35 E. Rot. 258. And Popham said further in this case that to erect an Hospitall by the name of an Hospitall in the County of S. or in the Bishopprick of B. and the like is not good because he is bound to a place too large and incertain But a Colledge erected in Accademia Cantabrig or Oxon. is good and sâ—me are so founded because it tends but to a particular place as a City Town c. King versus Bery and Palmer 2. IN an Ejectione firmae brought by William King against John Bery and William Palmer Defendants for two Messuages and certain Lands in Halstead in the County of Leicester upon a Demise alledged to be made by Dorothy Pool and Robert Smith the case upon a speciall Verdict was this The said Dorothy was Tenant for life of the said Tenants the Remainder over to the said Robert Smith and his Heirs and they being so seised made the Lease in the Declaration upon which the Action was brought And per curiam the Lease found by the Verdict doth not warrant the Lease alledged in the Declaration for although they joyned in the Demise yet during the life of the said Dorothy it is her Demise and not the Demise of the said Robert Smith but as his confirmation for that time for he hath nothing to do to meddle with the Land during the life of the said Dorothy but after the death of the said Dorothy then it shall be said to be the Domise of the said Robert Smith and not before because untill this time Smith hath nothing to do to meddle with the Land And in a more strong case If Tenant for life and he in the Reversion in Fee make a Gift in tail for the life of Tenant for life it shall be said to be his Gift but after his death it shall be said the Gift of him in the Reversion and if the Estate tail had expired during the life of the said Tenant for life he shall have the Land again in his former Estate and there shal be no forfeiture in the case because he in the Reversion of the immediate Estate of Inheritance had joyned in it and therfore hath dispensed with that which otherwise had been a meer forfeiture of the Estate for life wherby it was awarded by the Court that the Plaintif take nothing by his Bill in 33 34 Eliz. Rot. And the Judgment is entred Hill 34. Eliz. Ret. 72. 3. In this Term I hapned to see a Case agreed by the Iustices in 3. 4. Eliz. which was this If a man make a Lease of two Barns rendring Rent and for default of payment a Re-entry if the Tenant be at one of the Barns to pay the Rent and the Lessor at the other to demand the Rent and none be there to pay it that yet the Lessor cannot enter for the Condition broken because there was no default in the Tenant he being at one for it was not possible for him to be at both places together And upon this Case now remembred to the Iustices Popham Walmesley and Fennor said That perhaps also the Tenant had not money sufficient to have been ready to have paid it at either of the said places but it is sufficient for him to have and provide one Rent which cannot be at two places together And by the Case reported here also If Lands and Woods are demised together the Rent ought to be demanded at the Land and not the Woood because the Land is the more worthy thing and also more open then the Wood And therfore by the three Iustices aforesaid Rent ought not to be demanded in any private place of a Close as amongst Bushes in a Pit or the like nor in the open and most usuall passage therof as at a Stile Gate and the like 4. Vpon a Prohibition sued out of the Kings Bench the Case appeared to be this The late Lord Rich Father to the now Lord Rich devised to his Daughter for her advancement in marriage 1500. upon condition that she marry with the consent of certain friends and deviseth further that if his Goods and Chattels are not sufficient to pay his Debts and Legacies that then there shall be 200 l. a year of his Lands sold to supply it and dies making the now Lord Rich his Executor his Goods and Chattels not being sufficient to pay the Debts of the Testator as was averred the said Daughter married with a Husband against the will of those who were put in trust to give their assents and the Husband and the Wife sued in the Spirituall Court for the Legacy And it was surmised that they would not allow the proofs of the said now Lord Rich exhihited to prove the payment of the Debts of his Testator and further that they would charge him for the sale of the Land upon which matter the Prohibition was granted to the Delegates before whom the matter depended and now consultation was prayed in the case Vpon which it was affirmed by a Doctor of the Civill Law that they will allow the proofs for the payment of the Debts according to our Law and that the Legacy shall not be paid untill the Debs are satisfied But he said that by the Law if the Executor do not exhibit his Inventory but neglect it for a year or more that then if any