and takes notice that this Writ is not returnable into that Court from Wales and therefore orders that the Significavit shall be sent by Mittimus out of the Chancery to the Chief Iustice there and gives them power to make Process to inferior Officers returnable before them at their Sessions for the due Execution of this Writ all which had beén in vain if the Capias might go into Wales before the making this Act. Answ But that is an original Writ and so comes not up to this Case Wyndham Iustice agreed in omnibus and said that the Statute of 1 Ed. 6. was very needful for if a Man should be outlawed if the Process should be sent to the Sheriff of the next adjoining County in England he could not have any notice that he was outlawed and so could not tell when oulawed or at whose Suit Vaughan late Lord Chief Iustice held strongly Vaugh. 395. 2 Saund. 194. that no Execucution would go into Wales when this Case was argued before him and of the same Opinion was Iustice Twisden Williamson versus Hancock Collateral Warranty Mod. Rep. 192. A Special Verdict was found in an Ejectment where the Case was Richard Lock the Father was Tenant for Life with Remainder in Tail to Richard his Son Remainder to the right Heirs of the Father who levies a Fine with Warranty to the use of Susan and Hannah Prinn in Feé they by Bargain and Sale convey their Estate to the Defendant The Son in his Fathers life time before the Warranty attached comes of full age the Father dies The Question was whether the Sons Entry was barred by this collateral Warranty thus discended And the thrée Iustices absente North Chief Iustice were clear of Opinion that the collateral Waranty was a barr to the Son and so Iudgment was given for the Defendant Ellis Iustice held that his Entry is taken away for in every Warranty two things are implied a Voucher and Rebutter he that comes in by Voucher calleth the person into Court who is bound in the Warranty to defend his Right or yield him other Land in recompence and must come in by Privity but if a Man have the Estate though he comes in the Post he may rebut that is he may repel the Action of the Heir by the Warranty of his Ancestor without shewing how the Estate came to him Fitzh Nat. Br. 135. In a Formedon in the Discender to say the Ancestor enfeoffed J.S. with Warranty without shewing how J. S. came by his Estate is good Object It was objected by Serjeant Maynard that no person can take advantage of a Warranty who comes in by way of use as in this Case Answ But 't is expresly resolved otherwise in Lincoln Colledge Case 3 Co. 62. b. and the Prinns in this Case came in by Limitation and Act of the Party and the Defendant who hath the Reversion likewise by Limitation of Vse though he be in the Post shall take benefit of the Warranty as Assignee within the Statute of 32 H. 8. Mod. Rep. 181. c. 34. and so it was resolved in Fowl and Dobles Case in this Court that he who comes in by way of use may rebut and Iustice Jones in his Report fol. 199. affirms the fourth resolution in Lincoln Colledge Case to be Law It was formerly objected by the Lord Chief Iustice Vaughan that this Warranty goes only to the Heirs not to the Assigns and here the Estate was conveyed by the two Prinns before the Warranty attached Answ But when the Estate passeth the Warranty and Covenant followeth and the Assignée shall have the benefit thereof though not named and so is the Authority of 38 E. 3. 26. if a Warranty be made to a Man and his Heirs the Assigneé though not named shall Rebutt but he cannot Vouch. So if A. enfeoff B. with Warranty and B. enfeoff C. without Déed C. shall vouch A. as Assigneé of the Land of B. for the Warranty cannot be assigned In this Case though the Warranty did not attach before the Estate in the Land was transferred yet if it attach afterwards 't is well enough and he who hath the Possession shall Rebutt the Demandant without shewing how he came by the Possession If a Warranty be to one and his Heirs without the word Assigns the Assignée indeéd cannot Vouch but he may * 1 Inst 265. a 384. Rebutt for Rebutter is so incident to a Warranty that a Condition not to Rebutt is void in Law But 't is otherwise of a Condition not to Vouch for in such case you may Rebutt 'T is true it hath béen an Opinion that he who claimeth above the Warranty if it be not attached cannot take benefit of it by way of Voucher or Rebbutter as if Tenant in Dower maketh a Feoffment to a Villain with Warranty and the Lord entreth upon him before the descent of the Warranty the Villain can never take advantage of this Warranty by way of Rebutter because the Lords Title is paramount the Warranty and he cometh not under his Estate to whom the Warranty was made If Land be given to two Brothers in Feé with Warranty to the eldest and his Heirs the eldest dies without Issue the Survivor shall not take benefit by this Warranty for the reason aforesaid But in the Case at Barr the Warranty being collateral and annexed to the Land goeth with the Estate and whilst that continues the Party may Vouch or Rebutt so here the Defendant though he be only Tenant at Will for the Estate is in the Bargainors and their Heirs there being no Execucution of it either by Livery or Enrolment yet he may Rebutt Iustice Atkins was of the same Opinion that by this collateral Warranty the Entry of the Lessor of the Plaintiff was taken away for 't is the nature of a collateral Warranty to be a Barr a * Jones Rep. 199 200. 1 Inst 366 385. 25 H. 6. 63. Bro. Gar. 4. Right is bound by it it extinguishes a Right 't is annexed to the Land and runs with it If then a collateral Warranty be of this nature 't is against all reason that he who is thus bound should make any Title to the Land but 't is very reasonable that he who comes in quasi by that Estate should defend his Title The Opinions of Iustice Jones and Iustice Crook in the Case of * Cro. Car. 368. Spirt and Bence has occasioned this doubt The Case was shortly thus Cann being seised in Fée had thrée Sons Thomas Francis and Henry and devised Lands to the two eldest in Tail and to Henry the Meadow called Warhay which was the Land in question but doth not limit what Estate he should have in it then he adds these Words viz. Also I will that he shall enjoy all Bargains I had of Webb to him and his Heirs and for want of Heirs of his * Notwithstanding the word Body he had but an Estate for Life in Warhay for that
Construction can be made of them but that an Estate in possession was thereby intended to pass 4. Object That this Fine and Grant must be construed to enure according to the intent of the Parties ut res magis valeat and they never intended to make a Forfeiture Answ Certainly no Man ever intended to make a Forfeiture of his own Estate those are generally the effects of Ignorance and not of the Will as the Case of Gimlet and Sands Cro. Car. * 1 Roll. Abr. 856. 391. where Tenant in Fee makes a Feoffment to two to the use of himself for Life then to the use of his Wife for Life Remainder in Tail to his Son and Heir Remainder to his own right Heirs and afterwards he made another Feoffment to Smith with Warranty the Mother and Son join in another Feoffment adjudged that this was a Forfeiture of her Estate for life though she had no notice of the Warranty made by her Husband for the Feoffment made by him was a publick Act upon the Land and she ought to have taken notice of it and though by her joining in the Feoffment with her Son she did not intend to forfeit her Estate yet the Law adjudges according to what is done But in the Case at Barr the intention of the Parties may be collected by the Act done and there is great reason to presume that the Parties thereby intended to displace the Reversion for the Husband joyning in the Fine and in the Warranty if it was no divesting the Warranty is of no use Another Objection has been only mentioned which is that admitting this should amount to a displacing if the Estate had been in possession yet in this Case it would not because it was prevented by the Lease for years in being But that cannot hinder the execution of this Fine 't is a Fine sur concessit which is executory in its nature and doth not pass any Estate or take any effect 'till executed and so is the Book 41 5. 3. 14. b. But in this Case the Fine was executed which may be by matter in pais as well as by Scire facias and as to this purpose may be executed by the entry of the Conusor 1 Rep. 106. Dyer 376. b. without suing out any Execution 38 Ed. 3. Brook tit Scire facias 199. If there had been a Fine executed there would have beén little doubt left in this Case and by the Attornment of the Lessee for years it must be admitted that this Fine was executed as 8 Ed. 3. f. 44. For a Fine of a Reversion may be executed to all purposes by the Attornment of the Lessee for years and if so when a Fine executory is once executed 't is as good as a Fine sur Conusance de droit come ceo to make a forfeiture of the particular Estate Where a Feoffment is made and a Lease for years is in being the Feoffment is not good because in such case there must be a present transposition of the Estate Postea Moor and Pitt which is hindred by the Lease But in case of a Fine which is a Feoffment upon Record a Lease for years is no impediment or displacing of the Reversion for if Tenant in Tayl expectant upon a Lease for years levy a Fine 't is a discontinuance of the Tayl and notwithstanding this Lease the Fine has such an operation upon the Free-hold that it displaces the Reversion in Fee Co. Lit. 332. And therefore if a Lease for years prevents not a Discontinuance it will much less hinder a displacing in this case But no Iudgment was given now in this Case another matter being debated whether the Plaintiff could have Iudgment because he was barred by the Statute of Limitations for it did not appear that he had been in possession for twenty years past and the Verdict hath not found any Claim or that the Plaintiff was within the Proviso of the Act. Waterfield versus the Bishop of Chichester Oath Ex Officio not to be administred A Prohibition was granted last Easter-Term to the Bishop of Chichester upon a Suggestion made by Waterfield that he being chosen Churchwarden of the Parish Church of Arundel in the County of Sussex the Bishop tendered him an Oath ex officio which was that he should Present every Parishioner who had done any Offence or neglected any Duty mentioned in certain Articles contained in a printed Book delivered to him some of which Articles concern the Church-warden himself and so in effect he was to swear against himself in case of any default which is expressly against the Statute of 13 Car. 2. Sid. 232 cap. 12. which prohibits any person having Ecclesiastical Iurisdiction to administer the Oath ex officio or any other Oath whereby the person to whom 't is administred may be charged to accuse himself of any criminal matter whereby he may be lyable to any Censure or punishment and because the Bishop had Excommunicated him for refusing such Oath he prayed a Prohibition which was granted quoad the compelling him to make any answer to the said Articles concerning himself and the Excommunication was discharged But now upon the motion of Serjeant Brampston a Consultation was awarded because it appeared by the Affidavit of the Commissary who tendred this Oath and likewise by the act of the Court that he was Excommunicated for refusing to take the Oath of a Church warden according to Law which was the only Oath tendred and therefore the ground of the Prohibition being false a Consultation was awarded In this Prohibition it was recited That the Bishop cannot give an Oath but in two cases viz. in matters Testamentary and Matrimonial whereas they have authority in many cases more 't is true also that until his Iurisdiction was increased by Act of Parliament he could hold Plea in none but those two causes 2 Inst 487 537. but by the Statute De circumspecte agatis and of Articuli Cleri he may now hold Plea in many other cases The Bishop informed the Lord Chief Iustice that the Plaintiff Waterfeild had caused 2000 of the Prohibitions to be printed in English and had dispersed them all over the Kingdom intituling them a true translated Copy of a Writ of Prohibition granted by the Lord Chief Iustice and other the Iustices of the Court of Common Pleas in Easter-Term 1676. against the Bishop of Chichester who had proceeded against and Excommunicated one Thomas Waterfield a Churchwarden for refusing to take the Oath usually tendred to persons in such Office by which Writ the Illegality of all such Oaths is declared and the said Bishop commanded to take off his Excommunication And this was declared by the Court to be a most seditious Libel and gave order to enquire after the Printer that he might be prosecuted Eleanor Plummer versus Sir Jeremy Whitchot Intr. Trin. 27 or 28 Car. 2. Rot. 301. in B. R. IN an Action of Debt for an Escape Vpon Nil debet
By the Statute of 21 H. 8. cap. 5. the Ordinary is to grant Administration to the Widow of the Intestate or to the next of his Kin or to both as by his discretion he shall think good and in Case where divers persons claim the Administration as next of Kin which be in equal degree the Ordinary may commit Administration to which he pleaseth and his power was not abridged but rather revived by this late Act by which 't is Enacted 22 23 Car. 2. That just and equal distribution shall be made amongst Wife and Children or next of Kin in equal degree or legally representing their Stocks pro suo cuique jure and the Children of the half Blood do in the Civil Law legally represent the Father and to some purposes are esteemed before the Vncles of the whole Blood 'T is no Objection to say that because the Law rejects the half Blood as to Inheritances therefore it will do the same as to personal Estates because such Estates are not to be determined by the Common but by the Canon or Civil Law and if so the half Blood shall come in for distribution for this Act of Parliament confirms that Law Winnington Sollicitor General contra He agreed that before this Act the half Blood was to have equal share of the Intestates Estate but that now the Ordinary was compelled to make such distribution and to such persons as by the Act is directed for he had not an original power to grant Administration in any case that did belong to the Temporal Courts Sid. 370 371. but it was given to him by the Indulgence of Princes not quatenus a Spiritual Person Hensloes Case 9 Co. Bendl. 133. And if he had not power in any Case he could not grant to whom he pleased But admitting he could his power is now abridged by this Statute and he cannot grant but to the Wife and Children or next of Kin in equal degrée or legally representing their Stocks Now such legal representation must be according to the Rules of the Common and not of the Civil Law for if there be two lawful Brothers and a Bastard eigne and a Question should arise concerning the distribution of an Intestates Estate the subsequent Marriage according to the Law in the Spiritual Court would make the latter legitimate and if so a legal Representative amongst them but this Court will never allow him so to be But the Court were all of Opinion that in respect of the Father the half Blood is as near as those of the whole and therefore they are all alike and shall have an equal distribution and that such Construction should be made of the Statute as would be most agreeable to the Will of the dead person if he had devised his Estate by Will and it was not to be imagined if such Will had been made but something would have been given to the Children of the half Blood And thereupon a Consultaion was granted Anonymus In C. B. FAux Judgment viz. Serjeant Turner took this Exception that the Plaintiff in the Court below had declared ad damnum 20 l. whereas it not being a Court of Record and being sine Brevi the Court could not hold Plea of any Sum above 40 s. and for this Cause the Iudgment was reversed DE Termino Paschae Anno 29 Car. II. in Communi Banco Southcot versus Stowel Intrat ' Hill 25 26 Car. 2. Regis Rot. 1303. IN a Special Verdict in Ejectment The Case was Covenant to stand seised how it differs from a Conveyance at the Common Law Mod. Rep. 226. Thomas Southcot having Issue two Sons Sir Popham and William and being seised in Fée of a Farm called Indyo the Lands now in question did upon the Marriage of his eldest Son Sir Popham covenant to stand seised of the said Farm to the use of the said Sir Popham Southcot and the Heirs Males of his Body on Margaret his Wife to be begotten and for want of such Issue to the Heirs Males of the Covenantor and for want of such Issue to his own right Heirs for ever Sir Popham had Issue begotten on his Wife Margaret Edward his Son and five Daughters and dies Thomas the Covenantor dies Edward dies without Issue And whether the five Daughters as Heirs general of Thomas or William their Vncle as special Heir Male of Thomas per formam doni shall inherit this Land was the Question Two Objections were made against the Title of William the Vncle. 1. Vaugh. 49. Because here is no express Estate to Thomas the Covenantor for 't is limited to his Heirs Males the Remainder to his own right Heirs so that he having no Estate for Life the Estate Tail could not be executed in him and for that reason William cannot take by descent 2. He cannot take by Purchase for he is to be Heir of Thomas and Heir Male the Limitation is so but he cannot be Heir for his five Nieces are Heirs In answer to which these Assertions were laid down 1. That in this Case Thomas the Covenantor hath an Estate for Life by implication and so the Estate Tail being executed in him comes to William by descent and not by purchase for though the Covenantor had departed with his whole Estate and limited no Vse to himself yet he hath a Reversion because he can have no right Heir while he is living and therefore the Statute of 27 H. 8. Hob. 30. creates an Vse in him till the future use cometh in esse and by consequence the right Heirs cannot take by purchase for wherever the Heir takes by purchase the Ancestor must depart with his whole Fee for which reason a Fee cannot be raised by way of purchase to a Mans right Heirs by the name of Heirs either by Conveyance of Land or by Vse or Devise but it works by descent 1 Inst 22. b. And that Vses may arise by Implication by Covenants to stand seized the Authorities are very plentiful Moor 284. 1 Co. 154. Lord Paget's Case cited in the Rector of Cheddington's Case Cro. Eliz. 321. 1 Roll. Rep. 239 240 317 438. Lane vers Pannel Cor. Car. And in the Case of Hodgkinson and Wood in a Devise there was the same limitation as this the Case was Thomas being seised in Fee had Issue Francis and William by several Venters and devised Land to Francis his eldest Son for Life then to the Heirs Males of his Body and for default of such Issue to the Heirs Males of William and the Heirs Males of their Bodies for ever and for default of such Issue to the use of the right Heirs of the Devisor then he made a Lease to William for 30 years to commence after his death and dies William Enters and Surenders this Lease to Francis who Enters and makes a Lease to the Defendant and dyes without Issue and William Enters and makes a Lease to the Plaintiff it was adjudged for William because he being
