where the Plaintiff shews a speciall Title under the Possession of the Defendant As for example In trespasse for breaking of his Close the Defendant pleads that J. G. was seised of it in his Demesne as of fee and enfeoffed J. K. by virtue of which he was seised accordingly and so being seised enfeoffed the Defendant of it by which he was seised untill the Plaintiff claiming by calour of a Deed of Feoffment made by the sayd J. G. long before that he enfeoffed J. K. where nothing passed by the sayd Feoffment entred upon which the Defendant did re-enter here the Plaintiff may well traverse the Feoffment supposed to be made by the sayd J. G. to the sayd I. K. without making Title because that this Feoffment only destroies the Estate at will made by the sayd I. G. to the Plaintiff which being destroyed he cannot enter upon the Defendant albeit the Defendant cometh to the Land by Disseisin and not by the Feoffment of the sayd I. K. for the first Possession of the Defendant is a good Title in Trespasse against the Plaintiff if he cannot shew or maintain a Title Paramounâ— But the Feoffment of the sayd I. G. being traversed and found for him he hath by the acknowledgment of the Defendant himself a good Title against him by reason of the first Estate at will acknowledged by the Defendant to be to the Plaintiff and now not defeated But in the same case he cannot traverse the Feoffment supposed to be made to the sayd I. K. to the Defendant without an especiall Title made to himself for albeit that I. K. did not enfeoff the Defendant but that the Defendant disseised him or that he cometh to the Land by another means yet he hath a good Title against the Plaintiff by his first Possession not destroyed by any Title Paramount by any matter which appeareth by the Record upon which the Court is to adjudge and with this accord the opinion of 31 4. 1. That the materiall matter of the Bar ought alwaies to be traversed or other wise that which upon the pleading is become to be materiall and that which the Plaintiff traversed here to wit the Lease made by Wright to the Defendant is the materiall point of the Bar which destroyeth the Title Paramount acknowledged to the Plaintiff by the colour given in the Bar which is good without another Title made So note well the diversity where in pleading in Trespasse the first Possession is acknowledged in the Plaintiff by the Bar and where it appeareth by the pleading to be in the Defendant and where and by what matter the first Possession acknowledged in the Plaintiff by the Bar is avoided by the same Bar And upon this Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff as appeareth in 34. and 35. Eliz. Rol. Earl of Bedford versus Eliz. Anne Russell Mich. 34. and 35. Eliz. 2. IN tho Court of Wards the Case was thus between the now Earl of Bedford In the Court of Wards and Elizabeth and Anne the Daughters and Heirs of John late Lord Russell which was put ten times to all the Iustices to be resolved Francis late Earl of Bedford was seised of the Mannor of Baruake Chaldon c. in Commitatu Dorset in his Demesne as of see and so seised the fourth year of Queen Eliz. of it enfeoffed the Lord S. John of Bletsoe and others in see to the use of himself for forty years from the date of the sayd Deed and after to the use of the sayd John then his second Son and the Heirs Males of his body and for default of such Issue then to the use of the right Heirs of the sayd Earl the Feoffor for ever Afterwards Edward Lord Russell Son and Heir apparant to the sayd Earl dyed without Issue and after the sayd John Lord Russell dyed without Issue Male having Issue the sayd two Daughters afterwards to wit 27 Eliz. the sayd Francis Earl of Bedford by Indenture made between him and the Earl of Cumberland and others in consideration of the advancement of the Heirs Males of the body of the sayd Earl which by course of descent should or might succeed the sayd Earl in the name and dignity of the Earldome of Bedford and for the better establishment of his Lordships Mannors and Hereditaments in the name and blood of the sayd Earl covenanted and grantes with the sayd Covenantees that he and his Heirs hereafter shall stand seised of the sayd Mannors amongst others to the use of himself for life without impeachment of Waste and after his decease to the use of Francis the Lord Russell and the Heirs Males of his body for default of such Issue to the use of Sir William Russell Knight his youngest Son and the Heirs Males of his body with diverse Remainders over after which the sayd Francis Lord Russell tyed having Issue Edward the now Earl of Bedford and after this the sayd Francâ—s late Earl of Bedford dyed also and after the Daughters of the sayd John Lord Russell or the now Earl of Bedford shall have these Mannors of Barunke c. was the question and upon this it was argued by Cook Sollinton and others for the Daughters that an use at Common-law was but a confidence put in some to the benefit and behoof of others and that Conscience was to give remedy but for those for whose availe the confidence was and that was in this Case for the sayd Daughters which were the right Heirs to the sayd Francis late Earl of Bedford upon the first conveyance made 41 Eliz. for the confidence that he put in the Feoffees as to the profits that he himself was to have was but for the forty years and how can any other say that he shall have any other Estate when he himself saith that he will have it but for forty years and therefore in this case his right Heir shall take as a Purchasor by the intent of the Feoffor which hath power to make a disposition of the use at his pleasure and his pleasure as appeareth was to have it so and it is not as if the use had been limitted to be to himself for life with such a Remainder over in which Case the use of the Fee by the operation of Law ought to execuse in himself for the Free-hold which was in him before As where Land is given to one for life the Remainder to his right Heirs he hath a Fee-simple executed but here he shall have but an Estate for forty years precedent and that the Fee-simple cannot be executed by such a limitation made to the right Heirs but in case of an Estate for years only precedent such a limitation to his right Heirs afterwards is not good but in case of an use it is otherwise for it may remain to be executed to be an use in Esse where the right Heir shall be and therefore not to be resembled to an Estate made in Possession And an Vse is alwaies to be
guided according to that which may be collected to be the purpose and intent of the parties And therefore if a man make an Estate of his Land without limitation of any Vse or confidence the Law shall say that it is to his own use but if it be upon confidence then it shall be to the Vse of the party to whom it is made or according to the confidence which shâ—ll be absolute or according to that which is limitted which may alter that which otherwise shall be taken upon the generall confidence as 30 H. 6. Fitz. Devise If a man devise Lands to another in Fee he hath the use and Title of it but if it be limitted to his use for his life only the use of the Fee shall be to the Heir of the Devisor for by the limitation his intent shall be taken to be otherwise then it should be taken if this limitation had not been and in as much as in this case the Earl reserves to himself but the use for years it is evident that his intent never was to have the Fee to surrender this Term which perhaps he intended to be for the benefit of his will which shall be defeated contrary to his purpose if the Fee shall be also in him by the death of the sayd Iohn without Issue Male and therefore the sayd Daughters ought to have the Land And on the other part it was argued by Glanvil Serjeant and Egerton the Attorney Generall that this limitation made to the right Heirs is void in the same manner as if a man give Lands to another for life the Remainder to the right Heirs of the Feoffor in this case the Heir shall take by descent as a Reversion remaining to the Feoffor and