omission or default be in the true value of the Inventory exhibited that then such on Executor for this default shall pay all the Legacies of his Testator of what value soever they are not respecting the Debts or the value of the Goods or Chattels how small soever the omission or default be in the Inventory And so he said was the case of the now Sir Richard S. who did not bring in the Inventory for four years after the death of the Testator and that in the Inventory exhibited the values of every thing were found to be too small and therfore to be charged by their Law albeit he hath not Goods and Chattels sufficient of the Testators To which it was answered that this was quite without reason for by such means every Subject of the Realm may be utterly defeated if he take upon him the charge of an Executorship And if this shall be admitted no man will take upon him the Execution of the Will of any and by such a means none will have their Wills performed which shall be too inconvenient And they said further that in as much as Debts are to be proved by the Common Law of the Realm those of the Ecclesiasticall Courts ought to admit in the proof therof such proofs as our Law allows and not according to the precisenesse of their Law And although by their Law such a Condition as before being annexed to a Legacy is void because that marriage oughr to be free without Coercion yet where we are to judge upon the point as we are here if the Execution happen to be charged because of the sale of Land and for
where the Plaintiff shews a speciall Title under the Possession of the Defendant As for example In trespasse for breaking of his Close the Defendant pleads that J. G. was seised of it in his Demesne as of fee and enfeoffed J. K. by virtue of which he was seised accordingly and so being seised enfeoffed the Defendant of it by which he was seised untill the Plaintiff claiming by calour of a Deed of Feoffment made by the sayd J. G. long before that he enfeoffed J. K. where nothing passed by the sayd Feoffment entred upon which the Defendant did re-enter here the Plaintiff may well traverse the Feoffment supposed to be made by the sayd J. G. to the sayd I. K. without making Title because that this Feoffment only destroies the Estate at will made by the sayd I. G. to the Plaintiff which being destroyed he cannot enter upon the Defendant albeit the Defendant cometh to the Land by Disseisin and not by the Feoffment of the sayd I. K. for the first Possession of the Defendant is a good Title in Trespasse against the Plaintiff if he cannot shew or maintain a Title Paramounâ— But the Feoffment of the sayd I. G. being traversed and found for him he hath by the acknowledgment of the Defendant himself a good Title against him by reason of the first Estate at will acknowledged by the Defendant to be to the Plaintiff and now not defeated But in the same case he cannot traverse the Feoffment supposed to be made to the sayd I. K. to the Defendant without an especiall Title made to himself for albeit that I. K. did not enfeoff the Defendant but that the Defendant disseised him or that he cometh to the Land by another means yet he hath a good Title against the Plaintiff by his first Possession not destroyed by any Title Paramount by any matter which appeareth by the Record upon which the Court is to adjudge and with this accord the opinion of 31 4. 1. That the materiall matter of the Bar ought alwaies to be traversed or other wise that which upon the pleading is become to be materiall and that which the Plaintiff traversed here to wit the Lease made by Wright to the Defendant is the materiall point of the Bar which destroyeth the Title Paramount acknowledged to the Plaintiff by the colour given in the Bar which is good without another Title made So note well the diversity where in pleading in Trespasse the first Possession is acknowledged in the Plaintiff by the Bar and where it appeareth by the pleading to be in the Defendant and where and by what matter the first Possession acknowledged in the Plaintiff by the Bar is avoided by the same Bar And upon this Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff as appeareth in 34. and 35. Eliz. Rol. Earl of Bedford versus Eliz. Anne Russell Mich. 34. and 35. Eliz. 2. IN tho Court of Wards the Case was thus between the now Earl of Bedford In the Court of Wards and Elizabeth and Anne the Daughters and Heirs of John late Lord Russell which was put ten times to all the Iustices to be resolved Francis late Earl of Bedford was seised of the Mannor of Baruake Chaldon c. in Commitatu Dorset in his Demesne as of see and so seised the fourth year of Queen Eliz. of it enfeoffed the Lord S. John of Bletsoe and others in see to the use of himself for forty years from the date of the sayd Deed and after to the use of the sayd John then his second Son and the