when not and if the people have power to Iudge of danger and defend themselves without and against their King then may they intrust that power unto some others for that all should assemble â—â— next to impossible and could not be without confusion a few thâ—refore may bee intrusted to judge for all and to direct the manner of their defence well It is admitted they may intrust this power with some few but that they have intrusted it with the Lords and Commons I must deny There is no colour to say it is intrusted with the Lords they judge only for themselves and if the King intended to alter the Government or Religion it is likelie he would create such as should assist his intentions and therefore it will be of little purpose to give the kingdome a power to judge of dangers and save it selfe unlesse they may doe it by the major part of their proxies alone both against King and Lords You put in the Lords only to glosse your actions for the present but by your principles the power must bee in the Commons onely if anywhere Now cleerely there is no such trust imparted to the Commons their trust is limited by the writ to advise with the King not to make Acts and Ordinances in any case against him Nor can I possibly see why the Coroners elected by the body of each Countie according to the Kings writ might not as reasonably claime this trust as the major part of the Commons alone unlesse we must therefore thinke it to bee the Commons right because they now pretend unto it The Observator tells us We may not imagine the Houses should be injurious no age will furnish us with one story of any Parliament freely elected and held that ever did injure a whole kingdome or exercise any Tyranny I 'le charge tirannie on none only I say if the now major part of Lords and Commons against the Kings pleasure and authenticke Proclamations have power to command the subiects in generall and to imprison kill and slay such as withstand their commands and obey his Maiesties Proclamations I would gladly bee instructed how this power is derived unto them either from King or people or whether we must think they above all other men were naturally borne unto it Meane while I like well the Observators note in honour of free Parliaments that never any such iniured a kingdome But yet such as have called themselves free Parliaments have injured King and kingdome this have the Lords and Commons done when they have left the head free in His Royall assent or disassent to such Bills as they had a minde to passe of which take one Example 15. E. 3. The Lords and Commons pressed the King to passe a Law derogatorie to his just prerogative that Parliament being ended and the kingdome representing it selfe againe the same yeare it was enacted Whereas in the last Parliament certaine Articles expressely contrary to the Lawes of England and the Prerogatives and Royall rights were pretended to be granted by manner of a Statute the King considering how that by the bond of his Oath he was bound to the defence of such Lawes and Prerogatives because the King never freely consented to the said pretended Statute It seemed good to the Earles Barons and other wise men that sithence the said statute did not of the Kings free-will proceed the same should be voyd It seemes at this time the King was not bound to passe whatsoever the Lords and Commons Voted to be for the good of the kingdome And his oath did tye him to seeke a restitution of his prerogative against such forced lawes so farre was it from tying him to passe all such lawes as the Houses should judge fit Questionlesse the King is bound by oath and office to passe all good and just lawes yet that part of the oath that hath beene urged doth not prove so much But the question is whether hee bee not free to judge what is a good and just Law and what not But must submit his understanding judgment and Conscience to the votes of Lords and Commons so that the sixe Articles for poperie passe them he is bound to passe it Queene Elizabeth was bounâ— to passe an Act abolishing popery because the Lords and Commons had Voted a Bill againâ—â— Protestancie Queene Mary was bound to passe that likewise So againe the King wishes all good subjects to put the case to themselves If the Papistâ— in Ireland should make themselves the major part of both Houses and pretending their Religion to bee in danger of extirpation by a Malignant party of Protestants and puritans should passe a Bill for setling the Militia in such as they should confide in is not the King bound to assent unto it Not in that case saith the Observator For England and Ireland are one and the same Dominion there is as true and intimate an union betwixt them and England as betwixt England and Wales though they meete not in one Parliament yet to sâ—â—â— purposes their Parliaments are not to be held severall Parliaments and therefore if Papistâ— were stronger and more in Parliament there yet would they want authority to over rule any thing voted and established before in England and they being the minor part of Ireland 〈◊〉 ENGLAND both ought to sit downe for that the major part will probability prevaile against them and in all suffrages the minor part that bloud may not bee shedâ— ought to 〈◊〉 downe Alack alack how doth the good man bestirre himselfe to bedge up a seeming answer unto this objection He supposeth England and Ireland to be one and the same dominion which is certainely false Statutes that are limitted to the Realme and Dominion of England do not extend to Ireland That there is as true and intimate an union betwixt England and Ireland as betwixt England and Wales is conâ—radicted by himselfe acknowledging England and Ireland to be governed by severall Parliaments severall to most if not to all purposes T is true Ireland is united to the Imperiall Crowne of England and so is Scotland yet all three are distinct kingdomes He saith they want authoritie there to over rule any thing established before in England But Ireland will say the English Parliament wants authority to establish a Religion in Ireland Or admit the Irish Parliament hath not authoritie to over rule any thing established before in England yet the point that the King instanteth in that is the Militia of Ireland is not established by Parliamâ—nt in England why ought not the King then to assâ—nt to the disposall of it according as the Irish parliament shall desire or if he will not assent why may not the Irish of themselves dispose of it as now the English doe If we shall admit them to be one Dominion why then if the papists in Ireland the popish partie in England and their adherents the Episcopall party and the misnamed Malignant partie shall joyne in one desire against
The King onely cites the Writ the Form whereof is ancient whereby they are summoned to counsell the King de quibusdam arduis not in all things but in some things saith the King Is this to say only in such points as the King shall please to propose Did not His Majesty in expresse words at the beginning of this Parliament leave them to their own method Again Doth the King say If they make any transition they are liable to imprisonment at His pleasure Not His pleasure but the Law is the Rule he tyes Himself unto these then are but false Calumnies Pag. 8. 9. 46. he charges the King with this Position The Lords and Commons in Parliament are meerly to councell the King As if without their consent the King might make a Law That they are limitted by the Writ ad consilium onely That if we make the Lords and Commons to be more then Counsellors we make them commanders and controllers and this is not suitable to royalty From hence the Observator takes occasion to argue very sadly That the Lords and Commons are summoned not onely ad câ—nsilium but ad consensum also in the making and altering Laws And in this though in nothing else he brings authority to back his reasons withall citing the close Roll 7. Ed. 1. Quodomnes tangit ab omnibus approbâ—ri dâ—bet or tratâ—ari He did well to corrupt the Record by putting approbari dâ—bet for tractari otherwise it would not have served his turn But surely the Point needed not proof for never did the King nor any body else deny it the King no where sayes They are called ad consilium onely meerly or that to allow them mere then to counsell were to make them Commanders He saith they are called to counsell that 's true not to command that 's true but he doth not deny them power of consenting which the Observator contradicting himself doth afterwards acknowledge Pag. 16. It is lâ—sâ— unqâ—â—sâ—imed saith he That the legislative power is partly in the King partly in the Kingdome and that the King in ordinary cases cannot make a Law or Ordiaâ—nâ—â— without the Parliament Is it left unquestioned why then would you abuse the people as if the King had claimed a legislative power to himself whereto the consent of the Lords and Commons were not requisite Pag. 7. The King saith he deniâ—s the Lords and Commons if hâ— withdraw himselâ— to have any power of any Court Pag. 10. He cites these as the Kings precise words 'T is improbable and impossible that His Cabinet-Councellors or His Bishops or Souldiers who must have so great a share in the misery should take such pains in the procuring thereof Pag. 25. He tells you That the King saith he cannot without renouncing His own conscience and reason preforce the Parliaments counsell before the Courts All which and many more are falsly imposed upon the King to alienate and corrupt the affections of His Majesties Subjects Pag. 25. He saith The King charges the Parliament with these Doctrines as so offensive 1. That the Parliament hath an absolute indisputablâ— power of dâ—â—laring Law 2. That Parliaments are bound to no Presidents And then the Observator justifies these Doctrines as well as he may for they are most true And had the King denied them as the Observator wou'd have it thought he had indeed destroyed the power of Parliaments But the Doctrines the King chargeth them with are That the then major part of the two Houses had indisputable power of declaring Iaw and were not bound to Presidents Had the Observator taken the Charge aright he would not have answered Statutes are not binding to them why then should Presidents For I hope the now major part of the Houses are bound by Statutes and cannot repeal them though the Parliament may What though his Pamphlet be stuffed with such corruptions yet let me speak one word for him He is no more faulty in this kinde then others You see his iâ—genuity I shall now consider the solidity of his Reasons and the goodly Consequences he draws from them Omitting then those loose extravagant Passages which have no connexion with the Body of his Discourse the sum of that part which seemeth rationall is as followeth Quicquid efficit tale est magis tale The efficient cause is ever superiour unto and more excellent then that which it causeth But the people in whom Power is originall and Majestie underived are the efficient cause conveying Regall Power and Majestie unto Princes not God who is no more the author of Regall then Aristocraticall Power The same people being the efficient cause are also the finall cause for whose good and preservation onely that Power is conveyed and their conveyance is fiduciary upon trust and under such Conditions as they please The people being the efficient cause of Kingly Power he hence infâ—rres They are above the King Rex etsi singâ—lis major universis minor est And from thence to bring it on to his purpose it must needs follow as he thinks the people being above the King The Houses being by vertue of representation the same people must likewise be above the King The Houses then being by vertue of representation the efficient cause conveying Regall Power upon Trust and to no other end but to the good and preservation of the people may when they please to say That it is not disposed of by the King to that end and according to that Trust re-assume that Power and make themselves the disposers thereof from all which Grounds he inferres their power of making Ordinances obliging the People in generall The Ordinance of the Militia to be legall and consequently the Commissions of Array illegall The taking and retaining Hull to be justifiable The taking the Magazine and whatsoever else hath been taken from the King That the King hath in nothing appertaining to His Crown an unconditionable Property That whatsoever Acts he hath passed whatsoever he hath done or can do for His subjects is meer Duty That He ought to acknowledge that he can in nothing merit of the whole State That he ought to assent to all Bills that they approve and adjudge fit to passe That His great Officers be such as they shall allow of That without him they may authoritivè declare the Law and consequently make and repeal Laws and Statutes at their pleasure That when they adjudge the Power intrusted with Him for the Kingdoms safety to be turned against them they and all are ipso facto absolved of all Obedience of all Oaths and Tyes of Allegiance whatsoever to His Majesty and bound to seek their preservation by resistance and defence Desperate Conclusions I shall examine his Grounds ordine retrogradâ— beginning with that immediately antecedent to all his Conclusions Whethâ—r the Parliament so he would have you call the major part of the Lords and Commons remaining are above the King by reason of their representing the whole Kingdom How true it is That the
