3. Sect. 5. where I call them Phantasms For taking them to be Things real without us like Bodies and seeing them to come and vanish so strangely as they do unlike to Bodies what could they call them else but incorporeal Bodies which is not a Name but an Absurdity of Speech 6. It is true that the Heathens and all Nations of the World have acknowledged that there be Spirits which for the most part they hold to be incorporeal whereby it might be thought that a Man by natural Reason may arrive without the Scriptures to the Knowledge of this That Spirits are But the erroneous Collection thereof by the Heathens may proceed as I have said before from the Ignorance of the Cause of Ghosts and Phantasms and such other Apparitions And from thence had the Grecians their Number of Gods their Number of Daemons good or bad and for every Man his Genius which is not the Acknowledging of this Truth That Spirits are but a false Opinion concerning the Force of Imagination 7. And seeing the Knowledge we have of Spirits is not natural Knowledge but Faith from supernatural Revelation given to the holy Writers of the Scriptures it followeth that of Inspirations also which is the Operation of Spirit in us the Knowledge which we have must all proceed from Scripture The Signs there set down of Inspiration are Miracles when they be great and manifestly above the Power of Men to do by Imposture As for Example the Inspiration of Elias was known by the miraculous Burning of the Sacrifice But the Signs to distinguish whether a Spirit be good or evil are the same by which we distinguish whether a Man or a Tree be good or evil namely Actions and Fruit For there are lying Spirits wherewith Men are inspired sometimes as well as with Spirits of Truth And we are commanded in Scripture to judge of the Spirits by their Doctrine and not of the Doctrine by the Spirits For Miracles our Saviour hath forbidden us to rule our Faith by them Matth. 24.24 And Saint Paul saith Gal. 1.8 Though an Angel from Heaven preach to you otherwise c. let him be accursed Where it is plain that we are not to judge whether the Doctrine be true or not by the Angel but whether the Angel say true or no by the Doctrine So likewise 1 Joh. 4.1 Believe not every Spirit for false Prophets are gone out into the World Vers. 2. Hereby shall ye know the Spirit of God Vers. 3. Every Spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the Flesh is not of God and this is the Spirit of Antichrist Vers. 15. Whosoever confesseth that Jesus is the Son of God in him dwelleth God and he in God The Knowledge therefore we have of good and evil Inspiration cometh not by Vision of an Angel that may teach it nor by a Miracle that may seem to confirm it but by Conformity of Doctrine with this Article and Fundamental Point of Christian Faith which also Saint Paul saith is the sole Foundation That Jesus Christ is come in the Flesh 1 Cor. 3.11 8. But if Inspiration be discerned by this Point and this Point be acknowledged and believed upon the Authority of the Scriptures How may some Men ask know we that the Scripture deserveth so great Authority which must be no less than that of the lively Voice of God that is how we know the Scriptures to be the Word of God And first it is manifest that if by Knowledge we understand Science infallible and natural as is defined Chap. 6. Sect. 4. proceeding from Sense we cannot be said to know it because it proceedeth not from the Conceptions ingendered by Sense And if we understand Knowledge as supernatural we cannot have it but by Inspiration And of that Inspiration we cannot judge but by the Doctrine It followeth that we have not any Way natural or supernatural of the Knowledge thereof which can properly be called Infallible Science and Evidence It remaineth that the Knowledge that we have that the Scriptures are the Word of God is only Faith which Faith therefore is also by Saint Paul defined Heb. 11.1 to be the Evidence of Things not seen that is to say not otherwise evident but by Faith for whatsoever either is evident by Natural Reason or Revelation supernatural is not called Faith else should not Faith cease no more than Charity when we are in Heaven which is contrary to the Doctrine of the Scripture And we are not said to believe but to know those Things that be evident 9. Seeing then the Acknowledgment of Scriptures to be the Word of God is not Evidence but Faith and Faith Chap. 6. Sect. 7. consisteth in the Trust we have of other Men it appeareth plain that the Men so trusted are the holy Men of Gods Church succeeding one another from the Time of those that saw the wondrous Works of God Almighty in the Flesh Nor doth this imply that God is not the Worker or Efficient Cause of Faith or that Faith is begotten in Man without the Spirit of God for all those good Opinions which we admit and believe though they proceed from Hearing and Hearing from Teaching both which are natural yet they are the Work of God for all the Works of Nature are his and they are attributed to the Spirit of God As for Example Exod. 28.3 Thou shalt speak unto all cunning Men whom I have filled with the SPIRIT of Wisdom that they may make Aaron's Garments for his Consecration that he may serve me in the Priests Office Faith therefore wherewith we believe is the Work of the Spirit of God in that Sense by which the Spirit of God giveth