Selected quad for the lemma: lord_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
lord_n	firm_a	glory_n	great_a	99	3	2.1248	3	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A09553	The philosopher of the court, written by Philbert of Vienne in Champaigne, and Englished by George North, gentlema[n].; Philosophe de court. English	Philibert, de Vienne, 16th cent.; North, George, gentleman.	1575 (1575)	STC 19832; ESTC S114638	55,136	134

slaunderouslye touched with nigardnesse or miserie Couetousnesse commonly is hated in all persons but chéefely in Princes and greate Lords to whome it is moste conuenient and seeming of all others to exercise bountie and liberalitie where otherwise the continuall taking receyuing of their right from their Subiectes without giuing dispersing and distributing agayne in processe of time they shall find themselues to haue neither tribute to receyue nor subiect to pay it For who cā better dispose of goods whiche that nobleman Plato would haue had cōmon thā those that haue them Howe shall men of vertue and valure good companions and small mates come by any parte or por●ion if there be not bountifull giuers following this opinion some will say and mainteyne that the riche couetous are théeues in making that pryuate their proper owne which shoulde bée common to all men It is not then without cause that this vice is so much hated of vs banished from our cōpany wherein there is nothing so displeasant as not to be glad and willing to doe pleasure And therefore howe much the infamy of it is greate so much the rather should we withdrawe our selues and shunne the chaunce of such extremities euē with y lesse of our goods or rather as I haue sayd to be reputed prodigall For the prodigall are more excusable without cōparisō in our vertue then the couetous And if we will well consider of it we shall finde none so prodigall therfore the more reprouable as the auaricious For what may be greater prodigalitie than to gather togither and laye vp the goods of this commonaltie and to take away from a cōmon wealth the faculty to vse it by that meane to lose it and as it is sayde cast it into the Sea for if the goods of a myser bée not loste from the profiting of a commō wealth at the least for his lyfe I cannot tell what may bee accompted more lost For hee pleasureth his friendes and benefiteth himselfe as much with that he hath as with that he hath not and his riches are to him as to others no riches at all ▪ Wherby it is spoken Tam deest auaro quod habet quàm quod non habet The auaricious hath no lesse neede of that he hath than of that he hath not Then if his goods serue too no purpose neyther too himselfe nor in the fellowshippe of men we muste accompt it loste and béeing loste wée may cleerelie perceyue that the auaricious and miser is the true and perfite prodigall But to the end we will not séeme to allowe vnmeasurable expēces we will giue boūds confines and limits to liberalitie Cicero in his offices sayth We ought not to gyue any thing except it be either profitable or necessarie So that profit and necessity be the two bounds of this vertue which ouerpassed any way we become presētly prodigall But truly if we should thus strictly cōprehend all we s●al make most part of our courtiers the best praised wilfull wasters whō we not withstāding esteme very wise For not only those which cōsume their welth or make sōtimes magnificencie without profite cause or necessitie are not alone pronounced prodigall But this vnquenche able heate and vnsatiable desire of glory the whiche withoute all iudgemente and consideration constraynes them to doe it is honest ●●d commeth of so good a nature that there is attributed vnto them a vertue more greate than liberalitie which is called Magnificencie wherof comes this tytle so excellent of magnicall And moste truelye when the intention and good wyll of any person dothe fynde and féele that whiche hee doothe good or euill suche magnificencie is muche to bee praysed proceeding from ●o greate a loue of oure vertue and from suche affection too pleasure others that they haue no leysure too thinke of nor consyd●r all the maximes and circumstances the whiche ferupulouslye the Auncientes woulde haue vs obserue and kéepe in this liberalitie And further wée that doe long looke or muche muse on things secrete and hydden but regarding the superficiall parte and the outwarde appearance of theyr déedes séeing that by suche magnificencie they shewe them selues of minde the liberalleste that maye bée not considering the vtilitye profite or necessitie cunningly couched and well couered ouer howe can we but iudge of