Selected quad for the lemma: life_n

Word A Word B Word C Word D Occurrence Frequency Band MI MI Band Prominent
life_n grant_v reversion_n tenant_n 6,527 5 10.6162 5 false
View all documents for the selected quad

Text snippets containing the quad

ID Title Author Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication) STC Words Pages
A64753 The reports and arguments of that learned judge Sir John Vaughan Kt. late chief justice of His Majesties court of Common Pleas being all of them special cases and many wherein he pronounced the resolution of the whole court of common pleas ; at the time he was chief justice there / published by his son Edward Vaughan, Esq. England and Wales. Court of Common Pleas.; Vaughan, John, Sir, 1603-1674.; Vaughan, Edward, d. 1688. 1677 (1677) Wing V130; ESTC R716 370,241 492

There are 20 snippets containing the selected quad. | View lemmatised text

the Grantee for life when his Estate was enlarg'd needing no new Attornment or privity he did not thereby lose the Rent-arrear If two Jointenants in Fee let the Land for life Litt. Sect. 574 reserving a Rent to them and their Heirs if one release to the other and his Heirs this Release is good and he to whom it was made shall have the Rent of Tenant for life only and a Writ of Waste without Attornment to such Release for the privity which once was between the Tenant for life and them in the Reversion So is it if one Jointenant confirms the Land to the other and his Heirs Litt. Sect. 523. The Law must necessarily be the same if a man seis'd of a Rent-service or Rent-charge in Fee grant it to two and their Heirs or to two and the Heirs of one of them and the Tenant attorn if after one Jointenant release to the other or he which hath the Inheritance to him which hath but an Estate for life and to his Heirs the person to whom such Release is made shall thereby have a Fee-simple whereas before he had but for life in the Rent and an Estate absolute which before was joynt without any new Attornment for the reason of the former Case because there was once a privity between the Tenant and them which was never destroyed So is it if there be Lessee for life the Remainder for life he Litt. Sect. 573 in the Reversion releaseth to him in the Remainder and to his Heirs all his right he in the Remainder hath thereby a Fee and shall have a Writ of Waste and likewise the Rent of Tenant for life if any were without any Attornment of the Tenant for life for the former privity between them Enlargement of Estate by descent If a man seiz'd of a Rent-charge in Fee grant it for life to A. and the Tenant attorns after the Grantor grants the Reversion of this Rent to the Father of A. and his Heirs to whom A. attorns as in this Case he may by Sir Edward Coke's Comment and after the Father dies Coke's Litt. Sect. 556. and this Reversion descends upon A. whereby he hath a Fee-simple in the Rent no new Attornment is requisite for this enlargement of Estate Diminishing of Estate A man seis'd of a Rent-charge in Fee grants this Rent for Seven years to commence from the time of his death the Remainder in Fee and the Tenant attorns in the life time of the Grantor 2. Rep. Sir Rowland Hayward's Case as he must by the Resolution in Sir Rowland Hayward's Case 2. Rep. here the Grantor hath diminish't his Estate in the Rent from a Fee-simple to an Estate for life yet it cannot be doubted but he may distrain for his Rent-arrear And so is the Law where a man seis'd in Fee of a Rent for good consideration Covenants to stand seiz'd for life with Remainder over Vpon these grounds upon Littleton If a man seis'd of a Rent-charge in Fee grant it over to a Feme sole for a term of years the Tenant attorns and she take Husband and during the term the Grantor confirm the Rent to the Husband and Wife for their lives or in Fee they become Jointenants for life or in Fee of this Rent and need no new Attornment This Case is proved by a Case in Littleton Sect. Hence it is manifest that where a man hath a Rent for which he may once lawfully distrain by Attornment of the Tenant which gives sufficient privity to avow such Grantee or Possessor of the Rent may enlarge or change his Estate in the Rent to a greater or lesser or different Estate and needs no new Attornment or privity therefore to distrain and avow for such Rent whenever Arrear unless he become dispossess'd of the Rent and the privity to distrain and avow thereby be destroyed by a Right gained by some other to have the Rent and a Right in the Tenant to pay it to some other 9 H. 6. f. 43. Br. Avoury p. 123. To this purpose there is a Case If a man be seis'd of Land in Jure uxoris in Fee and leaseth the Land for years reserving Rent his Wife dies without having had any Issue by him whereby he is no Tenant by the Curtesie but his Estate is determined yet he may avow for the Rent before the Heir hath made his actual Entry This Case is not adjudg'd but it is much the better Opinion of the Book Objections The Conizors are in possession since the Fine of another Estate Obj. 1 than they were before the Fine that is according to the uses of the Fine which they could not be without an Alienation of the Rent to the Conizee by the Fine to enable the raising of that new use out of the Estate transferr'd to the Conizee by the Fine That by such Alienation the former privity between the Conizors and the Tenant which they had as Parceners by Attornment to the first grant of the Rent was destroy'd and therefore they cannot now distrain but for Rent-arrear since the Fine by the possession given them by the Statute of 27 H. 8. to which no Attornment is necessary and not for any Arrears due before upon the old privity As specious as this Reason seems it may be answer'd Answ That the Conizors had alwaies an actual and separate seisin and possession of the Rent and were at no time without it therefore the Conizee could have no several and separate possession of it at any time for it is not possible that two severally can possess the same thing simul semel for the same thing can no more be in two separate possessions at the same time civilly then the same thing can be in two separate places at the same time naturally Is not the Reason then of equal force that the Conizors were at no time out of possession and seisin of this Rent and consequently never lost the power to distrain for it As to say the Conizee had sometime a separate possession of the Rent from the Conizors out of which the new uses were raised and therefore the privity to distrain for the old Arrears was for sometime destroy'd Besides if the old privity be destroy'd the greatest absurdity imaginable in Law follows That a man hath a right to a thing for which the Law gives him no remedy which is in truth as great an absurdity as to say the having of right in law and having no right are in effect the same When as on the other side the loss of the Arrears and the Conizors right to them is a Consequent deduc'd from the destruction of the old privity between the Conizors and the Tenant by an imaginary and not a real possession of the Rent by the Conizee Obj. 2 Ognell's Case 4. Rep. Nor will it serve to say as is insinuated in Ognell's Case that the Conizors have dispens'd with their own right in the Arrears and therefore such
been breach'd is no Judicial Opinion nor more than a gratis dictum But an Opinion though Erroneous concluding to the Iudgment is a Judicial Opinion because delivered under the Sanction of the Judges Oath upon deliberation which assures it is or was when delivered the Opinion of the Deliverer Yet if a Court give Judgment judicially another Court is not bound to give like Judgment unless it think that Judgment first given was according to Law For any Court may err else Errors in Judgment would not be admitted nor a Reversal of them Therefore if a Judge conceives a Judgment given in another Court to be erroneous he being sworn to judge according to Law that is in his own conscience ought not to give the like Judgment for that were to wrong every man having a like cause because another was wrong'd before much less to follow extra-judicial Opinions unless he believes those Opinions are right The other Case is in Coke 5 Car. Salvin versus Clerk in Ejectment upon a special Verdict Alexander Sidenham Tenant in tayl to him and the Heirs males of his body the Reversion to John his eldest Brother made a Lease for three Lives warranted by the Statute of 32 H. 8. c. 28. with warranty And after 16 Eliz. levies a Fine with warranty and proclamations to Taylor and dies without Issue male leaving Issue Elizabeth his Daughter Mother to the Plaintiffs Lessor In 18 Eliz. the Lease for Lives expir'd In 30 Eliz. John the elder Brother died without Issue the said Elizabeth being his Neece and Heir The Defendant entred claiming by a Lease from Taylor and Points entred upon him as Heir to Elizabeth A question was mov'd upon a suppos'd Case and not in fact within the Case Whether if the Fine had not been with proclamation as it was and no Non-claim had been in the Case as there was this warranty should make a discontinuance in Fee and barr Elizabeth it not descending upon John after Alexanders death but upon Elizabeth who is now also John's Heir or determined by Alexander's death The Judges were of opinion as the Reporter saith That the warranty did barr Elizabeth and consequently her Heir because the Reversion was discontinued by the Estate for Lives and a new Fee thereby gain'd and the Reversion displac'd thereby and the warranty was annex'd to that new Fee But this Case is all false and mis-reported 1. For that it saith the Lease for Lives was a discontinuance of the Reversion thereby a new Fee gain'd to Tenant in tayl which he passed away by the Fine with warranty which could not be for in the Case it appears the Lease was warranted by the Stat. of 32 H. 8 and then it could make no discontinuance nor no new Fee of a Reversion could be gain'd 40 Eliz. Keen Copes C. 602. pl. 13. and then no Estate to which the warranty was annex'd and so was it resolv'd 40 El. Keen Copes Case 2. That Opinion was extra-judicial it being concerning a point not in the Case but suppos'd 3. That Case was resolv'd upon the point of Non-claim and not upon this of the warranty which was not a point in the Case 4. Some of the Judges therefore spoke not to that point as appears in the Case As to the second Question Admitting the warranty of Tenant in tayl doth bind the Donor and his Heirs yet in regard the Defendant Tenant in possession cannot derive the warranty to her self from the Feoffees as Assignee or otherwise Whether she may rebutt the Demandants or not by her possession only is the question and I conceive she may not as this Case is I shall begin with those Authorities that make and are most press'd against me which is the Authority of Sir Edward Coke in Lincoln Colledge Case in the third Report and from thence brought over to his Littleton f. 385. a. His words in