with diuine excellency as the minde The other is yoked to the body as apâ—etite or desier and anger The higher â—s a receauer of Reason The lower is â—gnorant it is hir parte to rule and it â—elonges vnto this to obey But this oftentimes as an Horse waryng fierse not regarding the will of the Carter is whirled with a violent brayde vnto those thinges which him liketh whether they be honest or filthy yeldyng a deafe eare to reason and not hearyng the mynde and intelligence whiche is a copartner of those knowledges whiche by nature are planted in vs or rather ingendred of God and at all times incourageth vnto honest mattiers whether they be pleasant or lamentable For there is a triple good Honest profitable and pleasaunt Honest is which agreeth with the streight sentence of Reason Profitable is which succoureth nature and lyfe Pleasaunt is which deliteth naturall appetite as the drynke the thyrsty And out of these Fountaynes procede all actions It is the duety of the minde and Intelligence to determyne but to the other parte it belongeth to execute the commaundement of the minde and to labour The minde hath two principall Intelligences entalied of nature the one of debatinge truth and falshoode the other of discerning good and euill For al men through a certaine secret sence do discerne what thinges are iust and wrongfull so that this light of nature be not pesterd for nature hath geueÌ„ to vs as it were litle sparkes and seedes and a certayne procliuitie of minde and facultie to labour This affection doth stirre Operacion succeedeth the affection and by often operacions there is gotten a perfectnes either of vertue if it be trayned vnto a â—ood end or els of vice if vnto an euill â—nd this is the grounde of all humaine â—ctions Of Affections Cap. iij. SIth perdie euery fourme of vertues and vices doth spring as it were out â—f these Fountaines hability affection operation and perfection we wil compendiously manifest these And certes those few things which are said concerning faculty shall suffice And let that difference be obserued betwixt the natiue readines of the minde the braide or affection of this procliuity As choler doth moue the nature of an ireful man so dooth the coueting of glory force the couetous of honour Henceforth then we haue to breake our minde of affections Affection is a commocion of the minde disquieting the tranquility therof which in Greeke is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and of Cicero Perturbatio a Perturbation and it is defined a troublesom and a violeÌ„t moode of the soule bended from reason an enemye to the minde and quiet life The Stoikes when as they saw a man to be turmoyled hither and thither with many and wicked desires and falsly supposed the very nature of man to be vncorrupted and not defloure dthey gainsaid affections to be naturall but graunted them to be only opinions eyther of good or yll and in theyr kinde euery one to be vicious and to be rooted out of the nature of menne from which they would a wise man to be fre yet they are easily conuicted of errour For first of al that they are Natiue and ingendred by that it is lightly confirmed because motions and certayne inclinations are ingraffed in liuyng creatures by nature as the Zeale of parentes towardes theyr Children And who seeth not som men to be more enclined to anger or loue to ioyfulnesse or heauinesse than other som Farthermore that all are not faultye thereby it is apparant inough by reason the very law of God geueth vs in charge to beare loue towarde him towarde all men towardes our wife children and parentes And enioyneth vs mercy hope confidence ioye and some other affections very profitable and expedient to encourage the minde For what is more commodious for the life of man than the hope of glory and rewardes and the feare of rebuke and punishments And so doubtles affctions may be handsomly diuided that som may be called good by nature which agre with reason or els with the prescript of nature as good will compassion Some euill which do disagrée as Hatred Enuy Pride Dispere Som betwixt bothe as anger hope boldnes feare desire loue merinesse sorow which that they may not swarue from â—ertue they are to be ruled by the briâ—ell of reason and to be Iudged by mediocrity But neither is that to be commended which som construed that affections are naturall not also voluntary For whereas our will onely subiect to God may apppeare to haue a free Originall to worke it is to be thought the very redinesse perdie vnto these or them and likewise the first motion to be naturall but theyr vexacions to be voluntary and able to be chastised by th' authority of reason lesse they should run headling and be plucked with violence eake inforce a man immediatly welny vnwillyng vnto naughtinesse Albeit truly at that time the will coueting doth range at liberty and by some meanes may reteine it if so she woulde inuocate God the helper For put case it be feeble yet there is some libertie whiche when shame feare are set out to the show may be of power to bridle the affections And that they can be corrected by discipline those wordes deliuered of God do manifestlie denounce Sub te erit appetitus tuus tu Dominaberis illi Vnder thee shal be thine apetite thou shalt beare rule ouer it Wheras also a man consisteth of two partes a Soule and a bodie and there is a double force of the soule one a copartner of reason the other void she is stedfast and quiet this wandring and tormented