Houses without the King represent the Universall Realm shall be considered anon passing that by I conceive that the Parliament truely so called is above the King taken solely for that it doth involve the King without whom they are not truely a Parliament The Parliament then thus considered is a whole compared with some part and the King but a part though the most excellent part of the whole Now every whole is greater then any part the Head though more excellent then all the other Members yet not more excellent then the whole Man whereof the Head is but a part But the King solely compared with the Parliament or rather the Houses of Parliament excluding or not involving the King is superiour and above them whether you consider them scorsim or conjunctim for taken conjunctim they make but a Body which though it be greater then then the Head in Bulk yet doth the Head excell in Vertue Excellence and Authority And although by vertue of representation they are the Body of the whole Kingdom yet is the King the Head of that Body and the Representative of God himself who I am sure is above the Body they represent It is a Principall undeniable Pax in parem non habet imperium multo minus in superiorâ—â—â— If then the Houses be above nay if but equall with the King He can have no Command over them But it is evident He hath Command over them He calls and commands them to assemble being assembled or united together He may command them to prorogue or adjourn for time or place upon which Command it is then their Duty to rise and remove and again at His pleasure He can dissolve them Although for this time His Majesty hath been graciously pleased to restrain Himself from the exercise of that Power yet the Power it self is still in Him as an Inheritance inseparable from His Crown The Representatives of the Kingdom either are Subjects or not That they are not Subjects by reason that they are assembled is absurd and so would not the Kings Protection due unto Subjects belong unto them If they are Subjects then doth the King remain their Soveraign and Superiour And indeed so far is their uniting and assembling in Parliament from diminishing the Kingly Soveraignty to which they were before all and every one Subject as that the Regall Majesty is thereby much more encreased and augmented Cromp. Jurisâ— 10. We are informed by Our Judges saith King H. 8. to His Parliament That We at no time stand so highly in Our Estate Royall as in the time of Parliament wherein We as Head and you as Members are conâ—oyned and knit together in one Body Politique If the Houses as representing the Universall Realm are above the King then they may judge Him punish or depose Him But they cannot judge Him 22 Edw. 3. 3. Le Roy per cux ne doit estre ajuge 3 Edw. 3. 19. Scrope Those which are Judges of Parliament are Judges of their Pâ—â—rs but the King hath no Peer within His Own Kingdom and therefore ought not to be judgedly them And for deposing a King or depriving Him of His Right and Authority or any necessary part thereof no Act of Parliament can prevail much lesse the Lords and Commons An Attainder by Parliament could not barre the title to the Crowne from descending on King H. 7. nor was an act of Parliament disabling King H. 6. to reassume the Government of his people of any force but without any repeale in it selfe frustrate and voyd 7. Rep. 14. Calvins case an act of Parliament cannot take away the Kings protection or the Subjects service which is due by the Law of nature 11. Rep. Sur de la wares Case William de la ware although disabled by act of Parliament was neverthelesse called by Q. Eliz. to sit as a Peere in Parliament for that it seemes the Queene could not be barred of the service and Counsell of any of her Subjects 2. H. 7. 6. A statute that the King by no non obstante shall dispence with it is void because it would take a necessary part of Governement out of the King If then no act of Parliament be of force to take away the government or any necessary part thereof from the King then surely is not any Ordinance of the Lord and Commons of force to doe it And consequently the Lords and Commons as representing the vniversall Realme cannot be above the King but inferior to him Before the King commanded them to assemble each particular and all of them were his Subjects and inferior to him If by assembling into one body and the vertue of representation they cease to be his Subjects and inferiors why doe they then in all their petitions and declarations or Answers proceeding from them not as particular men but as houses of Parliament united stile him Their gracious Soveraigne and themselves His Majesties most humble Subjects the Lords and Commons in Parliament Let our Observator judge whether these representatives have not ill discharged their duty to the Kingdome by debasing thus the underived Majestie so he calls it of the people by petitioning in so low and humble a forme him that is but their creature and in whom there is no Majestie but what is from them derived downe unto him for so the Obseruator conceives it But now to answer the Observators Argument which is thus There is nothing saith he more known or assented to then this that although the King be singulis major yet universis minor being below the people then in universali he must likewise be below the representatives of that universalitie I will not stand to question what necessary connexion these propositions have The people are above the King therefore their representatives are so The King of England is above the King of Spain doth the English Embassadour therefore take place of the King of Spain But admitting a necessary Connexion The people are above the King ergo the houses representing them Why then è converso The houses representing are not above the King ergo the people represented are not and so having proved the houses below the King I have already proved the King above the people yet a word more 'T is true as the Observator saith nothing is more known or assented to then this that the King solely is Minor universis the universalitie including the King For no part be it the head can exceed or be greater then the whole But againe if the King and universalitie bee contradistinguished nothing is more known or assented to then this That the King I speake of the King of England a Soveraign King not a Duke of Venice is not onely singulis major but major universis Nay most properly is the King above the people considered as an entire Congregation For chiefly as he is King he is above all others Now King relates to kingdome Rex to Regnum and Kingdome or Regnum denotes an
universalitie or body collected As he is head so is he in place power and dignitie above the body politique or universalitie and not otherwise the head of any particular but as he is a part of that universalitie As out of the Embrion saith Fortescue ariseth a body naturall ruled by one head even so of a multitude of people ariseth a kingdome which is a body mysticall governed by one man as by its head As then in the naturall body the head is improperly said to be the head of the arme or of the leg but the head of the body so in truth must the King be made the head of the misticall body not of the particular members The King is but one head and therefore but of one body not then of the particulars which are many bodyes but of the universall one body There is a politique body wich is the Vniversalitas Angliâ— hath this body politique no head or is the head inferiour to its body and yet no Monster The Observator will object that the politicall head must be sâ—bservient to its body for that it received its first being and subsistence from the body we shall hereafter prove that the Regal power hath alwayes its being from God though it be sometimes with the peoples approbation And as the politicall head hath its subsistence with the body and must be destroyed by its dissolution so if you destroy the head or kingly power you destroy the kingdome and dissolve it into a Chaos and confused multitude Nec populus Acephatus saith Fortescue corpus vocari meretur quiaut in naturalibus capite detruâ—cato residuum non corpus sed truncum appellamus Sic in politicis sine capite communit as nullatenus corporatur But admitting that in the body politique the head hath its power authority derived meerly and solely out of the politique provision that radically and habitually was in the people to provide for its own safety and weale yet I cannot see how it will follow that therefore the Regall power must be subservient and subject unto the people for as in the naturall body the heart being primum vivens distributeth blood and spirit unto all the members and giveth life and vertue unto the head it selfe yet must that and the whole body be subject unto the head which as Supreame governeth and directeth the whole man A second kingly Attribute is this that he is Sponsâ—s regni and at his Coronation wedded with a Ring unto the kingdom The Observator saith this must be applyed to subjects taken devisim not conjunctim Otherwise as the wife is inferiour to the husband so would the people be in politiques to the King But in sadnesse is the King wedded to the particular men and women within this kingdome with beards and without I pray how many wives will he so have The Observator foresaw the Arguments which might be drawne from these and other attributes whereby Princes are 〈◊〉 Gods Lords Fathers c. and that therefore subjects must stand by the same relation as Creatures Servants Children c. all Which he would shift off by his misapplyed distinction of Kings are such singulis but not universis But indeed a King is said to be a Father or Pater patriae that is of the universalitie not of particular persons And elsewhere the King is termed an Oeconomus or Paâ—eâ—familuis which with no congruity can be said in respect of particulars Nor can the Observator satisfie any man considering that Domesticall government is the very Image and modell of Soveraignty in a Common-weale why children and servants might not as wel use this distinction against their Parents and Masters as subjects against their Soveraign for may it not be objected though the Father in relation to his Children or a Master of a Family in relation to his servants be singulis major yet Vniversis minor and therefore if all the sons or servants hold together they may command their Father or Master or turn him out of doores which was wisely foreseen by Agesilaus when he returned this answer to a Citizen of Sparta that desired an alteration of the Government That kind of Rule which a man would disdain in his own house were very unfit to governe great Regions by But the Observator will object that the relation holds not alike betwixt King and Subjects as between Master and servants For that the Master saith he is more worthy then his servants and above them all but this holds not in relation betwixt a King and his Subjects Why that 's the question For proofe whereof although he neither doth or can alleadge any one authority yet to prove the contrary that the people neither conjunctim nor divisim and much lesse then representatives are more worthy or above the King amongst many peruse these few Bracton l. 1. cap. 8. Omnis quidem sub eo rege ipse sub nullo nisi tantum sub Deo parem non habet in regno suo quia sic amitteret praeceptum nam par in parem non habet imperium item nec multò fortiùs superiorem nec potentiorem habere debet quia sic esset inferior sibi subditis If he be tantum sub deo then not under the people or their representatives 19. E. 4. 6. If all the people in England would make a warre yet if the King will not assent it cannot be said a warre but the King alone may make a warre or league Is not the King in this above all the people in England 24. H. 8. cap. 12. Where by divers sundry old authentique histories and Chronicles it is manifestly declared and expressed that this Realme of England is an Empire and so hath been accepted in the world governed by one Supreame head and King having the Dignity and royall estate of the Imperiall Crowne of the same unto whom a body politique compact of all sorts and degrees of people been bounden and owen to beare next to God a naturall and humble obedience c. Note the King the supreame head true saith the Observator singulis not universis unto whom a body politique compact of all sorts been bounden and owen next to God Then no mediate underived Majestie 'twixt God and him a naturall obedience that is due by the law of nature or the Divine Law not onely by the pactions and agreement of politique Nations 25. â—â— 8. 25. H. 8. This your Graces Realme recognizing no Superiour under God but only your Grace By Realme is meant either Subjects divisim or conjunctiâ— If divisim then no particular is subject to Judges and Justice nor to the Lords and Commons in Parliament but onely to the King which is absurd If conjunctim then is the King in the act recognized Major universis Camb. Eliz. pag. 39. The Queene explaines the Oath of Supremacie that she claymes nothing thereby Quam quod ad coronam Angliae jam olim jure spectavit scilicet se sub Deo
