts cannot be assured After these come Recompences with which they shall not charge the Treasure as little as may be for the which the King must bestow Offices and Dignities and accustome all the great Men not to seeke any other kind of Recompence which is of most share and more durable then that which is made by money For a Prince which aduanceth some one to honâ—r that hath done him seruice he publisheth the merrit of him whom he recompenceth and his fauour withall the which remaines continually in the mind of him that receiues it And it lasts as long in the minds of the people as they see him who hath receiued it in this degree And moreouer the remembrance which they haue to haue seene a Man gratified for his merrit many by this meanes are inuited to serue seeing seruices so honorably rewarded whereas to recompence in money few know it and the grace many times continues no longer then the money lasteth The Prince may likewise recompence his seruants to the discharge of his Treasure in procuring eyther for them or theirs marriages and alliances of aduantage Not thereby to force his Subiects for that were tiranny But he that sees himselfe debarred of the Princes fauour is glad sometimes to approach by the meanes of the alliance of one that is in grace with his Master though otherwise inferiour in meanes and family Especially when the inequallity is not such as hee may receiue some dishonor by the alliance Knowing then how to husband these kind of recompences the greatest part of great seruices will be rewarded and recompences of small seruices will be of so little moment as they will not greatly charge the Treasure After recompences follow gifts the which must not be done at pleasure But as recompences are made for seruices done gifts must likewise be for seruices according to the quality and impoâ—tance thereof as also to the quallity sufficiencie and power of the person the Prince must moderate his bounty and giue not to one alone but to many little and often I say to many for that in giuing to one alone the enuy is great the grace little and the ingratitude of him that receâ—ues may one day be hurtfull I say little and often especially in money which is soone consumed for that the great expence in gifts wast the Treasure and accustome those that receiue them to moderate demâ—unds Small bounties often reitterated are as it were insensible the grace is the more durable in the minds of those which receiue them and the desire and hope in continuing the seruice to receiue daily bind Men the more I except the gifts that are made to Embassadours and Forraigne Princes the which are done for reputation and to shew the magnificence of him that giues them or of his Estate and may in no sort bee omitted where they haue beene accustomed The expence which followes is that which hath beene propounded by some for the breeding vp and instructing of youth to that whereunto they shall be found fit especially the poore as we haue formerly sayd by the Erecting of publique houses for manuall Arts and all sorts of manufactures Whereunto may bee added the building of Seminaries for piety and the study of Diuinity and other learned vocations and some for the excercises of honor and vertue of the Nobility In many Estates they haue prouided a great number of Seminaries for piety and the sciences but the greatest are so ill gouerned as they are become vnprofitable by the disorder which is found in them As for Seminaries of honor and vertue I meane those places which are destinated for the instruction of the Nobility which are to be imployed in Armes in long and dangerous voyages and in the mannaging of publique affaires Whereof hitherto they haue made small accompt And yet the safety and reputation of an Estate especially of a principallity consists in those of this condition Who if with that greatnesse of courage which is not naturall vnto them they ioyne industry and prudence which may be gotten by exercises and instructions fit for their profession there is no doubt but many would haue beene more capable to serue the publique then they are It were a great Art both of pollicy and wisedome if the Prince should cause the young Gentlemen of his Estate to be bred vp in those places whose Fathers haue not the meanes to vndergoe the charge of such an instruction as is necessary for them of this condition And there to entertaine theÌ„ at the charge of the publique vnto a certaine Age to â—e distributed do seruice in the troups and garissons affecting câ—â—taine places of honor vnto them with suffiâ—â—â—â—â—â—â—tertaâ—ment to the which they may bee adâ—aâ—ced aâ—â—r they haue seâ—ued some time For besides that these Mâ—n gouerning all the affaires of the Prince they would be more faithfull vnto him The Gentlemen who find themselues burthened with many children and who for feare to leaue them miserable become house-doues to husband both their liues and goods would hazard the one and the other freely for the Princes seruice and not be diuerted for the care of their Children whom they knew could not one day faile of preferment aswell by reason of the institution as for the beginning of imployment for the Princes seruice which should bee assured vnto them And the charge which should be made in these Seminaries would be recompenced by the seruice which the whole Nobility would bee thereby inuited to do willingly and freely to the publique And the troupes especially those of Foote would bee found with more order discipline fidellity and courage being filled with young Men of good houses bred vp with honour and obedience then they now are being for the most part Men of no moment Ryotous and drawne together from all parts After all these expences come those which may serue eyther for the commodity or the decoration of Townes and Prouinces as conduits of Water structure of Bridges repairation of wayes Churches Royall Pallaces Pyramides Tombs Statues Collosses and other publique buildings But with this restraint neuer to enter into those expenses vntill the sparing of the soÌ„me which is necessry be first made For to multiply the Subsedies to make Pallaces more stately then necessary were to leaue a remembrance of his tyranny aad a perpetuall testimony to posterity that they haue built with the blood of the Subiects Behold the principall husbandry which consists in the order of the expence But the stocke of the Treasure being not sufficient to beare all these charges most part of which seeme necessary they must seeke the meanes to raise the Farmes and fall to the cutting off of debts especially of interests of Fees and of excessiue gifts rather then to come as