with affections whiche moste commonly doth disquiet her where by it insueth that a man if he doth pursue the aduise of reason and intelligence he may want perturbacion But if he had rather to become Subiecte vnto the concupiscence of the body he may be diuerslie prouoked The Fountaine then of affections is that part of the Soule voide of reason and that is double 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 waryng angry and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 very desirous of a thinge The which if refusinge the Empire and Yoke of the minde and reason it be caried with his proper vehemencie it is needefull that forthwith one or other of the perturbations bee incensed and plucked throughe the opinion or similytude of good or yll sometimes bither and somtimes thither eke nowe and then be broughte all oute of frame with pleasure or luste and one while with timidity or hatred For vnto these twoo sortes it appeareth that any one of the affections may be referred because all mocions proceede from a suspicion of good or euill whether it be present or absent Out of the Iudgement of good floweth pleasure and out of the conceit of euill commeth sorow Vnto pleasure are referred loue desire gladnesse whiche succoure nature and among these especiallie ioy Vnto sorow appertaine anger hatred feare sadnesse which discommoditie Nature most painfully
nor others which very wel â—s termed in the sanctified Scriptures Omnium malorum radix the roote of al mischiefes out of whiche felonies robberies despoilinges deceipts bewrayinges discords hurly burlyes do spring Et quid non mortalia pectora cogis auri sacrafames and what doost not thou detestable hunger of gold enforce mennes harts to do The desire of mony is vnsaciable and a cruell Dropsy of whom the more that the waters are supped vp the more they are thristed for Nam crescit amor numini quantum ipsa pecunia crescit for the loue of money increaseth as muche as money her selfe doth increase This bondage is altogether moste wretched and most vile alwaies carefull at all times fearfull neuer quiet at no time content Contrary to the vice of Auarice is excesse whiche commonly they term prodigality which same likewise is a vice and resisteth liberality For as the couetous man is ouer gredy in receyuing and reteyning so contrary wise the prodigall person passeth a meane in geuinge Therfore prodigality may be defined an immoderate largesse and committed vpon no iust cause This perdy is vicious yet may be reuoked more easely vnto liberality than auarice by reason she is accustomed to profit others this no man and not so much truely the very possesâ—our vnto this oftimes youth is hurtful to the other old age Moderate expence in like manner as liberalitie is placed betweene two vices vnmeasurable riot couetousnesse Herehence a pinch-peny or els a thrifty felowe neither is called prodigall nor yet a niggard Sauing is defyned a diligent laying vp of those thinges which are gotten and a guidinge of expenses Wherof there springes a Prouerbe Magnum Vectigal parsimonia Sparinge is a greate reuenew Of Magnificence Cap. xxvi MAgnificence seemeth to be vnited to liberalitie which is no other thyng than a certaone larger bountuousnesse whiche is defined of Cicero an handlyng or administration of great excellent matâ—ers with a certaine honourable faâ—us intent Herehence coÌ„meth a sumpâ—uous a notable man he who worketh wounderous feates This vertue is not belonging vnto poore men whiche can not performe mightie and miraculous matters but vnto rich men as to kings and Princes of whome yet it is to be taken heede of that they be not incensed more through the desier of vayne glory than vertue neither principally regarding the good will of God nor passynge for the commoditie of men lesse they wade beyonde measure with their cost and administracion in enterprising gorgious actes For also there be two vices repugnant to this vertue the one which is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a worke of a base courage and a beggerly magnificence whiche is of kinne to auarice the other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is to wit an vnruly sumptuousnesse riot which accordeth with prodigalitie Of Freendship Cap. xxvij AMonge the parts of Iustice Freendship also is to be nuÌ„bred wherof sith Aristotle and after him Cicero copiously haue disputed we will here breifly touche those thinges which appeare necessarie Therfore as Cicero telleth in his first booke De Legibus all the force of Freendship is in the agréement of willes studies and opinions and in Laelius Freendship sayth he is no other thyng than a perfecte accorde of all diuine and humain affayres with beneuolence and fauour whiche he calleth the ayde of vertues geuen of Nature not a companion of vices And the same nominated of loue and begunne of Natute her selfe That wee may vnderstande loue to be naturall by whiche men are vnited together amonge them â—elues And because as also wee haue knowen by the holy scriptures by which the lawe of nature is approued in this cause one man oweth good wil and loue â—o another whereas also al other liuing Creatures may appeare to mayntayne freendship in their kind or els surely to preserue beneuolence it can not bee â—oubted but that fréendeship is to be reâ—erred vnto Iustice which also is verie â—ecessary for the vse of life and conteyneth the common wealth What beneuolence doth differ from friendship Aristotle teacheth