Electors throughout the whole Kingdome may according to this doctrine revoke the trust and authority that all the Members have If so how can my obedience be required to their Votes when as it is doubtful whether the major part of the Free-holders do not disavow their proceedings Most certain it is whether the people were the authors of Regall power or not there neither is nor can be any power remayning in the people above that which is in a Monarch or King for if the supream power remayn in the people it must be a popular State such as Rome sometimes was The Lacedemonians had a King in name but their Estate was truly a popular Estate the supream power being in those 5 worthy Members called the Ephori who figuring patronizing the people had power to controll the doings of their King and their custome was as Plutarch relates every ninth yeere upon some cleer night to gaze upon the Firmament and if they observed the Moon to twincle or any Star to sparkle or shoot they thereupon would commit their King to prison who might not thence be delivered untill the Oracle of Apollo had so declared A happy Government I assure you both for King and people But if you will allow of a true King in power as well as in name the sovereigne power next under God must be in him not controllable with the breath of the fickle multitude Princeps Nec ponit aut sumit secures Arbitrio popularis aurae The Roman Emperour was anciently chosen by the Souldiers but did there remayne in them a power over the Emperour so elected T is recorded that the Souldiers having chosen Valentinian the elder would have added ao lleague unto him in the Imperiall government but the Emperour answered them me ad imperium eligere penes vos erat sed cum jam à vobis electus sim consortem imperii quem postulastis non amplius in vectra sed in mea potestate eligere situm est and with this answer were the Souldiers well contented whereby it appeares there remained no superour power in them Did there remaine a superintendent power in the people over the King it would then be lawfull to appeale from the Kâ—ng to the people as to the more supreame power but such appeales were never heard of at least not till of late nor are they consistant with Monarchy or any government but necessarily tend to Anarchy and destruction Omnis honestae rei malus judex est vulgus there is no Common-wealth wherein there are not more evill then good more simple then wise if then the majority of the people shall determine upon the last Appeale what judgement shall we be ruled by You see whereunto the Observators principles do lead and if you desire to know the fountaine from whence he drew these goodly doctrines that little Treatise entituled Puritano-Iesuitismus will point it out unto you I shall forbeare to consider any further by what authority Kings doe reigne And I heartily wish that this Anti-monarchist had spent his time in praising God for giving us that forme of government which experience teacheth and all the learned in the world do acknowledge to be the best and most convenient rather than by presumptuous enquiry after the cause and origen thereof to have endeavoured to shake and unsettle the same As concerning the finall cause of Regall Authority it must be acknowledged the generall end thereof is no other then the conservation and good of the people and true it is that the King is bound not only by his Oath but also by the very end of his Regall Office to protect us and to endeavour our promotion to all kinde of politicall happinesse even as much as he intends his owne honour and right But I cannot swallow that ingratefull inference the Observator makes from thence daring to tell his King That hee cannot merit of the State that whatsoever hee doth for them is meâ—re duty May not the same act be of duty and yet meritorious or deserving Is it not the duty of a Father to take care for his children and yet your selfe acknowledge the Father doth all his offices meritoriously You suppose though falsly Kingly authority commenceth by pact and agreement with the people is not honour and obedience even by that very pact to be paid him as a due reward and doth not reward presuppose desert although after such pact made his care and protection be of duty yet being free to oblige himselfe by that pact to preserve nourish and defend his people was an act meritorious Omnium domos illius vigilia defendit omnium otium illius labor omnium delitias illius industria omnium vacationem illius occupatio For which the Law doth attribute unto him all Honour Dignity and P cheminence and yet you say he deserveth nay he can deserve nothing The word Grace you tell him sounds not well in his mouth yet surely former Kings have used the word without being checkt for it 28. â— 1. cap. 1. The King â—f his speciall grace for redresse of the grievances of his people sustained by his warres and for the amendment of their estate and to the intent that they may be the more ready to doe him service the more willing to assist and â—yde him in time of need grants c. You see that King tearms it of speciall Grace though for amendment of their estate and for those Articles hee granted them hee expected in retribution that his subjects should bee the more willing to assist and ayde him in time of need And so I hope will all good subjects bee at this time the more willing to ayd his Majesty for those many Acts of greater grace he hath pleased to passe unto us You may see sundry other Acts wherein the King himselfe speaking pronounceth them to be of his speciall grace W. 2. cap. 10 cap. 29. 18. E. 1. Stat. de quo warranto c Statutum de gratia regia diâ—itur quando Rex dignatur cedere de jure suo regio pro quiete comodo populi sui Prâ—m Regall the Observator passeth on to consider Parliamentary power pag. 5. Parliaments have the same efficient cause as Monarchies if not higher for in truth the whole Kingdome is not so properly the author as the essence it selfe of Parliaments and Parliaments have also the same shall cause as Monarchies Well 't is agreed that the good of the Kingdome is the end whereto Parliamentary power should direct it selfe but then as concerning the power of Parliaments and the efficient cause of that power it will be requisite to consider the parts distinctly and then the power of all together The Parliament is a Body consisting of three distinct Estates the King the Lords and the Commons Unto the Commons considered alone it most properly appertaines to present the grievances of the people and in humble manner to pray such redresse as the King with
their consent and advice of the Lords shall deeme to be just and fit And this power or rather trust they derive from the people their Electors yet not without dependance on the King The Knights are sent by the County but the County had power and command by the Kings Writ to send them And as for the Burgesses their trust or power call it what you will doth more especially referre unto the King as the author thereof for whence had the elected Burgesses their power but from the Borough that sent them whence had the Borough power to send but from the King who by his Letters Patents incorporated them into a Borough and gave them power to send Burgesses to the Parliament which otherwise they had no more right to doe then any other vile whatsoever And this is the ground of that power which the house of Commons have as concerning the generalty of the Kingdome And besides this the house of Commons although a great and honourable Assembly yet of themselves as I think they are no Court either of Record or of ordiâ—ary Iustice unlesse it bee with respect to their owne Members which is rather a necessary priviledge then any power They can neither administer an Oath nor give any judgement twixt party and party nor have they power to controll or reverse a judgement given in the meanest pipowder Court I speak not this with a minde to derogate from the due honour of that Assembly but to occasion some friendly brother if I am in errour to instrâ—ct me how the imposing of the Protestation by order of the Commons only upon all the subjects in generall under a penalty of being branded with malignancy and adjudged unfit to beare any publike office may be defended How that order for levelling Chancels and making other alterations in the Church which issued from the Commons without the King and in opposition to the Lords may be justified either by reason or president How that Remonstrance a chiefe meanes of all our succeding dissentions that was voted with so much opposition in their owne house and was after published I will not say to disaffect the people from his Majesties government may be defended and justified In briefe may I be instructed with some grounds by which these and many other their actions and Votes may be warranted I shall thenceforth acknowledge them whom now perhaps by mistake I think to be no Court at all to be the most supreme Iudicatory both for Law and State In the meane while I am ignorant of any trust they have other then a trust from the people to consult and assent to the King and Lords in the making of Lawes which without the consent of the Lords and his Majesties concurrence is altogether uselesse and of no vertue And in them apart I know no Iurisdiction but with respect to their owne Members and surely that such as it is they have from the Crowne the fountaine of all Iustice and the spring head of all Iurisdiction The house of Peeres considered simply have power by assent or disassent to enable or disable the making or repealing of any Lawes and generall Ordinances but without the concurrence of King and Commons this of it self is of no use They are likewise an high Court of Iudicatory in respect of particular causes orderly brought before them having Iurisdiction in many though not in all Cases In criminall causes concerning life and member I think they have not Iurisdiction without the Kings speciall Commission and therefore they cannot attaint any man for treason murder or felony They are not only a Court of Iustice but of Record they may take a recognizance and by the Kings Writ or Commission may reverse for errour the Iudgements given in any of the ordinary Courts But all these powers as likewise their Baronies by reason of which they have place and vote in Parliament are immediately and meerely derived from the Crowne the fountaine of all honour and jurisdiction and they doe so necessarily depend upon the King in matters of Iudicatory as that in iudgement of law they speak ove bouch le Roy mesme Thus much concerning the Lords and Commons apart from the King The King alone he is Capitalis Angliae Iusticiarius the fountaine of all Iurisdiction and above all other Iurisdictions Britton speaking in the person of King E. 1. nous volousque nostre jurisdiction soit sur touts jurisdictions in nostre royalme By the law of Nations and by the very end of Regall power the King is to iudge the people 1 Sam. cap. 8. Give us a King to judge us vers. 20. We will have a King over us that we also may be as the Nations and that our King may judge us Bracton tels us That the King alone if he could suffice ought to judge the people and that by his Oath he is bound thereunto And as the ordinary iuridicall power is supreme and originally in the King so likewise is the legislative it being a principall end of Regall authority dare jus populo which power was in Kings by the law of nature while they governed the people by naturall Equity long before either municipall lawes or Parliaments had a being Before Moses there were no standing municipall lawes or at least not before Pharoneus long before which there were Kings of Sâ—itâ—â—â— Assyria Egypt c. who according to naturall Equity gave law unto their people Rhemo cum fratre Quirinuâ— jura dabat Hoc Priami gâ—stamen erat â—um jura vocatiâ— Mâ—râ— dâ—ret populâ—â— But their lawes they so gave ought to bee agreeable to naturall Equity aiming no lesse at the good of the people then of themselves Such conditions and limitations as are agreeable to naturall Equity Kings by the divine institution were bound to observe and some by their voluntary Oaths for themselves and their successours many times bound themselves to more strict limits then were absolutely requisite yet being agreeable to Equity and consistent with Royalty ought to be observed And thenâ—e it is according to the severall degrees that the latitude of naturall Equity doth admit in giving lawes that some Kings are more strictly limiâ—ed then others and according to the oaths and promises made by the King of this Realme they can neither give nor repeale any law but â—ith the assent of the Peeres and people The Observaâ—or doth not deny the Legislative power to bee in the King but saith he partly in the King partly in the Kingdom which I shall admit to be true in this sence viz. that the Legislative power is not so in the King onely as that he being sole can either in ordinary or extraordinary cases make or alter any Law for thereunto is necessarily required the assent both of Lords and Commons But yet to speak properly the Legislative power is solely in the King although not in the King being sole Rex solus legislator non si solus the assent of