Lincoln Colledge Case f. 63. a. are He which hath the possession of the Land shall rebutt the Demandant himself without shewing how he came to the possession of it for it sufficeth him to defend his possession and barr the Demandant and the Demandant cannot recover the Land against his own warranty And there he cites several Cases as making good this his Assertion In the same place he saith it is adjudg'd 38 E. 3. f. 26. That an Assignee shall rebutt by force of a warranty made to one and his Heirs only This Doctrine is transferred to his Littleton in these words If the warranty be made to a man and his heirs without this word Assignes yet the Assignee or any Tenant of the Land may rebutt And albeit no man shall vouch or have a Warrantia Chartae either as party Heir or Assignee but in privity of Estate yet any one that is in of another Estate be it by disseisin abatement intrusion usurpation or otherwise shall rebutt by force of the warranty as a thing annex'd to the Land which sometimes was doubted in our Books when as in the Cases aforesaid he that rebutteth claimeth under and not above the warranty I shall clearly agree no man shall vouch or have a warrantia Chartae who is not in in privity of Estate that is who hath not the same Estate as well as the same Land to which the warranty was annexed And the reason is evident because the Tenant must recover if the Land be not defended to him by the warranter such Estate as was first warranted and no other unless a Fee be granted with warranty only for the life of the Grantee or Grantor in which Case the Grantee upon voucher recovers a Fee though the warranty were but for life I shall likewise agree the Law to be as Sir Edward Coke saith in both places if his meaning be that the Tenant in possession when he is impleaded may rebutt the Demandant without shewing how he came to the possession which he then hath when impleaded be it by dissism abatement intrusion or any other tortious way And for the reason given in Lincoln Colledge Case That it sufficeth that the Tenant defend his possession But if his meaning be that the Tenant in possession need not shew that the warranty ever extended to him or that he hath any right to it then I must deny his Doctrine in Lincoln Colledge Case or in Littleton which is but the former there repeated to be Law For as it is not reasonable a man should recover that Land which he hath once warranted to me from me what title soever I have in it at the time when he impleads me So on the other side it is against reason I should warrant Land to one who never had any right in my warranty And the same reason is if a man will be warranted by Rebutter he should make it appear how the warranty extends to him as if he will be warranted by Voucher for the difference is no other than that in the case of Voucher a stranger impleads him in
than a local Subject ibid. 286 5. He must be otherwise a Subject than any Grant or Letters Patents can make him ibid. 6. The Natives of Jersey Garnsey Ireland and the English Plantations c. are not Aliens 268 in loco 278 279 7. Those which are born in the Kings Forreign Plantations are born his Natural Subjects and shall inherit in England 279 8. A Natural Subject is correlative to a Natural Prince and a man cannot have two natural Soveraigns no more than two Fathers or two Mothers 280 273 in loco 283 9. The several ways by which men born out of England may inherit in England 281 10. An Antenatus in Scotland shall not inherit without an Act of Parliament because he is an Alien 274 in loco 284 287 11. Who are the Antenati Postnati and the difference between them 273 in loco 283 12. An Act of Parliament in Ireland shall never Naturalize an Alien to England to make him inheritable there 274 in loco 284 13. No Tenure by Homage c. in any of the Kings Dominions acquired by Conquest or by Grant or Letters Patents can make a man inheritable in England 279 14. No Laws made in any Dominion acquired by Conquest or new Plantation by the Kings Governor or people there by virtue of the Kings Letters Patents can make an Alien inheritable in England 279 15. One Naturalized in Scotland since the Union cannot inherit in England 268 in loco 278 279 280 285 16. A man born a Subject to one that is King of another Country and who afterwards comes to be King of England is an Alien and shall not inherit in England ibid. 285 286 17. An act of Law making a man as if he had been born a Subject shall not work the same effect as his being born a Subject which is an effect of Law 280 18. An Alien hath issue a Son and afterwards is Denizen'd and he afterwards hath another Son here the youngest Son shall inherit 285 Allegiance 1. All Allegiance and Subjection are acts and obligations of Law the subjection begins with the birth of the Subject at which time the Kings protection of him likewise begins 279 Appendant 1. Whatsoever is appendant to the Land goes to the Occupier thereof naturally 190 2. An Advowson may be appendant to a Mannor 12 Apprentice 1. The Law permits not persons who have served Seven years to have a way of livelyhood to be hindred from the exercise of their Trades in any Town or part of the Kingdom 356 Arch-bishop See Ordinary Dispensation 1. The Arch-bishop may dispense for a Plurality 20 Assets 1. The manner of pleading Assets ultra 104 Assignee and Assignment 1. Offices or acts of personal Trust cannot be assigned for that Trust which any man may have is not personal 180 181 2. An Occupant becomes an Assignee in Law to the first Lessee 204 3. If a man Covenants against himself his Executors Administrators and Assigns yet if his Assigns do a tortious act it is no breach of the Covenant because he may have remedy by Action for the tort 118 to 128 Assise 1. An Assise will not lye for a Rent issuing out of Tythes barely 204 Attaint See Title Statutes 3 11. 1. An Attaint lies only in Civil not Criminal Causes 145 146 2. Jurors are not finable for a false Verdict an Attaint only lies against them 145 Attorney 1. An Attorney cannot bring Debt for Soliciting but Case only 99 2. The Defendant cannot wage his Law for Attorneys Fees ibid. Attornment 1. By the Common Law an Attornment was requisite to entitle the Lord the Reversioner the Grantee of a Remainder or of a Rent by Deed or Fine to distrain for Rent in arrear 39 2. By a Grant and Attornment the Grantee becomes actually seised of the Rent 40 3. Attornment and power to distrain follows the possession and not the use 43 4. An Attornment cannot be for a time 27 5. An Attornment of the Tenant doth not disclaim but affirm his possession For it is the act of the Tenant by reason of his being in possession 193 6. A mans Estate in a Rent-charge may be enlarged diminished or altered and no new attornment or privity requisite to such alteration 44 7. Attornment is requisite to the Grant of an Estate for life but to a Confirmation to enlarge an Estate it is not 44 45 46 8. A Rent-charge is granted to Commence Seven years after the death of the Grantor Remainder in Fee Attornment must be made in the life time of the Grantor 46 9. If a Fine is levied of the Reversion of Land or of a Rent to uses the Cestuy que use may distrain without Attornment 50 51 10. Where a Rent Reversion or Remainder is sold by Bargain and Sale the Bargainee may distrain without Attornment 51 11. Where a man is seised of a Rent-charge and grants it over to which the Tenant attorns and he afterwards retakes that Estate here must be a new Attornment for the former privity is wholly destroyed 44 12. Where an Attornment shall be good to a contingent use 52 Bargain and Sale See Intollment 1. WHere a Rent Reversion or Remainder is sold by Bargain and Sale the Bargainee may distrain for the Rent without Attornment 51 Baron and Feme 1. The man after the marriage hath the deduction of the woman ad Domum Thalamum and all the civil power over her and not she over him 306 2. The Interdicts of carnal knowledg in the Levitical Law were directed to the men not to the women who are interdicted but by a consequent for the woman being interdicted to the man the man must also be interdicted to the woman for a man cannot marry a woman and she not marry him 305 Bishop See Ordinary Archbishop 1. What Bishops were originally 22 2. A Parson is chosen Bishop his Benefices are all void and the King shall present 19 20 3. It is not at all inconsistent for a Bishop to be an Incumbent 22 4. A Bishop may be an Incumbent after Consecration 24 5. How many Benefices a Bishop may retain by a Dispensation 25 6. No Canon Ecclesiastical can be made and executed without the Kings Royal assent 329 7. Bishops in Wales were originally of the foundation of the Prince of Wales 411 Canons Ecclesiastical See Title Ecclesiastical Court 1. WHat Canons are good and binding and what not 327 328 Capias ad Satisfaciendum See Execution Certiorari 1. A Certior lies out of the Chancery to Ireland to certifie an Act of Parliament but it doth not lye to Scotland 287 2. A Certiorari doth not lye to Wales to certifie a Record to the Courts at Westminster to the intent that Execution may issue out here upon it 398 Certificate 1. There are many things whereof the Kings Courts sometimes ought to be certified which cannot be certified by Certiorari 288 Chancery 1. The Chancery may grant a Habeas Corpus and discharge a Prisoner thereupon as well