in the .v Chapiter of his .ix. booke that also we may be vnited in good wil with them whom we do not know and that the same may be secret that it cannot be freendeship and that beneuolence is the Original and Fountaine of amity By whose Sentence freendship is thus defyned That it be an euident beneuolence Freendship is double One true and sincere and proceeding of vertue which is emonge good men The other forged and vulger which is two folde for either it is procured throughe profit or els throughe good will. The end than of true freendship is Honestie of the counterfayted profite or pleasure Pleasure ioigneth together children and young folkes Profite yoketh together marchauntes and suche like but vertue bindeth good men who be friendes indeede and also do persist after death but they loue for a time True frendship than because it ariseth out of vertue can not be emonge wicked persones as betwixtâ— theeues robbers spoylers traitours conspiratours albeit somewhiles they may appeare fettered together with a moste straighte bonde neither also is it sure inoughe amonge them who are equal neither in maners nor in exercise nor in wil nor in opinions nor in riches althoughe these do not alwaies hinder amity like as nether the age nor yet in statelines Emong Princes and their fréends the glosing of certain Courtiers doth welnie extinguishe amitie approuinge all matters of their gouernours both sayings and doinges although they be foolish whiles they get gaine promotion and fauour The freendship then amonge equals is stronger more sincere vnited together through consent of mindes both willinge and nillinge one thinge whom also a like study doth delite But this freendeship cannot be betwixt many that narrow bonde is appertaining to few what manner of one wee reade to haue flourished emongste them of whiche scarcelye foure or fiue partes are reckened and perhappes it should be a difficult matter to trace out more of whom truly it may be verified Amicus alter idem a fréende an other same or one as like as it were the selfe same person of which two there ought to be one minde Although verily good men often times haue many fréendes and wish wel vnto those of whom they theÌ„ selues likewise are entirely beloued yet they communicate that cheefest consent of minds and good wils and studies onely with one or two or els surely with very few That true friendship is very seldome what one was betwixte those fewe copartners of vnfained fréendes and so many times renowned Because perdie fréendship issueth of loue and the degrees of Loue are diuers likewise more degrees of fréendship are to be appointed Of which the firste is of Parents and Children the second of brothers and Kinsfolke the third of beneficial persons and Citizens the last of all men Yet somewhiles that sincere friendship which is of a fewe doth farre exceede al the amities of al men yea
The Harbourough forsouthe of them all is featelie disposed in the harte to whom there is a greate familyarity with will whiche either may couet or els eschew if any thing be obiected whiche may seem either to pleasure or domage nature Of loue Cap. iiij LOue is an inclination of will prone to that which is thought good For when as any thinge is profered which either is good in deede or els deliteth with a certain likelyhood of good through that opinion the greedy faculti of the Soule is vehemently inticed to enioy and possesse the same And of the goods which are sought for of men we tolde that there were three kindes Honest Profitable and Pleasant whiche coÌ„monly are coupled together because one thyng both may be honest and profitable and pleasant yet not by and by that which is either profitable or pleasant is honest whereas these now and than may appere to contende with honestie But for all this nothinge is in deed either profitable or pleasaÌ„t which same is not honest Certes what is honest that is onely required for the proper behoofe no consideration had neither of commoditie nor of delectation How greate the power of loue is the verses of Poets do beare witnesse and wee deeme that there be very few whiche can quite them selues cleare of all loue Plato constituted a threefolde loue the first which embraceth and cherisheth only Vertue but this is exempted from the number of affections he appeareth rather to be reckned among vertues because he vseth the iudgemeÌ„t of vpright Reason The other filthie which cloueth to the pleasure of bodie The thyrde whiche mindeth the Soule and Body Nothyng is more noble than the first nothynge more foule than the other The thyrd truly is a companion of bothe but yet he rometh abrode no lesse than the other By reason he reuerenceth the personage of the body and ardenly esteemeth it Vnlesse wee repine this loue resortyng amorously and strokyng the minde with sugred words and except this loue sike soule brought vnto another bayte Feates of Phisick should be practised in vayne when as now the loue shall growe in vse eake shal haue taken deeper rootes Of Desire and Hope Cap. v. DEsire is a luste to enioye that good whiche as yet is not presente If so that be in place it is loued but if it bee out of sight it is coueited Out of this Fountain if the sentence of reason be neglected and the desire bee immoderate and excéede the boundes and Limits of Nature who is apaid with few thinges many vices do arise as Niggardlines Ambicion Sensualitie Riot such other Hope is defined of Cicero an expectation of good to whom