French King on the one side and the sayd Arch-Duke on the other as procurator for the Kings of Spaine And that they themselues had likewise sworne vpon the holy Euangelist and the Crucifix to confirme whatsoeuer he should doe yet vnder diuers precepts forbare to ratifie it to the end that the longer the French King should remaine in this su pence the longer hee would stay to make his preparations to succour his Men who for want of releife hauing bin forced to abandon the countrey the said Kings of Spaine Notwithstanding their solemne Oath would heare no more speech of ratifying the treaty made by his Sonne in law From all these examples we may gather that during a treaty wee must watch more carefully and make our selues the stronger not onely to frustrate our Enemies of all hope to surprize vs but to the end that the consideration of our forces may make vs obtaine conditions of more aduantage And wee must not hold a treaty firme and concluded vnlesse it be ratified by the Prince with whom we treate especially if the treaty be made with a Prince whom they detayne Prisoner For the force by the which he hath beene constrayned to promise will alwayes dispence him to re-aduise himselfe Pope Clement the Seuenth refused to ratifie the Conditions which the Duke of Ferrara when the sayd Pope was a Prisoner saying that it was an vnworthy thing that a man in life should approue of that which had beene done in his Name whilest he was dead And King Francis the first excused himselfe to accomplish the treaty of Madrid vppon the inhumanity which Charles the fift vsed towards him to extort from him the Cessions which he made All which tooke not place although the King had giuen his Children in hostage As in the parlies of Princes the place where the enter-view is to be made is very considerable So is it in treaties of peace which are made by Deputies If it be to choose a League there must be a conuenient place not too farre from the confederates to the end they may haue a more speedier answere of the difficulties that may happen When as the Kings of France and England were to treate a League with the Princes of Italy they resolued to treate in France to be the nearer to England Pope Iulio the second meaning to treate with the Emperour and the French King desired that the Embassadours should come to Rome to the end hee might gaine the Emperours Minister by kinde vsage promises and benefits to perswade his Maister to dis-vnite himselfe from the French King The which he of Francâ— refused to doe being neyther reasonable nor honorable to treate a peace in the house of his Enemy how great soeuer he were So as the vsuall course is to choose a neuter place But the question is if an Embassadour hauing agreed to goe vnto the Prince with whom he is to treate whether the Prince be bound to treate with the Embassadour himselfe Or depute some of his Councell for that effect This last manner of proceeding is the most vsuall as wel to preserue the dignity of the Prince which cannot bee maintayned amidst the contestations which happen in conferences as for that Princes are vsually little practised in such negotiations And the example of the Bishop of Gurgia is not therein to be followed who going to Pope Iulio the second vpon his request to treate with him and the sayd Pope hauing deputed three Cardinals to that effect he deputed three Gentlemen to conferre with them excusing himselfe vpon other affaires For therein the sayd Bishop carryed himselfe not as a simple Embassadour but as Lieutenant to the Emperour to the which quality he had beene receiued at Rome by the Pope The Deputies being assembled their seats are considerable they hauing no power to quit any thing of the ranke which their Maisters ought to hold The first place is at the head or end of the Table if there be one The second is the first on the righthand and the third is the first on the left hand of him that is at the end And if there be many Deputies to one Prince they vsually sit all on one side to haue the more facility to conferre together if it be needfull The seates being resolued the Deputies are to see the Commissions of eyther side and to consider of them For that from thence doth grow the assurance which they may haue of the proceeding of the treaty there being Commissions so generall and so ambiguous as thereby they may easily iudge that he which hath giuen such to his Deputies hath no will to conclude any thing for that vnder these ambiguous and generall termes he hath a desire afterwards to ground a new breach Some desiring to deferre the conclusion of a treaty whereof the motion seemed reasonable on eyther side they haue concluded in requiring the Prince of the contrary paâ—ty to consent vnto them before they ratifie it The which Pope Iuliâ— the second did seeing himselfe prest by the Cardinals to make a peace with Lewis the twelfth who propounded certaine Articles of an Accord vnto him whereupon the gaue Commission to the Cardinall of Final and to the Bishop of Tiuolly to transport themselues to the French Court and there to treate promising to ratifie the sayd Articles which had beene propounded vnto him if the King consented But he neyther gaue them Commission nor power to conclude them hauing no will but to gaine time and to frustrate the instance which the Consistory made vnto him for this pacification As for the clauses of treaties there can be nothing certaine prescribed this depending of the differences for the which the treaties are made the which are infinite be it for peace or truce for the restitution of that which they pretend to haue beene vniustly taken from them or for the Cession of rights or else for limits and bounds the which if they cannot regulate they put them in sequestration or suspence or they make some Act which may interrupt the prescription of him that holds them or else for a passage with consignation of hostages or of Forts for the assurance Or else for an offensiue or defensiuâ— league or for neutrality whereof I will treate hereafter But the principall considerations we must haue are not to vse nor to speake for a person which is odious to them with whom we treate not to yeeld to the first demaunds though iust but to resist them stoutly And yet if the danger be emment wee must not study so much to Negotiate with aduantage as to prouide for safety And especially to haue a care that the clauses may not be Equiuocall and of a double vnderstanding or so generall and indefinit as they may breed a doubt in the interpretation of the treaty The Spaniards are Masters in such practises Isabelle of Castille and Ferdinand of Aragon circumuented Charles the eight when hee restored vnto them