in two at the same time not out of the one and yet in the other more than the same Body can be in two several places at the same time 3. If a Feoffee to use of me and my Heirs make a Feoffment to another without consideration to the use of me and my Heirs notwithstanding there is a new Feoffment the words of a use to me and my Heirs Dyer 28 H. 8. f. 12. 6. per Baldwin Chief Justice yet the use being the former use viz. to me and my Heirs this latter is no new use given to me for I cannot have that use given which I had before for to give what I had before is no gift as is well press'd by that Book And by the same necessity where I have the possession before a new possession cannot be really given me by the Statute of 27 H. 8. whose operation is properly to give to him which had not the possession but only an use the possession which he wanted before to the use which he had before in such manner as he hath the use But here the Statute cannot give the possession to the Conizors which they never wanted nor the Conizee never had ad aliquem Juris effectum though perhaps fictitiously and in order only to a form of Conveyance which was not the end or intention of the Statute of Vses but an use invented after that might be made of the Statute in order to a general form of Conveyance by which the parties might execute their Intentions wherein the Conizee is but an Instrument or Property to execute their purpose as in Cromwells Case is said L. Cromwells c. 2. Rep. but the Statute brings the new uses rais'd out of a feign'd possession and for no time in the Conizee to the real possession and for all times in the Conizors which operates according to their intent to change their Estate but not their possession Besides it hath been admitted at the Bar that if the Fine had been levied without consideration and no uses express'd the Conizors might then have distrained for the Arrear because the uses were the same as before which if granted it resolves the Question for the Attornment and power to distrain follows the possession and not the use And if after the supposed possession of the Conisee and his being seis'd to the old uses when the Statute gives the possession back to the old uses the Conizors might distrain for the Arrears before the Fine as well as for those after what hinders their distraining for them still For the possession which the Statute gives to the old uses is as new a possession as that it gives to the new uses and the privity is the same in both Cases in regard of the Tenant And it is common experience that a Fine levied without consideration or use expressed Sir Moyle Finch's Case 6th Rep. f. 68. b. is to the use of the Conizor and his Heirs who may have an action of waste after the Fine for waste committed before as well as he could before the Fine The instant possession of the Conizee notwithstanding which differs not from this Case The next enquiry is What affinity this Case hath with the second Case propos'd viz. That if one seiz'd of a Rent in Fee grants it over to a Stranger and his Heirs and the Tenant attorns if such Grantee regrants the Rent back to the Grantor and his Heirs there must be a new Attorment of the Tenant to the Regrant for the privity by the first Attornment was totally destroyed and all Arrears of Rent lost when the Tenant attorn'd to the Grantee which Case I take to be clear Law for by the Regrant a total new Estate is gain'd in the Rent and thereby he who hath the Rent as if he never had any former Estate in it And in the present Case the Estates after the Fine are wholly new and other Estates in the Conizors to which the Tenant never attorn'd than the Conizors had before the Fine in these Respects 1. Before the Fine the Husbands had but Estates in right of their Wives and now they are Jointenants with their Wives 2. The Wives before the Fine had Estates of Inheritance absolute and now they are Iointenants with their Husbands and among themselves where Survivorship obtains 3. The Women were Coparceners before and the Husbands in right of their Wives and they are now all Jointenants 4. Two of the Coparceners had the Inheritance of entire third parts and the two other of one intire third part and now the four Women and three Husbands are equally Iointenants which are Estates much differing from the Estates they had before the Fine I must agree That where persons seiz'd of a Rent-charge by granting it over with Attornment of the Tenant have totally departed from their Estate and after retake either such an Estate as they had before or a differing Estate in the Rent they must have a new Attornment and the former privity is wholly destroyed and consequently no Arrears can be distrain'd for by reason of the first privity which is not But in this Case the Conizors never were for any moment of time out of possession of their first Estate nor destroyed the first privity by any new Attornment which either was or possibly could be but only some have enlarg'd their Estate some diminish't it others alter'd it without destroying the old privity which may stand well with the Rules of Law and consequently they may distrain for Rent arrears and avow lawfully by reason of the first privity still continuing And I must observe in this Cases that the Avowants after the Fine are the same persons avowing as before 2. That after the Fine there is but one common Avowry as before 3. That there is no new person after the Fine between whom and the Tenant there was not a privity before the Fine That a mans Estate in a Rent-charge may be enlarg'd diminish'd or otherwise alter'd and no new Attornment or privity requisite to such alteration of Estate Litt. Sect. 549. A man seiz'd of a Rent-service or Rent-charge in Fee grants the Rent to another for life and the Tenant attorns after the Grantor confirms the Estate of the Grantee in Fee-tail or Fee-simple this Confirmation is good to enlarge his Estate according to the words of the Confirmation Here no new Attornment to this new Estate which now is Fee-tail or Fee-simple in the Rent which was before but an Estate for life is requisite else the Confirmation were not good but by Littleton it is good to enlarge the Estate 2. Sir Edward Cook in his Comment upon this Case saith It is to be observ'd that to the grant of the Estate for life Littleton doth put an Attornment because it is requisite but to the Confirmation to enlarge the Grantees Estate there is none necessary and therefore he puts none No man can doubt in this Case that if Rent had been in Arrear to
Arrears in strictness of Law when the Fine is levied are not due at all but remitted and so no absurdity to have no remedy for a thing not due 1. By this reason a Law should be equally good that provides no remedy for performance of Contracts as that which doth because all Contracts for performance of which the Law gives no remedy shall in Iudgment of Law be dispens'd with releas'd discharg'd 2. By this reason a Rent-seck before seisin had of it shall be no duty because the Law gives no Remedy before seisin And consequently such Rent or such Arrears as in the present Case being paid by the Tenant may be recover'd again as the proper mony of the Tenant deliver'd to the Grantee of the Rent without any consideration upon an indebitatus Assumpsit the Law creating a promise So might a Debt paid after six years elaps'd for which by the Statute of Limitations there was no remedy yet that doth not cease to be a Debt as if it had been released By like reason if a man hath by accident had his Bonds burn'd or destroy'd whereby he had no remedy to recover the Debt by Law it should cease to be a Debt at all 32 H. 8. c. 37. To this the words of the Statute of 32 H. 8. c. 37. may be added which gives remedy for recovery of such Debts by Executors as were due to the Testators and for which there was no remedy before viz. That the Tenants did retain in their hands such Arrearages of Rents whereby the Executors could not therewith pay the Debts and perform the will of the Testator c. and surely no Arrearages could be of Rent if they were remitted in Law nor was it fit the Executors should pay the Debts or perform the Testators Will with that which was no part of the Testators Estate either in possession or as a credit If a common Recovery had been to uses of Lordships and Mannors before the Statute of 27. the Recoverors had no remedy to make the Tenants attorn for a quid Juris clamat would not lye upon a Recovery before the Statute of 7 H. 8. 7 H. 8. c. 4. c. 4. which did give remedy and which saith That such refusal of Attornment was to the great offence of their Conscience refusing and not only to the disinheritance of the Recoverors but often to the breaking of the last Wills of the Recoverees and also to the disinheritance of Husbands Wives and others to whose use the Recovery was had By which it is plain that duties for which there is no remedy often in Law are not therefore dispenced with and discharged by the party as is superficially said in Ognell's Case That the Conizee of a Rent granted by Fine to uses cannot have any actual seisin or be in possession of such Rent since the Statute of 27 H. 8. cap. 10. Before the Statute of 27 H. 8 If a Feoffment had been to uses and no Livery given or given by one Attorney when it ought to have been by two the uses in such Deed of Feoffment could never rise so if a Reversion had been granted to uses and no Attornment to the Grantee no use could rise because there was no sufficient Estate in possession And when the Statute of Vses came it could have no operation when the Estates in possession were not sufficient So if an Estate for life had been granted to the use of a man and his Heirs an Estate in Fee could not rise out of it by the Statute of 27 H. 8. c. 10. And if before the Statute a Reversion had been granted by Fine to Vses and no quid Juris clamat brought though the Land pass'd by the Fine yet the Tenant could not be distrain'd nor a Writ of Waste brought against him until he attorn'd and when the Statute came to transferr the use into the possession it could be but into such a possession as the Conizee had by the Fine without power to distrain or bring Waste for the words of the Statute are That the Estate Title Right and Possession that was in such person or persons that were or hereafter shall be seis'd of any Lands or Hereditaments to the use confidence or trust of any person or persons be from henceforth adjudged to be in him or them that have or hereafter shall have such use confidence or trust c. And therefore if before the Statute of 27. a Fine had been levied of a Rent-charge to uses as this Case is if before Attornment to or seisin had by the Conizee the Statute had come and brought the possession of the Rent to the use the Cestuy que use could have had the Rent but as a Rent-seck for which he could not distrain for want of Attornment nor have an Assise for want of seisin for the Conizee had no other possession of the Rent but after Attornment and seisin to or by Cestuy que use his possession perhaps became perfected But since the Statute if a Fine be levied of a Reversion of Lands to uses or of a Rent because the use and possession by the Statute come instantly together and the Conizee of the Fine hath no time possible to bring either a quid Juris clamat or a quem redditum reddit Sir Moyl Finch's Case Coke 6. f. 68. a for or to receive an Attornment to perfect his possession It was resolv'd in Sir Moyl Finch's Case that the Cestuy use should notwithstanding distrain and have the same advantage as if the Conizees possession had been perfected by Attornment and seisin The intent of the Statute of 27. which was to bring together the possession and the use when the use was to one or more persons and the possession in one or more other separate persons was soon after the Statute wholly declined upon what good construction or inference I know not For now the use by the name of trust which were one and the same before the Statute remains separately in some persons and the possession separately in others as it did before the Statute and are not brought together but by Decree in Chancery or the voluntary Conveyance of the possessor of the Land to Cestuy que trust So as now the principal use of the Statute of 27. especially upon Fines levied to uses is not to bring together a possession and use which at no time were separate the one from the other but to introduce a general form of Conveyance by which the Conizors of the Fine who are as Donors in the Case may execute their intents and purposes at pleasure either by transferring their Estates to Strangers by enlarging diminishing or altering them to and among themselves at their pleasure without observing that rigour and strictness of Law for the possession of the Conizee as was requisite before the Statute Which I have sufficiently evidenc'd by shewing that the Attornment of the Lessee to the Conizee or Reversioner or of the Tenant to him as