not as a Remainder devested out of him for the ancient right priviledge the Estate which he may take and therfore he shall take it by descent and not by purchase for the name of right Heir is not a name of purchase betwixt the Ancestor and his heir because that doth instance that he happeneth to be heir he takes it by descent and then it comes too late to take by purchase And another reason that the Daughters shall not have it is because that when Sir Iohn Russell dies without Issue Male which Estate might have preserved the Remainder if it shall be a Remainder there was not any right heir of the sayd Francis Earl of Bedford to take this Remainder because that the sayd Earl survived him And therefore it is to bee resembled to this Case Land is given in Tail the Remainder to the right Heirs of I. G. the Donee dyes without Issue in the life of I. G. in this case albeit I. G. dyes afterwards having an heir yet this heir shall never have the Loud because he was not heir in Esse to take it when the Remainder fell and for the mean Estate for years this cannot preserve a Remainder no more then when Land is given for years the Remainder to the right heirs of I. G. this Remainder can never be good if I. G. be then living because such a Remainder cannot depend but upon a Free-hold precedent at least and therefore the Inheritance here shall go to the now Earl of Bedford by the second assurance And upon consideration of the Case and severall Confirmes had upon this amongst the Iudges and Barens it was at last resolved by all but Baron Clarke that the Daughters shall not have the Mannors in the County of Doâ—set but the now Earl of Bedford and principally upon this reason because there was nor right Heir to take as Purchasor where the mean Estate Taile was determined which was by the Lord Iohn without Issue Male for they agreed that the Remainder to the right Heirs if it be a Remainder cannot be preserved by the mean Estate for years for it ought to be a Free-hold at least which ought to preserve such a Remainder untill there be one to take it by name of Purchasor as right Heir And at this day they did not think there was any diversity between the Case of a Remainder in Possession limitted to the right heir of one and of a Remainder in use so limited over to another Mich. 34. and 35. Eliz In the Kings Bench. 3. IN Ejectione firmae upon speciall verdict the case was thus A man possessed of a Term of years in right of his wife made a Lease for years of the same Land to begin after his death which was the Lessor and afterwards he dyed and his wife survived him and the question was whether the wife shall have the Land after the death of the husband or the Lessee for if the husband had devised the same Land to an estranger yet the Wife shall have it and not the Devisee as it happened in the Case of Matthew Smith who made first such a Devise of a Term of his Wife and yet the Wife had it because that by the death of the husband before which the Devise did not take effect the wife had it in her first Right not altered in the life of her Husband but it was agreed in this case by all the Court that the Lessee shall have it during his Term for as the husband during his life might contract for the Land for the whole term which the wife had in it so might he do for any part of the term at his pleasure for if he may devise the Land for one and twenty years to begin presently he also may make it to begin at any time to come after his Death if the term of the Wife be not expired but for the Remainder of the term of the husband made no disposition during his life the Wife shall have it which by Popham this Case happened upon a specialll Verdict in the County of Somerset about 20 Eli. Where he and Sergeant Baber were Practisers in the Circuit there to wit the Lands were demised to husband and wife for their lives the Remainder to the Survivor of them for years the Husband granted over this term of years and dyed and the question was whether the Wife shall have the term of years or the Grantee and adjudged that the Wife shall have it and it was upon this reason because there was nothing in the one or the other to grant over untill there was a Survivor And the same Law had been if the Wife bad dyed after the Grant and the Husband had survived yet he shall have the term against his own Grant as if a Lease were made for Life the Remainder for years to him which first cometh to Pauls if A. grant this Term for years to another and afterwards A. is the first which commeth to Pauls yet the Grantee shall not have this Term because it was not in A. by any means neither in Interest nor otherwise untill he came to Pauls As if a man make a Lease for life the Remainder to the Right heirs of J. S. J. S. hath
such Estates that the Law allows them to be good against the Lords themselves they performing their Customs and Services and therfore are more commonly guided by the guides and rules of the common Law and therfore as appeareth in Dyer Tr. 12. Eliz. Possessio fratris of such an Estate facit sororem esse haeredem And to say that Estates of Copyhold Land are not warranted but by custom and every Custom lies in Vsage and without Vsage a Custom cannot be is true but in the Vsage of the greater the lesser is alwaies implyed As by Vsage three lives have been alwaies granted by Copy of Court Roll but never within memory two or one alone yet the grant of one or two lives only is warranted by this Custom for the use of the greater number warrants the lesser number of lives but not è converso And so Fee-simples upon a Limitation or Estates in tail are warranted by the equity of the Statute because they are lesser Estates then are warranted by the Custom and these lesser are implyed as before in the greater and none will doubt but that in this case the Lord may make a Demise for life the Remainder over in Fee and it is well warranted by the Custom and therfore it seems to them that it is a good Estate tail to John Gravenor and a good Remainder over to Henry his Brother and if so it follows that the Plaintiff hath a good Title to the Land and that Iudgment ought to be given for him And for the dying seised of Elizabeth they did not regard it for she cannot dye seised of it as a Copyholder for she had no right to be Copyholder of it And by the dying seised of a Copyholder at common Law it shall be no prejudice to him who hath right for he may enter But here in as much as she cometh in by admittance of the Lord at the Court her Occupation cannot be fortious to him and therfore no descent at common Law by her dying seised for it was but as an Occupation at Will But if it shall not be an Estate tail in John Gravenor as they conceive strongly it is yet for the other causes alledged by Gawdy and Clench Iudgment ought to be given for the Plaintiff and the Remainder which is not good shall not prejudice the Fee-simple conditionall granted to John which is no more then if the Surrender had been to the use of Iohn Gravenor and his Heirs the Remainder over because that we as Iudges see that this cannot be good by Law and therfore not to be compared to the case where the Custom warrants but one life and the Lord grants two joyntly or successively there both the one and the other is void And this is true because the custom is the cause that it was void and not the Law and also it is a larger Estate then the Custom warrants which is not here and upon this Iudgment was given that the Plaintiff shall recover And by Popham it hath been used and that upon good advice in some Maâ—nors to bar such Estates tails by a common Recovery prosecuted in the Lords Court upon a Plaint in nature of a Writ of Entry in the Post 2. JUlius Cesar Iudge of the Admiralty Court brought an Action upon the Case for a Slander against Philip Curtine a Merchant-stranger for saying that the said Cesar had given a corrupt Sentence And upon not guilty pleaded and 200. marks Damages given it was alledged in arrest of Iudgment where it was tryed by Nisi prius at the Guildhall by a partiall Inquest because that