Peeres and Commons gives weight and testimony unto the Law but the King only gives it force and authority And it will be thus proved the Legislative is the most soveraign power jus dare is somewhat more then jus dicere If then this most supreame power were formalitèr subjectivè aswell in the Lords and Commons as in the King the Government of this kingdome during Parliament would be Democraticall or Aristocraticall not Monarchichall or Regall Nor would it be a kingdome or Realme but a Republique For what else is Aristocracy but the supreme power seated in divers of the Nobilitie or what Democracy but a like power in the people The Legislative power is then solely in the King ut in subjecto and the consent of Lords and Commons is no parting or sharing in that power but onely a condition requisite to the use of that power in the King And this I conceive is evidently proved by the Oath of Supremacy whereby the King is acknowledged the onely Supreame Governour and likewise by the forme of all our ancient Statutos in which the King only speaks as the Law-maker some Statutes are in forme of a Writ in the Kings name only directed to the severall Sheriffs some in form of a Charter made by the King sometimes it runs the King wills the King ordained or the King in Parliament or the King with the assent of the Lords and Commons c. And never did any Act runne thus The Lords and Commons with the assent of the King or the Lords and Commons in Parliament ordaine or order c. And in the passing Bills to this day the imperative is only by the King Soit fait come est desire or Le Roy voet 22. E. 3. 3. Pl. 25. Le roy fist les leyes per assâ—nt des Peeres de la comune non pas lâ—s Peeres le comune In a learned argument made in Parliament against impositions and printed by command of a Committee this Parliament that Champion for liberty examining where the soveraigne power is in this kingdom The soveraigne power saith he Is agreed to be in the King but in the King is a twofold power the one in Parliament the other cut of Parliament the correcting of the errors of the ordinary Courts is by him Acts of Parliament be they Lawes grounds or whatsoever the Act and power is the Kings but with the assent of the Lords and Commons which maketh it the most supreame power not controlable by any but controling the regall power out of Parliament so he Now by all that hath been said 't is apparant That in the Lords and Commons severed from the King there is onely power in particular cases as is before expressed but that power that may oblige the subject in generall by Lawes Ordinances or such like Acts or Orders is solely in the King In the name of goodnesse then what is that which the people speak of when they talke of the power of the Parliament in such generall cases without and in opposition to the King How can they without the King the power being only in the King make Lawes and Ordinances and with binding authority declare the Law Is the Legislative power solely in the King and yet hath he not a free assent but must of necessity follow the major Vote The Royall assent was that which onely did give power and force unto the Law and it is now turned to an empty piece of formality a matter of course that without any Election must follow which way the Vote shall lead it Or if the Royall assent bee not added yet if the major part at any time shall deeme it necessary that their Votes stand for Lawes without it they are as compleatly and firmely binding as if they were added I wish some man would first sadly consider and then give me satisfaction if by these very Votes the Government be not already altered and Monarchy regulated by Law turned into an arbitrary boundlesse Cligarchy altered I say as farre forth as meere Votes are abâ—e to prevaile which yet I hope will never be actually effected This and many other Observations that may be made out of the premisses I shall remit unto the ingenious reader I shall only make application of what hath been said against the Observator pag. 9. It is alleadged saith he in derogation of Parliament that whatsoever the right of Parliaments is to assemble and treat in all cases of a publike nature yet without the Kings concurrence or consent they are livelesse conventions without all vertue and power the very name of Parliament not due to them This Allegation saith he at one blow confounds all Parliaments and subjects us to as unbounded a regiment of the Kings meere will as any Nation under heaven ever suffered under Patience good Observavator The very name surely is not due but to the very thing In conjunction with the King I can say the King and Parliament nâ—ming the King specially propter excellentiam but I cannot rightly say the King or Parliament or the King against the Parliament can you shew me where the Lords and Commons opposed to the King are termed a Parliament Did ever any man describe a Parliament to be a body consisting of Lords and Commons only with some difficulty I could find where it is said to be a body consisting of King Lords and Commons I would not strive about words but that I see the very name of Parliament misapplyed to the two Houses doth somewhat abuse the people As for Parliamentary power itselfe I have proved it to be formally and immoveably in the King only ut in subjecto and that the consent of Lords and Commons is but a requisite condition to compleat that power as to the doing of some Acts to which it cannot other wise extend If then there bee no concurrence of the King in whom only the power is what are they but a livelesse Convention without all value and power What 's a confirmation of the Deane and Chapter without a grant of the Bishop to be confirmed An assent oâ— Lords and Commons without an Act to be assented to is somwhat like two cyphers without any figure which yet if added to a figure make it centuple If this Allegation against which the Observator doth exclaime with so much vehemency be any new doctrine I am content to bee discarded but if it shall appear to be a most known truth and such as doth not more support the Royall Prerogative then the liberty of the subject then I trust men will be satisfied upon what grounds that odious scandall is raised against his Majesty of intention to bring in an Arbitrary Government such as the French are subiect to A calumny not a little practised to beat off the subiects from their due Allegiance The truth then of this position that the Houses without the King as to the making of any publike Acts Orders or Ordinances are livelesse
Conventions will appeare by these ensuing proofes Com. 79. Although the Lords and Commons agree to a thing it is but as an Embrio or issue in the belly and yet unborne It were to bee wished these Embrio's â—id not at present too much trouble this part of the world Lamberts Archeion 271. The necessitie of the assent of all the three Estates in Parliament is such as without any one of them the rest doe but lose their labour 11. H. 7. 27. per Davers Le Roy est assentus ceo fait un Act de Parliament Polidore 185. Nihil ratum habetur nisi quod major pars utriusque concessus senserit idque rex comprobarit Cowell â—nter verbo prorog. The King may quash any Law 8. Rep. 20. b. Cromptons Iurisd. 8. 6. Institut 1 part 90. b. Institut 2. part 158. accord ' Sir Tho. Smyth at Republica Anglicana lib. 2. cap. 3. No Bill is an Act of Parliament Ordiâ—inaâ—ce or Edict of Law untill both the Houses severally have agreed unto it No nor then neither but the last day of that Parliament or Session the Prince commeth in person and declares his pleasure concerning their proceedings whereby the same may have perfect life and accomplishment by princely authority and so have the whole consent of the Realm those that the Prince doth â—â—ow be taken as perfect Lawes and Ordinances of the Realm of England and none other to those which the Prince liketh not he answereth Le Roy advisera and thâ—se be accounted utterly dashed and of none effect Bodin de Republica lib. 1. cap. 8. Albeit that in the Parliaments of England which have commonly been holden every third yeare there the Estates seeme to have every great libertie as the Northern people almost all breath thereafter yet so it is that in effect they proceed not but by way of supplications and requests unto the King As in the Parliament of England holden in October 1566. When the Estates by a common consent had resolved as they gave the Queene to understand not to entreat of any thing untill they had first appointed who should succeed her in the Crowâ— shee gave them no other answer but that they were not to make her grave before she were dead All those resolutions were to no purpose without her good liking neither did she in that any thing that they required Now also the Estaies of England are never otherwise assembled no more then they are in this Realm of France or Spaine then by Parliament Writs and expresse commandments proceeding from the King which sheweth very well that the Estates have no power of themselves to determine command or decreâ— any thing seeing that they cannot so much as assemble themselves neither being assembled depart without expresse commandment from the King Yet this may seeme one speciall thing that the Lawes made by the King of England at the request of the States cannot be againe repealed but by calling again of the States which is much used and ordinarily done as I understood by Master Dale the English Embassadour an honourable Gentleman and a man of good understanding who yet assured me that the King received or rejected the Law as seemed best unto himselfe and stuck not to dispose thereof at his pleasure and contrary to the will of the Estats I might adde many more but that by understanding men I should be laught at as holding a Candle to the Sun Let the Observator tell me which of all these doth not say fully as much as that which he saith at one blow confounds all Parliaments and subiects us to as unbounded a regiment of the Kings meere will as ever any Nation under Heaven suffered under Let him against all these and such others as I might adde alledge but one single opinion from the beginning of the world till 1640. that in publike Cases the Lords and Commons have any vertue and power without nay maugre the King to oblige the subiect in generall by any Law or Ordinance they shall make and I promise him upon that to turn Reformado Meane while I must think not the King but the Observator with one blow confounds all Parliaments for it doth not only cut off the head with which the vertue life and soule of that body expires but by the same reason it cuts off likewise the Lords from being any necessary part of the Parliament For if the Commons shall adiudge that the Militia for repelling danger ought to be put into such a way as dislikes the King and maior part of the Lords that 's in truth now the Case yet ought the House of Commons being virtually the whole kingdom to be obeyed by the people against the will and command of King and Lords and against the desire of the minor part perhaps by two Votes in the House of Commons If the maior part of the Lords shall be bâ—uited to bee Popishly affected or Malignant and thereupon their names shall be required that so the Rabble-rout may take a course with them by meanes whereof they are necessitated to absent themselves and by like seditious courses a considerable part if not the maior of the Commons shall be driven from Parliament if after this by the cunning practise of some few the Major part of Lords and Commons that shall be remaining shall adjudge such Assemblies not to have bin riotus and seditious and that therefore themselves have power as a free Parliament to provide for the safety of the Realme and shall therupon by or dinante require a Levy of Subsidies to be presently made throughout the Kingdome you will say the Subjects are bound in such case to lay along their necks and pay and is not this to subject us to as unbounded a regiment of meere will as any Nation under heaven ever suffered under This is more then ever the King pretended to he never claimed a power â—o make Lawes and lay taxes without the consent of Parliament he onely layes claime to a negative voice that they without him may not make any Lawes or charge his Subjects but that all be done by the joynt consent of him and his people and otherwise their proceedings without him to be vertulesse and of no force Against which so well knowne right let us see what worthy argument the Observator brings forth By the same reason saith he that Parliaments are thus vertulesse and void Courts upon the Kings desertion of them other Courts must needs be the like and then what remaines but that all our Laws rights and liberties be either no where at all determinable or else onely in the Kings brest He is very wary not to fall under the Kings determinations though as appeares before the â—nd why a King was set over Nations was to judge them and Bracton tels us That the King by his oath is obliged if he were able in person to judge his people And t is a known principle in the Lawes of England Rex presumitur habere