it is said The Rent was granted out of the Twenty Acres being the Locus in quo by the Name of all the Grantors Lands and Hereditaments in King's Norton and that a per nomen in that Case is not good The Case of Grey and Chapman was urg'd 43 Eliz. Cro. f. 822. where by Indenture S. one Prudence Cousin let a House and Twenty Acres of Land by the Name of all her Tenements in S. But it was not alledg'd in what Vill the Acres were The Court was of Opinion in Arrest of Judgment that the naming of the Vill in the per nomen was not material Another Case to the same purpose was urg'd of Gay against Cay where a Grant in possession was pleaded 41 Eliz. Cro. f. 662. pl. 10. and not as in Reversion And upon view of the Record the Grantor had granted Tenementa praedicta per nomen of a Mesuage which A. P. held for life where the per nomen was adjudg'd not to make good the Grant The Court is of Opinion notwithstanding these Cases That in the present Case the per nomen is well enough because it is alledg'd the Grantor was seis'd of Two hundred Acres of Land in Kings Norton whereof the locus in quo being Twenty Acres is parcel By reason whereof the Rent being granted out of every parcel of the Two hundred Acres it is well enough to say it was granted out of the Twenty Acres per nomen of all his Lands in Kings Norton because the Twenty Acres are alledg'd to be parcel of all his Lands there being Two hundred Acres But in Chapman's Case It is not alledg'd that the Twenty Acres of Land demis'd were parcel of all the Tenements in S. per nomen of which the Twenty Acres were to pass As for the second Case of Gay it was not possible that Lands granted as in possession should pass per nomen of Land that was in Reversion The second Exception is Because the Clause of Entry and Distress in the Deed upon Oyer of it differs from the Clause of Entry and Distress alledg'd in the Conizance For in the Conizance it is said It should be lawful to Enter and Distrain if the rent were unpaid and behind after any of the Feasts whereon it was due that is at any Feast that should first happen after the death of Anne or Thomas Greaves for the Rent did not commence before But by the Deed If the Rent were behind at any the Feasts the Entry and Distress is made to be lawful for it during the joynt Lives of Anne and Thomas Greaves the Uncle and during their joynt lives it could not be behind for it commenc'd not till one of them were dead Scarplus Handkinson 37 El. Cro. f. 420. words repugnant and sensless to be rejected So as the sense must run That if the Rent were behind it should be lawful to distrain during the joint Lives of Anne and Thomas Greaves which was before it could be behind for it could not be behind till the death of one of them Therefore those words during their joynt natural lives being insensible ought to be rejected For words of known signification but so placed in the Context of a Deed that they make it repugnant and sensless are to be rejected equally with words of no known signification Judgment pro Defendent The Chief Justice delivered the Opinion of the Court. Trin. 16 Car. II. C. B. Rot. 2487. But Adjudg'd Mich. 20 Car. II. Bedell versus Constable BY the Act of 12 Car. 2. cap. 24. It is among other things Enacted That where any person hath or shall have any Child or Children under the Age of One and twenty years and not married at the time of his death It shall and may be lawful to and for the Father of such Child or Children whether born at the time of the decease of the Father or at that time in ventre sa mere or whether such Father be within the Age of One and twenty years or of full Age by his Deed executed in his life time or by his last Will and Testament in writing in the presence of two or more credible Witnesses to dispose of the custody and tuition of such Child or Children for and during such time as he or they shall respectively remain under the Age of One and twenty years or any lesser time to any person or persons in possession or remainder other than Popish Recusants And such disposition of the Custody of such Child or Children made since the Four and twentieth of February 1645. or hereafter to be made shall be good and effectual against all and every person or persons claiming the custody or tuition of such Child or Children as Guardian in Soccage or otherwise And such person or persons to whom the custody of such Child or Children hath been or shall be so disposed or devised as aforesaid shall and may maintain an Action of Ravishment of Ward or Trespass against any person or persons which shall wrongfully take away or detain such Child or Children for the Recovery of such Child or Children and shall and may recover Damages for the same in the said Action for the use and benefit of such Child or Children And such person or persons to whom the custody of such Child or Children hath been or shall be so disposed or devised shall and may take into his or their custody to the use of such Child or Children the profits of all Lands Tenements and Hereditaments of such Child or Children and also the custody tuition and management of the Goods Chattels and personal Estate of such Child or Children till their respective Age of One and twenty years or any lesser time according to such Disposition aforesaid and may bring such Action or Actions in relation thereto as by Law a Guardian in Common Soccage might do By the Will is devised in these words I do bequeath my son Thomas to my Brother Robert Towray of Rickhall to be his Tutor during his Minority Before this Act Tenant in Soccage of Age might have dispos'd his Land by Deed or last Will in trust for his Heir but not the Custody and Tuition of his Heir for the Law gave that to the next of Kinn to whom the Land could not descend But Tenant in Soccage under Age could not dispose the Custody of his Heir nor devise or demise his Land in trust for him in any manner Now by this Statute he may grant the Custody of his Heir but cannot devise or demise his Land in trust for him for any time directly for if he should the devise or demise were as before the Statute as I conceive which is most observable in this Case I say directly he cannot but by a mean and obliquely he may for nominating who shall have the Custody and for what time by a consequent the Land follows as an incident given by the Law to attend the custody not as an Interest devis'd or demis'd
the Statute If the Father under Age should make such a Devise it were absolutely void for the same syllables shall never give the Custody of the Heir by the Father under Age which do not give it by the Father which is of Age. But in both Cases a Devise of the Custody is effectual and there is no reason that the Custody devis'd shall operate into a Lease when a Lease devis'd shall not operate into a Custody which it cannot do If a man devise the Custody of his Heir apparent to J. S. and mentions no time either during his Minority or for any other time this is a good devise of the Custody within the Act if the Heir be under Fourteen at the death of the Father because by the Devise the Modus habendi Custodiam is chang'd only as to the person and left the same it was as to the time But if above Fourteen at the Fathers death then the Devise of the Custody is meerly void for the incertainty For the Act did not intend every Heir should be in Custody until One and twenty Non ut tamdiu sed ne diutius therefore he shall be in this Custody but so long as the Father appoints and if he appoint no time there is no Custody If a man have power to make Leases for any term of years not exceeding One hundred and he demises Land but expresseth no time shall this therefore be a Lease for One hundred years There is no Reason it should be a Lease for the greatest term he could grant more than for the least term he could grant or indeed for any other term under One hundred Therefore it is void for incertainty and the Case is the same for the Custody For if the Father might intend as well any time under that no Reason will enforce that he only intended that And to say he intended the Custody for some time therefore since no other can be it must be for that will hold as well in the Lease and in all other Cases of incertainty If a man devises Ten pounds to his Servant but having many none shall have it for the incertainty It may be demanded If the Father appoint the Custody until the Age of One and twenty and the Guardian dye what shall become of this Custody It determines with the death of the Guardian and is a Condition in Law and the same as if a man grant to a man the Stewardship of his Mannor for Ten years or to be his Bailiff It is implyed by way of Condition if he live so long A Copyholder in Fee surrenders to the Lord Dyer 8 Eliz. f. 251. pl. 90. ad intentionem that the Lord should grant it back to him for term of life the Remainder to his Wife till his Son came to One and twenty Remainder to the Son in tayl Remainder to the Wife for life The Husband died The Lord at his Court granted the Land to the Wife till the Sons full age The Remainders ut supra The Wife marries and dies Intestate The Husband held in the Land The Wives Administrator and to whom the Lord had granted the Land during the Minority of the Son enters upon the Husband This Entry was adjudg'd unlawful because it was the Wives term but otherwise it had been if the Wife had been but a Guardian or next Friend of this Land The like Case is in Hobart Balder and Blackburn f. 285. 