incline to that party where there is more honesty and Iustice. For although it miscarries yet we shall alwayes haue a satisfaction remaining in vs and a glory outwardly and to haue chosen the best Besides no man knowes what might haue happened if wee had chosen tâ—e contrary party Finally if wee doubt which is the best or shortest way Wee must hold the straâ—ghtest We must not in difficult affaires diue into all sorts of inconueniences not in accords and treaties trouble our selues wiâ—h nice poynts which grow vsually in treating But wee must looke to the maine and to assurances I mâ—ght adde hereâ—nâ—o an infinite number of other rules the which might â—eâ—ue a Prince to make him to be held Prudent in practising them Yet I doe not hold that in mattâ—r of State hee should so tye himselfe to rules and maximes as he should not peâ—ze and waigh the circumstaâ—ces and particularities of affaires For hee may encounter with such a circumstance as he shall be forced to take a resolution contrary to maximes But the greatest sigâ—e of pâ—udence in a Prince is to be secret Otherwise he should betray himselfe and none of his resolâ—tioâ—s would succeed CHAP. 8. Of Cunning or Pollicy ANd for that they make two sorts of prudence the one which is guided by the ordinary maximes of honesty and Iustiâ—e and the other which consists moâ—e in surprizes and deceipt which they call cunning Many haue doubted whether it were expedient for a Princes reputaâ—ion to make vse of this last Wherein I wiâ—l speake my opinion here but I will deliuer that of one of our time who hath written vpon this subiect Who holds that Fraud Cunning and Deceipt if they be without vice or wickednesse may bee allowed vâ—to a Prince for the Pubâ—ique good and for his defence and preseruation but not to offend any man It is his duty to procure the Publique good and the health of the people â—his is the foueraigne Law by the which the Prince ought to gouerne all his actioâ—s Wicked men should haue too much aduantage if by cuâ—ning they migâ—t not repell their cunning It is lawâ—ulâ— to â—â—â—eâ—d aâ— Estate with the same Armes with the which they aâ—â—aile it It is not tollerable to turne the backe to honesty and â—ustice but sometimes to gâ—e about it and coast it But the more distinctly to explicate this we will borrow the distiâ—ction which he makes of diuers sorts of cunning and deceipts Some are light others great and some â—eane and indifferent Tâ—e light he not only allowes to Princes but commands them The meane he tollerates The gâ—eater he foâ—biddâ— Amoâ—g the light he puts distrust and dissimulation Distrust is as necessary in a Prince as credulity is hurtfull So it hath beene called the strength of prudence that is to say to waâ—ch to beleeue nothing lightly and to haue an eye to all things He must therefore trust few Men and â—hose loâ—g knowne and often tryed And yet hee may not so slipp the line in such sort as hee doth not alwayes hold it by one end and haue an eye to it But hee must couer and disguise his distrust yea in diâ—râ—â—â—iâ—g he must make a shew to haue some confidence For open distrust offends and inuites another as well to deceiue vs as too much indiscreet confidence They haue many times had a desire to deceiue him whom they haue found fearefull to bâ—e deceiued And on the other side an open confidence bindes some to guard loyalty From distrust they come to dissimulation â—hich smotheâ— the fore-head and couers the thoughts no lesse necessary for a Prince then the first But he must learne how to play this part cunningly without excesse or foolery making open profession of simplicity cherishing those that are free and open as enemies to dissimulation and that in small matters the Prince pâ—oceede openly to the end they may hold him for such in greater Another sort of deceipt and ordinary among Pâ—inces are the practices and intelligences which they haue in the Estates one of another drawing cunningly the hearts of their Neighbours officers seruants and confidents to discouer their secrets and to crosse the designes of their Masters and sometimes to lead a hand to some Enterprize against thâ—ir Masters person This hath proceeded so farre as it hath sometimes corrupted euen the Wiues of Princes This is done by two meanes Either by perswasion making vse of the discontentments which great men haue of their Masters Or by money which is the most vsuall course And many haue held this manner of proceeding allowed against an Enemy a rebellious or suspected Subiect yea against any stranger with whom they haue no alliance But against his Friâ—â—ds Allies and Confederates it is treachery which ought not to be practised as they doe at this day There are Princes to whom all sorts of meanes are iust to gaine some adâ—antage and to attaine to their designe who haue made vse to deceiue by Equiuocations faire words promises Letters Embassies yea and by lies to obtaine that which they could not otherwise doe by reason of the difficulty of time and affaires Plato allowes this deceipt so as it be for the good of the Subiects Yet to make this proceeding iust there must be a necessity and it must be in a tâ—oublesome and confused time and not onely to aduaâ—ce the good but to diuert some great mischiefe and against the wicked There are other kinds of proceeding frequent enough in Princes to preserue tâ—emselues and their Estate fâ—om their Eâ—emâ—â—s the which cannot be excused but by nâ—cessity And the Prince which is reduced to this point mâ—st know that it is a misery for him to â—ee himâ—elfe forced to leaue the ordinary course of Iustice for the safety of his Estate and he may not proceed but with some feeling of griefe but he must carry â—imselfe therein like a Fathâ—r when he is forced to cauterize or cuâ— off a member of his Child to saue â—is life I will set downe here some examples As to put those secretly to death and without forme of Iustice which cannot be punished without trouble and danger to â—he Estate If they deserue death the Prince who may dispence with the other formes may likewise dispence for the safety of his Estate To clip the wings and shorten the meanes of some one which mutines and fortifies too much in the Estate and makes himselfe fearefull before he hath a commodity to attempt Tâ— diue by authority into the purses of his rich Subiects in some necessity and pouerty of the Estate To reuoke the priuiledges giuen to some one or to some Comminalties or particular men to the preiudice of the Soueraigne and the Estate To seaze vpon some neighbour place for feare that another holding it he should make Warre against vs and ruine vs. All these things are in themselues vniust but this iniustice is ballanced by necessity and publique profit Necessity as they say