omnia jura in scrinio pecttoâ—s sui And yet as the government of this Kingdome is now setled the King cannot make void or vertulesse the setled Courts of Justice and thereby draw all things to a determination within his owne breast And if any cause shall come before him as a Judge to determine yet he hath a rule to follow and that 's the Law not his will which Law in respect of the King hath somewhat more then a directive force restrayning him and disabling him to goe against it so that he can doe no wrong The Lawes are made by the Kings power with the peoples or Parliaments assent which is a superiour power or rather the same power in a higher degree or extent to the Regall power alone and withâ—â—â—â— their assent And therefore the Regall power out of Parliament cannot change nor alâ—â—â— the Lawes and Ordinances made in Parliament but is bound by them as being made by a superiour power whence it is that Bracton every where affirmes the Law to be above the King solely And by this superiour power that is by the King with the assent of his people or Parliament were the ordinary Courts of Justice founded and established and their jurisdiction assertained and therefere may not be altered by the Regall power alone and by the same reason the King cannot alter the Constitution of the Court of Parliament but is the Constitution of all Courts alike the ordinary Courts are so constituted as that the Kings speciall Concurrence is not neeessary Arts and Judgements by the ordinary Judges alone are compleat and binding their assembling and departing is setled and doth not depend on the speciall pleasure of the Prince But the Court of Parliament hath another kind of Constitution the Kings speciall concurrence is in that a necessary and essential part Rex est capâ—t principium et finis Parliamenti Their assembling expects his speciall call their continuance depends on his will the Judgemements Arts and Ordinances made in Parliiament and concerning the Kingdome in generall are the Kings onely and without him frustrate and null Consider this good observator and then tel me if you did not endeavor grosly to abuse your reader by telling us that by the same reason the Parliament is not a Court compleâ— without the King the Common-pleas and all other Courts are not I confesse I have wondred to see it of late so often aâ—â—iâ—med That as the King cannot nor ought to declare by prâ—claimation or otherwise his disalowance of the acts judgments of the ordinary Courts so not of the Votes Ordinances of the Lords Commons in Parliament being the highest Court Should the ordinary Courts take upon them to dispose of the Militia by vertue of an Ordinance by them made might not the King by his Proclamation declare the Militia of that Ordinance and forewarne his Subjects not to be abused by it if the Observator can prove that the Lawes and Ordinances made by the now major part of the Lords and Commons are without and against the Kings pleasure of any more validitie that they are in themselves Lawes and Ordinances and not onely so called then I shall admit that the King either by Prociamation or otherwise ought not to declare against them meane while let every man judge how well the observatour hath maintained the power of the Lords and Commons mauger their King to make Lawes and Ordinances that shall bind the people in generall By which Ordinances the Militia the taking of Hull the Navy the Magazine the intercepting all mony and other provision that is but suspected to be passing towards the King the imprisoning all such as appeare dutifull towards his Majesties commands and such like Acts must be justified or acknowledged unjust The Observator finding it more then difficult in a plain field to maintaine his cause endeavours to shelter it under famed pretences of extraordinary danger and necessity in this extremity the King neglecting the helme nay purposely stearing towards rocks and shelves It is the duty of his Parliament in this case to oppose and preserve him and his Kingdome from utter wrecke and ruine He will then acknowledge that in ordinary cases without the King they cannot make a binding Law or Ordinance but in danger that is when they please In the miast of our calamities we are sensible of none thankes be to God but what their Ordinances have occasioned the Parliament seeing they must make use of their legislative power and make Ordinances to secure sâ—me Forts and settle the Militia or else two Kingdomes probably will be lost they doe accordingly the King proclaimes to the contrary in this contrariety consider if the Parliament 〈◊〉 vertually the whole Kingdome if it be not the supreame Judicatory as well in maâ—â—â—â—â— of State as Law if their grounds of jealousie be vaine To what purpose shall we consider of their jealousies if we thinke them to be but pretended by the cunning and practise of some few for accomplishing their designes and plots invented by some of their owne partie to be againe by them discovered yet must King and people submit to their judgement Are not the now major part the supreme Judges of danger to whom King and people are bound to submit If they are is it lesse then a mockery to bid us consider when as after consideration will we nill we we must subjugate our understandings and opinions to whatsoever they already have or hereafter shall declare But yet at your bidding I le consider in this contrariety whether the Parliament pray call them the Lords and Commons now assembled may not make use of their legislaiâ—e power yes if they have any such but I would not have them make use of the King legislative power without him and against him had they beene partners in that power some colour you might have had to have called it theirs but it seemes the power is solely the Kings they are onely to give an assent to the use of it Then you will I consider whether they be not the supreme Judicatory I thinke not the Parliamentiâ— supreame and above them both in matters of State and Law but againe I must consisider you say if the Lords and Cammons be not vertually the whole Kingdome why doe you put in the Lords whom at other times you can be content to spare The Lords Vote in respect of their Barronies derived from the Crowne the Commons Vote in right of their electors whom they represent at least nine parts of the Kingdome neither doe nor may Vote in their election the Clergie in respect of their spirituall livingt may not nor the most substantiall Coppy-holders Farmours nor Lessees for yeers not inheritrixes Jointresses nor reversioners Heirs apparrent and men that live upon Interest are excluded and all that have not 40. s. per annum free hold Land which I imagine cannot be above a tenth part of the Kingdome Tell me good Sir you that
list to unsettle principles power being you say nothing else but that might and vigour which a society of men containes in it selfe why should the might and vigour of these being farre the major part be over mastred and concluded by the Votes of those that are deputed by a miner number of the people or why should halfe the Kingdome in which there are but few Burroughes be equalled and overborne in Voting by two Counties out of which many Burgesses are chosen Old Sarum shal have as many Votes in Parliament as the Citty of London or County of Wiltes By which it seemes the Commons are not sent with equallity from all parts nor sent by all how doe they then represent all what reason is there that all the Kingdome should sit downe with their Votes the truth is the King Lords and Commons in conjunction are vertually the whole Kingdome for that all the people did at first submit themselves to their determination 25 H. 8. 21. your royall Majestie and your Lords and Commons representing the whole Realme in this your most high Court of Parliament have power c. So that in the King principally but yet in conjunction with the Lords and Commons is the vertue and power of the whole Kingdome contained But if we shall admit that the vertue and power of the whole Realme is by representation in the Commons alone or at least in the Lords and Commons what will thence follow the Kingdome you will say are the efficient cause of Kingly power and consequently above it they being above it have power over it may reassume it or dispose of it to such persons as they can confide in and this power the Kingdom may confer upon such as they shall choose for that purpose The Observator hath met with a free Gamster though his principles have beene particularly disproved and are distructive not onely to Monarchy but unto all government yet at present let him take all for granted First that the people have such power and secondly that they may transmit it unto such as they shall choose for that purpose But the question is whether they have done it whether they have chosen the new members for that purpose or for some other The King did not create the Lords I beleeve for that end nor create Borroughes with power to send Burgesses for that end nor command the Counties to elect Knights for that purpose nor did the Borroughes and Counties when they did elect give any such power upon the receipt of the Kings Writ by the Sheriffe and warning or notice given to the Freeholders they meet and cry up some mans name this in it selfe imports nothing but with reference to the Writ so that the people intrust them to doe onely what the Writ requires and thereupon the Sheriffe returnes Elegi feci duos milites who have power from the County ad faciendum what I pray quod breve in se exegit in that they have no avthority without the King to judge of dangers and oblige the King and people to goe their way for repelling the â—ame and yet doth the Writ continue as large as ever it hath been seeing neither the Kings writ nor the peoples election made thereupon doe give it I demand whence have the Lords and Commons excluding the King this soveraign power to judge of dangerâ—â— and thereupon if they so cause to take from the King the power of the Kingdome and according to their pleasures to dispose thereof unto certaine confiding persons unto which disposition the King and people are all required to conform and give consent We have beene often told that it is by the fundamentall Law of the Land a foundation so deepe that like the River Nilus it hides its head from all that seeke it never yet could any the most learned instruct us where to finde out this fundamentall Law which hath layen buried so long that no Law-booke Record or Chronicle makes any the least mention thereof But yet at length a certaine Pamphleter defending the Observatour hath hapt upon it but not amongst the Lawes of this Land he was nessitated to dig a little deep for it but amongst natures principles It is radically couched in nature it selfe and irrepealably enacted in her Magna Charta to which all positive Lawes must in equity vaile that the State may lawfully of its selfe provide for its preservation espectally if the King either see not the danger or seing it will not provide for it in such mâ—nner as may give best security to himselfe and the Common-wealth Certaine it is there is no state but is endued with ability and meanes to preserve it selfe instinct of nature will force all men preserve themselves from present destructior and providence teacheth all to provide against future emergent dangers and this surely the State of England hath done in submitting it selfe to the care and protection of a King on whose good foresight and wisdome next under God the welfare of the whole Realme dependeth he sits as on a watch Tower survaying his owne dominions and by the vigilancy of his Councell at home and Embassadours abroad hath timely intelligence of any approaching evill against which if he shall need any extraordinary advise or aide of his Subjects he hath power by his writ to assemble them in Parliament and with their assent to raise mony and other necessary provision for their defence and safeguard And this I say is that meanes of safety wherewith the State of England hath provided it selfe by putting themselves for better for worse under the protection of a King against all dangers And certainly he that ought to protect them against dangers to him it appertaines to judge of danger and so much was admitted by those who argued for the Subject in case of Ship-mony that the King was sole Judge of the dangers but that he could not therupon tax the Subject but by assent in Parliament But what you will object if the King will not see the danger or seeing it will neverthelesse suffer the Kingdome to fâ—eat at all hazzards or what if being carried away with Malignant Counsell he himselfe shall steere it towards rocks and shelves May not the Kingdome in such case save themselves from ruine and oppose the King There can be no Generalissime so uncircumscribed but that if he shall turne his Cannons upon his owne Souldiers they are ipso facto absolved of all obedience of all Oathes and tyes of Allegiance whatsoever for the time and bound by higher duety to seeke their owne preservation by resistance and defence For my part I cannot but thinke that a state after much sufferance seeing utter destruction to be at hand ready to swallow them up may use any good and lawfull meanes as flight and avoydance to preserve themselves from ruine by the hand of a tyranizing Lord yet I dare not approve of active resistance by taking up armes against a lawful Soveraign Prince though