Heir Male of the Body of the Devisor had by this Limitation an Estate Tayl as by Purchase and that the Inheritance in Fee simple did not vest in Francis 2. If Thomas the Covenantor had no Estate executed in him yet William his Son in this Case may take by way of future springing use because the Limitation of an Estate upon a Covenant to stand seised may be made to commence after the Ancestors Death for the old Seisin of the Covenantor is enough to support it There is a great difference between a Feoffment to Vses and a Covenant to stand seised for by the Feoffment the Estate is executed presently 1 Co. 154. Rector of Cheddington's Case So if there be a Feoffment to A. for Life Remainder to B. in Fee if A. refuse B. shall enter presently because the Feoffor parted with his whole Estate but if this had been in the Case of a Covenant to stand seised if A. had refused the Covenantor should have enjoyed it again till after the death of A. by way of springing use like the Case of Parsons and Willis 2 Roll. Abr. 794. Where a Man Covenants with B. That if he doth not marry he will stand seised to the use of B. and his Heirs B. dies the Covenantor doth not marry this Vse arises as well to the Heir of B. as to B. himself if he had been living and he shall have the Land in the nature of a descent But if William cannot take it either by purchase or by descent he shall take it 3. Per formam doni as special Heir to Thomas This Case was compared to that in Littleton Sect. 23. If Lands are given to a Man and the heirs Females of his Body if there be a Son the Daughter is not Heir but yet she shall take it for voluntas donatoris c. So if Lands are given to a Man and the Heirs Males of his Body the youngest Son shall have it after the death of the eldest leaving Issue only Daughters for these are descents secundum formam doni So in this Case the Estate Tail vested in Edward and when he died without Issue it comes to William per formam doni Object The Case of Greswold in 4 5 Ph. Mariae Dyer 156. seems to be express against this Opinion which was that Greswold was seised in Fee and made a Grant for Life the Remainder to the Heirs Males of his Body the Remainder to his own right Heirs he had Issue two Sons and dyed the eldest Son had Issue a Daughter and dyed and if the Daughter or her Vncle should have the Land was the question in that Case And it was adjudged that the Limitation of the Remainder was void because Greswold could not make his right Heir a Purchasor without departing with the whole Fee Postea Brittain and Charnock and therefore Iudgment was given against the special Heir in Tail for the Heir general which was the Daughter Answ Admit that Case to be Law yet the Iudges there differed in their Arguments 'T is not like this at Bar for that Case was not upon a Covenant to stand seised but upon a Deed indented and so a Conveyance at the Common Law But for an Authority in the point the Case of Pybus and Mitford was cited and relied on which was Trin. 24 Car. 2. Rot. 703. Mod. Rep. 159. 1 Ventris 372. adjudged by Hales Chief Iustice Rainsford and Wild but Iustice Twisden was of a contrary Opinion Serjeant Stroud who argued on the other side made three Points 1. Whether this Limitation be good in its creation 2. If the Estate Tail be well executed in Thomas the Covenantor 3. If it be good and well executed whether when Edward died without Issue the whole Estate Tail was not spent 1. And as to the first Point he held that this Limitation to the Heirs Males of Thomas was void in the creation because a Man cannot make himself or his own right Heir a Purchasor unless he will part with the whole Estate in Fee Dyer 309 b. If A. being seised in Fee makes a Lease for Life to B. the Remainder to himself for years this Remainder is void so if it had been to himself for Life because he hath an Estate in Fee and he cannot reserve to himself a lesser Estate than he had before 42 Ass 2. If I give Lands to A. for Life the Remainder to my self for Life the Remainder in Fee to B after the death of A. in this Case B. shall enter for the Remainder to me was void 1 H. 5. 8. 42 Edw. 3. 5. Bro. Estate 66. Dyer 69. b. 'T is true these Cases are put at the Common Law but the Statute of Vses makes no alteration for according to the Rules laid down in Chudleigh's Case by my Lord Chief Iustice Popham 1 Co. 138. 1. Vses are odious and so the Law will not favour them 2. A Rule at Common Law shall not be broke to vest an Vse and the Vses here cannot vest without breaking of a Rule in Law 3. Vses are raised so privately that he who takes them may not know when they vest and for that reason they are not to be favoured 4. The Statute annexes both the Possession and the Vse together as they vest and divest both together Moor 713. 2 Co. 91. Co. Lit. 22. Moor 284. 2. As to the second Point The Estate is not executed in Thomas and therefore William cannot take it by descent Heirs of his Body or Heirs Male are good Words of Limitation to take by Purchase from a Stranger but not from an Ancestor for there he shall take by descent and for this there is an Authority Co. Lit. 26. b. John had Issue by his Wife Roberga Robert and Mawd John dies Michael gave Lands to Roberga and to the Heirs of her Husband on her Body begotten Roberga in this Case had but an Estate for Life for the Fee Tail vested in Robert and when he died without Issue his Sister Maud was Tenant in Tail per formam Doni and in a Formedon she counted as Heir to Robert which she was not neither was she Heir to her Father at the time of the Gift yet it was held good for the Words Viz. Heirs of the Body of the Father were Words of Purchase in this Case If therefore no Vse for Life vested in Thomas then William cannot take by descent Dyer 156. Co. Lit. 22. Hob. 31. Dyer 309. 1 Co. 154. Lord Paget's Case cited in Hob. 151. 3. To the third Point Admitting both the former to be against him yet since Edward is dead without Issue the Estate Tail is spent But the whole Court were of Opinion Judgment That William should Inherit this Land in question for though at the Common Law a Man cannot be Donor and Donee without he part with the whole Estate yet 't is otherwise upon a Covenant to stand seised to Vses And if any other Construction should be made
Estate for years and so having no Freehold the Contingent Remainder could not be supported that Mary could not take by way of Executory Devise because Robert was living when his Son Benjamin dyed within Age that therefore 't is quasi a Condition precedent Grant's Case 10 Co. cited in Lampet's Case 1 Leon. 101. There is a difference between Boraston's Case and this at the Barr for that was a Devise to Executors till Hugh shall attain his Age of 21 years and the mean Profits in the mean time to be applyed by them for payment of the Testators Debts and because he might have computed how long it would be before his Debts could be paid therefore it was adjudged that after the death of Hugh within Age the Executors should continue in possession till Hugh might have attained his full Age had he lived and so a present Devise to them But here the Devise is generally till Benjamin Wharton shall attain his Age of 21 years so that nothing vested in him until that time and he dying before then the Estate shall descend to the general Heir who is the Plaintiff 2. Admitting this should be taken as an executory Devise there must be some person capable to take when the Contingency happens and there was no such person in this Case for Robert was alive when Benjamin dyed and Mary could not then take as Heir of his Body for Nemo est haeres viventis like the Case of 2 Cro. 590. Vaugh. 272. Pell and Brown viz. Brown had Issue William and Thomas he devises Land to his youngest Son Thomas and his Heirs and if he dye living William then to William and his Heirs Thomas did dye without Issue living William and it was adjudged that if those Words Living William had been left out of the Will Thomas would have a Fee Tail which he might have docked by a Common Recovery but by reason of those Words he had only a limited Fee because the Words viz. If he dyed without Issue are not indefinite to create a Tail but are restrained to his dying without Issue Living William which is a limited Fee and his Estate being determined William then had a Fee but if he had died before the Contingency happened viz. in the Life time of Thomas and then Thomas had dyed without Issue the Heirs of William would not have an Estate in Fée for the Reasons aforesaid If therefore nothing vested in Benjamin Wharton nor in Mary his Sister then the Land descends to Augustine Smith as Heir at Law to Elizabeth who was Heir to the Testator and so the Plaintiff hath a good Title Ex parte Def. Newdigate Serjeant contra Here is only an Estate for years in the Sister of the Testator and an Estate in Fee presently vested in Benjamin Wharton and he relyed upon Boraston's Case where the Father having Issue Humfry and Henry devised to his Executors till Hugh his Grandson the Son of Henry should be of Age and then to him in Fée it was there adjudged that the Executors had a Term till Hugh might have attained his full Age and that though he dyed at the Age of nine years yet the Remainder did immediately vest in him in possession upon the death of his Grandfather and that by his dying without Issue the Lands did descend to his Brother So here the Fee descends to Benjamin Wharton in possession and he dying without Issue and within Age the Land shall then descend to his Sister and Heir The like Iudgment was given in the Case of Taylor and Wharton about 12 years since and in Dyer 124. a. A Devise to his Wife till his Son shall be of the Age of 24 years then to the Son in Fee and if he die before 24 years without Issue then to the Wife for Life the Remainder to A. c. The Testator dyed 2 Leon. 11. pl. 16. Dyer 354. a. it was adjudged that the Son had a Fee simple presently for an Estate tail he could not have till he was 24 years old and after the death of his Father there was no particular Estate to support that Estate in the Remainder till he should come to the Age of 24 years so that he took by descent immediately So here a Feé vested in Benjamin presently and he being dead within Age Mary may take as Heir however when she is of Age she shall take as Heir of the Body of Robert by way of executory Devise arising out of the Estate of the Devisor Stiles 240. Owen 148. which needs no particular Estate to support it as in case of a Contingent Remainder for before Mary was of Age Robert her Father was dead and so she might well take Trin. 19 Car. 2. in B. R. Snow versus Cutler Rot. 1704. North Chief Iustice Curia Favourable distinctions have béen always admitted to supply the meaning of Men in their last Wills and therefore a Devise to A. till he be of Age then to B. and his Heirs this is an Estate for years in A. with a Remainder in Feé to B And if such a Devise to A. who is also made Executor or for payment of Debts it shall be for a certain Term of years viz. for so long as according to computation he might have attained that Age had he lived Contingent Remainders are at the Common Law and arise upon Conveyances as well as Wills one may limit an Estate to A. the Remainder to another and so it may be by Devise if the intent of the Parties will have it so But as at the Common Law all Contingent Remainders shall not be good so in Wills no such latitude is given as if none could be bad they are subject to the same Fate in Wills as in Conveyances In this Case Elizabeth had a Term till Benjamin Wharton be of Age for she is Executrix she was likewise Heir at Law to the Devisor and this Land had gone to her had it not béen for this Will so that 't is plain the Testator never intended that a Fee-simple should vest in her but somewhere else for he could never intend the Descent of the Inheritance to that person to whom he had devised the Term. It has beén argued that Mary is Heir at Law to Benjamin as well as Heir of the Body of Robert and so if she can take either way 't is good but to make her Heir to Benjamin 't is necessary that the Estate vest in him before he comes to 21 years and for that Boraston's Case was much relyed on which was also said not to differ from this at the Barr that an Estate passes to Benjamin Wharton in praesenti and that there was no Incapacity for Mary to take by way of Executory Devise as was urged on the other side and therefore why should she not take by way of Executory Devise as Heir of the Body of her Father or at least as Heir of Benjamin her Brother An Executory Devise needs no
particular Estate to support it for it shall descend to the Heir till the Contingency happen 't is not like a Remainder at the Common Law which must vest eo instanti that the particular Estate determines but the Learning of Exeecutory Devises stands upon the Reasons of the old Law wherein the intent of the Devisor is to be observed For when it appears by the Will that he intends not the Devisee to take but in futuro and no disposition being made thereof in the mean time it shall then descend to the Heir till the Contingency happen but if the intent be that he shall take in praesenti and there is no incapacity in him to do it he shall not take in futuro by an executory Devise Sid. 153. pl. 2. A Devise to an Infant in ventre sa mere is good and it shall descend to the Heir in the mean time for the Testator could not intend he should take presently he must first be in rerum natura 3 Co. 20. a. 1 Inst 378. a. If an Estate be given to A. for Life the Remainder to the right Heirs of B. this is a contingent Remainder and shall be governed by the Rules of the Law for if B. dye during the Life of A. 't is good but if he survive 't is void because no Body can be his right Heir whilst he is living and there shall be no descent to the Heir of the Donor in the mean time to support this contingent Remainder that so when B. dies his right Heirs may take In this Case a Fée did vest in Benjamin presently and therefore after his death without Issue the Defendant is his Heir and hath a good Title if not as Heir at Law yet she may take by way of Executory Devise as Heir of the Body of her Father which though it could not be whilst he was living because nemo est haeres viventis yet after his death she was Heir of his Body and was then of Age at which time and not before she was to take by the Will That Elizabeth the general Heir had only an Estate for years till Benjamin should or might be of Age And so by the Opinion of the whole Court Iudgment was given for the Defendant Evered versus Hone. SPecial Verdict in Ejectment wherein the Case was thus viz. A Man hath Issue two Sons Thomas his eldest and Richard his youngest Son Thomas hath Issue John Richard hath Issue Mary The Father devised Lands to his Son Thomas for Life Constructi-of Words in a Devise and afterwards to his Grandson John and the Heirs Males of his Body and if he die without Issue Male then to his Grandaughter Mary in Tail and charged it with some Payments in which Will there was this Proviso viz. Provided if my Son Richard should have a Son by his now Wife Margaret then all his Lands should go to such first Son and his Heirs he paying as Mary should have done Afterwards a Son was born and the Question was whether the Estate limited to Thomas the eldest Son was thereby defeated And the Court were all clear of Opinion that this Proviso did only extend to the Case of Mary's being intituled and had no influence upon the first Estate limited to the eldest Son Anonymus IN the Exchequer Chamber before the Lord Chancellor Executor of an Executor de son tort not liable at Law the Lord Treasurer and two Chief Iustices the Case was thus viz. The Plaintiff had declared against the Defendant as Executor of Edward Nichols who was Executor of the Debtor The Defendant pleads that the Debtor died intestate and Administration of his Goods was granted to a Stranger absque hoc that Edward Nichols was ever Executor but doth not say or ever administred as Executor for in truth he was Executor de son tort The Plaintiff replies that before the Administration granted to the Stranger Edward Nichols possessed himself of divers Goods of the said Debtor and made the Defendant Executor and dyed and the Defendant demurred and Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff but reversed here for an Executor of an Executor de son tort is not lyable at Law though the Lord Chancellor said he would help the Plaintiff in Equity But here Administration of the Goods of the Debtor was granted before the death of the Executor de son tort so his Executorship vanished and nothing shall survive The Lady Wyndham's Case IF Flotsam come to land and is taken by him who hath no Title the Action shall not be brought at the Common Law and no Proceedings shall be thereon in the Court of Admiralty for there is no need of Condemnation thereof as there is of Prizes By the Opinion of the whole Court of Common Pleas. Rose versus Standen Action where misconceived by the Plaintiff and Verdict against him no Barr to a new Action IN Accompt for Sugar and Indigoe the Defendant pleaded that the Plaintiff brought an Indebitatus Assumpsit a quantum meruit and an insimul computasset for 100 l. due to him for Wares sold to which he pleaded Non assumpsit and that there was a Verdict against him and then averrs that the Wares mentioned in that Action are the same with those mentioned here in the Action of Accompt The Plaintiff demurred and it was said for him that he had brought his former Action on the Case too soon for if no Accompt be stated the Action on the Case on the Insimul computasset will not lye and so the former Verdict might be given against him for that Reason Ex parte Def. But on the contrary the Defendant shall not be twice troubled for the same thing and if the Verdict had been for the Plaintiff that might have been pleaded in Barr to him in a new Action Curia 2 Cro. 284. But the Court were of another Opinion that this Plea was not good and that if the Plaintiff had recovered it could not have been pleaded in Barr to him for if he misconceives his Action and a Verdict is against him and then brings a proper Action the Defendant cannot plead that he was barred to bring such Action by a former Verdict Antea Putt and Roster Postea Rosal and Lamper Ante. because where 't is insufficient it shall not be pleaded in Barr as in Debt upon Bond the Defendant pleaded another Action upon the same Bond and the Iury found Non est factum the Entry of the Verdict was that the Defendant should recover damages eat inde sine die but not quod Querens nil capiat per Breve so no Iudgment to barr him 2 Cro. 284. But pending one Action another cannot be brought for they cannot both be true If no Accompt be stated the Action on the Case upon an Insimul computasset would not lye the Insimul computasset implies an Accompt and upon Non assumpsit pleaded the Defendant might have given payment in Evidence and for that
