of God But there is and must be a gradâ—al difference and more in respect of the goodness of the objects of the habâ—t of charity or the love of God in Christ Therefore there is and must be a gradual difference in respect of the several acts of this habit of charity or the love of God in Christ In the Argument there is committed that fallacy which is termed fallacia ignorationis Elenchi for the conclusion takes the acts of the love of God in Christ in such a latitude as to comprehend those acts of love which were terminated unto man Whereas Dr. H. and the Refuter are to be understood as hath been shewn only concerning those acts of the love of God which are terminated on God himself and between these there is no gradual difference for they have one Object alone Gods infinite goodness in himself Unto this we may add ex abundanti unto the Minor that the pretended difference betwixt the Objects of the love of God in Christ is by the Defendants opinion only as touching the material objects thereof for the formal object or reason is asserted by him to be still one and the same and hereupon 't will follow that the acts of Christs love of God are formally the same and consequently the acts of this love which have their specification from their objects are by his opinion formally the same too and the formal consideration of things is chiefest and most to be heeded These answers might easily have been foreseen but instead of them the Defendant falls to his conjectures p. 232 233. There can saith he be but two things possible as far as I can foresee returned in answer to this discourse First that it is not one and the same habit of charity whereby we love God and our neighbâ—us aâ— our selves and and therefore as the precepts are several so the objects are divers and the affections of the soul that carry it on to the love of God and our neighbour are as different as the Objects themselves are And therefore though it be granted that the several acts that flow from these severally distinct habits do gradually differ in themselves in respect of intenseness according to the gradual distance of goodness in the object yet it follows not that therefore the acts of one and altogether the same habit of charity and holy love do gradually differâ— also which was the thing to be proved Secondly Though it were granted that the hâ—bit of charity and holy love to God and our neighbours be one and the same habit yet a gradual difference in the goodness of the objects of this love will not argue a gradual difference of intenseness in the inward acts of this love but onely in the outward acts and expressions These answers are none of mine but the groundless sictions of the Defendant and therefore I may justly pass them over in filence But yet unto the first I shall say something because it affords occasion of some discourse that may be acceptable unto the Reader First Scotus resolves indeed with Aquinas that eodem habitu diligimus Deum proximum but then scripto Parisiensi in 3um sent dist 28. he determâ—ues that diligere proximum is velle eum condiligere Dâ—um Dico quod eodem habitu diligimus Deum proximum quia eodem actu volo vel diligo Deum in se volo proximum Deum in se diligere perfecte autem amans dilectum vult diligi Deus qui est bonum commune non vult esse bonum particulare ideo habens habitum talem cujus actus praecipitur in communi quod possibile est fieri potest diligere Deum proximum velle Deum diligere quia eodem habitu possum tendere in objectum reflecti super illud ergo eadem charitate possum diligere Deum velle proximum diligere Deum hoc est diligere proximum quod est respectu honesti Quod probatur ex boâ— quod ista duo sc alquid velle diligere sunt ejusdem rationis To love our Neighbour is to will that together with us he should love God Scotus then doth not take the love of our Neighbour in such a latitude as the Defendant but far more restrainedly Secondly If Aquinas his opinion be that the habitual love of God and the habitual love of our neighbour be one simple and indivisible habit one specie infimâ then his opinion may be impugned by two arguments in the solution of which the Defendant may do well to take some pains The I. argument is because the habitual love of God is or ought to be more intense then the habitual love of our Neighbour and this inequality is an argument of a real essential and consequently specifical distiâ—ction For it cannot be numerical because duo accidentia numero tantùm diversa non possunt esse in eodem subjecto simul Secondly If the habitual love of God and the habitual love of out Neighbour were one and the same specifically then the acts of love that are terminated to our Neighbour all Duties of the Second Table would be elicite acts of the habitual love of God whereas 't is evident they are onely imperate acts thereof But the Defendant objects pag. 233 234. That God and our Neighbour are beloved for one and the same formal reason or object and therefore the habit of Divine love towards them must be one and the same Unto this it may be answered First That the love of God and the love of our Neighbour have one formal ultimate object or motive Yet their formal immediate objects may be different The formal object or motive of our love of God is his infinite Goodness considered as it is in himself and the immediate formal object of our love of our Neighbour is the Goodness of God commuâ— cated unto and shining in our Neighbour Secondly though the formal object be one and the same yet the application thereof and the way of tendeney thereunto is far different For 't is applied unto God intrinsecally unto our Neighbour extrinsecally Unto God as the end unto our Neighbour as the means And therefore our love of God is called Charitas finis and the love of our Neighbour Charitas propter finem To clear this I shall quote the words of Suarez Metaph. disp 44 sect 11 n 30. Advertendum est in omni habitu dari ex parte objecti aliquam rationem tendendi in illud quam motivum operandi possumus appellare c. habitus antem voluatatis tendunt ad prosequâ—ndum aliquod bonum omais autem proseâ—utio boni est ex aliquo motivo seu ex aliqud ratione boaitatis quae voluntatem attrahit Hoc ergo motivum seu ratiâ— tendendi est absque dubio quae dat actui specificam rationem quae eadem erit si aequaliter aut eodem modo per actus attingatur quia semper id quod est sermale est quod dat spectem materiale
Passe on to the fâ—urth and last Evasion of Dr. Creed I shall from what hath been said in impugning the Pretended Termes of Immanent Actions inferre the impertinency of all that he faith p. 72.73.74.75.76.77.115.116.117.118 In defence of this pro-Position Position in Dr. Hammond the word Love is a Genus equally comprehending the two Species habitual and actual Love or the Acts of Love For Dr. H. by actual Love or the Act of Love understands as hath been shewn the Action of Loving and not as the Defend most vainly pretends any quality Produced by that Action which is its Term and Product His Proposition then notwithstanding all Doctor Creeds Defence is still chargeable with that absurdity which I objected against it viz. that it makes Love as a Genus equally to comprehend as Species primo diveâ—sa things put in several Predicaments For habitual Love is in the Predicament of Quality and the action of loving in the Predicament of Action For further disproof of Dr. H. his preposition I shall add what I said touching the habit of Love and the sincere and cordial expressions thereof No one word can as a Genus equally comprehend the efficient and the effect viz. as species but the habit of Love is the efficient and the acts of Love are the effects thereof the habit of Love saith the Defend effectively concurres with the Will to the production of the inward Acts of Love therefore Love as a Genus doth not comprehend habitual Love and actual Love as Species The Major of this Syllâ—gisme the Defendant will say is most ridiculously false as appeares by what he saith to the like Syllogisme that I framed concerning the habit of Love and the Expressions thereof His Answer is very remarkable for the transcendent and matchless both ignorance and impudence of it and therefore I shall crave the Readers patience for a while to consider it Dr. CREED YOur third to begin with that for I shall not tie my self to your Method is most ridiculously falfe You say not to trouble our selves about the Moâ—d and Figure 3 No one word can as a Gerus equally comprehend the efficient and the effect The habit of Love is the efficient cause and the sincere and cordial expressions of Love are the effect Therefore Love is not predicated of them equally as a Genus Your Major Sir your Major by all meanes have a care of your Major For what think yâ—u Sir of all Vnivocal prâ—ductions When Fire produces Fire and Corn brings forth Corn when a Man begets a Man and one Heat makes another does not one and the same word as a Genus comprehend the efficient and the effect And is it not in these a certain maxime thaâ— Qualis est causatalis est effectus such as the Cause is in nature such also is the effect And I hâ—pe you will think it lawfull for things of the same nature to be comprehended under the same Genus Nay are not these distinguished from equivocal productions because in these Effectum est ejusdem ratiâ—nis cum efficiente but in the other efficiens non convenit cum effectu in eadem forma sed eminenter illam câ—ntinet Nay does not your own Scheibler as well as Suarez both whom you so seriously commend to the Doctor 's perusall tell you that Causa univoca est quae prâ—ducit effectum similem in specie But methinks Sir if since your more noble more serious employments in the Study and writing of Scholasticall and Practicall Divinity you had thought sit to neglect such Vulgar Authors and to forget the Common Notions and Maximes delivered by them yet you should at least have observed this in your reading of Aquinas that in his Sums does frequently deliver this doctrine and makes very good use of it And now Sir I hope you will think it lawfull for things of the same Nature to be comprehended under the same Genus For where I pray will you rank the several individualls of the self-same Species for such are all Vnivocall Causes and Effects as is plain from Sense and Experience if not under the same Genus I might prove the grosse and palpable falshood of your Major Sir by divers instances drawn from equivocall productions where the Cause and Effect must be placed in the same predicament and consequently under the same remote Genus at least which is sufficient to destroy your Major When the Sun and Stars produce Gold and Silver and Brasse and other Mineralls when they produce Sâ—ones of all sorts and kinds in the Bowâ—lls of the Earth are not the cause and the effect at least as species subalternae placed under the siâ—ne Genus of substantia Corporea When an Asse begets a Mule or a Man produces Wormes and Vermin in his Head and Entrailes and when a Woman brings for mâ—nstrâ—ous births instead of Lâ—gitimate issues as Serpâ—nts Moles and Froggs and other such like of which among Physitians there are maâ—y true stories I pray Sir must not the cause and effect be both ranged under the same immediate Genus proximum which is Animal So when light produces Heaâ— are not the Cause and the Effect both put in the same Predicament under the same Genus of Patible Qualities To keep closer to the business more immediately in controversie The habit of Love effectively concurrs with the will of to the production of the inward Acts of Love and yet I say that love as a Gâ—nas is Equally predicated of the habit and the inwaâ—d Acts of Love as has already been demenstrated and may in due time bâ— further proved notwithstanding any thing you have or can say to the contrary And this is abundantly more than sufficient to shew the faâ—shoâ—d of your Major when you say that no one word can as a Genus whether proximum or remotum sâ—mmum or subalâ—eâ—um for you â—bsâ—lutely deliver it equally comprehend the Efficient and the Effect The Major which you say Is most ridiculously false and against which you make so horrible an Out-cry I shall fortifie by three reasons The 1. Is because Genus Analogum non praedicatur aequaliter dae speciebus But now Analogy viz. Attributionis Intriâ—secae consists in dependency from which Effective dependency is not excluded as is maintained by the generality of the ancient Thomists by my Master Scheibler Metaph. lib. 2. cap. 1. art 3. cap. 3. tit 5. art 1. And by Scheibler's Master Suarez Mâ—taphys di p. 28. s 3. disp 32. s 2. n. 11 12 13 14 15. By â—â—enâ—us a Frier Ca melite Discep in Univers Logic. p. 113. Martinus Exercit. Metaph. p. 521. And by divers others as you may see in Stalio Reg. Philosoph p. 397. And upon this account is it that Ens is made to be Gerus Analogum to Ens creatum and increatum to substantia and accidens And I have read in the Manuscript of a Great Philosopher of the Vniversity of Oxford that for this reason Qualiâ—as is geâ—us Analogum because of the
boldnesse to tell you that no such matter is visible unto me in any of the School-men But perhaps you may mean such School-men as such a Puny as I never saw or heard of however you cannot expect bâ—lief until you produce their testimonies And I shall intreat you to alledge such as may be had in Pauls-Church yard oâ— at least in the Library at Oxford Now from this the Defendant concludes â— 62. that I tell the world in effect that I have all the School-men at my singers end nay just as many no more nor no lesse than are in Pauls-Charchyard and the Lâ—bâ—ary as Oxford Fourthly p. 88 89. the Defendant saith that I do not throughly understand a passage which I quote out of Raynandus My words are these Kaynaudus makes mention out of Gabriel Biel of a distinction of love into affâ—ctive and effâ—ctive and â—hat is this effective love but the effects and expressions of love But now that he doth not take this to be a proper destribution of a Gâ—nus into its Species appeareth by what he saith out of the same Author concerning the division c. Well where lieth my mistake in these words why plain it is say you from Raynaudus that love effective is not only the outward sensible effects and expressions but also something else For though it be true that all the outward sensible effects and expressions of love be love effective or in plain English the issues and effects of love yet the termes are not reciprocil and convertible For there are many effects of love that are not sensible and thus external For instance good wishes good prayers are the effects of true love so also are joy at the we fare of the beloved persons wâ—ll-doing and sorrow and grief at his miscarriage and yet thâ—y are not alwayes expressed nor does any prudent man alwayes shew his joy or grief or expresse his good wishes thoughts and desires to him be most tenderly affects Well what of all this Why saith the Defendant the subject-matter of your discourse leads me necessarily to understand your interrogation of the outword sensible effects and expressions of love Sir you must put in the word only or else you say nothing to the purpose and if you put that in what you say is very false It is I say false that the subject-matter of my discourse leads you necessarily to understand my interrogation only of the outward sensible effects and expressions of love and you can never prove it by any rule of argumentation Indeed my designe is to prove that love is not a genus unto the outward expressions of love or that the outward expressions of love are not a species of love and may not this be very well proved though in my interrogation the effects and expressions of love be taken in a general sense abstracting from both inward and outward expressiens may not that which is denied of estective love in general that is all effects and expressions of love be particularly denied of the outward and sensible expressions of love Did you never hear of arguing à genâ—re ad spâ—ciem negativè grounded upon this Maxâ—me * Sanderâ—â—m Logâ—â— p. 205. Quod convenit aut not convenit generi Convenit etiam aut non convenit spâ—câ—eâ— Is it not a good argument to conclude that homâ— is not lapis bâ—cause nullum animal it lâ—pis because no effective love no effects and expressions of love are a species of love will it not thence irrefâ—agably follow that no outward effects and expressions of love are a speciâ—s of love Fifthly I had said p. 10. of my Refutation c. I am very loth to enter into a Contest with so great a Critick touching the meaning of a word And from this innocent and harmiess passage the Defendant concludes That I contemptuously undervalue the Doctoâ—'s excellent Critical learning That with me a Critick is but a whisting Grammaâ—ian an empty Pedagâ—gae p. 96 97 98 99 100 101. That the Doctor in my opinion is some petty Grammaticaster that knows the meaning of Musa and can tell how to decline Lapis some great Critick for sooth one fit to teach School-boyes perhaps the meaning of a Greek or Latine Author but for any skill in the Arts and Reserches of Philosophy he is a very Dunce and not at all seen in the curious speculations and subtleties of School-learning But what colour is there for these odious sequeles in my words Indeed they can be drawn from no Topick place but that of the Defendant's furious malice Sixthly Whereas Dr. Hammond had said that each of the expressions of Christs love of God had an act of internal love of which they were so many proportionably different expressions I answered that if the Doctors meaning were that these different expressions in regard of intension must be proportioned exactly unto their inward respective acts of love must be equal or parallel unto them then I denyed what he said and called upon him for the proof of it Now this my denyal which no rational man can or will deny the Defendant himself most unnecessarily and idly confirms in 16. pages p. 139 140 c. usque ad 155. and p. 150 151 152 153 154. he quotes the testimonies of many School-men for the confirmation hereof and in the close of all this he wonders at my omission of these and the like testimonies And hereupon he concludes my ignorance in School-men His words are these And therefore I cannot chuse but wonder that our Refuter should take no notice of these or the like passages which to ordinary eyes would have shewed more to his advantage than all that he has quoted in his Panphlet from the School-men and Suarez and Scheibler to boot But this and some other passages in his book which offered themselves at first sight make me not value his School-learning at the same rate and pâ—ice he has put upon it in the Title-page of his mixture But old Homer was blind though he were the Prince of Poets and our Writer of Practical and Scholastical Divinity sees not all things in those Doctors that may most serve for his advantage Here by the way I deny that I put such a rate and value upon my School-learning in the Title-page of my Mixture as the Defendant pretends only I profess my self a Well-wisher unto Scholastical Divinity desirous to revive the study thereof but however there is not either in mine or in his own discourse any foundation shall I say nay not so much as any shadow for either his wender or censure The particle therefore therefore I cannot chuse but wonder c. plainly intimates that what he saith is a conclusion drawn from something foregoing And for my part I have most diligent'y sought for premises unto this conclusion and can find none and therefore must earnestly entreat the Defendant to direct us where or what they are In my fore-mentioned denyal I acted the part of a Respondent and by