our superfine Reformers the Reformers being farre the minor part ought to sit downe and acquiesse otherwise bloud will be shed and the major part in probabilitie prevaile you to lay a Calumny on the King will say they speake all one language and conspire in one end which although no sober man will credit yet this is certaine that they all concurre in some things against new Confounders I should say Reformers In these things then by your owne rule the minor part ought to yeeld and acquiesse If the major part present of Lords and Commons shall desire it the King you will say is bound to passe an Act that no marriage for any of his Children shall be concluded not treated on without the Parliaments assent By the same reason that he is bound to passe this Law to the English hee will bee bound to passe the like to the Irish and againe the like to the kingdome of Scotland because the Lords and Commons in the severall Parliaments desire it and the kingdomes have a like interest and right to warrant that desire If these Lawes bee passed what will become of the Royall line Besides a match may bee mentioned or treated on a Parliament for that 〈◊〉 purpose must bee called in each kingdome and being called is it probable three Nations so different in their constitutions should agree in one The Scots â—â—y approves marriage desired with the French The Irish will rather desire the alliancs of Spaine The English of Denmarke In this case to observe one Law is to breake two yet such a Law being Voted or any thing else the King you say is bound to passe it and you seeme to prove it thus T is acknowledged the King is bound by Oath and Office to passe all just Lawes that are either for preservation or good of the Subjects to grant this say you that hee is bound to passe just â—awes and yet to leave him to his owne free Iudgement what is a just and good Law is to give us a dry right without a remedy So againe you obiect If the King will not call the Parliament For making Lawes when it is expedient that must not conclude the people for theâ— they would have a dry right to Parliaments without a remedy And upon this ground and for that the King hath his power given him as you suppose by the people and that upon trust you will have him accomptable to the Lords and Commons the representatives of the people how he hath discharged his trust and if he shall be found neglectfull or faulty there must bee you say a meanes to inforce otherwise wee are subject to the boundlesse will of the Prince and a gappe is opened to as past and arbitrary power as ever the Grand Seignior had If the King may so assume a share in the Legislative power as that without his concurrence the Lords and Commons may not Judge of dangers and by temporary Ordinances put the kingdome into a posture of defence God hath not then left humane nature any meanes of sufficient preservation Thus the Observator Although he mention God yet I doubt his Argument is grounded in Atheisme because forsooth we have not the remedy in our own hands therefore are we without remedy exposâ—â— to the will of any tirannous Prince that may bee either then hee thinkes there is no God or with Epicurus that hee is otâ—osum inexerâ—itum et neminem iâ—t humanis rebus ad â—â—li cardines oâ—â—â—b lat nulla tangitur mortalium cura For if there be a God with providence why should we be affraid to trust our remedy with him There is a bridle to restraine the licencious will of ambitious Princes and that 's the Law but the reynes must not be layd in the hands of subjects The Heart of the King must be in the hands of the Lord he will direct it towards the subjects good or if a Prince shall incline to Tyranny he will in good time remove him unlesse it be his pleasure by him to chastice the sinns of that people or to try and improve their patience in which case there is a blessing for them that can content themselves with a fiat voluntas Domini God only I have proved is the Author and efficient cause of Kingly power Kings are his annoynted his vicegerents and therefore properly occomptable to him alone Where the word of a King is there is power and who may say unto him what doest then Non potest ei Regi necessitatem aliquis imponere quod injurianâ— sâ—â—m corrigat et emendat nisi velit cum superiorem non habeat nisi Deum et satis erit â—i ad paeâ—â—â— quod dominum expectat ultorem Punishment enough indeed if you consider how much more severe God is in taking an Account of Kings then of other men subject to temporall punishments which you may see sett downe by a King himselfe Heare therefore O ye Kings and understand learne ye that be Iudges of the end of the Earth Give â—are you that rule the people and glory in the multitude of Nations for power is given you of the Lord and sovereignty from the highest who shall try your workes and search out your Councels because being Ministers of his kingdome you have not judged aright nor kept the law nor walked after the councell of God horribly and speedily shall he come upon you for a sharpe Iudgement shall be to them that be in high places for mercy will soone pardon the meanest but mighty men shall be mightily tormented Were there not a God to take this severe accompt from Kings and to straine their ambitious desire from tyrannizing over their subjects yet by what hath been formerly said it will appeare to be more safe for a people to live subject to the inconvenience then to give power to the people upon pretence of saving themselves to riâ—e against Sovereigne authority A supreme indisputable power must be somewhere this the observator acknowledgeth and al must acknowledg that are not in love with Anarchy the question then is only this wheâ— is its most safe resting In the Parliament saith the observator â— agree with him in the King in Parliament is the most safe resting of the supreame indisputable power But the mischeife is the observator by Parliament meanes only the Lords Commons distinguished from the King Now whether it be more safe resting in them or in the King with them thâ—â— is the question which in effect is all one with this whether Democracy be a better forme of Government alwayes followes the disposition of the Sovereigne power If therefore the Sovâ—reigne power rest incontrollably in one alone then is the Government simply Monarchicall If it rest in the cheife Peeres then it is an Optimacy If in the people Democracy If it râ—â—t in one alone and yet to the use of it in the most weighty matters a consent of Peers and people is to be had then it is
not an absolute but an admirably well tempered Monarchy Now if you compare the 3 simple formes of Government Aâ—istotle will thus determine Harâ—â—â—â— optima est Regnum deterima Democratia In so cleere a truth the spirit of opposition could not force him to dissent from his Master Plato who having set downe those 3 simple formes of Government with three mixt and compounded thus delivers his judgment Vâ—iâ—â— dominatio bonis instructa legâ—bus sex illarum omnium optima est Gubernationem vero â—aâ—in quâ— non multi imperant mediam censâ—re dâ—bâ—mus caeterum multorum administrationâ—m â—â—â—ibus is rebus debilematque infirmâ—m And surely if this judgement be not right neare all the world are in error But nâ—w though simple Monarchy doe farre excced their Consâ—â—ar or popular Government yet is it not without its inconveniencies and therefore it may be so tempered and mixt as that it may still remaine Monarchy and yet have its inconveniencies restrayned avoyded as farforth as may be then will it of all others whether absolute or mixt become the most usefull and convenient forme of Government Now such and no other is the constitution of Government in England so well poysed and molded by the wisedome of our ancestors as that it gives to this Kingdome the conveniencies of all without the inconveniencies of any one as far forth as by humane prudence they may be prevented The supreame power therefore of making Laws whereby to governe and judge the people in time of peace as likewise the power of armies for preventing of invasions and insurrections rests in a King only immovably whereby he is sufficiently enabled to protect his people And againe as the King himselfe acknowledgeth those lawes by which he is to govern may not be made but by the Consent of the house of Peers and by the house of Commons chosen by the people all hâ—ving free votes and particular priviledges And that the Prince may not make use of his high and perpetuall power to the hurt â—f â—hoâ—e for whose good he hath it the house of Commons as an â—â—cellent conservâ—r of liberty is solely intrusted with the first propositions concerning the levies of mâ—â—y the sinewes of peâ—câ— aâ—â—â—â— and for the impeâ—ckiâ—g of thoâ—e who for their own ends though countenanced by any surreptitiâ—usly gotten command of the King have violated that law which the King is bound when hâ— knows it to protect and to the protection of which they were bound to advise him at the least not to serve him in the contrary And the Lords being trusted with a judâ—â—atory power are an excâ—llent skâ—â—ene and bank between the prince people to assist each â—gainst the incroachment of the other Now whether it be more safe for the supreame indisputable power after this manner to rest in the King or els to be in the Lords and Commons excluding the king that 's the question The â—bserâ—ator vrgeth these inconveniences that sâ—eme to remâ—iâ— in this regulated Monarchy so that it is at the kings pleasure when hâ— shal iudgâ— fit to cal parliamentâ— and being called by dissent hee my frustrate their proceedings and at his pleasure dissolve â—heir being If this be so how have they a power more than sufficient to restraine Tyrannie â—â—â—â—ly if these principles hold Parliaments will be made the very Engines and Scaffolds whereby to erect a Government more tyrannicall then ever was knowne in any other kingdome What â—â—mes doe we live in when the known principles of ancient Government shall be thus impudently railed at That it is left at the Kings just pleasure to call Parliaments upon which oâ—â—er rights depend is a truth so manifest that I am ashamed to alleadge any proofe of it that the King hath indisputable power of dissolving of Parliaments is equally manifest and acknowledged by the Act for not dissolving this present Parliament and that the King in his â—udgment dissenting may thereby quash their proceedings for as much as it is at this time denied I have formerly proved it But if this be so what is left to restraine Tyrannie Marry as much as conveniently may be For though it be at the Kings pleasure to call and dissolve Parliaments he is disabled to make any new Lawes or repeale the old how great need soâ—ver there be for it Nor may he raise Subsidies for his Warres or other occasions without 〈◊〉 in Parliament If impositions be otherwise indirectly laid upon the subject the ministers ought not to levy it or if it be levied experience teacheth that the King will be thereby the greater looser These and many other motives there are inforcing a King to call Parliaments and to comply with the just desires of his subiects And yet of late I must confesse we have had occasion to bewaile the too long intermission of Parliaments of which a reverend Iudge complaining gives us the probable reason At the last meeting in Parliament saith he either by ill choice of the members of that House or by the great increase of the number or by the ambitious humours of some Members of that House who aimed more at their owne â—â—ds and designes then the generall good of the Common-wealth things were so carried not â—â— was used in ancient time but so disastrously that it hath wrought such a disease of this course of Parliaments as we and all that love the Common-wealth have just cause to be sorry for it But now the fruits that have sprung from this error in Government are discovered the remembrance whereof will ever hereafter put Princes in mind of calling Parliaments And to secure this unto us His Maiestie hath now passed an Act for Trieninall Parliaments not dâ—â—â—olvable within the space of 50 dayes then which can there be a better assurance against Tirannie not destroying Monarchie it selfe Yet all this will not satisfie the Observator If the King shall have the disposing of the Militia or power of the kingdome according to the established laws and may so claime a share in the Legislative power as that the Lords and Commons may not without him make lawes and ordinances whensoever themselves shall think fit and necessary so to do or if at any time without presupposing a necessity he shal not according to his oath and office assent to what lawes and ordinances the Houses shall Vote though they go against his own Iudgment and Conscience there will be still a meanes left for the King to make himselfe a tyrant or an absolute Lord not limited by Law but disposing all things according to his lawlesâ—e wil and pleasure A power you say is left that hee may these but the Law trusts him presuming he wil not abuse it and that obiection that is against the presumption of the Law none should presume to make Something must be left if it cannot be restrained but that Monarchy will be destroyed or disabled to performe its office that restraint that you would put upon