dispaire is contrarye a supposed difficultye and mistrust of a good thinge to be atchiued the which shal be Recapitulated heareafter among the fourmes of sadnesse It is the guise of a wise man to hope for those thinges whiche he maye attaine neither rashly to dispaire whither he may atchiue through trauaile And this hope verely by which we wish for good either trewe or shadowed differeth from that whiche is tearmed Theologicall and it is a vertue eke is depainted to be a waytinge for eternall felicitie Vnto whom in like case the repugnant vice is Desperatio despeire Of Gladnesse Cap. vi GLadnesse is an affection which is stirred with the opinion of some present goodnesse wherwith the minde is delited Cicero doth distynguish GaudiuÌ„ and Laetitiam ioye and gladnesse in this wise that the minde should be mooued with ioy paciently and constantly but with gladnesse vainely and prodigally With this affection the Nature is merueilously delighted and the hert enlarged and as it were embracynge that whiche is apparant good doth stirre the minde sweetly and delectably and faustreth life in the hert whiche sorow the contrarie passion doth oppresse And this pleasantnesse and delectacion for the amplitude of the good which is propounded may be greater or lesser and either honest or filthy It shabe honest if it be answerable to the meane of nature and vnto reason what one is gotteÌ„ through the contemplation and studies of commendable thinges But filthy if it be immoderate and dissonant to reason what one is receiued of corporal delites of peruerse exercises and of yll will as if any man should be delited with another mans harme than which vice nothing ought to be more abrogate from a man especially a Christian Of Hatred and anger and like affections Cap. vij COntrarye to Loue is hatred which is defined of Cicero Ira inueterata a longe festred Anger that is to wit of longe continuance This affection is ingendred of the discontenting of the minde detestinge the harme which is vnderstanded damaged either with the deede or sayinge of som man or deming him selfe hurted and sometimes abhorring from anothers freendship through a priuy instinct of nature Euen as perdie by Loue all all men are accorded so by hatred they are vnyoked than whiche nothynge is more pernicious to humaine societie which also by so much is more irkesom by how much more secretly it inuadeth To contempne vices it profiteth but to loue a man Christian charitie commauÌ„deth and to forgeue him whiche offendeth But to hate a man for no cause is very obsurde and most dissonant from vpright iudgement Vnto hatred are ascribed many affection whiche are to be auoyded of a godly man As dispight as anger as Hostilitie Despight whereby any man thinketh another more base then himselfe Whereas truly there is no cause why any one shoulde suppose himselfe to be preferred before his felow by reason that he cannot commonstrate any thinge of himselfe whiche he hath not receiued els where as it ought to be most euident vnto the Christians by holy Scriptures Anger is defined a lust to punish him who may seeme to haue hurted with iniury This affection appeareth to be mingled with sorowe and a greedinesse of reuengemeÌ„t which greeuously racketh a man and sharpely kindleth agaynst him of whome he is thought to be displeasured the moste troublesome of all the affections by which not only the minde but also the whole body is brought into suche a perplexitie that for anger a man can vneth see and moderate his senses and scarcely speake Hereto doth Hostilitie belonge which is defined an anger of punishing obseruynge oportunitie And hither discorde the destruction of the coÌ„mon weale and hither all hatred is referred Iracundia doth differ from Ira because Iracundia is a natiue faculty by which any man is made prone to anger But Ira is a commocion of this vertue and a rage bended from reason Wherby now and than the minde is so turmoyled that the angrie man doth very litle disagree from the Frantike And truly it may be verified of Horace Ira fuâ—or breuis anger is a shorte furie and of Ennius Insaniae principium the originall of Madnesse The bloud is incensed with this passyon and waxeth hotte in the bodie and the Spirites sodenly disquieted doo so
ought to deuyse to encrease her goods ought to keepe that with sobernesse whiche is gotten with the toyle of her husband The children ought to reuerence their parentes they ought to loue them as God him selfe hath coÌ„maunded they ought to honour them they ought willingly to execute their coÌ„maundements they ought to be obedient to them in all respectes they ought likewise to obey their schole masters which are the instructours of the minde as it were second parents For they both are charged with one thing to trayne vp youthe vertuously They ought to apply the studies appoynted them they should eschew idlenesse and pleasure before the rest as pernicious plagues they ought to reuerence their elders and magistrates as well spirituall as temporall and the honest persons and discreete But they ought to esteeme those with a certayne principal good will of whom both their vtteraunce and harte are decked with right excellent sciences vnto all humanitie The seruantes ought to be obedient and faithfull to their maysters herkenyng to their precept and alwaies bent to finish their commaundement they ought to haue in reuerence loue their maisters as their parentes they ought to be thriftie appayde with a moderate