profit of thâ— sayd Seminaries of honor â—or the Estate Expences for the coÌ„modity and decoration of Towne and Prâ—uinces Cutting off Expences Of the iustice and necessity of cutting off of debts Of the choice they ought to make of those which are to manage the Treasure A commendable custome of the Romans Youth more fit for the maÌ„naging of the Treasure then Age. That experience is not so much necessâ—ry A forme to regulate Accomptants Of Accompts and of those which are to heare and examine the Accompts Conâ—iderations which makes the â—eaping vp of Treasure hurtfull to a Puâ—lique Considerations necessary for the gathering of Treasure Prudence and discretion necesary for the gathering â—f Treasure A â—emedy to the end that sparing mâ—y not hinder the Commerce Difficultieâ— for the keeping of thâ— Treaâ—ure of Gold and Siluer Oâ— the carâ— â—â—â—â—ging of 〈…〉 How a Prince should gouernâ— himselfe with his neighbouâ—s Geâ—â—â—â—ll considerâ—tâ—â—â—◠〈◊〉 thâ— manner 〈…〉 Of the entâ—rview oâ— Princes where thâ—y may be aâ—â—ptâ—â—e oâ— the â—â—â—â—ndship and good 〈◊〉 which 〈◊〉 â—â—mâ—â—â—y 〈◊〉 A Prince beâ—â—â—chc pâ—â—heâ—â—ust hâ—ue a câ—râ— not to pâ—ocurâ— Eâ—â—y or â—â—alousâ—â— agâ—â—â— hâ—m no◠〈…〉 Of safety 〈…〉 What Princes ought to doe before their Enter-viewes not to put their Neighbours in Iealousie Of Deputies Embassadors to treate with a Prince and of the choice they are to make Qualities of a Deputy or Eâ—bassadour Not to be interested in the businesse hee treates of Of a â—â—ane condition 〈◊〉 â—cre 〈◊〉 of the 〈◊〉 â—â—â—enti 〈◊〉 which 〈◊〉 made I hat they must stand most vpon their guards when they prâ—pound a treaty and â—â—pecialy during the treaty That a treaty ought not to be held firme and assured if it be not ratified by the Prince with whom they treate Of the plate where the treaties of a peace â—ra league is to be made An Embassador going vnto a Prince to treat whether he is bound to treate himselfe with him or by Deputies Of the sitting of Embassadorâ— Of the power of Embassadors on either side Oâ— the clauses of treaties Principall considerations They must haue a care thâ—t there be no equiuâ—cation in the clauses That generall clauses are captions Tâ—eaties of Peace Oâ— Tâ—ucâ— That treaties of trece are lesse Subiect to rupture then thâ—se of a peacâ— Diuâ—rs intentions for tâ—e which they make a truce Of defensiue leagues Diuers considerations for the treating or making of a league â—rdinary cauâ—â—s oâ—â—â—aâ—ueâ— Other considerations for the treatie of a league Of the time wâ—en wee are to make a Lâ—â—gue O◠〈◊〉 tiâ—e of the â—oÌ„tinuâ—nce â—o a leâ—gue That the Colleaguâ—s are bound to the râ—couery of the Countrey of their Allie conquered by the Enemy Of the contribution of a league 〈…〉 place 〈…〉 dyâ— or 〈…〉 mâ—nâ—y Which of the confederates ought to verisie and declaâ—e himselâ—e first That an offâ—nsiue league and for an â—nâ—erprizâ—â—uccâ—â—dâ— seldoâ—e accâ—â—ding to â—he hope of the Allies Oâ— the causes of the rupâ—ure of Leagues Oâ—â—eaguâ—s â—etwiâ—â— meane â—â—tateâ— and of the deâ—â—cts wâ—â—ch aâ—â—â—ften 〈◊〉 Of Succourâ— one against another among confederates Of the defence of one that is noâ— allied against an Ally Of the vnequal alliaÌ„ce betwixt Princes and Estates â— that is to say of protection Difference betwixt pension and tribute Of protection Of the mutuall duty of the protector and hee that is protected Of Hostages Hostages for the assurance of a Princes passage through anothers Estate The assurance of a treaty It is dangerous for an ally to receiue a strong Gaâ—â—ison from his protector or make him Master of his Forts c. â—sâ—â—blishment of Iudges for the deciding oâ— differences betwixt allies Of compromise betwixt Allies vpon differences which may grow betwixt them Of aâ—compromise vpon the possessory When and how a Prince should deale to reconcile a difference betwixt his Neighbours Meanes to assure a treaty that they may not enter into rupture Pretext of rupture Of the obligation a Prince hath to hold his word That force nor feare cannot diâ—pence a Prince of his word or promise 〈◊〉 preâ—â—xts o◠〈◊〉 That the constancy and asâ—â—â—tance of a Prince â—â— his wâ—rd is of great 〈◊〉 Two sortsâ— of Neutrality The aduantages of a Neutrality Diâ—aduantages of Neutrality That a powerfull Prince should not leaue a Neutrality without cauâ—â— That a Neutralâ—â—y is more beâ—eficiall to a weake a Prince then to imbrace a 〈◊〉 Considerations to leaue a Neutrallity How a Prince ought to 〈◊〉 himselfe in a demand made vnto him by one of his Neiâ—hbours oâ—â—ome diffiâ—ulâ— thing To demaÌ„d somthing of his Neighbours We must not refuse that which is demanded if it doth not much preiudice We must nâ—t be too credulous in that which Princes say Politiquely to nourish distrusts iealosies betwixt them To testifie his good will vnto them Oâ— the resentmenâ— hee must hâ—ue of Iniuâ—ties â—eceiued by his neighbouâ— To pierce into the designes of his Neighbours Of the introduction of Embassadours or Agents The difference betwixt an Embassadour and Agent Qualities and perfections required in an Embassadour Instructions for an Embassadour how to gouerne himselfe in a strange Countrey Oâ— the priuiledges of Emâ—aâ—â—adouâ—s How Embassadours ought to carry themselues toward their Master Of their dispatches The preseruation of the Estate consists in the authority of a Prince The Loue of the people cause the authority of the Soueraigne Diuers meanes to gaine his good-will Effects of mildnesse in a Prince To cherrish great Men. Two sorts of liberality The excesse of liberality in a Prince most hurtfull to the Estate Considerations necessary in liberality Diuerâ— kinds of liberality Of the liberality which is vsed for the acknowledgment of seruice and merit That a Prince 〈◊〉 shewe him 〈◊〉 liberall to those which may seâ—ue him agâ—inst â—is â—nemy be thâ—y oâ— a conâ—râ—ry paâ—â—y Of the liberality of the Prince to purchase reputation The manner of giuing Benefits must be propoâ—tioâ—aâ—le tâ— the time â—ecompences 〈◊〉 liâ—nâ—ur mâ—â—t â—ee well 〈◊〉 Libeâ—â—lity of the 〈◊〉 towâ—rds â—hâ— Publâ—quâ— The Liberality of a priuate person towards the Publique is not to be allowed Liberality of the Prince towards the Publique which consists in aduancing vertue Iustice diuided into two parts wherein the princâ— ought to shew himselfe a 〈◊〉 of Iustice in â—â—gard of priuate men Against vâ—ury Two sorts of violence in an Estate which the Prince ought to suppresse Of the oppression of the poor◠〈◊〉 Princes 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 â—n 〈…〉 〈◊〉 wherein 〈◊〉 may 〈◊〉 That the grace and sauour of the Prince not extend to haue violence done against the Magistrate Of the choise a Prince ought to make of Iudges Magistrates I 〈◊〉 mâ—anes 〈…〉 tâ—oâ—e which â—re to be established in the administâ—aâ—ion oâ— Iustâ—ce 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 must 〈◊〉 caâ—e to 〈◊〉 the 〈…〉 to do◠〈◊〉 〈◊〉 meanes 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 Of the compositions with officâ—rs misbehauing themselues in their charges â—and of the inconuâ—niences which follow That a Prince hauing pardoned an