it by placing a superior power in the Lords Commons into whose command the King shal be but a meere Minister changes the government to popular or consular having lesse appearance of Monarchy in it then that of Venice wherâ— the Duke in the highest power of making lawes hath a concluding voice freely allowed him and yet is that government acknowledged to be Aristocraticall if not Democraticall If then the King should so abuse his power as to make himselâ—â— an absolute Monarch yet we are better to live under that then under an optimacie mixt with democracie How are Consular estates almost continually tossed vp and downe with the billâ—â—â—◠〈◊〉 surges of ambitious discontented factions what Republique could ever preserue it selfe froâ— being torne in peeces with intestine disentions or over runne with forragne invasion diâ— not Rome when it was a Republique any other while degenate into seditions diâ—cord and Civill warres with in the space of 500 yeares to which period it could not reach how many thinges and rechanges had they of their Gouernment vnder all which it 〈◊〉 came to flourish soe as vnder the sole Gournement of Iulius and Augustus And yet Râ—â—â— of all states haue best thriven vnder such popular Gouernment the other three empires Assirian Grecian and Persian grew to their greatnesse vnder Monarchy and were of lonâ—â—â— continuance then the Republique of Rome but I will not inlarge my selfe vpon soe coâ—â—â— a Theame where in all learned men agree and experience conformeth an Optimaâ—â—â—â— Repâ—â—lique vnlimited to be farre worse then vnlimited Soureigntie The Obsâ—ruator neuâ—rtheâ—â—â— stands vpâ—n defence of the contrary the King obiecting that the houses clayme an arbirâ—â—â—â— illimited power to vnsettle the security of all mens estates and that they are sedâ—â—ible 〈◊〉 may nay have abused this power To this the observator answereth That there is an Arbitâ—â—ry power in every state somewhâ—re t is true t is necessary every man hath absolute power ovâ—r himselfe but because no man can hate himselfe this power is not dâ—ngerous So every State haâ— aâ— arbitrary power over it selfe and there is no danger in it for the same reason if the state 〈◊〉 his to one man or feâ— thâ—râ— may be danger in it but the Parliament is neither onâ— or feâ— it is noe good consequence the Parliament doth abuse power because it may and againâ— The King challenges a greater power then Parliaments Is not this to preferre Democracy if not Anarchy before Monarchy Not onely supremâ— power regulated by Law is safer in many then in one or few but an arbitrary power is likewise in them without danger because as one man cannot hate himselfe so a state cannot hâ—â—â— it selfe But yet a state may hate one another some few may ambitiously seeke to overtoâ—â— the rest the rest may tumultuously rise against the few divisions may bâ—eake thâ—â— into peâ—ces and make them a prey for forreigne invasion and there wants a Sovereigne King to settâ—â— differences to suppresse tumults and invasions and yet no danger because no man can â—ate himselfe But what though arbitrary power in the people or their proxies the Parliment may be thus abused t is no good consequence therefore they do or will abuse it If it be not a good consequence against Parliaments then not against Kings that because they may abuse their power to make themselves absolute therefore they doe it or will doe it Again you tell us the King challenges a greater power then Parliaments you meane the Lords and Câ—â—mons and t is true he challenges a greater power then they have but not â— greater then they challenge or you give them for you say Every state hath an absolute arbitrary power and â—â— Parliament is indeed the state it selfe and so have an absolute arbitrary power a greater theâ— which I am sure neither King nor Tyrant can clayme and the King of England neâ—ther lawfully can nor doth claime so much He claimes a supreame power not absolute buâ— politicall regulated by law not arbitrary nor can he make Parliament ordinances or lawes binding to the kingdome in generall without them upon any pretended necessities but without him they make such The observator haâ—h another Argument to prove Domocracy or the Soveraiâ—ne power in a Committee to be better and more safe then in one The King asketh why not the King predominate rather then the Lords and Commons The observator answers We â—â—â— a maxime and it was groundâ—d upâ—n nature and never till this Parliament with-stood That a Committeâ— can have no private eâ—ds â—o mislâ—ad it no Parliament ever injured a whole kingâ—â—â—â— oâ— exercised any Tyranny nor is there â—â—y possibility how it should True it is a Committee or Corporation Metaphisically abstracted from those of whome it is compounded can have no private end as not being subject to any lust appetite or passion 〈◊〉 yet to death but the particulars compounding that body may have private or at least evill 〈◊〉 What doth the Observator thinke of the Councell of TRENT Could it ayme 〈◊〉 nothing but good cannot a Committee exercise Tyrannâ—e Dâ—d the vasâ—alls unto â—â—â—thage never suffer under that Committee would they not have chosen to groane under the oppressions of a Dionisius rather than under the intollerable exactions and Ordinances â—f that Tyranâ—zing Dame Did not Athens suffer under thirtie Tyrants who at first had the peoples consent to governe Did never any Parliament in Rich. 2d time abuse the â—ingdome Why then did one Parliament condemne another Was there not a Parliament sometimes branded with the name of Parliamentum insanum and hath there not bin â— Parliament termed Parliamentum Doctorum in quo jugulum Ecclesiae atrocius petebatur I speake not this to cast any the least blemish upon that thrice Honourable and never enough commended Counsell but onely to shew that by the fury and practise of some Members the whole body may possibly bee lead into error and injure the Common-wealth Some members may possibly combind themselves for alteration of Government in Church and State and if they can backe their designe which the force of an unruly multitude they may with that force and hypocrisie mixt together prevaile with the major part of the Houses and then having got an Act to bee indissolvable they may goe on with their designe making â—se of such schismaticall and seditious dispositions as the Common-wealth shall then abound with and abusing the rest of the people with imaginary feares and Iealousies from forraigne kingdomes and pretending an alteration of Government to be indeavoured a prelaticall popish malignant partie at home who have so farre seduced their King as that hee will not â—earken to the advise of his great Councell they may then upon pretence of prepelling such dangers make themselves Monsters of the Militia and strength of the Realme That â—one it is possible they may proceed to destroy the Hierarchie of Church and Monarchie in the State and then what will
let but that they may reigne as arbitrary Lords possible I say it is that some Members in a Committee may thus make themselves Lordly Tyrants and theâ— too late will the people wish to have kept under a King though hee should have proved â— Tyrant for so there might have beene some end of their miseries Many Tyrants have againe changed into worthy Kings or if that hope should delude their expectations yet his death would ere long make place for a successor who probably may prove a milder Lord but a tyrannizing community will be an immortall slavery I daâ—e not say this is now aymed at by any yet I could wish men would waâ—ily consider circumstances and well weigh with themselves whether our Observators principles doe not make way for some such end which the wisdome of Parliament cannot but deterre and I hope will ever present Hee gives an absolute arbitrary power to such as shall by what meanes soever make themselves a major part in the Houses neither Statutes nor presidents shall be binding unto them all oaths and tyes of Allegiance unto their King must cease if they Vote their Soveraigne bee their danger and yet forâ—ooth they are obliged by Iustice and honour not to doe wrong to King nor kingdome that is all the security this observator will allow for our Religion lives â—â—â—â—erties and yet what applause and approbation hath his despâ—rate principles received amongst many of us as if they all tended to a glorious freedome O that men would wisely consider what enemies they are unto themselves who blindly hinting after the name of libertie overtorne and destroy their ancient secâ—â—ities T is not prerogative that is now contending with the Subiects libertie but liberâ—ie struggles with Othlocracie the established protestant Religion with scisme and heresie whether learning Law the flower of Nobility the best and choyce of the commonalty may live anâ— not be destroyed is the question An Act of oblivion wherein all unhappy differenceâ— and contentions may lye forever buried hath once and againe bin offered and refused Soâ—â— mens debts and necessities must be satisfied out of the skinns of those they call malignantâ— Are not all such as meddle with the Commission of Array or assist and stand by his Majestie in this opposition declared by those whose well meaning integritie his Majestie supposeth to be abused by some few malignant spirits to be wicked and traiterous enemies to the State Is it not agâ—ine required that all who are or shall be voted Delinquents be delivered up to the Iustice as they call it of Parliament will they be content to be tried oâ— both sides by the kingdome representing it selfe in a second Parliament No saith the Observator that were to exceed in infinitum Will they then allow the King to be an essentiall part of this Parliament or if not will they remove this Parliament to any other placâ— but London that so all the members may freely resort unto it and deliver their conscienceâ— without being posted or prescribed or torne in peeces by a rabble of people that shall requirâ—â— their names They see no reason for that What remaines then but that themselves be justified by themselves and all that dissent from them be at their mercy or destruction And do not three parts of foure of the Nobility dissent from them Are not neer an equall part of the Commons house dis-inclined to these proceedings If you intermingle the Lords and Commons elected are they not opposed with equall number Besides the King and his Royall Line to turne the State survey the kingdome are not the most and most learned of the Divines against them Are not the most and most learned in the professions of Canoâ— and Common law disapproving their proceedings will they in that propertie fals within the cognizance of Iudges as the legalitie or illegalitie of the Commission of Array be directed by the Iudges and Serjeants for such purposes attending in the house of Lords On which side stands the visible major part of those Seminaries of learning the Vniversities and Innes of Court which way are the most of the Gentrie and such of the Commonaltie whose education or nature gives them abilities to discerne further into things then other men Must these be all turned out of the Kings protection to be at pleasure destroyed Must the Militia be delivered up that so the King may be disabled to give them and such as shall hereafter finding themselves abused returne unto their Soveraigne a due and just protection because those that demand the disposall of it have found a meanes to betray a multitude unto their cause amongst whom and on whose side all the Anabaptists Brownists Familists and Non-conformists are to be found even to a man and yet besides them I verily beleeve there are very many able honest and well minded men as likewise many right noble Lords and Members in the House of Commons most heartily desiring the good of their Countrey whose innocence and noble disposition making them unapt to suspect a foule face of treachery to be masked under the pretence of libertie subjects them to the deceipts and hypocrisie of some few furious deformers who as they want not art to abuse the integritie of many good subjects so have they many other meanes and inducements to make their cause suitable with the common sort of men They adorne it with assuming but unjustly the glorious name of Parliament with the very tyâ—le of Reformation they so tickle up the crasie minds of the multitude who ever are in dislike with what is present and beleeve much vertue to be in that which they never tryed that to witnesse their affections and forwardnesse in such a cause they will be content to charge and overcharge themselves and some of them to hazard their owne lives rather then as they are perswaded to live like vassals under a tyrannizing Prince or Popish superstition and these slanders of an intention to bring in Popery and superstition and arbitrary rule with such other falsities are ever made the Triarian Legion in which they put their last and chiefest strength were in soundnesse of reason that did support their cause it would not prevaile chiefely where least abilitie of judgement is But as which the simpler sort ever jealous over the intents and purposes of wiser men imaginary feares and slanders are the aptest meanes to prevaile So in others ambition and selfe conceipt meeting with an unquiet and factious spirit is that which I am perswaded hath given the greatest furtherance unto this unhappie cause Let every man enter into his owne heart and aske himselfe what it is that he particular wants what point of libertie his Ancestors ever had which hee now hath not or may not have granted by the King Let him aske himselfe whether more be not granted then ever our Forefathers had and whether it be not as well Nay better secured unto us then ever any liberty was unto them Why then