upon the default of strangers one being challenged and tryed out a Tales was awarded De circumstantibus by the Iustice of Nisi prius wheras as was alledged a Tale could not have been granted in this case for the Statute of 35 H. 8 cap. 6. which give the Tales is to be intended but of commontryals of English for the Statute speaks at the beginning but of such Iuries which by the Law eught to have 40 s. of Free-hold and wills that in such cases the Venire facias ought to have this clause Quorum quilibet habeat 40 s. in terris c. which cannot be intended of Aliens which cannot have Free-hold And it goes further that upon default of Iurors the Iustices have authority at the Prayer of the Plaintiff or Defendant to command the Sheriff or other Minister to whom it appertaineth to make a return of such other able persons of the said County then present at the same Assises or Nisi prius which shall make a full Iury c. which cannot be intended of Aliens but of Subjects and therfore shall be of tryals which are onely of English and not of this Inquest which was part of Aliens And further the Tales was awarded only of Aliens as was alledged on the Defendants part but in this point it was a mistake for the Tales was awarded generally de circumstantibus which ought alwaies to be of such as the principall Pannell was But Per Curiam the exceptions were disallowed for albeit the Statute is as hath been said yet when the Statute comes to this clause which gives that a Tales may be granted by the Iustices of Nisi prius and is generally referred to the former part of the Act for it is added Furthermore be it enacted that upon every first Writ of Habeas Corpora or Distringas with a Nisi prius c. the Sheriff c. shall return upon every Juror 5 s. Issues at the least c which is generall of all And then it goes further And wills that in every such Writ oâ— Habeas Corpora or Distringas with a Nisi prius where a full Jury doth not appear before the Justices of Assise or Nisi prius that they have power to command the Sheriff or other Minister to whom it appertains to nominate such other persons as before which is generall in all places where a Nisi prius is granted and therfore this is not excepted neither by the Letter nor intent of the Law And where it is said such persons by it is to be intended such as the first which shall be of Aliens as well as English where the case requires it for expedition was as requisite in cases for or against them as if it were between other persons And Aliens may well be of the County or place where the Nisi prius is to be taken and may be there for although an Alien cannot purchâ—se Land of an Estate of Free-hold within the Realm yet he may have a house for habitation within it for the time that he is there albeit he be no Denison but be to remain there for Merchandise or the like And by Gawdy where the default was only of strangers the Tales might have been awarded only of Aliens as where a thing is to be tryed by Inquest within two Counties and those of the one County appear but not those of the other the
to Charles late Lord Sturton Father to the said Iohn Lord Sturton and the said Charles Lord Sturton disseised the said Lady Sturton and levied a Fine of the said Land to Cottington and his Heirs with Proclamations according to the Statute and warranted it against him and his Heirs And the said Lord Charles dyed before the Proclamations past and the Warranty descended upon the said John Lord Sturton after which and before the Proclamations past the said Lady Sturton entred upon the said Cottington after which the said Lady died and after her death and all the Proclamations past the said John Lord Sturton as Heir in Tail entred and made the Lease to the said Okes upon whom Cottington the Defendant entred as under the right of the said Cottington the Conusee And I perceiving the Court strongly to incline upon the matter of Warranty that it shall bar the entry of the Heir and make a discontinuance against him according to the inference which is taken by Littleton in his Chapter of Discontinuance because the truth was and so acknowledged to the Court although it were omitted in the Verdict that the said Charles Lord Sturton was attained of Felony and Murther and so the blood corrupted between the said Charles and John Lord Sturton wherby in a new Action the Garranty had not hurt the Title of the said Lord John I then moved the Court upon the other point of the Fine with Proclamations and the Court also agreed in this point if the Warranty had not been that yet the Fine with Proclamations shall bar the said John Lord Sturton notwithstanding the entry made by the Lady Sturton were before the Proclamations past because that notwithstanding his regresse made the Reversion remains in Cottington not defeated by his regresse in respect of the Statute whch makes that the Fine remains effectuall against the Heir in Tail if nothing be done by him to undo it before the Proclamations past as by claim regresse and the like but the Act of a stranger shall not help him wherby Iudgment being therupon given against the said Okes the said John Lord Sturton stood satisfied and the Cottingtons enjoy the Land to this day wheras if this opinion of the Court had not been on a new Action the said Sir John might have been relieved against the Warranty And Gaudy said that this was a very good Case for the point upon the Statute in this case Earl of Shrewsbury versus Sir Thomas Stanhop 8. GIlbert Earl of Shrewsbury brought a Scandalum Magnatum against Gilbert Earle of Shrewsbury against Sir Thomas Stanhop in a Scandalum Magnatum Sir Thomas Stanhop Knight and it was upon the Statute Tam pro Domina Regina quam pro seipso c. For that communication was had between the said Sir Thomas and one Francis Fletcher of divers things touching the said Earl the said Francis at such a day and place said to the said Thomas My Lord the said Earl meaning is a Subject innuendo that the said Earl was a Subject of the now Queen the said Sir Thomas then and there said of the said Earl these slanderous words to wit he intending the said Earl is sorry for that meaning that the said Earl was sorry that he was then a Subject to our said Soveraign Lady the Queen that is his grief meaning that it was grief to the said Earl that the said Earl was Subjâ—ct to the Queen to the damage of the said Earl of 20000 l. To which the said Sir Thomas Stanhop said that a question was formerly moved between the said Earl and the Defendant touching the subversion and drawing away of certain Weares heretofore erected by the said Sir Thomas at Shelâ—ord in the said County of Nott. where the Action was brought to oust the River of Trent there that for the subversion therof a Petition was exhibited to the privy Councell of the Queen before the speaking of the said words by certain Inhabitants of the County of Lincoln and divers other places not known to the Defendant with the privity allowance and knowledge of the said Earl which Petition at the time of the speaking of the said words depended before the said Councell not determined wherupon at the day and place comprised in the Declaration there was Communication between the said Defendant and the said Francis Fletcher concerning their purpose to have the said Wears subverted and touching the said Petition upon which the said Francis said to the said Defendant the matter meaning the Petition aforesaid hanging undetermined before the Councell aforesaid is to be heard before the privy Councel meaning the aforesaid Councell of the Queen and what their Honours meaning the Councell aforesaid determine my Lord the aforesaid Earl meaning will willingly obey To which the said Francis then there answered saying My Lord the aforesaid Earl meaning is a Subject upon which the said Defendant they then having speech as well of the said Petition as of the order therupon to be taken by the said Councell answered saying the words comprised in the Declaration meaning that he was sorry and grieved that he was subject to the order to be made upon