17 Jac. If it be insisted That this new Guardian hath the Custody not only of the Lands descended or left by the Father but of all Lands and Goods any way acquir'd or purchas'd by the Infant which the Guardian in Soccage had not That alters not the Case for if he were Guardian in Soccage without that particular power given by the Statute he is equally Guardian in Soccage with it and is no more than if the Statute had appointed Guardian in Soccage to have care of all the Estate of the Infant however he came by it Besides that proves directly that this new Guardian doth not derive his interest from the Father but from the Law for the Father could never give him power or interest of or in that which was never his The Court was divided viz. The Chief Justice and Justice Wylde for the Plaintiff Justice Tyrrell and Justice Archer for the Defendant Hill 19 20 Car. II. C. B. Rot. 506. Holden versus Smallbrooke IN Trover and Conversion and not Guilty pleaded Robinson the Iury gave a Special Verdict to this Effect That Doctor Mallory Prebendary of the Prebend of Wolvey founded in the Cathedral of Litchfield seis'd of the said Prebend and one Messuage one Barn and the Glebe appertaining thereto and of the Tithes of Wolvey in right of his Prebend 22 April 13 Car. 2. by Indenture demised to Giles Astly and his Assigns the said Prebend together with all Houses Barns Tenements Glebe Lands and Tithes thereto belonging for three Lives under the ancient Rent of Five pounds ten shillings Astly being one of the Lives died seis'd of the Premisses at whose death one Taverner was Tenant for one year not ended of the Demise of Astly of the Messuage Barn and Glebe Lands and in possession of them whereupon the Plaintiff entred into the Messuage and Glebe and was in the possession of the same and of the Tithes as Occupant And afterwards Frances Astly the Relict of the said Giles Astly enters upon the Messuage and claims the same as Occupant in haec verba Frances Astly Widow of Giles Astly enters upon the House and claims the same with the Glebe and Tithe as Occupant Taverner attorns to Frances Astly and afterwards grants and assigns all his Estate in the Premisses to the Plaintiff afterwards Conquest the Husband of Frances Astly took one Sheaf of Corn in the name of all the Tithes and afterwards demised the Tithes to the Defendant The Tithes are set forth and the Defendant took them whereupon the Plaintiff brought this Action Before I deliver my Opinion concerning the particular Questions before open'd arising upon this Record I shall say somewhat shortly of Natural Occupancy and Civil Occupancy First opening what I mean by those terms then briefly shewing their difference as far only as is material to the Questions now before me I call Natural Occupancy the possession either of such natural things as are immoveable fixt and permanent as Land a Pool River Sea for a Sea is capable of Occupancy and Dominion naturally as well as Land and hath naturally been in Occupancy as is demonstrated in Mr. Selden's Mare Clausum at large which lye unpossess'd and in which no other hath prior right Or of things natural and moveable either animate as a Horse a Cow a Sheep and the like without number or Inanimate as Gold precious Stones Grain Hony Fruit Flesh and the like numberless also wherein no man until the possession thereof by Occupancy had any other right than every man had which is
Robert the son had Issue Margaret Isabel Jane Antenatas living the First of Octob. 14 Car. 1. and now have Issue at Kingston John naturalized 9. Maii 1 Jac. John the third son by the name of Sir John Ramsey was naturalized by Act of Parliament holden at Westminster May the Ninth 1. Jac. and after made Earl of Holdernes George Ramsey the fourth Son George naturalized 7 Jac. was naturalized in the fourth Session of Parliament held at Westminster begun by Prorogation 19 Febr. 17 Jac. and after had Issue John primogenitum filium Quodque idem Johannes had Issue John the now Defendant primogenitum suum filium but finds not where either of these were born nor the death of George Nicholas the second Son had Issue Patrick his only Son Nicholas had Issue Patrick a Native 15 Jac. born at Kingston after the Union 1 Maii 1618. about 15 Jac. John the third Son Earl of Holdernes seiz'd of the Mannors Rectory and Premisses in the Declaration mentioned with other the Mannors of Zouch and Taylboys John covenanted to levy a Fine de Premissis 1 Jul. 22 Jac. and divers other Lands in the County of Lincoln in Fee by Indenture Tripartite between him on the first part Sir William Cockayne and Martha his Daughter of the second part c. Dated the First of July 22 Jac. Covenanted to levy a Fine before the Feast of St. Andrews next ensuing to Sir William of all his said Lands To the use of himself for life then to the use of Martha his intended Wife for life with Remainder to the Heirs Males of his body begotten on her Remainder to such his Heirs Females Remainder to his right Heirs The Marriage was solemnized the Seven and twentieth of Sept. 22 Jac. John married 29 Sept. 22 Jac. He levied the Fine Octab. Michael 22 Jac. John died 1 Car. 1. Jan. 24. The Fine accordingly levied in the Common Pleas Octabis Michaelis 22 Jac. of all the Lands and Premisses among other in the Declaration mentioned The Earl so seiz'd as aforesaid with the Remainder over at Kingston aforesaid died the Four and twentieth of January 1 Car. 1. His Countess entred into the Premisses in the Declaration mentioned and receiv'd the Profits during her life After the Earls death a Commission issued Inquisition after his death capt 29 Febr. 7 Car. 1. and an Inquisition taken at Southwark in Surrey the Nine and twentieth of February 7 Car. 1. By this Inquisition it is found the Earl died seiz'd of the Mannor of Zouch and Taylboys and divers Land thereto belonging in Com. Lincoln and of the Mannor of Westdeerham and other Lands in Com. Norfolk and of the Rectory of Kingston and of the Advowson of the Vicaridge of Kingston in Com. Surrey but no other the Lands in the Declaration are found in that Office And then the Tenures of those Mannors are found and that the Earl died without Heir But it finds that the Earl so seiz'd levied a Fine of the Premisses to Sir William Cockayne per nomina Maneriorum de Zouches Taylboys Rectoriae de Kingston cum omnibus Decimis dictae Rectoriae pertinentibus and finds the uses ut supra and so finds his dying without Heir c. It finds the Fine levied in terminis Michaelis 22 Jac. but not in Octabis Michaelis as the Special Verdict finds but between the same persons The Irish Act to naturalize all Scots 4 Jul. 10 Car. 1. The general Act of Naturalizing the Scottish Antenati in the Kingdome of Ireland was made in the Parliament there begun at the Castle of Dublin the Fourth of July 10 Car. 1. Nicholas died 1 Sept. 10 Car. 1. Nicholas died the First of September 10 Car. 1. Leaving Issue Patrick Murrey's Pat. 25 Octob. 10 Car. 1. King Charles the First by his Letters Patents dated the Five and twentieth of October the Tenth of his Reign under the Great Seal granted to William Murrey his Heirs and Assigns in Fee-farm All the said Mannors Lands and Rectory mentioned in the Declaration with the Reversion depending upon any life lives or years Patrick conveys to the Earl of Elkin 16 Febr. 1651. Patrick and Elizabeth his wife by Indenture dated the Sixteenth of February 1651. Covenant with the Earl of Elkin and Sir Edward Sydenham in consideration of Eleven hundred pounds and bargained and sold the Premisses in the Declaration to them and their Heirs and covenanted at the Earls charge to levy a Fine with proclamation Patrick Uxor levy a Fine à die Paschae in fifteen days to the use of the Earl and his Heirs of the Premisses before the end of Easter Term next and accordingly did levy it with warranty against them and the Heirs of Patrick by force whereof and of the Statute of Uses the said Earl and Sydenham were seiz'd c. The Earl and Sydenham convey to the Countess Dowager 10 Mar. 1652. The Earl of Elkin and Sydenham by Indenture of Lease dated the Tenth of March 1652. and by Deed of Release and Confirmation conveys the Premisses to Amabel Dowager of Kent and the Lady Jane Hart viz. the Eleventh of March 1652. by way of Bargain and Sale to them and their Heirs who entred by the Lease and were in quiet possession at the time of the Release The Dowager conveys to Pullayne and Neale The Dowager and Lady Hart by like Conveyance of Lease and Release bargained and sold to Pullayne and Simon Neale dated the First and Second of November 1655. who entred and were in possession as aforesaid John Ramsey the now Defendant entred in 15 Car. 2. and kept possession Dat. 25 Sept. 1656. Pullayne and Neale convey to Talmuch and Weld by Bargain and Sale 20 Jan. 16 Car. 2. John Pullayne and Symon Neale by Deed of Bargain and Sale duly inrolled convey'd the Premisses to Lionel Talmuch and Humphrey _____ their Heirs and Assigns Lionel and Humphrey demis'd to Philip _____ the Plaintiff having entred and being in possession by Indenture dated the Twentieth of January 16 Car. 2. John then in possession and John re-entred upon the Plaintiff and Ejected him The Questions upon this Record will be three 1. Whether a Naturalization in Ireland will naturalize the person in England If it will not all other Questions are out of the Case 2. If it will then whether by that Act for naturalizing the Antenati of Scotland any his brothers had title to inherit the Earl of Holdernes in the lands in question By reason of the Clause in the Act of Naturalization That nothing therein contained should extend to avoid any Estate or Interest in any Lands or Hereditaments which have already been found and accrewed to his Majesty or to King James for want of naturalization of any such person and which shall and doth appear by Office already found and return'd and remaining of Record or by any other matter of Record An Office was found as appears
Heirs is expresly forbidden by the Statute de Donis 374 Right See Title Action 1. Where there can be presumed to be no remedy there is no right 38 Seisin 1. THe profits of all and every part of the Land are the Esplees of the Land and prove the Seisin of the whole Land 255 2. In an Entry sur Disseisin or other Action where Esplees are to be alledged the profits of a Mine will not serve 254 Spoliation 1. The Writ of Spoliation lyes for one Incumbent against the other where the Patrons right comes in question 24 Statute See Recognizance 1. A Recognizance taken before the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas in the nature of a Statute Staple 102 Statutes in general 1. Where an Act of Parliament is dubious long usage is a just medium to expound it by and the meaning of things spoken and written must be as hath been constantly received by common acceptation 169 2. But where usage is against the obvious meaning of an Act by the vulgar and common acceptation of words then it is rather an oppression then exposition of the Act 170 3. When an Act of Parliament alters the Common Law the meaning shall not be strained beyond the words except in cases of publick utility when the end of the Act appears to be larger than the words themselves 179 4. Secular Judges are most conizant in Acts of Parliament 213 5. When the words of a Statute extend not to an inconvenience rarely happening but doth to those which often happen it is good reason not to strain the words further than they will reach by saying it is casus omissus and that the Law intended quae frequentius accidunt 373 6. But where the words of a Law do extend to an inconvenience seldom happening there it shall extend to it as well as if it happens more frequently 373 7. An Act of Parliament which generally prohibits a thing upon a penalty which is popular or only given to the King may be inconvenient to diverse particular persons in respect of person place time c. For this cause the Law hath given power to the King to dispense with particular persons 347 8. Whatsoever is declared by an Act of Parliament to be against Law we must admit it so for by a Law viz. by Act of Parliament it is so declared 327 9. Where the Kings Grant is void in its creation a saving of that Grant in an Act of Parliament shall not aid it 332 10. How an Act of Parliament may be proved there hath been such an Act where the Roll is lost 162 163 404 405 407 11. An Act of Parliament in Ireland cannot effect a thing which could not be done without an Act of Parliament in England 289 12. Distinct Kingdoms cannot be united but by mutual Acts of Parliament 300 13. A repealed Act of Parliament is of no more effect than if it had never been made 325 Statutes 1. Merton cap. 4. The Statute of Merton which gave the owner of the Soyl power to approve Common did not consider whether the Lord was equally bound to pasture with his Tenants or not but it considered that the Lord should approve his own Ground so as the Commoners had sufficient 256 257 2. The inconveniences before the making of the Statute and the several remedies that were provided by it 257 1. Westm 1. 