to one Man Wisdom and cunning in Workmanship more than another and by which he effecteth also in other Points pertaining to our ordinary Life that one Man believeth that which upon the same Grounds another doth not and one Man reverenceth the Opinion and obeyeth the Commands of his Superiour and others not 10. And seeing our Faith that the Scriptures are the Word of God began from the Confidence and Trust we repose in the Church there can be no Doubt but that their Interpretation of the same Scriptures when any Doubt or Controversie shall arise by which this Fundamental Point That Jesus Christ is come in the Flesh may be called in question is safer for any Man to trust to than his own whether Reasoning or Spirit that is to say his own Opinion 11. Now concerning Mens Affections to God-ward they are not the same always that are described in the Chapter concerning Passions There for to love is to be delighted with the Image or Conception of the Thing loved but God is unconceivable To love God therefore in the Scripture is to obey his Commandments and to love one another Also to trust God is different from our trusting one another for when a Man trusteth a Man Chap. 9. Sect. 8. he layeth aside his own Endeavours but
What Truth is hath been defined in the precedent Chapter What Evidence is I now set down and it is the Concomitance of a Mans Conception with the Words that signifie such Conception in the Act of Ratiocination for when a Man reasoneth with his Lips only to which the Mind suggesteth only the Beginning and followeth not the Words of his Mouth with the Conceptions of his Mind out of Custom of so speaking though he begin his Ratiocination with True Propositions and proceed with certain Syllogisms and thereby make always true Conclusions yet are not his Conclusions evident to him for Want of the Concomitance of Conception with his Words for if the Words alone were sufficient a Parrot might be taught as well to know Truth as to speak it Evidence is to Truth as the Sap to the Tree which so far as it creepeth along with Body and Branches keepeth them alive where it forsaketh them they die for this Evidence which is Meaning with our Words is the Life of Truth 4. Knowledge therefore which we call Science I define to be Evidence of Truth from some Beginning or Principle of Sense for the Truth of a Proposition is never evident until we conceive the Meaning of the Words or Terms whereof it consisteth which are always Conceptions of the Mind Nor can we remember those Conceptions without the Thing that produced the same by our Senses The first Principle of Knowledge is that we have such and such Conceptions the second that we have thus and thus named the Things whereof they are Conceptions the third is that we have joyned those Names in such Manner as to make true Propositions the fourth and last is that we have joyned those Propositions in such Manner as they be concluding and the Truth of the Conclusion said to be known And of these two Kinds of Knowledge whereof the former is Experience of Fact and the later of Evidence of Truth as the former if it be great is called Prudence so the latter if it be much hath usually been called both by Ancient and Modern Writers Sapience or Wisdom and of this latter Man only is capable of the former brute Beasts also participate 5. A Proposition is said to be supposed when being not evident it is nevertheless admitted for a Time to the End that joyning to it other Propositions we may conclude something and to proceed from Conclusion to Conclusion for a Trial whether the same will lead us into any absurd or impossible Conclusion which if it do then we know such Supposition to have been false 6. But if running thorow many Conclusions we come to none that are absurd then we think the Proposition probable likewise we think probable whatsoever Proposition we admit for Truth by Errour of Reasoning or from trusting to other Men And all such Propositions as are admitted by Trust or errour we are not said to know but think them to be true and the Admittance of them is called Opinion 7. And particularly when the Opinion is admitted out of Trust to other Men they are said to believe it and their Admittance of it is called Belief and sometimes Faith 8. It is either Science or Opinion which we commonly mean by the Word Conscience for Men say that such and such a thing is true in or upon their Conscience which they never do when they think it doubtful and therefore they know or think they know it to be true But Men when they say Things upon their Conscience are not therefore presumed certainly to know the Truth of what they say It remaineth then that that Word is used by them that have an Opinion not only of the Truth of the Thing but also of their Knowledge of it to which the Truth of the Proposition is consequent Conscience I therefore define to be Opinion of Evidence 9. Belief which is the admitting of Propositions upon Trust in many Cases is no less free from Doubt than perfect and manifest Knowledge for as there is nothing whereof there is not some Cause so when there is Doubt there must be some Cause thereof conceived Now there be many Things which we receive from Report of others of which it is impossible to imagine any Cause of Doubt for what can be opposed against the Consent of all Men in Things they can know and have no Cause to