liuing and requisite apparel thei ought willyngly to enlarge the riches of their maysters they ought to steale nothyng priuily They ought paciently to suffer their mayster if he shal be more curious than needeth if he shal be more easie to please they may not neglecte him Whether it be leiful for Christians to haue bondemen and whether any may be bondmen by nature which thing Aristotle alloweth I leaue to be discussed of others Of Politike gouernance Cap. xiiij EVen as a Family consisteth of particuler men so doth a City of many Families of which presently we will debate In a common weale wel to be gouerned Prudencie is cheefely tried withoute which no societie of man can be ruled Politike gouernaunce or els a weale Publike is defined of Plutarchus in his booke De tribus Reipub. generibus a state and order of a Citie to be obserued in ruling of matters This Ciuill wisdom prescribeth the actions of Citizens eke is altogether occupied in defendinge the societie of man as in the matter which it hath taken in hand to be reasoned vpon and hath that scope propounded vnto her selfe that the weale publik may be discretly handled and that prouision may be made for the sauegard of the inhabitantes Aristotle gaue this difference betwixt a Family and a common wealth that in the common wealthe there shoulde be an equalitie of prerogatiue by which the highest shoulde be valued with the lowe But in the houshold the Maister should haue the Empire of a King ouer his children and Seruauntes as his Subiectes amonge whom the like equality can not be Of common weales sixe fourmes are recited three good which the prince the Nobilitie and the commens do minister iustfully and conueniently for for the general profite of the whole Citie and so many wicked which the Tiraunte and the bande of a fewe and the â—eane people do gouern as their owne â—st impelleth them haling all thinges â—o their proper behoofe There appeaâ—eth no Citie of any nation which may â—ot be referred to some of these That Common weale whiche consisteth of them three whiche are esteemed good Cicero in his bookes De Repub supposeth to be best by reason it is more excelent more profitable and of lenger perpetuitie than the rest Amonge the Romanes after the kynges expelled out of their Realmes euen vnto Iulius and Augustus Respub Democratica the fourme of the coÌ„mon wealth where the people had authoritie without any other state seemeth to haue ben so tempred with a certaine moderation of the kyngdome of Aristocratia whiche is a state of a Weale publike where many rule that are moste worthie in vertue and prowesse that a certaine Princely maiestie did excell in the Consuls Aristocraria in the senators Democratia in the Tribunes of the common sorte but the cheefest power was in the possession of the people Now a princely Monarchy ratified by the aduice of prudente Peeres and Sauced with vnremoouable decrées appeareth worthelie to be aduaunced before al others for coÌ„modity and quietnesse especialy sithens not by election but throughe a certaine Heauenlie prouidence Realmes are transported to the Children of Kinges Princes generated through the Lawe of bloud beinge the successours of their Parents or vnto the next of aliaunce Because perdy a Citie consisteth of the multitude of Cittizens leadinge their liues vprightly let vs manifest what ones they ought to be He is to be named a good Citizen of his countrie who being trimmed with ciuill vertues and espicially with Iustice and Fortitude whom Prudence and Temperaunce do moderate may be able to perfourme very well not only Domestical and familier offices but also Publike both at home and in warre There is neede of common Schoolemaisters bothe honest and lerned to declare vertues through whose trauel Children gaily instituted from their youth may depart exquisite in honesty and Godlinesse and through the knowledge of most excellent matters become profitable members to their countrie If so be the riches of the Parentes may not beare that their Children by leasure may be enriched with liberall studies the next remedie is that they be learned som kinde of occupacion whereby they may get their liuing Ydlenesse and pleasure verely are diligently to be shunned of all men Alwaies studie and an honeste and commodious exercise bothe of the minde and body is to be required By al meanes possible it is to be laboured of all good citizens but principally of the Parents and instructours that by reason children and youthstate can easilie imitate any thinge they may lighten them in the purity of life and may be a paterne of vertu to their younger Let euery occasion of trespassyng as much as habilitie will geue leaue be taken away Let the enticementes of concupiscence and wantonnesse be remoued Let obedience be exhibited to the magistrate if he be good As to the father of the country vnto whom authoritie is geuen from aboue But if he be ill let him pacienly be suffered and without sedicion modestly and meekely be admonished of his duty Let the Lawes be obserued Let Religion cheefely be reuerenced Let peace and concord be kept among the Citizens Let euery cause of discord be eschewed Let euery manne haue a respect to his owne businesse Neither let any man giue him selfe to beare Office in the common weale vnlesse he be called Let rest alwaies be soughte for Let pencions be paide Let the countrey be most deare to euery man for whom a good Citezen shall not feare to die if neede shall require For the cheefest loue next vnto God is due to the Countrey and to the Magistrate the next to the Parentes and kinsfulke the third to the Citizens linked or vnited together through the commonnesse of Lawe Let Foriners or Straungers peruse their