Church and Common-wealth and yet before that the Lords had rejected a bill for imposing the same Protestation How shaâ—l I defend their published orders as that of the ninth of September in derogation of the book of Common prayer and for suspension of some lawes in force concerning Church-government Or if not in ordinary â—ases yet informe me whether in case of neâ—essitie the Commons may make Oâ—dinances mauger the King and Lords and dispose of the strengeh of the Realme And if so whether they may not likewise levie Subsidies and impose taxes in such manner as they shall think fiâ— Whether is it pliamentaâ—y when a Biâ—l hath been once and againe rejected to obtrude it a third time in the same Session taking advantage of the absence of such as are knowne to oppose it Thus it is said was done to passe the Ordinance for the Militia How shall I satisfie such as saw heard and felt the frequent tumults resorting to the Parliament house dâ—ores o be no tumults but lawfull assemblies although they threatned and assaulted some Members and afâ—righted very many If I yeeld they were tumults I contradict a Declaration in the name of the Lords and Commons defining them to be lawfull assemblies If I say they were not tumults I am threatned by a Declâ—ration formerly made by a fuller house of Peers and sâ—nt downe to the house of Commons to have had their assistance for the suppressing of such tumulâ—s If it be objected to me that the new major part of the Houses doe assume and challenge ordinary power to make new and repeale old lawes shall I answer that they have not as yet so farre incroached upon the libertie of the Subject my opponent will I doubt reply that indirectly and impliciteâ—y they have alrâ—ady done it though polâ—â—ie will that they forbeare a while to claime it in downe right termes for feare it should too much staâ—tle the subject whose libertie must be invaded by degrees at first thâ—refore the vâ—te shall be onely thus Whensoever the Lords aâ—â— Commons shall dâ—claâ—e what the law of the land is the same must be asseâ—ted to and obeyed Let this be â—rst swallâ—wed and it wâ—ll â—hence be early proved in good time that those that may authorative declare the law lâ—ying an obligation immediately upon all to obey such Declaration may likewise whensoever they please make new or repeale the old law this will wilâ— be proved by a Declaration of the Lords and Commons If it were admitted say they that the King by his Proclamation â—he â—ow major part of Loâ—ds and Commons by their vote may declare a law thereby his Proclamation their vote will in effect become lawes which would turne â—o the subversion of the law of the land and the rights and liberties of the Subject This againe the Observator proves There is saith hee in the interpretation of law upon the last appeale the same supremacy of power requisite as is in making it and therefore grant the King to be supreme interpreter and t is all one as if we grant him to be suprâ—mâ— maker of law grant him this and we grant â—im to be above all limits all conditions all humane bounds whatsoever we resigne all into his hands Lives Lawes Liberties Parliaments all to be held at meâ—re discreâ—ion But the King will my opponent say never câ—aimed to himselfe alone any such power but the now major part of the two Houses do claime to themselves and such as shall at any time make themselves a major part this supreme power of interpreting and declaring law and accordingly they declare that the King may not send for Serjeant Skippon nor require any subject to come to him which by some speciall service is not bound to come to him That the Kâ—ng could not by the law adjourne the Terme to York and many such other Declarations and Interpretations of law they have made to all which they require the kingdome should obey without appealing And so they not the King will have our Lawes Lives Liberties Parliaments all to be held at meere discretion Now what cleere answer may be made to this reply I desire to be instructed Another doubt that perplexeth me ariseth from their declaring the priviledge of Parliament to extend to high treason now I do not know that any priviledge can have its ground or commencement unlesse it be by statute grant or prescription no statute grant or presciption can be alledged for this priviledge against treason nor indeed can a grant in such case hold foâ—ce if the King and Pope when the Pope was conceived to have had plenitude of power should have both joyned in granting a Sanctuarie for treason although it were not to exempt traytors from all manner of triall or punishment yet was such a grant in it selfe meerly void 1 Hen. 7. Staffâ—rds case c. And by the statute 26 Hen. 8. cap. 13. it is enacted that no offendor in any kinde of high treason shall have the priviledge of any manner of Sanctuarie And as there is neither statute nor grant so no prescription neither to exempt the members of Parliament wholly from punishment nor yet to change the method and manner of their triall for no prescription can be but it must be both reasonable in it selfe and also used and allowed now there hath not been nor can be any one instance given to prove that this priviledge was either allowed or so much as claimed nay the contrary practise hath been witnessed by Wentworths case cited by his Majestie whereunto many others might be added and as it wants allowance or claime so is it in it selfe unreasonable for if after the rising of the House I shall overheare or discover a Parliament man plotting treason and yeâ— may not attach him till I have acquainted the House which cannot be till next day or perhaps two dayes after that they againe sit the treason in the meane while will be executed or the traytor perceiving himselfe discovered will be fled So if a Parliament man at York commit treason murder or robberie if you may not arrest him till you have been at London and got leave of the House the offendor without doubt will not stirre away till you returne to apprehend him Can we imagine any should have greater priviledge then the law of Nations gives to Embassadours and yet they have no priviledge iâ— case of high treason being an offence against the lawes of Nations and Nature Cambd. Eliz. fol. 201. May not every Iudge in Westminster Hall claime this priviledge with better colour then a Member of Parliament though the Parliament be a higher Court then any of them For as the King may impeach one Iudge so more and then it will be in his pleasure or of any other accuser to make the ordinarie Courts though setled by prescription and Acts of Parliament and lesse depending upon the will of the King then doth the being of the two Houses what they will
â—yranizing over his Subjects If the Prince saith Bodin be an absolute Soveraigne as are the true Monarches of Spaine England c. where the Kings themselves have the Soveraignty without all doubt or question not divided with their Subjects in this case it is not lawfull for any one of the Subjects in particular nor all of them in generall to attempt anything either by way of fact or of justice against the honour life or dignity of the Soveraigne albeit that hee had committed all the wickednesse â—mpiety and cruelty that could be spoken for as to proceede against him by way of justice the Subjest hath uo such jurisdiction over his Soveraigne Prince of whom dependeth all power and authority to command Now if it be not lawfull for the Subject by way of justice to proceede against his Prince how should it then be lawfull to proceede against him by way of fact or force for question is not here what men are able to doe by strength and force but what they ought of right to doe the subject is not onely guilty of Treason in the highest degree who hath slaine his Soveraigne Prince but he also which hath appempted the same who hath given Counsell or consent thereto And then he goes on to prove the same by sundry examples taken out of Scripture and then saith he to answer vain objectiâ—ns were but idely to abuse both time and learning But as he which doubteth whether there be a God or noe is not with arguments to be refuted but with severe punishments so are they which call into question a thing so cleare and that by Bookâ—s publiquely imprinted that the Subjects may take up armes against their Prince being a Terant Howbeit the most learned Divines are cleare of opinion that it is not lawfull without especiall command from God And as for that which Calvin faith if there were at this time Magistrates appointed for the defence of thee people and to restraine the insolency of Kings as were the Ephori in Lacedemonia the Tribunes in Rome and the Demarches in Athens that they ought to resist and impeach their licentiousnesse and cruelty He sheweth sufficiently that it was never lawfull in a right Monarchy for he speaketh but of the popular and Arâ—stocratique States of Common-weales We read also that the Protestant Princes of Germany before they entred into armes against Charles the Emperour demanded of Martin Luther if it were lawfull who frankly told them that it was not lawfull whatsoever Tiranny or impiety were pretended yet was he not therein of them beleeved So thereof ensued a most deadly and lamentable Warre the â—â—d whereof was most miserable drawing with it the rume and destruction of many great and noble houses of Germany with exceeding slaughter of the Subjeâ—ts The Prince we may justly call the Father of the Countrey and ought to bee more deare unto every one then any Father Et nulla tanta impretas nullum tantum scelus est quod sit parricidio vindicandum I say therefore that the Subject is never to be suffered to attempt any thing against his soveraigne Prince how naughty and cruell soever he be Lawfull it is not to obey him in all things contrary unto the Lawes of God and nature to fly and hide our selves from him but yet to suffer stripes yea and death also rather then to attempt any thing against his life or honour This is the substance of that learned Protestants discourse which is worth your reading at large But alas all this discourse is besides the present businesse nothing is attempted against the life or honour of the Prince the taking up of Armes and shooting bullets at him is in defence of his Majesties person there are no expressions in this observatour nor yet in him that hath made observations upon a speech of King James with eight and twenty Queres nor in any other Pamphlets that licenciously slye about that doe at all touch the honour of the Kings Subjects may not resist saith Bodin and our best Divines without speciall command but ouâ— Brethren now have speciall instruction from the Spirit to doe what they doe or if they have not the Spirit assuring them that they may take armes against their Prince yet Master Cal. hath well distinguished that it is one thing to sight against a King another thing to fight against the lusts of a King Against the lusts of a King my beloved Brethren we may fight nay we ought to fight against them And our Observatour stands in defence of that distinction That levying Forces against the personall commands of the King though accompanied with his presence is not levying warre against the King but warre against his authory though not person is warre against the King But in truth are not all these shifting distinctions like a Shipmans hose that will fit an Jrish Rebell as well as an English I dare not speake my minde of that distinction the Observator maintaines but you shall heare what an honourable Chancellour of England hath long since said of it This is a dangerous distinction betweene the King and the Crowne and betweene the King and the Kingdome it reacheth too farre I wish every good Subject to beware of it It was never taught but either by traytours as in Spencers Bill in Edward the seconds time or by treasonable Papists as Harding in his confutation of the Apologie maintaineth that Kings have their authority by the positive Law of Nations and have no more power then the people have of whom they take their temporall jurisdiction and so Ficlerus Simanca and others of that crew by seditious sectaries and puritans as Buchanan de Jure Regni apud Scotus Penry Knox and such like in Calvins case it is reported that in the reigne of Ed. 2. the Spencers to cover the treason hatched in their hearâ—s invented this damnable and damned opinion that homage and oath of ligeance was more by reason of the Kings Crowne that is of his politique capacity then by reason of the person of the King upon which opinion they inferred execrable and detestable consequence 1. If the King doe not demean himself by reason in the right of his Crown his leiges are bound by oath to remove the King 2. Seeing the King could not be removed by suit of Law that ought to be done per aspertee 3. That his leiges be bound to govern in aid of him and in default of him All which were condemned by two Parliaments I will not say that this concernes the Observator or any body else let others judge I only say I am unsatisfied how we may lawfully use active resistance with our swords in our hands against a lawfull soveraign Prince though tyrannizing or if it might be done yet certainly not till after much sufferance and that destruction shall open its jawes ready to swallow us up and not upon imagenary feares and jealousies such as we have had now at lest twelve moneths past