Selected quad for the lemma: lord_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
lord_n	assemble_v	king_n	parliament_n	11,796	5	6.7701	4	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A86917	A treatise of monarchie, containing two parts: 1. concerning monarchy in generall. 2. concerning this particular monarchy. Wherein all the maine questions occurrent in both, are stated, disputed, and determined: and in the close, the contention now in being, is moderately debated, and the readiest meanes of reconcilement proposed. Done by an earnest desirer of his countries peace.	Hunton, Philip, 1604?-1682.	1643 (1643)	Wing H3781; Thomason E103_15; ESTC R5640	60,985	86

evident that a Court is the seat and subject of Authority and power and not barely of counsell and advice Object 2 Secondly the two Houses together with the King are the supreme Court of the Kingdome but taken divisely from the King it is no Court and consequently hath no power Sol. Suppose them no entire Court divided from the King yet they are two Estates of the three which make up the supreme Court so that they have a power and authority though not complete and sufficing to perfect an Act without the concourse of the third For it appeares by the Acts of that Court that every of the three Estates hath a Legislative power in it every Act being enacted by the Kings most excellent Majesty and by the Authority of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament Sect. 3 Thirdly they have an authority but in subordination to Object 3 the King and derived from him as his Parliament Indeed this is a maine Question and hath very weighty Arguments on both sides Whether the authority of the two Houses be derived from the King viz. Whether the authority of both the Houses be a subordinate authority and derived from the King as its originall Three Reasons seeme strong for the affirmative First because it is his Parliament so called and acknowledged If his Court then the power whereby they are a Court is his power derived from him as the power of other Courts is Secondly because he hath the power of calling and dissolving it Thirdly because he is acknowledged in the Oaths of Allegeance and Supremacy to be the Head and of supreme authority in the Kingdome and all subject to him And whereas some make answere that he is Singulis major but Vniversis minor Treatise entitituled A fuller Answer to Dr. Ferne. so the Answerer to Doctor Ferne I wonder that the Proposition of the Observator that the King is Vniversis minor should be so much exploded Every member scorsi●● is a subject but all collection in their houses are not And hee sayes simply the Houses are co-ordinate to the King nor subordinate that the Lords stile Comites or Peeres implies in Parliament a co-ordinative society with his Majesty in the Government I conceive this Answerer to avoid one extreme falls on another for this is a very overthrow of all Monarchy and to reduce all Government to Democracy For looke where the apex potestatis is there is the Government Also it is against Common Reason For the King is he not King of the Kingdome and what is the Kingdome but all united all the particulars knit together in one body politick so that if he be King of the Kingdome he is Vniversis major too for the King is major and the Kingdome is the united universe of the People Thus those expressions are some of them false some though secundum quid true yet spoken simply and in that manner are scandalous and incompatible to Monarchy Thus you see what may be said on the one side to prove the King to be the originall of all power even of that which is in the Houses of Parliament assembled On the other side are as weighty Arguments to prove the contrary viz. That the two Houses authority is not dependent nor derived from the Royall power First the authority of the Houses being Legislative is the supreme and so cannot bee derived Three concurrent Powers producing one supreme act as con-cause joint causes of the same highest effect cannot have a subordination among themselves in respect of that casualty it not being imaginable how a power can cause the supreme effect and yet be a subordinate and derived power Secondly the end of constituting these two Estates being the limiting and preventing the excesses of the third their power must not be totally dependent and derived from the third for then it were unsuitable for the end for which it was ordained For to limit an Agent by a power subordinate and depending on himself is all one as to leave him at large without any limitation at all Thirdly that which hath beene spoken of a mixed Monarchy doth fully prove that the two other powers which concurre with the Monarch to constitute the mixture must not be altogether subordinate to it and derived from it I must professe these Reasons to prevaile with me that I cannot conceive how the authority of the two Houses can in the whole being of it be a dependent and derived power That we may find out the truth amidst this potent contradiction Sect. 4 of both sides Resolution of the Question recourse must be had to the Architecture of this Government whereof I must declare my self to be so great an Admirer that what ever more then humane wisedom had the contriving of it whether done at once or by degrees found out and perfected I conceive it unparalleld for exactnesse of true policy in the whole world such a care for the Soveraignty of the Monarch such a provision for the liberty of the People and that one may bee justly allayed and yet consist without impeachment of the other that I wonder how our Forefathers in those rude unpolished times could attain such an accurate composure First then suppose a people either compelled to it by conquest or agreeing to it by free consent Nobles and Commons set over themselves by publike compact one Soveraigne and resigne up themselves to him and his heires to be governed by such and such Fundamentall Lawes there 's a supremacy of power set up though limited to one course of exercise Secondly then because in all Governments after cases will come it requiring an addition of Lawes suppose them covenanting with their Soveraigne that if cause be to constitute any other Lawes hee shall not by his sole power doe that worke but they reserve at first or afterwards it is granted them which is all one a hand of concurrence therein that they will be bound by no Lawes but what they joyne with him in the making of Thirdly because though the Nobles may personally convene yet the Commons being so many cannot well come together by themselves to the doing of such a worke it be also agreed that every Corporation of the Commons shall have power to depute one or more to be for the whole in this publike legislative businesse that so the Nobles by themselves the Commons by their Deputies assembling there may be representatively the whole body having Commission to execute that reserved authority for establishing new Lawes Fourthly because the occasion and need of making new Lawes and authentick expounding the old would not be constant and perpetuall and it would carry an appearance of a Government in which were three Heads and chiefe Powers they did not stablish these Estates to be constantly existent but occasionally as the causes for which they were ordained should emerge and happen to be Fifthly because a Monarchy was intended and therefore a Supremacy of power as farre as possible must be