examined and to giue their aduice yet for that the varietie of opinions might hinder the conclusion it hath bin held most reasonable yea necessary to vse it in this manner The rule of wise men which cannot faile is that of two vniust things they follow that which is most iust and of two inconueniences to auoid the greater Otherwise there would neuer bee an end of humane actions If the command be so vniust as without wronging their conscience they cannot passe it some Magistrates to auoid the disobedience and not to charge their consciences in verifying it haue incerted by the expresse commaundement of the Prince many times reâ—terated The manner of verifying the Edicts ordinances and commands of Princes by the Magistrates hath beene brought in in some estates to make the people more willing to obey them Who hauing not capacitie to iudge of things by themselues and being more inclined to distrust and to calumniate the will of the Prince then approue it And the Prince on the other side being iâ—â—roned by importune Courtiers who without any regard of duty or of iustice nor to the good of the Estate seeke by new inuentions to worke their owne ends and to get them authorized by circumuenting the Prince It hath beene held conuenient for the Prince to cause his will to passe by such solemnities to the end they might bee receiued by the people and that being examined and found contrary or preiudiciall to the publique good they might be refused by humble remonstrances which wipe away the disgrace of the deniall and serue the Prince for an excuse to free himselfe from the importunitie and iniustice of great men It remaines now to know how an Officer ought to carry himselfe in executing a command if there comes vnto him a reuocation the businesse being begun Some hold opinion that if the execution be so much importing the Estate as not being finished there would happen some inconuenience that notwithstanding the reuocation hee ought to proceed If not hee must leaue the businesse as it is But for the first it is necessary that the danger of the Estate be euedent and knowne to all Men and not to the Magistrate alone who might bee suspected to haue proceeded lightly or with spleene passing on after the Reuocation CHAP. 32. Of the duty of Magistrates one towards another THe duty of Magistrates and the manner of proceeding which they ought to hold one towards another is regulated according to the power which they haue whereof in most Estates they make three degrees The highest is of those who in some part of the Estate haue power to determine without appeale The Prince only may command them the middle sort obeyed these and commanding those which are of a lower degree who haue not any command ouer the Officers but only ouer particular persons Wee may call the first superiors or principalls the second middle or subalterne and the last inferiors The first haue power to command all Magistrates and Officers without exception or only certaine Officers subiect to their Iurisdiction They which haue power to command all in generall without execution ought not to be brought into the Estate for the change that such a power might vsually cause For there being but one degree to climbe and to make themselues Masters ambition doth teach it speedily and euery man doth the more easily indure it for that all men are accustomed to obey them The dutie of a Superiour or principall Magistrate is to containe those that are vnder him in the termes and duties of their charges of whom he may be Iudge and not they of him in qualitie of a Magistrate but as a priuate person And as for the Soueraigne although they may iudge in their owne cause to whom God hath giuen power to dispose without Iudgment as Xenophon saith yet it is much more fitting for the Soueraigne to suffer the Iudgement of his Magistrates then to make himselfe Iudge in his own cause prouided alwayes that the businesse doth not concerne the Soueraignty or his particular person but to the end that Maiestie may not suffer diminution of its greatnesse or that the splendor of a Royall Name may not dazell the eyes of the Iudges It hath bin wisely aduised in some Estates that the Soueraigne should not plead but by his procuratour and would neuer assist in Person And as in the power of the Prince the power of Magistrates is held in suspence so in the presence of superior Magistrates the power of Inferiors hath no effect The which is vnderstood not only of superiour heads and Magistrates but also of their Lieutenants who are therein held the same thing as being but one power distributed to two Wherefore the Lieutenant cannot determine any thing his chiefe being present Yet the Magistrate may take notice of an iniury or wrong done by his Lieutenant But that which hath bin spoken of the power of Superior Magistrates ouer their inferiors must be vnderstood in their territorie their seats and in the limits of their Iurisdiction out of which they are but priuate men without power or command Magistrates which are equall in power or haue no dependance one of another cannot bee commanded nor corrected one of another But if there bee question to execute the decree or Iudgement of one in the territory of another they must vse honest intreaties and clauses of request Yet where there shall bee question of the interpretation of a decree made by one Magistrate another that is his equall may not take knowledge For euery one ought to bee the interpreter of his owne will And in regard of the sentence giuen by the Officer of a Forraine Prince for the execution whereof in the territory of another there should be a Commission of intreatie The iudges of this Prince to whom the Commission is directed may not examine the Iudgement least the stranger bee induced another time to doe the like anâ— to dissolue the Iudgements whereof they should demand the execution the which would bee done more through iealousie of the Estate then for any iniustice in them Yet if there bee question of honour or life they may not execute the Iudgements of forraine Magistrates if they haue not knowne the merrite of the cause and seene the informations And Princes owe this respect one vnto another for the good of Iustice not onely to punish the wicked which slie from one Estate into another but also for the Exemplary punishment which ought to be made vpon the places are bound to yeeld the naturall subiect to his naturall Prince vnlesse the Prince to whom the fugitiue is retired â—indes that hee is vniustly pursued for in this case he ought not to yeeld them Yea he is forbidden by the Law of God to restore a Bondman which is fled into another Mans house to auoid the fury of his Master But aâ—tâ—ough the Magistrate may not command his Equals yet
