a Fee upon a Fee is not yet plainly determined but it will be soon found out if men shall set their Wits on work to contrive by Contingencies to do that which the Law has so long laboured against the thing will make it self Evident where it is Inconvenient and God forbid but that Mischief should be obviated and prevented I have done with the legal Reasons of the Case it is fit for us here a little to observe the Equitable Reasons of it and I think this Deed is good both in Law and Equity And the Equity in this Case is much stronger and ought to sway a man very much to incline to the making good this Settlement if he can For 1. It was prudence in the Earl to take care that when the Honour descended upon Henry a little better support should be given to Charles who was the next Man and trode upon the heels of the Inheritance 2. Though it was always uncertain whether Thomas would die without Issue living Henry yet it was morally certain that he would die without Issue and so the Estate and Honour come to the younger Son for it was with a careful circumspection always provided that he should not Marry till he should recover himself into such estate of body and mind as might suit with the honour and dignity of the Family 3. It is a very hard thing for a Son to tell his Father that the provision he has made for his younger Brothers is void in Law but it is much harder for him to tell him so in Chancery And if such a provision be void it had need be void with a vengance it had need be so clearly void that it ought to be a prodigie if it be not submitted to Now where there is no perpetuity introduced no cloud hanging over the Estate but during a Life which is a common possibility where there is no inconvenience in the Earth and where the Authorities of this Court concur to make it good to say all is void and to say it here I declare it I know not how to do it To run so Counter to the Judgment of that great man my Lord Keeper Bridgman who both advised this settlement and when he was upon his Oath in this place decreed it good I confess his Authority is too hard for me to resist though I am assisted by such learned and able Judges and will pay as great a Deference to their Opinions as any man in the World shall If then this shall not be void there is no need for the Merger by the Assignment or the Recovery to be considered in the Case For if so be this be a good limitation of the Trust and they who had notice of it will palpably break it they are bound by the Rules of Equity to make it good by making some Reparation Nay which is more if the Heir enter upon the Estate to defeat the Trust that very Estate doth remain in Equity infected with the Trust which was the Case of my Lord of Thomond so also was the Resolution in Jackson and Jackson's Case So that to me the Right appears clear and the Remedy seems not to be difficult Therefore my present thoughts are that the Trust of this Term was well limited to Charles who ought to have the Trust of the whole Term Decreed to him and an account of the mean profits for the time by past and a recompence made to him from the Duke and Marryot for the time to come But I do not pay so little Reverence to the Company I am in as to run down their solemn Arguments and Opinions upon my present Sentiments and therefore I do suspend the Inrolment of any Decree in this Case as yet but I will give my self some time to consider before I take any final Resolution seeing the Lords the Judges do differ from me in their Opinions De Termino Pasch anno 34. Car. II. Ro. In Cancell Sabbati 13 die Maij. Howard Versus Le Duc de Norfolk THis Day was appointed for final Judgment in this cause and it being called Mr. Serjeant M. moved My Lord we depend upon your Lordship in that cause for your Opinion Mr. S. G. My Lord in the Case of Howard against the Duke of Norfolk I do not know whether I may have the Liberty to move this that I am going to offer It stands now in the Paper now for your Lordships Judgment and therefore I speak this that I now offer with great submission if your Lordship will please to hear it If you will please to allow my Lord of Arundel's Counsel the liberty of offering any thing further in the Cause Possibly it will not become them to offer any thing that hath been said but if they may be permitted to argue some new matter if they can find any Therefore we that are for my Lord of Arundel desire the liberty of having some little time till Mr. Keck who is of my Lords Counsel but at present indisposed and has not yet been heard can come which we hope will not be long We hope it will be no prejudice to this Cause which has had so long an agitation to stay a few days longer A Weeks time sure will break no squares Lord Chancellor I did appoint the first Tuesday in the Term to deliver my Opinion in this Case for I desire to rid my hands of it But Mr. Keck who was then at the Bar did pray that he might argue it once more for the Defendant and my Lord Duke of Norfolk having never been heard by Mr. Keck I was willing to hear him For it was a Cause of moment and difference of Opinions and there are so many short-hand Writers that nothing can pass from us here but it is presently made publick and tho' a Man doth not speak in Print yet what he says shall be immediately put in Print therefore because Mr. Keck desired it and to justify my own Opinion tho' I had appointed the first Tuesday in the Term yet I gave till this day It is but reason Mr. Keck should be heard who has not yet argued it and if any Man can convince me I am in an error or make it appear to me that I am mistaken in the Law in the Opinion I have given which as yet I see no cause in the World to change God forbid but I should hear them but on the other side this cause must not everlastingly be put off because my Lord Dukes Counsel are not here Therefore I will give you a Weeks time further but upon this Day seven-sevennight come or not come I will give my Judgment in the Cause Mr. Serj. M. If your Lordship pleases to put it upon the other side unless they shew cause then the Opinion your Lordship has given to stand Lord Chancellor If my Opinion which is under the prejudice of being contrary to that of the three Chief Judges can be refuted I am not ashamed to retract any error I