3 E. 1. The Antiquae Custumae upon Woolls Woolfells and Leather were granted to E. 1. by Parliament and therefore they are not by the Common Law 162 163 1. Westm 1. cap. 38. Attaints in Pleas real were granted by this Statute 146 1. Westm 2. cap. 24. The Quare Ejecit infra terminum is given by this Statute for the recovery of the Term against the Feoffee for an Ejectment lay not against him he coming to the Land by Feoffment 127 Statute of Glocester 1. Restrained warranties from binding as at Common Law 366 377 2. Before this Statute all Warranties which descended to the Heirs of the Warrantors were barrs to them except they were Warranties which commenced by Disseisin 366 3. The reason why the warranty of Tenant in Tayl with assets binds the right of the Estate Tayl is in no respect from the Statute de Donis but by the equity of the Statute of Glocester by which the Warranty of the Tenant per Curtesie barrs not the Heir for his Mothers Land if his Father leaves not assets to descend 365 4. If this Statute had not been made the lineal Warranty of Tenant in Tayl had no more bound the right of the Estate Tayl by the Statute de Donis with assets descending than it doth without assets ibid. Westm 2. De Donis 1. All Issues in Tayl within this Statute are to claim by the Writ purposely formed there for them which is a Formedon in the Descender 369 2. it intended not to restrain the alienation of any Estates but such as were Fee-simples at the Common Law 370 3. This Statute intended not to preserve the Estate for the Issue or the Reversion for the Donor absolutely against all Warranties but against the alienation with or without Warranty of the Donee and Tenant in Tayl only 369 4. Therefore if Tenant for life alien with Warranty which descended upon the Reversioner that was not restrained by the Statute but left at the Common Law 370 5. By this Statute the Warranty of Tenant in Tayl will not barr the Donor or his Heir of the Reversion ibid. 6. The Donee in Tayl is hereby expresly restrained from all power of alienation whereby the Lands entayled may not revert to the Donor for want of issue in Tayl 371 7. See a further Exposition upon this Statute from fol. 371 to 393 1. Wales Statute de Rutland 12 E. 1. after the Conquest of it by Edward the First was annext to England Jure proprietatis and received Laws from England as Ireland did Vide postea 9 17 18. and had a Chancery of their own and was not bound by the Law of England until 27 H. 8. 300 301 399 400 2. Although Wales became of the Dominion of England from that time yet the Courts of England had nothing to do with the Administration of Justice there in other manner than now they have with the Barbadoes Jersey c. all which are of the Dominions of England and may be bound by Laws made respectively for them by an English Parliament 400 See for a further Exposition 401 402 c. Acton Burnell 13 E. 1. 1. Recognizances for Debt were taken before this Statute by the Chancellor two Chief Justices and Justices Itinerants neither are they hindred by this Statute from taking them as they did before 102 28 E. 3. c. 2. concerning Wales 1. Tryals and Writs in England for Lands in Wales were only for Lordships Marchers and not for Lands within the Principality of Wales Vide ante 7. pòstea 17 18. for the Lordships and Marchers were of the Dominion of England and held of
is not sufficient by the Rule of the Act of 25. unless confirmed by the King It was otherwise in the Popes case before the Act. There are many Presidents in Mr. Noy's Book where in like Obj. 2 case the King after the death of a Bishop holding in Commendam after his translation to another See and after his resignation hath presented All those Presidents are since the Twentieth of the Queen which Answ 1 cannot alter the Law 2. Who knows in the cases of death whether those Presentations were not by consent of the Patrons and doubtless there are Presidents wherein the Patrons did present else this Question had been earlier But Judicandum est legibus non exemplis Vpon Translation of a Bishop holding a Commendam in the Answ 2 Retinere as long as he continued Bishop there the King ought to present for the Dispensation is determined upon his remove and then is as if it had not been and a Dispensation gives no property to the Living nor takes away any But where property is given to the Living as by Presentation Institution and Induction or by Grant as in Appropriations Hob. Colts and Glovers Case and sometimes otherwise by the King such presenting or granting for a year or six is to grant it during life As an Atturnment cannot be for a time nor a Confirmation nor a Denization or Naturalization and the like but such Acts are perfect Manwarings Case 21 Jac. Crook f. 691. as they may be notwithstanding Restriction to time as is agreed well in Manwaring's Case I shall say nothing of the case of Resignation as not being in the present Question Judgment was given by the Opinion of the whole Court That the Avoidance was by Death not by Cession Hill 19 20 Car. II. C. B. Rot. 1785. Baruck Tustian Tristram Plaintiff Anne Roper Vicountess Baltinglass Vidua Defendant in a Plea of Trespass and Ejectment THe Plaintiff declares That the Defendant vi Armis entred into 20 Messuages 1000 Acres of Land 200 Acres of Meadow and 500 Acres of Pasture cum pertinentiis in Thornbury Shalston Evershaw Oldwick Westbury and Looffield and into the Rectory of Thornbury which Thomas Gower Kt. and Baronet and George Hilliard to the said Baruck demis'd the First of Octob. 19 Car. 2. Habendum from the Feast of St. Michael the Arch-angel last past for the term of Five years next ensuing into which he the said Baruck the same day entred and was ousted and ejected by the Defendant ad damnum 40 l. To this the Defendant pleads Not Guilty And the Jury have found specially That the Defendant is not guilty in all those Tenements besides 5 Messuages 400 Acres of Land 50 Acres of Meadow 100 Acres of Pasture cum pertinentiis in Thornbury Shalston Evershaw Oldwick and Westbury and in the Rectory of Thornbury and besides in one Messuage 100 Acres of Land 50 Acres of Meadow and 100 Acres of Pasture cum pertinentiis in Looffield And as to the Trespass and Ejectment aforesaid in the said five Messuages c. and in the Rectory of Thornbury the Iury say upon their Oath that before the said Trespass and Ejectment suppos'd 22 Junii 12 Jac. Sir Arthur Throgmorton Kt. was seis'd in Fee of the aforesaid Rectory and Tenements last mentioned and of the said Premisses in Looffield and so seis'd A certain Indenture Tripartite was made 22 Junii 12 Jac. between him the said Sir Arthur of the first part Edward Lord Wootton Augustine Nicholls Kt. Francis Harvey Esq and Rowly Ward Esq of the second part and Sir Peter Temple and Anne Throgmorton Daughter of the said Sir Arthur of the third part To this effect That the said Sir Arthur Throgmorton did covenant and promise with the said Lord Wootton and Sir Augustine Nicholls in consideration of Marriage to be had between the said Sir Peter Temple and the said Anne and other the considerations mentioned in the said Indenture by Fine or Fines before the Feast of St. Michael the Arch-angel next ensuing or other good Conveyance to be levied by him and the said Dame Anne his wife to the said Lord Wootton c. The scite and precinct of the Priory of Looffield the Rectory of Thornbury and divers Mannors Lands and Tenements in the said Indenture mentioned several yearly Rents therein mentioned and all other his Lands in the Counties of Northampton Buckingham and Oxford at any time belonging to the said Priory to convey and assure To the use of himself for life without Impeachment of Waste Then to the use of Dame Anne his Wife Then to the use of the said Sir Peter Temple and the said Anne his Wife during their natural lives and the longer Liver of them and after both their Deceases To the use of the first Son of the Body of Anne by the said Sir Peter begotten and of the Heirs Males of the Body of the said first Son so to the sixth Son Then to the use of all other Sons in succession in like manner of the Body of Anne begotten by the said Sir Peter And for default of such Heirs To the use of all the Issues Female of the Body of the said Anne by the said Sir Peter begotten and the Heirs of the Bodies of the said Issues Female For default thereof To the first Son of the said Anne by any other Husband and his Heirs Males and so to the tenth In like manner to the Issues Female of the Body of Anne with divers Remainders over A Proviso That it be lawful for Sir Arthur at all times during his life to lett set and demise all or any the said Premisses aforesaid which at any time heretofore have been usually letten or demised to any person or persons for and during the term of One and twenty years or under in possession and not in Reversion or for or during any other number of years determinable upon one two or three Lives in Possession and not in Reversion reserving the Rents therefore now yielded or paid or more to be yearly due and payable during such Lease and Leases unto such person and persons unto whom the said Premises so to be demised shall come and be by virtue of these Presents if no such demise had been made so long as the same Lessees their Executors and Assigns shall duly pay the Rents and perform their Conditions according to the true meaning of their Indentures of Lease and commit no waste of and in the things to them demised The like Proviso verbatim for Sir Peter Temple and Anne his Wife to make like Leases during their Lives and the Life of the longer liver of them after the death of Sir Arthur and Dame Anne his Wife That a Fine was accordingly levied c. to the uses aforesaid They find that all the Messuages Lands Tenements and Rectory in the Declaration mentioned are compris'd in the said Indenture Tripartite They find the death of Sir Arthur Throgmorton and Anne his Wife 2. Septemb.