in a body or colledge consisting of many equall in power the greatest part may command the lesse For in this case they that are superior in number are likewise superior in power So as the lesser part cannot command the greater nor yet hinder it Yet one Tribune at Rome opposing might hinder the acts of all the rest the Romans making a difference betwixt opposition and command for that hinderance and opposition is lesse then a command and doth not induce any superiâ—â—â—â—â— like vnto a command But Colledges hauing no superiority one ouer another they cannot haue any command but they may well hinder one another this hinderance growing rather from a contrariety in an equall concurrence then from any superiority This may be grounded vpon the generall Rule of all those which haue any thing in Common amongst which he that hinders hath more force and his condition in this case is better then his that seekes to proceede and among many Lawes that which forbids is of greatest force But if before the Act a Magiâ—trate may hinder his Equall by opposition yet after the Act he cannot doe it by any other meanes but by appeale to the Superior CHAP. 33. Of the duty of Magistrates to priuate Persons THe duty of Officers or Magistrates to particular person hath two principall foundations The one is grounded on the power which is giuen to the Magistrate by the Edict or Letters of Commission the other vpon the seemlinesse which consists in the particular carriage of the Magistrates person to be able to maintaine himselfe in credit reputation and authority with those ouer whom he is to command And although that the power of all Magistrates regards generally the execution of the Law the which without the Magistrate were idle Yet the power of some is more strictly limited then that of others For some are bound by the Lawes and Ordinances to command and vse the power that is giuen them in that forme and manner that is prescribed them without adding or diminishing any thing And in this case they are but simple Executioners of Lawes To others they giue more liberty and leaue many things to their discretion and iudgement Wherein notwithstanding they must so gouerne themselues as they doe not any thing that is extraordinary without a speciall command or that may not be easily required that they are not forced by some strong and powerfull necessity or an apparent danger But in these things where the diuersity of circumstances is a hinderance that he cannot specifie or set downe in particular the power as in the arbitriment of Princes the Magistrate may according to his conscience decree without a speciall command But therein he shall auoyde to affect the reputation of pittifull as well as of cruell For cruelty although it be blameable yet it retaynes the Subiects in the obedience of the Lawes But too much Clemency causeth the Magistrate to be contemned with the Lawes and the Prince which hath made them Wherefore the Law of God forbids them to take pitty of the poore in Iudgement But one of the things most requisite in a Magistrate is to make the grauity of offence knowne as well to make offenâ—ers vnderstand what they haue deserued as to induce them to repentance And in doing so the punishment will haue lesse bitternesse and more profit Wherefore the principall Rule of the duty of a Magistrate to priuate persons is to vse the power that is giuen him well and priuate Men reciprically owe him all obedience in executing his charge bee it right or wrong so as he exceeds not the termes of his power or Iurisdiction For then they may contradict his ordinances by appeale or opposition and if he proceeds he must make a distintion whether the grieuance be irreparable or not If it may be repaired they shall not oppose by fact but by course of law but if it be irreparable they may oppose by fact yea with force not to offend the Magistrate but to defend the innocent As for iniuries which priuate men doe vnto Magistrates it is certaine that the Magistrate being wronged hee cannot be Iudge in his owne cause vnlesse it bee for some vnreuerence or iniury done vnto him publiquely in executing his Office For in this case it is lawfull for the Magistrate being wronged to punish such Men for the offence done vnto the particular person of the Magistrate For this reason if a Body or Colledge of Iudges hath bin wronged they may censure and condemne those which haue done the offence not to reuenge the iniury done vnto them but to the Estate whose Maiesty is wronged by the contempt they haue made of them As for obedience it seemes requisite that the Magistrate should carry himselfe to priuate persons with all mildnesse and patience yet in such sort as the dignitie of his place be not vilified as it would be if he should indure any indiscreete words in his presence and not take exception Or a countenance of little respect But especially as hee ought not to shew himselfe rough and difficult of excesse So he must not grow familiar laugh or ieast with priuate men but to speake little with discretion without making shew of any passion of choller Enuie Iealousie or such like which may diminish the opinion which they haue of him Wherefore to collect in few words that which concernes the duty of Magistrates they must learne to obey the Soueraigne to bend vnder the power of their superiors to honour their equals to command the Subiects to defend the poore to make head against great men and to doe Iustice to all CHAP. 34. Of the Iustice of Commanding AS the forme of commanding is diuers so is the Diuersity of power which according vnto Iustice obserues diuers Rules to make the commandments iust For in certayne things according to an Arithmeticall proportion it makes all the Subiects equall In others it enters into consideration of the quality and followes a Geometricall proportion In others according to an Harmoniacall proportion it neither follows an equality altogether nor a similitude but taking a consideration of other differences it mingles the one with the other by a certayne temper and accord And as that which they seeke most in the settling of an Estate is Concord which cannot be without some harmony or correspondence of the parties one with another This last proportion is followed in many things as in the forme of gouernment in the distribution of Offices honours dignities and recompences in the establishment of punishments and for the peace and greatnesse of families in Marriages and diuisions of successions But in contracts and treaties betwixt man and man and in that which concernes the performance of promises which they make one vnto another or the Iudgement of that which belongs to euery man whereas Faith and Integrity ought to be equal in all men of what quality and condition soeuer