the Petition aforesaid by the said Councell and averred that this was the same speech upon which the Action was grounded upon which it was demurred in Law and for cause shewn according to the Statute it was alledged that the bar was defective because it is not alledged at what place nor by whom nor against whom the Petition was exhibited and also because that by the Bar the matter of the Declaration is not confessed avoided or traversed and also that the Bar was insufficient And it seemed to Fennor that the matter of the Bar had been sufficient if it had been well pleaded but the Plaintiff alledgeth the words to be spoken in one sence in the Affirmative and the Defendant shews matter also in the Affirmative which proves the words to be spoken in another sence then the Declaration imporrs and two Affirmatives can never make a good Issue and therfore the Defendant ought to have taken a traverse to that which is comprised in the Declaration and for want of this traverse the plea in Bar is not good Gawdy said that the Bar is not sufficient neither in matter nor form not in matter because that wheras Fletcher said that the said Earl was a Subject this can have no other sence but that he was a Subject to the Queen in his Allegiance and her Soveraignty and so much is drawn out of the course of their former speech and therfore the answer which the Defendant made to it refers to his subjection of alleagiance and not to the matter of obedience which he owed to the order of the said Councell and if it cannot have any other sence in good understanding he cannot help himself now by an Innuendo which is in it selfe according to common intendment contrary to that which the nature of the words
in execution in all Circuits That if a man taken for Felony be examined by a Justice of Peace it appeareth that the Felon is not bailable by the Law and yet the Justices commit him to Goal but as upon suspition of Felony not making mention for any cause for which he is not bailable wherby he is brought before another Justice of Peace not knowing of any matter why he ought not to be bailed wherupon they bail him these Justices ought to be fined by the Statute of 1 2. Phil. Mar. for they offend if they bail him who by the Statute of Westm 1. is not bailable and therfore they at their peril ought so to inform themselves before the bail taken of the matter that they may be well satisfied that such a one is bailable by Law and therfore observe well the Statute of Westm 1. cap. 18. who is bailable and who not by the Law And it seems that no Justice of Peace could have bailed any one for Felony before the Statute of 1 Rich. 3. cap. 3. which is made void by 3 H. 7. cap. 3. for before this he ought to have been bailed by the Sheriff or other Keeper of the Prison where he was in Ward or by the Constable and by no other Officer unlesse Justices of the Kings Bench Justices in Eyre or Justices of Goal-delivery Herbin versus Chard and others 2. IN Trespasse by William Herbin Plaintiff against Chard and others Defendants for a Trespasse made at Pynon Farm in Netherbury and Loder in the County of Dorset the Case upon the Demurrer appeared to be this The Lord Mordant was seised of the Farm in his Demesne as of Fee and so seised demised it to Philip Fernam Elizabeth his wife and Iohn Fernam the eldest Son of the said Philip for term of their lives and of the Survivor of them and the said Eliz. died after which the said Philip his Father demised his part of the Farm by his Deed indented dated 13. Mart. 32. Eliz. to Philip his Son and Toby Fernam his Son for eighty years immediatly after the death of the said Philip the Father if the said Iohn Fernam shal so long live with divers remainders over for years depending upon the life of the said Iohn after which the said Philip the Father died and Iohn survived him and demised the said Farm to the Plaintiff upon whom the Defendants entred in right of the said Philip and Toby and whether their entry were congeable was the question And it was moued by Goodridge of the Middle-Temple that the entry of the Defendant was not lawfull because the said John was now in by the Lessor and not by his joynt Companion And further he had no power to dispose therof beyond his own life for suppose that he makes a Lease therof for years and afterwards grant over his Estate to a stranger and dies the Lease for years is therby determined albeit his joynt Companion be yet living and that his Estate continues And yet he agreed that if had made a Lease for years to begin at a day to come as at Michaelmas following or the like that this had been good for it is an Interest in the Grantee to be granted over for the presumption that it might be executed in his life but in the other case there is not any possibility that he who hath not but for his life can demise it to begin after the Estate made to him is determined But on the other part it was moved that the Demise remains in force for the life of the said John for at the first every one had an interest for the life of the other also and therfore if one Ioynt-tenant for life make a Lease for years in possession and dies the Lease yet continues And Crook the younger alledged that it was adjudged at last Hartf Term If a man possessed of a Term for years in right of his Wife makes a Lease for years of the same Lands to begin after his death dies during the Term without other alteration of it and the Wife survives him that now the Lease made by the Husband is good and that the like case as this by the opinion of Clench and Walmsley was decreed to be good in the Chancery Arton versus Hare 3. IN a second deliverance between Francis Arton Plaintiff and Henry Hare Avowant the case appeared to be this William Cocksey Esquire was seised in his Demesne as of Fee of the Mannor of Wolverton in the County of Worcester and so seised in Octab. Mich. 7 Eliz. levied a Fine of the said Mannor to certain persons to the use of the said William and Alice his Wife and the Heirs of William untill a marriage had between Martin Croft and Anne Wigstone and after this marriage to the use of the said William and Alice his Wife and the Heirs of the body of the said William and for defualt of such Issue to the use of the said Martin Crofts and Anne and the Heirs Males of the body of the said Martin upon the body of the said Anne begotten untill the said Martin should go about to alien sell grant or give the said Mannor or any parcell therof or to suffer any Recovery or levy any Fine therof or make any discontinuance c. And after the Estate of the said Martin and Anne and of the Heirs Males of their bodies to the Premisses by any such attempts determined and finished then to the use of the said Anne for her life and after to the use of the Heirs Males of the body of the said Martin upon the body of the said Anne lawfully begotten and for default of such Issue to the use of the Heirs of the body of the said Martin and for default of such Issue to the use of Giles Croft brother of the said Martin and the Heirs Males of his body untill c. as before and after to the use of the Heirs of the body of the said Giles and for default of such Issue to the use of Edmund Crofts the third brother of the said Martin and of the Heirs Males of his body as is before limited to the said Giles with remainders over afterwards the marriage was had between the said Martin and Alice after which the said Martin and Giles died without Issue without any thing done by the said Martin to determine his Estate or by the said Giles to determine his Estate if any had been And it was agreed by all the Court that as this case is no remainder can enure over to the said Giles without an attempt precedent by the said Martin to determine his Estate because the Estate of Giles is not limited to begin but upon such an attempt precedent And in the same manner Edmund shall have nothing untill the Estate of Giles determine by some attempt made by him if the said Giles had an Estate because the Estate of Edmund depends upon the attempt made by Giles