what laws of disputation a Respondent though a School-man is obliged to heap up testimonies out of School-men for the confirmation of every denyal that he makes especially if the proposition denyed be apparently false as this was viz. That the outward expressions and the inward acts of love of God in Christ must of necessity be of equal intension And thus hoping that by the next we shall know why you fell into this fit of wondering I pass on Seventhly In the next place you tell us that in men the inward affection commonly varies according to the intension and remission of the outward expressions and effects and in prosecution of this he spends with a great deal of noise and triumph about 16. pages more p. 155 156 c. â—usque ad 171. But what of all this Sir is this any thing to the matter in hand Can you from any thing in this tedious discourse inferre any thing against my Denyal vlz. that the outward different expressions of love must of necessity be proportioned exactly unto their inward acts of love and if you cannot as undoubtedly you cannot to what end serves all that you say but to waste time pen ink and paper But you tell us often that the Doctor is no wayes engaged to prove that the inward acts of love and the outward expressions are of necessity equal in point of intension But the contrary will appear to every Puâ—sâ—ny in Logick that will but peruse the Doctors sequel as 't is in him at large for thus it runneth and from hence I suppose is unavoidably consâ—queâ—t prâ—y Mr. Defendant mark the word unavoidably that that act of internal love expâ—esâ—ed by Christs dying for us was supeâ—â—â—ur to thâ—se â—oâ—mer act supply in intention which only exprest themselves in his povertie and so the same person that loved sincerely did also love and expresse that love more intensely at one time then at another which was the very thing I said in another instancâ— Now choose unto this consequent what Antecedent you will out of Dr Hammonds words either those that are immedâ—aâ—ely foregoing yet it being â—eâ—â—ain that each of these expresâ—ions had an act of internal love of which they were so many propertionabâ—y different expressionâ— or thâ—se that precede these To this I subjoyne that such as the expression waâ— such was the act of inward love of which that was an expression and from it it is impossible for you or any other of Dr. Hammonds friends to inferre thâ—s consequent But you pretend p â—68 that you have done the feat your self And now because you pâ—â—sesse and it is your third charge that the reason of the Doctâ—rs consequencâ— is to you invisible and that you shall never acknowledge his Inference legitimate uâ—til you be dâ—iven thereto by â—educing his Enâ—hymeâ—â—e unto a Syllogisme I shâ—â—l â—nce for your better satisfaction â—â—rsâ—râ—e it Iâ— ordinaâ—iâ—y there iâ— and must be a proportionable agreement in respect of Inâ—erâ—ion and Râ—mission betwixt the inward acts of love and the outward expressions then that act of internal love expressed by Christs dyiâ—g for us was superiour to thâ—se former acts which only exprest themselves in hâ—s Povertie c. But the Antecedent is true as we have shewed from reason and experience and the Authâ—rity of Gregory and the Schoolmen Therâ—fâ—re also is the consequent First for the major of this your Syllogisme I demand concerning the Consequent vvhether you inferre it from your Anteâ—edent necessarily or only probably If you say only probably then your Consequent is none of Dr. Hammâ—nds for he supposeth that his follovveth necâ—ssarily from vvhat he hath said Hence I suppose it faith he unavoidably consequent that is necessarily consequent that that act of internâ—l love expressâ—d by his dying for us was superiour to those former acts which only exprest themselves in his povertie If you say you inferre it necessarily then the consequent is evidently false you must then change in your Antecedent the vvord ordinarily and in the room thereof put in the vvord necessarily or else the consequent vvill not follovv unavoidably As for the assumption that is evidently false too if you supply what is to be supposed for then thus it runs Ordinarily there is and must be in all men and was in Christ a proportionable agreement in respect of intention and remission betwixt the inward acts oâ— the love of God and the outward expressions thereof Now all men are by the commandement of God which Christ fulfilled oblâ—ged to love God when they love him with all their might and consequently with all their habitual might But by the opinion of both Dr. Hamond and the Defendant men are not bound in all expressions of their love of God to performe thenâ— with all their might and therefore 't is false very false that there must be a proportionable agreement in respect of intension and remission betwixt the inward acts of the love of God and the outward expressions thereof And thus you see what a rare Syllogisme you have made both the premises of which are notoriously false By whâ—t hath been said the Reader may as discover the faishood of your Syllogisme so also frame a true Syllogisme against the sequele of Dr. Hammond and 't is as followeth If all the inward acts of Christ's love of God were with all his habitual might then that act of hâ—s internal love viz. of God exprest by his dying for us was not superiour viz. in intension to those former acts which only exprest themselves in his poverty but all the inward acts of Christ's love of God were with all his habitual might therefore that act of his interral love of God expressed by his dying for us was not superiour viz. in intension to those foâ—mer acts which only expresse themselves in his poverty The Major is undenyable and we may say as much of the Minor because Christ fulfilled the commandement which was to love God with all his might and strength Therefore with all his habitual might and strength and this is confessed by your self touching the acts of love that are terminated unto God himself of which I have proved Dr. Hammond only to be understood Eightly Dr. Hammond saies that if it be proved that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to the vulgar translation signifieth Luke 22 44. Prolixiùs theâ—e will yet be place equally for his conclusion viz. that one act of his eternal love of God was more intense then another But if there be any place for such a conclusion then thus the argument stands Christ in his agony prayed longer then before therefore his inward actual love of God was then more intense then before But this sequele as is evident unto every ordinary Reader is very illogical and irrational and yet the Defendant justifieth it and in vindication of it spends twelve pages p. 253 254 c. usque ad 265. But how unsatistying this hâ—â— vindication is will quickly appear if he please to
and actual in the predicament of action In the next place I forestalled an objection that might be made from the opinion of divers groat Philosoghers and Schoolmen that makâ— all ' Immaâ—ient acts and consequently all inward acts of love to be qualities they are say they only Grammatical actions not Metaphysical actions in the predicament of action For refutation of this opinion I offered unto Dr. Hammonds consideration two arguments out of Sâ—belbleâ— unto which let us hear what the Defendant saith Defendant And have you not told us news indeed You should have brought us word that the Sun shines at Rbodes or when it is in its Zenith There is nothing more generally received in the Schools then that is And I dare say searce any Philosopher or School-man of any note has for these hundred years almost delivered any thing to the contrary Why then urge you Scheibler and his reasons as if he being a late wâ—â—tor had discovored a truth which former Authors were mistaken in c. Here is strange considence indeed down-right impudence for 't is as clear as the Sun that many Mâ—dern both Philosophers and School-men have delivered much to the contrary and this is well known unto all that have read any thing almost in either Philosaphers or School-men But you will be ready to but face the matter and thorefore to consound your 〈◊〉 confiâ—â—â—â—ce I shall refer unto souse Philosophers and School-men that are of good here and that have sâ—ourished within theso hundred 〈◊〉 who 〈◊〉 terminis affâ—m That immanent acts are only qualities and nor 〈◊〉 proper and predicaâ—â—tutal actions Reda that was printed 1620. super 〈◊〉 c. â— Controv. 7. p. 121 122 123 124 125 126. Faber 〈…〉 licensed April 〈◊〉 1612. In 〈…〉 Rapâ—ael Avers◠〈…〉 Controvâ—â— pukeâ— 1. Pouclus part 3. 〈…〉 p. 499.500 c. Unto these testimonies it were very easie to add many others bâ—â— these are sufficient to satisfie the Reader that you neither know nor care what you say herein But to return from this digression In the next place I shall add ex abundanti that divers great Philosophers both Protestants and Papists maintain that immanents acts are properly predicamental actions and that yet they are not productive of any terms that are qualities Amongst Protestant writers I may justly reckon the generality of Logicians for these qualities have no place in their prediâ—amental tables and if they had thought that there had been such qualities the omission of them had been an inexcusable defect in their Logicks because supposing though not granting such qualities they would have been as numerous as any other entities whatsoever and there is nothing can be said to exclude them from the Predicaments As for Papists Suarez confesseth that there are many Thomists of this opinion Metaph. disp 48 Sect. 2. n. 5. Secunda sententla negat esse de intrinsecâ essentiâ actioni ut sit habere terminum qui per cam fiat ad quem dicat respectum de essentia inquam actionis quatenus est proprium quoddam genus summum ab aliis distincâ—um quia sub eo genere quaedam sunt actiones habentes terminum aliae non Habentes terminum sunt actiones transcuntes in quo haec sententia convenit cum praecedenti Quae verò non habent terminum sunt actiones immanentes de quibus longè diverso modo sentit haec sententia quà m praecedens Existimat enim has actiones immanentes esse proprissimas actiones de genere praedicamento actionis esse tamen puras actiones quae nullum terminum intrinsecum per se loquendo producunt sed immediatè per sese attinguâ—t sua objecta Ita sentiunt de actionibus immanentibus multi ex discipulis Divi Thomae nam licèt pâ—culiariter tribuant intellectioni quod producat verbum tanquam intrinsecum effectum tamen neâ— similem aut proportionalem effectum tribuunt omni actioni immanenti nam in actionibus sensuum utriusque appetitus id ferè omnes negant Neque inter se conveniunt in attribuendo illo effectu omni intellectionis nam quidam solùm propter absentiam objecti in quibusdam intellectionibus illum effectum requirunt Nec denique videntur ponere illud verbum per modum proprii termini intellectionis ut actionis producentis quia docent verbum intellectionem esse res omninò distinctas quod repugnat actioni proprio termino intrinseco quià actio solùm potest esse modus illius rei quae est terminus non reâ— realiter distincta us supra probatum est disputando de causalitate effectivâ Est ergò â—orum sententia actionem immanentem ut sic perse nihil producere quod sit proprius terminus ejus sed esse puram actionem quamvis interdum ex illâ aliquis effectus resultet Ita sentiunt citati Thomistae alii Moderni Interpretes D. Thom. in 1. parte q. 27 a. r. Javel 9. Metaph. q. 16. Ubi non numerat alios effectus actionum immanentium nisi habitus ad quos potius comparantur ut principia agendi quà m ut actiones in quo satis declarat illas actiones non habere terminos intrinsecos propriè dictos Suarez propounds three grounds they lay down for this Opinion two are common unto them with others but the third I believe is proper and peculiar unto them Tertio potest adjungi haec ratio qula hae actiones non sunt à natura institutae ad aliquid producendum neque ut agens per illas communicet suum esse sed ut per eas potentiae sese uniant objectis suis Ergo sine causâ tribuitur his actionibus quod aliquid producant These actions are by Nature instituted for this end that by them their Powers may unite themselves with their Objects but this union may be performed without production of any term that is a quality and therefore these actions have no term that is a quality Whereas Suarez saith in answer that the union is sufficiently Metapborical this no ways weakens but rather fortifieth the Argument For unto a Metaphorical union of powers unto their objects what need is there that there should be produced de novo real and physical qualities But to say nothing further of these Thomists I shall trouble the Reader but with one Author more and 't is a very late one Franciscus Bonae Spei That which I conceive in him to be most pertinent I shall here transcribe in lib. de animâ disp 11. dub 3. Dico 3. intellectio formaliter consistit in actione siâ—e termino realiter à se distincto 1. Contra Molinam 1. parte Conimbricenses Scotum Lessium Hurtadum Fonsecam Gonzalem c. docentes illam quidem sormalitèr consistere in actione sed habere terminum realiter à se distinctum 2. Contra Vasquez 1. part Suarez etiam 1. parte Valentiam Salas Arriagam Poncium post Scotam in primum distinct 3.
his love of his neighbour This is so plain in Suarez out of whom the Dâ—fendant borroweth the distinction as that one would think it impossible for the Gentlâ—man to oversee it But this oversight renders it very probable that he never read Suarez himself but had the distinction sent him from some friend who knew not the consistency of it with his other distinctions Unto this we may adde that those that stickle for this twofold actual love of God in Christ as terminated unto God himself have not so much as one word or syllable for the indifferency of his love as Viator touching the degrees whereof all the indifferency that they assert therein is Contradistionis quoad exercitium actus So much is affirmed by Gregory De Valentia tom 4. disp 1. q. 19. punct 2. Hunc actum charitatis aiunt in Christo fuisse aliquo modo liberum ita scilicet ut posset ab eo certe aliquando desistere c. quam libertatem modo diceudi in Scholis usitato vocamus libertatem quoad actus excreitium tantum c. But our Defendant himself will not deny that all the inward acts of the love of God in Christ that were terminated immediately on God himself were alwayes at the highest equally intense And therefore this distinction being meant of the acts of Christs love of God as terminated unto God himself can do Dr. Hammond no service at all in this Controversie Having beaten the Râ—fater from all his Evasions I shall next examine what he saith unto my three Arguments The first is drawn from the all fulnâ—ss and perfection of Christs habitual grace The habits of all graces and vertues in Christ were alwayes fulâ— and perfect most intense and not capable of further or higher degrees and therefore so are the inward acts or actions of those graces and vertues too Now what is said in general of the habits of all graces may in particular be averred of the habitual grace of divine charity That in Christ was alwayes full and perfect most intense and not capable of further or higher degrees and therefore so were the inward acts that is actions thereof too Here are two Enthymems implyed the latter subordinate unto the former For habitual grace is the genus of divine charity and not the equivalent thereof as the Defendant fondly thinks That I make it p. 330. B. the Consequence of the latter Enthymem I proved p. 3 4 12. from which the confirmation of the former may easily be collected The said proof of the Consequence I shall briefly repeat and somewhat re-inforce And 't is that there can no other ground be assigned for the intension of the action of loving of God in Christ but the intension of the habit of love which Dr. Hammond and his Defendant both affirm in Christ to be alwayes so full and intense as that it was not capable of further or higher degrees For an action is not capable of degrees of intension and remission but sâ—condarily mediante qualitate which it produceth or from which it proceedeth vatione termini or vatione principij it cannot be ratione termini any quality that was the effective term the product of the inward action of love for that there is no such term or product of the action of love hath now been largely confirmed And if it be said that it was ratione principij then it must be in regard of the habitual grace of divine love for there are but two qualities that are the principles of the action of loving God in Christ the power or faculty of the will and the habitual grace of love Now the power or faculty of willing cannot be intended in any man and the habitual grace of love in Christ was alwayes so intense as that in him 't was uncapable of further intension and consequently all the inward actions flowing therefrom were of an equal intension Here your Answer unto which you referre is that I ignorantly or wilfully confound the immanent acts of love with the action of loying c. And that the Doctor speaks of the immanent acts of love and not at all of the actions p. 21 22. But first I have proved that there are no such things in rerum naturá as the acts of love distinguished from their actions as their termes Secondly Suppose that there were such termes yet that the Doctor cannot reasonably be understood of them hath been sufficiently demonstrated Unto this I adde ex abundanti the testimonies of some few Schoolmen from which may be gathered that the habit and the act are alwayes equal in gradual perfection and from this it will follow that if the habit be alwayes equally â—ntense the act mâ—st be so too But now for preventing all future mistakes and to cut off the Defendants Objections I shall lay down of this a limitation which might easily have been foreseen and is usually in things of this and the lâ—ke nature It is to be understood caeteris paribus provided that all other caâ—sâ—s concurre equally and uniformly unto the act so that the habit be not hindred by them but left to its natural way of working Now in Christ caetera erant paria there was no disâ—arity but a most absolute and perfect equality and uniformity in the influence of other causes viz. The will of Christ and Gods assisting grace in the production of his actual love of God hâ—s will never willed any abatement of the act and God never withdrew his assisting grace in the least degree or measure and therefore his habitual love of God wrought in him alwayes equally and uniformly as to the inward acts thereof Having premised this limitation which I shall intreat the Reader to carry along with him in his mind in that which followeth Let us come unto what you say unto the testimonies themselves First you quarrel me for that I cite not Aquiâ—as from his own writings But quote him twice from Caprcolus but I had very good reason for this for the passages that I quote are not in Aquinas his Sâ—mâ—nes or in his book Contra gentes which is all that I have of Aquinas The first passage he quotes out of Aquinas De Vertutibus q. 1. a. 11. and the second is out of the same work questio de charitate art 10. I believe that if you had read Caprcolus you would have been as much to seek to sind these places in Aquinas as I was If you can direct me to them I shall thank you but I suppose 't is a book not commonly to be had The first testimony you do not answer but outface From iâ— I truly as you grant concluded that a greater vehemency in the operation of love argued a greater participation in the subject of the habit of love Now from this it undeniably followeth that if the operation of love be more vehement at one time than another then the subject doth more participate of the habit of love at one time than another and
Contradiction for they incline unto frequency of their acts loco tempore debitis and incline against sinful omission of their acts This Reason may for the substance of it be collected from what the School-mâ—n usually say to prove that free-will doth not consist in a habit I shall at present content my self only with a Quotation of Aquinas Primâ part q. 83. a. 2. Corp. Habitus dicuntur secundum quos nos habemus ad pâ—ssionâ—s vel ad actus bâ—ne vel male nt dâ—citur in 2. Ethic. Nam per temperantiam bene nos habemus ad omcupiscentiâ—s Per intemperantiam a tem male Per scientiam etiam bene nos habemus ad actum incellectus dum verum cognoscimus per habitum autem contearium male Liberum awem arbitrium indifferenâ—er se habet ad bene eligendum vel male unde impossibile est quod liberum arbitrium sit habiâ—us This mutatis matandis will prove that no habit is formally free Secondly Though habits be not formally free yet I confess they are in regard of their use and exercise subject * Aquinas 1. 2 ae q. 52. a. 3. q. 63. a. 2. q. 71. a. 4. unto the impery of the will So that the will freely useth or not useth them But this will no wayes advantage the Defendant for all men are obliged to act the habit of love as touching its inward acts unto the highest ad extremum virium They are bound to love God with all their might and strength therefore with all their habitual might and strength and if their love fall short of this height it is sinâ—ul and defective which cannot without blasphemy be imagined of Christ who was impeccabilis and therefore fulfilled all righteousness and therefore when he loved God he lovâ—d him as much as he could the all-fulness of his actual love was for dâ—grees answerable to the all-fulness of his nabitual As for his Answer to my seconâ— Argument drawn from the beatifical vision in Christ that hath been sufficiently replyed unto in my examination of his distinction of Christs love of God as he was Viator and as he was Comprebenso The third and last Argument was fetcht from Christs impeceability It was impossible for Christ to sin but if the inward acts of his love of God had been less intense at one time than at another he had sinned for he had broken that first and great Commandment Thou shalte love the Lord thy God with all thy heart with all thy soul with all thy mind with all thy might and strength Deut. 6.5 Mat. 22.37 Mark 12.30 Luke 10.27 In Answer unto this Argument the Defdenant insists from pag. 357. usque ad 520. of examining which his own concession will save the labour for he grants that if we speak of that eminent act of holy charity that is immediately terminated on God himself we are bound to love God to the utmost height we can and that he who doth not so love him doth not love him so much as he deserveth or as much as man ought and that therefore the acts of Christâ— love as immediately terminated on God were alwayes at the the height and one equal perfection p. 71. Now that Doctor Hammond is to be understood of this eminent act of holy charity that is immediately terminated on God I have clearly demonstrated and unlesse the Defendant can answer my arguments his accusation of my third argument as guilty of that Sophisme which the Philosopher calleth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 will passe but for an idle and ignorant calumny The Defendants friends may be ready to say that 〈◊〉 decline the examination of that which followeth because 't is unanswerable but alass there 's no such matter for that it is a very â—otten eâ—roneous discourse guilty of complyance with Popâ—ry in a great measure I shall shortly demonstrate in a dâ—stinct Treatise if God grant me life health and liberty The reason then why at present I take no further notice of it is because not only the Stationer but divers good friends have for several reasons much importuned me to contract this Debate as much as I could and I should now forth with put a period to it but that I am desirous to give the Readet in brief a further taste of the inconsâ—qâ—â—â—ncies with which 〈◊〉 work of Doctor Creed is every where fraught First p. 53 54 55 56 57 he concludes that a habit of divine love in Christ was not capable of further degrees because the act and exercise of it was capable of further degrees If Christs love of God in the act and exercisâ— was capable of Degâ—ees more intense at one time than another and had in its latitude or amplitude several Degrees one different from another secundâ—m magis minus all them comprehended in because issuing from the habit of Divine Love then this babitual love of God must be acknowledged all-full and perfect alwayes pray Master Defendant mark the word alwayes in him so fall and so perfect as not to want and so not to be capable of further degrees But the Antecedent is true and therefore also the Consequent The evidence of the sequel is supposed and grounded upon two very â—nowâ— Maxims Nihil est in effectu quod non prius erat in causâ and Nihil dat quod non habit This is an argument silly and ridiculous beyond all comparison for mutatis mutandis a man from it may argue against the growth of the habit of love in all the Saints that ever were are or shall be on the earth If their love of God in this life in the acts and exercise was capable of Degrees c. then their habitual love of God must be acknowledged all-full and perfect alwayes in them so full and perfect as not to want and so not to be capable of further degrees As for the two known Maxims they will do him no service unlesse he put in the word semper Nihil est in effectu quod non erat prius semper in causa Nihil dat quod non habet semper And if you adde the particle semper every fresh-man will soone discover their notorious falshood Secondly p. 57. he hath another rare consequence The Apostle saith that Christ's being in the forme of God though he thought it no robbery to be equal with God yet made himself of no reputation and took upon him the forme of a servant and was made in the likunesse of man and being found in fashion as a man he humbled himself and became obedient unto death even the death of the Crosse wherefere God also hath exalted him Therefore Christs love viz. actual and inward was more intense at one time than another v.z. iâ— his agony and dying for us more intense than in his suffering nakednesse and hunger for us Thirdly in p. 18 19. of my Refutation of Doctor Hammonds 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I have these words If this be your meaning I must needs assume the