they haue done in many Estates to make new impositions In an Estate where the Prince finds himselfe ill assured of the will of his prime Men they haue obserued the course which Eumenes vsed to borrow of those that were ill affected to the end that interessing them in the Estate and the losse thereof for feare of loosing their debt they helpe to maintaine it But if they finde some hinderance to assure themselues elsewhere this meanes would be but weake Wherefore a Prince must neuer borrow vnlesse it bee in an vrgent necessity For there is nothing that doth so much harme to a bad husband as the publique is many times then credit I know that many hold that this cutting off of debts or wages is vniust as in truth it is if the Estate hath wherewithall to pay But if the sparing of the ordinary Reuenew be not sufficient to satisfie the necessity makes this cutting off necessary and iust For to satisfie it by a new imposition were to repaire one iniustice by another more generall to draw most commonly from the poore to giue vnto the rich in which cutting off part of the interest of debts will not preiudice so much although it be great as a Subsedie would do the Poore I doe not say that among those to whom the Prince is indebted there may bee some one found to whom this cutting off would bee hurtfull But for one of that quality among the Princes creditors there would be fiue hundred of the poore reduced to beggery if they should by that meanes pay the debts due by the Estate the which I vnderstand of Estates which are already ouercharged with great impositions and likewise with great debts CHAP. 48. Of those which ought to be imployed in the gouernment of the Treasure AS for the quallity of those to whom the mannaging of the Treasure ought to be committed if Men could be knowne there is not any one but would make choice to deliuer it into the hands of the most loyall But making this choyce most commonly by hazard I say that although we suppose him to be an honest Man to whom wee will giue this charge yet we must not take neither a poore Man nor a needy nor one that is too powerfull nor of too great authority The first for feare that through necessity he bee not inuited to rob vs and the other least that he steale from vs too boldly and hauing robbed vs we are not able to call him to an accompt and to punish his thefts There is besides this an ordinary fault which is coÌ„mitted in this subiect in many Estates which is that they make a trade of it apart and profession of the managing of the Princes purse So as he that enters into it instructs himselfe as to an Art to do his owne businesse the which he cannot doe but with the preiudice of the publique Thus the elder they grow the more learned they are that is to say preiudiciall to the Estate I doe much commend that ancient custome of the Romans to imploy young Men in the mannaging of the Treasure before they aduanced them to any other Offices For this is to giue them occasion to shew their discretion and for the hope to bee one day something more to incourage them to doe their duties well and to mannage the publique Reuenewes Besides this youth is lesse auaritious then another Age and more innocent and lesse hardy in deceipts easie to be discouered So as the Romans leauing them but a short time in these charges to bee aduanced to other honors they came forth more innocent then they entred To say that a long experience is necessary in these places to mannage them well this were to endeare the trade The greatest pollicy in the Treasure to serue the publique is to haue no other but discretion and to know how to write downe that which hee receiues and paies to recouer that which he receiues not hauing charge to make the recouery and to follow exactly the commandements and ordinances of those which haue power to ordaine There is no factor in a shop but vnderstands this But I will confesse that to know how to steale from the publique cunningly and to couer and disguise his thefts he must haue a long experience of ill doing be it to defend the falshood of an acquittance of the omission of a receipt of a false reprisall of a disguising of parties and a secret composition with those that are to receiue with other courses oâ—dinary to those which deale in this trade Not meaning to taxe honest Men. Some to make accomptants more diligent to make their receipts and to hinder them that they may not maliciously as it often happens make reprizes or to ease some more then others or to vse it for their owne particular or for some other designe haue held it fit to regulate their Fees proportionably to that which they are to receiue and to diminish theÌ„ according vnto that which they shall leaue in reprizes to the end that being interessed in their owne particular they would be more exact to make their receipts Others haue giuen their receipt to make the abatments with charge to make it good and not to bring in any not soluable The which would seeme more iust As for those which ought to heare and examine the accompts besides the choyce that they are to make of the honestest men for this â—ffect it is necessary to bind them to iudges accordiâ—g to certainâ— formes and orders which haue beene held fit to hinder the abusâ—s which accomptants or themselues might commit And especially to draw particular Notes of the distribution of the Treasure which they shall enjoyne the accomptant to verifie vpon those of the receipt and expence without any meanes of dispencing for any occasion whatsoeuer but afterwards he may addresse himselfe vnto the Prince if there bee any reason to â—ase him But as the Prince is not alwayes at leasure nor sometimes of experience to regulate direct his owne affaires and that moreouer hee is importuned by an infinit number of beggers whom if he should satisfie his Treasure would be found too short To free himselfe of the hatred which the deniall of so many demaunds might purchase him and to discharge himselfe of the importunity the custome is to send such sutors to a Councell consisting of rough and seuere men more inclined to refuse then to graunt and who know how to moderate the denialls which they make as they doe not depriue those which are refused of all hope to be satisfied in some other thing For rough and contumelious denialls may distast many from imploying themseâ—ues in the Princes seruice although the Prince make not the deniall For that as they loue the dogg for the Masters sake it falls out often that when the dogg bites too sharply in the end they take exceptions at the Master CHAP. 49. Of the Exchequer or sparing of