Heirs Males of his body and for default of such Issue then to the use of the right Heirs of the sayd Earl the Feoffor for ever Afterwards Edward Lord Russell Son and Heir apparant to the sayd Earl dyed without Issue and after the sayd John Lord Russell dyed without Issue Male having Issue the sayd two Daughters afterwards to wit 27 Eliz. the sayd Francis Earl of Bedford by Indenture made between him and the Earl of Cumberland and others in consideration of the advancement of the Heirs Males of the body of the sayd Earl which by course of descent should or might succeed the sayd Earl in the name and dignity of the Earldome of Bedford and for the better establishment of his Lordships Mannors and Hereditaments in the name and blood of the sayd Earl covenanted and grantes with the sayd Covenantees that he and his Heirs hereafter shall stand seised of the sayd Mannors amongst others to the use of himself for life without impeachment of Waste and after his decease to the use of Francis the Lord Russell and the Heirs Males of his body for default of such Issue to the use of Sir William Russell Knight his youngest Son and the Heirs Males of his body with diverse Remainders over after which the sayd Francis Lord Russell tyed having Issue Edward the now Earl of Bedford and after this the sayd Francâ—s late Earl of Bedford dyed also and after the Daughters of the sayd John Lord Russell or the now Earl of Bedford shall have these Mannors of Barunke c. was the question and upon this it was argued by Cook Sollinton and others for the Daughters that an use at Common-law was but a confidence put in some to the benefit and behoof of others and that Conscience was to give remedy but for those for whose availe the confidence was and that was in this Case for the sayd Daughters which were the right Heirs to the sayd Francis late Earl of Bedford upon the first conveyance made 41 Eliz. for the confidence that he put in the Feoffees as to the profits that he himself was to have was but for the forty years and how can any other say that he shall have any other Estate when he himself saith that he will have it but for forty years and therefore in this case his right Heir shall take as a Purchasor by the intent of the Feoffor which hath power to make a disposition of the use at his pleasure and his pleasure as appeareth was to have it so and it is not as if the use had been limitted to be to himself for life with such a Remainder over in which Case the use of the Fee by the operation of Law ought to execuse in himself for the Free-hold which was in him before As where Land is given to one for life the Remainder to his right Heirs he hath a Fee-simple executed but here he shall have but an Estate for forty years precedent and that the Fee-simple cannot be executed by such a limitation made to the right Heirs but in case of an Estate for years only precedent such a limitation to his right Heirs afterwards is not good but in case of an use it is otherwise for it may remain to be executed to be an use in Esse where the right Heir shall be and therefore not to be resembled to an Estate made in Possession And an Vse is alwaies to be
guided according to that which may be collected to be the purpose and intent of the parties And therefore if a man make an Estate of his Land without limitation of any Vse or confidence the Law shall say that it is to his own use but if it be upon confidence then it shall be to the Vse of the party to whom it is made or according to the confidence which shâ—ll be absolute or according to that which is limitted which may alter that which otherwise shall be taken upon the generall confidence as 30 H. 6. Fitz. Devise If a man devise Lands to another in Fee he hath the use and Title of it but if it be limitted to his use for his life only the use of the Fee shall be to the Heir of the Devisor for by the limitation his intent shall be taken to be otherwise then it should be taken if this limitation had not been and in as much as in this case the Earl reserves to himself but the use for years it is evident that his intent never was to have the Fee to surrender this Term which perhaps he intended to be for the benefit of his will which shall be defeated contrary to his purpose if the Fee shall be also in him by the death of the sayd Iohn without Issue Male and therefore the sayd Daughters ought to have the Land And on the other part it was argued by Glanvil Serjeant and Egerton the Attorney Generall that this limitation made to the right Heirs is void in the same manner as if a man give Lands to another for life the Remainder to the right Heirs of the Feoffor in this case the Heir shall take by descent as a Reversion remaining to the Feoffor and not as a Remainder devested out of him for the ancient right priviledge the Estate which he may take and therfore he shall