Habens legale jus titulum need not shew what Title the disturber had after Verdict 213 In a Bond to pay 40 l. when an Accompt is stated by two Attornies to be chosen between the Parties 't is a Covenant and not a solvendum 266 Breach is assigned relating to three Covenants and concludes sic Conventionem fregit 't is good 311 Where an Agreement to pay will amount to a Covenant 269 Covenants reciprocal cannot be pleaded in bar to each other 34 75 76 309 Breach where assigned and not necessary to aver performance on the part of the Plaintiff 309 Court Inferiour the cause of Action must arise within the Jurisdiction 30 Judgment therein arrested because the Damages were laid to 30 l. 101 102 For not saying that the Jurors were electi ad triand ' 102 Taliter processum fuit and the proceedings not set forth at large well enough in a Plea but not in a Writ of Error 102 195 Vi armis contra pacem whether good or not 102 Cannot hold Plea for work done without the Jurisdiction though the Promise be made within 141 Cause of Action must appear to be within the Jurisdiction to oust the Courts above 197 Where it doth not appear that the Court was held either by Grant or Prescription good 197 198 If the cause of Action doth not appear to be within the Jurisdiction though there is a Judgment recovered below yet an Action of Trespass will lye and false Imprisonment upon the taking out of that Judgment 197 If upon Evidence it appear that the cause of Action did arise extra Jurisdictionem the Plaintiff must be non-suit 273 If Jurisdiction be admitted in pleading and Verdict and Judgment thereon t is too late for a Prohibition Ibid. Court Ecclesiastical In what Case a Bishop shall administer an Oath in Temporal Matters 118 Custom One cannot be pleaded in bar to another 105 In pleading it must be strictly alledged 41 Where 't is a reasonable Custom for the Lord to have derelict Lands 107 D. Day Vide Plea WHere 't is excluded being alledged in the Declaration it makes the Plea ill 146 'T is but punctum temporis and of no consideration in the Law 281 Release of all demands usque 26 April a Bond dated that day is not released 281 Debt Upon the Sheriffs Bond will be good though the Statute be not pleaded 36 Will lye upon the Contract where the whole Term is assigned 174 175 176 Whether it will lye for a Fine set by a Steward for 't is ex quasi contractu 230 It must be upon the Contract or ex quasi contractu 262 Deed. Where 't is lost the Party must make Oath of it to entitle himself to a Bill in Equity to have it performed in Specie 173 Demand Must be made where an Interest is to be determined 264 Devise To a Man and his Heirs if the Devisee die in the Life time of the Devisor his Heir takes nothing 313 Republication makes it a new Will ibid. To the Heir at Law makes a Limitation and not a Condition 7 To an Infant in ventre sa mere if there is a sufficient description of him 't is good 9 Where the word paying makes a Fee where not 26 To him till he be of Age then to him in Fee he dyed within Age yet a Free-hold vested in him presently 289 To him in Fee when of Age if he dye before then to the Heirs of the Body of R. and their Heirs he died living R. within Age his Sister and Heir shall take by way of Executory devise 289 Executory devise how it differs from a contingent Remainder at Common Law ibid. Construction of words therein 290 Departure From his Plea 31 Disability By a Statute where it ought to be removed by the Party to enable himself to execute an Office 299 Discharge By Parol good before the breach of promise but not afterwards 259 Discontinuance Where amendable 316 In pleading the Plaintiff declared of taking several things the Defenant justifies as to part and saith nothing of the residue 259 In the Adjournment of a Court where a day certain is not given 59 Distress Cannot be of Sheaves of Corn in Shocks for Rent 61 Distribution Shall be equally made amongst the Children of the whole and half Blood 204 205 206 Disturbance Coactus fuit to pay is a sufficient Disturbance 55 E. Escape THE Plaintiff declared upon Process in an Inferiour Court and the Bond was not made infra Jurisdictionem the Action would not lye 29 30 Debt thereon lies against the Warden of the Fleet as Superior where the Grantee for Life is insufficient 119 After an Escape the Plaintiff may have a Capias ad satisfaciendum or Scire facias at his Election 136 Whether it will lye against the Sheriff for taking insufficient Bail 181 Election In disjunctive Conditions where the Election is in the Obligor 201 304 'T is at the Plaintiffs Election to have a Ca. Sa. or Scire facias after an Escape 136 Enclosure Where a Custom is good to Enclose in a Common Field 105 Entry Not necessary to avoid an Estate in case of a Limitation 7 Error Where a Writ of Error will lye upon a Fine in the Old Bayly 219 Error in Fact cannot be assigned in the Exchequer-Chamber 194 If one be dead after the Judgment he must be named in a Writ of Error 285 Where a Judgment shall be avoided by a Plea without a Writ of Error 276 Estate Where the word Body makes an Estate for Life and no Tail 16 Estoppel Good by a Fine levied by a Remainder man in Tail 90 No Uses can be declared of a Fine by Estoppel 90 One who has no Estate levies a Fine 't is good by Estoppel 115 Evidence A Decree in Chancery or Sentence in in the Ecclesiastical Court read as Evidence of the fact 231 232 Excuse If one Man doth not perform his Covenant 't is no Excuse for the breach on the other side 75 76 What is a good Plea by way of Excuse and what not 27 28 29 Executor De son tort cannot retain 51 Where the Judgment shall be de bonis Testatoris 108 What is requisite to make an Executor 147 What must be done when he refuseth Ibid. De son tort where he may be of a Term but not of a Term in futuro because he cannot enter 175 Cannot plead non detinet where the Testator could not plead nil debet 266 Executor of an Executor de son tort where not liable at Law 293 294 Where he pleads a Judgment kept on Foot by fraud 36 Explain A Man grants Tenementa praedicta then follows totum quicquid habet whether these subsequent words shall explain or enlarge the Grant 112 113 c. Execution Payment of the Mony to the Marshal the Defendant may be taken again in Execution at the Suit of the Plaintiff 212 213 Executory Decree Is of no force in Equity 232 Existen
word extends to no other than Webbs Bargains Body to his Son Francis and that Margaret should have it for Life Cann dies the Meadow was not one of Webb's Bargains Thomas had Issue Thomas the Lessor of the Plaintiff Henry made a Feoffment in Fée to A. and B. to the use of himself and his Wife and to the Heirs of their two Bodies Remainder to his own right Heirs with Warranty against all persons and died without Issue the Lessor of the Plaintiff enters being his Cousin and Heir and of full age when Henry died In this Case it was held that if it had béen found that Margaret had an Estate for Life and that Henry entred in her Life time that it had beén then a Warranty commenced by Disseisin and would not have bound Thomas the Reversioner But as it was those two Iudges held it no Barr because the Warranty began with the Feoffment to uses and Henry being himself the Feoffeé it returned instantly to him and was extinct as to the Reversion because that was revested in him in Fée and therefore they held he could have no benefit either by Voucher or Rebutter it being destroyed at the same time it was created But Berkly and Richardson Iustices held that quoad the Estate of Henry's Wife the Warranty had a Continuance and the ground of the contrary opinion might be because Iustice Jones said there was no such Resolution as is mentioned to be the fourth in Lincoln Colledge Case yet he affirmeth that very Resolution in his own Reports fol. 199. There is a Clause in the * 27 H. 8. c 10. Statute of Vses difficult to be understood by which 't is Enacted That every Cestuy que use may take such Advantage of vouching c. as the Feoffees themselves might so that Cestuy que use have the Estate executed in him before the first day of May 1536. which was a year after the making that Statute so that the Clause seems to be exclusive of all others who shall come in afterwards Answ But he supposed the Intention of the Law Makers to be That there should be no more Conveyances to Vses But because they presumed that at first Men might not know of it therefore lest the Parties should be any ways prejudiced they gave liberty till such a time to Vouch or Rebutt within which time they might have some knowledge of the Statute and then it was supposed they would make no more Limitations to Vses But though they imagined them to be left expiring yet they revived Since then the Parliament gave leave to Vouch or Rebutt whilst they could in reason think there would be any Conveyance to Vses 't is but reasonable whilst they do continue that the Parties should Rebutt especially since most Conveyances at this day are made to Vses Windham Iustice accord in omnibus and so Iudgment was given as aforesaid Anonymus DOwer The Tenant pleads That a Lease was made by the Husband for 99 years before any title of Dower did accrue which Lease was yet in being and shews that the Lessor afterwards granted the Reversion to J. S. and died and that J. S. devised to the Tenant for Life The Demandant replies That the Lessor made a Feoffment in Fee absque hoc that the Reversion was granted prout c. The Tenant Demurrs Newdigate Serjeant for the Demandant argued That the Plea was not good to which he tooke several Execeptions 1. Except The Tenant by his Plea confesseth That the Demandant ought to have Iudgment of the Reversion expectant upon the Lease for 99 years de tertia but doth not say parte 2. Except Here is the Grant of a Reversion pleaded and 't is not hic in Curia prolat ' Then for the Matter as 't is pleaded 't is not good He agreed if Dower be brought against Lessee for years he may discharge himself by pleading the continuance of his Lease during which time the Demandant can have no Execution but here the Tenant is no ways concerned in the Lease 't is Littleton's Case None shall take advantage of a Release but he who is party or privy and therefore the Lessee in this Case being party might have pleaded this but the Tenant is altogether a Stranger Before the Statute of Gloucester cap 11. If the Demandant had recovered in a real Action against the Tenant the Termor had been bound because at the Common Law no body could falsifie the Recovery of a Free-hold but he who had a Free-hold himself this Statute prevents that Mischief and Enacts That the Termor shall be received before Judgment to defend the Right of his Term upon the default of the Tenant and though the Iudgment cannot be hindred thereby yet Execution shall be suspended during the Term and therefore in Dyer 263. b. The Lady Arundel brought Dower against the Earl of Pembroke who made default and before Iudgment the Termor prays to be received upon this Statute and pleads a Lease made by the Husband after Coverture which was assigned to him and that Dower de tertia parte of the Rent of this Lease was assigned to the Demandant by the Court of Augmentations which was afterwards confirmed by Letters Patents that she accepted it and concludes That the Plea of the Tenant was by Collusion between him and her to make him lose his Term And this was held ill for the Reason given by my Lord * Hob 316. Not for that reason but because that Court could not assign Dower and so the Letters Patents of Confirmation could not make that good which was void before Hobart That it is absurd to admit two Persons to dispute the Interest of a third Man But whether the Traverse is good or not if the Plea is naught Iudgment ought to be given for the Demandant Jones Serjeant contra The Pleading is well enough 1. The Tenant confesseth That the Demandant ought to have Iudgment of the Reversion de tertia which is well enough omitting the word parte because he claims a third part of such Tenements and the Tenant confesses she ought to have Iudgment which is full enough if the words de tertia parte were wholly omitted 2. He agreed That whoever Claims under a Deed must shew it but the Tenant in this Case did not defend himself by any Title from the Deed for the substance of the Plea which secured him was That a Lease of 99 years was in being and by his alledging the Devise of an Estate to him for Life made by the Grantee of the Reversion he did but allow the Demandant's Writ to be true which mentions him as Tenant of the Free-hold Then for the Matter of the Plea he says it was good and that the Tenant might well plead the Lease for years By the * 3 Inst 32. b. Statute of Merton Damages are given in Dower where the Husband died seised which he did in this Case but yet no Damages ought to be paid here but for the third part
