actual love of God is taken properly only of those aâ—â—s that are terminated immediately unto God and all those that are terminated unto us men for Gods sake are termed the love of God only improperly and by a trope and Dr. Hammond speaks absolutely of the actual love of God and hath nothing to restrain his speech unto the latter sort of acts and therefore he is to be understood of the former those that arâ— immediately terminated on God Secondly If this were a mistake it had been an easie matter for Dr. Hammond to have prevented it in his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by a clear and distinct explication of his meaning but he hath not done this and therefore if the Refuter be to be blamed Dr. Hammond cannot be altogether excused But I deny that I am guilty of any such mistake as is imputed to me For that Christs actual love of God in Dr. Hammond cannot rationally be understood of all those acts of love that were immediately terminated on us men all duties of the Second Table c. I shall prove by an Argument drawn from the Relation that Dr. Hammonds discourse concerning Christs actual love of God c. hath to the Commandment Deut. 6.5 Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy 〈◊〉 and with all thy soul and with all thy might It is brought as an Exemplification and proof of his interpretation thereof and therefore this actual love of God in Christ must be the same with that love of God which is there commanded Now that love of God which is there commanded is that only which is immediatly terminated on God For 1. It must be with all the heart soul might and strength and the Acts of love that are terminated unto the creature immediatly cannot be performed in such an intension without grosse and palpable Idolatry 2. The love of God here commanded is by our Saviour himself distinguished from the love of our neighbour and of our selves and consequently 't is restrained unto the love of God which is terminated immediatly upon God Jesus saith The great Commandement 〈◊〉 the Law is Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy mind this is the first and great Commanâ—ement and the second is like unto it Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self Matth. 22. vers 36 37 38 39. Here these two Commandements are the two Summaries of the Commandements of both Tables And seeing they are distinguished by our Saviour himself we must not make any confusion betwixt them But they are confounded when the duties of the second Table or this Commandement Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self are ranged under the first Table Or this Commandement Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart soul might and strength Now those acts of charity that are immediatly terminated unto us men for Gods sake are all Duties of the second Table and belong unto that Commandment Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self 3. Unto this let me adde a third Argument which may be reduced unto the first taken from the second Part of Doctor Hammona's Exposition of the place and thus it stands That act of the love of God which transcends all those acts of love that are immediatly terminated on the creature is that high act of the love of God which is immediatly fixed and terminated on God as the only good But the act of the love of God which is commanded Dâ—ut 6.5 transcends all those acts of love which are immediatly terminated on the creature Therefore 't is that act of the love of God which is terminated and fixed immediatly on God himself as the only good The Major is undeniable and if the Minor be not Doctor Hammond's own let the Defendant expound unto us these words of his That Phrase thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart with all thy soul denoteth secondly the loving him above all other things and not admitting any thing into competition with him not 〈◊〉 any thing else in such a degree This argument may briefly be thus also varied No acts of the love of God that are superiour unto those that are immediately terminated on us men for God's sake can be those very acts that are immediately terminated on us men for God's sake for one and the same thing cannot be superiour unto it self But those acts of the love of God that are commanded Deut. 6.5 are superiour unto those that are immediately terminated on us men for God's sake and so much is evident by Dr. Hammond's exposition of the place And therefore those acts of the love of God that are commanded Dâ—ut 6.5 are not those that are immediately terminated on us men for God's sake But suppose that Dr. Hammond spake of those acts of holy charity that are terminated on us men for Gods sake yet by what the Defendant saith it will be no injustice to think that he speaks of those actâ—s under this reduplication as terminated immediately on God himself For by the Defendants opinion pag. 234 235 holy charity and it's acts are terminated unto us mea for God's sake onely as a material object and unto God's infinite goodnss alone as the formal object Now things are rather denominated from that which agreeth unto them formally then from that which is ascribed unto them onâ—ly materially for dâ—nâ—minatio fit à pottori Now those acts of charity that are terminated unto us men considered as terminated on God as their formal object ought to be in all and were in Christ alwayes at the height and one equal perfection Our Defendant himself confesses pag. 217. that to English ears this phâ—ase the love of God seems especially to import the prime and more principal love that hath God for its immediate Object but then withal he adds that in Scripture phrase it frequently does not The first place he quotes is Luk. 11.42 Wo unto you Phariseâ—â— saith our Saviour for ye tythe mint and rue and all manner of hâ—rbs and passe over judgement and the love of God these ought ye to have done and not to leave the other undone But this place he confesseth to be otherwise expounded by divers and we have saith he no need of doubtfull places But 't is without doubt that the love of God is not there taken in such a latitude oâ— amplitude as to contain the whole duty of man towards God and our neighbour for 't is distinguished from judgement and that compriseth if not all yet a great part of our duty towards our neighbour But the Defendant in the next place alledgeth instances out of the first Epistle of St. John that are he saith beyond all exception The first instance is 1 John 2.5 But who so keepeth his word in him verily is the love of God perfected hereby know we that we are in him But to prove the impertinency of this place we need go no
of God But there is and must be a gradâ—al difference and more in respect of the goodness of the objects of the habâ—t of charity or the love of God in Christ Therefore there is and must be a gradual difference in respect of the several acts of this habit of charity or the love of God in Christ In the Argument there is committed that fallacy which is termed fallacia ignorationis Elenchi for the conclusion takes the acts of the love of God in Christ in such a latitude as to comprehend those acts of love which were terminated unto man Whereas Dr. H. and the Refuter are to be understood as hath been shewn only concerning those acts of the love of God which are terminated on God himself and between these there is no gradual difference for they have one Object alone Gods infinite goodness in himself Unto this we may add ex abundanti unto the Minor that the pretended difference betwixt the Objects of the love of God in Christ is by the Defendants opinion only as touching the material objects thereof for the formal object or reason is asserted by him to be still one and the same and hereupon 't will follow that the acts of Christs love of God are formally the same and consequently the acts of this love which have their specification from their objects are by his opinion formally the same too and the formal consideration of things is chiefest and most to be heeded These answers might easily have been foreseen but instead of them the Defendant falls to his conjectures p. 232 233. There can saith he be but two things possible as far as I can foresee returned in answer to this discourse First that it is not one and the same habit of charity whereby we love God and our neighbâ—us aâ— our selves and and therefore as the precepts are several so the objects are divers and the affections of the soul that carry it on to the love of God and our neighbour are as different as the Objects themselves are And therefore though it be granted that the several acts that flow from these severally distinct habits do gradually differ in themselves in respect of intenseness according to the gradual distance of goodness in the object yet it follows not that therefore the acts of one and altogether the same habit of charity and holy love do gradually differâ— also which was the thing to be proved Secondly Though it were granted that the hâ—bit of charity and holy love to God and our neighbours be one and the same habit yet a gradual difference in the goodness of the objects of this love will not argue a gradual difference of intenseness in the inward acts of this love but onely in the outward acts and expressions These answers are none of mine but the groundless sictions of the Defendant and therefore I may justly pass them over in filence But yet unto the first I shall say something because it affords occasion of some discourse that may be acceptable unto the Reader First Scotus resolves indeed with Aquinas that eodem habitu diligimus Deum proximum but then scripto Parisiensi in 3um sent dist 28. he determâ—ues that diligere proximum is velle eum condiligere Dâ—um Dico quod eodem habitu diligimus Deum proximum quia eodem actu volo vel diligo Deum in se volo proximum Deum in se diligere perfecte autem amans dilectum vult diligi Deus qui est bonum commune non vult esse bonum particulare ideo habens habitum talem cujus actus praecipitur in communi quod possibile est fieri potest diligere Deum proximum velle Deum diligere quia eodem habitu possum tendere in objectum reflecti super illud ergo eadem charitate possum diligere Deum velle proximum diligere Deum hoc est diligere proximum quod est respectu honesti Quod probatur ex boâ— quod ista duo sc alquid velle diligere sunt ejusdem rationis To love our Neighbour is to will that together with us he should love God Scotus then doth not take the love of our Neighbour in such a latitude as the Defendant but far more restrainedly Secondly If Aquinas his opinion be that the habitual love of God and the habitual love of our neighbour be one simple and indivisible habit one specie infimâ then his opinion may be impugned by two arguments in the solution of which the Defendant may do well to take some pains The I. argument is because the habitual love of God is or ought to be more intense then the habitual love of our Neighbour and this inequality is an argument of a real essential and consequently specifical distiâ—ction For it cannot be numerical because duo accidentia numero tantùm diversa non possunt esse in eodem subjecto simul Secondly If the habitual love of God and the habitual love of out Neighbour were one and the same specifically then the acts of love that are terminated to our Neighbour all Duties of the Second Table would be elicite acts of the habitual love of God whereas 't is evident they are onely imperate acts thereof But the Defendant objects pag. 233 234. That God and our Neighbour are beloved for one and the same formal reason or object and therefore the habit of Divine love towards them must be one and the same Unto this it may be answered First That the love of God and the love of our Neighbour have one formal ultimate object or motive Yet their formal immediate objects may be different The formal object or motive of our love of God is his infinite Goodness considered as it is in himself and the immediate formal object of our love of our Neighbour is the Goodness of God commuâ— cated unto and shining in our Neighbour Secondly though the formal object be one and the same yet the application thereof and the way of tendeney thereunto is far different For 't is applied unto God intrinsecally unto our Neighbour extrinsecally Unto God as the end unto our Neighbour as the means And therefore our love of God is called Charitas finis and the love of our Neighbour Charitas propter finem To clear this I shall quote the words of Suarez Metaph. disp 44 sect 11 n 30. Advertendum est in omni habitu dari ex parte objecti aliquam rationem tendendi in illud quam motivum operandi possumus appellare c. habitus antem voluatatis tendunt ad prosequâ—ndum aliquod bonum omais autem proseâ—utio boni est ex aliquo motivo seu ex aliqud ratione boaitatis quae voluntatem attrahit Hoc ergo motivum seu ratiâ— tendendi est absque dubio quae dat actui specificam rationem quae eadem erit si aequaliter aut eodem modo per actus attingatur quia semper id quod est sermale est quod dat spectem materiale