Avowry is in liew of an Action and thereto privity is requisite for the same cause he cannot have an Action of Waste nor many other Actions there mentioned and the Authorities cited and so is Littleton himself expresly Litt. Sect. 580. Section 580. Where a man by grant to himself or by descent from his Ancestor hath a Rent-charge and might once lawfully distrain and Avow for such Rent if Arrear by due Attornment made to him or his Ancestor he may still do so whenever the Rent is behind unless by Law that power be some way lost 1. That power may be lost by extinguishment of the Rent by a perpetual union of the tenancy to the rent or rent to the tenancy or in other manner the Grantee having no Heir 2. It may be lost for a time by Suspension as by such union for a time and after restored again 3. It may be lost by a Grant of the Rent upon Condition 7 H. 6.3 Br. Extinguishment p. 17. and upon performance or breach of the Condition restored again but the power of distraining is not in this Case lost by any of these ways 4. It may be principally lost by a sufficient granting over and transferring the Rent to another which way comes nearest to the Case in question And therefore I shall agree the Case so much insisted on which is said to be agreed per Curiam Andrew Ognell's Case 4. Rep. f. 49. in Andrew Ognell's Case in the fourth Rep. That if a man be seized of a Rent-service or Rent-charge in Fee and grant it over by his Deed to another and his Heirs and the Tenant Attorn such Grantor is without remedy for the Rent arrear before his Grant for distrain he cannot and other remedy he hath not because all privity between him and the Tenant is destroyed by the Attornment to the Grantee and he hath no more right than any Stranger to come upon the Land after such transferring over of the Rent I shall likewise agree another Case That if such Grantee should regrant the same Rent back to the Grantor either in fee in tail or for life and the Tenant Attorn as he must to this regrant yet the first Grantor shall never be enabled to distrain for Arrears due to him before he granted over the Rent for now the privity between him and the Tenant begins but from the Attornment to the regrant the former being absolutely destroyed and the Tenant no more distrainable for the ancient Arrears than he was upon the creation of the Rent for Arrears incurred before till first attorn'd If the Case in question prove to be the same in effect with either of these Cases then the reason of Law for these Cases must sway and determine the Case in question And I conceive that there is no likeness or parity between the Case in question and either of those Cases either for the fact of the Cases or the reason of Law I shall therefore begin with comparing this Case with the first of those Cases 1. In the first of those Cases he that is seis'd of the Rent-charge doth intend to transferr his Estate in the Rent to the Grantee and it is accordingly actually transferr'd by the Tenants Attornment to the Grant 2. The Grantee by his Grant and Attornment to it becomes actually seis'd of the Rent and may enjoy the benefit of it by perception of the Rent 3. His Wife becomes dowable of it 4. It is subject to Statutes Recognizances and Debts enter'd into by the Grantee or due from him to the King 5. It is possible to descend to his Heir 6. It may be Arrear and he hath a possibility to distrain and avow for it 1. But in the Case in question the Conizors of the Fine did never intend to transfer their Estate in the Rent to the Conizee nor that any Attornment be made to him What a man intends to pass to another he intends to be without it himself at least for some time which is not in this Case 2. The Conizee never becomes actually seiz'd of the Rent and not only doth not but never can enjoy the perception of it for there is no moment of time wherein the Conizors themselves are not actually in seisin of it and consequently may distrain if it be in Arrear and the Conizee can never have actually seisin or possibility to have Attornment or distrain his seisin being but a meer fiction and an invented form of Conveyance only 3. The Conizee's Wife is never dowable of it 4. It is not subject to any Statutes Recognizances or Debts of the Conizee 5. It is never possible to descend to his Heir for it instantly vests in the Conizors 6. It can never be Arrear to the Conizee nor hath he ever a possibility to distrain for it To this purpose what is agreed in the Lord Cromwell's Case L. Cromwell's Case 2. Rep. f. 77. 2. Rep. is applicable Then it is to be consider'd what seisin Perkins had who was the Conizee of a Fine in that Case and he had but a Seisin for an instant and only to this purpose to make a Render for his Wife shall not be endowed nor the Land subject to his Statutes or Recognizances f. 77. Therefore that first Case cited out of the Report of Andrew Ognell's Case which I admit to be good Law hath no resemblance with the present Case in any circumstance or consequent but had the Fine been to a third persons use the consequents had been the same as in the Case cited out of Ognell's Case not as to the Conizee but as to that third person to whom the rent was intended To conclude then this first part 1. That whereof the Conizors were alwaies actually and separately seiz'd the same was never by them transferr'd to the seisin of another But of this Rent the Conizors were alwaies in actual seisin for there was no moment of time wherein they were not seis'd therefore this Rent was never transferr'd to the seisin of another nor could any other for any moment of time have a separated seisin thereof for what was mine at all times could be anothers at no time 2. It is an impossibility in Law that two men severally shall have several Rights and Fee-simples in possession in one and the same Land Dyer 28 H. 8. f. 12. a. p. 51. simul semel per Fitz-herbert in the Argument of Bokenhams Case and the same impossibility is so to have of a Rent Nor hath this relation to the learning of Instants in Digbie's Case Coke 1. Rep. and Fitz-williams in the sixth Report That an old Use may be revoked and a new rais'd in the same time and an old possession ended and a new begun this is usual in all transmutation of Estates and things also For in nature a new form introduc'd doth in the same moment destroy the old according to that Generatio unius est corruptio alterius but a separate possession can never be
Grantee of the Rent-charge is now dispenc'd with which was not before the Statute For if that were now requisite the Conizors could not only not distrain for the Rent due before the Fine but not for the Rent due since the Fine nor doth the Statute help the matter because the Cestuy que use is in possession of the Rent by the Statute and therefore needs no Attornment for that is true when the Conizee hath a perfect possession but without Attornment the Conizee had no perfect possession impowring him to distrain and therefore the Statute can bring no perfect possession to the uses to that end And so Sir Edward Coke agrees the Law Cok. Litt. f. 307. Sect. 55● that since Littleton wrote If the Conizee of a Fine before Attornment by Deed indented and inroll'd bargains and sells a Seigniory to another the Bargainee shall not distrain because the Conizee that is the Bargainor could not for want of Attornment But on the other side a man perfectly seis'd of a Seigniory Rent Reversion or Remainder bargains and sells by Deed indented and inroll'd according to the Statute the Bargainee shall distrain without Attornment by vertue of the Statute And if a Fine be now levied to a man to the use of a third person the third person shall distrain without any Attornment made not only to himself by reason of the Statute but to the Conizee by the Resolution in Sir Moyle Finch his Case for otherwise the Fine were to little purpose Which Case though it make an Attornment not necessary where it is impossible to be had that the Conveyance might not be useless in effect and an intended right to be de novo introduc'd altogether hindred Shall it therefore destroy an old Attornment which cannot but be had and is still in being for no other use or end but to deprive the Conizors of a Rent and former Right justly due to introduce a general inconvenience upon all that have granted Leases for lives and are occasioned to settle their Estates And there is great difference between a Fine levied of a Reversion or of a Rent-charge to the use of a third person and to the use of the Conizors for a third person can never distrain unless either an Attornment were to the Conizee which is impossible because no possession continues in him so as to receive an Attornment or unless the construction of the Statute according to Sir Moyle Finch his Case to make the Conveyance of effect to Cestuy que use made the Attornment because it could not be had not necessary which is a great strain and violence upon the true reason of Law That a Conveyance which in reason could not be good without Attornment should be sufficient because it could not have an Attornment which was necessary to make it sufficient And this practice hath been frequent since the Statute of Uses Sir Will. Pelham's Case as in making a Recovery against his nature to be a forfeiture because taken as a Common Conveyance To make Vses declared by Indenture between the parties made a year after the Recovery to be the Vses of the Recovery Downan's Case 9. Rep. with such Limitations as are mentioned in Downan's Case the 9. Rep. L. Cromwell's Case 2. Rep. f. 72. b. To make a Rent arise out of the Estate of Cestuy que use upon a Recovery which was to arise out of the Estate of the Recoveror and his possession which is a principal point in Cromwell's Case and resolv'd because by the intention of the parties the Cestuy que use was to pay the Rent 14 Eliz. Harwell versus Lucas Moore 's Rep. f. 99. a. n. 243. Bracebridge's Case is eminent to this purpose Tho. Bracebridge seis'd of the Mannor of Kingbury in Com. Warwick made a Lease for One and twenty years of Birchin Close parcel del Mannor to Moore and another Lease of the same Close for Six and twenty years to commence at the end of the first Lease to one Curteis rendring Rent and after made a Feoffment of the Mannor and all other his Lands to the use of the Feoffees and their Heirs and Assigns upon Condition that if they paid not 10000 l. within fifteen daies to the said Tho. Bracebridge or his Assigns they should stand seiz'd to the use of Bracebridge and Joyce his Wife the Remainder to Thomas their second Son in tail with divers Remainders over The Remainder to the Right Heirs of Thomas the Father Livery was made of the Land in possession and not of Birchin Close and no Attornment the Feoffees paid not 10000 l. whereby Bracebridge the Father became seis'd and the first Tenant for years attorn'd to him Adjudg'd 1. That by Livery of the Mannor Birchin Close did not pass to the Feoffees without Attornment 2. That the Attornment of the first Lessee was sufficient Moore f. 99. n. 243. 