Harrison Erringtons case 202p Hebborns case 206p I JEne and Chesters case 151p Jenningâ— Maystâ—â—â— case 102b Jorden Ayliffs case 168b Jenkin and Vivians case 201p K. Kettle and Masons Case 50p King and Berys Case 57p Kellies Case 104p Kirton and Hoxtons case 115p The King and Brigs case 150p Kebles case 18â—b Knights case 187b King Merricks case 2o L Lee and Browns case 128p Lewes and Jeofferies case 153p Lemasons and Dicksons case 189p Laurking and Wylds case 126p Leechford and Saunders case 194b Liverel and Rivets case 206b Lathams case 210b M MIchels case 8b Morgans case 52p Morgan and Tadcastles case 55p Montague and Jeofferies case 108p Mounson and Wests case 110p May and Kets case 129p Middletons case 131p May and Samuels case 134p Mingies case 135p Sir Arthur Mannarings case 145p Morley and Sir Richard Molineuxs case 1â—5p Millen and Fandries case 161p March and Fandries case 161p March and Newmans case 163p Mayor of Maidstons case 180p Mills and Parsons case 199b O OAks and the Lord Sturtonrs case 65b Overton and Sydalls case 120p Old and Estgreens case 160b Owen Wards case 187b P PIgots case 94p Porramor and Veralds case 101p Pollard and Lutterells case 108p Sir John Pools case 128p Powels case 139p Pack and Metholds case 160p Probe and Maynes case 192b Petit and Robinsons case 203p Ployden and Symes case 205p R ROper and Ropers case 106b Robinson Walkers case 127p Rawlinson and Greens case 127p Rones case 133p Richardson and Cabells case 142p Sir George Reynalds case 165p Ryman and Bickleys case 129p Reynor and Hallets case 187p Rochester and Rickhouse case 203p Rosse and Harvies case 206b Risley and Hains case 209p S STocks case 37p Smiths case 53p Southwell and Wards case 91p Sawyer and Hardies case 99p Stainings case 102p Scot and Mainys case 109p Strowd and Wyllis case 114p Southern and Howes case 143p Silvesters case 148p Stone and Withipoles case 152p Sary and Pigots case 166p Sharp and Rasts case 181p Snaggs case 187b Sherry and Richardsons case 15p Smithers case 169b Scheverel Dales case 193p Sanders Meritors case 200p Staple Kings case 206b Savile Wortleys case 207p Sparman Sherwoods case 222p T THompson Traffords case 8p Taunton Raries case 106p Tailours case 133p Thurman Coopers case 188p Talbot and Sir Walters Lacens case 146p Turner and Dennis case 169 V VAughans case 134p W WOod and Downings case 10p Webly and Skinners case 85p Wood and Matthews case 102p Westcot and Cottons case 130p Wrenhams case 135p Wootton and Byes case 136p Wards case 144p Webb and Paternosters case 151p Westermans case 151p Wales case 160p Welden and Bâ—sies case  Wicks case 186b Williams and Vaughans case 186b Willers case 197b Whelhorseys case 208p Woodroof and Vaughans case 210q CASES Reported by S R. JOHN POPHAM Knight Lord chief Justice of ENGLAND In the time of Queen ELIZABETH and written with his own hand in French and now faithfully done into English to which are added some remarkable CASES Reported by other Learned and Judicious Pens since his death Fenner versus Fisher Mich. 34. and 35. Eliz. Reginae in the Kings Bench IN Trespasse brought by Iustice Fenner against Andrew Fisher for a Trespasse done in the Parsonage house of Cravfords in the County of Kent 30. Maij 34. of the Queen the Defendant pleaded that one 〈…〉 was seised of the same Messuage in his Demesne as of see and being so seised the 〈…〉 day of in the same year did demise it to the Defendant for two years from such a Feast then last past by virtue of which he entred and was possessed untill the Plaintiff claiming by colour of a Deed made of the sayd Wrighâ— where nothing passed by the Deed upon which the Defendant entred c. The Plaintiff replies by protestation that the sayd Wrighâ— was not seised as the Defendant hath alledged And for Plea saith that the sayd Wright did not let it to the Defendant as the Defendant hath alledged upon which being at Issue and found for the Plaintif Ackinson moved that Iudgment ought not to be given for the plaintiff because that he hath not made any Title by his Replication for by 9 E. 4. 49. In Trespasse the Defendant pleads in Bar and gives colour to the Plaintiff it is taken for a Rule that the Plaintiff ought to make Title Cook answered that he needs not to make Title in this case but that it sufficeth to traverse the Bar without making a Title and sayd that in 22 E. 4. Fitzh Trespass It is adjudged that in Trespasse the Plaintiff may traverse the Bar without making Title in his Replication and here in as much as it is acknowledged by the Defendant that Wright did demise it to the Plaintiff and that this is a Lease ta will at the least not defeated by his own shewing but by the Lease made to Defendant this being traversed and found against the Defendant The Plaintiff by the acknowledgment of the Defendant himself hath a good Title against him to enter into the Land and by it the Defendant by his Re-entry is become Trespassâ—â— to the Plaintiff and he sayd that in 2 E. 4. fol. In Trespasse where the Defendant pleads that he let the Land to the Plaintiff for another mans life and that he for whose life it was was dead upon which he entred and it is adjudged that it sufficeth for the Plaintiff to maintain that Cestuy vie was yet living without making any other Title And yet these reasons Cleoch and Gawdy held the Replication good to which Popham sayd that we as Iustices ought not to adjudge for the Plaintif where a good formall bar is pleaded as here it is But wherby the Record it self which is before us we cannot see that the Plaintiff hath good cause of Action And therefore I agree that in Trespasse in some cases the Plaintiff may traverse the Bar or part of it without making any other Title then that which is acknowledged to the Plaintiff by the Bar but this alwaies ought to be where a Title is acknowledged to the Plaintiff by the Bar and by another means destroy by the same Bar for there it sufficeth the Plaintiff to traverse that part of the Bar which goeth to the destruction of the Title of the Plaintiff comprised in the Bar without making any other Title but if hee will traverse any other part of the Bar he cannot do it without making an especiall Title to himself in his Replication where by the Bar the first possession appeareth to be in the Defendant because that although the Traverse there be found for the Plaintiff yet notwithstanding by the Record in such a Case the first Possessions will yet appear to be in the Defendant which sufficeth to maintain his Regresse upon the Plaintiff and therefore the Court hath no matter before them in such a Case to adjudge for the Plaintiff unlesse in cases
35 E. Rot. 258. And Popham said further in this case that to erect an Hospitall by the name of an Hospitall in the County of S. or in the Bishopprick of B. and the like is not good because he is bound to a place too large and incertain But a Colledge erected in Accademia Cantabrig or Oxon. is good and sâ—me are so founded because it tends but to a particular place as a City Town c. King versus Bery and Palmer 2. IN an Ejectione firmae brought by William King against John Bery and William Palmer Defendants for two Messuages and certain Lands in Halstead in the County of Leicester upon a Demise alledged to be made by Dorothy Pool and Robert Smith the case upon a speciall Verdict was this The said Dorothy was Tenant for life of the said Tenants the Remainder over to the said Robert Smith and his Heirs and they being so seised made the Lease in the Declaration upon which the Action was brought And per curiam the Lease found by the Verdict doth not warrant the Lease alledged in the Declaration for although they joyned in the Demise yet during the life of the said Dorothy it is her Demise and not the Demise of the said Robert Smith but as his confirmation for that time for he hath nothing to do to meddle with the Land during the life of the said Dorothy but after the death of the said Dorothy then it shall be said to be the Domise of the said Robert Smith and not before because untill this time Smith hath nothing to do to meddle with the Land And in a more strong case If Tenant for life and he in the Reversion in Fee make a Gift in tail for the life of Tenant for life it shall be said to be his Gift but after his death it shall be said the Gift of him in the Reversion and if the Estate tail had expired during the life of the said Tenant for life he shall have the Land again in his former Estate and there shal be no forfeiture in the case because he in the Reversion of the immediate Estate of Inheritance had joyned in it and therfore hath dispensed with that which otherwise had been a meer forfeiture of the Estate for life wherby it was awarded by the Court that the Plaintif take nothing by his Bill in 33 34 Eliz. Rot. And the Judgment is entred Hill 34. Eliz. Ret. 72. 