cast into Syllegismes what he takes to be argumentative therein But this is a thing that he dates not so much as attempt for then every Freshman will easily discover the foppery of his discourse However in the meane time I shall give the utmost strength that I can unto Dr Hammond's argument as 't is propounded by himself and as 't is reinforced by the Defendant The conclusion to be proved is that one inward act of Christs love of God was more intense then another Now this Dr. Hammond proves from the length of his prayer for paralel to a greâ—ter length there 's a greater intension of the inward actual love of God in a longer prayer compared with that which is shorter All the proofe that I can finde of this reduced into forme stands thus Where there is a multiplication of Degrees more degrees of the inward actual love of God there 's a greater intension of the inward actual love of God but in a larger prayer of Christ there was a greater multiplication of Degrees of love c. more degâ—ee of love c. then there was in a shorter And therefore theâ—e was a greater intension viz. of the actual internal love of God The Major is confirmed from the nature of intension which is nothing else but a multiplication of Degrees in the same subject an addition of one Degree unto another And then the Minor is thus confirmed by Dr. Hammend where there is a greater multiplication of the acts of love viz. inward where there are more acts of love there is a greater multiplication of the degrees of love for in every act of love there was some degree of intension but in a longer prayer of Christ there was a greater multiplication of the inward acts of love mâ—re acts of love then there was in a shorter and answerably there was a greater multiplication of the Degrees oâ— love more Degrees of love c. My Answer unto thâ—s Syâ—â—gisme shall be both unto the Major and the Minor First then I answer unto the Major by distinguishing concerning the multiplication of Degrees It is either of the same numerical forme or fo foâ—mes numerically different Where there is a greater multiplication of degrees of the same numerical forme there is a greater intension but not where there is a greater multiplication of formes numerically different for intension is an addition of Degree unto Degree in the same numerical forme The Major then if understood of the latter multiplication of degrees is false but if understood of the former is true But then thâ— Minor if understood answerably of the same will be false And Dr. Hammond's proofe of it will be most impeâ—inent For the several inward acts of Christs love of God are formes numerically different and therefore let them be multiplyed never so much this will conduce nothing unto the greater multiplication of Degrees in one act of love then there is in another So that from this it can never be inferred that one inward act of love in Christ was more intense then another But Dr. Creed very stoutly and lustily affiâ—meth the contrary p. 256. I Reply and say If the Degrees of his live are in number multiplyed as the acts are there must be a growth in their intensive perfection and the last act which has the greater number of Degrees in it will be gradually more perfect then the former Here you say that if the Degrees of Christ's love are in number multiplyed as the acts are there must be a growth in their intensive perfection and withall you suppose that the last act hath a greater number of degrees in it and here upon you conclude of it that it will be gradually more perfect then the former But good Mr. Defendant instead of saying and supposing you should have proved what you say and suppose but of such proofe there is not in all that you say any the least footsteps Bâ—t â—e this how it will plaine it is you say p. 257. that I do not reâ—ch the Doctor 's meaning and the force of his argument I have made the most of his words that I could but as for any hidden and invisible meaning distinct from that which his words hold forth I know not that I was obliged to search after it And therefore I shall leave that unto the Defendant who can see further into a Mill-stone then other Mortals But however let us examine this profound meaning of Dr. Hammond's The Doctor concludes and argues from the effect to the cause thus where thâ— zâ—ale is true and real and not tersonate and counterfâ—it as in Christ without doubt it was most true there a multiplication of the outward acts of prayer and a longer continuance in them argues a greater a denâ—y of inward affection and true zeale And for the truth of this assâ—rtion I appeal to the practice of the whole world Here if you supply what is to be supplyed touching the object of this inwaâ—d affection This assertion which you obtrude with such a confidence is apparently untrue I say 't is apparently untrue that a multipâ—cation of the outward acts of prayer and a longer continuance in thâ—m argues a greater ardency of inward affection to God or love â—f him And for the falshood of this assertion I appeale to thâ— bosomes of all experienced either Ministers or Christians who can tâ—ll him that their inward love of God is frequently as intense in their shorâ—es as it is in their longer prayers and that the shortnesse of their prayers many times doth not proceed from any abarement of their love of God but from regard to the infirmities of such as joyn with thâ—m and for diverse other reasons Mr. Paul Beyne was esâ—eem'd a very plous and devout man in his time and 't is said of him that his prayer in his Family was not usually above a quarter of an hour long as having respect to the weaknesses and infirmities of his Servants and Children and he used to disswade others from tediousnesse in that duty I beleive the Defendâ—nt will not deny but that a man may in putting up the Lord's Prayer have his actual love of God every way as high and intense as in the longest prayer either of a man 's own or anothers composition But not to insist longer on other men It is plaine of Christ that his shortest prayers his shortest eiaculations did proceed from an actual love of God every way as intense as the longest And for the truth of this I appeale unto the Commandement of God that enjoyned Christ and all other men to love God with all their migâ—t and strength therefore with all their habitual might and strength Now however other men may transgresse this Commandement Christ did not could not and therefore whenever Christ loved God actually he loved him with all his habitual might and strength ad extremum virium and consequently one inward Act of his love of God was not more intense then another Ninthly
p. 268 you accuse my Answer unto an Argument of Dr. Hammond's as guilty of that fallacy which is called petitio principii If this be not say you 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I know not what your great Master Aristatle mednes But this is a most ridiculous and groundlesse crimination for this as every other fallacy is a sault or defect in arguing not in answering 't is saith my â—â—rtle Master Scheibler dâ—ceptâ—o in syllogizando De Sydogism cap. 17. n. 6. 't is saith my great Master Aristotle Elenchus Sophisticus It hath alwaies been observed for a rule in dâ—sputing that when the Respondent denyes a sequel and gives a reason for it it is the Opponents part to â—â—fute the reason and the Respondent is not obliged to confirm it It is then a grosse non-sequitur to conclude me gâ—â—ltie of this faâ—lacie of petitio principii because I do not confirm the reason for which I deny Dr. Hammonds consequence But Sir if you had not falsifted it by adding must to may be it is a Proposition so plain and evident as that it needs no confirmation and can be denied by no rational man Thus it stands my reason is because in all these inward acts of Christs love of God and we may say the same of the inward acts of other vertues and graces there may be no gradual dissimilitude Mark Sir the word may be and then tell us whether there be any contradiction in this Proposition in several inward acts of Châ—â—sts love of God there is no gradual dissimilitude it there be pray discover it if there be hot then give me leave to conclude that in the multiplied acts of christs love of God there may be no gradual dissimilitude You say this is the controversie betwixt me and the Doctor But your own conscience must needs convince you that this is a faishood for you your self state the controversie to be whether one act of châ—â—sts love of God were actually more intense then another and yet if I had said that in the inward acts of Christs love of God there could be no gâ—adual dissimilitude this I have proved by three reasons unto which you have given but â—orrie answers and these reasons I am not bound to repeat at every turne for this would quicklie swell my book to such a Volume as yours is Tenthly he hath a passage page 272. for which he hath not in my words the least toundation And will not every man think that our Refuteâ— was a man of great judgment and parts and fit to quote Suarez against Dr. Hammond But I rather think he was misguided by some Notes and that he never consulted the Authors he quotâ—s but took them upon trust otherwise mâ—thinks it is impossible he should be so strangely deceived But pray Sir wherein wherein is the â—efuter so strangely deceived in Suarez why 't is clear and evident by Suarez though every act of Christ in respect of the person that performed it was of an infinite and so of an equal in ensive value yet in respect of the moral goodnesse that is intrinsecally inherent in Christs actions nothing hinders but that one in this respect may be better and more intensely persect then another as well as one grief and torment which he suffered was greater then another And therfore say you the same Suarez even in that very page and columne and in the section immediately preceding that passage that our Refuter has quoted expressely sayes to this purpose Primum omnium satendum esse opera Christi fuisse inequalia in prepâ—â—â bonitate intrinfecâ— essentiall vel â—â—â—ter inhaerente ipsi actai quia ut dictum est 〈◊〉 hee bonites 〈◊〉 finiâ—a poâ—â—rat ergo esse major 〈…〉 allunde unum â—pus Chrisâ—â— erut metioris objects quam aliud uâ—â—m inâ—thsâ—u's 〈◊〉 sic de 〈…〉 â—â—go 〈…〉 vol poterâ—nt esse inaequalta in hâ—c bonitate c. Why what of all this hâ—â—e I delivered aâ—y thing that contradicts this either expresly or implyedly or doth Suarez here oppose in the least degâ—ee any thing that I have said doth not †Sed haec sententia totâ— objectio procedunt ex falso principio singunt enim esse in eodem acta plures valores seu plura merita juxta varias ejus circumstâ—ntias quod patet esse falsum ex his quae paulò superiùs dicebamus de infinitate sacrisicii ex re oblaâ—a vel person a offerenâ—e sumpta Ostendimus enim reipsa non esse duas neque pertinere ad diversa merita vel satisâ— actiones quia ratio meritâ— vel satisfactionis sieut ratio bâ—nitatis non consu git ex singulis conditientbus actus pâ—rse sumpris sed ex colâ—ecâ—s ne omnâ—â—m Haec enim ratio ettam in praesente proâ—edit nam intensio octus vel obiectum out persona â—pâ—rons per se singâ—la non sâ—fficiâ—nt ad mernum ut ex singaliâ— distinctamerâ—ta in actu orientur sed omnia simuâ— necessaria â—el suâ—t vel suâ— modo concurrunt ad unum meritum quentitate â—eius Aâ—que ita cessat objectio nom stoneritum actus tantum est unum illud est infinitum aequâ—le â—â—hil est meâ—iti in que ceâ—ni possit inaequalitâ— In tertiam part Toom tom 1. disp 4. s â— 49. Suâ—rez all along assert that there is but one meâ—itotious value in one act of Christ and that in respect of meritorious value one act of Christ was not better and more intensively perfect then another Nay do not you your felâ—e p. 271. quote a place out of Suâ—rez where in he affirmuth that the moral goodnesse inherent in the actionâ— of Christ is a thing distinct from their meritorious value Therefore Suaâ—tz say you acknowledgeth in that very fection I quote Valorem hunt quem habet actus in ordine ad meritum esse quid distinctumâ—d realt boniâ—ate quae est dâ—ffe entin ipsius actû prout consâ—â—ituitur in esse viâ— tuâ—â—c â—el illi aâ—rquo 〈…〉 instâ—e inhâ—ret Now Dr. Hummond is to be understood only of a meritorious value for he is to be understood of a value that was to be rewarded and that out of debt and such a one is a meritorious value Nay do not you your selfe understand him to speak of a meritoâ—ious value p. 266. And now to shew the appâ—sirnesse of the Proof I must tell him what either he knowes not or will not observe That the Doctor â—gaine a gues à posterâ—ori from the effect to the cause and the necessary releâ—â—â—n betwâ—xt thâ— work and the reward His â—â—gument is funâ—ed upon a Maxune of dâ—sâ—ributive justice not expressed but suppesed and intâ—â—â—ted and it is thâ—â— where the reward does proceed of debt as in Christ certainly it did and is properly wages there must be a proportionable incre sâ— of thereward and the work c. By this then the Roader may sâ—e that all that you have concerning the moral goodnesse in
us what those cogent reasons were that necessitated you unto this complyance with Papists Now from these words of mine the Father of Lyes cannot inferre that proposition which you most injuriously Father upon me viz. that whosoever make use of any argument or Tenent or exposition of Scripture that is to be found in Bellarmine or other Popish Writers is guilty of complyance with Papists But the Defendant will extort this proposition from my wordâ— whether I will or no. What say you Sir is not this your present argument Can you give us any other proposition to reduce your Socratial Enthymeme into a Syllogisme If you cannot pray tell me then what strength is in your Major and what answer you will give to it when a Socinian an Anabaptist or Ranter or Atheist shal presse you with it c. And so he raves on most furiously as if he were wood not only in this but the next page But to discover to every ordinary Reader that he doth most grossely and palpably calumniate me I shall reduce my words into two Syllogismes and yet leave out that proposition which he so maliciously imputes unto me The proposition to be proved it that it was fit that Dr. H. should acquaint his Readers what those cogent Reasons were that necessitated him unto the answer that he gave and thus 't is proved If this answer were guilty of complyance with Papists then it Was sit that Dr. H. should acquaint us vvhat cogent reasons necessitated him hereunto But this ansvver is guâ—lty of complyance vvith â—apists And therfore it vvas fit that Dr. Hammond should acquaint us vvhat cogent reasons necessitated him hereunto For consâ—â—mation of the Minor the particle this this complyance c. carrieth us to the foregoing vvords and from them vve may cravv this Syllogisme That ansvver vvhich is the shâ—â—t of Papists in several controversies betvveen them and us is guilty of complyance vvith Papists But this ansvver is the shift of Papists in several controversies betvvixt them and us And therefore 't is guilty of complyance vvith Papist And novv my vvords being thus Analyzed the Reader cannot but be astonished a Sâ—hâ—lar a Mâ—n of wiâ—â— and parts a Minister a Christian should so forget himself as to lay at my doores a proposition that hath no bottome at all in my vvords bâ—t is his ovvn meere invention that I say not forgery and I believe hâ— can haâ—dly tell vvhich to vvonder at most the malice or ignorance that is in this crimination of the Defendant But I forget my selfe thus to go beyond the limits that I have prefixed to my selfe in the examination of this Volume and indeed I beleeve 't is very inksome unto the Reader as vvell as unto my self to take in such a Dunghil of Non-seâ—uiturs as this vvork is and therefore I shall trouble the Reader vvith the Examination of but one Argument more and that I am vvilling to inâ—st a little upon because it seems at first blush â—o be of more force and weight then the rest And besides 't is concerning that vvhich is the the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the matter in connoversie 't is draâ—â— from Luke 2.52 And Jesus ino eased in wisdom and stature and in grate wiâ—h God and man This Argument the Defendant prosecutes from page 188. usqâ—e aâ— 206.343 344 369 370 572 573. c. usâ—â—eâ—od 596. vvhere he heaps up the â—est monies of a vvorld of Commentators vvhereof many contradict one ano hen st no purpose that I knovv but to distract the unvvary and unlearned Reader and to vvork in hâ—m a belief that our Defendant is a man of vast reading The Argument for better distinction-sake may be branched into tvvo parts First he argueâ—h from Christs increase in vvisdom he increased in wisdome therefore he increased also in the invvard actual love of God The reason of the consequence is because love of necessitie bears propotion unto knovvledge p 60 370 431 512 524. Unto this I shall return several Ansvvers The first is in the first part of my mixture p. 249. The increase in wisdom hâ—ré spoken of is only extensive not inâ—ensive and from an extensive increase in wisdom can never be inferred an intensive increase in the inward acts of the love of God Yea but saith our Defendant p. 191. how you will reconcile this with what followes I will leâ—vâ— any man to judge and so will I too provided that he be a man that und â—stands any thing of an Argument 〈◊〉 for such a one will quickly perceive that there is nothing in that which followeth either in my own words or else in those quoted one of Amos which doth in the least degree contradict what I say Secondly it is only an increase in the knowledge of the formal object of the love of God viz. his infinite goodnesse in himself that will argue and inferre an increase in the inward actual love of God Now that Christ increased in knowledge of the infinite goodnesse of God in himself St. Luke never averred neither will any man averr it but an Arâ—ian or Socinian The Defendant objects often against me that I confesse that the fulnesse of Christs knowledge in the state of humâ—liation was consistent with the nescience of diâ—â—rs things But pray Sir what were those diverse things he knew not as man I say the day of judgment the barrennesse of the figâ—tree c. p. 249. But do I or any Schoolman or any Orthodox Protestant say that Nescience of the tormal object of divine love Gods infinite goodnesse in himself was consistent wâ—th the fulnesse of his know edge If not all that you say is a meer extravagâ—â—ce Thirdly the increase in wisdom that Luke speaks of is by none of all the Authors that you alledge applied unto the beatifical vision and if Christ did not increase in his beatifical vision then neither in his beatifick love and consequently not in his love at all for there was in him at the same time only one inward actual love of God for accidentiâ— numero tantum diversa non pâ—ssunt esse siâ—nal in eâ—dem subjectâ— as for the acts of the infused habit of divine love distinct from the bâ—a ifick love they as I have already shewn are proved by Vasquez to be but a figâ—nent and as much may be said of that love of complaeency that acquisite and experimental love which you ascribe unto Christ p 537. for you make it to arise from Christs acquisite or experimental knowledge And that Vasquez proves to be imposâ—ble because the act of the love of God seeing 't is of a supernatural order ought to arise from a supernatutal knowledge of God and such is not that which is acquisite and experimental Exscientiâ â—cquisitâ nullum actam amoris circa Deum esse posse â—â—nisestum est quia actus charitatis cum sit supernaturalis ordinis oriâ—iâ—dâ—bet exnotitiâ Dâ—â— supernaturali in tertiam â—â—â—tem Thomae tom 1. dâ—sp 73. c. 3.