by Serjeant Jones that they should not pass for though Lands would pass so by a Fine because it was the Agreement of the Parties yet in a Recovery 't is otherwise because more certainty is required therein But in Fines no such Certainty is required and therefore a Fine de Tenementis in Golden-Lane hath beén held good though neither Vill Parish or Hamlet is mentioned Cro Eliz. 693. Cro. Jac. 574. Addison and Ottoway Postea But there being a Vill called Walton in the Parish of Street and a Fine being levyed of Land in Street the Lands in Walton did not pass unless Walton had béen an Hamlet of Street and the Fine had beén levied of Lands in the Parish of Street And the reason of this difference is because in Fines there are Covenants which though they are real in respect of the Land yet 't is but a personal Action in which the Land is not demanded ex directo but in a Recovery greater preciseness is required that being a Praecipe quod reddat where the Land it self is demanded and the Defendant must make Answer to it Cro. Jac. 574 5 Co. 40. Dormer's Case The Word * Antea 41. Liberty properly signifies a Right Priviledge or Franchise but improperly the extent of a place Hill 22 23 Car. 2. Rot. 225. B. R. Waldron's Case Hutton 106. Baker and Johnson's Case Liberties in Iudgment of Law are incorporeal and therefore 't is absurd to say that Lands which are corporeal shall be therein contained They are not permanent having their existence by the Kings Letters Patents and may be destroyed by Act of Parliament they may also be extinguish'd abridged or increased and a Vinire fac of a * Rast Ent. 267. Liberty or Franchise is not good 't is an equivocal Word and of no signification that is plain and therefore is not to be used in real Writs Rast Entr. 382. There is no Praecipe in the Register to recover Lands within a Liberty neither is there any authority in all the Law Books for such a Recovery and therefore if such a thing should be allowed many inconveniences would follow for a good Tenant to the Praecipe would be wanting and the intent of the Parties could not supply that But Barton Serjeant said that this Recovery would pass the Lands in Cotton for as to that purpose there was no difference betweén a Fine and a Recovery Postea 2 Roll. Abr. 20 Godb. 440. they are both become Common Assurances and are to be guided by the agreément of the Parties Cro. Car. 270 276. 'T is true a Fine may be good of Lands in an Hamlet Lieu conus or Parish 1 H. 5. 9. Cro. Eliz. 692. Jones 301. Cro. Jac. 574. Monk versus Butler Yet in a * Godb. 440. contra Scire Fac̄ to have Execution of such Fine the Vill must be therein mentioned Bro. Brief 142. The demand must be of Lands in a Vill Hamlet or at farthest in a Parish Cro. Jac. 574. And of that Opinion was the whole Court absente Ellis who was also of the same Opinion at the Argument and accordingly in Michaelmas Term following Iudgment was given that by this Recovery the Lands in Cotton did well pass And North Chief Iustice denied the Case in Hutton 106. Postea to be Law where 't is said A Common Recovery of Lands in a Lieu conus is not good and said that it had béen long disputed whether a Fine of Lands in a Lieu conus was good and in King James his time the Law was settled in that Point that it was good and by the same reason a Recovery shall be good for they are both amicable Suits and Common Assurances and as they grew more in practice the Iudges have extended them farther A Common Recovery is held good of an Advowson and no Reasons are to be drawn from the Visne or the Execution of the Writ of Seisin because 't is not in the Case of adversary Procéedings but by Agréement of the Parties where 't is to be presumed each knows the others meaning Indeed the Cursitors are to blame to make the Writ of Entry thus and ought not to be suffered in such practice Where a Fine is levied to two the Fée is always fixed in the Heirs of one of them but if it be to them and their Heirs yet 't is good though incertain but a Liberty is in the nature of a Lieu conus and may be made certain by Averment The Iury in this Case have found Cotton to be a Vill in the Liberty of Shrewsbury and so 't is not incorporeal Alford versus Tatnel JVdgment against two who are both in Execution Mod. Rep. 170. and the Sheriff suffers one to escape the Plaintiff recovers against the Sheriff and hath satisfaction the other shall be discharged by an Audita Querela Osbaston versus Stanhope General Replication good DEBT upon Bond against an Heir who pleaded that his Ancestor was seised of such Lands in Fee and made a Settlement thereof to Trusteés by which he limited the Vses to himself for Life Remainder to the Heirs Males of his Body Remainder in Feé to his own right Heirs with power given to the Trusteés to make Leases for threé Lives or 99 years The Trustées made a Lease of these Lands for 99 years and that he had not Assets praeter the Reversion expectant upon the said Lease The Plaintiff replies protestando that the Settlement is fraudulent pro placito saith that he hath Assets by discent sufficient to pay him and the Defendant demurrs Ex parte Def. Newdigate Serjeant The Barr is good for the Plaintiff should not have replied generally that the Defendant hath Assets by discent but should have replyed to the praeter Hob. 104. Like the Case of Goddard and Thorlton Yelv. 170. where in Trespas the Defendant pleaded that Henry was seised in Fee who made a Lease to Saunders under whom he derived a Title and so justifies The Plaintiff replies and sets forth a long Title in another person and that Henry entred and intruded The Defendant rejoyns that Henry was seised in Fée and made a Lease ut prius absque hoc that intravit se sic intrusit and the Plaintiff having demurred because the Traverse ought to have been direct viz. absque hoc quod intrusit and not absque hoc that Henry intravit c. it was said the Replication was ill for the Defendant having alledged a Seisin in Fée in Henry which the Plaintiff in his Rejoynder had not avoided but only by supposing an intrusion which cannot be of an Estate in Fée but is properly after the death of Tenant for Life for that reason it was held ill Ex parte Quer. But Pemberton Serjeant for the Plaintiff held the Replication to be good The Defendants Plea is no more than Riens per descent for though he pleads a Reversion 't is not chargeable because 't is a Reversion after
Execution yet he may extend the very Lands so released so if the Debtee release to the Debtor all his right and title which he hath to his Lands and afterwards gets a Iudgment against him he may extend a Moiety of the same Lands by Elegit the reason is because at the time of these Releases given they had no title to the Land but only an inception of a right which might happen to take place in futuro so here a Release by the Executor of the Debtee to the Administrator of the Debtor before Probate of the Will is not good because by being made Executor he had only a possibility to be entituled to the Testators Estate and no Interest 'till Probate for he might refuse to prove the Will or renounce the Executorship It is true a Release of all * Godol 145. pl. 4. Actions had been good by the Executor before Probate because a right of Action is in him and a Debt which consists meerly in Action is thereby discharged but in such case a Release of all right and title would not be good for the reasons aforesaid Ex parte Def. But for the Defendant it was insisted that this Release was a good Plea in Barr for if a Release be made by an Executor of all his right and title to the Testators Estate and then the Executor sues the Party Released as the Administrator is sued in this Case for a Debt due to the Testator the Release is good because if he had recovered in this Case the Iudgment must be de bonis Testatoris which is the subject matter and that being released no Action can lye against the Administrator Adjornatur DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 28 Car. II. in Banco Regis Piggot Lessee of Sir Thomas Lee versus the Earl of Salisbury Intrat ' Pasch 26 Car. 2. Rot. 609. IN Ejectment for fourteén Houses and some Gardens in the Parish of St. Martin in the Fields Warranty where by displacing of a Right by a Fine sur concessit it shall barr the Heir Jones 68. the Iury find as to all but one Moiety for the Defendant as for the other Moiety they find that these were formerly the Houses of one Nightingale who was seised thereof in Fée and made a Lease of them which commenced 1 Apr. 7 Jac. yet in being That the Reversion descended to Briget his Daughter and Heir who married William Mitton by whom she had a Daughter named Elizabeth That upon the Marriage of the said Elizabeth with Francis the Son of Sir Oliver Lee by Fine and other Settlements these Houses were settled to the use of the said Bridget for Life then to the use of Francis Lee and the said Elizabeth and the Heirs on the Body of the said Elizabeth to be begotten by Francis And for want of such Issue to William Mitton for Life and afterwards to the right Heirs of Bridget Mitton for ever William Mitton and Bridget his Wife before the expiration of the Term levy a Fine sur concesserunt to two Cognisees wherein the said Husband and Wife conced ' tenementa praed ' totum quicquid habent in tenementis praed ' cum pertin̄ for the Life of the said Husband and Wife and the Survivor of them with Proclamations They find that the Lessee for years attorned and that the Fine thus levied was in Trust for the Earl of Salisbury and that before the first day of February before the Action brought he entred by the direction of the two Cognizees and that he was seised prout Lex postulat That 1 Febr. 7 Jac. Sir Oliver Lee Francis Lee his Son and Heir and Elizabeth his Wife William Mitton and Bridget his Wife by Bargain and Sale convey the Premises to the Earl and his Heirs which was enrolled in Chancery in which Deéd there was a Warranty against Sir Oliver and his Heirs That in the same Term viz. Octab. Purificationis William Mitton and Bridget his Wife levyed a Fine sur Cognisance de droit come ceo c. to the Earl That Francis Lee was Son and Heir of Sir Oliver Lee. That Sir Oliver and Elizabeth died in the Life-time of Francis and that Francis died leaving Issue Sir Thomas Lee the now Lessor of the Plaintiff That the Warranty discended upon him being inheritable to the Estate Tail That the Estate of the Earl of Salisbury descended to the present Earl who was the Defendant That Sir Thomas Lee entred and made a Lease to the Lessor of the Plaintiff Question The Question upon this Special Verdict was if by the Fine sur concesserunt levied 7 Jac. the Estate which the Husband and Wife had in possession only passed or whether that and the Estate for Life which the Husband had after the Tail spent passed likewise If the latter then they passed more than they could lawfully grant because of the intervention of the Estate Tail and then this Fine wrought a * Co. Lit. 338. b displacing or divesting the Estate of William Mitton for Life in Reversion and turned it into a Right and if so then this collateral Warranty of Sir Oliver Lee will discend on Sir Francis and from him to the Plaintiff and will barr his Entry But if the Estate was not displaced and turned into a Right at the time of the Warranty then the Heir is not barred by this collateral Warranty of his Ancestor This Case was argued by Serjeant Pemberton for the Plaintiff and by Sir William Jones the Attorny General for the Defendant Ex parte Quer. And for the Plaintiff it was said that this Fine passed only the Estate which William Mitton and his Wife had in possession and no other and therefore worked no divesting and his Reasons were 1. Such a Construction seems most agreeable to the intention of all the Parties to the Fine 2. It may well stand with the Nature and the Words of the Fine 3. It will be most agreeable both to the Iudgments and Opinions which have formerly béen given in the like Cases And as to the first of these it will be necessary to consider what will be the effect and consequence of levying this Fine both on the one side and the other It cannot be denyed but that there was a Purchase intended to be made under this Fine and that the Parties were willing to pass away their Estate with the least hazard that might be to themselves neither can it be imagined that they intended to defeat this Purchase as soon as it was made which they must do if this Fine works a Forfeiture for then he in Remainder in Tail is entituled to a present Entry and so the Estates for Life which the Baron and Feme had are lost and there was a possibility also of losing the Reversion in Feé which the Tenant in Tail after his Entry might have barred by a Common Recovery And had not the Parties intended only to pass both the Estates which they lawfully might
pass why did they levy this Fine sur concessit They might have levyed a Fine sur Cognisance de droit come ceo c. and that had beén a Disseisin Besides what need was there for them to mention any Estate which they had in these Houses if they had intended a Disseisin But this being done such a Construction is to be made as may support the intent of the Parties and it would be very unreasonable that what was intended to preserve the Estate should now be adjudged to work a Dissesin so as to forfeit it and such a Disseisin upon which this collateral Warranty shall operate and barr the Estate in Remainder And therefore no more shall pass by this Fine than what lawfully may and rather than it shall be construed to work a Wrong the Estate shall pass by fractions for both the Estates of William Mitton for Life are not so necessarily joyned and united by this Fine that no room can be left for such a Construction 2. Such a Construction will not agreé with the Nature and Words of this Fine 'T is true a Fine as it is of the most solemn and of the greatest Authority so 't is of the greatest force and efficacy to convey an Estate and the most effectual Feoffment of Record where 't is a Feoffment and likewise the most effectual Release where 't is to be a Release But on a bare Agreément made in Actions betwéen the Demandant and Tenant at the Barr and drawn up there the Iudges will alter and amend such Fines if they did not in all things answer the intention of the Parties 24 Ed. 3. 36. Postea 'T is agreed that Fines can work a Disseisin when they can have no other Interpretation as if Tenant pur auter vie levy a Fine to a Stranger for his own Life 't is more than such a Tenant could do because his Estate was during the Life of another and no longer So a Fine sur Cognisance de droit c. implies a Fée which being levyed by any one who has but a particular Estate will make a Disseisin But this Fine sur concessit has beén always taken to be the most harmless of all others and can be compared to nothing else than a Grant of totum statum suum quicquid habet c. by which no more is granted than what the Cognisor had at the time of the Grant and so it hath been always construed Indéed there is a Fine sur concessit which expresses no Estate of the Grantor and this is properly levyed by Tenant in Fée or Tail but when particular Tenants pass over their several Estates they generally grant totum quicquid habent in tenementis praedictis being very cautious to express what Estate they had therein When this Fine sur concessit was first invented the Iudges in those days looked upon the Words quicquid habent c. to be insignificant and for that reason in Anno 17 E. 3. 66. they were refused The case was Two Husbands and their Wives levied such a Fine to the Cognisee and thereby granted totum quicquid habent c. which Words were rejected and the Iudge would not pass the Fine because if the Party had nothing in the Land then nothing passed and so is 44 Ed. 3. 36. By which it appears that the Iudges in those times thought these Fines did pass no more than what the Cognisor had and for this there are multitude of Authorities in the Year Books Now these Words cannot have a signification to enlarge the Estate granted they serve only to explain what was intended to pass for in the Case at the Barr if the Grant had béen totum quicquid habent in tenementis praedictis there would have been no question of the Estate granted but the Cognisors having granted tenementa praedicta they seem by these subsequent Words to recollect themselves viz. totum quicquid habent in tenementis praedictis Object But it may be objected that the Limitation of the Estate viz. durante vita eorum alterius eorum diutius viventis works a Disseisin because by those Words two Estates for Life pass entire in possession whereas in truth there was but one Estate for Life of the Husband in possession and therefore this was more than they could grant because the Estate Tayl came between the Estate which the Husband and Wife had for their Lives and for the Survivor of them and the Estate which the Husband had for his own Life And this is farther enforced by that Rule in Law That Estates shall not pass by fractions for otherwise there can be no reason why they should not thus pass Answ But this Rule is very fallible and not so much to be regarded 't is true the Rule is so far admitted to be true where without inconveniency Estates may pass without fraction but where there is an inconveniency it may be dispensed withal it being such an inconveniency as may appear to the Iudges to make the thing granted to go contrary to the intent of the Parties And that such Interpretations have been made agrees with the third Reason proposed in this Case viz. That it hath received countenance by judicial Opinions and determinations in former Iudgments 14 E. 4. 4. 27 H. 8. 13. 1 Co. 67. Bredons Case which was thus Tenant for life remainder in tayl to A. remainder in tayl to B. Tenant for life and he in the first remainder levied a Fine sur cognisance de droit come ceo 't was adjudged that this was no Discontinuance of either of the Remainders 1 Roll. Abr. lit I. pl. 4. 1 Inst 45. a. Cro. Car. 406. because each of them gave what he might lawfully viz. The Tenant for Life granted his Estate and the Remainder-man passed a Fee-simple determinable upon his Estate Tail and yet each of their Estates were still divided On the other side it was said that in all Cases where the person who hath a particular Estate takes upon him either by Feoffment in pais or by Fine which is a Feoffment on Record to grant a greater Estate than he hath as in this Case is done though possibly the Estate of the Grantée may determin before that of the Grantor yet 't is a displacing the Reversion as if a Man has an Estate for ten Lives and makes a Grant for the Life of another here is a possibility that the Estate which he granted may be longer than the Estate he had in the thing granted because one Man may survive the Ten and for that reason 't is a divesting 1. In this Case the Estate which the Husband and Wife had is to be considered 2. What they granted And by comparing of these together it will appear whether they granted more than they had The Husband and Wife had an Estate for the Life of the Wife and after the Estate Tail the Husband had an Estate for his own Life now they grant