take it by descent and not by purchase for the name of right Heir is not a name of purchase betwixt the Ancestor and his heir because that doth instance that he happeneth to be heir he takes it by descent and then it comes too late to take by purchase And another reason that the Daughters shall not have it is because that when Sir Iohn Russell dies without Issue Male which Estate might have preserved the Remainder if it shall be a Remainder there was not any right heir of the sayd Francis Earl of Bedford to take this Remainder because that the sayd Earl survived him And therefore it is to bee resembled to this Case Land is given in Tail the Remainder to the right Heirs of I. G. the Donee dyes without Issue in the life of I. G. in this case albeit I. G. dyes afterwards having an heir yet this heir shall never have the Loud because he was not heir in Esse to take it when the Remainder fell and for the mean Estate for years this cannot preserve a Remainder no more then when Land is given for years the Remainder to the right heirs of I. G. this Remainder can never be good if I. G. be then living because such a Remainder cannot depend but upon a Free-hold precedent at least and therefore the Inheritance here shall go to the now Earl of Bedford by the second assurance And upon consideration of the Case and severall Confirmes had upon this amongst the Iudges and Barens it was at last resolved by all but Baron Clarke that the Daughters shall not have the Mannors in the County of Doâ—set but the now Earl of Bedford and principally upon this reason because there was nor right Heir to take as Purchasor where the mean Estate Taile was determined which was by the Lord Iohn without Issue Male for they agreed that the Remainder to the right Heirs if it be a Remainder cannot be preserved by the mean Estate for years for it ought to be a Free-hold at least which ought to preserve such a Remainder untill there be one to take it by name of Purchasor as right Heir And at this day they did not think there was any diversity between the Case of a Remainder in Possession limitted to the right heir of one and of a Remainder in use so limited over to another Mich. 34. and 35. Eliz In the Kings Bench. 3. IN Ejectione firmae upon speciall verdict the case was thus A man possessed of a Term of years in right of his wife made a Lease for years of the same Land to begin after his death which was the Lessor and afterwards he dyed and his wife survived him and the question was whether the wife shall have the Land after the death of the husband or the Lessee for if the husband had devised the same Land to an estranger yet the Wife shall have it and not the Devisee as it happened in the Case of Matthew Smith who made first such a Devise of a Term of his Wife and yet the Wife had it because that by the death of the husband before which the Devise did not take effect the wife had it in her first Right not altered in the life of her Husband but it was agreed in this case by all the Court that the Lessee shall have it during his Term for as the husband during his life might contract for the Land for the whole term which the wife had in it so might he do for any part of the term at his pleasure for if he may devise the Land for one and twenty years to begin presently he also may make it to begin at any time to come after his Death if the term of the Wife be not expired but for the Remainder of the term of the husband made no disposition during his life the Wife shall have it which by Popham this Case happened upon a specialll Verdict in the County of Somerset about 20 Eli. Where he and Sergeant Baber were Practisers in the Circuit there to wit the Lands were demised to husband and wife for their lives the Remainder to the Survivor of them for years the Husband granted over this term of years and dyed and the question was whether the Wife shall have the term of years or the Grantee and adjudged that the Wife shall have it and it was upon this reason because there was nothing in the one or the other to grant over untill there was a Survivor And the same Law had been if the Wife bad dyed after the Grant and the Husband had survived yet he shall have the term against his own Grant as if a Lease were made for Life the Remainder for years to him which first cometh to Pauls if A. grant this Term for years to another and afterwards A. is the first which commeth to Pauls yet the Grantee shall not have this Term because it was not in A. by any means neither in Interest nor otherwise untill he came to Pauls As if a man make a Lease for life the Remainder to the Right heirs of J. S. J. S. hath