3. In this Term I hapned to see a Case agreed by the Iustices in 3. 4. Eliz. which was this If a man make a Lease of two Barns rendring Rent and for default of payment a Re-entry if the Tenant be at one of the Barns to pay the Rent and the Lessor at the other to demand the Rent and none be there to pay it that yet the Lessor cannot enter for the Condition broken because there was no default in the Tenant he being at one for it was not possible for him to be at both places together And upon this Case now remembred to the Iustices Popham Walmesley and Fennor said That perhaps also the Tenant had not money sufficient to have been ready to have paid it at either of the said places but it is sufficient for him to have and provide one Rent which cannot be at two places together And by the Case reported here also If Lands and Woods are demised together the Rent ought to be demanded at the Land and not the Woood because the Land is the more worthy thing and also more open then the Wood And therfore by the three Iustices aforesaid Rent ought not to be demanded in any private place of a Close as amongst Bushes in a Pit or the like nor in the open and most usuall passage therof as at a Stile Gate and the like 4. Vpon a Prohibition sued out of the Kings Bench the Case appeared to be this The late Lord Rich Father to the now Lord Rich devised to his Daughter for her advancement in marriage 1500. upon condition that she marry with the consent of certain friends and deviseth further that if his Goods and Chattels are not sufficient to pay his Debts and Legacies that then there shall be 200 l. a year of his Lands sold to supply it and dies making the now Lord Rich his Executor his Goods and Chattels not being sufficient to pay the Debts of the Testator as was averred the said Daughter married with a Husband against the will of those who were put in trust to give their assents and the Husband and the Wife sued in the Spirituall Court for the Legacy And it was surmised that they would not allow the proofs of the said now Lord Rich exhihited to prove the payment of the Debts of his Testator and further that they would charge him for the sale of the Land upon which matter the Prohibition was granted to the Delegates before whom the matter depended and now consultation was prayed in the case Vpon which it was affirmed by a Doctor of the Civill Law that they will allow the proofs for the payment of the Debts according to our Law and that the Legacy shall not be paid untill the Debs are satisfied But he said that by the Law if the Executor do not exhibit his Inventory but neglect it for a year or more that then if any omission or default be in the true value of the Inventory exhibited that then such on Executor for this default shall pay all the Legacies of his Testator of what value soever they are not respecting the Debts or the value of the Goods or Chattels how small soever the omission or default be in the Inventory And so he said was the case of the now Sir Richard S. who did not bring in the Inventory for four years after the death of the Testator and that in the Inventory exhibited the values of every thing were found to be too small and therfore to be charged by their Law albeit he hath not Goods and Chattels sufficient of the Testators To which it was answered that this was quite without reason for by such means every Subject of the Realm may be utterly defeated if he take upon him the charge of an Executorship And if this shall be admitted no man will take upon him the Execution of the Will of any and by such a means none will have their Wills performed which shall be too inconvenient And they said further that in as much as Debts are to be proved by the Common Law of the Realm those of the Ecclesiasticall Courts ought to admit in the proof therof such proofs as our Law allows and not according to the precisenesse of their Law And although by their Law such a Condition as before being annexed to a Legacy is void because that marriage oughr to be free without Coercion yet where we are to judge upon the point as we are here if the Execution happen to be charged because of the sale of Land and for
Vse may be averred without Deed upon a Fine sur Render And all agreed that if there had been a Deed to have declared the purport of the Fine that the Fine shall not be taken to extend further then is comprised in the Deed. And what is the cause therof the Deed or the intent of the parties and none can say but that it is the intent of the parties and not the Deed and the intent may as well appear without the Deed as with it albeit it be not so conclusive by Parole as by Deed. And therfore suppose I have 100. acres of Land in a Close in D. and I. S. hath another 100. acres in the same Close and Town and I. S. hath a 100. acres of Land in the same Town out of this Close and my intent is to levy a Fine to I. S. of the whole Close by the name of 200. acres of Land with a Render as before and I levy it accordingly shall the Render enure to the Land which I. S. had in the same Town It is cleer that it shall not although it be without Deed why then shall the Fine here be taken to work rather to the Land called Karkian then to any other Lands which any other had in the same Towns when it appeareth plainly that it never was the intent of the parties that the Fine should extend to these Lands called Karkian and it was decreed in Chancery accordingly Hall versus Arrowsmith 4. IN the case between Hall and Arrowsmith it was agreed by the whole Court in the Kings Bench That if a Copyholder for life hath licence to make a Lease for three years if he shall live so long and he makes a Lease for three years without such a Limitation that yet this is no forfeiture of his Estate because the operation of Law makes such a Limitation to the Estate which he made to wit that it shall not continue but for his life and then such an express Limitation in the case where the Law it self makes it is but a meer trifle and yet if a Lessee for life makes a Lease for years and he in the Reversion confirm it it remains good after the death of the Tenant for life but this then shall be as if it had been made by him in the Reversion himself and shall be his Lease But if the Lease there had been made determinâ—ble upon the life of Tenant for life the confirmation therof by him in the Reversion will not help him after the death of him who was Tenant for life Causa patet But in the principall case if the Copyholder had had an Estate in Fee by Copy it had been a forfeiture of his Estate to make an absolute Lease because in that case he does more then he was licensed to do And they agreed that such a licence cannot be made to be void by a Condition subsequent to the execution therof to undo that which was once well executed But there may be a Condition precedent united to it because in such a case it is no licence untill the Condition performed but the licence before mentioned is not a condition all Licence but a Licence with a Limitation and therfore hath not been of force if the Limitation which the Law makes in this case had not been and the Limitation in Law shall be preferred before the Limitation in Deed where they work to one and the same effect and not different Arthur Johnsons Case 5. ARthur Johnson was possessed