autem est quasi per accidens vel individuale respectu talis actûs Dicâ— autem si aequaliter vel eodem modo talem rationem tendat nam contingit 〈◊〉 eandem rationem tendendi non aequè applicari diversis materiis ideo non eodem modo attingi per actus ut ect v. g. bonitas divina quatenus est in Deo reddit illum amabilem vel quatenus per quendam respectum applicatur proximo ut illum etiam amabilem reddat Nam licet illa bonitas in se una sit non tamen ill is rebus aequè conveâ—t ideò modus tendendi in illan non est idem Et idem est universum de bonicate finis respectu ipsius finis respectu mediorum de similibus in quibus ratio tendendi alteri intrâ—asâ—cè altis vero extrinsècè applicatur I confess Suarez holds that the habitual love of God and the habitual love of our Neighbour are but one indivisible habit But this is no hinderancè but that we may make use of his words against himself and the rather because what afterwards may be picked out of him in answer hereunto is very unsatisfying The utmost that he saith is that there is a necessary sonnexion betwixt the acts of the love of God and the love of our neighbour he saith the same of other acts But this connexion of the acts doth not prove an unity of the habits The habits may be connexed as well as the acts and connexion if it be real implieth a real distinction And 't is very observable that Suarez himself infers from the connexion of acts onely a possibility not a necessity of the unity of the habit Tandem quando actus ipsi sunt inter se connexi quasi radicati in aliquo primo tunc etiam possunt habere similem connexionem saltem virtualem in ipso habitu ergo quantum est ex hoc capite si aliud non obstet poterit idem indivisibilis babitus esse principium hujusmedi actuum Disp sect praedict n. 32. But I shall not pertinacioâ—sly contend about this matter but leave it to the judgement of the learned Reader Here I shall digress a little from the Defendant to consider the opinion of some School-men who maintain that 't is alwayes one and the savie act whereby God and our Neighbour are loved and they have of it a pretty illustcation from their tenet of Image-worship Look say they as an Image and its Prototype are worshipped with one and the same worshâ—p so God and our Neighbour are loved with one and the same act of love But the real distinction of the acts of the love of God and the love of our Neighbour I shall prove from four Arguments 1. From their separability there may be an actual love of God when at the same time there is not an actual love of our Neighbour And so again on the other side there may be an actual love of our Neighbour when at the same time there is onely virtual or habitual love of God For at the same time there may not be any actual cogitation of God Now things that may really be separated are qâ—estionless really distinguished 2. From their inequality The love of God ought to be more intense then the love of our Neighbour for it is to be with all the soul heart might and stâ—ength and therefore 't is really distinguished therefrom 3. From the dependency of the love of our Neighbour upon the love of God The actual love of God is the efficient cause of the actual love of our Neighbour and the efficient and the effect are alwayes really distinguished 4. From this may be drawn another Argument proceeding from the posteriority of the actual love of our Neighbour unto our actual love of God For being the effect thereof it must needs be after it and that really à parte rei and not onely in regard of our consideration Now this is an evidence of the real distinction of these acts for if they were one and the same act really then one and the same thing should be really both before and after it self which is a manifest contradiction But I return unto our Defendant and unto his second Argument which he pursues very copiously p. 236 c. usque ad 244. The sum of it is this There are not onely perfect and effectual but also imperfect conditionate and uneffectual acts of Christs will and those are gradually distinguished from these c. But what of all this it will not therefore follow that one act of Christs love of God is more intense then another act unless you can prove that these imperfect and uneffectual acts of Christs will are elicite proper and formal acts of his love of God This is a thing that you all along presuppose but have not proved nor never can prove Not onely Scholastical Dâ—vines but all that have any moderate insight into Practiâ—al Divinity will tell you Master Defendant that to say that Christs actual love of God is imperfect uneffectual conditionate is an ignorant gross and very lewd blaspbemy I shall but remark two things more touching this second Evasion of the Defendant and then proceed unto a third First Christs actual love of God which Dr. Hammond speaks of is not saith the Defendant frequently the action of loving but a term produced thereby and yet he saith p. 70. that the acts of Christs love of God are some of them terminated immediately on God and others of them on us men c. By this then it seems that the supposed utmost term of the action of loving in Christ is terminated further unto another term if not effective yet objective Now this is a very deep subtilty the clear explication and confirmation of which we shall justly expect from the Defendant 2. The Defendant grants that the outward expressions of love are not love it self and wonders that I can be so uncharitable as to think that Dr. Hammod was a man of so shallow and slendor parts as to take the outward expressions of love for love it self pag. 84 90 95. And yet he tells us that Dr. Hammond takes Christs actual love of God in such a latitude or amplitude as that it contains the whole duty of man towards God and our Neighbour whatsoever is good and excellent in him pag. 216 219 c. Now the outward expressions of the love of God are a part of man's duty and therefore by the Defendant are the love of God in Dr. Hammona's sense of the word How the Defendant will reconcile this the event will shew But go we on unto the third Evasion of the Defendant He distinguisheth of a two-fold actual love 1. the action of loving 2. the term of that action a quality produced thereby which for want of words is called love Now Dr. Hammond he saith is to be understood of the latter the term and not of the former the action of
That Christ's love which Dr. Hammond saith is capable of degrees c. is that very love which is commanded Deut. 6.5 a love of God with all the soul heart might and strength c. and that is a love proper and peculiar unto God and not to be communicated unto any creature And pray Sir is not this that high and transcendent act of Divine love you speak of pag. 5. whereby the soul is immediately fixed and knit to God as the onely good and then with what face can you deny it to be the love of God properly and formally taken But however the poor Refuter must be condemned lege falsarii pag. 5. right or wrong For whereas Doctor Hammond spake expresly of Christ's love of God the Refuter is so dull and simple an Animal as to understand him of his love of the Creator whereas alas Doctor Hammond had a profounder conceit which is highly rational in it self and is to be interpreted concerning his love of the Creature And this is enough to clear me from the crime of Forgery with which this shamelesse Defendant asperseth me But his Calumny will be the more apparent if we insist upon those two Tropes One of which he sayes the Doctor makes use of The first is the Metonymie of the effect and that is when the effect is put for the efficient Now do not you by your Discourse plainly insinuate that the efficient is here taken for the effect the love of God for the issues and effects of the love of God If there were then a Metonymie in Doctor Hammond's words it was by you a Metonymie of the efficient and not of the effect And indeed you tell us pag. 217. that all the acts of piety and mercy and charity and vertue are called the love of God by a Metonymie of the efficient because they flow from it And either this is a flat contradiction to what you here say or else the Metonymie of the efficient and of the effect must be confounded and be all one But secondly Dr. Hammond doth not make use of any Metonymie at all either of the efficient or of the effect For that which is termed the love of God only Metonymically is so called only equivâ—cally and that the love of God is here taken by the Doctor for that which is so stiled only equivocally you dare not aver for that which is predicated of a thing equivocally may in propriety of speech be denyed of it that which is the love of God only equivocally may be said not to be the love of God But you may perhaps say that he speaks if not by a Metonymy of the effect yet by a Synecdoche generis But Synecdoche generis as Vossius Alsted and other Rhetoricians have taught me is when the genus is put for the species as creature for man Mark 16.15 But how the love of God is here by Dr. H. taken for any of its species passeth my dull imagination I shall not therefore adventure so much as to guess at your meaning but patiently wait for your own Learned Explication of it And thus the Reader sees how this first Evasion that Dr. Hammond speaks of the love of God only as 't is taken tropically by a Metonymy of the Effect or by a Synecdoche generis fails against both Logick and Rhetâ—rick But it may be objected from pag. 6. That Christs love of God which Dr. Hammond speaks of is his prayer unto God now prayer is properly an act of Religion and Devotion towards God and improperly and figuratively an act of holy Charity or divine Love For answer 1 Though Prayer considered formally in it self be an act of divine Love only improperly and figuratively yet it implieth