an Estate for the Life of the Husband and Wife and the Survivor What is this but one entire Estate in possession No other Interpretation can be agréeable to the sense of the Words for if it had been granted according to the true Estate which each had then it should have been first for the Life of the Wife and after the Tail spent then for the Life of the Husband The next thing to be considered is Whether the Estate shall pass entire or by fractions And as to that I need say no more than only to quote the Authority of that Iudgment given in Garret and Blizard's Case 1 Roll. Abr. 855. which is shortly thus viz. Tenant for Life Remainder for Life Remainder in Tail Remainder in Fee to the Tenant for Life in Remainder this Tenant for Life in Remainder levies a Fine come ceo c. it was adjudged a Forfeiture of his Estate for Life so that the Remainder Man in Tail might enter after the death of the Tenant for Life in possession for it shall not be intended that he passed his Estate by fractions viz. an Estate in Remainder for Life and a Remainder in Feé expectant upon the Estate Tail but one entire Estate in possession and 't is not like the Authority in Bredon's Case for there the Estate for Life and the Estate Tail followed one another Next it is to be considered whether after they granted omnia illa tenementa the subsequent Words totum statum suum c. do not come in by way of Restriction and qualifie what went before But those subsequent Words are placed in this Fine not by way of Restriction but of Accumulation Litt. 345 In Littleton Sect. 613. 't is said that if Tenant in Tail grants all his Estate in the Tenements Habendum all his Estate c. in this Case the Alienee hath but an Estate for the Life of the Tenant in Tail and 't is observable that totum statum in the Case put by Littleton is both in the Premisses and the Habendum But if I will grant tenementa praedicta in the Premisses and then make another Limitation in the Habendum there totum statum quicquid can make no Restriction if it should it will spoil most Conveyances It is agréed that if those Words had béen omitted in this Case then by this Fine the Reversion would be displaced and therefore much weight is laid upon these Words to explain the meaning of the Parties thereby and that when they granted tenementa praedicta they meant totum statum c. But here is no ground for such an Interpretation 't is an entire Grant of the Houses by the Words Tenementa praedicta and the subsequent Words shall never be allowed to make such a Restriction which shall overthrow the frame of the Déed If a Man who has no Estate in the Land passes it by Deéd this shall work against him by way of Estoppel and these Words totum quicquid c. which are usual in all Conveyances shall make no alteration of the Law for if such construction should be made of these Words as hath béen objected then in all Déeds where they are inserted if it happen that the Party hath no Estate or a void Estate nothing passes and then Covenants Estoppels and Warranties would be no Securities in the Law 2. These Words totum quicquid c. come in a distinct Clause of the Grant the precedent Words are Tenementa praedicta totum statum quicquid c. reddiderunt which are two parts a Grant and a Release and have no dependance upon each other being distinct Clauses and therefore these Words shall not be any Restriction of the former but if one Clause be carried on with a connexion so as 't is but an entire sentence in such Case a Man may restrain either general or particular Words Hob. 171. in Stukely and Butler's Case 3. Admitting these Words are a Restriction of the former yet the Estate is so limited that if the first Words were out of the Case this later Clause he said was enough for his purpose for the Grant is not in the usual Words by which Estates pass viz. Estate Right Title Interest but Totum quicquid c. for the Lives of the Grantors and the Survivor which shews that they took upon themselves to grant for a longer time than they had in possession if they had only granted it for both their Lives they might have some colourable pretence 4. 'T is apparent from the Clause of the Warranty that the intent of the Parties was to grant an Estate expresly in possession for the Lives both of the Husband and his Wife for 't is that which the Grantée shall hold c. during their Lives and the longest Liver Object The Case of * 2 Rol. Abr. 36 403. Eustace and Scaven has been objected 'T is reported in 2 Cro. 696. which is Feme Covert and A. are Iointenants for Life the Husband and Wife levy a Fine to A. the other Iointenant and grant the Land and totum quicquid habent c. to him during the Life of the Wife with Warranty the Wife survives A. her Companion Adjudged that these Words Totum quicquid shall not enure by way of Grant and severance of the Iointure of the Moiety for then there would be an Occupancy but they are restrictive only to the Estate of the Wife and shall enure by way of Release to A. so that after his death he in Reversion may enter Answ It would not be a Question in that Case whether these Words were restrictive or not for nothing was granted but what might lawfully pass viz. during the Life of the Wife the other Ioyntenant neither was there any stress laid on those Words for Mr. Iustice Jones who was a Learned Man and reported the same Case fol. 55. hath made no mention thereof but hath wholly omitted those Words which he would not have done if the Case had depended upon them 2. Object Next the Form of this Fine has been objected and a President was cited Rast Entr. 241. where such a Fine was levied and nothing passed but for the Life of the Conusor Answ But no Authority can be produced where a Man that had an Estate for Life in Possession and another in Remainder and granted by the same Words as in this Case but that it was a Forfeiture 3. Object That the Law will not make a Construction to work a Wrong and therefore if Tenant for Life grant generally for Life it shall be interpreted during the Life of the Grantor Answ That Case is without express Words or shewing any time for which the Grantee shall have the thing granted and therefore the Law restrains it to the Life of the Grantor because it will not make Words which are doubtful and of incertain signification to do any Wrong But where there are express Words as in this Case no other
Assurances c. of Land not being the Lands of the late King Queen Prince c. and not being Land sold for any pretended Delinquency since the first of June 1641. and all Statutes and Judgments suffered by the Offenders from being impeached from which it appears that the Parliament lookt upon entailed Lands as forfeited for if Estates made to others upon a valuable consideration had need of a Proviso to save them from Forfeiture à fortiori the Estates out of which those are derived have need of such a saving and therefore must be forfeit by the Act for which Reasons these Lands are forfeited As to the great Objection which hath been made and insisted on the other side and which is Trudgeons Case 22 Eliz. 1 Inst 130. Where Tenant in Tail was attainted in a Praemunire and it was adjudged that he should forfeit his Land but during his Life for though the Statue of 16 R. 2. cap. cap. 5. Enacts That in such Case their Lands Tenements Goods and Chattels shall be forfeited to the King yet that must be understood of such an Estate as he may lawfully forfeit and that is during his own life and therefore being general Words they do not take away the force of the Statute de donis so that his Lands in Fee-simple for life c. shall be forfeited but the Land entailed shall not during his life But the Answer is plain For in the Reign of R. 2. when the Statute of Praemunire was made Estates Tail were under a Perpetuity by the said Statute de donis which Statute is now much weakened in the Point of Alienation and the Law is quite altered since that time and 't is apparent by multitude of Presidents that such strict Constructions have not been made since that time to preserve Estates Tail from Forfeitures without special and particular Words 4 Co. 164. and therefore in the Case of Adams and Lambert which is a Case in Point the Iudges there construed Estates Tail to be forfeit for want of special Words in the Statute of 1 E. 6. cap. 14. to save it and that was only a Law made for suppressing of superstitious Vses upon a politick consideration but this is a much greater Offence intended to be punished by this Act in which there are demonstrations both from the Words and intent of the Law-makers to make this Estate forfeited to the Crown than in that Case so much relied on And Iudgment was given accordingly Wyld died before Iudgment was given but Iustice Twisden said he was of that Opinion and Jones Iustice concurred Basset versus Salter After an Escape the Plaintiff may have a Ca. Sa. or Sci. Fa. against the Sheriff IN an Action for an Escape the Question was whether the Plaintiff may take out a Ca. Sa. or have a Fi. Fa. against the Defendant after the Sheriff or Gaoler voluntarily suffer him to escape but the Court would not suffer it to be argued because it had been lately settled that it was at the Election of the Plaintiff to do either and upon a Writ of Error brought in the Exchequer-Chamber the Iudges there were of the same Opinion But in the Lord Chief Iustice Vaughan's time the Court of Common Pleas were divided but 't is since settled 1 Roll. Abridg. 901 902. If there be an Escape by the Plaintiffs consent though he did not intend it the Law is hard that the Debt should be thereby discharged as where one was in execution in the Kings Bench and some Proposals were made to the Plaintiff in behalf of the Prisoner who seeing there was some likelyhood of an Accomodation consented to a Meeting in London and desired the Prisoner might be there who came accordingly and this was held to be an Escape with the * If it had been by the consent of the Sheriff he could never take him again but the Plaintiff might Sid. 330. consent of the Plaintiff and he could never after be in Execution at his Suit for the same Matter Peck versus Hill In Communi Banco Bond good given in discharge of another Mod. Rep. 221. DEBT upon a Bond brought against the Defendant as Administrator who pleads that he gave another Bond in his own Name in discharge of the first Bond and upon Issue joined it was found for the Defendant and it was moved that Iudgment might not be entred hereupon because it was a bad Plea But North Chief Iustice and Wyndham and Scroggs Iustices were of Opinion that it was a good Plea because there was other Security given than what the Plaintiff had before for upon the first Bond he was only lyable de bonis Intestatoris but now he might be charged in his own Right Co. Lit. 122. b. which may be well said to be in full satisfaction of the first Obligation for where the Condition is for payment of Mony to the Party himself there if he accept any collateral thing in satisfaction 't is good If a Security be given by a Stranger it may discharge a former Bond and this in effect is given by such And 't is not like the Case in Hobert where a Bond was given by the same Party upon that very day a former Bond was payable and adjudged not a good discharge for the Obligee was in no better condition than he was before Iustice Atkins doubted but inclined that one Bond cannot be discharged by giving another though the Discharge be applied to the Condition of the Bond and for this he cited Cro. Car. 85. Cro. Eliz. 716 727. which was a Case adjudged so in Point and therefore this Plea upon Demurrer should have been over-ruled yet since Issue was taken upon it and a Verdict for the Defendant the Plea is helped by the Statute of Jeofails 32 H. 8. here being a direct Affirmative and Negative But as to that the Chief Iustice and Scroggs Iustice replied that an immaterial Issue no ways arising from the Matter is not helped as an Action of Debt upon a Bond laid to be made in London and the Defendant saith that it was made in Middlesex and this is tried 't is not aided by the Statute but there must be a Repleader But because it was sworn that the Obligor who was the intestate was alive four years after the time that the second Bond was given and for that reason it could not be given upon the accompt of the Defendants being liable as Administrator but must be intended a Bond to secure a Debt of his own therefore a new Trial was granted Cook and others versus Herle Covenant will lie in the personalty tho' the Grant be executed by the Statute of Uses which makes a Distress the proper remedy Mod. Rep. 223. IN Covenant the Case was this Charles Cook made a Iointure to Mary his Wife for life and died without Issue the Land descended to Thomas Cook his Brother and Heir who grants an Annuity or Rent Charge of 200 l. per
to such person or persons and to such use and uses intents and purposes as she should think fit and that the Plaintiff should assent thereunto and not impeach the same in Law or Equity The Marriage shortly afterwards took effect and Philippa by Will in Writing gave all her Estate away in Legacies and Charitable Vses and she devised to the Plaintiff 20 l. to buy him Mourning and gave to Sir William Turner the Defendant 100 l. and made him Executor and she devised to Mr. Hays and to Mr. Grace 20 l. apiece whom she made Overseers of her Will and died There was neither Date or Witnesses to this Will save only the Month and Year of our Lord therein mentioned and that this Will not being proved in the Spiritual Court the Plaintiff moved for a Prohibition and the Defendant took Issue upon the Suggestion In which Case these Points were resolved by the Court. Mod. Rep. 211. 1. If there be an Agreement before Marriage that the Wife may make a Will if she do so 't is a good Will unless the Husband disagreés and his Consent shall be implyed till the contrary appear And the Law is the same though he knew not when she made the Will which when made 't is in this Case as in others ambulatory till the death of the Wife and his dissent thereunto but if after her death he doth consent he can never afterwards dissent for then he might do it backwards and forwards in infinitum 2. If the Husband would not have such Will to stand he ought presently after the death of the Wife to shew his dissent 3. If the Husband consent that his Wife shall make a Will and accordingly she doth make such a Will and dieth and if after her death he comes to the Executor named in the Will and seems to approve her choice by saying He is glad that she had appointed so worthy a Person and seemed to be satisfied in the main with the Will and recommended a Coffin-maker to the Executor and a Goldsmith for making the Rings and a Herald Painter for making the Escutcheons this is a good assent and makes it a good Will though the Husband when he sees and reads the Will being thereat displeased opposes the Probate in the Spiritual Court by entring Caveats and the like and such disagreément after the former assent will not hurt the Will because such assent is good in Law though he know not the particular Bequests in the Will 4. When there is an express Agreement or Consent that a Woman may make a Will a little proof will be sufficient to make out the continuance of that Consent after her death and it will be needful on the other side to prove a Disagreement made in a solemn manner and those things which prove a dissatisfaction on the Husbands part may not prove a disagreement because the one is to be more formal than the other for if the Husband should say that he hoped to set aside the Will or by a Suit or otherwise to bring the Executor to terms this is not a dissent Sir Robert Howard versus the Queens Trustees and the Attorney General In the Dutchy UPON a Bill exhibited in the Dutchy Court Jones 126. The Question was whether the Stewardship of a Mannor was grantable in Reversion or not The Attorny General and the Queens Council Butler and Hanmore held that it was not But Serjeant Pemberton and Mr. Thursby would have argued to the contrary for they said it might be granted in Fée or for any less Estate and so in reversion for it may be executed by Deputy But this Question arising upon a Plea and Demurrer the Debate thereof was respited till the hearing of the Cause which was the usual Practice in Chancery as North Chief Iustice who assisted the Chancellor of the Dutchy informed the Court. And he said that in all Courts of Equity the usual course was when a Bill is exhibited to have Mony decreed due on a Bond upon a Suggestion that the Bond is lost there must be Oath made of it for otherwise the Cause is properly triable at the Common Law and such course is to be observed in all the like Cases where the Plaintiff by surmise of the loss of a Déed draws the Defendant into Equity but if the Case be proper in its own nature for a Court of Conscience and in case where the Déed is not lost the Remedy desired in Chancery could not be obtained upon a Trial at Law there though it be alledged that the Déed is lost Oath need not be made of it as if there be a Déed in which there is a Covenant for farther Assurance and the Party comes in Equity and prays the thing to be done in specie there is no need of an Oath of the loss of such Deed because if it 't is not lost the Party could not at Law have the thing for which he prayed Relief for he could only recover Damages Note also That he said in the Case of one Oldfeild that it was the constant practise where a Bill is exhibited in Equity to foreclose the right of Redemption if the Mortgagor be foreclosed he pays no Costs and though it was urged for him that he should pay no Costs in this Case because the Mortgagee was dead and the Heir within Age and the Mony could not safely be paid without a Decree yet it being necessary for him to come into Equity he must pay for that necessity Note also the difference between a Mortgage in Fee and for Years for if 't is in Fee the Mortgagor cannot have a Reconveyance upon payment of the Mony till the Heir comes of Age. It was agreed in this Case by the Court that if there be Tenant for Life Remainder in Fee and they joyn in a Deed purporting an absolute Sale if it be proved to be but a Mortgage he shall have his Estate for Life again paying pro rata and according to his Estate and so it shall be in the Case between Tenant in Dower and the Heir Loyd versus Langford Lessee for Years makes an Assignment of his Term where Debt lies upon the Contract and where not IN a special Verdict the Case was Viz. A. being Tenant in Fee of Lands demised the same to B. for seven years B. re-demises the same Lands to A. for the said Term of seven years reserving 20 l. Rent per Annum A. dyes his Wife enters as Guardian to the Heir of A. her Son and receives the Profits B. brings Debt against her as Executrix de son tort in the debet and detinet and whether this Action would lie or not was the Question Serjeant Baldwyn who argued for the Plaintiff held that it did lie for though the Rent in this Case reserved did not attend the Reversion because the Lessee had assigned over all his Term yet an Action of Debt will lie for that Rent upon the Contract Cro. Jac. 487.