upon the death of the party to whom the term was so given it shall go to his Executors as a Chattle and not to his Heirs Male. 2. I do conceive it will not be denied by any that if there be a long term for years for a 1000 years more or less in trust and a man purchases or settles the Inheritance to the use of himself for life the Remainder in Tail the Remainder in Fee and declare that the trusts of the term shall wait upon those Estates and fall in with them But that this trust of the term shall go along with all the Estate and shall not be merged in any of them and this trust shall not go to an Executor but shall go along with the Estate and if the tenant in tail dye without Issue it shall go along with the next Remainder man in tail and after his death without Issue it shall go to him in Fee simple and attend all the Estates in Remainders be they never so many And this I conceive is the common course in Chancery to incorporate such trusts to go with all the Estates This is not an absolute Trust for Henry and the Heirs Male of his body but a limited and qualified Trust as long as Duke Thomas's elder Brother lived and hath Heirs Males of his body and until the Earldom of A. doth come unto him so as by the death of Duke Thomas without Issue the Trust to Henry which was but a limited Trust is now determined and vanquished as to Henry As this was a contingent trust in Henry but in Case Tho. was alive and had issue when the term was to begin so the continuance and duration of the trust of the term was but to last until the Earldom came unto him and it is the stronger for that this trust ends in Henry by way of Limitation Query How long shall Henry and his Issue have this Trust Answ Until Thomas die without Issue Male and the Earldom of A. come unto him both which hath happened so as the trust for Henry and his Issue is ended by way of limitation and is now disposed over to others as it may well be so as this is a new Trust that by a contingent subsequent Declaration takes away the Trust from Henry and settles a new Trust in the younger Children and it is to be considered that Henry is to have the Trust of this term not so long as he shall have Issue but so long as the Lord Maltravers shall have Heirs Male so as that makes it a collateral Limitation or Determination of the said Estate 4. The Equity and Justice of this Trust carries much weight with me and that condition the Lord Maltravers was in It was fit to settle the Trust in Henry so long as the Lord Maltravers had Heirs Male of his body and if they failed and that the Earldom of A. and great accession of Estate to come to Henry it was a great reason that the younger Children should be provided for and taken notice of And it will not be easie to blow off and overthrow a Trust in a Court of Equity contrary to the express mind and intention of him that made it for the provision of they younger Children especially it being made with so much Justice and Reason wherein he hath both a respect for his Honours Family and younger Children Obj. There is no Objection against all I have said which seems prima facie to carry weight with it and that is when the legal interest is come to Henry and he is Tenant intail in possession and suffers a common Recovery and bars all the Remainders Intail Query How can this trust which is an Accessary follow Estates Answ To which I answer first If the Trust had been to follow and wait upon the Estate this Objection had been the stronger but this trust is not absolutely to wait upon Henry's Estate but so long as Duke Thomas hath Heirs Male of his body and until the Earldom of A. come to him both which are happened he continues still Tenant Intail and yet this Interest is determined in the trusts Secondly this is a future contingent Interest that now is happened to the younger Brothers which cannot be barred and it may be resembled to Pell and Brown's Case 2 Cro. 590 591. A man demiseth his Land to his second Son Thomas and his Heirs and if he die without Issue leaving William his elder Brother then William should have it in Fee it was adjudged that this was a Fee Simple in Thomas the second And though regularly one Fee cannot descend on another yet this being a future contingent Interest that the Devise of the Fee Simple to William his eldest Son. Another great Question was Thomas the second Son suffered a common Recovery whether this did not bar the future contingent possibility of William And it was adjudged it did not Now here is as much a future contingent possibility of a Trust as there was of an Estate and more and therefore there is much reason that the future contingent possibility of a Trust should not be barred by a common Recovery as in that Case And as to that which is said that an Accessary cannot be without a substance and the Estates of the younger Children is to succeed and yet they have no