of a Term for years and so possessed assigned this over to Robert Waterhouse and John Waterhouse being Brothers to the Wife of the said Johnson to the use of the said Wife the said Johnson dies and makes his Wife his Executrix after which the said Wife takes Robert Witham to Husband who takes the Profits of the Land during the life of his said Wife the Wife dies Intestate her said Brothers being next of kin to the said Wife took administration as well of the Goods of the said Wife as of her first Husband And whether the said Waterhouses or the said Witham shall have this Lease or the use therof was the question in the Chancery and therupon put to the two chief Iustices upon which they and the chief Baron and all the other Iustices of Serjeants-Inne in Fleetstreet and Beamont also were cleer in opinion that the said Administrators had now as well the Interest as the Vse also of the said Term as well in Conscience as in Law and that they had the use as Administrators to the said Wife and that the said Witham shall not have it because it is as a thing in Action which the Administrators of the Wife alwaies shall have and not the Husband As if an Obligation had been made to the use of the Wife And this opinion was certified accordingly to the Lord Keeper of the great Seal of England and it was so decreed Taunton versus Barrey 6. IN an Ejectione firmae brought by Giles Taunton Plaintiff in the King Bench against Giles Barrey Defendant the Case was thus Iohn Coles Esquire made a Lease of the Lands in question to the Father of the said Barrey for divers years depending upon the life of the Lessee and of the said Defendant and of the Survivor of them upon condition that the said Father should not alien without the consent of the said Coles his heirs after which the said Father devised the Term to the said Defendant and died making his Executor who assented And the question upon this point found upon a speciall Verdict was whether upon the matter the Condition were broken and by the opinion of the whole Court adjudged that it was for in such a case he ought to have left it to his Executor without making any Devise of it for the Devise is an Alienation against him and therfore it was agreed that the Plaintiff shall recover Term 37 Eliz. Rot. between Roper and Roper Michaelmas Term 38 39. Eliz. Everets Case 1. THis Case was moved by the chief Iustice to the other chief Iustices at Serjeants-Inne in Fleetstreet concerning one Everet who before was attaint for stealing of a Horse reprieved after Iudgment and Indited again for stealing another Horse before this Attainder And the Vicar of Pelton in the County of Somerset was Indited as accessary before this Felony for the procurement of it And Everet being again Indited upon this last Inditement did not plead that he was formerly Indited of another Felony c. but acknowledged the Inditement wherby the Accessary was Arrained tried and found guilty and had his Iudgment also as the principall but the Execution of the Accessary was respited And now moved whether upon this matter it shall be fit to execute the Accessary the principall being executed And it seemed convenient to all the Iustices and Barons that he shall be executed and that the matter was cleer in this case because the principall did not take advantage of his
to attend and be assistant to the Iustices Sheriffs or other Ministers of the King in the doing of it 3. AT the same time it was also resolved by them all except Walmsley Fennor and Owen in the Case of one Richard Bradshaw and Robert Burton who with others lately by word entred themselves into an agreement one with another to rise and put themselves into Armes and so to go from one Gentlemans house to another and so from house to house to pull down Inclosures generally that this so appearing by their own confession or by two Witnesses according to the Statute is high Treason by the Statute of 13 Eliz. cap. 1. The words of which Statute are That if any intend to levy War against the Queen and this maliciously advisedly and expresly declare or utter by any words or sayings that this shall be high Treason For all agreed that Rebellion of Subjects against the Queen hath Rebellion of Subjects high Treason been alwaies high Treason at the Common Law for the Statute of 25 E. 3. cap. 1. is that levying of War within the Realm against the King is Treason and Rebellion is all the War which a Subject can make against the King But Walmsley and the others with him said that the Statute of 1 Mar cap. 12. 10. That if any to the number of twelve or more assemble themselves to the intent to pull down Inclosures Pales and the like with force and continuing together after proclamation according to the Statute to go away by the space of an hour or do any of the Offences mentioned in the Statute that this is Felony So that if these Actions had been Treason at the Common Law it had been to no purpose to have made it Felony And it seemed to them that the resistance ought to be with force to the Queen before that such Acts shall be said Treason But all the other Iustices agreed and so it was put in ure lately in the case of the Prentices of London that if any assemble themselves with force to alter the Laws or to set a price upon Victualls or to lay violent hands upon the Magistrate as upon the Major of London and the like and with force attempt to put it in action that this is Rebellion and Treason at Common Law and yet this Statute of 1 Mariae makes it in such a case but Felony And they put a diversity between the cases of pulling down Inclosures Pales c. comprised in the Statute of 1 Mar. for those are to be understood where diverse to the number of twelve or more pretending any or all of them to be injured in particular as by reason of their common or other Interest in the Land inclosed and the like and assembling to pull it down forcibly and not to the cases where they have a generall dislike to all manner of Inclosures and therfore the assembling in a forcible manner and with Armes to pull them down where they have any Interest wherby they were in any particular to be annoyed or grieved is not Treason but the case here tending to a generality makes the act if it had been executed to be high Treason by the câ—uâ—se of the Common Law And therfore the intention appearing as the case is here it is Treason by the Stâ—tute of 13. aforesaid Periam in some manner doubted of the principall case but to intend to rise with force to alter the Laws to set price upon any Victuals or to use force against a Magistrate for executing his Office of Iustice and the like he said that they were cleerly Treason by the Statute of 13. aforesaid if it may appear by expresse words or otherwise as the said Statute mentions for all these tend against the Queen her Crown and Dignity and therfore shall be as against the Queen her self And if it had been put in practice it had been Treason at the Common Law Here ends the LORD POPHAM'S REPORTS An addition of certain Select CASES in the time of KING JAMES and KING CHARLES Trin. 15. Jac. In the Kings Bench entred Hill Jac. Rot. 194. Brooks Case IN an Ejectione firmae brough by one Brook against Brook the Case was thus Iohn Wright a Copyholder in Fee 10 Eliz. surrendred his Land into the hands of the Lord by the hands of Tenants according to the Custom c. without saying to whose use the Surrender should be And at the next Court the said Iohn Wright was admitted Habendum to him and his Wife in Tail the remainder to the right Heirs of Iohn Wright and the Wife of Iohn Wright now Defendant was seised from the time of Where upon surrender of Copyhold land no use is limited to whole use iâ— shall be the admittance untill this day And it was objected by the Counsell of the Plaintiff that the surrender was void because no use was limitted and therfore by constitution of Law ought to be to the use of the Surrender as if a Feoffment be made and no Use limited it shall be to the Use of the Feoffor or as it is in Sir Edward Cleers Case Coke lib. 6. 