shall it be leifull also to seuour Iniustice First and formoste into common and priuate and this into distributinge and chaunging Secondly as we haue tolde the partes of Iustice religion godlynes and others so may the members of iniustice be repeted supersticion impiety and moe which briefly we haue descriued Only in presence we wil make manifest the percels and common and priuate wronge Common Iniustice compriseth two formes One which resisteth ordinaunce the other whiche repungneth equitie the lawes are violated when as either through niggardlines or the contempt of men or els for som other occasion holsom decrees and statutes are inuerted or abrogated or vnrightfulye wrested and weakened with counterfet interpretacions Equity is defiled when as not onely the wordes of law are recited and writhed subtilly but the vnderstandinge and euennesse the very soule of the law is neglected and the Prouerb winneth place SumuÌ„ ius summa iniuria extreme law extreme wrong as if the Iudges or Lawyers shoulde be corrupted with gifts or distempered with the affections of loue or hatred These matters also are debated of Rhetoricians in the Chapiter De statu scripti et voluntatis There are two parts of priuate iustice against whome likewise two maye be layde â—niustè distribuens and iniustè commuâ—ns wrongfully distributinge and vnâ—ustly exchaunging Wrongfully distributing doth fauour the wicked doth not defend the good them she exalteth these she presseth downe she preferreth flatterers and lewde personnes before the simple and honest she more estéemeth nobility and riches than vertue and sapience Vniustly exchaunging doth not restore what is due she deceiueth them with whom she ioigneth in byinge selling and in concluding other contractes especially in guage and confederacie she deuiseth titles of possessions she taketh pleasure by long practise in things procured by couine she trauaileth to â—minish common and publike commoâ—ies and out of these to adde somwhat her selfe To conclude she leaueth â—t vnto euery man his owne Doubtâ—e of all these partes of Iniustice Iniurie is the mother which is don either to the common wealth or els to al men either in violatinge the lawes or els either in distributinge or exchaunginge vniustly Of Fortitude Cap. xxix WE haue disputed of wisdome and Iustice it ensueth that mencion bee made of Fortitude Fortitude may be defined A custome or els an affection of the minde whiche taketh in hande premeditated daungers and laboures and susteineth what euer incoÌ„modities do chaunce repelling timidity and anger Of Cicero it is defined an affection of the minde pacient in aduenturinge peril and in trauell and sorow whose principall duties he wil that there be two a contempte of death and sorow because all valiante courage is tried either in wofulnesse or in labour or in daunger and in the vndertakinge and putting to flight of dreadefull matters The Stoikes define Fortitude a vertue contending for equity Chrisippus an affection of the minde in sufferinge and susteyning yelding vnto extreame law without feare Manly courage séemeth to bee ingendred partely of will partly of the faculty of the angry soule because the operacion of Fortitude requireth some commocion hereof who notwithstanding her selfe is voluntary and is busied in the suffering of sorow and in aduenturing of perilles and the will ought to rule but that rage ought to be obeysant vnto desire and counsell Fortitude is conuersant in restreining of fearefull matters both causing timiâ—itie of som daunger aboute to hurt and also the expectation of perill as it were in the matter wherin she is exercised whether it be in Marcial prowes or els in Domestical troubles that at last she may obtaine that vtterest good This vertu as likewise the residew is a mediocrity betwixte ouermuch and to litle that is to witte betweene timidity and boldnesse whiche vices after what fashion they may be eschewed Horace expoundeth in these Verses In neede appere stoute and stronge be thou vvise To shrinke in thy sayles beginning to rise The dutie of Fortitude is double to aduenture and to sustaine daungers aduersities with that minde that it maye content God and obay his commaundements for whose sake all things ought to be done and doubtlesse to enter on them and to abide them not only couragiously and manfully but also prudeÌ„tly is the parte of a valiant man for neyther should he take in hande any thynge vnaduisedly and harebraynly and with no consideration lesse he may seem rather to be allured with violent moode than with perfect reason Vnto Fortitude true and sincere adorned with other vertues Aristotle hath annected in his thirde booke Ad NicomachuÌ„ other fiue fourmes not absolute yet as of kinne The first of Citizens fighting for their countrie The seconde of Souldiours who by Marciall policie do aduenture perils the thirde of them whiche trust vnto experience the fourthe of them which trauell through an hope to winne the fifte of such as haue al their affiaunce in Fortune neither sufficieÌ„tly examininge the daungers whom ignorance causeth sturdie Verely it is no lesse the parte of Fortitude to suffer calamitie to susteine iniurie to bridell the moodes of minde with an vpright and constant