p. 790. As for the Reason whereby your consequence is confirmed our love must of necessity be â—roportioned unto our knowledge It is I suppose to be understood of a gradual proportion in point of degree and yet even so it needs limitation For 't is evident that it failes if it be understood universally of all men For First the knowledge of many surmounts their love of vertuous objects but this is a sinful disparity and therefore I shall wave it But secondly mens love many times doth and sawfully may exceed their knowledge in point of degree A mans love of Philosophy may be more intente then his skill in it Aquinas 1.2 q 27. a. 2. the Question there debated is Vâ—um â—â—â—niâ—iâ— fit causâ— amoris the second Objection against the Affirmative is as followeth Ejusdem ratioâ—is vidâ—tur esse quod aliquâ—d incognitum ametur quod aliquid amâ—tur plusquon câ—gaoseatur sâ—d aliqua amantur plusquam cognosâ—untar sicut Deus qui in hic vitâ— potest per seipsum amari nâ—n autem per sespsum cognosci ergo cogniâ—o nonest câ—usa amoris Unto this Objection Aâ—uinas returnes thâ—s following answer Ad secundum dicendum quod aliquid requiâ—itur adperfectionem câ—gâ—itio is quod non requiritur ad persectionem aâ—â—is Cognitio enim adâ—aâ—onem pertiâ—et cuius est distingue eâ—interea quae secundum rem sunt conjuncta componere quodamâ—odo ea quae sunt diversa unuâ—â—lteri comparando id ò ad persectionem cognitionis reqâ—iâ—itur quod homâ— câ—gnoscat figillaâ—im quiâ—quid est in re sâ— ut partes virtutes proprietâ—â—tes Sed amor est in vi appetitiva quae respicit rem secundum quod in se est Vâ—de ad perfectionem ameris sufficit quod res prout in se apprehâ—n litur ametur Ob hoc ergo contingit quod â—liquid plus ameâ—â—â— quam cognoscaâ—ur quâ—a potest perfectè amari etâ—â—msi non persectè â—gnoscatur sicut maximè pâ—â—et in scientiiâ— quas aliqui amant propior â—â—iquam suâ—mariam cognitionem quem de eis habent put a quod sciun Rhetoricanâ— esse sâ—e tiam â—er quam homo porest persuadere hoe in Rhetorica amâ—nt Eâ—â—similâ—ter est diâ—endum circa amoreâ—â— Dei From the last words Irenaeus the Carmâ—lite dâ— Animâ— c. 3. s 6. p. 151. hath this inference Inde fit uâ— licâ—t Deuâ— lâ—viteâ— cognâ—scamus vehementer tâ—men eum aliquâ—ndo amemus Against this doctrine of Aqâ—â—â—â—s Irenaeus propound an Objection and returnes unto it an Answer both which I shall insert Dices Tuncigitur voluntas fertur in incogniâ—â—â— rations excessûs amoris supa cognitionem Râ—sâ— Dist aneced sertuâ— in incogniâ—um simpliciter nego fertur in incognitum cognitione distinctâ perfectâ concâ—do 〈◊〉 etiâ—mâ—i distincâ—â— explicâ—â—e non cognosâ—â—â— singula quae sunt objecti tamen implicitè 〈◊〉 cognâ—scit saltem novit illud esse appetibile Resâ—lara est exemplo Plures enim ardenter appetunt scientiâ—â— v.g. Rheâ—â—ricam Philosophiam c. Eisâ— viae sciant queles â—a sint sed solum quod doceant medum discrurrendi c Hinc etiam fit ut aliquando levis cogitâ—tio animi aut propositio alicujus objecti intensum excitet amorem eò qòod mâ—gna sit convenientiatalis objects cum appetiâ—us licèt illâ—â—s notitia fit consusa in intellectu And thus you see this proposition our love of necessity must beare propotion unto our knowledge is not true if it be understood universally of all men and so 't is understood by the Defendant for he speaks not only of Christ but of us Our love of necessity must bare proportion to our knowledge c. But now concerning Christ we shall readily grant that his love of God was alwaies for degree proportioned unto his knowledge oâ— God his knowledge of God's infinite goodnesse in himself But now that he increased in this knowledge Luke doth not affirme neither have you proved that he is to be understood hereof by any of the School men in Paul's Church-yard or in the Library at Oxford Nor by any other of the Authorities of which you make in the pages forecited such a vain-glorious but impertinent muster The second branch of the argument is taken from Christs increase in grace he increased in grace therefore in the love of God at least actual for love is a grace of God But is it that grace of God which Luke speaks of let the Reader but look upon the words following 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which God and man and the addition of them which addition our Defendant for the most part leaves our in his quotation of the words will soon inform him that Luke speaketh not of the grace of the Spirit in Christ either actual or habitual but of the grace of Gods favour towards him and in our Translation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is rendred in favour Now in Gods favour he did not increase otherwise then in some effects fruits and signes thereof and from that our Defendant can never conclude a gradual increase in the inward acts of Christs love of God The Defendant quotes me p. 189 369. as saying that Christ did as truly and really grow in the invvard acts of vvisdom and grace as he did in stature Indeed I said that he did as really increase in vvisdom aske did in stature But that he did as really increase in grace as in stature I never said I never thought for I vvell knevv that his increase in stature vvas proper vvhereas he increased in favour or grace vvith God only improperly and metonymically in regard of the effects and tokens thereof That Christ then encreased in the invvard acts of grace as really as he did in stature are none of my vvords but foisted in by the Defendant vviâ—h vvhat truth and ingenuity I leave unto the Reader to judg And now I shall dismisse the Reader and take my leave of the Defendant too The Gentleman is pleased p. 643. to promise that if I manage my Reply in a Scholastical way then he will keep close unto our Ob. and Soâ—â— this indeed would be very acceptable as unto my selfe so also unto all judicious Readers But when I consider how in this pretended Defence he hath all a long vapored bragged railed and raved like a Bedlam I have little reason to expect from him any such thing as a faire candid regular and orderly disputation Hovvever he shall have my hearty prayers unto God to cure him of this his raging distemper that 〈◊〉 the future he may as Paul Act. 26.25 speak forth the words of truth and soberâ—â—â— FINIS
ERRATA PAge 10. l. 6. r. love of God p. 23. l. 45. r. praerequiritur p. 42. l. 19. r. analogum p. 47. l. 15 16. r. where he saith man hath not causalitatem p. 50. l. 32. r. indiguisset p. 52. l. 23. fruitionis p. 54. marg l. 5. r. infinitum l. 17. r. â—reâ—tuâ— p. 56. l. 39. r. patet p. 5â— marg l. 19. r. libeâ—è p. 61. l. ult r. as already p. 64. l. 6. r. added l. 12. r. usual p. 68. l. 6. r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 70. l. 13. r. is lapis p. 71. 35. r. you spend p. 72. l. 5 21 42. r. intension l. 40. r. supplyed p. 73. l. 43. betwixt length and there 's insert is a greater intension p. 74. l 21. r. of p. 75 l. 5. r. knevâ— p. 77. l. 40. r. vel unum l. 41. r. rationem marg l. 7. r. actu l. 40. r. vel necessaria â—unt p. 78. l. 26. r. conferre l. 39. r. à quâ l. 44. r. his p. 81. l. 35. r. Monachis â—b r cap. 13. p. 82. l. 15. r. that a Scholar l. 24. r. rake p. 83. l. 34. r. lavvfully â— 84. l. 11. r. appetitu l. 16. r. beare There are divers other escapes mispointings mispellings misaccentings and the like omitted because they are so obvious that every ordinary Reader may easily discerne them and so slight as that every ingenuous Reader vvill pardon them There vvere divers pages in the Defendant misfigured against which the Author in his quotation of them had found an expedient but the Printer not having observed his direction the matter is left to be rectified by the Reader himself Dr. CREED'S Voluminous Defence OF Dr. HAMMOND'S ἘΚΤΕÎΕ'ΣΤΕΡΟΠBriefly EXAMINED And The weaknesse thereof fully discovered By HENRY JEANES LONDON Printed for Edward Brewster at the Signe of the Crane in Saint Paul's-Church-yard 1661. Dr. CREED'S Defence OF Dr. HAMMOND'S ἘΚΤΕÎΕ ' ΣΤΕΡΟΠEXAMINED I Shall premise three things touching this doughty Work of Dr. Creeds The first shall be concerning the Insolent and Scurrilous Incivilities wherewith it is every where fraught And it is to acquaint the Reader That I shall not honour them so much as to take a distinct and particular notice of them for they are so gross as that they carry their condemnation in their forehead Indeed I have not heard of any wise sober and moderate man though of the Doctors perswasion in other particulars that hath made the least Apology for them when they have been told how he hath in them trespassed against all good manners I shall therefore leave them unto his Romanceâ— Readers who are so much taken with their gaudy language and for the Meridian of whose soft understandings they were especially calculated 〈◊〉 and they shal have my fair leave to make themselvs as merry with them as they please their mirth may stir my pity but it shall have no influence upon either my anger or envy The second shall be concerning the wonderful prolixity thereof occasioned by his frequent extravagancies or out leaps his numerous but impertinent Quâ—tations his frivulous Objections in all which should I follow him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the bulk of my Book would be so swell'd thereby as that all Readers would be aâ—righted from the perusal thereof In favor therefore to the Reader I shall pass by most of these with a just and deserved neglect and select only such passages to be examined which those learned and judicious friends whom I have consulted have judged most material and important A third thing shall be concerning the sense of Doctor Hammond in the controversie He never affirms saith the Defendant that the self same numerical act of holy love in Christ was more intense at one time then at another but onely that one act of his love of God compared with another was more high and intense then another pag. 22 23 63 64 185. Unto this I shall readily agree neither know I any reason that he hath to charge me for dissenting herein About the state of the Question he objecteth pag. 17 47. that the terms of the Question are much altered from what they were at the first Saith he This Refuter charged the Doctor with a direct and flat denial of the all-fulness of habitual grace in Christ and now it is onely by consequence To prove the notorious falshood of this crimination I shall onely refer the Reader unto pag. 258 259. of my Mixture for there he may see 〈◊〉 by sequel I did deduce my charge from the Doctors words and the validity of this deduction I have made good against Doctor Hammond and shall further clear against this our Defendant by discovering the vanity of all subterfuges that he hath to evade the force of my argumentation They are in number four When the Doctor saith that the acts of Christ's love of God are â—â—pable of degrees and sometimes more heightned more ardent and intense then at other times or in other acts 1. He speaks by a Metonymie of the effect or Synecdoche generis and not of the love of God properly and formally taken 2. He is not to be understood of those acts of love of God that are immediately terminated on God the onely good but of those that are immediately terminated on us men for God's sake 3. By the actual love of God he understands saith he not the action of loving but the term of that action a quality produced thereby which for want of words is called love 4. By the actual love of God he understands not that which agreeth to him as Compreâ—ensor and was a sequel of the beatifical vision but that which belonged to him as he was Vâ—ator and arose from the infused knowledge of God and the infused habit of Divine charity Having thus propounded the evasions of the Defendant in General I shall take a distinct and several survey of them The first is pag. 5 6 217 335 336 546. and 't is That when Doctor Hammond saith that the acts of Christ's love of God or holy charity are capable of degrees's and sometimes more heightned more ardent and intense then at other times or in other acts he speaks by a Metonymie of the effect or Synecdoche generis and not of the love of God properly and formally taken But that Dr. Hammond is to be understood of love properly and formally taken when he asserts a greater ardency in Christ's love of God at one time then another is as clear as the Sun from sect 22. of his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For there he saith that love as a genus is predicated of that love which he speaks of Now the genus is predicated properly and formally of it's species for 't is predicated thereof in primo modo dicendi per se But perhaps you may say that though the love which Dr. Hammond speaks of be love properly and formally taken yet 't is called the love of God onely tropically Unto this I Reply I.