Witton versus Bye 45 Ed. 3. 8. 20 E. 4 13. Covevenant will lie upon the Words Yeilding and Paying If then here is a good Rent reserved the Wife who receives the Profits becomes Executrix de son tort and so is lyable to the payment It hath been held there cannot be an Executor de son tort of a Term but the Modern Opinions are otherwise as it was held in the Case of Porter and Sweetman Trin. 1653. in B. R. And that an Action of Debt will lie against him Indeed such an Executor cannot be of a Term in futuro and that is the Resolution in Kenrick and Burgesses Case Moor Rep. Where in Ejectment upon Not Guilty pleaded it appeared that one Okeham had a Lease for years of the Lands in question who dyed Intestate which Lease his Wife assigned by parol to Burgess and then she takes out Letters of Administration and assigns it again to Kenrick who by the Opinion of the Court had the best Title But if one enter as Executor de son tort and sell Goods the Sale is good which was not so in this Case because there was a Term in Reversion whereof no Entry could be made for which reason there could be no Executor de son tort to that and therefore the Sale to Burgess before the Administration was held void And that there may be an Executor de son tort of a Term there was a late Case adjudged in Trin. 22 Car. 2. between Stevens and Carr which was Lessee for years rendring Rent dies Intestate his Wife takes out Letters of Administration and afterwards Marries a second Husband the Wife dies and the Husband continues in Possession and receives the Profits It was agreed that for the Profits received he was answerable as Executor de son tort and the Book of 10 H. 11. was cited as an authority to prove it Pemberton Serjeant for the Defendant Ex parte Def. would not undertake to answer these Points which were argued on the other side but admitted them to be plain against him for he did not doubt but that Debt would lie upon the Contract where the whole Term was assigned and that there may be an Executor de son tort of a Term but he said that which was the principal point in the Case was not stirred The question was whether an Action of Debt will lie against the Defendant as Executor de son tort where there is no Term at all for 't is plain there was none in being in this Case because when the Lessee Re-demised his whole Term to the Lessor that was a Surrender in Law and as fully as if it had been actually surrendred and therefore this was quite different from the Case where Lessee for years makes an Assignment of his whole Term to a Stranger Debt will lie upon the Contract there because an Interest passes to him in Reversion and as to this purpose a Term is in esse by the Contract of the Parties and so it would here against the first Lessor who was Lessee upon the Re-demise but now because of the Surrender the Heir is intituled to enter and the Mother who is the Defendant enters in his Right as Guardian which she may lawfully do If therefore Debt only lies upon the Contract of the Testator as in truth it doth where the whole Term is gone the Plaintiff cannot charge any one as Executor de son tort in the debet and detinet And the whole Term is gon here by the Re-demise which is an absolute Surrender and not upon Condition for in such Case the Surrenderor might have entred for non-performance and so it might have been revived And of this Opinion was the whole Court in both points and would not hear any farther Argument in the Case the Plaintiff having no remedy at Law the Court told him that he might seek for relief in Chancery if he thought fit Harman's Case IN Covenant the breach assigned was that the Defendant did not repair He pleads generally quod reparavit de hoc ponit se super patriam this was held good after a Verdict Quadring versus Downs al' Wardship cannot be where there is no descent IN a Writ of right of Ward the Case was Viz Sir William Quadring being seised of Lands in Fee by Deed and Fine settles them upon his Son William and his Wife for their Lives the Remainder to the second Son in Tail with divers Remainders over The Grandfather dyes the Father and Mother dyes the eldest Son dyes without Issue and so the Land came to the second Son The Plaintiff intitles himself as Guardian in Socage to the Wardship both of the Person and Lands of the Infant whom the Defendant detained and Serjeant Newdigate for him demurred because where there is no descent there can be no Wardship for the second Son is in by purchase and not by descent for here is no mention of the Reversion in Fee and therefore it may be intended that it was conveyed away and besides if it should be intended to continue to Sir William Quadring the Grandfather after this Settlement yet it cannot be thought to descend to the Ward because 't is not said who was Heir for though it be said that the Father of the Ward was Son to Sir William yet 't is not said Son and Heir and of that Opinion was the whole Court in both points for there must be a descent or else there can be no Wardship and it doth not appear that any descent was here because 't is not said that the Reversion did descend nor who was Heir to Sir William which the Plaintiff perceiving prayed leave to amend and it was granted In this Case it was said at the Bar that one might be a Ward in Socage though he be in by Purchase for the Guardian is to have no profit but is only a Curator to do all for the benefit of the Ward and so there need be no descent as is necessary in the Case of a Ward in Chivalry for that being in respect of the Tenure the Guardian is to have profit The Lord Chief Iustice North said Nota. he knew where there was some doubt of the sufficiency of the Guardian in Socage that the Court of Chancery made him give good Security Harding versus Ferne. IN an Action of Assault Battery and Imprisonment Antea Anonymus 'till the Plaintiff had paid 11 l. 10 s. The Defendant pleads and justifies by reason of an Execution and a Warrant thereupon for 11 l. and doth not mention the 10 s. And upon demurrer for this Cause Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff upon the first opening because it appeared the Defendant took more than was warranted by the Execution Ellis versus Yarborough Sheriff of Yorkshire IN an Action of Escape the Plaintiff sets forth that the Defendant Arrested a Man upon a Latitat directed to him at the Suit of the Plaintiff Case lies not against
the space of 14 days after complaint made then the Sub-Commissioners of the Excise are to determine the same from whom no Appeal doth lye to the Justices of the Peace at their next Sessions which Commissioners of Excise Justices of the Peace and Sub-Commissioners amongst other things are inabled by the said Act to Issue out Warrants under their Hands c. to levie the Forfeitures and so justified the Entry under a Warrant from the Sub-Commissioners three Iustices having refused to hear and determine this Offence To this Plea the Plaintiffs demurred and had Iudgment in the Court of Kings-Bench and a Writ of Inquiry of Damages was Executed and 750 l. Damages given and it was alledged that the Defendant could not move to set aside the Iudgment in that Term it was given because the Writ of Inquiry was executed the last day of the Term and the Court did immediatly rise and that he could not move the next Term because the Iudgment was given the Term before the Writ of Error was brought The Attorny General therefore said that this was a hard Case and desired a Note of the Exceptions to the Plea which he would endeavour to maintain which Mr. Pollexfen gave him and then he desired time to answer them The Exception to the Plea upon which the Iudgment was given was this Viz. The Act giveth no power to the Sub-Commissioners to hear and determine the Offences and so to issue out Warrants for the Forfeitures but where the Iustices or any two of them refuse And though it was said by the Defendant that three refused yet it was not said that two did refuse for there is a great difference between the allegation of a thing in the Affirmative and in the Negative for if I affirm that A. B. C. did such a thing that affirmation goes to all of them but negatively it will not hold for if I say A. B. C. did not such a thing there I must add nec eorum aliquis So if an Action be brought against several Men and a Nolle prosequi is entred as to one and a Writ of Enquiry awarded against the rest which recites That the Plaintiff did by Bill implead naming those only against whom the Inquiry was awarded and leaves out him who got the Nolle prosequi this is a variance for it should have been brought against them all 'T is true where a Iudgment is recited 't is enough to mention those only against whom it is had but the Declaration must be against all so in a Writ of Error if one is dead he must be named and so the Iustices ought all to be named in this Case viz. that the three next Iustices did not hear and determine this Offence nec eorum aliquis Wells versus Wright In Communi Banco DEBT upon Bond conditioned Bond with an insensible Condition good that if the Obligée shall pay 20 l. in manner and form following that is to say 5 l. upon four several days therein named but if default shall be made in any of the Payments then the said Obligation shall be void or otherwise to stand in full force and vertue The Defendant pleads that tali die c. non solvit 5 l. c. and upon this the Plaintiff demurred Barrel Serjeant The first part of the Condition is good which is to pay the Mony and the other is surplusage void and insensible but if it be not void it may be good by transsposing thus viz. If he do pay then the Obligation shall be void if default shall be made in Payment then it shall be good and for Authority in the Point the Case of Vernon and Alsop was cited Sid. 105. 1 Sand. 66. 2 Sand. 79. Hill 14 Car. 2. Rot. 1786. in B. R. Where the Condition was that if the Obligée pay 2 s. per Week until the Sum of 7 l. 10 s. be paid viz. on every Saturday and if he fail in Payment at any one day that the Bond shall be void and upon the like Plea and Demurrer as here it was adjudged that the Obligation was single and the Condition repugnant The Court were all of Opinion that Iudgment should be given for the Plaintiff and the Chief Iustice said that he doubted whether the Case of 39 H. 6. 9 10. was Law Brittam versus Charnock Where the the Heir takes by the Will with a Charge he is a Purchaser and the Lands shall not be Assets DEBT upon Bond against the Defendant as Heir Vpon Riens per discent pleaded the Iury found a Special Verdict in which the Case was viz. The Father was seized of a Messuage and thrée Acres of Land in Fee and devised the same to his eldest Son the Defendant and his Heirs within four years after his decease provided the Son pay 20 l. to the Executrix towards the Payment of the Testators Debts and then he deviseth his other Lands to be sold for payment of Debts c. The Father dies the Son pays the 20 l. and if this Messuage c. was Assets in the Hands of the Defendant was the Question Cro. Car. 161. Cro. Eliz. 431. 833. Vaugh. 271. That it was not Assets it was said because the Heir shall not take by descent but by Purchase for the Word Paying is no Condition if it should the Heir is to enter for the breach and that is the Defendant himself and for that reason it shall be a Limitation Southcot and Stowel Antea 'T is true where there is no alteration of the Estate the Heir must take by descent but in this Case there is an alteration of the Estate from what is directed by the Law viz. the manner how he shall come by the Estate for no Fee passeth to him during the four years But this was denyed by Serjeant Pemberton for he said if a Devise be of Land to one and his Heirs within four years it is a present Devise and if such be made to the Heir 't is a descent in the mean time and those Words within four years are void so that the Question will be whether the Word Paying will make the Heir a Purchaser and he held it would not He agreed that it was usual to make that a Word of Limitation and not a Condition when the Devise is to the Heir and therefore in a Devise to the Heir at Law in Fée he shall take by descent Styles Rep. 148. But if this be neither a Condition or Limitation 't is a Charge upon the Land and such a Charge as the Heir cannot avoid in Equity North Chief Iustice and Atkins Where the Heir takes by a Will with a Charge as in this Case he doth not take by Descent but by Purchase and therfore this is no Assets Moor versus Pit SPecial Verdict in Ejectment The Case was this Surrender of a Copyhold to a Disseisor whether good to extinguish the Right viz. A Copyholder for Life the Remainder for Life he in
Authorities with great exactness and nicety yet this Matter of Livery upon Endorsements of Writing was always favourably expounded of later times unless where it plainly appeared that the Authority was not pursued at all Sid. 428. as if a Letter of Attorney be made to thrée joyntly and severally two cannot execute it because they are not the Parties delegated they do not agreé with the Authority And Iudgment was given accordingly Richards versus Sely. THIS was a Special Verdict in Ejectione firmae for Lands in the County of Cornwal The Case was this viz. Covenant made to enjoy a Copy-hold de anno in annum 't is a Lease and so a Forfeiture Thomas Sely was seised of the Lands in question for life according the Custom of the Mannor of P. and he together with one Peter Sely were bound in a Bond to a third person for the payment of 100 l. being the proper Debt of the said Thomas who gave Peter a Counter-bond to save himself harmless And that Thomas being so seised did execute a Déed to Peter as a Collateral Security to indempnifie him for the payment of this 100 l. by which Deéd after a recital of the Counterbond given to Peter and the Estate which Thomas had in the Lands he did covenant grant and agree for himself his Executors Administrators and Assigns with the said Peter that he his Executors and Administrators should hold and enjoy these Lands from the time of the making of the said Déed for seven years and so from the end of seven years to seven years for and during the term of 49 years if Thomas should so long live 2 Cro. 301. In which Déed there was a Covenant that if the said 100 l. should be paid and Peter saved harmless according to the Condition of the said Counterbond then the said Déed to be void The Question was whether this being in the Case of Copyhold Lands will amount to a Lease thereof and so make a Forfeiture of the Copyhold Estate there being no Custom to warrant it Ex parte Quer. This Case was argued this Term by Serjeant Pemberton for the Plaintiff and in Trinity Term following by Serjeant Maynard on the same side who said that this was not a good Lease to entitle the Lord to a Forfeiture It hath béen a general Rule that the Word Covenant will make a Lease though the Word Grant be omitted nay a Licence to hold Land for a time without either of those Words will amount to a Lease much more when the Words are to * 2 Cro. 92 398. Noy 14. 1 Roll. Abr. 848 849. Cro. Car. 207. have hold and enjoy his Land for a Term certain for those are Words which give an Interest and so it hath béen ruled in Tisdale and Sir William Essex's Case which is reported by several and is in Hob. 35. and 't is now setled that an Action of Debt may be brought upon such a Covenant And all this is regularly true in the Case of a Fréehold But if the construing of it to be a Lease will work a Wrong then 't is only a Covenant or Agreément and no Interest vests and therefore it shall never be intended a Lease in this Case because 't is in the Case of a Copyhold Estate for if it should there would be a Wrong done both to the Lessor and Lessée for it would be a Forfeiture of the Estate of the one and a defeating of the Security of the other It has beén generally used in such Cases to consider what was the intention of the Parties and not to intend it a Lease against their meaning for which there is an express Authority 2 Cro. 172. in the Case of Evans and Thomas Noy 128. in which Howel covenants with Morgan to make a Conveyance to him of Land by Fine provided that if he pay Morgan 100 l. at the end of thirtéen years that then the use of the Fine shall be to the Congnisor and covenants that Morgan shall enjoy the said Lands for thirtéen years and for ever after if the 100 l. be not paid The Assurance was not made and this was adjuged no Lease for thirtéen years because it was the intent of the Parties to make an Assurance only in the nature of a Mortgage which is but a Covenant And this appears likewise to be the intention of the Parties here because in the very Deed 't is recited that the Lands are Copihold It also sounds directly in Covenant for 't is that Peter shall or may enjoy without the lawful let or interruption of the Lessor All Agreements must be construed secundum subjectam materiam if the Matter will bear it and in most Cases are governed by the intention of the Parties and not to work a Wrong and therefore if Tenant in Tail makes a Lease for Life it shall be taken for his own Life and yet if before the Statute of Entails he made such Lease he being then Tenant in Fée-simple it had been an Estate during the Life of the Lessée but when the Statute had made it unlawful for him to bind his Heir then the Law construes it to be for his own Life because otherwise it would work a Wrong Hob. 276. Co. Lit. 42. So in this case it shall not amount to a Lease for the manifest inconveniency which would follow but it shall be construed as a Covenant and then no injury is done On the Defendants part it was argued by Serjeant Newdigate that though this was in the Case of a Copyhold Ex parte Def. that did not make any difference for the plain meaning of the Parties was to make a Lease But where the Words are doubtful and such as may admit of diverse constructions whether they will amount to a Lease or not there they shall be taken as a Covenant to prevent a Forfeiture So also if they are only Instructions as if a Man by Articles sealed and delivered is contented to demise such Lands and a Rent is reserved and Covenants to repair c. Or if one covenants with another to permit and suffer him to have and enjoy such Lands 1 Rol. Abr. 848. these and such like Words will not amount to a Lease because as hath béen said the intention of the Parties is only to make it a Covenant but here the Words are plain and can admit of no doubt But for an Authority in the Point the Lady * 2 Cro. 301. Mountagues Case was cited where it was adjudged that if a Copyholder make a Lease for a year warranted by the Custom sic de anno in annum during ten years 't is a good Lease for ten years and a Forfeiture of the Copyhold Estate Vide Hill 15 16 Car. 2. Rot. 233. the Case of Holt and Thomas in this Court The Court inclined that it was a good Lease Curia and by consequence a Forfeiture of the Copihold and that a Licence in this