proper Estate for Henry is now Tenant so as this is a personal trust for the younger Children independent of their Estates and if so then clearly this Recovery cannot bar their Estates Another reason why a Court of Equity should help and interpose in this Case may be because the Estate for years was conveyed by Marriot in breach of the Trust which a Court of Equity ought to maintain and support as much as they can First Because Marriot and the now Duke are not Purchasers for a valuable Consideration Secondly They came in with privity and had notice of the Trust And I conceive may and will notwithstanding these Acts make good these Trusts for the younger Children and if this be a new doubtful Case certainly I conceive it is the surest and safest way for a Court of Equity to make good the intention of him that made it and to preserve the Trust for the younger Children William Ellis 26 Feb. 1677. De Termino S. Hill. Anno Reg. Car. 2d Regis XXXIII XXXIV Anno Dom. 1681. Martis 24 die Jan. in Curia Cancellarii Howard versus Le Duc de Norfolk al. THis day being appointed for Judgement in this Cause the three Judges assisted the Lord Chancellor at the hearing viz. the Lord Chief Justice Pemberton the Lord Chief Justice North and the Lord Chief Baron Montague came into the Court of Chancery and delivered their Opinions Seriatim beginning with the Lord Chief Baron Montague and so upwards after whom the Lord Chancellor also delivered his Opinion The sum of all the Arguments as near as could be taken were as followeth The Argument of the
Lord Chief Baron Montague Charles Howard is Plaintiff and the Duke of Norfolk and others are Defendants The Plaintiff by his Bill seeks to have Execution of a Trust of a term of 200 years of the Barony of Grastock which was made by Henry Frederick Earl of Arundel and upon the Bill Answers Deeds and other Passages in this Cause contained is this Henry Frederick Earl of Arundel by Lease and Release of the 20th and 21th of March 1647. did settle the Barony of Grastock and of Burgh and several other Lands to himself for Life then to the Countess Elizabeth his Wife for life and then there is a term created for 99 years which we need not mention in this Case because it is determined and after the death of the Countess there is a term for years limited to my Lord of Dorchester and other Trustees for 200 years under a Trust to be declared in a Deed of the same date with the Release and the limitation of the Inheritance after this term of 200 years is first to Henry Howard now Duke of Norfolk and the Heirs Males of his Body then to Mr. Charles Howard the now Plaintiff Brother of the said Henry and so to all his Brothers successively intail Male with the last Remainder to the Earl of and his Heirs then by a Deed 21 of March 1647 the Earl declares the Trust of the term of 200 years reciting first the uses of the former Deed and therein says it was intended that the said term should attend the Inheritance and the Profits of the Barony of should be received for 200 years by Henry Howard now Duke of Norfolk and the Heirs Males of his body so long as Lord Thomas eldest son of the said Earl of Arundel or any Issue Male of his body should be living but in case he should die without Issue Male in the life of Henry Howard not leaving his Wife ensient with a Son or in case after the death of Thomas without Issue Male the Honour of the Earldom of Arundel should descend to Henry Howard then he and his Issues to have no benefit of this term of 200 years but it was to descend to the other Brother Charles Howard the now Plaintiff as hereafter is mentioned and then comes Now this Indenture witnesseth and therein the Earl declares that it should be under the Limitations after specified viz. if Thomas Lord Howard had any Issue Male or Heirs Male of his body living Henry Howard then the Trustees should have the commencement of the term in trust for the said Henry Howard and the Heirs Males of his body till such time as the Earldom should come to Henry Howard by the death of Thomas without Heirs Males of his body and after to the other Brothers successively and the Heirs Males of their bodies and then doth divide the other Mannors with cross Remainders to the five Brothers then the Case goes on thus the Earl of Arundel dies in time in 1652 Elizabeth the Countess dies in 1673 then in 1675 my Lord of Dorchester the surviving Trustee assigns the Term to one Marriot he assigns it to the now Duke of Norfolk and the Duke the 24th of Octob. 1675 by Bargain and Sale makes a Tenant to the Precipe and then a Recovery is suffered and the Uses of that Recovery 25th of October are declared to be to the Duke and his Heirs Then Thomas Howard the former Duke died without Issue having never been married and that is in the year 1677 whereby the Honour came to the now Duke and so the Plaintiffs Bill is to have execution of the Trust of the term of the Barony of to the use of himself and the Heirs Males of his body This I conceive was opposed by the Counsel for the Defendant upon these grounds 1. That by the Assignment made by Marriot to my Lord Duke Henry the Term was surrendred and quite gone 2. The second ground was the common Recovery suffered which they say barred the remainders which the other Brothers had and so also would be a bar to the Trust of this term 3. And the other ground was that the Trust of a term to Henry and the Heirs Males of his body until by the death of Thomas without Issue the Earldom should descend upon him and then to Charles is a void Limitation of the Remainder As to the