report otherwise than they are such as is great Part of our Histories unless a Man would say that all the World had conspired to deceive him And thus much of Sense Imagination Discursion Ratiocination and Knowledge which are the Acts of our Power cognitive or conceptive That Power of the Mind which we call motive differeth from the Power motive of the Body for the Power motive of the Body is that by which it moveth other Bodies and we call Strength but the Power motive of the Mind is that by which the Mind giveth animal Motion to that Body wherein it existeth the Acts hereof are our Affections and Passions of which I am to speak in general CHAP. VII Of Delight Pain Love Hatred Appetite Aversion Fear Good Evil Pulchritude Turpitude End Fruition Profitable Vse Vain Felicity Good and Evil mixt Sensual Delight and Pain Joy and Grief IN the eighth Section of the second Chapter is shewed that Conceptions and Apparitions are nothing really but Motion in some internal Substance of the Head which Motion not stopping there but proceeding to the Heart of Necessity must there either help or hinder the Motion which is called Vital when it helpeth it is called Delight Contentment or Pleasure which is nothing really but Motion about the Heart as Conception is nothing but Motion in the Head and the Objects that cause it are called pleasant or delightful or by some Name equivalent The Latines have Jucundum à juvando from helping and the same Delight with Reference to the Object is called Love but when such Motion weakeneth or hindereth the vital Motion then it is called Pain and in Relation to that which causeth it Hatred which the Latines express sometimes by Odium and sometimes by Taedium 2. This Motion in which consisteth Pleasure or Pain is also a Solicitation or Provocation either to draw near to the Thing that pleaseth or to retire from the Thing that displeaseth and this Solicitation is the Endeavour or internal Beginning of animal Motion which when the Object delighteth is called Appetite when it displeaseth it is called Aversion in Respect of the Displeasure present but in Respect of the Displeasure expected Fear So that Pleasure Love and Appetite which is also called Desire are divers Names for divers Considerations of the same Thing 3. Every Man for his own Part calleth that which pleaseth and is delightful to himself Good and that Evil which displeaseth him insomuch that while every Man differeth from other in Constitution they differ also from one another concerning the common Distinction of Good and Evil Nor is there any such Thing as Absolute
all or most Men 11. Indignation is that Grief which consisteth in the Conception of good Success happening to them whom they think unworthy thereof Seeing therefore Men think all those unworthy whom they hate they think them not only unworthy of the good Fortune they have but also of their own Vertues And of all the Passions of the Mind these two Indignation and Pity are most raised and increased by Eloquence for the Aggravation of the Calamity and Extenuation of the Fault augmenteth Pity and the Extenuation of the Worth of the Person together with the magnifying of his Success which are the Parts of an Orator are able to turn these two Passions into Fury 12. Emulation is Grief arising from seeing ones self exceeded or excelled by his Concurrent together with Hope to equal or exceed him in Time to come by his own Ability But Envy is the same Grief joyned with Pleasure conceived in the Imagination of some ill Fortune that may befall him 13. There is a Passion that hath no Name but the Sign of it is that Distortion of the Countenance which we call Laughter which is always Joy but what joy what we think and wherein we triumph when we laugh is not hitherto declared by any That it consisteth in Wit or as they call it in the Jest Experience confuteth for Men laugh at Mischances and Indecencies wherein there lieth no Wit nor jest at all And forasmuch as the same Thing is no more ridiculous when it groweth stale or usual whatsoever it be that moveth Laughter it must be new and unexpected Men laugh often especially such as are greedy of Applause from every Thing they do well at their own Actions performed never so little beyond their own Expectations as also at their own Jests And in this Case it is manifest that the Passion of Laughter proceedeth from a sudden conception of some Ability in himself that laugheth Also Men laugh at the Infirmities of others by Comparison wherewith their own Abilities are set off and illustrated Also Men laugh at Jests the Wit whereof always consisteth in the elegant Discovering and Conveying to our minds some Absurdity of another And in this case also the Passion of Laughter proceedeth from the sudden Imagination of our own Oddes and Eminency for what is else the Recommending of our selves to our own good Opinion by Comparison with another Mans Infirmity or absurdity For when a Jest is broken upon our selves or Friends of whose Dishonour we participate we never laugh thereat I may therefore conclude that the Passion of Laughter is nothing else but sudden Glory arising from some sudden Conception of some Eminency in our selves by Comparison with the Infirmity of others or with our own formerly for Men laugh at the follies of themselves past when they come suddenly to Remembrance except they bring