the love of God properly and formally taken and 't is undeniable that Dr. H. speaketh of Prayer under this consideration as implying the love of God properly and formally such for he bringeth Christs praying more earnestly as a proof to make good his exposition of those words Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy soul heart might and strength where the love of God is taken properly and formally Now of this exposition it can be no confirmation if the Doctor do not consider Christs prayer as implying his love of God properly and formally taken Though Prayer considered formally in it self be not properly an act of divine love but only implyedly viz. preposiâ—ivè and concomitantèr yet the reason which the Defendant brings for the confirmation of this because 't is properly and formally an act of Religion is very questionable For 2 According to the language of Protestant Divines one and the same Act may properly be an act of both Religion and holy charity too for they take Religion in so large a sense as that it comprehends all duties of he first Table Thus Ames makes all parts of Gods Worship both natural and instituted to be parts of Religion Now if this acception of Religion be proper it will not be material though it be somewhat different from that of the Schoolmen 2 But proceed we unto his Second Evasion which differs little from the former if at all but in termes and 't is concerning the acts of Christs love of God These saith the Defendant are of two sorts 1 Those that are immediately terminated on God the only good 2 Those that are immediately terminated on us men for Gods sake in whose love as the prime act they are all radicated and founded the one the Schooles call charitas ut finis the other they call charitas propter finem Though then the acts of Christs love as immediately terminated on God were always at the height and one equal perfection as was never yet questioned or denyed by the Doctor yet this nothing binders but that the other acts of this love of which alone the Doctor speaks regarding us for Gods sake might consist in a latitude and gradually differ from one another and fall short of the fervour of those acts that immediately respected God c. See pag. 3 5 22 70 71 216 c. usque ad 248 279. usque ad 291 328 329 335 336 338 343 361 372 373 516 c. Well then the great mistake of the Refuter is That whereas Dr. Hammond spake expresly of Christs actual love of God the Creator and yet meant thereby his actual love of man a creature the Refuter was such a dull Block-head as not to reach this hidden and invisible meaning of Dr. Hammond But first if this were a mistake it should not me thinks be so criminous and unpardonable For First The Refuter in his exposition of the actual love of God went by that common rule Analogum per se positum stat pro faviosiori analogato If a word hath two significations one proper another improper and â—â—opical it must be taken properly if it be put by it self and have nothing added to determine and carry it unto an improper and tropical sense Now the
loving p. 21 22 25 c. usque ad 42 73 74 75 76 77 115 116 117 118 120 121 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 211 212 113 214. But first suppose though not grant that there were such a term of the immanent action of loving yet this cannot be the actual Divine love which Dr. H. speaks of For 1. The actual love which he speaks of is the matter of that Commandement Deut. 6.5 Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart c. Now that the supposed term of the immanent action of love is not in any probability For 1. That is most likely to be the matter of this precept whose being is most undeniable and uncontroverted but the existence of immanent actions is less questioned then that of their terms The existence of these hath been much questioned by many subtil Philosophers and setting aside Philosophers the most of men never so much as dâ—camt of them Take ten rational and knowing men that never heard of this Question An omnis actio habeat terminum and demand of them whether they think that by the immanent actions of their senses their understandings and wills they preduce within themselves certain qualities of the same name with the actions themselves and I am confident that most if not all of them will return a negative answer 2. The matter of this precept is of a very important general an necessary obligation and therefore it must be obvious and evident unt all that have the use of their reason so that the knowledge of it ma be gained without any great difficulty but now the pretended terme of the action of loving is a very dark and abstruse thing and it will be a very difficult matter to make unlearned men understand it Nay I believe many great Scholars are yet strangers to what the Schoolmen say about the nature of it 3. We may and ought to examine the sincerity of that love of God in us which is commanded Deut. 6.5 But it would be new Divinity to say that we are to examine the terms of the immanent actions of divine love whether they be in us or no men may with some certainty review and reflect upon the habit of love and the immanent actions thereof but their reslex knowledg of the terms thereof can be but conjectural 2. The Love of which Dr. Hammond speaks is by the Defendant such wherein there is exercised that freedome of the will which is usually called a freedome of indifferency But there is no freedome of the will exercised in the supposed terms of the immanent action for they presupposing the actions are supposed to be necessary and unavoidable and therefore the will hath no indifferency unto them the will indeed is a free cause of the action of loving but this action if it be the cause of a terme it is the natural and necessary cause thereof 3. The Terme of the immanent action of loving is called love saith the Defendant for want of sufficient words but to affirm this of that actual love which Dr. Hammond speaks of is very very ridiculous For of that love saith he love is predicated as a genus and so in primo modâ— dicendi per se the love therefore that Dr. Hammond meant cannot be the terme of the immanent action of loving But secondly It is denyed also by many great both Philosophers and Divines that there is any such terme as the immanent action of loving and they say the same of all other immanent actions Indeed our Defendant takes notice of no Diffenters but my self and my poor Master Scheibler But this bewrayes his gross ignorance in the School-men many of whom lead the way unto Scheibler into this his opinion and go herein a great deale farther then he Durand is very express for it Lib. 1. dist 27. q. 2. Capreolus l. 1. dist 27. q. 2. quotes also Aureolus Petrus de Pallude Gerar. de Carmâ—lo as of the same judgment unto these I may add Scotus upon the same Dist quaest 3. and two Eminent Scotists Philip. Faber Favâ—ntinus lib. 1. disp 21. and Reda l. 1. Controvers 7. represent this to be the Common opinion of the followers of Scotus Unto all these let me farther subjoyn Raphel Aversa Philos tom 2. q. 58. Sect. 3. And Franciscus bonae spei in lib. de animâ Disp 2. dub 3. who mentions others of the same perswasion Oviedo though he blame Cajetan and other Thomists for denying actual intellection to have a terme because every action he thinks is productive of some terme or other yet he thinks this opinion may be so interpreted as to be drawn into a good sense and that is done he supposeth by making the terme not to be really distinct but the same with actual intellection Haec opinio jure ab omnibus rejecta si loquendi modum attemperaret mea quidem sententia optime posset defendi Existimo enim tantum in modo loquendi discedere à sententiâ quam poste à omnibus praeferam asserente intellectionem consistere in qualitate immediatè per se-ipsam nullâ interjectâ actione à principio dimanaute vel in actione identificatâ cum termino quod sic ostendo utraque opinio constituit intellectionem in entitate quadam immediatè ab intellectu dimananâ—e per suammet entitatem ex vi cujus intellectûs in actu secundo constituitur formaliter intelligens Ergo tantum differunt hae duae opiniones ex â—o quod una entitatem hanc essentialiter per suam entitatem ab intellectu dependentem nullum distinctum terminum respicientem vocat actionem sine termino altera â—andemmet entitatem vocat actionem â—um termino identificatam Neutra â—nim barum opinionum novam formalitatem concedit vel negat quam altera opinio diverso modo deâ—endat De anima Controv 6. punct 1. S. 1. It were an easie matter to produce many other testimonies But the matter must not be carried by the number of voices but by the weight of Arguments And therefore I shall next propound the Arguments on both sides The Arguments for the Negative may be ranged into two sorts the first prove that some immanent actions have no terms the second that no immanent actions have any terme The 1. That some immanent actions have no terms Cajetan as it is said determineth that intuitive intellections have no term and such are the Beatifical Vision of the Saints in Heaven the Angels intuitions of themselves And the reason which he giveth is Because the Objects of such intellections are per se present unto them and intimately conjoyned with them But omitting Cajetan I shall insist onely upon the Arguments of Scheibter which I referred unto in my refutation of Dr. Hammond's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Defendant is pleased in derision to call him my Master But where the wit of the Sarcasme lieth is best if not onely known unto himself If his meaning be that I have no Metaphysicks
Passe on to the fâ—urth and last Evasion of Dr. Creed I shall from what hath been said in impugning the Pretended Termes of Immanent Actions inferre the impertinency of all that he faith p. 72.73.74.75.76.77.115.116.117.118 In defence of this pro-Position Position in Dr. Hammond the word Love is a Genus equally comprehending the two Species habitual and actual Love or the Acts of Love For Dr. H. by actual Love or the Act of Love understands as hath been shewn the Action of Loving and not as the Defend most vainly pretends any quality Produced by that Action which is its Term and Product His Proposition then notwithstanding all Doctor Creeds Defence is still chargeable with that absurdity which I objected against it viz. that it makes Love as a Genus equally to comprehend as Species primo diveâ—sa things put in several Predicaments For habitual Love is in the Predicament of Quality and the action of loving in the Predicament of Action For further disproof of Dr. H. his preposition I shall add what I said touching the habit of Love and the sincere and cordial expressions thereof No one word can as a Genus equally comprehend the efficient and the effect viz. as species but the habit of Love is the efficient and the acts of Love are the effects thereof the habit of Love saith the Defend effectively concurres with the Will to the production of the inward Acts of Love therefore Love as a Genus doth not comprehend habitual Love and actual Love as Species The Major of this Syllâ—gisme the Defendant will say is most ridiculously false as appeares by what he saith to the like Syllogisme that I framed concerning the habit of Love and the Expressions thereof His Answer is very remarkable for the transcendent and matchless both ignorance and impudence of it and therefore