first that by the assignment of Marriot to Henry Howard the whole Term was surrendred and being so surrendred hath no existance at all that I find but was barely mentioned and I think cannot be stood upon for this the term by the surrender is gone indeed and merged in the Inheritance yet the Trust of that term remains in Equity and if this Trust be destroyed by him that had it assigned to him this Court has full power to set it up again and to decree the term to him to whom it did belong or a recompence for it therefore I think that stands not at all as a point in the Case or as an objection in the way As to the next thing the common recovery now suffered by the now Duke that doth bar the remainders to the other Brothers And so also the trust of this term that I conceive to be so in case this can be interpreted to be a term to attend the Inheritance and indeed in the reciting part the Deed doth seem to say that it was intended to attend the Inheritance But by that part of the Deed which followeth after now this Indenture witnesseth there it is limited that the term should be to Henry Howard and the Heirs Males of his body until such time as the Honour of the Earl of Arundel by his elder Brothers death without Issue should come to him then to the Plaintiff which doth convey the Estate of the term in a different Channel from that in which the Inheritance is setled and taking this Deed altogether it doth limit this term in such various Estates that it can no way be construed to be a term attending the Inheritance and then I conceive the recovery doth not bar the trust for the recovery would bar the incident to any Estate as this would do here if it attended the Inheritance but being onely a term in Gross and a collateral thing I conceive the recovery has no operation to bar the trust in the term Then the Case singly depends upon the third point whether the Trust of a term thus limited to Henry Howard and the Heirs Males of his body until his Brother die without Issue whereby the Honour came to him with such contingent Remainders over be a good Limitation this is the Question and so in short the Case is but thus A Term of Two Hundred years is granted in trust that Henry Howard and the Heirs Males of his body shall receive the Profits until Thomas die without Issue Male of his body and then to Charles Howard and the Heirs Male of his body And in this case I am
of Opinion that these Limitations to the younger Brothers upon this Contingency are absolutely void in the first Creation and are gone without the Surrender and that upon this Recovery Henry Howard now Duke of Norfolk ought to have the trust of the whole Term. The Expositions of Devizes of Terms or the Dispositions of the Trust of Terms have proceeded by many steps to higher degrees than was at first thought of by the makers It would be too long to give a distinct History of it but it is so plain that it is now a resolved and decreed thing and setled therefore it were in vain to tell you the steps taken towards it That the devize of a Term and the limitation of the trust of a Term to one and the Heirs of his body is good though Burgesses Case was onely for Life the Cases are very full in it On the other side where there is a limitation of a Term to one and the Heirs of his body there a positive Limitation of the Estate over after his death without Issue that I think also is as fully declared to be void I shall not cite Cases at large but onely those Points and Expressions in them which are peculiar and pertinent to this purpose there is Jinkins and Kennish's Case I think it was in the Exchequer there it was said it was such a total Disposition of the term to limit it to one and his Heirs Males that it would not admit of a Limitation over but adjudged to be void So in my Lord Rolls Abridgments 1 Part Tit. Devise fol. 611. 11 Car. 1. Leventhorp and Ashby's Case B. R. It is said that the Remainder of a Term to C. after it is limited to B. and the Heirs Males of his body is a void Remainder and fol. 613. he puts down the reason why the Remainder is void because the Limitation to one and the Heirs Males of his body is a full disposition of the Term. And if such Limitations over were permitted it would create perpetuities which the Law doth abhor Sanders and Cornishes Case Croke fol. 230. There it is resolved that the Devise of a Term in such a manner with Limitations after one another to make a perpetuity cannot be good For says the Book to limit a possibility and to limit the Remainder of a term after a dying without Issue stands not with the Rules of Law. Now to bring this Case within these Rules that if there be the Trust of a term to a man and the Heirs of his body no Limitation can be over I say then if this Estate be so limited to my Lord Duke by the name of Henry Howard the other will follow when there is a Limitation Intail though it cannot be properly stiled Intail of a Term yet it is a Disposition of that Term as long as the Tail lasts then there can be no Limitation over And as to that I think as the Deed is penned it may well be stood upon that here is an Estate given to Henry and the Heirs Males of his body For though the Deed says until by the death of Thomas without Issue the Earldom of Arundel shall descend upon him yet the first Limitation I think shall stop at the Heirs Male of his body and the Remainder over shall be then void But I will not stand upon that because I think I shall not need it but admit until by the failure of the Issue of Thomas the Earldom come to him makes it not an Estate to Henry and