courage than to hazarde the life to contempne death and doubtlesse with harte and will to die if so he shall purpose to please god And because Fortitude is conuersant either in the receiuyng of daungers or els in the enduring vnto this vertue foure fourmes are subnected Confidence magnaminitie whiche perteine vnto receiâ—ing Pacience and Perseuerance who â—e referred vnto enduring The two â—t belonge as it were to the first moâ—n of Fortitude the latter to the sufâ—ance and stablenesse and constancie of euils Of all these perfect manlinesse doth consist Of Confidence and Magnanimitie Cap. xxx COnfidence saith Cicero is a sure trust of minde either by which the minde hath planted in her selfe much beleif in weightie and honest matters with a sure hope And vnto this Boldenesse appeareth to be of aliance and yet it is a vice sith it is led not with counsell and iudgement as Fortitude vnto whom Prudency is a perpetuall companion but with violence and temeritie not taking sufficient aduise before it geue the assaulte on daungers whether it may ouercome and how it may and whether it be honest to vndertake the same But confidence doth not aduenture ieoperdies stoutely and with a great trust vnlesse diligently premeditated afore For they are not to be iudged stronge men who dare to aduenture lesse but they which commonstrate a moderate vertue of minde whom reason ought to rule and make agreeable to vertue Contarie to confidence is mistrust a lowe abashmente of the minde the same which dispeire is which aboue we haue compendiously touched in the chapiter of desire and hope Magnanimity is an amplenesse of a noble and an vnconquerable stomacke and a might and stoutnesse to commit valiaunt actes This supporteth confidence and as an helper dothe fortify her being of kinne Vnderstand you a noble corage not a proud neither an
ouer muche industrious labour is worthely dispraysed so is negligence and the contempte of Science whiche is apperteyninge to blockish and dull persons who appeare more like vnto bruite creatures then to men The third braunche of Modestie is Merinesse or Pleasantnesse and delectablenesse and also Humanitie and courtesie of talke whiche who that shall vse prudently he shal be pleasant to all men and for that also the better accepted Merinesse is which ascribeth a certaine meane to sportes and pastimes and vseth these same in time and place with them vnto whom they are thankefull to stur vp honest mirth and to wipe away the anguishes of the minde with a certayne delight This also is a meane betwixt two vices as Aristotle beareth witnesse in his second booke Ad Nicomachum vnhonest skoffing and carterlike vnsauournesse He that keepeth a meane of pleasantnesse applied to sporte is reckened mery and ciuill He that passeth degree is compted a rayler what maner of felowes are the Parasites and stage Players and other light and foolish men But he which altogether abhorreth Maygames is iudged beastly and vplandishe But wée must diligently take heede lesse through our bourdyng wee offende any man that there be not immoderate coÌ„ceites not filthy not foolish The work of Apothegmes collected of Erasmus shall minister many mery toyes And as concernyng that pleasantnesse of life whiche is remnant who that shewes himself delectable in suche sorte as reason requireth he is called easie gentell courtise and Facilitie is reckened Mediocritie He whiche passeth the meane if he be ledde with no occasion is to be compted ouer easie and pliant but if for his owne profit he is to be esteemed a flatterer But he whiche altogether dissenteth and departeth from meane and reason and sheweth himselfe sadde in all respects he is to be thought testif and churlish and worthie of al mennes hatred with that vncourteise sadnesse and rude grauitie and vnthankefull to wise men A certayne sadde sagenesse in countenance séemeth to be ingraffed in certayne what one is geuen to that Crito of Terence which if it be naturall surely it can neither be called properly good nor euill It shal be reckened good if it agree to right reason But there is a certaine secte of menne which cloke foolishnesse in their face and countenaunce and also in their iesture ietting and communication Whose affectate grauity ratified by lewd custom is wonte to appeare very foolishe vnto witty men and more rightlie informed vnto humanity The last member of sober moode doth teache that the paumpering and apparelling of the carcase is to be moderated and seemelinesse to be kepte in it as in other matters lesse either ouer curious care and riotte or els carterlye and vnnaturall slouenry and vncleanlinesse be reproued For this vertue which consisteth of adourning agreeable for the commodity of the body necessity of nature is a meane betwixt superfluity and filth Let the apparell than be moderate cleane fit for the body and conueniente for vse not for foolishnesse and rediculous ostentacion what one the barbarous and outlandish is wont to be let it be applied to the persons accordyng to their dignitie and riches and to kinde to age to place to time and to honest custome One beâ—eemeth noble and riche men another the base and poore one men another women one olde fathers another the galant youthe Of Intemperance and her two partes Cap. xxxvij INtemperancie is a redinesse conseting to desiers againste reason which Cicero in his fourth boke TusculanaruÌ„ questionum doth define a swaruing from al vnderstanding and from righte reason so