I shall crave the Readers patience for a while to consider it Dr. CREED YOur third to begin with that for I shall not tie my self to your Method is most ridiculously falfe You say not to trouble our selves about the Moâ—d and Figure 3 No one word can as a Gerus equally comprehend the efficient and the effect The habit of Love is the efficient cause and the sincere and cordial expressions of Love are the effect Therefore Love is not predicated of them equally as a Genus Your Major Sir your Major by all meanes have a care of your Major For what think yâ—u Sir of all Vnivocal prâ—ductions When Fire produces Fire and Corn brings forth Corn when a Man begets a Man and one Heat makes another does not one and the same word as a Genus comprehend the efficient and the effect And is it not in these a certain maxime thaâ— Qualis est causatalis est effectus such as the Cause is in nature such also is the effect And I hâ—pe you will think it lawfull for things of the same nature to be comprehended under the same Genus Nay are not these distinguished from equivocal productions because in these Effectum est ejusdem ratiâ—nis cum efficiente but in the other efficiens non convenit cum effectu in eadem forma sed eminenter illam câ—ntinet Nay does not your own Scheibler as well as Suarez both whom you so seriously commend to the Doctor 's perusall tell you that Causa univoca est quae prâ—ducit effectum similem in specie But methinks Sir if since your more noble more serious employments in the Study and writing of Scholasticall and Practicall Divinity you had thought sit to neglect such Vulgar Authors and to forget the Common Notions and Maximes delivered by them yet you should at least have observed this in your reading of Aquinas that in his Sums does frequently deliver this doctrine and makes very good use of it And now Sir I hope you will think it lawfull for things of the same Nature to be comprehended under the same Genus For where I pray will you rank the several individualls of the self-same Species for such are all Vnivocall Causes and Effects as is plain from Sense and Experience if not under the same Genus I might prove the grosse and palpable falshood of your Major Sir by divers instances drawn from equivocall productions where the Cause and Effect must be placed in the same predicament and consequently under the same remote Genus at least which is sufficient to destroy your Major When the Sun and Stars produce Gold and Silver and Brasse and other Mineralls when they produce Sâ—ones of all sorts and kinds in the Bowâ—lls of the Earth are not the cause and the effect at least as species subalternae placed under the siâ—ne Genus of substantia Corporea When an Asse begets a Mule or a Man produces Wormes and Vermin in his Head and Entrailes and when a Woman brings for mâ—nstrâ—ous births instead of Lâ—gitimate issues as Serpâ—nts Moles and Froggs and other such like of which among Physitians there are maâ—y true stories I pray Sir must not the cause and effect be both ranged under the same immediate Genus proximum which is Animal So when light produces Heaâ— are not the Cause and the Effect both put in the same Predicament under the same Genus of Patible Qualities To keep closer to the business more immediately in controversie The habit of Love effectively concurrs with the will of to the production of the inward Acts of Love and yet I say that love as a Gâ—nas is Equally predicated of the habit and the inwaâ—d Acts of Love as has already been demenstrated and may in due time bâ— further proved notwithstanding any thing you have or can say to the contrary And this is abundantly more than sufficient to shew the faâ—shoâ—d of your Major when you say that no one word can as a Genus whether proximum or remotum sâ—mmum or subalâ—eâ—um for you â—bsâ—lutely deliver it equally comprehend the Efficient and the Effect The Major which you say Is most ridiculously false and against which you make so horrible an Out-cry I shall fortifie by three reasons The 1. Is because Genus Analogum non praedicatur aequaliter dae speciebus But now Analogy viz. Attributionis Intriâ—secae consists in dependency from which Effective dependency is not excluded as is maintained by the generality of the ancient Thomists by my Master Scheibler Metaph. lib. 2. cap. 1. art 3. cap. 3. tit 5. art 1. And by Scheibler's Master Suarez Mâ—taphys di p. 28. s 3. disp 32. s 2. n. 11 12 13 14 15. By â—â—enâ—us a Frier Ca melite Discep in Univers Logic. p. 113. Martinus Exercit. Metaph. p. 521. And by divers others as you may see in Stalio Reg. Philosoph p. 397. And upon this account is it that Ens is made to be Gerus Analogum to Ens creatum and increatum to substantia and accidens And I have read in the Manuscript of a Great Philosopher of the Vniversity of Oxford that for this reason Qualiâ—as is geâ—us Analogum because of the
Pâ—râ—pâ—teticis licet in actibus ad extra pâ—â—â—ant Dâ—um agere necessariò beati in patria sâ—â—undum nos libere diligunt Dâ—â—n tamen necessario licâ—t â—rgo in voluntâ—â—â— creata pro hoc statu couâ—iagentia concomitâ—nter libertatem saepe consunâ—â—ntur tamen propr è loqu 〈…〉 idem ut vidimus ex hoc patet solutâ—o dabâ—tat onis quia licet concedamus Spiritum Sanctum procedere libere non tamen ab hoc sequitur contingerter produci Faber Faventinus In 1um lib. Sent. disp 37. c 4. p. 224 325. answer that there is no such repugnancy betwixt freedome and necessity as is imagined indeed a natural agent and a free are opposite and so also a necessary agent and cowingent And therefore the same agent in the sane act cannot work naturally and freelâ— wâ—â—ssarily and contingently But now there is no such opposition betwixt natural and contingent and betwixt free and nâ—cessary and hereup on it followeth that a natural agent may work contingently and per accidens as we see in Monsters in casu and soâ—â—wta and so again on the other side a free agent may work necessarily thus God loves himself most freely and yet withal most necâ—ssarily too Rada hath four very shrewd Arguments to prove the coâ—sistency of the highest freedome with the highest necâ—ssity which I shall insert for the Defendant to try his utmost still upon Quod summa necessitas â—star cum summâ libertate probo multipliciter Primòvoluntas divina necessariò vult bonitatem suam ut supra ostendimus tamen in volendo eam est libera igitur libertas stat cum summâ necessitate Consequentia tenet minorem verò probo Voluntas divina refert ad finem alia objecta quae sunt volibilia propter finem igitur ipsa sub eadem ratione potentiae est operativa circa utrunque sed circa ea quae sunt ad sinem operatur sub ratione potentiae liberae ut etiam Thomistae concedunt ergo etiam circa sinem ut puta circa bonitatem suam operabitur sub ratione potentiae liberae ergò liberè vult bonitatem suam Prima consequentia hujus argumentationis probatur quia potentia operans circa unum objectum non absolutè sed in ordine ad aliud eadem sub eadem ratione est operativa circa utrunque Quod pater ex Philos 2. de anima tex Com. 146. ubi ait quod potentia illa qua cognoscimus differentiam unius objecti ab alio illamet sub eadem ratione potentiae cognoscit utrunque ergo simâ—liter in proposiâ—o potentia operans circa unum objectum in ordin ad aliud ipsa sub eadem ratione potentiae operabitur circa utâ—unque Et câ—nfiâ—matunquia alias oporterer constituere unam potentiam quae versaretur ciâ—ca sinem aliam circa media Secundò probatur Libertas est Conditio intrinseca voluntatis absolute vel in ordâ—ne ad actum volâ—ndi ergo est compossibilis cum conditione perfecta operaâ—ionis perfectae circa perfectâ—ssimum Objectum praesertim illa conditio nâ—n repugnat imâ— otest convenire tali operationi sed talis conditio in operatione perfâ—ctâ—est necessitas Erâ—ò libertas est compossibilis cum necessitate Antecedens est manifestum quia voluntas natura sua intâ—inseca libera est Consequentia probatur quia conditio intrinseca potentiae quae secundum se nullam dicit imperfectionem non potesf esse contraria perfectioni operationis ejusdem potentiae quia tunc prorsus repugnaret hujusmodi potentiae habere perfectam operationem etiam in ente infinito in quo reperitur Sâ—dâ—quod talis conditio perfecta sit necessitas patet quia perfectio voluntatis unde voluntas est est diligere Deum ergo perfectionis est habere illam operationem sirmiter necâ—ssariò Et confirmatur quia posse non habere illam dicit imperfectionem ergò necessariò habere illam perfectionis est maximae rutsus ergo est possibilis illa necessitas in operatione perfectâ— voluntatis ut voluntas est alias enim nec in Deo reperitetur Tertiò probatur Actio circa finem ultimum ut finis est est perfectissima ergo necessitas in tali actione non tollit sed magis ponit id quod ad ejus perfectionem per sepertinet sed libertas maxime eam perficit ergo necessitas quae in tali actione reperitur non tollit sed ponit potius libertatem Probo assumptionem quia actio libera ex natura sua est perfectior cunctis operationibus ut in controversiis quarti Deo favente ostendemus Quarto probatur Qâ—antoactio voluntatis circa finem ultimum est magis necessaria tanto est liberior Ergo summa necessitas est compossibilis cum summa libertate Consequentia est evidens antecedens probo quia secundum Anselmum Augustinum quos suprà citavimus illa voluntas est liberior quae omninò à rectitudine deviare non potest sed illa quae necessariò simpliciter diligit bonum insinitum à rectitudine nullatenus deviare potest ergo illa est liberrima sed talis est divina voluntas respectu dilectionis Dei c. ergo est respectu carum liberrima In 1 â—m lib. Sent. Controv. 13. p. 213 214. The Defendant is pleased to say page 68. That the Saints and Angels in heaven love God freely with a freedome improperly taken for a liberty from coâ—action But first the Scotists * Cenditio intrinscca potentâ—e â—â—n repugnot perfâ—ctioni inâ—p rando ip Gus potenâ—ie si 〈◊〉 ab sulatè potâ—mia consideretu siâ— in ordine adâ—actum perfectum sâ—d libertas est coad tio intrinscea essentiatis voluntatis ergo non repugnat pâ—rficiâ—oni â—â—sius vol nâ—aâ—is in operande ei ca actium porfâ—ctissmum Faber Faventinus In 1um lib. Sâ—nt disp 37. c 3. p. 221. will tell him that freedome is attributed unto their love of God in the greatest propriety For the beatisick love is the greatest perfection incident unto their wills and freedome is an intrinsâ—cal and essential condition of their wills Now say they thâ—â— which is intâ—insâ—cal and esscutâ—â—l unto a power or faculty cannot be repugnant unto the greatest perfect on thereof therefore the beatisick love of God which is accessary and freedome are no wayes inconsistent Secondly In their love of God there is a freedome not only from coact on but also from natural necessity such as that which is in the metion of a stone downward which prelupposeth no act of the understanding The nâ—cessity which is in their love of God is not such anecessity but a voluntary necessity which hath alwayes foregoing anact of intellectual knowledge And this for the first answer unto the difficulty propounded There is by some School-men given another indeed a quite contrary answer and 'c is that Christs love of God was not meritorious and in asserting this they think there is no absurdity