pleaded Debt for Escape lies against the Warden of the Fleet as superior the Grantee for life being insufficient Jones 60. 1 Vent 314. the Iury found a special Verdict upon which the Case was this Viz. That Sir Jeremy Whitchot was seised in Fee of the Office of Warden of the Fleet and of several Mesuages thereunto belonging and being so seised did make a Grant thereof to one Duckenfield for life and for the lives of three more Duckenfield by Rule of Court was admitted into the said Office being approved by the Court and esteemed a Man of an Estate He suffers a Prisoner afterwards to Escape and being not able to make the Plaintiff satisfaction this Action was brought against Sir Jeremy Whitchot the now Defendant and whether he was chargeable or not with this Action was the Question Wallop who argued for the Plaintiff said Ex parte Quer. That he would not take up any of their time to make a Narrative of Imprisonment for Debt or what remedy there was for Escapes at Common Law and what remedy by the Statute but supposing an Action of Debt will lye whether it be by the Statute of Westm 2. cap. 11. for at the Common Law before the making of that Act Sid. 306 397. an Action of Debt would not lye against the Goaler for an Escape but a special Action on the Case grounded on a Trespass or whether this Action lay against the Defendant by the Statute of 1 R. 2. 2 Inst 382. cap. 12. which gives it against the Warden of the Fleet who in this case had not the actual Free-hold in possession but the inheritance and not the immediate Estate but the Reversion is in Question The Office of the Warden of the Fleet may be taken in two capacities either as an Estate or common Hereditament wherein a Man may have an Inheritance and which may be transferred from one to another or as a publick Office wherein the King and the People may have a special Interest As 't is an Inheritance transferrable 't is subject to the Rules of Law in point of Descent and is demisable for Life in Fee Tayl Possession or Reversion and in many things is common and runs parallel with other Estates of Inheritance 'T is true he cannot grant this Office for years not for any disability in the Grantor but in respect of the matter and nature of the thing granted it being an Office of Trust and Personal for otherwise it would go to the Executor which is inconvenient 9 Co. 96. Sir George Reynell's Case To enquire what superiority the reversioner hath over the particular Estate is not to the point in Question but there is such an intimacy and privity between them that in Iudgment of Law they are accounted as one Estate And therefore Littleton Sect. 452 453 saith that a Release made to a Reversioner shall aid and benefit him who hath the particular Estate and likewise a Release made to the Tenant of the Freehold shall enure to him in Reversion because they are privies in Estate so that these two Estates in the Case at Bar make but one Office This is a publick Office of great Trust and concerns the Administration of Iustice and therefore 't is but reasonable to admit the Rule of Respondeat Superior lest the Party should be without remedy and the rather because Execution is the life of the Law 39 H. 6. 33. He who is in the Office as Superiour whether it be by droit or tort is accountable to the King and his People and this brings him within the Statute of Westm 2. cap. 11. or 1 R. 2. If the Defendant had granted the Office in Fee to Duckenfeild before any Escape had been and the Grantee had been admitted the Defendant then had been discharged or if he dye before or after the Action brought and before Iudgment moritur actio cum persona for if he had not reserved something he could not be charged and if he had parted with the Inheritance the privity had been gon but by reserving that he hath made himself liable for now he is Superiour he may exact Homage and Fealty and the particular Tenant is said to be attendant upon the Reversion and these are marks of Superiority And this Rule of respondeat superior holds not only between the principal Officer and his Deputy and between the Master and his Servant but in many other Cases one is to be answerable for another as 1. Where a Man has power to elect an Officer he is chargeable so the County hath power to elect Coroners and if they fail in their Duty the County shall be charged for by reason of the power they had to elect they are esteemed Superiours 4 Inst 314. 2 Inst 175. 2. Where one Man recommends another to an Office concerning the Kings Revenue the person who recommends is liable if the other prove insufficient and for this there is a notable Case 30 E. 3. 6. 'T is Porter's Case cited in the Case of the Earl of Devonshire 11 Co. 92. b. Where Porter being Master of the Mint covenanted with the King to deliver him Mony within 8 days for all the Bullion delivered ad Cambium Regis to Coyn which he did not perform Et quia Walwyn Picard duxerunt praesentaverunt the said Porter ideo consideratum est quod onerentur versus Dominum Regem 4 Inst 466. And why not the Defendant in this Case who praesentavit the said Duckenfeild to the Court tanquam sufficientem the reason being the same and the King is as much concerned in the ordering this Court of Iustice as in the ordering of his Coffers for as the Treasure is Nervus Belli so the execution of the Law is Nervus Pacis 3. In the Case of a dependant Officer though he is a proper Officer and no Deputy the person who hath the Reversion shall answer as in 32 H. 6. 34. 2 Inst 382. 9 Rep. 98. Dyer 278. b. The Duke of Norfolk who had the Inheritance of the Marshalsea was charged for an Escape suffered by one Brandon who was Tenant for Life in possession of the said Office and there is great reason it should be so for when a principal Officer may make an inferiour Officer who afterwards commits a Forfeiture the superiour shall take advantage of this Forfeiture and 't is as reasonable he should he answerable for his Miscarriage Cro. Eliz. 384. Poph. 119 The Earl of Pembrook against Sir Henry Berkley And therefore admitting the Defendant is out of the Statute yet he is within the Maxim of Respondeat Superior which is not grounded upon any Act of Parliament as appears in the Case of the Coroner and the Statute of Westm 2. And all other Acts which inculcate this Rule are but in affirmance of the Common Law and this is not only a Rule of the Common but also of the Civil Law which is served with the Equity of this Maxim in
of Lands Tenements and Hereditaments 't was adjudged entailed Lands did not pass do not concern this Case but now since they are made forfeitable by that Statute such general words are sufficient to serve the turn By the Statute of 16 R. 2. cap. 5. entailed Lands are not forfeited in a Praemunire but during the Life of Tenant in Tail because they were not then to be forfeited for Treason 2 Inst 334. 1 Inst 3. Co. Lit. 130. If then it appears that the Crime of which Sir John Danvers was guilty was Treason and if entailed Lands are forfeited for Treason then when the Act saith That he shall forfeit all his Lands by those general Words his entailed Lands shall be forfeited And though by the Common Law there can be no Attainder in this Case the Party being dead yet by Act of Parliament that may be done and the words in this Act amount to an Attainder The intent of it was to forfeit Estates Tail which may be collected from the general Words for if a Fee-simple is forfeited though not named why not an Estate Tail especially since the word Hereditaments is very comprehensive and may take in both those Estates Spelman's Glossary 227. 2 Roll. Rep. 503. In the very Act of 26 H. 8. cap. 13. Estates Tail are not named for the Words are Every Offender convict of Treason c. shall forfeit all such Lands Tenements and Hereditaments which he shall have of any Estate of Inheritance in use possession or by any Right Title or Means c. and yet a Construction hath been made thereupon in favour of the Crown so a Dignity of an Earldom intailed is forfeitable by this Statute by the Word Hereditament 7 Co. 34. Afterwards in Hillary Term Rainsford Chief Iustice delivered the Opinion of the Court Judgment That upon Construction of the Act of Pains and Penalties this Estate Tail was forfeited to the King He agreed the Series and progress of Estates Tail to have been as argued by the Solicitor and that the Question now was whether by the Act of Pains c. Estates Tail can be forfeited unless there are express Words to take away the force of the Statute de donis conditionalibus Preface to 3 Co. for by that Statute there was a settled perpetuity Tenant in Tail could neither forfeit or alien his Estate no not in Case of Treason and Forfeiture is a kind of Alienation but afterwards by the Resolution in Ed. 4. an Alienation by a Common Recovery was construed to be out of the said Statute and by the Statute of Fines 4 H. 7. which is expounded by a subsequent Statute of 32 H. 8. cap. 36. Tenant in Tail notwithstanding his former restraint had power to alien the Estate Tail and barr his Issue but all this while his Estate was not to be forfeited for Treason till the Statute of 33 H. 8. cap. 20. which gives Uses Rights Entries Conditions as well as Possessions Reversions Remainders and all other things of a person attainted of Treason by the Common or Statute Law of the Realm to the King as if such Attainder had been by Act of Parliament Then by the Statute of 5 6 Ed. cap. 11. 't is Enacted That an Offender being guilty of High Treason and lawfully convict shall forfeit to the King all such Lands Tenements and Hereditaments which he shall have of any Estate of Inheritance in his own Right in Use or Possession by which Statutes that de donis conditionalibus was taken off in Cases of Treason as it had been before by the resolution in 12 E. 4. and by the Statute of Fines as to the Alienation of an Estate Tail by Fine and Recovery If therefore this Act of Pains c. will admit of such a construction as to make Estates Tail forfeit here is a Crime great enough to deserve such a great punishment a Crime for which the Parliament hath ordered an Anniversary to be kept for ever with Fasting and Humiliation to implore that the Guilt of that innocent Blood then shed may not be required of our Posterity this they esteemed as another kind of Original Sin which unless thus expiated might extend not only ad Natos sed qui nascantur ab illis And that this Act will admit of such a Construction these Reasons were given 1. From the general comprehensive Words mentioning those things which are to be forfeited viz. Messuages Lands Tenements Reversions and Interests which last Word signifies the Estate in the Land as well as the Land it self or otherwise the Word must be construed to have no effect 2. Estates Tail are not now protected by the Clause in the Statute de donis * Inst 334. Non habet potestatem alienandi but are subject to the forfeiture by the Act of H. 8. which though it extends to Attainders only yet 't is a good Rule for the Iudges to make a Construction of an Act of Parliament by especially in such a Case as this wherein 't is plain that the Law did look upon these Offenders if not attainted yet in pari gradu with such persons and therefore may be a good Warrant to make the like Construction as in Cases of Attainder 3. Because the Offenders are dead for had they béen living there might have been better reason to have construed this Act not to extend to Estates Tail because then something might be forfeited viz. an Estate for Life and therefore the Act would signifie very little if such Construction could not be made of it to reach Estates Tail of such persons who were dead at the time of the making the Law especially since 't is well known that when Men engage in such Crimes they give what Protection they can to their Estates and place them as far as they can out of danger 4. It appears by the Act that the Law-makers did not intend that the Children of such Offenders should have any benefit of their Estates because in the Proviso there is a saving of all Estates of Purchasers for Mony bona fide paid and therein also a particular Exception of the Wife and Children and Heirs of the Offenders and if the Act would not protect the Estate of the Children though they should be Purchasers for a valuable consideration it will never protect their Estate under a voluntary Conveyance made by the Ancestor especially in this Case because the Entail carries a suspicion with it that it was designed with a prospect to commit this Crime for Sir John Danvers was Tenant in Tail before and in the year 1647. levies a Fine to barr that Entail and then limits a new Estate Tail to himself in which there is a Provision to make Leases for any number of years upon what Lives soever in Possession or Reversion with Rent or without it and this was but the year before the Crime committed 5. The Proviso in the Act for saving the Estates of Purchasers doth protect all Conveyances and