That Christ's love which Dr. Hammond saith is capable of degrees c. is that very love which is commanded Deut. 6.5 a love of God with all the soul heart might and strength c. and that is a love proper and peculiar unto God and not to be communicated unto any creature And pray Sir is not this that high and transcendent act of Divine love you speak of pag. 5. whereby the soul is immediately fixed and knit to God as the onely good and then with what face can you deny it to be the love of God properly and formally taken But however the poor Refuter must be condemned lege falsarii pag. 5. right or wrong For whereas Doctor Hammond spake expresly of Christ's love of God the Refuter is so dull and simple an Animal as to understand him of his love of the Creator whereas alas Doctor Hammond had a profounder conceit which is highly rational in it self and is to be interpreted concerning his love of the Creature And this is enough to clear me from the crime of Forgery with which this shamelesse Defendant asperseth me But his Calumny will be the more apparent if we insist upon those two Tropes One of which he sayes the Doctor makes use of The first is the Metonymie of the effect and that is when the effect is put for the efficient Now do not you by your Discourse plainly insinuate that the efficient is here taken for the effect the love of God for the issues and effects of the love of God If there were then a Metonymie in Doctor Hammond's words it was by you a Metonymie of the efficient and not of the effect And indeed you tell us pag. 217. that all the acts of piety and mercy and charity and vertue are called the love of God by a Metonymie of the efficient because they flow from it And either this is a flat contradiction to what you here say or else the Metonymie of the efficient and of the effect must be confounded and be all one But secondly Dr. Hammond doth not make use of any Metonymie at all either of the efficient or of the effect For that which is termed the love of God only Metonymically is so called only equivâ—cally and that the love of God is here taken by the Doctor for that which is so stiled only equivocally you dare not aver for that which is predicated of a thing equivocally may in propriety of speech be denyed of it that which is the love of God only equivocally may be said not to be the love of God But you may perhaps say that he speaks if not by a Metonymy of the effect yet by a Synecdoche generis But Synecdoche generis as Vossius Alsted and other Rhetoricians have taught me is when the genus is put for the species as creature for man Mark 16.15 But how the love of God is here by Dr. H. taken for any of its species passeth my dull imagination I shall not therefore adventure so much as to guess at your meaning but patiently wait for your own Learned Explication of it And thus the Reader sees how this first Evasion that Dr. Hammond speaks of the love of God only as 't is taken tropically by a Metonymy of the Effect or by a Synecdoche generis fails against both Logick and Rhetâ—rick But it may be objected from pag. 6. That Christs love of God which Dr. Hammond speaks of is his prayer unto God now prayer is properly an act of Religion and Devotion towards God and improperly and figuratively an act of holy Charity or divine Love For answer 1 Though Prayer considered formally in it self be an act of divine Love only improperly and figuratively yet it implieth the love of God properly and formally taken and 't is undeniable that Dr. H. speaketh of Prayer under this consideration as implying the love of God properly and formally such for he bringeth Christs praying more earnestly as a proof to make good his exposition of those words Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy soul heart might and strength where the love of God is taken properly and formally Now of this exposition it can be no confirmation if the Doctor do not consider Christs prayer as implying his love of God properly and formally taken Though Prayer considered formally in it self be not properly an act of divine love but only implyedly viz. preposiâ—ivè and concomitantèr yet the reason which the Defendant brings for the confirmation of this because 't is properly and formally an act of Religion is very questionable For 2 According to the language of Protestant Divines one and the same Act may properly be an act of both Religion and holy charity too for they take Religion in so large a sense as that it comprehends all duties of he first Table Thus Ames makes all parts of Gods Worship both natural and instituted to be parts of Religion Now if this acception of Religion be proper it will not be material though it be somewhat different from that of the Schoolmen 2 But proceed we unto his Second Evasion which differs little from the former if at all but in termes and 't is concerning the acts of Christs love of God These saith the Defendant are of two sorts 1 Those that are immediately terminated on God the only good 2 Those that are immediately terminated on us men for Gods sake in whose love as the prime act they are all radicated and founded the one the Schooles call charitas ut finis the other they call charitas propter finem Though then the acts of Christs love as immediately terminated on God were always at the height and one equal perfection as was never yet questioned or denyed by the Doctor yet this nothing binders but that the other acts of this love of which alone the Doctor speaks regarding us for Gods sake might consist in a latitude and gradually differ from one another and fall short of the fervour of those acts that immediately respected God c. See pag. 3 5 22 70 71 216 c. usque ad 248 279. usque ad 291 328 329 335 336 338 343 361 372 373 516 c. Well then the great mistake of the Refuter is That whereas Dr. Hammond spake expresly of Christs actual love of God the Creator and yet meant thereby his actual love of man a creature the Refuter was such a dull Block-head as not to reach this hidden and invisible meaning of Dr. Hammond But first if this were a mistake it should not me thinks be so criminous and unpardonable For First The Refuter in his exposition of the actual love of God went by that common rule Analogum per se positum stat pro faviosiori analogato If a word hath two significations one proper another improper and â—â—opical it must be taken properly if it be put by it self and have nothing added to determine and carry it unto an improper and tropical sense Now the
actual love of God is taken properly only of those aâ—â—s that are terminated immediately unto God and all those that are terminated unto us men for Gods sake are termed the love of God only improperly and by a trope and Dr. Hammond speaks absolutely of the actual love of God and hath nothing to restrain his speech unto the latter sort of acts and therefore he is to be understood of the former those that arâ— immediately terminated on God Secondly If this were a mistake it had been an easie matter for Dr. Hammond to have prevented it in his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by a clear and distinct explication of his meaning but he hath not done this and therefore if the Refuter be to be blamed Dr. Hammond cannot be altogether excused But I deny that I am guilty of any such mistake as is imputed to me For that Christs actual love of God in Dr. Hammond cannot rationally be understood of all those acts of love that were immediately terminated on us men all duties of the Second Table c. I shall prove by an Argument drawn from the Relation that Dr. Hammonds discourse concerning Christs actual love of God c. hath to the Commandment Deut. 6.5 Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy 〈◊〉 and with all thy soul and with all thy might It is brought as an Exemplification and proof of his interpretation thereof and therefore this actual love of God in Christ must be the same with that love of God which is there commanded Now that love of God which is there commanded is that only which is immediatly terminated on God For 1. It must be with all the heart soul might and strength and the Acts of love that are terminated unto the creature immediatly cannot be performed in such an intension without grosse and palpable Idolatry 2. The love of God here commanded is by our Saviour himself distinguished from the love of our neighbour and of our selves and consequently 't is restrained unto the love of God which is terminated immediatly upon God Jesus saith The great Commandement 〈◊〉 the Law is Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy mind this is the first and great Commanâ—ement and the second is like unto it Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self Matth. 22. vers 36 37 38 39. Here these two Commandements are the two Summaries of the Commandements of both Tables And seeing they are distinguished by our Saviour himself we must not make any confusion betwixt them But they are confounded when the duties of the second Table or this Commandement Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self are ranged under the first Table Or this Commandement Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart soul might and strength Now those acts of charity that are immediatly terminated unto us men for Gods sake are all Duties of the second Table and belong unto that Commandment Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self 3. Unto this let me adde a third Argument which may be reduced unto the first taken from the second Part of Doctor Hammona's Exposition of the place and thus it stands That act of the love of God which transcends all those acts of love that are immediatly terminated on the creature is that high act of the love of God which is immediatly fixed and terminated on God as the only good But the act of the love of God which is commanded Dâ—ut 6.5 transcends all those acts of love which are immediatly terminated on the creature Therefore 't is that act of the love of God which is terminated and fixed immediatly on God himself as the only good The Major is undeniable and if the Minor be not Doctor Hammond's own let the Defendant expound unto us these words of his That Phrase thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart with all thy soul denoteth secondly the loving him above all other things and not admitting any thing into competition with him not 〈◊〉 any thing else in such a degree This argument may briefly be thus also varied No acts of the love of God that are superiour unto those that are immediately terminated on us men for God's sake can be those very acts that are immediately terminated on us men for God's sake for one and the same thing cannot be superiour unto it self But those acts of the love of God that are commanded Deut. 6.5 are superiour unto those that are immediately terminated on us men for God's sake and so much is evident by Dr. Hammond's exposition of the place And therefore those acts of the love of God that are commanded Dâ—ut 6.5 are not those that are immediately terminated on us men for God's sake But suppose that Dr. Hammond spake of those acts of holy charity that are terminated on us men for Gods sake yet by what the Defendant saith it will be no injustice to think that he speaks of those actâ—s under this reduplication as terminated immediately on God himself For by the Defendants opinion pag. 234 235 holy charity and it's acts are terminated unto us mea for God's sake onely as a material object and unto God's infinite goodnss alone as the formal object Now things are rather denominated from that which agreeth unto them formally then from that which is ascribed unto them onâ—ly materially for dâ—nâ—minatio fit à pottori Now those acts of charity that are terminated unto us men considered as terminated on God as their formal object ought to be in all and were in Christ alwayes at the height and one equal perfection Our Defendant himself confesses pag. 217. that to English ears this phâ—ase the love of God seems especially to import the prime and more principal love that hath God for its immediate Object but then withal he adds that in Scripture phrase it frequently does not The first place he quotes is Luk. 11.42 Wo unto you Phariseâ—â— saith our Saviour for ye tythe mint and rue and all manner of hâ—rbs and passe over judgement and the love of God these ought ye to have done and not to leave the other undone But this place he confesseth to be otherwise expounded by divers and we have saith he no need of doubtfull places But 't is without doubt that the love of God is not there taken in such a latitude oâ— amplitude as to contain the whole duty of man towards God and our neighbour for 't is distinguished from judgement and that compriseth if not all yet a great part of our duty towards our neighbour But the Defendant in the next place alledgeth instances out of the first Epistle of St. John that are he saith beyond all exception The first instance is 1 John 2.5 But who so keepeth his word in him verily is the love of God perfected hereby know we that we are in him But to prove the impertinency of this place we need go no
further then Dr. Hammond's Paâ—aphrase of it But the observing his commands is the onâ—ly sure argument that he that doth so is a perfect lover of God truly so called the appellation being falsely assumed by the Gnosticks and an argument of evidence to himself that be is a branch a member of Christ as the Gnosticks boast that they are and that whatsoever they do it cannot make them cease to be so The observing of God's commandments is an argument of the perfect love of God but it doth not therefore follow that it is the love of God it self The two next places the 1 Joh. 3.17 1 Joh. 4.20 every rational Reader will judge wide from the mark For the utmost that can be gathered from them is that the love of God is inseparably connexed with the love of our Neighbour and hath an influence or impery upâ—n the acts thereof But what is all this unto the purpose The last place the 1 Joh. 5.3 may perhaps be thought to have some colour of an Argument For this is the love of God that we keep his commandments Here 't is plain that the Apostles speech is to be understood Metonymically and the meaning of it is that the love of God is the cause of the keeping his commandments and the keeping of God's commandments iâ— an inseparable effect or fruit of the love of God This meaning of the place is excellently laid down by Estius Sensus idcircò adjecâ— de mandatis ejus servandis quia diligere Deum per consequentiae rationeâ—â— est mandata ejus servare Charitas si quidem erga Deum ait Cajetanus ratio est servandi mandata ejus Unde quamvis praeceptum diligendi Deum ab aliis â—â—us praeceptis diversum sit quicunâ—ue tamen boc dilectionis servat praeceptum ex câ dilâ—ctione ettam caetera Det praecepta servat ut quorum obsâ—rvatio ex dilectione Dei necâ—ssariò depâ—ndeat ac sequatur tanquam effectus ex propriâ causâ Quod etiam significant illa Châ—â—sti verba Jâ—an 14. Qut babet mandata mea servat ea ille est qui diligit mâ— Et iterum Si quis diligit me sermonem meum servabit Et ca. 15. Ves amiâ—s met estis sifeceritis quae ego praecipio vobis Simile est buit loco qued supra capite â— dixit Joannes Qui servat verbum ejus vâ—è in boc charitas Dâ—i perfecta est By what hath been said the Reader may perhaps think that this place seems to be very advantagious for the Defendants turn But upon more serious consideration it will be found to do him no service at all For First though there be a Metonymy in the Apostles words yet it lieth not in the love of God the Metonymy is in the praedicate and not in the subject of the Proposition and the love of God is the subject of the Proposition as is evident from the prefixing of the Greek artâ—cle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and there is nothing hindâ—eth but that it may be taken in the greatest propriety onely the praedicate this that we keep the commandments of God is affirmed of it Metonymically Secondly it is plain that in S. John's words there is a causal predication (a) Praedicatio impropria caâ—salis est quâ unum extremum alteri ad ejus causam designandam nâ—n repugnante loquâ—â—di consuetudine conjungitur e.g. Ira est fervor sanguinis circa cor est oratio vera sensu causali Nee â—nim ira quae est affectio auimi proprie loquendo est servor seu ebullitio sed existit ex illà ebullitione ebullitio illa existit ex irâ sed diversa respectu Huc reser illa hic bolus est mihi mors boc est mortifer Alsted for the love of God is the keeping of his Commandements not formally but causally that is 't is the cause of keeping Gods Commandements Now every one knows that in a causal predication there is ever a Metonymy of either the efficient or effect But noâ— in thâ—s proposition one act of Christs love of God was more intense then another which the Defendant confesseth to be the sense of Doctor Haâ—mond there is no causal predication nor any footsteps of any other argument from which a man may Logically conclude a Metonymy Nay thirdly if any Argument can be drawn from coherence it is as I have already shewen evident that Dr. Hammond cannot be understood of the love of God in a Metonymical acception for he speaks of the same love of God that is commanded Deut. 6.5 and that is undeniably the love of God properly taken In the next place pag. 219 220 c. Usque ad 227. the Defendant endeavouresh to prove by arguments from the Doctors writings that he takes the love of God in such a large sense as to take in all duties to our neighbour The weakness of which arguments it were an easie matter to discover if it were worth the while but indeed we may justly despise them for it being cleared that Dr. Hammond cannot rationally be understood of any other love of God but that which is immediately terminated on God himself if they prove any thing they will conclude that the Dr. contradicts himself and that is a matter wherein I that am none of his Idolaters am no wayes concerned Once it is very apparent that this large acception of the love of Godâ—s very Catachrestical for according to it the lowest and meanest acts of both Charity and Justice towards our neighbour even the Hangmans conscientious performance of his Office may be termed the love of God and most men would judge this to be an unsavoury expression it would sound very harshly unto not only English but all Christian eares And whether so harsh a Catachresis be to be tolerated in Controversal writings may justly be doubted If Dr. Hammonds cause then cannot be upheld but by flying unto such a Catachrestical and abusive acception of the love of God it is a shrewd signe that 't is in a very tottering if not desperate condition From what hath been said the Reader may furnish himself with an answer unto the greatest part of the book But more particularly unto two of those arguments which the Defendant brings to make good this affection that there is and must be in Christ a gradual difference in respect of the several acts of the habit of the love of God As for the third argument p. 244. the confirmation of it may more fitly be referred unto a more proper place The first argument he prosecutes from p. 227 usque ad 236. and 't is by him thus summed up p. 227 228. Where there is and of necessity must be a gradual difference and more in respect of the goodness of the Objects of the habit of charity or the law of God there is and of necessity there must be also a gradual difference in respect of the several acts of this habit of charity or the love