because there is otherwise a very wide and spacious field for Christs merit in the acts of his love of man and in the â—cts of his other vertues Of this opinion Becaâ—us makes mention Sum. Theol. Scholast tom 5. c. 14. q. 3. Alij sic sâ—â—t unt Christiam suisse viatorens not solum ratione carnis animae passibilis sicut jam explâ—catum est sed etiam ratione animae quatenus amabat proximos Comprehensorem vero ratione animae quatenusamabat Deum clare visam Itaque meruisse per actium charitatis circa proximos non tamen per actum charitatis circa Deum This opinionhe thinks to be probable and Suarez in 3am part Thom. tom 1. disâ— 39. S. 2. saith that it may easily be defended The contrary opinion therefore at the most is but a Scholastical Probleme But Vasquez hath a full defence of this Opinion that Christs love of God was not meritorious and with it he joyneth a refutation of this distinction of Christslove given by Suarez and others the passige is somewhat large but because 't is home and accurate I hope I shall have the Readers patience for the inserting of it Mihi verò multò probabilius semper visum est Christum non meruisse per affectum ullum charitatis dilectionis erga Deum sed per opera aliarum virtutum tam circa se quam circa proximum c. Primum igitur Christum non meruisse per illum actum charitatis ortum ex scientia infusa in Doctrina S. Thomae manifestum est nam cum ille aperte dicat q. 11. a. 1. essentiam Dei ac proinde mysterium ipsum Trinitatis non cecidisse sub scientiam infusam id quod nos etiam supra disputatione 53. c. 11 satis saperque probavimus consequitur nullum potuisse in Chrislo esse affectum dilectionis erga Deum pâ—aeter illum quem vocant beatificum cumque ille non potuerit esse meritorius ut pâ—aecedenti capite monstravimus effieitur etiam per nullum actum dilectionis Dei Ghristum mereri potuisse quamvis enim diâ—amus in Christo mansisse scientiam naturalem unins Dei tamen illa non potuit esse principium dilectâ—onâ—s ipsius Dei ex charitate ut manifestum est Praeterea cum Christus non habuerit fidem sequitur ex nulla cognitione potuisse Deum dilâ—gere Age tamen concedamus Christo scientiam-infusam essentiae Dei distinctâ—m ab adquisita nihilomâ—nus frustra in eo concedemus daos affectus charitatis erga Deum alterum ortum ex visione clam Dei alterumâ—ex scientia infusa nam affectus dilectionis tendit in rem cognitam sicut in subjectum non autem in ipsam cognitionem ergo licet esset scientia infusa Dei in Christo quia tamen esset eadem bonitas ipsius Dei proposita voluntati per scientiam infusam per visionem idem-effectus esset dilectionis qua ratione ut communis fert opinio Theologorum eadem est dilectio Dei in via in patria quamvis visio Dei in patria essâ—t causa novi actus dilectionis Dei quia intensius eliceretur aut alio modo tamen non potest esse causa diversi actus secundum speciem uterque actus simul non posset manere in patria etiamsi in patria posset manere fides non quidem alia ratione nisi quia dum-voluntas movetur circa objectum duplici modo cognitum solum ab eo allicitur prout perfectiori modo cognito ipsum autem prout cognitum minus perfecto modo nihil mover voluntatem acâ—â— eo modo cognitum non esset hoc quisque quotidie in se ipso experitur nam cum quis diligit alium ex relatu atque ipsum ea quae de ipso audiverat postea vider jam non ex relatu sed ex clara visione experientia ipsum diligit aliorum testimonium nihil in ipso operatur ut eam diligat quae doctrina multo majori ratione in pâ—aesenti locum habet nam cum essentia divina per claram vifionem perfectissimo modo videatur ita ut necessariò ad se trahat voluntatem per affâ—ctum amoris ut supra diximus neque adeò rapiet ad se voluntatem ut ipsa deinceps moveri non possit ex alio genere cognitionis ad diligendum Deum alio affectu aut codem Quod verò dicitur Johannis 14. Sed ut cognoscat mundus quia dâ—ligo patrem sicut mandatum dedit mihi Pater sic facio surgite eamus hinc non probat Christum per dilectionem Dei nobis redemptionem meruisse quia eo loco solum commendatur charitas Christi erga Patrem obedientia de merito â—autem operatione meritoria non agitur Here Vasquez presupposeth two things already proved by him 1. That in Christ there was no infused knowledge of the essence of God and the mystery of the Trinâ—ty distinct from the beatifical Vâ—sion 2. That Christs beatifique love of God was not meritorious Having premised these tâ—o things he next proves that though there were in Christ an infused knowledge of the essence of God distinct from the beatâ—fical vision yet it would not hereupon follow that there should be in him a love of God distinguished from that which was the sequele of the beatisical vision and the reason is because there was one and the same goodness propounded unto his will by the infused knowledge and the beatâ—sique vision and therefore the same effect of love where the will is moved and stiâ—ed up about an object known after a twosold manner it is only allured and wrought upon as 't is known after the more perfect way and manne◠〈◊〉 when I come to see by experience those good things in a man which before I knew only by report I then love him only upon mine own experimental knowledge and no longer upon the relation of others Lastly Suppose this distinction of Christs love of God were true and sound yet 't is utterly unserviceable for the defence of Dâ— Hammond and that by the opinion of the Defendant himself For Dr. Hammond saith he is to be understood of the acts of Christs love terminated towards man for Gods sake Now the Authors and Fautoâ—s of this distinction understand it expressly concerning the act of Christs love * Dico ergo primo habuisse Christum actum amoris Dei liberum supernaturalem elicitum à charitate ab amore beatisico distinctum illo actu perfectissime meruisse Ita intelligo sententiam D. ' Tho. hic solutione ad primum dicentis meruisse Christum per charitatem non in quantum erat charitas comprehensoris sed in quantum crat viatoris ubi de charitate lequitur prost terminatur ad Deum Suarez in 3 part Thom. tom 1. disp 39. S. 2. p. 622. as terminated towards God himself and they do distinguish it from the acts of
his love of his neighbour This is so plain in Suarez out of whom the Dâ—fendant borroweth the distinction as that one would think it impossible for the Gentlâ—man to oversee it But this oversight renders it very probable that he never read Suarez himself but had the distinction sent him from some friend who knew not the consistency of it with his other distinctions Unto this we may adde that those that stickle for this twofold actual love of God in Christ as terminated unto God himself have not so much as one word or syllable for the indifferency of his love as Viator touching the degrees whereof all the indifferency that they assert therein is Contradistionis quoad exercitium actus So much is affirmed by Gregory De Valentia tom 4. disp 1. q. 19. punct 2. Hunc actum charitatis aiunt in Christo fuisse aliquo modo liberum ita scilicet ut posset ab eo certe aliquando desistere c. quam libertatem modo diceudi in Scholis usitato vocamus libertatem quoad actus excreitium tantum c. But our Defendant himself will not deny that all the inward acts of the love of God in Christ that were terminated immediately on God himself were alwayes at the highest equally intense And therefore this distinction being meant of the acts of Christs love of God as terminated unto God himself can do Dr. Hammond no service at all in this Controversie Having beaten the Râ—fater from all his Evasions I shall next examine what he saith unto my three Arguments The first is drawn from the all fulnâ—ss and perfection of Christs habitual grace The habits of all graces and vertues in Christ were alwayes fulâ— and perfect most intense and not capable of further or higher degrees and therefore so are the inward acts or actions of those graces and vertues too Now what is said in general of the habits of all graces may in particular be averred of the habitual grace of divine charity That in Christ was alwayes full and perfect most intense and not capable of further or higher degrees and therefore so were the inward acts that is actions thereof too Here are two Enthymems implyed the latter subordinate unto the former For habitual grace is the genus of divine charity and not the equivalent thereof as the Defendant fondly thinks That I make it p. 330. B. the Consequence of the latter Enthymem I proved p. 3 4 12. from which the confirmation of the former may easily be collected The said proof of the Consequence I shall briefly repeat and somewhat re-inforce And 't is that there can no other ground be assigned for the intension of the action of loving of God in Christ but the intension of the habit of love which Dr. Hammond and his Defendant both affirm in Christ to be alwayes so full and intense as that it was not capable of further or higher degrees For an action is not capable of degrees of intension and remission but sâ—condarily mediante qualitate which it produceth or from which it proceedeth vatione termini or vatione principij it cannot be ratione termini any quality that was the effective term the product of the inward action of love for that there is no such term or product of the action of love hath now been largely confirmed And if it be said that it was ratione principij then it must be in regard of the habitual grace of divine love for there are but two qualities that are the principles of the action of loving God in Christ the power or faculty of the will and the habitual grace of love Now the power or faculty of willing cannot be intended in any man and the habitual grace of love in Christ was alwayes so intense as that in him 't was uncapable of further intension and consequently all the inward actions flowing therefrom were of an equal intension Here your Answer unto which you referre is that I ignorantly or wilfully confound the immanent acts of love with the action of loying c. And that the Doctor speaks of the immanent acts of love and not at all of the actions p. 21 22. But first I have proved that there are no such things in rerum naturá as the acts of love distinguished from their actions as their termes Secondly Suppose that there were such termes yet that the Doctor cannot reasonably be understood of them hath been sufficiently demonstrated Unto this I adde ex abundanti the testimonies of some few Schoolmen from which may be gathered that the habit and the act are alwayes equal in gradual perfection and from this it will follow that if the habit be alwayes equally â—ntense the act mâ—st be so too But now for preventing all future mistakes and to cut off the Defendants Objections I shall lay down of this a limitation which might easily have been foreseen and is usually in things of this and the lâ—ke nature It is to be understood caeteris paribus provided that all other caâ—sâ—s concurre equally and uniformly unto the act so that the habit be not hindred by them but left to its natural way of working Now in Christ caetera erant paria there was no disâ—arity but a most absolute and perfect equality and uniformity in the influence of other causes viz. The will of Christ and Gods assisting grace in the production of his actual love of God hâ—s will never willed any abatement of the act and God never withdrew his assisting grace in the least degree or measure and therefore his habitual love of God wrought in him alwayes equally and uniformly as to the inward acts thereof Having premised this limitation which I shall intreat the Reader to carry along with him in his mind in that which followeth Let us come unto what you say unto the testimonies themselves First you quarrel me for that I cite not Aquiâ—as from his own writings But quote him twice from Caprcolus but I had very good reason for this for the passages that I quote are not in Aquinas his Sâ—mâ—nes or in his book Contra gentes which is all that I have of Aquinas The first passage he quotes out of Aquinas De Vertutibus q. 1. a. 11. and the second is out of the same work questio de charitate art 10. I believe that if you had read Caprcolus you would have been as much to seek to sind these places in Aquinas as I was If you can direct me to them I shall thank you but I suppose 't is a book not commonly to be had The first testimony you do not answer but outface From iâ— I truly as you grant concluded that a greater vehemency in the operation of love argued a greater participation in the subject of the habit of love Now from this it undeniably followeth that if the operation of love be more vehement at one time than another then the subject doth more participate of the habit of love at one time than another and