bended from the â—rescript of reason that by no meanes the appetites sensual neither can be ruled nor yet repressed The parts of this vice are two One which verily addicteth her selfe vnto pleasures the other which doth nothing at all Throughe her men do rush hedlong after the vsage of beasts into al delices the Empire of Reason throwen away Through this by the rudenesse of minde some as it were with a certaine abashmente are made dull vnto all pastaunces and also do reiect and contempne honest and necessary delighte without occasion But these I iudge a man may séeke and find a fewe which through a certayne Brutishnesse would so abhorre all pastime wherewith Nature is cheefely delited that they may be intreated with no delectation The better sort by a greate deale are wont to go astray in the other parte and to géeue to muche scope vnto pleasure which temperaunce doth bridel by the Squire of reason who being collocated betweene those two vices dothe alwaies laye claime to that precious peculier Mediocritie of Vertue Of the coniunction of Vertues amonge them selues the difference and excellencie Cap. xxxviij ALl Vertues which nowe are absolute and brought vnto the perfection of reason are so connected together amonge them selues with a certayne mutuall copulation as the members of our bodie they do so agrée in amible concord as musical Harmonie This is that manifold order of Ringes whiche Plato writeth to be drawen vnto of the Lodestone For you shal not cal him perfectly and truly a prudent man which same is not both iust and valiaunt and temperate neither iust who wanteth the rest nor valiaunte nor Temperate who is not â—urnished with the felowship of the residue although he be conuersaunt more commonly in one Vertue than in another But the vnperfecte vertues are not so yoked together that they may make as it weare a consente and agreement Wee haue heard that Socrates was Temperate and Modest yet that bourding whiche is sayde to haue béene peculiar vnto him when as he woulde reprehende the vnskilfulnesse of others so greedely can not escape the checke of arrogancie But truly that great pacience and Temperaunce of Iob published in holy Scriptures was most perfet of all others But not so many examples are alledged of this absolute Vertue yet many maye be disclosed of the vnperfect Som vertues excell others in excellencie and operation as Prudencie whose Harboroughe is placed in the minde and is occupied in the out findinge of trouthe she is preferred before Temperaunce whiche moderateth delices and appoynteth a meane vnto all thinges vnto whom a place is assigned in the desiringe facultye of the soule Iustice passeth Fortitude because she preserueth the equality of humayne society and hath no certaine habitation but is indifferently spred abrode vnto all partes of the Soule this ought to be busied in despising of perils and oughte to bee situated in the Vertue of the angrie Soule what soeuer verily be subiect vnto these cheefe Vertues as they are lower in order so be they in statelinesse by reason that some of them are vnder others neither forthwith should bee referred vnto the greateste good whiche those principall Fountaynes do nexte consider but euery one to their proper beginninges and shoulde haue regard of vs rather then of felicity sith not they of their owne power but by those foure Capitalles may be straightned vnto God him selfe who is the end of all good thinges To this wished marke and eternal felicitie we attaine by the operation of Vertue verily as in the beginning it is expressed yet the which God him selfe may make prosperous vnto vs through his Clemencie to whom be due all praise honoure and glory for euer and euer Amen FINIS 〈◊〉 1. â—…d VVâ—… Philâ—…phy iâ—… be mâ—…tated chrisâ—… men â—… The â—…raynâ—… for mâ—… God 〈◊〉 throâ—… him 〈◊〉 lastinâ—… True veâ—… is the bâ—…fite of 〈◊〉 This booke translated by Iohn Charlton late felow of Exetre Colledge in Oxford now Schole maister of Wyrksop in the countie of Nottingham Mors vltima Linea rerum The Table OF the ende and partes of Morall Science Cap. i. Of the end of man and the Soueraigne good Cap. ii Of Affections Cap. iii Of loue Cap. iiii Of desire and hope Cap. v. Of Gladnesse Cap. vi Of hatred and anger and like affectioÌ„s Cap. vii Of Sadnesse Cap. viii Of Feare Cap. ix Of Boldnesse Cap. x. Of Vertue and her diuision and Originall Cap. xi Of Prudencie Cap. xii Of Domesticall gouernaunce Cap. xiii Of Politike gouernaunce Cap. xiiii O Vices contrary to vvisdom Cap xv Of Iustice Cap xvi Of the partes of Iustice Cap xvii Of the six partes of Iustice constituted of Cicero and theyr Vices and of some other vvhich be vvelnie of the same nature cap xviii Of Godlinesse cap. xix Of Reuerence Cap. xx Of Trouth cap. xxi Of Reuengement Cap. xxii Of Thanke cap. xxiii Of compassion Cap. xxiiii Of Liberality and vices contrary to this Auarice and Prodigalitie cap. xxv Of Magnificence Cap. xxvi Of Frendship cap. xxvii Of Iniustice Cap. xxviii Of Fortitude cap. xxix Of Confidence and Magnanimitie Cap. xxx Of pacience and perseuerance cap xxxi Of the Vices betvveene vvhiche Fortitude is placed cap. xxxii Of Temperaunce cap. xxxiii Of Continence and abstinence cap. xxxiiii Of Clemencie Cap. xxxv Of Modestie Cap. xxxvi Of Intemperaunce and her tvvo partes cap. xxxvii Of the coniunction of Vertues amonge â—hem selues the difference and excelâ—encie Cap. xxxviii FINIS ¶ These are to be solde at the Southwest doore of Poules Churche