the Heirs of his body directly yet it gives an Estate to him and the Heirs of his body as long as Thomas has any Issue of his body and that I count to be all one as to the Operation of Law for each of the Estates must determine upon the persons dying without Issue which is too remote a Condition to limit the Remainders of a Term upon And this until he die without Issue and as long as he shall have Issue are terms Synonimous in my Opinion and so it being a Limitation to him and his Heirs of his body as long as Thomas liveth and hath Issue of his body it cannot be limited over and the rather upon comparing the former part of the Deed where there is an expression that it was intended the Estate should remain in my now Lord Duke so long as Thomas lived or had any Issue of his body Therefore I say there being in my opinion no difference as to operation of Law between the Limitations to a man and the Heirs of his own body and to a man and the Heirs of his body during the life of another and the Heirs of his body there can be no difference in the resolution It is as possible a disposition of the Term during the continuance of an Intail as the other and therefore no Remainder can be limited over But now the doubt in this Case that is made ariseth upon this point that this Limitation over to the Brothers is upon a meer Contingency and whether that be good I think is the main Question And truly upon the reasons of Child and Baily's Case I cannot think it is a good Limitation that Case has been so often reported that I need not put it at large In short this it was A Devise by A. of a Term to William his eldest Son and his Assigns and if he die without Issue then to Thomas his youngest Son there the Judges of the Kings-Bench did first deliver their Opinion that this was a void Limitation to Thomas And after it came into the Exchequer-Chamber and there by the Opinion of ten Judges it was affirmed and the reasons of the Judgement are not what was alleadged at the bar in this Cause but they went upon the ground because thereby a perpetuity would ensue and that which was observed by one of the Councel that the Term was given to him and his Assigns was onely an Answer to a Case put in the argument upon Child and Baily's Case which was the Case of Rhetorick and Chappell Hill. 9 Jac. R. 889. B. R. which was cited by my Lord Chief Baron Tanfield against the resolution of Child and Baily's Case to difference it from the Case then before them And though it was urged in Child and Baily's Case that it was given upon a Contingency to the younger Son which would soon be determined and end in a short time yet that weighed not with the Judges but that they ruled it to be a void Limitation and I met lately with a Judgement in the Common-pleas which crosseth that Case of Rhetoricks and Chappell's it was Hill. 31 and 32 Car. 2. Reg. 1615 Gibson's and Sanders's Case Matthews possessed of a long Term of years having Issue a Son and three Daughters makes his Will and devises his Chattel-Leases to his Son and if that Son die before Marriage or after Marriage without Issue that then they should go to the Daughters The Son doth Marry and dieth without
may be convinced of but truly at present I see no colour to retract it Mr. Serj. M. We pray then my Lord that we may have this right done for us who are for Mr. Howard the Plaintiff that they on the other side will let us know what particular points we must go upon for if they come at large we may not perhaps be so well provided to answer them Lord Chancellor I suppose they can say nothing to any point but that which is the main point in the Case the limitation of the remainder of a springing Trust after the Entail of a Term that is to determine upon a contingency that expired in the time of a Life a point which was never argued for Mr. Howard at the Bar nor stirred by the Counsel Mr. Serj. M. I hope we for Mr. Howard shall be heard to justify your Lordships Opinion Lord Chancellor What hath been said here at the Bench on both sides has been taken in Short-hand and made publick I know the Counsel on both sides hath seen it or will see and look into it well and if they can give me any reasonable satisfaction that I am in the wrong I shall easily recede from it But upon any thing yet offered I am of the same mind I was As to the Learned Judges that assisted me at the hearing the Decree is mine and the Oath that Decree is made upon is mine theirs is but Learned Advice and Opinion And therefore if they can satisfy my Conscience that they are in the right and I not well and good if not I must abide by that Decree I have made according to my Conscience And I will repeat this to you I go upon these Heads for my Opinion and I would be glad any body would answer them I say it is against natural Justice to say that a Man who hath no Estate but what consists in Terms shall be disabled from settling his Estate so as to provide for the contingencies in his Family that are in immediate prospect I say it is a common Case A Man that is less for Years assigns his Term in Trust for himself until such a Marriage take effect and after to himself for Life to his Wife for Life with remainder in Tail to his Children Is that springing Trust upon the contingency of the Marriage good or not If it be not good then what will become of a great many Marriage settlements If it be good then why not in this Case as well as that And I would fain know what difference there is between the Case as it is at the Bar and if it had been limited thus If my Lord Arundel had said that if Thomas Die