Contradiction for they incline unto frequency of their acts loco tempore debitis and incline against sinful omission of their acts This Reason may for the substance of it be collected from what the School-mâ—n usually say to prove that free-will doth not consist in a habit I shall at present content my self only with a Quotation of Aquinas Primâ part q. 83. a. 2. Corp. Habitus dicuntur secundum quos nos habemus ad pâ—ssionâ—s vel ad actus bâ—ne vel male nt dâ—citur in 2. Ethic. Nam per temperantiam bene nos habemus ad omcupiscentiâ—s Per intemperantiam a tem male Per scientiam etiam bene nos habemus ad actum incellectus dum verum cognoscimus per habitum autem contearium male Liberum awem arbitrium indifferenâ—er se habet ad bene eligendum vel male unde impossibile est quod liberum arbitrium sit habiâ—us This mutatis matandis will prove that no habit is formally free Secondly Though habits be not formally free yet I confess they are in regard of their use and exercise subject * Aquinas 1. 2 ae q. 52. a. 3. q. 63. a. 2. q. 71. a. 4. unto the impery of the will So that the will freely useth or not useth them But this will no wayes advantage the Defendant for all men are obliged to act the habit of love as touching its inward acts unto the highest ad extremum virium They are bound to love God with all their might and strength therefore with all their habitual might and strength and if their love fall short of this height it is sinâ—ul and defective which cannot without blasphemy be imagined of Christ who was impeccabilis and therefore fulfilled all righteousness and therefore when he loved God he lovâ—d him as much as he could the all-fulness of his actual love was for dâ—grees answerable to the all-fulness of his nabitual As for his Answer to my seconâ— Argument drawn from the beatifical vision in Christ that hath been sufficiently replyed unto in my examination of his distinction of Christs love of God as he was Viator and as he was Comprebenso The third and last Argument was fetcht from Christs impeceability It was impossible for Christ to sin but if the inward acts of his love of God had been less intense at one time than at another he had sinned for he had broken that first and great Commandment Thou shalte love the Lord thy God with all thy heart with all thy soul with all thy mind with all thy might and strength Deut. 6.5 Mat. 22.37 Mark 12.30 Luke 10.27 In Answer unto this Argument the Defdenant insists from pag. 357. usque ad 520. of examining which his own concession will save the labour for he grants that if we speak of that eminent act of holy charity that is immediately terminated on God himself we are bound to love God to the utmost height we can and that he who doth not so love him doth not love him so much as he deserveth or as much as man ought and that therefore the acts of Christâ— love as immediately terminated on God were alwayes at the the height and one equal perfection p. 71. Now that Doctor Hammond is to be understood of this eminent act of holy charity that is immediately terminated on God I have clearly demonstrated and unlesse the Defendant can answer my arguments his accusation of my third argument as guilty of that Sophisme which the Philosopher calleth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 will passe but for an idle and ignorant calumny The Defendants friends may be ready to say that 〈◊〉 decline the examination of that which followeth because 't is unanswerable but alass there 's no such matter for that it is a very â—otten eâ—roneous discourse guilty of complyance with Popâ—ry in a great measure I shall shortly demonstrate in a dâ—stinct Treatise if God grant me life health and liberty The reason then why at present I take no further notice of it is because not only the Stationer but divers good friends have for several reasons much importuned me to contract this Debate as much as I could and I should now forth with put a period to it but that I am desirous to give the Readet in brief a further taste of the inconsâ—qâ—â—â—ncies with which 〈◊〉 work of Doctor Creed is every where fraught First p. 53 54 55 56 57 he concludes that a habit of divine love in Christ was not capable of further degrees because the act and exercise of it was capable of further degrees If Christs love of God in the act and exercisâ— was capable of Degâ—ees more intense at one time than another and had in its latitude or amplitude several Degrees one different from another secundâ—m magis minus all them comprehended in because issuing from the habit of Divine Love then this babitual love of God must be acknowledged all-full and perfect alwayes pray Master Defendant mark the word alwayes in him so fall and so perfect as not to want and so not to be capable of further degrees But the Antecedent is true and therefore also the Consequent The evidence of the sequel is supposed and grounded upon two very â—nowâ— Maxims Nihil est in effectu quod non prius erat in causâ and Nihil dat quod non habit This is an argument silly and ridiculous beyond all comparison for mutatis mutandis a man from it may argue against the growth of the habit of love in all the Saints that ever were are or shall be on the earth If their love of God in this life in the acts and exercise was capable of Degrees c. then their habitual love of God must be acknowledged all-full and perfect alwayes in them so full and perfect as not to want and so not to be capable of further degrees As for the two known Maxims they will do him no service unlesse he put in the word semper Nihil est in effectu quod non erat prius semper in causa Nihil dat quod non habet semper And if you adde the particle semper every fresh-man will soone discover their notorious falshood Secondly p. 57. he hath another rare consequence The Apostle saith that Christ's being in the forme of God though he thought it no robbery to be equal with God yet made himself of no reputation and took upon him the forme of a servant and was made in the likunesse of man and being found in fashion as a man he humbled himself and became obedient unto death even the death of the Crosse wherefere God also hath exalted him Therefore Christs love viz. actual and inward was more intense at one time than another v.z. iâ— his agony and dying for us more intense than in his suffering nakednesse and hunger for us Thirdly in p. 18 19. of my Refutation of Doctor Hammonds 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I have these words If this be your meaning I must needs assume the
boldnesse to tell you that no such matter is visible unto me in any of the School-men But perhaps you may mean such School-men as such a Puny as I never saw or heard of however you cannot expect bâ—lief until you produce their testimonies And I shall intreat you to alledge such as may be had in Pauls-Church yard oâ— at least in the Library at Oxford Now from this the Defendant concludes â— 62. that I tell the world in effect that I have all the School-men at my singers end nay just as many no more nor no lesse than are in Pauls-Charchyard and the Lâ—bâ—ary as Oxford Fourthly p. 88 89. the Defendant saith that I do not throughly understand a passage which I quote out of Raynandus My words are these Kaynaudus makes mention out of Gabriel Biel of a distinction of love into affâ—ctive and effâ—ctive and â—hat is this effective love but the effects and expressions of love But now that he doth not take this to be a proper destribution of a Gâ—nus into its Species appeareth by what he saith out of the same Author concerning the division c. Well where lieth my mistake in these words why plain it is say you from Raynaudus that love effective is not only the outward sensible effects and expressions but also something else For though it be true that all the outward sensible effects and expressions of love be love effective or in plain English the issues and effects of love yet the termes are not reciprocil and convertible For there are many effects of love that are not sensible and thus external For instance good wishes good prayers are the effects of true love so also are joy at the we fare of the beloved persons wâ—ll-doing and sorrow and grief at his miscarriage and yet thâ—y are not alwayes expressed nor does any prudent man alwayes shew his joy or grief or expresse his good wishes thoughts and desires to him be most tenderly affects Well what of all this Why saith the Defendant the subject-matter of your discourse leads me necessarily to understand your interrogation of the outword sensible effects and expressions of love Sir you must put in the word only or else you say nothing to the purpose and if you put that in what you say is very false It is I say false that the subject-matter of my discourse leads you necessarily to understand my interrogation only of the outward sensible effects and expressions of love and you can never prove it by any rule of argumentation Indeed my designe is to prove that love is not a genus unto the outward expressions of love or that the outward expressions of love are not a species of love and may not this be very well proved though in my interrogation the effects and expressions of love be taken in a general sense abstracting from both inward and outward expressiens may not that which is denied of estective love in general that is all effects and expressions of love be particularly denied of the outward and sensible expressions of love Did you never hear of arguing à genâ—re ad spâ—ciem negativè grounded upon this Maxâ—me * Sanderâ—â—m Logâ—â— p. 205. Quod convenit aut not convenit generi Convenit etiam aut non convenit spâ—câ—eâ— Is it not a good argument to conclude that homâ— is not lapis bâ—cause nullum animal it lâ—pis because no effective love no effects and expressions of love are a species of love will it not thence irrefâ—agably follow that no outward effects and expressions of love are a speciâ—s of love Fifthly I had said p. 10. of my Refutation c. I am very loth to enter into a Contest with so great a Critick touching the meaning of a word And from this innocent and harmiess passage the Defendant concludes That I contemptuously undervalue the Doctoâ—'s excellent Critical learning That with me a Critick is but a whisting Grammaâ—ian