to Charles late Lord Sturton Father to the said Iohn Lord Sturton and the said Charles Lord Sturton disseised the said Lady Sturton and levied a Fine of the said Land to Cottington and his Heirs with Proclamations according to the Statute and warranted it against him and his Heirs And the said Lord Charles dyed before the Proclamations past and the Warranty descended upon the said John Lord Sturton after which and before the Proclamations past the said Lady Sturton entred upon the said Cottington after which the said Lady died and after her death and all the Proclamations past the said John Lord Sturton as Heir in Tail entred and made the Lease to the said Okes upon whom Cottington the Defendant entred as under the right of the said Cottington the Conusee And I perceiving the Court strongly to incline upon the matter of Warranty that it shall bar the entry of the Heir and make a discontinuance against him according to the inference which is taken by Littleton in his Chapter of Discontinuance because the truth was and so acknowledged to the Court although it were omitted in the Verdict that the said Charles Lord Sturton was attained of Felony and Murther and so the blood corrupted between the said Charles and John Lord Sturton wherby in a new Action the Garranty had not hurt the Title of the said Lord John I then moved the Court upon the other point of the Fine with Proclamations and the Court also agreed in this point if the Warranty had not been that yet the Fine with Proclamations shall bar the said John Lord Sturton notwithstanding the entry made by the Lady Sturton were before the Proclamations past because that notwithstanding his regresse made the Reversion remains in Cottington not defeated by his regresse in respect of the Statute whch makes that the Fine remains effectuall against the Heir in Tail if nothing be done by him to undo it before the Proclamations past as by claim regresse and the like but the Act of a stranger shall not help him wherby Iudgment being therupon given against the said Okes the said John Lord Sturton stood satisfied and the Cottingtons enjoy the Land to this day wheras if this opinion of the Court had not been on a new Action the said Sir John might have been relieved against the Warranty And Gaudy said that this was a very good Case for the point upon the Statute in this case Earl of Shrewsbury versus Sir Thomas Stanhop 8. GIlbert Earl of Shrewsbury brought a Scandalum Magnatum against Gilbert Earle of Shrewsbury against Sir Thomas Stanhop in a Scandalum Magnatum Sir Thomas Stanhop Knight and it was upon the Statute Tam pro Domina Regina quam pro seipso c. For that communication was had between the said Sir Thomas and one Francis Fletcher of divers things touching the said Earl the said Francis at such a day and place said to the said Thomas My Lord the said Earl meaning is a Subject innuendo that the said Earl was a Subject of the now Queen the said Sir Thomas then and there said of the said Earl these slanderous words to wit he intending the said Earl is sorry for that meaning that the said Earl was sorry that he was then a Subject to our said Soveraign Lady the Queen that is his grief meaning that it was grief to the said Earl that the said Earl was Subjâ—ct to the Queen to the damage of the said Earl of 20000 l. To which the said Sir Thomas Stanhop said that a question was formerly moved between the said Earl and the Defendant touching the subversion and drawing away of certain Weares heretofore erected by the said Sir Thomas at Shelâ—ord in the said County of Nott. where the Action was brought to oust the River of Trent there that for the subversion therof a Petition was exhibited to the privy Councell of the Queen before the speaking of the said words by certain Inhabitants of the County of Lincoln and divers other places not known to the Defendant with the privity allowance and knowledge of the said Earl which Petition at the time of the speaking of the said words depended before the said Councell not determined wherupon at the day and place comprised in the Declaration there was Communication between the said Defendant and the said Francis Fletcher concerning their purpose to have the said Wears subverted and touching the said Petition upon which the said Francis said to the said Defendant the matter meaning the Petition aforesaid hanging undetermined before the Councell aforesaid is to be heard before the privy Councel meaning the aforesaid Councell of the Queen and what their Honours meaning the Councell aforesaid determine my Lord the aforesaid Earl meaning will willingly obey To which the said Francis then there answered saying My Lord the aforesaid Earl meaning is a Subject upon which the said Defendant they then having speech as well of the said Petition as of the order therupon to be taken by the said Councell answered saying the words comprised in the Declaration meaning that he was sorry and grieved that he was subject to the order to be made upon the Petition aforesaid by the said Councell and averred that this was the