without Issue Living Henry then the Term for 200 Years in Tail should cease and a new Term should arise upon the same Trust for Charles that it seems had been well enough is there any sense in the World that can lead a reasonable Man to conclude why there should not be a new springing Term upon the same Trust I cannot see any reason to run this Case down upon the single authority of Child and Baylie's Case which was such a resolution as never had its like before nor since but contradicted by several resolutions as have been cited particularly Wood and Saunders Case in this Court in my Lord Bridgmans time These are the grounds my present apprehensions go upon but I will hear Mr. Keck if it may be in any reasonable time and give the respect to the Duke of Norfolk that he shall not be surprized tho' withall I must do Mr. Howard the Justice that he be not eternally delaid Then the Day sevennight was appointed but upon the continuance of Mr. Kecks illness it was put peremptorily for Judgment on the first Saturday in the next Term. De Termino Trin. Anno Regis Car. II. 34 in Cancell Howard vers le Duc de Norfolk Sabbati 17 Junii Anno Dom. 1652. MY Lord we have nothing to do in that Mr. Serj. M. Cause but to pray your Judgment Mr. S. G. My Lord we were in great hopes to have had other Assistances to day but it seems we are disappointed of them That which I shall humbly offer is but short We are by your Lordships favour permitted now to offer something if we can to answer the objections which your Lordship made and which were the ground of your Opinion We did apprehend them to be these that Child and Baylie's Case was not the same with this Case and that the Case of Wood and Saunders is the last resolution of this Nature and will rule this We do my Lord humbly with submission offer these Reasons why the first Case is the same with this and the other difference from it Child and Baylie's Case my Lord tho' it doth differ in some Circumstances yet it differs in no one that doth immediately concern the Limitation For the Circumstances wherein they Differ was the Length of the Term being almost Expired the Conveyances over to several Purchasers and at the end of the Term the resolution taken But tho' it differs in these Circumstances yet these have no influence upon the Limitation or the Construction of Law upon the Limitation Now the Limitation is the same there as it is here for there it is to one for Life and to his Son during the whole Term and if he die without Issue during the Life of his Father and Mother then the remainder over this remainder was adjudged void This is the same Case with ours for in the Case the first remainder actually vested in William the Son for it was to him and his Assigns during the whole Term and if he die without Issue Living Father and Mother then over This remainder I say was adjudged void he was actually seized of the whole Interest which being vested in him could not be devested upon the contingent Limitations over upon his death without Issue living Father and Mother It is the same in our Case the Duke of Norfolk has the Interest of this Estate by the Limitation in Tail actually vested in him and then it cannot be devested by the rule of Child and Baylie's Case upon the Contingency of Thomas's dying without Issue in the Life of Henry which is during the Life of the now Duke of Norfolk And in this respect the Case of Wood and Saunders is not the same It is a Limitation to the Father and Mother for Life and for 60 years if they so long live then to John the Son if Living at the time of the Death of Father and Mother the whole Term. My Lord this was not a vesting the Estate in John the Son but a Contingent Limitation that he should take or not If he were Living at the time of the Death of Father and Mother then he should take If not he should not take There was no Interest vested in him till the Contingency hapned and so the Limitations will be different And that
the Dukes behalf we now desire is that your Lordship will be pleased to take some further time to consider of it and deliver your Judgment the next Term. Mr. Serj. M. My Lord I did not expect I must confess an Argument at this rate and at this time but your Lordship in great tenderness and favour hath given them leave to do it but after all under favour what they say is a great mistake of the Case If they had observed what was said and truly applied it they would have answered themselves What interpretation in such a Case shall be made or not be made is meerly matter of Equity which upon the circumstances of every Case is governable by the Circumstances I would not go after their Example to argue to support as they have done to overturn the Opinion of the Court that has been delivered But I would offer this to your Lordship there is a great mistake in calling this a Remainder it is no such thing as a Remainder It is indeed a springing Trust upon a Contingency But pray my Lord consider how it stands here in Equity before your Lordship Here is a noble and great Family the Heir of it under the Visitation of the Hand of God which no one could remove but God alone here are a great and numerous Issue to provide for that provision which is made according to the Rules of Nature and Justice and it being necessary to be done no Man could contrive it better than this settlement My Lord they frighten us with the word Perpetuity It is true a Perpetuity cannot be maintained that is an Inheritance not to be aliened or barred or that can never end But here is but the name of a Perpetuity and certainly that