an empty Pedagâ—gae p. 96 97 98 99 100 101. That the Doctor in my opinion is some petty Grammaticaster that knows the meaning of Musa and can tell how to decline Lapis some great Critick for sooth one fit to teach School-boyes perhaps the meaning of a Greek or Latine Author but for any skill in the Arts and Reserches of Philosophy he is a very Dunce and not at all seen in the curious speculations and subtleties of School-learning But what colour is there for these odious sequeles in my words Indeed they can be drawn from no Topick place but that of the Defendant's furious malice Sixthly Whereas Dr. Hammond had said that each of the expressions of Christs love of God had an act of internal love of which they were so many proportionably different expressions I answered that if the Doctors meaning were that these different expressions in regard of intension must be proportioned exactly unto their inward respective acts of love must be equal or parallel unto them then I denyed what he said and called upon him for the proof of it Now this my denyal which no rational man can or will deny the Defendant himself most unnecessarily and idly confirms in 16. pages p. 139 140 c. usque ad 155. and p. 150 151 152 153 154. he quotes the testimonies of many School-men for the confirmation hereof and in the close of all this he wonders at my omission of these and the like testimonies And hereupon he concludes my ignorance in School-men His words are these And therefore I cannot chuse but wonder that our Refuter should take no notice of these or the like passages which to ordinary eyes would have shewed more to his advantage than all that he has quoted in his Panphlet from the School-men and Suarez and Scheibler to boot But this and some other passages in his book which offered themselves at first sight make me not value his School-learning at the same rate and pâ—ice he has put upon it in the Title-page of his mixture But old Homer was blind though he were the Prince of Poets and our Writer of Practical and Scholastical Divinity sees not all things in those Doctors that may most serve for his advantage Here by the way I deny that I put such a rate and value upon my School-learning in the Title-page of my Mixture as the Defendant pretends only I profess my self a Well-wisher unto Scholastical Divinity desirous to revive the study thereof but however there is not either in mine or in his own discourse any foundation shall I say nay not so much as any shadow for either his wender or censure The particle therefore therefore I cannot chuse but wonder c. plainly intimates that what he saith is a conclusion drawn from something foregoing And for my part I have most diligent'y sought for premises unto this conclusion and can find none and therefore must earnestly entreat the Defendant to direct us where or what they are In my fore-mentioned denyal I acted the part of a Respondent and by
what laws of disputation a Respondent though a School-man is obliged to heap up testimonies out of School-men for the confirmation of every denyal that he makes especially if the proposition denyed be apparently false as this was viz. That the outward expressions and the inward acts of love of God in Christ must of necessity be of equal intension And thus hoping that by the next we shall know why you fell into this fit of wondering I pass on Seventhly In the next place you tell us that in men the inward affection commonly varies according to the intension and remission of the outward expressions and effects and in prosecution of this he spends with a great deal of noise and triumph about 16. pages more p. 155 156 c. â—usque ad 171. But what of all this Sir is this any thing to the matter in hand Can you from any thing in this tedious discourse inferre any thing against my Denyal vlz. that the outward different expressions of love must of necessity be proportioned exactly unto their inward acts of love and if you cannot as undoubtedly you cannot to what end serves all that you say but to waste time pen ink and paper But you tell us often that the Doctor is no wayes engaged to prove that the inward acts of love and the outward expressions are of necessity equal in point of intension But the contrary will appear to every Puâ—sâ—ny in Logick that will but peruse the Doctors sequel as 't is in him at large for thus it runneth and from hence I suppose is unavoidably consâ—queâ—t prâ—y Mr. Defendant mark the word unavoidably that that act of internal love expâ—esâ—ed by Christs dying for us was supeâ—â—â—ur to thâ—se â—oâ—mer act supply in intention which only exprest themselves in his povertie and so the same person that loved sincerely did also love and expresse that love more intensely at one time then at another which was the very thing I said in another instancâ— Now choose unto this consequent what Antecedent you will out of Dr Hammonds words either those that are immedâ—aâ—ely foregoing yet it being â—eâ—â—ain that each of these expresâ—ions had an act of internal love of which they were so many propertionabâ—y different expressionâ— or thâ—se that precede these To this I subjoyne that such as the expression waâ— such was the act of inward love of which that was an expression and from it it is impossible for you or any other of Dr. Hammonds friends to inferre thâ—s consequent But you pretend p â—68 that you have done the feat your self And now because you pâ—â—sesse and it is your third charge that the reason of the Doctâ—rs consequencâ— is to you invisible and that you shall never acknowledge his Inference legitimate uâ—til you be dâ—iven thereto by â—educing his Enâ—hymeâ—â—e unto a Syllogisme I shâ—â—l â—nce for your better satisfaction â—â—rsâ—râ—e it Iâ— ordinaâ—iâ—y there iâ— and must be a proportionable agreement in respect of Inâ—erâ—ion and Râ—mission betwixt the inward acts of love and the outward expressions then that act of internal love expressed by Christs dyiâ—g for us was superiour to thâ—se former acts which only exprest themselves in hâ—s Povertie c. But the Antecedent is true as we have shewed from reason and experience and the Authâ—rity of Gregory and the Schoolmen Therâ—fâ—re also is the consequent First for the major of this your Syllogisme I demand concerning the Consequent vvhether you inferre it from your Anteâ—edent necessarily or only probably If you say only probably then your Consequent is none of Dr. Hammâ—nds for he supposeth that his follovveth necâ—ssarily from vvhat he hath said Hence I suppose it faith he unavoidably consequent that is necessarily consequent that that act of internâ—l love expressâ—d by his dying for us was superiour to those former acts which only exprest themselves in his povertie If you say you inferre it necessarily then the consequent is evidently false you must then change in your Antecedent the vvord ordinarily and in the room thereof put in the vvord necessarily or else the consequent vvill not follovv unavoidably As for the assumption that is evidently false too if you supply what is to be supposed for then thus it runs Ordinarily there is and must be in all men and was in Christ a proportionable agreement in respect of intention and remission betwixt the inward acts oâ— the love of God and the outward expressions thereof Now all men are by the commandement of God which Christ fulfilled oblâ—ged to love God when they love him with all their might and consequently with all their habitual might But by the opinion of both Dr. Hamond and the Defendant men are not bound in all expressions of their love of God to performe thenâ— with all their might and therefore 't is false very false that there must be a proportionable agreement in respect of intension and remission betwixt the inward acts of the love of God and the outward expressions thereof And thus you see what a rare Syllogisme you have made both the premises of which are notoriously false By whâ—t hath been said the Reader may as discover the faishood of your Syllogisme so also frame a true Syllogisme against the sequele of Dr. Hammond and 't is as followeth If all the inward acts of Christ's love of God were with all his habitual might then that act of hâ—s internal love viz. of God exprest by his dying for us was not superiour viz. in intension to those former acts which only exprest themselves in his poverty but all the inward acts of Christ's love of God were with all his habitual might therefore that act of his interral love of God expressed by his dying for us was not superiour viz. in intension to those foâ—mer acts which only expresse themselves in his poverty The Major is undenyable and we may say as much of the Minor because Christ fulfilled the commandement which was to love God with all his might and strength Therefore with all his habitual might and strength and this is confessed by your self touching the acts of love that are terminated unto God himself of which I have proved Dr. Hammond only to be understood Eightly Dr. Hammond saies that if it be proved that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to the vulgar translation signifieth Luke 22 44. Prolixiùs theâ—e will yet be place equally for his conclusion viz. that one act of his eternal love of God was more intense then another But if there be any place for such a conclusion then thus the argument stands Christ in his agony prayed longer then before therefore his inward actual love of God was then more intense then before But this sequele as is evident unto every ordinary Reader is very illogical and irrational and yet the Defendant justifieth it and in vindication of it spends twelve pages p. 253 254 c. usque ad 265. But how unsatistying this hâ—â— vindication is will quickly appear if he please to