autem est quasi per accidens vel individuale respectu talis actûs Dicâ— autem si aequaliter vel eodem modo talem rationem tendat nam contingit 〈◊〉 eandem rationem tendendi non aequè applicari diversis materiis ideo non eodem modo attingi per actus ut ect v. g. bonitas divina quatenus est in Deo reddit illum amabilem vel quatenus per quendam respectum applicatur proximo ut illum etiam amabilem reddat Nam licet illa bonitas in se una sit non tamen ill is rebus aequè conveâ—t ideò modus tendendi in illan non est idem Et idem est universum de bonicate finis respectu ipsius finis respectu mediorum de similibus in quibus ratio tendendi alteri intrâ—asâ—cè altis vero extrinsècè applicatur I confess Suarez holds that the habitual love of God and the habitual love of our Neighbour are but one indivisible habit But this is no hinderancè but that we may make use of his words against himself and the rather because what afterwards may be picked out of him in answer hereunto is very unsatisfying The utmost that he saith is that there is a necessary sonnexion betwixt the acts of the love of God and the love of our neighbour he saith the same of other acts But this connexion of the acts doth not prove an unity of the habits The habits may be connexed as well as the acts and connexion if it be real implieth a real distinction And 't is very observable that Suarez himself infers from the connexion of acts onely a possibility not a necessity of the unity of the habit Tandem quando actus ipsi sunt inter se connexi quasi radicati in aliquo primo tunc etiam possunt habere similem connexionem saltem virtualem in ipso habitu ergo quantum est ex hoc capite si aliud non obstet poterit idem indivisibilis babitus esse principium hujusmedi actuum Disp sect praedict n. 32. But I shall not pertinacioâ—sly contend about this matter but leave it to the judgement of the learned Reader Here I shall digress a little from the Defendant to consider the opinion of some School-men who maintain that 't is alwayes one and the savie act whereby God and our Neighbour are loved and they have of it a pretty illustcation from their tenet of Image-worship Look say they as an Image and its Prototype are worshipped with one and the same worshâ—p so God and our Neighbour are loved with one and the same act of love But the real distinction of the acts of the love of God and the love of our Neighbour I shall prove from four Arguments 1. From their separability there may be an actual love of God when at the same time there is not an actual love of our Neighbour And so again on the other side there may be an actual love of our Neighbour when at the same time there is onely virtual or habitual love of God For at the same time there may not be any actual cogitation of God Now things that may really be separated are qâ—estionless really distinguished 2. From their inequality The love of God ought to be more intense then the love of our Neighbour for it is to be with all the soul heart might and stâ—ength and therefore 't is really distinguished therefrom 3. From the dependency of the love of our Neighbour upon the love of God The actual love of God is the efficient cause of the actual love of our Neighbour and the efficient and the effect are alwayes really distinguished 4. From this may be drawn another Argument proceeding from the posteriority of the actual love of our Neighbour unto our actual love of God For being the effect thereof it must needs be after it and that really à parte rei and not onely in regard of our consideration Now this is an evidence of the real distinction of these acts for if they were one and the same act really then one and the same thing should be really both before and after it self which is a manifest contradiction But I return unto our Defendant and unto his second Argument which he pursues very copiously p. 236 c. usque ad 244. The sum of it is this There are not onely perfect and effectual but also imperfect conditionate and uneffectual acts of Christs will and those are gradually distinguished from these c. But what of all this it will not therefore follow that one act of Christs love of God is more intense then another act unless you can prove that these imperfect and uneffectual acts of Christs will are elicite proper and formal acts of his love of God This is a thing that you all along presuppose but have not proved nor never can prove Not onely Scholastical Dâ—vines but all that have any moderate insight into Practiâ—al Divinity will tell you Master Defendant that to say that Christs actual love of God is imperfect uneffectual conditionate is an ignorant gross and very lewd blaspbemy I shall but remark two things more touching this second Evasion of the Defendant and then proceed unto a third First Christs actual love of God which Dr. Hammond speaks of is not saith the Defendant frequently the action of loving but a term produced thereby and yet he saith p. 70. that the acts of Christs love of God are some of them terminated immediately on God and others of them on us men c. By this then it seems that the supposed utmost term of the action of loving in Christ is terminated further unto another term if not effective yet objective Now this is a very deep subtilty the clear explication and confirmation of which we shall justly expect from the Defendant 2. The Defendant grants that the outward expressions of love are not love it self and wonders that I can be so uncharitable as to think that Dr. Hammod was a man of so shallow and slendor parts as to take the outward expressions of love for love it self pag. 84 90 95. And yet he tells us that Dr. Hammond takes Christs actual love of God in such a latitude or amplitude as that it contains the whole duty of man towards God and our Neighbour whatsoever is good and excellent in him pag. 216 219 c. Now the outward expressions of the love of God are a part of man's duty and therefore by the Defendant are the love of God in Dr. Hammona's sense of the word How the Defendant will reconcile this the event will shew But go we on unto the third Evasion of the Defendant He distinguisheth of a two-fold actual love 1. the action of loving 2. the term of that action a quality produced thereby which for want of words is called love Now Dr. Hammond he saith is to be understood of the latter the term and not of the former the action of
instance which he gives of an effection in the preceding number is the making of a Syllogism in the mind and a Syllogism hath no existence in the mind after 't is made or longer then 't is making As for the two passages but now mentioned a favourable interpretation may be made of them A term or work may be said to remain after the action is past in order of nature or in order of time Now the term of immanent actions remain after their effection in order of nature not time And that permansion or remaining may have such a sense may be gathered from another place in Schiebler lib. 1. Metaph. c. 16 n. 17 Nihilominus si subtiliter intueamur hanc rem videtur etiam in unico momento esse qualiscunque permansio Momentum enim dicitur per defectum successionis temporalis unde in codem momento potest adhuc relinqui successio secundum prius posterius naturae Veluti in codem momento simul sunt forma res formata ut sol illuminatio sive lumen Vide de his naturae instantibus distinctis in codem momento Conim l. 4. Phys cap. 14. q. 3. a. 2. Atque sic etiam relinquitur in tali momento successio qualiscunque ut non sit prorsus repugnans durationem proinde permansionem tribuere enti instantanco But our Defendant saith that this of Scheibler is an utter impertinency unto the matter in hand But now how these assertions saith he if all were granted and these are two of these assertions Actiones immanentes aliquae non habent terminum Actio ut sic non dicit respectum ad terminum can any ways advantage the Refuters present Argument I leave any man to judge For Scheibler expresly asserts that as some immanent actions have no terms so others of them have and he proves it by an instance borrowed from Julius Scaliger against Cardan Exercit. 307. sect 28. Exercit. 1. sect 3. Now to prove that nulla actio immanens habet terminum which must be the Refuters proposition if he speak any thing to the purpose for how else will he prove that the immanent acts of love have no term by this medium by this assertion of Scheibler that speaks onely of some such and proves the contrary of others will be impossible till he can shew us a new Mood and Figure to prove an universal by a particular Here I must desire the Defendant to awake and to consider that I propounded an Objection that omnis actio habet terminum unto which I oppose Scheibler asserting and proving that some immanent actions have no term Now this particular negative proposition made good Some immanent actions have no terms is a full home and sufficient disproof of the universal proposition objected Omnis actio habet terminum because 't is contradictory thereunto For of contradictory Propositions that which is true overthroweth the other because 't is impossible that both contradictory propositions should be both either true or false But go we on unto a second fort of Arguments the Arguments of those who hold that no immanent actions whatsoever have terms 1. They all unanimously alledge the testimony of Aristotle l. 9. Metaph. text 16. Ubi distinguens actionem immanentem à transeunte aâ—t illum distingui ab ista quia haec habet aliquid operatum peâ— ipsum tanquam terminum illa vero scillcet immanens nullum habet operatum The words of Aristotle by Kada are thus rendred In quibus igitur aliud quippiam est quod sit praeter usum corum eorum actus in eo quod efficitur â—â—est qualis est aedificatio atque actus texendi illa enim in eo quod aedifcatur hic in eo quod texitur inest In quibus autem praeter actum non est aliud quicquam opus in iis ipsis est ipse actus nam visio in eo est sane quod videt contemplatio in eo quod contemplatur vita in anima I am not ignorant of the answers that Cajetan Bannes and Capreolus give unto this testimony of Aristotle but they are such gross evasions as that I shall for reply onely refer unto Rada and Faber Faventinus in the places above mentioned But Suarez hath another answer which I shall lay down and briefly reply to Ad primum ex testimonio Aristotelis dicitur Aristotelis sententiam non esse per has actiones immanentes nihil fieri sed vel nibil fieri extra ipsum operantem vel quod magis existimo nihil fieri quod maneat transacta actione hoc modo ait hujusmodi actionem consistere in ipso usu Quomodo 1. Ethicorum cap. 1. ait In nonnullis artibus operationes esse fines non aliquid per eas factum ut in arte cytharizandi quod necessario intelligendum est de termino facto permanente quia manet post actionem ut supra declaravimus tractando de causa finali Sic ergo dicitur per actiones immanentes nihil factum relinqui quia per illas nihil fit quod ill is finitis maneat Metaph. disp 48. sect 2. n. 20. The sum of this is that the meaning of Aristotle is that nothing is made or produced by immanent actions that remain after they are past and ended But 1. There is nothing in Aristotle that gives the least countenance unto this interpretation and if men may be allowed the liberty of devising such senses of Authors for which there is no ground in them it were no difficult matter to clude the most pregnant Authorities that can be alledged Secondly If this were the meaning of Aristotle then the difference of transient actions from immanent stands in this that they are productive of a term or quality that remains after they are past of finished But this cannot be the difference of transient actions from immanent for I demand whether it be predicated of transient actions per se or per accidens If it be predicated per accidens of transient actions then the difference of them cannot consist therein if it be praedicated per se of transient actions then 't is predicated of all transient actions for à per se ad de omni valet consequentia But 't is not predicated of all transient actions as is a little afterwards confessed by Suarez himself concerning the actions of singing and playing on Musical Instruments and therefore 't is not predicated of transient actions per se and consequently 't is not the difference of them from immanent actions As for reasons to confirm the conclusion most of them will serve which are brought to prove that intellection hath no term For 't is generally confessed that there is as to this particular the same reason of it and all other vital immanent actions If then actual intellection produce no term then neither is there any term produced by the acts of the senses of the sensitive appetite or of the will But now that intellection
quae dicitur esse cognitio objecti ponitur verbum propter illam tanquam terminus propter actionem sed potiùs si intellectio esset actio productiva verbi deberet ipsa esse exerceri propter verbum Cùm ergo principaliter per se constet dari intellectionem quae est cognitio objecti censendum potius esset ipsam intellectionem fieriper alià m actionem quam intellectionem esse actionem per quam fiat alius terminus A third reason is because the terme of an action is more noble and excellent then the action it self but suppose there be a terme of intellection it cannot be more noble then intellection The Beatifical vision is an action of the understanding but suppose it have a terme yet it connot be surmounted thereby in perfection for in it as the Thomists determino stands our happiness and our utmost end Now if one intellection be not productive of a term then to be productive of a term doth not agree per se and effentially unto intellection for that which agreeth unto intellection per se agreeth unto every intellection because à per se ad de omni valet consequentia But for the further strengthning of this Argument I shall quote the words of Aversa himself Semper terminus est nobilior praestantior actione ut habetur ex Aristot 1. Ethic. c. 1. ex re ipsâ notum est Sed certè intellectio quâ anima constituitur formaliter câ—gnâ—scens comprebendens objectum non potest dici nobilitate inferior aâ—io verbo quod tanquam terminus ejus inducitur Et Aristot 10. Ethic. 6. 7 〈◊〉 Docuit felicitatem debere esse praestantissimam perfectionem in ammâ simul determinavit esse contemplationem id est intellectionem Non ergo potest addi aliud verbum quod sit terminus intellectionis Et planè repugnat aâ—â—d aliqui ex adversariis respondent in actibus immanentibus actionâ—â— esse praestantiorem termins terminum esse propter actionem Id eniâ—â— manifestè est contra rationem ordinem intrinscecum actionâ—s termini Thus you see that intellèction hath no term and if that hath none then neither have the immanent aictons of the Will any But Oviedo hath a distinct and peculiar Argument concerning the action of love De anima controv 6. p. 1. sect 3. In amore de quo eadem est ratio ac dâ— intellâ—ctione spâ—â—iale instituitur argumentum ad probandum in actione confistere ex quo inferâ—mus talem actionem carere termino quia in 〈◊〉 tota ratio antoâ—ls sita est Argumentum is a precedit cognitio in omâ—ium sententiâ praerequitur ad amâ—rem sed cognitio tantùm requiritur ad actionem voluntatis Ergo in has actione consistit ratio amoris Probâ— minorem cognitio ex parte intellectûs requirit ut vâ—luntas valeat se determinare ad objectum amplectendum ergo requirstur ad determinatienem voluntatis â—â—d determinatio voluntatis consistit in actione per quam ex actu primo reducitur ad actum secundum Ergo cognitiâ— requiâ—itur ad actionem voluntatis Ergo in actione consistit amor ad quem cognitio praerequiritur Hac etiam ratione â—ptimè assignatur ratio formalis amoris cui primariò in se competâ—â— esse exercitium libertatis quia hoc exercitium in actione consisâ—it ergo ad hoc ut amor sit exercitium libertatis in ipsa actione constitui debeat per quam vâ—luntas constituatur amans quae cùm perâ—se ipsam hunc praestet essâ—ctum nâ—â—lo alio indiget termino cui nullum superest munus quod exerecat respectu libertatis quae per actionem formalitèr amans constituitur What he saith may be thus briefly summed up Knowledg is necessarily pre-required he means immediately unto actual love But 't is only pre-required immediately unto the action of loving and not unto any terme of such action and therefore the act of love consists wholly in the action and not in the term It may here perhaps be objected That all these Authors which I have mentioned differ from me for they make the immanent actions of the understanding and will to be only qualities and not predicamental actions they are only say they Grammatical actions that is they are wordâ—d and expressed after the manner of actions they are actions saith Rada non absolutè simpliciter sed secundum quid similitudinarie I confess this difference betwixt their opinion and mine but this difference is not material for it nothing advantageth the adversary nor prejudiceth me and the arguments may be considered so abstractly as that they may very well be applyed unto my opinion Oviedâ— tels us of some Thomists who agree with me in making intellection and the fame may be said of Volition to consist in an action not having any terme But he goes to reconcile them with his own opinion and against this reconciliation he propounds the same Objection that I now mentioned viz. that those Thomists which he speaks of held intellection to be a proper action whereas he made it only a quality Unto this he answers That the difference is not material but only modo loquendi His words I shall insert at large because I judge them very pertinent unto our present purpose Dices in re differre has opiniones quia Thomistarum opinio asserit illam â—ntitatem esse pâ—ram actionem altera vero opinio formalitatem qualitatis in illa actione cognoscit Contra formalitas qualitatis ab hac opinione in qualitate constituta in co debet consistere quod haec entitas tali modo afficiat subjectum illudque formaliter constituat intelligens informatum propria objecti representatione imagine â—ed in opinione asserente illam centitatem in qua intellectio constiruitur esse puram actionem codem modo assicit subjectum illudque cadem ratione constituit intelligons informat tanquam representatio imago objecti Ergo in re Thomistarum opinio concedit in hac intellectione quam appellat puram actionem formalitatem illam quam altera opinio qualitatem appellat Ergo in nullo roi differunt sed tanquam in loquendi modo Si dicas rationem qualitatis non consistere in modo respioiendi objectum peto âte quae sit formalitas qualitatis quam constituit opinio quae docet intellectioneâ—â— esse actionem cum termino identificatam Et cum illam dederis â—andem assignabo in entitato Thomistica quam actionem sine termino illius auctores vocant Concludo has opiniones tantum in modo loquendi differre Oviedo loc praedict Before I proceed farther I shall crave the Readers patience to digress in a few lines for the examination of a passage in the Defendant p. 119. I having proved that love is not a genus equally comprehending habitual and actual love as its two species because they are in several predicaments Habitual love in the predicament of quality