must be a strange and monstrous Perpetuity that must determine within the short space of a Life A Perpetuity is an Estate that can never be barred And Littleton hath a Rule that there is no Estate but can be barred if all the Persons concerned in it joyn But it is under favour a contradiction and a great one to call this a Perpetuity a monstrous one I say it is where any Man can see the end of it and whereas to the circumstances of the Case the Family could not otherwise be well provided for And whereas Perpetuities are abhorred it is upon the inconvenience which hinders other provisions in case of necessity and it were indeed an inconvenience that every Family should have the misfortunes that were in this and not be able to provide some sort of remedy for them Some cases my Lord have been put by the other side now which under favour are nothing to the purpose and would need no other answer than they give themselves But truly I think it is not fit for the advantage of the publick that after a Case has been so solemnly argued the Counsel should dispute the Opinion of the Court. My Lord I would desire to say a word in answer to some things that have been urged As to the Case that Mr. H ch s put I think it had been good by way of Executory devise To one and his Heirs Males till such an one returns from Rome or the like had been good especially where the determination Depends but upon the expiring of a short Life But all this is but Petitio principii the same thing over and over As for Child and Baylies Case there are several things that differ it from ours There it hath a semblance of our Case of one dying without Issue but it is there upon a Life and not within a Life as ours doth And in our Case my Lord this Limitation to Henry is a Limitation of a Term attendant upon an Inheritance and then it is plainly as if the Limitation of a Freehold Estate were to one and the Heirs of his Body and if such an accident happens the Estate to cease and be to another for a 100 Years And it is in Henry attendant upon the Inheritance it should not if Henry had died gone to his Exeecutor but to his Heir Then as to Charles here is a condition that determines the whole Trust as to Henry and there it begins to be first a Limitation of a Term in gross He that creates a Term attendant upon an Inheritance may sever it if he will and if he may sever it may he not limit it upon a Contingency that upon such a Contingency it shall be severed All conditions are either precedent or subsequent Precedent to create a springing Trust and Subsequent to destroy the former Estate In Wood and Saunders Case John did not take but upon the precedent Condition but Edward took it upon the subsequent Condition In our Case this condition is both as to the destroying of the Trust to Henry it is a subsequent Condition but as to the creating a new Trust to Charles it is a precedent Condition My Lord I must not undertake to argue this Case but only to say a little to what was said on the other side we hope it being upon so short a Contingency which has now hapned the Limitation of this Term to the Plaintiff is good and we pray your Judgment for him THE Lord Chancellor's SECOND ARGUMENT Lord Chancellor I Am not sorry for the Liberty that was taken at the Bar to argue this over again because I desired it should be so for in truth I am not in love with my own Opinion and I have not taken all this time to consider of it but with very great willingness to change it if it were possibe I have as fair and as justifiable an opportunity to follow my own Inclinations if it be lawful for a Judge to say he has any as I could desire for I cannot concur with the three Chief Judges and make a Decree that would be unexceptionable But it is my Decree I must be saved by my own Faith and must not Decree against my own Conscience and Reason It will be good for the satisfaction of the publick in this Case to take notice how far the Court is agreed in this Case and then see where they differ and upon what grounds they differ and whether any thing that hath been said be a ground for the changing this Opinion The Court agreed thus far That in this Case it is all one the Limitation of the Trust of a Term or the Limitation of the Estate of a Term all depends upon one and the same Reason The Court is likewise agreed which I should have said first to dispatch it out of the Case that it may not trouble the Case at all that the Surrender of Marryot to the Duke of Norfolk and the common Recovery suffered by the Duke are of no use at all in this Case For if this Limitation to Charles be good then is that Surrender and the Recovery a breach of Trust and ought to be set aside in Equity so all the Judges that assisted at the hearing of this Cause