annum to the Plaintiffs in Trust for Mary and this was to be in discharge of the said Iointure Habendum to them their Heirs Executors Administrators and Assigns in Trust for the said Mary for Life with a Clause of Distress and a Covenant to pay the 200 l. per annum to the said Trustees for the use of the said Mary the Breach assigned was that the Defendant had not paid the Rent to them for the Use of Mary The Defendant demurred specially for that it appears by the Plaintiffs own shewing that here is a Grant of a Rent-Charge for life which is executed by the Statute of Vses and therefore there ought to have been a Distress for Non-payment which is the proper remedy given by the Statute and this Action will not lie in the personalty 2. 'T is said the Defendant did not pay it to the Plaintiffs for the use of Mary which is a Negative pregnant and implies that it was paid to them 3. 'T is not averred that the Mony was not paid to Mary and if 't is paid to her then the Breach is not well assigned Ex parte Quer. But Serjeant Baldwin for the Plaintiff replyed that it was not a Question in this Case whether this Rent Charge was executed by the Statute or not for quacunque via data an Action of Covenant will lie and that the Breach was assigned according to the Words of the Covenant and so prima facie 't is well enough for if the Defendant did pay the Mony to the Plaintiffs he may plead it and so he may likewise if he paid it to Mary Curia The Court were all of Opinion that this Rent-Charge was executed by the Statute of Vses by the express Words thereof which executes such Rents granted for Life upon Trust as this Case is and transfers all Rights and Remedies incident thereunto together with the possession to Cestuy que use so that though the power of distraining be limited to the Trustées by this Deéd yet by the Statute which transfers that power to Mary she may distrain also but this Covenant being collateral cannot be transferred The Clause of Distress by the express Words of the Act is given to the Cestuy que use but here is a double Remedy by Distress or Action for if the Lessée assign his Interest and the Rent is accepted of the Assignee yet a Covenant lies against the Lessée for Non-payment upon the express Covenant to * Hayes and Bickerstaff Hollis and Carr Antea pay so if a Rent be granted to S. and a Covenant to pay it to N. for his use 't is a good Covenant And it was agreed that the assignment of a Breach according to the Words of the Covenant is good enough and that if any thing be done which amounts to a performance the other side must plead it as in this Case the Defendant might have pleaded that the Mony was paid to Mary which is a performance in substance but it shall not be intended without pleading of it Whereupon Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Read versus Dawson DEBT upon Bond against the Defendant as Executor Repleader after an immaterial Issue Issue was joyned whether the Defendant had Assets or not on the thirtieth day of November which was the day on which he had the first notice of the Plaintiffs original Writ and it was found for the Defendant that then he had not Assets It was moved for a Repleader because it was said this was an immaterial Issue for though he had not Assets then yet if he had any afterwards he is liable to the Plaintiffs Action But Barrel Serjeant moved for Iudgment upon this Verdict by reason of the Statute of 32 H. 8. which helps in Cases of Mispleading or insufficient Pleading 'T is true there are many Cases which after Verdict are not aided by this Statute as if there are two Affirmatives which cannot make an Issue or when after a Traverse Issue is joyned with an hoc petit quod inquiratur per patriam this is no Issue 2 Anders 6 7. Yelv. 210. Hob. 126. So if there be no Plea at all as if an Action is brought against Baron and Feme and she pleads only 2 Cro. 288. So if the Party puts himself super patriam where it should be tried by Record or if the Plea be nothing to the purpose or lie not in the Mouth of the Parties such immaterial Issues as these cannot be good The difference in Moor 867. is if the Plea on which the Issue is joyned hath no colourable pretence in it to barr the Plaintiff or if it be against an express Rule in the Law there the Issue is immaterial and so as if there was no Issue and therefore 't is not aided by the Statute but if it hath the countenance of a legal Plea though it want necessary matter to make it sufficient there shall be no Repleader because 't is helped after Verdict Here the Parties only doubt whether there were Assets at the time of the notice and 't is found there were none and so Iudgment was to be given accordingly and of that Opinion was the whole Court But Iustice Atkins was clear of Opinion that if the Parties join in an immaterial Issue there shall be no Repleader because 't is helped after Verdict by these Words in the Statute viz. any Issue 'T is not said an Issue joined upon a material Point and the intent of the Statute was to prevent Repleaders and that if any other Construction should be made of that Act he was of Opinion that the Iudges sate there not to expound but to make a Law for by such an Interpretation much of the benefit intended by the Act to the Party who had a Verdict would be restrained Curia The other Iustices were all of Opinion that since the making of this Statute it had been always allowed and taken as a difference that when the Issue was perfectly material there should be no Repleader but that it was otherwise where the Issue was not material And Iustice Scroggs asked merrily If Debt be brought upon a Bond and the Defendant pleads Robin Hood dwelt in a Wood and the Plaintiff joyns Issue that he did not this is an immaterial Issue and shall there not be a Repleader in such Case after Verdict Ad quod non fuit responsum Beaumont versus ........ Wager of Law THE Plaintiff brings an Action of Debt upon a Iudgment obtained against the Defendant in a Court Baron having declared there in an Action on the Case upon an Assumpsit and recovered The Defendant came to wage his Law and was ready to swear that he owed the Plaintiff nothing Sid. 366. but the Court held that he was not well advised for by the Recovery in the inferior Court it became now a Debt and was owing and being asked whether he had paid the Mony he answered that he owed nothing Whereupon the Court
Nomen collectivum and if twenty Breaches had been assigned he still counts de placito quod teneat ei Conventionem inter eos fact ' And of that Opinion was the Court and that the Breach being of all three Covenants the Recovery in one would be a good Barr in any Action afterwards to be brought upon either of those Covenants Parrington versus Lee. INdebitatus Assumpsit Limitation of personal Actions only extends to accompt between Merchants Mod. Rep. 268. 2 Sand. 125 127. Pl. Com. 54. for Mony had and received to the use of the Plaintiff a quantum meruit for Wares sold and an Insimul computasset c. The Defendant pleads the Statute of Limitations viz. non assumpsit infra sex annos The Plaintiff replyed that this Action was grounded on the Trade of Merchants and brought against the Defendant as his Factor c. The Defendant rejoyns that this was not an Action of Accompt and the Plaintiff demurred for that this Statute was made in restraint of the Common Law and therefore is not to be favoured or extended by Equity but to be taken strictly and that if a Man hath a double remedy he may take which he pleaseth and here the Plaintiff might have brought an Action of Accompt or an Action on the Case grounded on an Accompt But Baldwyn Serjeant insisted that the Declaration was not full enough for the Plaintiff ought to set forth that the Action did concern Merchants Accompts and that the Replication did not help it The Court were of another Opinion for that it need not be so set forth in the Declaration because he could not tell what the Defendant would plead so that supposing him to be within the Saving of the Act his Replication is good and 't is the usual way of Pleading and no departure because the Plea of the Defendant gives him occasion thus to reply But the Saving extends only to Accompts between Merchants their Factors and Servants and an Action on the Case will not lie against a Bayliff or Factor where Allowances and Deductions are to be made unless the Accompt be adjusted and stated as it was resolved in Sir Paul Neals Case against his Bayliff Where the Accompt is once stated as it was here the Plaintiff must bring his Action within six years but if it be adjusted and a following Accompt is added in such case the Plaintiff shall not be barred by the Statute Mod. Rep. 71. because 't is a running Accompt but if he should not be barred here then the Exception would extend to all Actions between Merchants and their Factors as well as to Actions of Accompt which was never intended and therefore this Plea is good and the Saving extends only to Actions of Accompt whereupon Iudgment was given for the Defendant Astry versus Ballard In Banco Regis Principals in Execution the Bail are lyable 1 Ventris 315 THE Defendant became Bail for six persons against whom the Plaintiff got a Iudgment and two were put in Execution the Plaintiff afterwards brought a Scire Facias against the Bail who pleaded that two of the Principals were taken in Execution before the Scire Facias brought and whether the Bail was not discharged thereby was now the Question It was agreed that if five had surrendred themselves after Iudgment 2 Cro. 320. 1 Roll. 897. yet the Bail had been lyable but are not so if the Plaintiff as in this Case hath once made his Election by suing out Execution against the Principals and thereupon two are taken and in Custody Before the Return of the second Scire Facias they have Liberty by the Law to bring in the Principals but the Plaintiff having taken out Execution he hath made it now impossible for the Bail to bring them in to render themselves But Sypmson argued that the Bail was not discharged for he ought to bring in the other four or else he hath not performed his Recognizance and so it was adjudged by the Court Sid. 107. for the Law expects a compleat satisfaction The like Resolution was in this Court between Orlibear and Norris Steed versus Perryer IN a Special Verdict in Ejectment the Case was this Republication makes it a new Will viz. Robert Perryer being seised in Fee of the Lands in question had Issue two Sons William his eldest and Robert his youngest Son and being so seised he devises these Lands to his youngest Son Robert and his Heirs Robert the Devisee dies in the Life time of his Father Jones 135. 1 Ventris 341 Mod. Rep. 267. and leaves Issue a Son named Robert who had a Legacy devised to him by the same Will The Grandfather afterwards annexed a Codicil to his Will which was agreed to be a Republication and then he expresly publishes the Will de novo and declared that his Grandson Robert should have the Land as his Son Robert should have enjoyed it had he lived And whether the Grandson or the Heir at Law had the better Title was the Question Pemberton and Maynard Serjeants argued for the Title of the Plaintiff who was Heir at Law That if a Devise be to S. and his Heirs if S. dye living the Devisor the Heir shall take nothing because no Estate vested in his Ancestor so if a Devise be to the Heirs of S. after his decease the Heir shall take by Purchase for he cannot take as Heir for the Reason aforesaid By the death of Robert the Son the Devise to him and his Heirs was void and the annexing a Codicile and Republication of the Will cannot make that good which was void before if it cannot make it good then the Heir cannot take by Purchase and by descent he cannot take for his Ancestor had no Estate and therefore he shall have none Besides this is not a good Will within the Statute which requires it to be in Writing Now the Devise by the written Will was to the Son and the Republication to the Grandson was by Words and not in Writing so that if he cannot take by the Words of the Will he is remediless and that he cannot take as Heir because his Ancestor dyed in the Life time of the Testator Moor 353. Cro. Eliz. 243. Cro. Eliz. 422. Moor 353 404. Skipwith and Barrel on the other side That the new Publication makes it good for it makes a new Will in Writing and it shall take according to the Publication which makes it have the effect of a new Will 'T is true Deeds shall not be extended father than the intent and meaning of the Parties at the time of the Delivery but Wills are to be expounded by another Rule therefore though by the death of the Son the Will was void yet by the Republication it hath a new Life 1 Roll. Abr. 618. 5 Co. 68. 8 Co. 125. The Chief Justice Wyndham and Atkins Iustices were of Opinion for the Grandson against the Heir at Law viz. That the Republication made it a
Remainder for Life surrenders the Copyhold to the Lord pro tempore who was a Disseisor only of the Mannor ut inde faciat voluntatem suam the Disseisor grants it to a Stranger for Life the Disseiseé enters the Stranger dies and whether the Disseisor or he in the Remainder for Life who made the Surrender had the better Title was the Question So that the Point was Cro. Car. 205. 2 Sid. 151. 1 Roll. Abr. 540. whether this Surrender by a Copy-holder in Remainder into the Hands of the Disseisor be good and shall so extinguish the Right to the Copyhold that it shall not be revived by the Entry of the Disseisee into the said Mannor It was said that in some Cases a Surrender into the Hands of a Disseisor was good that is when the Surrender is made to him to the use of another and his Heirs and he admits him there the person admitted claims not under the Lord but under the Copyholder who made the Surrender 1 Inst 59. b. for nothing passes to the Lord but only to serve the Limitation of the Vse 1 Rol. Abr. 503. litt Q. pl. 1. 4 Co. 24. But in this Case the Grantée must claim from the Lord himself and not from the Copyholder because he had but an Estate for his own Life with which he wholly departed when he made the Surrender to the use of the Disseisor himself In Trinity-Term following this Case was argued by Serjeant Maynard on the other side There are two sorts of Surrenders of a Copyhold 1. Proper 2. Formal and Ceremonious If a Surrender be to the Lord to the use of another this is no proper Surrender for no Estate passeth to the Lord he being only the Instrument to convey it to the Surrendree and this is but nominal But here the Surrender was to the use of the Lord himself which is a proper Surrender and in such Case 't is necessary that the Lord have a Reversion for one Estate is to be turned into the other and there must be a continuing of Estates But Dominus pro tempore who is a Disseisor hath no such Estate Executor de son tort shall sue but he cannot retain If therefore he is not capable to take a Surrender to himself unless he hath such an Estate then here is no Disseisin of the Copyhold 't is only of the Mannor and then no greater Interest passeth to the Disseisor than to a Stranger whilst the true Lord had been in possession for so he is quoad this Copyhold if he was not disseised of it for if the Copyholder had the possession there could be then no Disseisin if he was out of possession then he had nothing but a Right and that cannot be surrendred for it must be an Estate as if a Lessee for years keep possession 't is the possession of the Lord and the Law is the same in case of a Copyhold 2 Co. Bettisworth's Case Piggot and Lord Salisbury's Case Ante The true Owner makes a Feoffment in Fee if Lessee for years continue in possession no Fréehold passeth If Tenant at Will of parcel of the Mannor be in possession that prevents a Disseisin of the Freehold much more in Case of a Copyhold Lessee for years the Remainder to B. for Life the Remainder to C. in Fee C. by Deed makes a Feoffment to B. and Livery c. 't is a void Conveyance because the possession of Lessee for years is the possession of him in the Remainder for Life and as long as the Lessee for years is in the possession the Owner of the Inheritance cannot be out Lit. 324. cap. Attornment North Chief Iustice and Wyndham enclined that the Surrender was not good for it was a material distinction where the Surrender was made to the use of a Stranger and where it terminates in the Lord that a Surrender made by a Copyholder for Life could not transfer but extinguish his Right for he could not give a greater Estate than he had that there must be a Reversion in the Lord to make a Surrender to him to be good and that if a Copyholder keeps in possession there could be no Disseisin But Iustice Atkins contra That this Surrender must have operation to extinguish his Right for though a Copyholder for Life cannot surrender for longer time than his own Life yet if a Surrender be made of such a Copyhold to an Vse 't is good and works by way of Extinguishment of his Right though the Vse be void and if a Copyholder of Inheritance surrender to a Disseisor ut faciat voluntatem who regrants to the said Copyholder an Estate in Tail according to the Surrender this shall bind the Disseisee 1 Roll. Abridg. 503. pl. 3. Tamen quaere The Copyholder in this Case might have sold his Estate to the Disseisor and it had béen good and though the Acts of a Disseisor shall not prejudice the Disseisee yet he could see no reason why the Copyholder who had parted with his Estate should have it again Taylor versus Biddal SPecial Verdict in Ejectment The Case was thus Devise till he be of Age then to him in Fee he dyed within Age yet a Fee vested in him presently Richard Ben was seised in Fee of the Lands in question and had a Sister named Elizabeth formerly married to one Smith by whom she had Issue Augustine Smith now Lessor of the Plaintiff and she afterwards married one Robert Wharton by whom she had Issue a Son called Benjamin and a Daughter called Mary the now Defendant Richard Ben devised these Lands to Elizabeth his Sister and Heir for so long time and until her Son Benjamin Wharton should attain his full Age of 21 years and after he shall have attained his said Age then to the said Benjamin and his Heirs for ever and if he dye before his Age of 21 years then to the Heirs of the Body of Robert Wharton and to their Heirs for ever as they should attain their respective Ages of 21 years Richard the Testator dies Benjamin dyed before he came to the Age of 21 years living Roberr Wharton his Father afterwards Robert dyed And the Question was Whether the Lessor of the Plaintiff as Heir to Elizabeth or Mary either as Heir to her Brother Benjamin or as Heir of the Body of Robert should have this Land This Case was argued by Serjeant Pemberton this Term Ex parte Quer. and by Serjeant Maynard in Easter-Term following for the Plaintiff and they held that Augustine Smith the Lessor of the Plaintiff should have this Land because no Estate vested in Benjamin Wharton he dying before he had attained his Age of 21 years and the Testator had declared that his Sister should have it till that time and then and not before he was to have it so that if he never attained that Age as in this Case he did not the Land shall descend to the Heir of the Testator that Elizabeth had only an