same speech upon which the Action was grounded upon which it was demurred in Law and for cause shewn according to the Statute it was alledged that the bar was defective because it is not alledged at what place nor by whom nor against whom the Petition was exhibited and also because that by the Bar the matter of the Declaration is not confessed avoided or traversed and also that the Bar was insufficient And it seemed to Fennor that the matter of the Bar had been sufficient if it had been well pleaded but the Plaintiff alledgeth the words to be spoken in one sence in the Affirmative and the Defendant shews matter also in the Affirmative which proves the words to be spoken in another sence then the Declaration imporrs and two Affirmatives can never make a good Issue and therfore the Defendant ought to have taken a traverse to that which is comprised in the Declaration and for want of this traverse the plea in Bar is not good Gawdy said that the Bar is not sufficient neither in matter nor form not in matter because that wheras Fletcher said that the said Earl was a Subject this can have no other sence but that he was a Subject to the Queen in his Allegiance and her Soveraignty and so much is drawn out of the course of their former speech and therfore the answer which the Defendant made to it refers to his subjection of alleagiance and not to the matter of obedience which he owed to the order of the said Councell and if it cannot have any other sence in good understanding he cannot help himself now by an Innuendo which is in it selfe according to common intendment contrary to that which the nature of the words
alter the intendment that the Law hath otherwise of the words And Gawdy agreed also that in such cases the Defendant may plead the generall Issue and upon the matter also the Jury ought to find him not guilty But Popham and Clench sayd that this was a dangerous matter to be put in the mouthes of the Lay Gents as hath been said before and therfore to put it to the Iudgment of the Law by pleading And for the exception they ought to have shewn here where by whom and against whom the Petition was delivered to this they said that the exception was to no purpose for this was but a conveyance to the Speech used which Speech was the substance of the Bar and in this they put the case of the Lord Cromwell which was in this Court 22 Eliz. Rot. 752. In an Action upon the Statute of Scandalum Magnatum by him brought against Thomas Dye Clark for saying to the Lord Cromwel It is no news though you like not of me for you like of those that maintain Sedition against the Queens proceedings in which the Defendant said that he was Vicar of North Linham in the County of Norf. and that the Plaintff mentioned one Vincent Goodwyn Clark at such a time and one Iohn Trendle at such another time neither of them being licenced to preach in the said Church against the will of the said Defendant and shew how they severally preached there in their Sermons and shew certainly in what point Seditious Doctrine against the Laws of the Church as against the Crosse used in Baptisme and the wearing of the Surplice and that afterwards in speech therupon between the said Plaintiff and him the Plaintiff said to the Defendant That the Defendant was a false Knave and said in English words that he liked not of the Defendant wherupon the Defendant said the words comprised in the Declaration Innuendo That he liked of the said Goodwyn and Trendle who maintain Sedition Innuendo seditious Doctrine against the Queens proceedings Innuendo predict Leges Stat. Ecclâ—siae hujus regni Angl. c. And the Plaintiff was put to answer Scilicet de injuria sua propria absque tali causa c. And note in this case the Defendant would first have justified for the matter preached by one and it was not allowed by the Court but he was put to speak to both or otherwise it had not been good because his speeches were in the plurall number to wit That he liked of those which refers to more then to one And it was said in this case that the word Subject might have severall significations according to the circumstance wherupon it is spoken As Subiect generally without more is to be intended of the Queen but according to the circumstance it may be said Subject of England or Subject of Ireland or Subject to the Law or subject to any other authority or power set over him or subject to his Affections And if a man saith of another that he is a Subject and therfore he ought to serve the Queen in her Warrs and he answers that he is sorry for that and is grieved for it no Action wil lye for this because the grievance refers to service which is to be done and not to his Subjection as a Subject Dillon versus Fraine 9. IN Trespasse brought by William Dillon Esquire against John Fraine See this in Cook lib. 1. 