the Son but hath but a small Estate to give him The Elder Brother he has a Term for Years and has a mind to provide for the Son of his Younger Brother and his intended Wife and he limits the Trust of his Term thus to the use of himself and his Executors till the Marriage be had but if he die or provided he die before the Marriage had without Issue living his Younger Brother the Father of him that is to be Married then to the use of that Son and so on We do make a great doubt whether the Limitation of the Trust of the Term there would be good or not upon the difference of Child and Baylies Case that has been so often mentioned in this Cause and was so solemnly resolved The resolution of which Case and that also of Wood and Saunders we submit to your Lordships consideration As for the intention of the Parties in this settlement we cannot but say it was intended as a provision that when the Bulk of the Estate and the Honour came to the Duke his Younger Brothers should have an increase of their Portions But it is as plain the intent does fail as to all the other Younger Children because the construction of Law will not support it So that the intent without the Rule of Law to maintain it will signify nothing Mr. H. If your Lordship will please to give me leave I think I may offer something that has not yet been observed We do not trouble your Lordship or our selves out of a presumption that we shall so far prevail as to alter the Opinion your Lordship has delivered but truly my design is to offer some reasons why I hope your Lordship will be pleas'd to take some further consideration of the matter Not but that I know your Lordship did very seriously deliberate upon it before you delivered your Opinion and you have been pleased to tell us the reasons you went upon and they were two First upon the Case of Wood and Saunders in this Court And Secondly upon the natural Reason and Justice that a Man that has no other Estate but Terms for Years should have a power to settle those Terms so as to provide for the Contingencies of his Family That a settlement of a Term upon Trustees to himself till the Marriage take effect and then over shall be good this might be resembled to Pell and Browns Case and so come within the same reason Now my Lord with submission we have this to offer This Trust of this Term in our Case was first to attend the Inheritance and that was an Estate Tail limited but then there is a Contingency added to this Trust to this Trust of the Term that if Thomas die without Issue living Henry then to Charles and as it hath been said already it is very plain this Entail of the Term did actually vest Then the single first Question is whether upon the Contingency hapning the death of Duke Thomas without Issue it shall devest and a springing Trust arise to the now Plaintiff Mr. Charles Howard It is said there was a just care taken for him that was a Younger Son so there was but a like care was taken for the other five Bernard c. as well as for him Now then the Case lies upon this doubt with submission to your Lordship whether this can enure by way of a springing Trust by a new Creation We think that cannot be for here being once an Estate Tail limited in a Term that was to attend an Estate Tail of the Inheritance the Remainder over must be void in the very Creation My Lord I have observed ever since I have had the honor to practise at this Bar and very many particular instances might be given that when the Judges have been upon the Cases called to advise here they would not go beyond nor think fit that the Court would not go beyond nor think fit that this Court should beyond the Resolution in Mannings Case And they have often said if that Case were now to be adjudged it would receive another kind of Resolution The Judges gave that Resolution by way of Executory devise and now I think since that there have been more Suits in this Court of this Nature since the King's Restauration than were in forty Years before For cunning People will be always finding out Perpetuities and are fond of Limitations tending to Perpetuities not only in Inheritance but in Terms for Years After Mannings Case the Conveyancers did contrive these Trusts of Terms for Years to go beyond that Case For they seemed to argue thus That being good by way of Executory devise then we will declare a Trust and that the Law has nothing to do with it is a Creature of Equity and Governably by Equity And I have seen a Conveyance of this Nature made by my Lord of Leicester to Marryot and Western drawn 1658. Where there was the Trust of a Term limited over after an Estate Tail but that was never insisted upon to be good all the Cases being otherwise If then it be not good by way of Executory devise it cannot be good by way of Limitation of the Trust of a Term. Now in this Case certainly it would not be a good Remainder by way of Executory devise For when a Term is devised to end in Tail no Man will say a Remainder of the Term can be limited over As for the Case of Wood and Saunders That My Lord I conceive had been good by way of Executory devise A Man that hath a Term deviseth it to his Wife for life and if John his Son be living at the death of his Wife then to him in Tail but if he die without Issue living Wife then to Edward that might be good For it is a condition precedent as to John and there he must survive his Father and Mother or he takes nothing but he dying before them never vested in him at all and so might well vest in Edward But in our Case it is void in the Creation because in the Case here before your Lordship it did vest and was to attend the Inheritance when the Contingency happens Can it then enure to the Plaintiff by way of springing Trust surely no. In Wood and Saunders Case it never vested in our Case it did vest But I must My Lord crave leave to say one word to another point in the Case and that is the Recovery When Contingent Remainders in Law in Cases of Settlements may be by any act in Law barred this Court I conceive will not set them up agen Now in this Case before the Contingency hapned when the Estate Tail of the Inheritance was in my Lord Duke of Norfolk and the Lease for 200 Years attendant upon that Estate Tail then doth my Lord Duke suffer a common Recovery which we apprehend hath so barred and destroyed this Term that this Court will never interpose to set it up again My Lord that which on