with them any present Dishonour It is no wonder therefore that Men take hainously to be laughed at or derided that is triumphed over Laughing without Offence must be at Absurdities and Infirmities abstracted from Persons and when all the Company may laugh together for laughing to ones self putteth all the rest into Jealousie and Examination of themselves Besides it is Vain-Glory and an Argument of little Worth to think the Infirmity of another sufficient Matter for his Triumph 14. The Passion opposite hereunto whose Signs are another Distortion of the Face with Tears called Weeping is the sudden Falling out with our selves or sudden Conception of Defect and therefore Children weep often for seeing they think that every Thing ought to be given them which they desire of Necessity every Repulse must be a Check of their Expectation and puts them in mind of their too much Weakness to make themselves Masters of all they look for For the same Cause Women are more apt to weep than men as being not only more accustomed to have their Wills but also to measure their Powers by the Power and Love of others that protect them Men are apt to weep that prosecute Revenge when the Revenge is suddenly stopt or frustrated by the Repentance of their Adversary and such are the Tears of Reconciliation Also revengeful Men are subject to this Passion upon the beholding those Men they pity and suddenly remember they cannot help Other weeping in Men proceedeth for the most part from the same Cause it proceedeth from in Women and Children 15. The Appetite which Men call Lust and the Fruition that appertaineth thereunto is a Sensual Pleasure but not only that there is in it also a Delight of the Mind for it consisteth of two Appetites together to please and to be pleased and the Delight Men take in delighting is not sensual but a Pleasure or joy of the Mind consisting in the Imagination of the Power they have so much to please But the Name Lust is used where it is condemned otherwise it is called by the general Word Love for the Passion is one and the same indefinite Desire of different Sex as natural as Hunger 16. Of Love by which is understood the Joy Man taketh in the Fruition of any present Good hath been already spoken of in the first Section Chap. 7. under which is contained the Love Men bear to one another or Pleasure they take in one anothers Company and by which Nature Men are said to be sociable But there is another Kind of Love which the Greeks call {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} and is that which we mean when we say that a Man is in Love Forasmuch as this Passion cannot be without Diversity of Sex it cannot be denied but that it participateth of that indefinite Love mentioned in the former Section But there is a great Difference betwixt the Desire of a Man indefinite and the same Desire limited ad hunc and this is that Love which is the great Theme of Poets But notwithstanding their Praises it must be defined by the Word Need for it is a Conception a Man hath of his Need of that one Person desired The Cause of this Passion is not always nor for the most part Beauty or other Quality in the Beloved unless there be withall Hope in the Person that loveth which may be gathered from this that in great Difference of Persons the greater have often faln in love with the meaner but not contrary And from hence it is that for the most part they have much better Fortune in Love whose Hopes are built upon something in their Person than those that trust to their Expressions and Service and they that care less than they that care more which not perceiving many Men cast away their Services as one Arrow after another till in the End together with their Hopes they lose their Wits 17. There is yet another Passion sometimes called Love but more properly good Will or Charity There can be no greater Argument to a Man of his own Power than to find himself able not only to accomplish his own Desires but also
to assist other Men in theirs and this is that Conception wherein consisteth Charity In which first is contained that natural Affection of Parents to their Children which the Greeks call {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} as also that Affection wherewith Men seek to assist those that adhere unto them But the Affection wherewith Men many times bestow their Benefits on Strangers is not to be called Charity but either Contract whereby they seek to purchase friendship or Fear which maketh them to purchase peace The Opinion of Plato concerning honourable Love delivered according to his Custom in the Person of Socrates in the Dialogue intituled Convivium is this That a Man full and pregnant with Wisdom and other Vertues naturally seeketh out some beautiful Person of Age and Capacity to conceive in whom he may without sensual Respects ingender and produce the like And this is the Idea of the then noted Love of Socrates wise and continent to Alcibiades young and beautiful In which Love is not the sought Honour but the Issue of his Knowledge contrary to the common Love to which though Issue sometimes follows yet Men seek not that but to please and to be pleased It should be therefore this Charity or Desire to assist and advance others But why then should the Wise seek the Ignorant or be more charitable to the Beautiful than to others There is something in it