120. bâ— the name of Chudleighs case for breaking of his Close at Tavestock in the County of Devon called Seden upon not guilty and a speciall Verdict the case appeared to be this to wit that Sir Richard Chudleigh Knight was seised in his Demesne as of Fee of the Mannor of Hescot with the Appurtenances in the County of Devon of which the said Close was parcel and so seised 26 April 3 4 Phil. Mar. by his Deed of Feoffment of the same date enfeoffed Sir Tho. Saintleger Knight and others and their Heirs of the said Mannor to the use of the said Sir Richard Chudleigh and his Heirs of the body of the said Elizabeth then the wife of Richard Bainfield Esquire lawfully begotten and for default of such Issue then to the use of the said Sir Richard Chudleigh and of his Heirs of the bodies of other wives of other persons lawfully begotten And for default of such Heirs then to the use of the performance of the Will of the said Sir Richard Chudleigh for 10. years after his decease and after the said Term finished then to the use of the said Sir John Saintleger and his Co-feoffees and their Heirs during the life of Christopher Chudleigh Son and Heir apparant of the said Sir Richard and after the death of the said Christopher then to the use of the first Issue Male of the body of the said Christopher and to the Heirs Males of the body of this first Issue Male and for default of such Issue to the second Issue Male of the body of the said Christopher to the Heirs Males of the body of this second Issue Male and so to the tenth Issue Male And for default of such Issue then to the use of Thomas Chudleigh another Son of the said Sir Richard and of the Heirs of his body lawfully begotten And for default of such Issue to the use of Oliver Chudleigh another Son of the said Sir Richard and of the Heirs of his body lawfully begotten And for default of such Issue to the use of Nicholas Chudleigh another Son of the said Sir Richard and of the Heirs of his body lawfully begotten and for default of such Issue to the right Heirs of the said Sir Richard Chudleigh for ever wherby they were seised accordingly after which the 17th of Novemb. 5 6. Phil. Mar. the said Sir Richard died without any Heir of the body of any of the wives before mentioned And after that the said Christopher took to wife one Christian Strecheley after which to wit the 14th day of August 1 Eliz. the said Sir John Saintleger and the other Feoffees by their Deed of the same date enfeoffed the said Christopher of the said Mannor to have and to hold to him and his Heirs for ever to the use of the said Christopher and his Heirs the said Oliver Chudleigh then being living after which to wit the 20th day of September 3 Eliz the said Christopher had Issue of his body lawfully begotten one Strechly Chudleigh his first Issue Male And after this to wit the 30. day of March 5 Eliz. the said Christopher had Issue of his body lawfully begotten one John Chudleigh his second Issue Male after which to wit the first day of July 6 Eliz. the said Christopher by his Deed indented of the same date and inrolled within six months according to the Statute bargained and sold the said Mannor to Sir John Chichester Knight and to his Heirs and in the interint also between the date of this Deed and in the inrolement therof to
E. 6. with the assent of the Dean and Chapter and by Writing indented demised the said Prebend to the said William Sydall for 43. years from the Feast of the Annunciation of our Lady in the year of our Lord 555. at the yearly rent of 361. William Sydall assigned over his term and died making the said Thomas his Executor Henry Sydall also died and afterwards the Plaintiff was made Prebend and for the rent arrear in his time and after the assignment this Action is brought against the Executors in the Debet and Detinet And it was alledged that in Hillary Term 36 Eliz. Rot. 420. in the case between Glover and Humble it was adjudged in the Kings Bench that the Grantee of the Reversion shall not maintain an Action of Debt upon a Lease for years against the Lessee himself for any arrears of Rent incurred after that he had made an assignment of his Term over to another and alledged also that in Hillary 29 Eliz. in a case between it was adjudged that an Action of Debt lyeth for the Lessor himself against the Lessee for arrearages of Rent reserved upon the Lease and accrued after the Lessee had assigned his Term over and both these cases were adjudged accordingly in the Kings Bench and the reason in the first case was because that by the Grant of the Reversion over the privity of contract which was between the Lessor and the Lessee is dissolved and the Grantee of the Reversion as to it but a stranger But in the last case the privity of contract is not dissolved between the Lessor and the Lessee notwithstanding the Lessee hath passed over his Term neither is the contract