was saith he in Christ a twofeld actuall Love of God The one agreeing to him as Comprehâ—nsor being a sequell of the Bentisick Vision this he grants to be alwayes equally full and intense But this love saith he was necessary and therefore not meritorious There is therefore belonging unto Christ another Actuall Love of God as he was Viatâ—r which was free and by which he merited and this sprang from the infused knowledge of God and the infused habit of Charity And this Love was more intense at one time then another or one Act of it was more intense then another Act and this distinction he prosecutes very largely pag. 68. 244. 288.290 333 334 33â— 330 336 339 344 c. Usque ad 357 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 372 522 524 525 c. Usque ad 540 622 624 626 627 628 629 635 636 637. 1. This Answer I saw in Suarez but could not foresee that Dr. Ham. would make use of it Indeed I had no ground to think that he would for it cannot do him the least service as I shall shew anon and therefore I had no Reason to trouble the Reader with any mention of it 2. Where you read this distinction in Suarez you might have also seen an Objection against it which might have deterred you from using it if you had consiâ—ered how unsatisfying â—uarez his answers are therunto The Objection is that two accidents only numerically distinguished cannot be at the same time in the same subject But now Christs beatifick love of God and that which springs from the insused habit of charity are distinguished only in number And therefore they could not be at the same time in Christ The first Proâ—osition that two accidents cannot be at the same time in the same subject is a proposition that you your self acknowledge p 196.256 to say the contrary you say is a gâ—â—sse absurdity the salshood of which reasoâ— it self aâ— the veâ—y first proposal is able to discover But it may be said that Saarez hath unto this Objâ—ction two answers Bâ—t how unsatisfying they are will appear by the examination of them The fiâ—st is that thâ—se two loves differ not only numerically but also specifically Sâ—d hoe altero ex duabus modis probabilibus dissolvi potâ—st Primus est dâ—cenâ—o actus illos differre spâ—â—â— quia actus amoris beatifici tendit in Deam propter oâ—nnem peâ—fectionâ—m rationem propter quam amabilis est nam toâ—a ill a per 〈◊〉 bâ—ataâ— dist nâ—tè clarè vidâ—tur proponitur voluntati at vero amo qui consequitur jcientiam insusam vel tantum fertar in Dâ—um sub speciali aliqâ—â ratione bonâ— ut justitiae misericordiae c. vâ—l solum sub rationae summi boni quâ—si confusè cognita non distincte pâ—opofita quatenus in se conâ—inet omnem boâ—it atem perfectionem Qâ—ae diversitas satis esse videtur ad diversitatem specificam illorum actuam In certiam part Thom. tom 1. disp 49. f. 2. p. 622. Unto this I shall reply in the words of Becaâ—â—s Sum. Theol. Scholast part 3. trast 1. cap. 22. qâ—aest 5. having averred against Cajetan and Capreolus that actus chaâ—ttatis in via and in patria do not disserre specie he confirms his conclusion from the testimonie of Aquinas and from reason Tâ—rtia Coâ—â—l 〈◊〉 Actus charitatis non solum potest esse tam inâ—ensus in via quam in patria sed â—tiam tam perfectus in essentiali perfectione objectiva Est contra Cajetanum câ—prcolum qui doâ—ent actum charitat is in patria dâ—ffe re specie ab actu charitatis in via essontialiter persectiorem esse 〈◊〉 est quâ—a alter versatur cirea Deum clare visum alter cirea Dâ—iâ—m obscare cogniâ—am Sâ—out ergo clara visio obseura cognitio differunt spâ—cie ita etiam amoâ— viae amor patriae qui in illis fundantur Sed concâ—usio nostra est D. Thom. in 2 quaest 67. art 6. ad 2. ubi asserit dilectionem sumâ—re suam spâ—ciem essintiam non ex cognitione sed ex re cognita ac proiâ—de in via iâ— patâ—â—ia esse â—andâ—m spâ—cie charitatem quia licet cognitio sit diversa tamen res cognita est eadem Et confirmatur quia diversitas essentialis in actibus voluntatis praesertim quando conveniunt in genere proximo debet swni ex diversitate objecti formalis At in amore viae patriae est idem objectum formale nempe infinita benitas qua Deus in se infinite bonus est ergo in illis actibus non est diversitas essentialis The second answer is that duo accidentia solo numero distincta possunt salteâ— supernatur aliter esse in eadem subjecto c. But this supernatural providence of God is not to be fled unto without a man be necessitated thereunto by some cogent argument and if you can find any such argument in Suarez good leave may you have to manage it unto your best advantage All the argument that I can find in Suarez is that he thinks it fit to extend the merit of Christ unto his love of God Now his beatifick love of God was not meritoricus saith he becâ—â—se 't was not free but necessary and therefore he thinks there must be another love of God in Christ assigned which was free and so capable of meriting This argument you also propound very often Unto this arguâ—â—here are in the School-men several answers of which you take no notice for which concealment I believe no probable reason can be rendred but your late and small acquaintance with the School-men 1. Some hold that Christ did merit by the beatifick act of his love of God as terminated unto God himself Suarez in the place by you cited quoteth for this opinion Altisiodorensis Gabriâ—l Sâ—â—tus and Capreolus unto whom you may sâ—â— in Vasquez added Almain Occam Major You referre the Reade to a short passage of Scotus in the place cited by Suarez which proveth nothing denied by me But I shall now referre you to another paslage in the same place which expressely contradicts you for there Scotus declareth at large how Christ merited by his beaufice love of God as he was Comprehensor Dico inquit propter argumâ—ntâ—m quod Châ—istus meruit secuadum portionem superiorem secundum omn â—â—actum ejus Hoeâ—tamen est difficile tenere propter alios beatoâ— qui tunc videntur posse mereri in infinitum proâ—o autem illud quia omnis actuâ— acceptatus 〈◊〉 Deo tanquam actus â—owâ—s landabilis pro quo Deus velit aâ— quid retribuere illi cujus actum acceptat vel alteri pro quo fit est meritorius bujusmodi est omnis actus Cbristi secundum naturam humanun etiam actus beatificur quo secundum poâ—tionem superiorem fruitur Dâ—o quia persona illa non secuâ—dum omnem conditionem sui fuit simpliciter in
termino ideo potuit Deus omnem actum creatum illius personae acceptare tanquam dignum aliquo boto proâ—co retribuendo illi personae si indiguisset vel alteri scilicet nobis pro quibus meruit Et hoc tenendo oporter dicere quod si actus beatificus secundum portionâ—m superiorem Christi suit meritorius quod non includit contradictiounn actum beatifieum Michaelis vel alterius beati pesse acceptari tanquam aliquid dignum retributione quod retribuâ—um darâ—tar propter merâ—tum puta daretur Michaeli aliquid propter actum meritorium custodiae quam exerces circa me contradictio dico non esset tamen de facto Dâ—us non sicâ—acceptat actum illum quia persona illa est totaliter extra statum mâ—rendi secundum totum subjectum non sic Christus sed secundum aliquid suit in statu viatoris propter hoc omnis actus ejus creatus acceptus erat meritorius illis pro quibus offerrebatur Deo Oâ—e would think it very strange that you should over see this passage in Scotus in the very same question that you quote I may here make use of your words concerning my self p. 633. I can think of no other probable ground of the Defendants mâ—stake but only his writing at randome and câ—njectures upon other mens short notes and suggestions But this over-sight is trivial in respect of that which is in your Quotation out of Nicholaus Da Orbellis p. 349. for in that there are words expressely gainsaying your opinion for they assert that it was possible for the beatiâ—ick act in Christ that is in the Scotist-language his fruition of God by love consequent unto the beatifical vision to be meritorious Ideo potuit Deus omnow actum creatum illius personae acceâ—tare tanqu â—n dignum pro se vel pro illis pro quibus offertur Deo etiam actum beatificum Sicut enim meritum non tantum consistit in ipso actu clicito sed in conditionibus perâ—se elieitis sic acceptatio divina non solum respicit actum sed conduioxes accidentales suppositi elicient is In pig 637. with a great deale of gravity and scorn you advise me for the future to let the School men and Scholastâ—cal Divinity alone c. But I have juster reason to advise you that seeing you have been so unhappy in quoting Scotus and his Epitomator Nicholaus De-Orbellis to get some able friend if not to consture yet to expound such passages as you shall quote for the future our of School men seeing you are so wonderfully prone to alledge out of them such things as make nothing for you but apertly against you But to return to the matter in hand This opinion of Scotus touching the meritoriousneffe of Christs beatifick love of God is maintained by the generality of his followers as may be seen in two renowned ones of them Faber Faventâ—nus in Sent. lib. 3. disp 48. p. 210 211 212. Kada Super 3. lib Sent. Controv. 12. a. 1. p. 338 339. In Faberâ— Faventinus there are two other arguments besides that already urged by Sâ—â—tus Contra eandem assertionem recentiorum quod Christus non merucrit actu beatifico est aliud argumentum nam certum est quod Christus dilexit Deum ex charitate voluit illi bonum affectione â—ustitiae in hoc praesertim consistit meritum lit ait Scot. ipsi satenâ—uâ— quia radix omuis mâ—â—iti â—pâ—d Deum est charitas amor ipsius Dei ergo non vidâ—tuâ— neganâ—um esse hoe meritum 〈◊〉 Christo at hic amor dilâ—â—â—io in Christo fuit fruitio beatifica quia erat beatus videbat Deum clare ex qua visione sequebatur dilectio fruitio perfectissima quae est beatifica Praetercà est argumentum Scoâ—i sieut in nobis meritum respicit partem intellectivam sic in Christo sed in nohis non est meritum nisi sit in portione superiori neque 〈◊〉 meremur actiâ—us nostris nisi voluntas nostra perfectissime jungatur Deo actibus qui respiciunt Deum sicut nec peccamus nisi â—oluntas nostra â— cedat a Deo ergo Christus non potuit mereri secundum portionem inseriorem tantum non superiorem si meruit autem superiori hoc suit per dilectionem Dei quia hic actus immediate tendit in Deum ergo dilectio quae est fruitio fuit actus meritorius in Christo loc praedict Unto this some Modern-School-men answer by distinguishing as our Defendant out of Suarez concerning a twofold love of God in Christ This distinction Faber Favâ—ntinus in the place but now cited first propounds and then refutes 1. He propounds it Respondent ad hoc Recentiores ubi supra diffingnendo de duplici actu amoris dilection is in Christo nam alter actus dilection is crat in Christo quatenus erat comprehensor qui sequcbatur visionem beatisicam hoc actu non meruit quia non crat actus liber alter vero actus dilectionis â—rat in Christo in quantum crat Viator qui sequâ—batur non visionem beatificam sed cognitionem insusam hoc actu mâ—ruit quia erat actus liber hanc sâ—ntentiam â—sserunt essa D. Th. multis in loâ—is sed pâ—aeâ—â—rtim 3. p. q. 19. a. 2. in responsione ad primum uli ait quod Christus per charitatem meruit non in quantum crat Comprchâ—â—ser sed ut â—â—ot Viâ—oâ—r 2. Having thus propounded the distinction he replieth unto it Sed contra hanc Responsionem est argum ntum secundum Scoâ—i â—â—in ipalc quo probat quod actus quo anima Christi fâ—uebatur Deo non poteran esse duo sed unas tantum quod argumentum est tstud actus fruâ—tiâ—nis est actus adaequatus potentiae quia voluntas creata fenitar quantum otest seduna cadem potentia cirea id mâ—objectum non habâ—t actum 〈◊〉 adaequa um alterum in daequatum distinctum à primo quia boc implicat coâ—radiction m nam primus non esset adaequatus â—rgo voluntas Christi per actum sâ—uitioâ—is non poâ—est diligere Deum per se amoâ—e amicitie adâ—quaâ—e per alium actum cundem Deum deligere per se amoâ—e aâ—icitiae sed in dâ—qâ—ate Nâ—xt he sets down the Rejoynder of the Adversary and unto it sub oyns his Triplication Sed Responderunt quod Major est vera quin actus sunt omnino cjusdem rationis sed qâ—ando sunt dâ—vâ—â—rsi actus diversae rationis non est vera In proposito autem sunt diveâ—siactus specie quia actus fractionis tender in Deum propter omnem perfectionem rationem propter quam Deus est amabilis sed amor qui est meri oriustendit in Deum propter aliquam speccialem â—ationem ut propter justitiam vel misericordiam c. haec diversitas dicitur esse sufficiens ut actus ille distinguatur a priori
extra vi am non minus quam alii beati videtur sane quod non plus mereri potuerit quam alius beatus in Patria Respondeo cum Scoto quod sicut meritum non respicit nec consistit tantum in ipso actu eliâ—ito sed aliquo modo in conditionibus persona suae suppositi eâ—â—cienâ—is sic acceptatio Divinâ— non solum respicit actum sed conditiones etiam accidâ—â—tates suppositi clicientis Atque itâ— actus Christi ctiam beatisicus cum ipse esset viator nec totaliter in termino potuit ob hane conditionem acceptari non tamen actus beatificus alterius beati licet in hoc nulla esset contradictio Rada Super tert lib. sent controv 12. a. 1. p. 338 339. Faber Faventinus and Rada The first is taken from a comparison of Christs beatisick love with that of the blessed Angels and Saints in heaven If his beatisick love of God be meritorious then also that of the blessed Angels and Saints in Heaven is so too But this is absurd for then they should merit unto all eternity They both answer out of Scotus by denial of the sequel of the Major and for this denial they give this reason God's acceptation is requisite unto merit Now God accepteth all the created acts of Crist as meritoriouâ— whereas he made no Covenant with or promise unto the blessed Angels and Saints in Heaven touching any such acceptation And for this different dispensation towards them and Christ they lay down out of Scotus this following congruence Whilst Christ was here in this life he was Viator as well as Comprehensor and consequently all his created actions were capable of meriting for merit regards not only the action meriting but also the state and condition of the person performing the action but now the blessed Angels and Saints in Heaven were absolutely and altogether comprehensores and so in termino extra statum merendi uncapable of meriting You see then they resolve the meritoriousnesse of Christs beatisick love of God into the condition of Christs person Christ merited by it not so much because 't was beatisick but because 't was the love of a person who was in some respect Viator in viâ which was a state of meriting A second Objection is drawn from the necessity of Christs beatisick love of God Every merito ious act is free for freedome is essentially requlfite unto merit But now Christs beatisick love of God was not free because 't was necessary And freedome and necessity are incompetible in the same act It followeth therefore that Christs beatisick love of God was not meritorious This argument the Defendant inculcates frequently The Scotists answer by denying the Minor Christs beatisick love of God was say they free though not with a freedome of indifferency yet with a freedome of complacency and that not only concomitant but causal I call that concomitant which is in acts whereof the will is not a cause qua voluntas sibi complacet in aliquo etsi respectu ejus nullius causaeâ—â—rationâ—m habet and such a freedome there was say they in the Fathers bâ—getâ—ing of the Sonne the Father had a complacency therein and was well-pleased therewith But he did not beget the Sonne by any act of his will I call that cansal which is in acts whereof the will is a cause This is that liberty which the Scotists call the essential liberty of the will and is by Rada thus defined Haec libertas est complacenter cognitione finis sub propria finis ratione supposita quasi se determinare ad agendum sive con ingenter se determinet sive necessario In 1. lib. sent Controv. 13. p. 207. This freedome the Scotists make to agree unto every elicite act of the will and consequently unto the bâ—atifick love of God And the reason that they give is because freedome is essential to the will and is predâ—cated of it quitâ—nus ipswn and a quatenus ad de omni valet argumentum What is predicated of the will as the will is pâ—edicated of every act of the will This reason is urged very acutely by Faber Faventinus against Cajetan who saith that the will is a free agent only in respect of some acts and not in regard of others Contra vel competit volâ—ntati sâ—cundum essentiam absoâ—ute esse pâ—â—ncipâ—um liberum vel non si non ergo volunâ— as accidentaliter est principium liberum tunâ— quaere quaenam fit illa potentia cui inest principium agendi libere per essentiam vel est voluntas vel non dabitur principiuâ— liberum essentialiter quod est absurdum quia omne per accidens redueitur ad aliquod per se datur principium liberum per accidens ergo debet dari principium liberum per essentiam Si dicas voluntaes respectu aliquorum actum est libera per essentiam respâ—ctu aâ— orum est natueale principium Coâ—â—ra quod inest alieui per essâ—ntiam secundum quod ipsum inest â—i universaliter Ex Arist 1. Post c. 4. exemplum Homo per eslentiam secundum quod ipsum est rationalis ideo omnis actus qui provenit ab homine per essentiam est rationalis i. per rationem factus unde actus naturales sentiendi vegetandi c. quia non sunt rationales non competunt homini ut homo est sed ut animal vivens Est ergo verissimum quod inest alicui secundum quod ipsum inesse ei universaliter tunc sic at voluntas est principium liberum per essentiam ergo universaliter est libera respectu omnis actus vel est dicendum quod non est libera per essentiam sed per accidens quod jam rejectum est ut absurdum si dicas quod inest voluntati secundum essentiam tenc sic Duo praedicata contraria muâ—◠ò se destruentia non possâ—nt inâ—sse â—â—dem subjecto securdum id m quia implicat repugnantiam sed voluntati secundum essentiam inest esse principium liberum ergo nonporest secundum essentiam inesse principium naturale ut contra distinguitur à libero ut in proposito intendimus ex hace go ratione colligitur qued voluntas essentialiter est libera non naturalis sic patet quod ratio Scoti concludit nâ—m rum quod agere naturaliter agere liberè sunt differentiae primae entis quae non possunt inesse eidem potentiae principio essentialiter sed necessario constituunt duo opposita principia activa quotum unum non redecitur ad alterum nec ambo ad tertium per hoc impugnatur quoâ— volt â—as râ—spectu sin 's cla èâ—vâ—si beatitudinis in communi habeat actum naturalem si enâ—m est potentia essentiaâ—ter libera omnis actus clicâ—â—us ab ea est ei liber non naturalis Consi matur quia aliequin voluntas in primo instanti quo habet actum naturalem nonesset voluntas sed