18. If a Feoffment be made by one to the use of his last Will he hath the use in the mean time 2. That the admittance was not available to passe an Estate to the Wife for she was not named in the Premisses but only in the Habendum and the Office of an Habendum is to limit the Estate and not the person and therfore it is said in Throgmorten and Tracies Case in Plowd com That if one be named to take an Estate in the Habendum where he was not named at all in the Premisses this is not good But it was resolved by the whole Court for the first point that the subsequent Act shâ—ll explain the Surrender for Quando abest Provisio partis adest provisio legis And when the Copyholder accepts a new admittance the Law intends that the Surrender generally made was to such an Vse as is specified in the admittance and the Lord is only as an Instrument to convey the Estate and as it were put in trust to make such an admittance â—s he who surrenders would hâ—ve him to make And Crook Iustice said Fides adhibita fidem obligat For the second point it was also agreed by the Court that the Wife shall take by this admittance albeit she were not named in the Premisses but only in the Habendum and they agreed that in Feoffments and Grants the party that is not named in the Premisses shall not take by the Habendum and therfore Throgmorton and Tracies Case as to this point is good Law But this case of a Copyhold is like to the case of a Will or to the case of Frank-marriage in which it is sufficient to passe an Estate albeit the party be only named in the Habendum and if it should be otherwise the Estates of many Copyholders would be subverted And so they resolved that Iudg-should be
be avoided and in the same manner here But Popham took a diversity where the Possession or the Estate of the Queen is determined and where not for where the Estate is determined there the Subject may enter into the Land without Office or ouster le main But where the Possession continues there the party shall not come to it unlesse by petition Monstrans de droit officio or the like and therfore hee said that if the Queen had an Estate pur auter vie or depending upon any other Limitation if it be determined according to the Limitation the party who hath interest may enter so in the case of the Devise put before And if a Lease be made for life the Remainder in Tail the Reversion in Fee and he in the Remainder in Tail levy a Fine Sur conusance de droit come ceo que il ad de son done to a stranger with proclamations according to the Statute and afterwards the stranger convey the Remainder to the Queen her Heirs and Successors and after the Tenant for life dies and after he in the Remainder in tail dies without Issue now may he in the Remainder in Fee enter because the Estate of the Queen is determined But here the Queen hath a Fee-simple in her self but determinable upon the Estate-tail which yet remaineth which Fee-simple in Reversion cannot be divested out of the possession of the Queen but by matter of Record of so high nature as it is in her to wit by Petition Monstrans de droit or the like As if a Reversson or Remainder be alienated in Mortmain the claim of the Lord sufficeth therâ— to vest the Reversion in the Lord for the Alienation but if the Reversion or Remainder of which such a claim was made be conveyed to the King his remedy is now by Office Monstrans de droit or Petition for claim will not now serve him for this shall be to divest the possession out of the Queen which by such means cannot be done no more then where a Reversion or Remainder is granted to the Queen upon Condition but he ought to have an Office to find the performance of it if it be to be performed by matter in pais and without Monstrans de droit or otherwise it shall not be divested out of the Queens possession yet in the case of a common person a claim will divest it out of them but not so of the Queen And these cases Gawdy agreed but he conceived that in the case in question the claim made determines the Estate of the Queen which is made by means of the Fine upon the Statute And Popham denied the case put in 7 H. 6. to be Law as it is put upon the opinion of Strange there for it is cleer that the claim there does not divest any possession which was in the King by means of the Wardship and if this be not therby defeated the claim does not help the Disseisee against the Descent and this appeareth fully by Littleton who saith so of a Claime which avoids a Descent to wit that it ought to be such upon which the Disseisee may upon every such Claim made have an Action of Trespasse or Assise against the Dissessor or him who is in possession if he continue his possession after such Claim made which cannot be in this case where the possession is in the King which cannot be defeated by such a Claim And in the Lord Dyer where the Feoffee or Mortgagee of Lands holden of the Queen in Capite by Knights Service died before the day of Redemption his Heir being within age wherby upon Office found the Queen had the Wardship of the body and land of the Heir after which the Mortgagee at the day of redemption made payment and of this also an Office was found yet he could not enter either before or after Office but upon Monstrans de droit therupon he had his Ouster le main And the reason why a Claim shall serve in this case between common persons is because that by such Claim the thing it self is devested out of him who had it before and therby actually vested in him who made the claim As where a Villain purchase a Reversion by the Claim of the Lord the Reversion is actually in him as it is of a Possession by Entry But where he is put to his Claim to devest any thing out of a common person he is put to his Suit to devest it out of the Queen Aad to say that Bret should not take advantage of this Conveyance made to make it good by the Fine I think the Law to be clear otherwise as to this point for the Statute of Fines was made tor the security of Purchasors and Possessors of Land and therfore taken more strongly against them who pretend Right or Title and for the greatest advantage that may be for the Possessors of Lands and therfore the Possessor by what ever means he can may make his Fine to be forceable And therfore the Fine upon this Statute differeth much from a Fine at Common Law for where at Common Law an Infent being a Disseisor was disseised by one who levies a Fine and the year and the day passe without claim of the first Disseisee now was the first Disseisee barred yet if afterwards the Infant who was not bound by the Fine enter the first Disseisee may enter upon him because that by this entry the Fine at Common Law was utterly defeated But now by the Statute such a Fine being levied with Proclamations the first Disseisee not pursuing according to the Statute is barred for ever And although the Infant enter at full age and undoes the Fine as to himself yet this Fine remains alwaies to bar the first Disseissee and makes that the Infant hath now Right against all the world and so now takes advantage therof And this is the intent of the Statute for the repose of Controversies and Suits and the quiet of the people And if I procure a Fine to be levied on purpose to bar another of his Action which he may have against me for the Land yet I shall take advantage of this Fine and the other shall have no advantage against me because of this Covin for if this should be admitted it will countervail the benefit which is intended to be by means of the Statute of Fines And if a Disseisor enfeoffee another upon Condition to the intent that a Fine with Proclamations shall be levied to the Feoffee to bar the Disseisee and after the Disseisee is barred the Disseisor enter for the Condition he shall yet take advantage of the Fine against the Disseisee And Popham put a case which was in this Court 23 Eliz. upon a speciall Verdict which was between Okes Plaintiff upon the Demise of John late Lord Sturton of Cottington which was this The Lord Sturton was Tenant for life of certain Lands in Lighe in the County of Somerset the remainder in Tail