such people all good and all honor leaue we thē that same Valerie the great talker of liberalitie when he sayth that the two fountains from whence she cōmes is true iudgemente and honest good will for the ardent affection and hote desire to be praysed of all men can not discerne this nor will not be so scrupulous to consider of circumstances so farre off Let vs compare in semblable cases the mutuall loue betwéen the father and his childrē and we shall sée sometime the feruencie therof to be so great that without consideration meaning them well they doe marre and spoyle them not hauing their iudgement certaine by reason of this ouermuch affection to discerne what is good or euill for them Is such loue and friendship to be blamed with vs Is it not true affection yes verely although some others call it a cockering So that if any will nearer regard the profit of the one or the other if this amitie do not earnestly appeare therein it can not be perfit Euen so let vs iudge of the magnificall man who if he should consider with himselfe how profitable it were for him to do that he determineth would they not say his deliberation smelt of miser is and how he had great ●●are to lose that he mean● to lay out It is not at this time only or in these dayes y our vertue hath bin so measured For do not the noble ancient Romains glorie to be atrbūted magnificall Was it neede full or profitable to cut mountaines and to make of 〈◊〉 in the s●a a fyrme lande Was it requisit euerie morning to ●●● that came sayd god mor● ow my Lorde to giue and distribute such great s●●mes of money as they did whereof ●●●●●all doth well report What should I speake particularly of Pompe of the Th●aters the Triumphant Gates and Temples that he builded Is not the magnific●ncie of 〈◊〉 knowne by his ●ump●u●●s gardens and galleries For this cause onely we haue them as a president of perpetuall memorie and there is none of our Philosophers that dothe not with great diligence endeuer hym s●●●e to imitate and followe them chiefly in th●yr Antiquities The honour of the Romaines was so great for theyr haught courages and magnificall myndes as all Italie is yet proud of it And if we maye after them speake of oure selues shall we not fynde among vs in our tyme some whose sumptuous expenses haue gayned them great ●ame Let vs consider of the noble doctors and professed masters in our Philosophie whom we haue before our eyes for example whom we must followe and allowe in all whose authoritie ought to satisfie vs for reason as

doer herein None can sufficiently declare the great iniuries and other inconueniences that chanceth in enterprises of importance as in the feates of warre and pollicie in marchandise in phisicke and diuinitie it selfe through this rashnesse for example rashe Tylers ofte breake their owne neckes And to conclude there are so many examples of rashe brainesicke and headstrong people that their vice is so noted as it néedes no more reproofe The remedie to avoyde the falling into the faulte of rashenesse is to consider of all causes not suddenly but with discretion deliberation and good councell The other vice and extremitie of Prudence is Curiositie as we haue sayde afore whiche is no lesse daungerous than this last we haue treated of yet is it much more painefull for the rashe man executes his determinations and purposes without studie or iudgement the curious man with great circumstaunce tormentes himselfe daye and night and both of like substance and profit The great Philosopher Plutarch in a certaine treatise wherhe defineth what Curiositie is compareth the curious man to a housholder a very euill husbande who hath euer his nose out at his windowe viewing and noting the doings and gouernment of other men and not regarding nor hauing eye to his own familie whose seruantes and varlettesin the meane tyme doe spoyle and robbe him within his doores That man is double blinde in hys owne euill that killeth himselfe with others rares trauelles and toyles and yet his busynesse no whit the sooner doone Wée wyll call him Curious in oure Courtlye Philosophie that breaks his braines in searching the secretes of suche Artes and Scyences as serue too no purpose for the instruction of oure lyfe according too vertue that is too saye according too the manner of the Courte Lette vs then consider howe farre suche a one swarueth from Prudence or wisedome yet there are manye in these dayes that treade the steppes of the auncyent Sages and thereby séeke too attayne to this true and perfect vertue as they call it whiche is lodged so hyghlie and statelie and in a place so harde and daungerous to come too You