Treasure THere remaines to speake of the Exchequer the which some haue held hurtfull to the publique euen that which is made to heape vp Treasure drawing apart great summs of Gold and Siluer God forbidding it Deutrâ—nomy This many times hath caused some to attempt against Estates As the sonne of Tygranes who besieged Sopâ—one a Towne in Armenia which Pompeys Army to haue his Fathers Treasure Moreouer this gathering together ruines the Commerce and traffique of the Subiects and doth not hinder the ruine of the Estate when as the affaires are thereunto disposed Sardinapalus lâ—ft forty Millions of Gold to those which slue him Darius left fourscore to Alexander who vaÌ„quished him And many times the Father who leaues much Gold and Siluer to the Sonne leaues him withall a speedy meanes to ruine him For a young Man relying vpon his Treasure thrusts himselfe into impossible enterprizes which are aboue his foâ—ces hates peace contemns the friendship of his Neighbours Enters into Warre not onely vnnecessary â—nd of little profit but also hurtfull Yet custome is contrary as also reason if we had the consideration of heaping vp of Treasure For that to gather togetâ—er money when as necessity doth presse that were too late For that the bruit of Armes causing traffique to â—â—ase Tillage and the gathering in of fruits the customes and imposts by coâ—sâ—quence would decay and the Subâ—ectâ— impâ—uerished by the lodging of souldiers â—â—d the holding of the Fields will be vnable to pâ—y But there must be two considerations added for the gathering in of Treasure The one to make it equall to the other forces of the Estate that is to say of persons whom we may imploy and of Munition of Victualls and War which are necâ—ssary for vs whereof wee must make a Magazine or store-house before we gather Treasure For to hope that without it the Treasure alone which we gather will preserue vs from ruine were a vaine thing and the examples aboue mentioâ—ed shew it sufficiently The other considerations is not to draw together so much Gold and Siluer as it may incommodate the commerce and traffique of the Subiects For this were to dry vp the spring of the Treasure If the Sea should retaine all the waters of the Riuers which disgorge themselues into it and not â—eturne them to their fountaines by conduits vnder ground it would dry vp the Riuers and in the end grow dry it selfe Wherefore they which will shew any discretion in heaping of Treasure haue considered in grosse the quantity of money which goes forth and â—nters yearely into an Estate And if there enters more then goes forth they haue held that a Prince might lawfully and without any interest of the commerce lay vp yearely in his Exchequer as much Gold and Siluer as the entry exceeded the going forth But if the entry hath not exceeded the going forth they haue held and with reason that the Prince ought not to lay vp any Treasure But in this case there is another Remedy of which we haue formerly made mention which is that afâ—er necâ—ssary charges are payed the Prince hauing meanes to spare somethiâ—g for his neede he may distribute it vpon moderate inâ—erest to the Marchants of his Estate taking necessary security as we haue sayd Augustus did to yâ—ild it at a câ—rtaine time For in this manner the assurancâ—s being good this supply would bee as ready as if it were in his Coffers And the interest being such as the Marchanâ— may gaine therâ—by the commerce is no way diminished by this sparing but rather augmented and the Subiects and Prince enricht by this meanes But men haue beene much troubled for the guard of Treasures of Gold and Siluer The Kings of Peru kept it in great Massies of Gold and Siluer The Romans in Lingotis in the forme of Tyles The Kings of Morocco caused Massie Boules to be made which set vpon the top of their Mosquees or Temples Some to be guarded more religiously haue put them into Churches As the guard in a Common-wealth is not vneasie so in a Principality or Monarchie it is most difficult For they haue not so much cause to guard it from theeues as from their owne Princes who for their priuate pleasures or by the importunity of some flatterers scatter that in one yeare which their predecessors haue gathered in many So Caligula spent in one yeare seauentie and seuen Millions of Gold which Tybâ—rius as they write had drawne together And Carcalla consumed in one day that which Seuerus his Father had spared in Ninteene yeares Wherefore as it is most fitting that few men should know what is layd vp in the Treasure least that being too much it should prouoke some through Enuy to seâ—ke to get it or being too litâ—le it should make vs to bee contemned of our Enemies So many haue held it fit to ordaine not to touch the Treasure but in the great necessity of the Prince and State and by the Councell of the Magistrates of greatest autority CHAP. 50. Of treaties in generall be it for the enter-view and parley of Princes or by their Deputies and Embâ—ssadours EStates are like vnto buildings raised high the which although they bee built of good mâ—â—erials and strong Walles yet to subsist long they haue neede to be supported and vnderpropt without with Buttresses Pillars and Arches For that being threatned as well without as within they must bee rampired against all forces Wherefore the care of the affaires of Strangers especially of his Neighbours is most necessary for a Prince and for any man that shall bee called to the Rule or Goueâ—nment of the Estate This Care consists in three principall points The first is how hee shall gouerne himselfe with his Neighbours The second consists in gaining some credit among them to haue a part in their deliberations The third and last being vnable to passe without them to get meanes to pierce into their Designes The manner how to gouerne himselfe with his Neighbours depends of the manner of treating with them and of the obseruation of treaties according vnto the which hee must gouerne himselfe The manner of treating depends chiefly of the condition of persons and of affaires Yet there are some generall considerations which deserue to be knowne The first is in the ouerture which is made to treate it many times happening that of two Princes which are Enemies the one will not seeke vnto the other for an Accord so as the ouerture must bee made eyther by some greater Prince or by some Neighbour that is a Friend to both and sometimes the Ministers of two Princes meeting accidâ—ntally together if they be imployed Argenion and a Steward to the Duke of Mantoua mâ—eting at Creal Carragio to condole in their Masters names for the death of Marquesse of Montferrat made an ouerture for the treaty of peace betwixt Charles the eight and Lewis Sforse King Ferdinand of Aragon hath imployed Monkes to that