Pâ—râ—pâ—teticis licet in actibus ad extra pâ—â—â—ant Dâ—um agere necessariò beati in patria sâ—â—undum nos libere diligunt Dâ—â—n tamen necessario licâ—t â—rgo in voluntâ—â—â— creata pro hoc statu couâ—iagentia concomitâ—nter libertatem saepe consunâ—â—ntur tamen propr è loqu 〈…〉 idem ut vidimus ex hoc patet solutâ—o dabâ—tat onis quia licet concedamus Spiritum Sanctum procedere libere non tamen ab hoc sequitur contingerter produci Faber Faventinus In 1um lib. Sent. disp 37. c 4. p. 224 325. answer that there is no such repugnancy betwixt freedome and necessity as is imagined indeed a natural agent and a free are opposite and so also a necessary agent and cowingent And therefore the same agent in the sane act cannot work naturally and freelâ— wâ—â—ssarily and contingently But now there is no such opposition betwixt natural and contingent and betwixt free and nâ—cessary and hereup on it followeth that a natural agent may work contingently and per accidens as we see in Monsters in casu and soâ—â—wta and so again on the other side a free agent may work necessarily thus God loves himself most freely and yet withal most necâ—ssarily too Rada hath four very shrewd Arguments to prove the coâ—sistency of the highest freedome with the highest necâ—ssity which I shall insert for the Defendant to try his utmost still upon Quod summa necessitas â—star cum summâ libertate probo multipliciter Primòvoluntas divina necessariò vult bonitatem suam ut supra ostendimus tamen in volendo eam est libera igitur libertas stat cum summâ necessitate Consequentia tenet minorem verò probo Voluntas divina refert ad finem alia objecta quae sunt volibilia propter finem igitur ipsa sub eadem ratione potentiae est operativa circa utrunque sed circa ea quae sunt ad sinem operatur sub ratione potentiae liberae ut etiam Thomistae concedunt ergo etiam circa sinem ut puta circa bonitatem suam operabitur sub ratione potentiae liberae ergò liberè vult bonitatem suam Prima consequentia hujus argumentationis probatur quia potentia operans circa unum objectum non absolutè sed in ordine ad aliud eadem sub eadem ratione est operativa circa utrunque Quod pater ex Philos 2. de anima tex Com. 146. ubi ait quod potentia illa qua cognoscimus differentiam unius objecti ab alio illamet sub eadem ratione potentiae cognoscit utrunque ergo simâ—liter in proposiâ—o potentia operans circa unum objectum in ordin ad aliud ipsa sub eadem ratione potentiae operabitur circa utâ—unque Et câ—nfiâ—matunquia alias oporterer constituere unam potentiam quae versaretur ciâ—ca sinem aliam circa media Secundò probatur Libertas est Conditio intrinseca voluntatis absolute vel in ordâ—ne ad actum volâ—ndi ergo est compossibilis cum conditione perfecta operaâ—ionis perfectae circa perfectâ—ssimum Objectum praesertim illa conditio nâ—n repugnat imâ— otest convenire tali operationi sed talis conditio in operatione perfâ—ctâ—est necessitas Erâ—ò libertas est compossibilis cum necessitate Antecedens est manifestum quia voluntas natura sua intâ—inseca libera est Consequentia probatur quia conditio intrinseca potentiae quae secundum se nullam dicit imperfectionem non potesf esse contraria perfectioni operationis ejusdem potentiae quia tunc prorsus repugnaret hujusmodi potentiae habere perfectam operationem etiam in ente infinito in quo reperitur Sâ—dâ—quod talis conditio perfecta sit necessitas patet quia perfectio voluntatis unde voluntas est est diligere Deum ergo perfectionis est habere illam operationem sirmiter necâ—ssariò Et confirmatur quia posse non habere illam dicit imperfectionem ergò necessariò habere illam perfectionis est maximae rutsus ergo est possibilis illa necessitas in operatione perfectâ— voluntatis ut voluntas est alias enim nec in Deo reperitetur Tertiò probatur Actio circa finem ultimum ut finis est est perfectissima ergo necessitas in tali actione non tollit sed magis ponit id quod ad ejus perfectionem per sepertinet sed libertas maxime eam perficit ergo necessitas quae in tali actione reperitur non tollit sed ponit potius libertatem Probo assumptionem quia actio libera ex natura sua est perfectior cunctis operationibus ut in controversiis quarti Deo favente ostendemus Quarto probatur Qâ—antoactio voluntatis circa finem ultimum est magis necessaria tanto est liberior Ergo summa necessitas est compossibilis cum summa libertate Consequentia est evidens antecedens probo quia secundum Anselmum Augustinum quos suprà citavimus illa voluntas est liberior quae omninò à rectitudine deviare non potest sed illa quae necessariò simpliciter diligit bonum insinitum à rectitudine nullatenus deviare potest ergo illa est liberrima sed talis est divina voluntas respectu dilectionis Dei c. ergo est respectu carum liberrima In 1 â—m lib. Sent. Controv. 13. p. 213 214. The Defendant is pleased to say page 68. That the Saints and Angels in heaven love God freely with a freedome improperly taken for a liberty from coâ—action But first the Scotists * Cenditio intrinscca potentâ—e â—â—n repugnot perfâ—ctioni inâ—p rando ip Gus potenâ—ie si 〈◊〉 ab sulatè potâ—mia consideretu siâ— in ordine adâ—actum perfectum sâ—d libertas est coad tio intrinscea essentiatis voluntatis ergo non repugnat pâ—rficiâ—oni â—â—sius vol nâ—aâ—is in operande ei ca actium porfâ—ctissmum Faber Faventinus In 1um lib. Sâ—nt disp 37. c 3. p. 221. will tell him that freedome is attributed unto their love of God in the greatest propriety For the beatisick love is the greatest perfection incident unto their wills and freedome is an intrinsâ—cal and essential condition of their wills Now say they thâ—â— which is intâ—insâ—cal and esscutâ—â—l unto a power or faculty cannot be repugnant unto the greatest perfect on thereof therefore the beatisick love of God which is accessary and freedome are no wayes inconsistent Secondly In their love of God there is a freedome not only from coact on but also from natural necessity such as that which is in the metion of a stone downward which prelupposeth no act of the understanding The nâ—cessity which is in their love of God is not such anecessity but a voluntary necessity which hath alwayes foregoing anact of intellectual knowledge And this for the first answer unto the difficulty propounded There is by some School-men given another indeed a quite contrary answer and 'c is that Christs love of God was not meritorious and in asserting this they think there is no absurdity
because there is otherwise a very wide and spacious field for Christs merit in the acts of his love of man and in the â—cts of his other vertues Of this opinion Becaâ—us makes mention Sum. Theol. Scholast tom 5. c. 14. q. 3. Alij sic sâ—â—t unt Christiam suisse viatorens not solum ratione carnis animae passibilis sicut jam explâ—catum est sed etiam ratione animae quatenus amabat proximos Comprehensorem vero ratione animae quatenusamabat Deum clare visam Itaque meruisse per actium charitatis circa proximos non tamen per actum charitatis circa Deum This opinionhe thinks to be probable and Suarez in 3am part Thom. tom 1. disâ— 39. S. 2. saith that it may easily be defended The contrary opinion therefore at the most is but a Scholastical Probleme But Vasquez hath a full defence of this Opinion that Christs love of God was not meritorious and with it he joyneth a refutation of this distinction of Christslove given by Suarez and others the passige is somewhat large but because 't is home and accurate I hope I shall have the Readers patience for the inserting of it Mihi verò multò probabilius semper visum est Christum non meruisse per affectum ullum charitatis dilectionis erga Deum sed per opera aliarum virtutum tam circa se quam circa proximum c. Primum igitur Christum non meruisse per illum actum charitatis ortum ex scientia infusa in Doctrina S. Thomae manifestum est nam cum ille aperte dicat q. 11. a. 1. essentiam Dei ac proinde mysterium ipsum Trinitatis non cecidisse sub scientiam infusam id quod nos etiam supra disputatione 53. c. 11 satis saperque probavimus consequitur nullum potuisse in Chrislo esse affectum dilectionis erga Deum pâ—aeter illum quem vocant beatificum cumque ille non potuerit esse meritorius ut pâ—aecedenti capite monstravimus effieitur etiam per nullum actum dilectionis Dei Ghristum mereri potuisse quamvis enim diâ—amus in Christo mansisse scientiam naturalem unins Dei tamen illa non potuit esse principium dilectâ—onâ—s ipsius Dei ex charitate ut manifestum est Praeterea cum Christus non habuerit fidem sequitur ex nulla cognitione potuisse Deum dilâ—gere Age tamen concedamus Christo scientiam-infusam essentiae Dei distinctâ—m ab adquisita nihilomâ—nus frustra in eo concedemus daos affectus charitatis erga Deum alterum ortum ex visione clam Dei alterumâ—ex scientia infusa nam affectus dilectionis tendit in rem cognitam sicut in subjectum non autem in ipsam cognitionem ergo licet esset scientia infusa Dei in Christo quia tamen esset eadem bonitas ipsius Dei proposita voluntati per scientiam infusam per visionem idem-effectus esset dilectionis qua ratione ut communis fert opinio Theologorum eadem est dilectio Dei in via in patria quamvis visio Dei in patria essâ—t causa novi actus dilectionis Dei quia intensius eliceretur aut alio modo tamen non potest esse causa diversi actus secundum speciem uterque actus simul non posset manere in patria etiamsi in patria posset manere fides non quidem alia ratione nisi quia dum-voluntas movetur circa objectum duplici modo cognitum solum ab eo allicitur prout perfectiori modo cognito ipsum autem prout cognitum minus perfecto modo nihil mover voluntatem acâ—â— eo modo cognitum non esset hoc quisque quotidie in se ipso experitur nam cum quis diligit alium ex relatu atque ipsum ea quae de ipso audiverat postea vider jam non ex relatu sed ex clara visione experientia ipsum diligit aliorum testimonium nihil in ipso operatur ut eam diligat quae doctrina multo majori ratione in pâ—aesenti locum habet nam cum essentia divina per claram vifionem perfectissimo modo videatur ita ut necessariò ad se trahat voluntatem per affâ—ctum amoris ut supra diximus neque adeò rapiet ad se voluntatem ut ipsa deinceps moveri non possit ex alio genere cognitionis ad diligendum Deum alio affectu aut codem Quod verò dicitur Johannis 14. Sed ut cognoscat mundus quia dâ—ligo patrem sicut mandatum dedit mihi Pater sic facio surgite eamus hinc non probat Christum per dilectionem Dei nobis redemptionem meruisse quia eo loco solum commendatur charitas Christi erga Patrem obedientia de merito â—autem operatione meritoria non agitur Here Vasquez presupposeth two things already proved by him 1. That in Christ there was no infused knowledge of the essence of God and the mystery of the Trinâ—ty distinct from the beatifical Vâ—sion 2. That Christs beatifique love of God was not meritorious Having premised these tâ—o things he next proves that though there were in Christ an infused knowledge of the essence of God distinct from the beatâ—fical vision yet it would not hereupon follow that there should be in him a love of God distinguished from that which was the sequele of the beatisical vision and the reason is because there was one and the same goodness propounded unto his will by the infused knowledge and the beatâ—sique vision and therefore the same effect of love where the will is moved and stiâ—ed up about an object known after a twosold manner it is only allured and wrought upon as 't is known after the more perfect way and manne◠〈◊〉 when I come to see by experience those good things in a man which before I knew only by report I then love him only upon mine own experimental knowledge and no longer upon the relation of others Lastly Suppose this distinction of Christs love of God were true and sound yet 't is utterly unserviceable for the defence of Dâ— Hammond and that by the opinion of the Defendant himself For Dr. Hammond saith he is to be understood of the acts of Christs love terminated towards man for Gods sake Now the Authors and Fautoâ—s of this distinction understand it expressly concerning the act of Christs love * Dico ergo primo habuisse Christum actum amoris Dei liberum supernaturalem elicitum à charitate ab amore beatisico distinctum illo actu perfectissime meruisse Ita intelligo sententiam D. ' Tho. hic solutione ad primum dicentis meruisse Christum per charitatem non in quantum erat charitas comprehensoris sed in quantum crat viatoris ubi de charitate lequitur prost terminatur ad Deum Suarez in 3 part Thom. tom 1. disp 39. S. 2. p. 622. as terminated towards God himself and they do distinguish it from the acts of
were connatural sequels 1. A fulnesse of unspeakeable and unconceivable joy solace delight pleasure and comfort in his soul 2. A redundancy of glory from his soul unto his body But by he special dispensation of God the resultancy of the former was suspended and withheld in the time of his passion and the latter the derivation of glory from his soul unto his body was totally deserted until his exaltation Here I do not say that there was a cessation interruption or abatement of the beâ—tifical vision but only a restraint of its influence not upon his love of God but upon the fulnesse of joy in his soul in the time of his passion and the redundancy of glory from his soule unto his body in the whole time of his humiliationâ— excepting his transfiguration Now from this the Defendant inferieâ— two Propositions one in the neck of another one immediately and the other mediately 1. In his state of humiliation he could not see God so perfectly and so perfectly enjoy him as after his Glorification when there was no restraint And 2. Consequently his love of God could not be so ardent so highly intense and perfect as afterwards when now he sits at the right hand of God But now if any should presume to ask for a reason of the consequence of these two Propositions I must needs tell him that they are dravvn from a Topick place vvherein the Defendant is vvonderfully skâ—â—led fallacia cosequentis And in Keckerman's Logick p. 543 544. there are amongst others especially two rare sequels instanced in that are of the same stamp vvith these of our Defendants Beculus stat in argulâ— eâ—gò â—raâ— pluet Divus Gregorius edit casâ—um Ergò Divâ— Veronica saltâ—t I finde aftervvards p. â—22 that from this very same Proposition of mine he hath tvvo other like absurd and inconsequent inferences His vvords are as follovveth If the invvard acts of Christs love vvere alvvays at the utmost height because this most intense love is a natural and necessity sequel of the beatifical vision then it necessarily follovves if his love vvere alvvays thus intense that then he alvvays enjoyed the beatifical vision the sole and necessary cause of such a love For it is an undoubted maxime That positis â—ut sublatis effectu causa necessariis ponuntur â—olluntur causa effectus And if so vvhat then shall vve say to the Author of a mixture of Scholastical Divinity vvith Practical Henry Jeanes of Chedzey for sayes he not expressely That it is not to be denied but that by special dispensation there vvas some restraint of the influence of this happinesse or beatifical vision in the vvhole course of his humillation and particularly in the time of his doleful passion And novv if his fervour of love vvere a natural issue of the beatifical vision it vvill necessarily follovv that as that his happinesse and clear intuitive sight of the divine essence vvas restrained so the fervour of his love vvas proportionably abated also Here he dravves tvvo Propositions from my vvords 1. That Christ did not always enjoy the beatifical vision 2. That sometimes the fervour of his love of God was abated Now both these inferences are very inconsequent For First this stands the first there was some restraint of the influence of the beatifical vision in Christ Therefore he did not alwayes enjoy the beatifical vision with as good Logick a man may conclude that there was no heat in the fire Dâ—n 3. because God restrained its influence upon the bodies of those three Worthies It is very strange that this our great Schoolman should bâ— so ignorant as to confound the interruption or cessation of the beatifical vision vvith the restraint of its influence or to think the former a necessary sequel of the latâ—er Here by the vvay observe that vvhereas the Defendant p. 523. quotes a saying of Leo vvhich he saith is approved of by all Antiquity that at the time of our Saviours passion Non dissolvit unionem sed substraxit visiâ—nem It is to be understood vvarily that the beatifical vision vvas vvithdravvn only in regard of influence and never in respect of existence for that in had a perpetual being or existence in the soul of Christ iâ— upon very good reasons affirmed by the generalitie of both Papists and Protestants The second Inference is every way as inconsequent for thus it stands There was by special dispensation some restraint of the influence of his beatifical vision Therefore there vvas a restraint of the influence of it upon his love of God so that the fervour of his love vvas proportionablie abated as the influence of his beatifical vision vvas restrained Here is palpable fallacie à dicio secundâ—â— quid ad dictum simpliciter the restraint of the influence of the beatifical vision in Christ is particular not universal There vvas I said some restraint of the influence of this happinesse or beatifical vision c. And I instanced in the particulars upon vvhich the restraint of this influence vvas of vvhich his love of God vvas none Thirteenthly p. 378 379 380 381. the Defendant chargeth me to make use of an objection that not only opposes Dr. Hammond in this particular but equally overthrovvs the vvhole Christian Religion that destroys the doctrine of the eveâ—â—blessed Trinitie the Godhead and satisfaction of our Saviour and the immortalitie of the soul and hell-fire and eternal torments that blovvs up as vvell the office as the maintenance of Ministers and opens a broad gap for the Socinian and Anabaptist the Ranter and Atheist to come and invade all that is sacred among us This is a terrible and most horrid accusation and if the Defendant cannot make it good he may to use his ovvn vvords p. 11. justlie be decried for the most monstrous Railer and Sycophant or any vvoâ—se thing that Christianitie abominates But he pretends that he hath made it good And novv that the Reader may see that I do you no vvrong I shall for the present suppose that the Doctor had borrovved this Exposition from Bellarmine and consider the force of your Argument against him upon this supposition I reduce it thus into forme that the strength of it may appear Whosoever makes use of any Argument or Tenent or Exposition of Scripture that is to be found in Bellarmine or other Popish Writers is guiltie of a compliance vvith Papists But Dr. Hammond makes use of this very Exposition vvhich is to be found in Bellarmine Ergo Dr. Hammond is guiltie of compliance vvith Papists That you do me intolerable wrong the Reader may see if he will but peruse my words Your Reader hath just reason to expect a confirmation of what you say Because this very Answer is the shift of Papists in several controversies between them and us Bellarm Tom. 2. De Monarchis lib. 2. cap. 1. Tom. 4. de amissione gratie statu peccati lib. 1. cap. 12. c. And was it not fit that you should acquaint