shall sée some suche curiouse men in the Courte solemne sadde and melancholike that will not eate but at prescribed houres they will not speake but when it pleaseth them they wyll not laughe for the Pope nor bée subiect too anye Prince or Lorde bée hée neuer so greate euer cōtrarying misliking of that which others do and to conclude they are not pleasante to anye person To what ende or purpose serueth this greate curiositie onelesse it gyueth occasion too the worlde too call them precyse fooles and seruants to Signour Monarche whē shall they with their glosed hypocrisie obteyne the fauour and good reputation of honest Gentlemen and ciuil Courtiers neuer If another Diogenes should come amōg them with his staffe and his wallet blowing and supping his wortes in his tunne would not the Pages roll him vp and downe But if he were a Minippus or Fryer Iohn of Saincte Anthonies order they woulde prayse him better There are to be found infinite numbers verye curiouse in thousandes of small follies most vnprofitable and seruing to no purpose yet will séeme great wise men of singular knowledge as prognosticators Southsayers Magiciens and Alkumistes notwithstanding these laste haue béene of late and yet are welcome and well allowed of some for the time But I beléeue their credit will not haue place long It suffiseth to knowe so muche of their s●iences as may serue too passe pleasante discourses among companie and no more For the reste it is nothing to our vertue but rather hindreth and letteth from attayning the true honest meane that should bring vs to the perfection therof And thus you haue the summe of that whiche in oure Philosophie is called Prudence or Wisedome Of Iustice IVstice being next and aduauncing hir self in hir order is the same vnto the whiche we must referre all our other conclusions without the which the whol hath no part in vertue For to what end or purpose doth the knowledge of any art or science profit vs if the same be learned onely for fraude and deceyte How may wée iustly call or accompte any of a noble harte and inuincible minde able too frounte all fortunes if hée employ and indeuoure himselfe to harme and iniurie others Are not modeste men and those that dawnte their appetites and subdue their affectiōs to reason worthy to be termed Iuste without Iustice no vertue could cōtinue stand or should be supported Therfore we ought to take greate paine employ all our studies too the true knowledge of hir And for that she is of so mighty a maiesty as hir braunches cannot in bréefe definition bée cōprehēded we wil in some sort describe thē I am not altogither ignorant that the vulgare opinion of Iustice is a sure perfect mind to giue and do to euery man that belōgeth vnto him which truly is méete very requisite But since it séemeth vnto mée either that it cōprehēdeth much more or else that it ought not which belōgs vnto it to be vnderstāded so generally as the same shall néede more expositiō or explication thā Iustice hir selfe I meane not to vse it for a definition For a beginning or principle it is a true maxime as Cicero sayeth to be considered of in the whole deduction of Iustice That it is very good not to iniury or wrong any I thinke for the perfect accōplishment of this vertue it suffiseth not onely to iniury no person as we will shew herafter but we must also endeuor our selues to doe good to others yet must we not vnderstande that in dooing no good where wée ought though wée take nothing from him that is his we do him wrōg that were a suttell supposer suche captious opinions are damnable For we say not that to leaue pleasuring of him whome wée very wel might pleasure is doing him any wrōg The Iustice wherof we write may be diuided though hardly into Legal Moral whose difference cannot without greate difficultie be knowne for the néernesse of affinitie that is betwéene them onlesse we make some diuision and treate of them seuerallye to the ende it may bée discerned wherein they bée contrary and wherin they agrée All Iustice be it Legall or Moral is diuided in two kinds wherof the one propertie or kind is Commutatiue the other Distributiue And I beléeue in my opinion that out of this last Distributiue Cicero hath drawen liberalitie which he makes affirmes to be one part or mēber of Iustice in his offices Vnder these two kinds of Iustice is confirmed included consisteth the whole actes doings in the mutuall society of mans life This is the same vertue that is sayd to be the theater or place of humaine felowship vnder the which all people are boūd ioyned one with the other by the whiche euery one is warned from deuiding separating thēselues