cast into Syllegismes what he takes to be argumentative therein But this is a thing that he dates not so much as attempt for then every Freshman will easily discover the foppery of his discourse However in the meane time I shall give the utmost strength that I can unto Dr Hammond's argument as 't is propounded by himself and as 't is reinforced by the Defendant The conclusion to be proved is that one inward act of Christs love of God was more intense then another Now this Dr. Hammond proves from the length of his prayer for paralel to a greâ—ter length there 's a greater intension of the inward actual love of God in a longer prayer compared with that which is shorter All the proofe that I can finde of this reduced into forme stands thus Where there is a multiplication of Degrees more degrees of the inward actual love of God there 's a greater intension of the inward actual love of God but in a larger prayer of Christ there was a greater multiplication of Degrees of love c. more degâ—ee of love c. then there was in a shorter And therefore theâ—e was a greater intension viz. of the actual internal love of God The Major is confirmed from the nature of intension which is nothing else but a multiplication of Degrees in the same subject an addition of one Degree unto another And then the Minor is thus confirmed by Dr. Hammend where there is a greater multiplication of the acts of love viz. inward where there are more acts of love there is a greater multiplication of the degrees of love for in every act of love there was some degree of intension but in a longer prayer of Christ there was a greater multiplication of the inward acts of love mâ—re acts of love then there was in a shorter and answerably there was a greater multiplication of the Degrees oâ— love more Degrees of love c. My Answer unto thâ—s Syâ—â—gisme shall be both unto the Major and the Minor First then I answer unto the Major by distinguishing concerning the multiplication of Degrees It is either of the same numerical forme or fo foâ—mes numerically different Where there is a greater multiplication of degrees of the same numerical forme there is a greater intension but not where there is a greater multiplication of formes numerically different for intension is an addition of Degree unto Degree in the same numerical forme The Major then if understood of the latter multiplication of degrees is false but if understood of the former is true But then thâ— Minor if understood answerably of the same will be false And Dr. Hammond's proofe of it will be most impeâ—inent For the several inward acts of Christs love of God are formes numerically different and therefore let them be multiplyed never so much this will conduce nothing unto the greater multiplication of Degrees in one act of love then there is in another So that from this it can never be inferred that one inward act of love in Christ was more intense then another But Dr. Creed very stoutly and lustily affiâ—meth the contrary p. 256. I Reply and say If the Degrees of his live are in number multiplyed as the acts are there must be a growth in their intensive perfection and the last act which has the greater number of Degrees in it will be gradually more perfect then the former Here you say that if the Degrees of Christ's love are in number multiplyed as the acts are there must be a growth in their intensive perfection and withall you suppose that the last act hath a greater number of degrees in it and here upon you conclude of it that it will be gradually more perfect then the former But good Mr. Defendant instead of saying and supposing you should have proved what you say and suppose but of such proofe there is not in all that you say any the least footsteps Bâ—t â—e this how it will plaine it is you say p. 257. that I do not reâ—ch the Doctor 's meaning and the force of his argument I have made the most of his words that I could but as for any hidden and invisible meaning distinct from that which his words hold forth I know not that I was obliged to search after it And therefore I shall leave that unto the Defendant who can see further into a Mill-stone then other Mortals But however let us examine this profound meaning of Dr. Hammond's The Doctor concludes and argues from the effect to the cause thus where thâ— zâ—ale is true and real and not tersonate and counterfâ—it as in Christ without doubt it was most true there a multiplication of the outward acts of prayer and a longer continuance in them argues a greater a denâ—y of inward affection and true zeale And for the truth of this assâ—rtion I appeal to the practice of the whole world Here if you supply what is to be supplyed touching the object of this inwaâ—d affection This assertion which you obtrude with such a confidence is apparently untrue I say 't is apparently untrue that a multipâ—cation of the outward acts of prayer and a longer continuance in thâ—m argues a greater ardency of inward affection to God or love â—f him And for the falshood of this assertion I appeale to thâ— bosomes of all experienced either Ministers or Christians who can tâ—ll him that their inward love of God is frequently as intense in their shorâ—es as it is in their longer prayers and that the shortnesse of their prayers many times doth not proceed from any abarement of their love of God but from regard to the infirmities of such as joyn with thâ—m and for diverse other reasons Mr. Paul Beyne was esâ—eem'd a very plous and devout man in his time and 't is said of him that his prayer in his Family was not usually above a quarter of an hour long as having respect to the weaknesses and infirmities of his Servants and Children and he used to disswade others from tediousnesse in that duty I beleive the Defendâ—nt will not deny but that a man may in putting up the Lord's Prayer have his actual love of God every way as high and intense as in the longest prayer either of a man 's own or anothers composition But not to insist longer on other men It is plaine of Christ that his shortest prayers his shortest eiaculations did proceed from an actual love of God every way as intense as the longest And for the truth of this I appeale unto the Commandement of God that enjoyned Christ and all other men to love God with all their migâ—t and strength therefore with all their habitual might and strength Now however other men may transgresse this Commandement Christ did not could not and therefore whenever Christ loved God actually he loved him with all his habitual might and strength ad extremum virium and consequently one inward Act of his love of God was not more intense then another Ninthly
p. 268 you accuse my Answer unto an Argument of Dr. Hammond's as guilty of that fallacy which is called petitio principii If this be not say you 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I know not what your great Master Aristatle mednes But this is a most ridiculous and groundlesse crimination for this as every other fallacy is a sault or defect in arguing not in answering 't is saith my â—â—rtle Master Scheibler dâ—ceptâ—o in syllogizando De Sydogism cap. 17. n. 6. 't is saith my great Master Aristotle Elenchus Sophisticus It hath alwaies been observed for a rule in dâ—sputing that when the Respondent denyes a sequel and gives a reason for it it is the Opponents part to â—â—fute the reason and the Respondent is not obliged to confirm it It is then a grosse non-sequitur to conclude me gâ—â—ltie of this faâ—lacie of petitio principii because I do not confirm the reason for which I deny Dr. Hammonds consequence But Sir if you had not falsifted it by adding must to may be it is a Proposition so plain and evident as that it needs no confirmation and can be denied by no rational man Thus it stands my reason is because in all these inward acts of Christs love of God and we may say the same of the inward acts of other vertues and graces there may be no gradual dissimilitude Mark Sir the word may be and then tell us whether there be any contradiction in this Proposition in several inward acts of Châ—â—sts love of God there is no gradual dissimilitude it there be pray discover it if there be hot then give me leave to conclude that in the multiplied acts of christs love of God there may be no gradual dissimilitude You say this is the controversie betwixt me and the Doctor But your own conscience must needs convince you that this is a faishood for you your self state the controversie to be whether one act of châ—â—sts love of God were actually more intense then another and yet if I had said that in the inward acts of Christs love of God there could be no gâ—adual dissimilitude this I have proved by three reasons unto which you have given but â—orrie answers and these reasons I am not bound to repeat at every turne for this would quicklie swell my book to such a Volume as yours is Tenthly he hath a passage page 272. for which he hath not in my words the least toundation And will not every man think that our Refuteâ— was a man of great judgment and parts and fit to quote Suarez against Dr. Hammond But I rather think he was misguided by some Notes and that he never consulted the Authors he quotâ—s but took them upon trust otherwise mâ—thinks it is impossible he should be so strangely deceived But pray Sir wherein wherein is the â—efuter so strangely deceived in Suarez why 't is clear and evident by Suarez though every act of Christ in respect of the person that performed it was of an infinite and so of an equal in ensive value yet in respect of the moral goodnesse that is intrinsecally inherent in Christs actions nothing hinders but that one in this respect may be better and more intensely persect then another as well as one grief and torment which he suffered was greater then another And therfore say you the same Suarez even in that very page and columne and in the section immediately preceding that passage that our Refuter has quoted expressely sayes to this purpose Primum omnium satendum esse opera Christi fuisse inequalia in prepâ—â—â bonitate intrinfecâ— essentiall vel â—â—â—ter inhaerente ipsi actai quia ut dictum est 〈◊〉 hee bonites 〈◊〉 finiâ—a poâ—â—rat ergo esse major 〈…〉 allunde unum â—pus Chrisâ—â— erut metioris objects quam aliud uâ—â—m inâ—thsâ—u's 〈◊〉 sic de 〈…〉 â—â—go 〈…〉 vol poterâ—nt esse inaequalta in hâ—c bonitate c. Why what of all this hâ—â—e I delivered aâ—y thing that contradicts this either expresly or implyedly or doth Suarez here oppose in the least degâ—ee any thing that I have said doth not †Sed haec sententia totâ— objectio procedunt ex falso principio singunt enim esse in eodem acta plures valores seu plura merita juxta varias ejus circumstâ—ntias quod patet esse falsum ex his quae paulò superiùs dicebamus de infinitate sacrisicii ex re oblaâ—a vel person a offerenâ—e sumpta Ostendimus enim reipsa non esse duas neque pertinere ad diversa merita vel satisâ— actiones quia ratio meritâ— vel satisfactionis sieut ratio bâ—nitatis non consu git ex singulis conditientbus actus pâ—rse sumpris sed ex colâ—ecâ—s ne omnâ—â—m Haec enim ratio ettam in praesente proâ—edit nam intensio octus vel obiectum out persona â—pâ—rons per se singâ—la non sâ—fficiâ—nt ad mernum ut ex singaliâ— distinctamerâ—ta in actu orientur sed omnia simuâ— necessaria â—el suâ—t vel suâ— modo concurrunt ad unum meritum quentitate â—eius Aâ—que ita cessat objectio nom stoneritum actus tantum est unum illud est infinitum aequâ—le â—â—hil est meâ—iti in que ceâ—ni possit inaequalitâ— In tertiam part Toom tom 1. disp 4. s â— 49. Suâ—rez all along assert that there is but one meâ—itotious value in one act of Christ and that in respect of meritorious value one act of Christ was not better and more intensively perfect then another Nay do not you your felâ—e p. 271. quote a place out of Suâ—rez where in he affirmuth that the moral goodnesse inherent in the actionâ— of Christ is a thing distinct from their meritorious value Therefore Suaâ—tz say you acknowledgeth in that very fection I quote Valorem hunt quem habet actus in ordine ad meritum esse quid distinctumâ—d realt boniâ—ate quae est dâ—ffe entin ipsius actû prout consâ—â—ituitur in esse viâ— tuâ—â—c â—el illi aâ—rquo 〈…〉 instâ—e inhâ—ret Now Dr. Hummond is to be understood only of a meritorious value for he is to be understood of a value that was to be rewarded and that out of debt and such a one is a meritorious value Nay do not you your selfe understand him to speak of a meritoâ—ious value p. 266. And now to shew the appâ—sirnesse of the Proof I must tell him what either he knowes not or will not observe That the Doctor â—gaine a gues à posterâ—ori from the effect to the cause and the necessary releâ—â—â—n betwâ—xt thâ— work and the reward His â—â—gument is funâ—ed upon a Maxune of dâ—sâ—ributive justice not expressed but suppesed and intâ—â—â—ted and it is thâ—â— where the reward does proceed of debt as in Christ certainly it did and is properly wages there must be a proportionable incre sâ— of thereward and the work c. By this then the Roader may sâ—e that all that you have concerning the moral goodnesse in