savouring of the Use of that time in which Matter though Socrates be acknowledged for continent yet the Continent have the Passion they contain as much and more than they that satiate the Appetite which maketh me suspect this Platonick Love for meerly sensual but with an honourable Pretence for the Old to haunt the Company of the young and beautiful 18. Forasmuch as all Knowledge beginneth from Experience therefore also new Experience is the Beginning of new Knowledge and the Increase of Experience the Beginning of the Increase of Knowledge Whatsoever therefore happeneth new to a Man giveth him Matter of Hope of knowing somewhat that he knew not before And this Hope and Expectation of future Knowledge from any Thing that happeneth new and strange is that Passion which we commonly call Admiration and the same considered as Appetite is called Curiosity which is Appetite of Knowledge As in the discerning of Faculties Man leaveth all Community with Beasts at the Faculty of imposing Names so also doth he surmount their Nature at this Passion of Curiosity For when a Beast seeth any Thing new and strange to him he considereth it so far only as to discern whether it be likely to serve his turn or hurt him and accordingly approacheth nearer to it or fleeth from it Whereas Man who in most Events remembereth in what manner they were caused and begun looketh for the Cause and Beginning of every Thing that ariseth new unto him And from this Passion of Admiration and Curiosity have arisen not only the Invention of Names but also Supposition of such Causes of all Things as they thought might produce them And from this Beginning is derived all Philosophy as Astronomy from the Admiration of the Course of Heaven Natural Philosophy from the strange Effects of the Elments and other Bodies And from the Degrees of Curiosity proceed also the Degrees of Knowledge amongst Men For to a Man in the Chace of Riches or Authority which in Respect of Knowledge are but Sensuality it is a Diversity of little Pleasure whether it be the Motion of the Sun or the Earth that maketh the Day or to enter into other Contemplations of any strange Accident than whether it conduce or not to the End he pursueth Because Curiosity is Delight therefore also Novelty is so but especially that Novelty from which a Man conceiveth an Opinion true or false of bettering his own Estate for in such Case they stand affected with the Hope that all Gamesters have while the Cards are shuffling 19. Divers other Passions there be but they want Names whereof some nevertheless have been by most Men observed For Example from what Passion proceedeth it that Men take pleasure to behold from the Shore the Danger of them that are at Sea in a Tempest or in Fight or from a safe Castle to behold two Armies charge one to another in the Field It is certainly in the whole Summ Joy else Men would never flock to such a Spectacle Nevertheless there is in it both Joy and Grief for as there is Novelty and Remembrance of our own Security present which is Delight so there is also Pity which is Grief But the Delight is so far predominant that Men usually are content in such a Case to be Spectators of the Misery of their Friends 20. Magnanimity is no more than Glory of the which I have spoken in the first Section but Glory well grounded upon certain Experience of a Power sufficient to attain his End in open Manner And Pusillanimity is the Doubt of that Whatsoever therefore is a Sign of Vain Glory the same is also a Sign of Pusillanimity for sufficient Power maketh Glory a Spur to ones End To be pleased or displeased with Fame true or false is a Sign of that same because he that relieth on Fame hath not his Success in his own Power Likewise Art and Fallacy are Signs of Pusillanimity because they depend not upon our own Power but the Ignorance of others Also Proneness to Anger because it argueth Difficulty of proceeding Also Ostentation of Ancestors because all Men are more inclined to make shew of their own Power when they have it than of anothers To be at Enmity and Contention with Inferiours is a Sign of the same because it proceedeth from Want of Power to end the War To laugh at others because it is an Affectation of Glory from other Mens Infirmities and not from any Ability of their own Also Irresolution which proceedeth from Want of power enough to contemn the little Difficulties that make Deliberations hard 21. The Comparison of the Life of Man to a Race though it hold not in every Part yet it holdeth so well for this our Purpose that we may thereby both see and remember almost all the Passions before mentioned But this Race we must suppose to have no other Goal nor other Garland but being formost and in it To endeavour is Appetite To be remiss is Sensuality To consider them behind is Glory To consider them before is Humility To lose Ground with looking back Vain-Glory To be holden Hatred To turn back Repentance To be in breath Hope To be weary Despair To endeavour to overtake the next Emulation To supplant or overthrow Envie To resolve to break thorow a Stop foreseen Courage To break thorow a sudden Stop Anger To break thorow with Ease Magnanimity To lose Ground by little Hindrances Pusillanimity To fall on the sudden is Disposition to weep To see another fall is Disposition to laugh To see one out-gone whom we would not is Pity To see one