therby determined between the parties But Fennor said that in this case the privity in Deed is gone by the death of the Lessee and therfore the Executor who is but privy in Law is not subject to this Action unlesse in case where he hath the Term in which case he shall be charged as he who hath Quid pro quo which is not in the case here And he said further that a Lease made by a Prebend is good no longer then his own life but is meerly void by his death and therfore shall not be said to be a contract to bind further then his life and therfore also he said that the Action will not lye in the said case for the Successor But Gawdy said that here the Lease is confirmed and therfore good during the Term but it seemed to him that the Executor who is but in privy in Law shall not be chargable with this action for the arrearages due after the assignment over and yet he agreed that the Heir the Successor and the Executor of the Lessor shall have debt against the Lessee himself for the arrearages which accrues to be due after the assignment over of the Lease But he said that the Action of Debt against the Executor upon a Lease made to the Testator and for the arrearages due in the time of the Executor ought to be in the Debet and Detinet and that for the occupation of the Term wherby he hath Quid pro quo which is not in this case Popham said that for the time that the contract shall bind in nature of a Contract there is not any difference between thâ— Heir the Successor and the Executor of the Lessor and the Executor or Administrator of the Lessee for the one and the other are equally privy to the Contract and a Contract or Covenant especially being by writing binds as strongly the Executor or Administrator as the Testator or the Iâ—testate himself who made it For these are privies indeed to the Contract and as to it represent the person of the Testator or Intestate himself And he agreed that the Action of Debt against the Executors for the arrearages of Rent of a Lease which he occupies as Executor and accrued in their own time shall be in the Debet and Detinet The reason is although they have the Land as Executor yet nothinâ— ther of shall be â—mpâ—â—yed to the Execution of the Will but such Prâ—fits as are above that which wâ—s to make the Rent and therfore so much of the Profits as is to make or answer the Rent they shall take to their own use to answer the Rent and therfore they having Quid pro quo to wit so much of the Profits for the Rent the action ought to be brought against them in such cases where they are to be charged in Debt for Rent upon a Lease made to the Testator and have not the Profits of the Lease it self nor means nor default in them to come to it the action of Debt ought to be against them in the Detinet only and this is the case here and therfore the action being in the Debet and Detmet doth not lye And further he agreed in this case to the opinion of Fennor that the action here doth not lye for the Successor of the Prevend who made the Lease for no more then the Successor in this case shâ—ll be bound by the Contract of his Predecessor no more shall he take advantage by this Contract for it is the consideration which makes him to be bound and not only the Câ—ntract and so the Successor in such cases is but privy in Law and not in Dâ—ed tâ— the Contract of his Predecessor But otherwise it is â—f the Successor of a Bishop and the like which Leases are not void against the Successor but voidable Case of Armes 2. VPon an assembly of all the Iustices and Barons at Sergeants-Inne this Term on Munday the 15. day of April upon this question mâ—ved by Anderson chief Iustice of the Common Bench Whether men may arme themselves to suppresse Riots Rebellions or to resist Enemies and to endeavour themselves to suppresse or resist such Disturbers of the Peace or quiet of the Realm and upon good deliberation it was resolved by them all that every Iustice of Peace Sheriff and other Minister or other Subject of the King where such accident happen may do it And to fortifie this their resolution they perused the Statute of 2 E 3. cap. 3. which enacts that none be so hardy as to come with force or bring forcâ— to any place in affray of the Peace nor to go or ride armed night nor day unlesse hâ— be Servant to the King in his presence and the Ministers of the King in the execution of his Precepts or of their Office and these who are in their company assisting them or upon cry made for Weapons to keep the Peace and this in such places where accident happen upon the penalty in the same Statute contained wherby it appeareth that upon cry made for Weapons to keep the Peace every man where such accidents happen for breaking the Peace may by the Law arme himself against such evill Doers to keep the Peace But they take it to be the more discreet way for every one in such a case