3. Though the use limited to the Feoffees and their Heirs was determined before the Attornment yet the Attornment was good to the contingent use upon not paying the mony In the Resolution of this Case Wild Archer and Tyrrell Justices were for the Plaintiff and Vaughan Chief Justice for the Defendant Trin. 21. Car. II. C. B. Rot. 1714. The King Plaintiff in a Quare Impedit per Galfridum Palmer Atturnatum suum Generalem Robert Bishop of Worcester Thomas Jervis Esquire and John Hunckley Clerk Defendants THE King counts That Queen Elizabeth was seis'd of the Advowson of the Church of Norfield with the Chappel of Coston in gross in Fee in Jure Coronae and presented one James White her Clerk who was admitted instituted and inducted That from the said Queen the Advowson of the said Church with the said Chappel descended to King James and from him to King Charles the First and from him to his Majesty that now is who being seis'd thereof the said Church with the Chappel became void by the death of the said James White and therefore it belongs of right to him to present and the Defendants disturbe him to his damage of 200 l. which the said Attorney is ready to verifie for the King The Defendants plead severally and first the Bishop that he claims nothing in the said Church and the Advowson but as Ordinary The Defendant Jervis saith That long before the said Presentation suppos'd to be made by the late Queen one Richard Jervis Esquire was seis'd of the Mannor of Norfield with the Appurtenances in Com. praedicto to which the Advowson Ecclesiae praedictae tunc pertinuit adhuc pertinet in his Demesne as of Fee and so seis'd the said Church became void by the death of one Henry Squire then last Incumbent of the said Church and so continued for two years whereby the said late Queen praetextu lapsus temporis in default of the Patron Ordinary and Metropolitan Ecclesiae praedictae pro tempore existentis dictae nuper Reginae devolutae by her Prerogative afterward that is tertio die Decembris
of them constituent parts of the Prebendary or Rectory as the Services are of a Mannor for a total severance of the Services and Demesne destroy the Mannor but a severance of the Tithe or Glebe will not destroy the Rectory more than the severance of a Mannor parcel of the possessions of a Bishoprick will destroy the Bishoprick for the Glebe and the Tithe are but several possessions belonging to the Rectory But it is true that in the Case before us and like Cases a Grant of the Prebendary or of the Rectory una cum terra Glebali decimis de Woolney The Tithe which alone cannot pass without Deed doth pass by Livery of the Rectory Browlow part 2. f. 201. Rowles and Masons Case and so pass that though the Deed mentions the Tithe to be pass'd yet if Livery be not given which must be to pass the Land the Tithe will not pass by the Deed because the intention of the parties is not to pass them severally but una cum and together Therefore the Tithe in such Case must pass in time by the Livery which did not pass without it though granted by the Deed. Yet it is a Question Whether in such Case the Tithe passeth by the Livery or by the Deed For though the passing it by Deed is suspended by reason of the intention to pass the Land and Tithe together and not severally it follows not but that the Tithe passeth by the Deed where Livery is given though not until Livery given If a man be seis'd of a Tenement of Land and likewise of a Tithe and agrees to sell them both and without Deed gives Livery in the Tenement to the Bargainee in name of it and of the Tithe I conceive the Tithe doth not pass by that Livery But a Prebend or Church man cannot now by the Statute of 13 Eliz. cap. 10. make a Lease of the possessions of his Prebendary without Deed. 13 Eliz. c. 10. A Prebendary or Rectory is in truth neither the Glebe nor Tithe nor both for the one or the other may be recover'd and might at Common Law have been aliened the Rectory remaining But the Rectory is the Church Parochial whereof the Incumbent taketh the Cure and Seisin by his Induction after his Institution which is his Charge and without other Seisin then of the Ring or Key of the Church-door by Induction into the Rectory the Parson is seis'd of all the possessions belonging to his Rectory of what kind soever But though by the name of the Rectory the possessions belonging to it of what nature soever actually vest in the Incumbent upon Induction and may pass from the Prebendary by Livery of the Prebend or Rectory to his Lessee according to the parties intention Yet it follows not That therefore an Occupant who can be Occupant but of some natural and permanent thing as Land is should by being Occupant of that whereof occupancy may be have thereby some other thing heterogene to the nature of Land and not capable of occupancy as a Tithe is being neither appendant or appurtenant or necessary part of that whereof he is Occupant nor will it follow that because by giving Seisin of the Rectory the Tithe and Glebe belonging to it will pass that therefore giving Livery of the Glebe will pass the Tithe For it is observable That if a man be Tenant in tayl of a Mannor to which an Advowson is appendant or of a Tenement to which a Common is belonging and discontinue the Issue in tayl shall never have the Advowson or Common until he hath recontinued the Mannor or Tenement But if a man be seis'd in tayl of a Rectory consisting of Glebe and Tithe and discontinue it after the death of Tenant in tayl the Heir in tayl shall have the Tithe which lay in grant but must recover by Formedon the Rectory and Glebe This was agreed in this Court in a Case between Christopher Baker and Searl in Ejectment Cr. 37 El. f. 407. p. 19. Baker and Searls Case upon a Demise by the Earl of Bedford of the Rectory of D. de decimis inde provenientibus for Lives of three other persons and that Case seems to admit an occupancy of the Tithe the Question being concerning the Tithe only Quest 3 The next Question will be That if Taverner being Occupant of the House and Land shall not have the Tithe whereof Astly was in possession at the time of his death what shall become of this Tithe during the lives of the Cestuy que vies which is the hard question And as to this Question If a Rent be granted to A. for the life of B. and A. dies living B I conceive this Rent to be determined upon the death of A. equally as if granted to him for his own life I say determined because it is not properly extinguish'd nor is it suspended For Extinguishment of a Rent is properly when the Rent is absolutely conveyed to him who hath the Land out of which the Rent issues or the Land is convey'd to him to whom the Rent is granted And Suspension of a Rent is when either the Rent or Land are so convey'd not absolutely and finally but for a certain time after which the Rent will be again reviv'd The Reasons why it is determined are because a thing so granted as none can take by the Grant is a void Grant that is as if no such Grant had been Therefore a Grant to the Bishop of L. and his Successors when there is no Bishop in being at the time or to the Dean and Chapter of Pauls or to the Mayor and Commonalty of such a place when there is no Dean or Mayor living at the time of the Grant is a void Grant that is as if it had not been though such a Grant by way of Remainder may be good By the same Reason it follows That when any thing is so granted that upon some contingent hapning none can take by the Grant nor possibly have the thing granted both the Grant and thing granted must necessarily determine for what difference is there between saying that Rent can no longer be had when it is determined by his death for whose life it was granted and saying none can longer have this Rent when it determines by the death of the Grantee pur auter vie For there is no Assignee Occupant or any other can possibly have it and it is therefore determined In an Action of Trover and Conversion brought by Salter against Boteler Salter versus Boteler 44 El. Cr. 901. the Defendant justifies for that one Robert Bash was seis'd in Fee of Twenty Acres in Stansted and granted a Rent-charge to another Robert Bash his Executors and Assigns during the life of Frances the Grantees Wife of Sixteen pounds per Annum The Grantee dies and Frances his wife takes Letters of Administration and the Defendant as her Servant and by her command took a Distress in the said Twenty Acres for Rent
arrear and impounded them And Traverseth the Conversion and taking in other manner Vpon Demurrer to this Plea all the Court held the Plea to be bad and gave Iudgment for the Plaintiff 1. Because the Rent was determined by the death of the Grantee because no Occupant could be of it 2. Because the Feme was no Assignee by her taking of Administration 3. None can make title to a Rent to have it against the terr Tenant unless he be party to the Deed or make sufficient title under it Moore 664. p. 907. Salter vers Boteler The same Case is in Moore reported to be so adjudg'd because the Rent was determined by the death of the Grantee and Popham said That if a Rent be granted pur auter vie the Remainder over to another and the Grantee dies living Cestuy que vie the Remainder shall commence forthwith because the Rent for life determined by the death of the Grantee which last Case is good Law For the particular Estate in the Rent must determine when none could have it and when the particular Estate was determined the Remainder took place And as the Law is of a Rent so must it be of any thing which lies in Grant as a several Tithe doth whereof there can be no Occupant when it is granted pur auter vie and the Grantee dies in the life of Cestuy que vie 20 H. 6. f. 7 8. This is further cleared by a Case in 20 H. 6. A man purchas'd of an Abbot certain Land in Fee-farm rendring to the Abbot and his Successors Twenty pounds yearly Rent If all the Monks dye this Rent determined because there is none that can have it It lies not in Tenure and therefore cannot Escheat and though new Monks may be made it must be by a new Creation wholly In vacancy of a Parson or Vicar the Ordinary ex officio shall cite to pay the Tithes Fitz. N. Br. Consultation Lett. G. This Case agrees exactly with the Grant of a Rent or other thing which lies in Grant pur auter vie the Grantee dying the Rent determines though it were a good Grant and enjoyed at first yet when after none can have it it is determined So was the Rent to the Abbot and his Successors a good Rent and well enjoyed But when after all the Covent died so as none could have the Rent for the Body Politique was destroyed the Rent determined absolutely By this I hold it clear That if a man demise Land to another and his Heirs habendum pur auter vie or grant a Rent to a man and his Heirs pur auter vie though the Heir shall have this Land or Rent after the Grantees death yet he hath it not as a special Occupant as the common expression is for if so such Heir were an Occupant which he is not for a special Occupant must be an Occupant but he takes it as Heir not of a Fee but of a descendible Freehold and not by way of limitation as a Purchase to the Heir but by descent though some Opinions are that the Heir takes it by special limitation as when an Estate for life is made the Remainder to the right Heirs of J. S. the Heir takes it by special limitation if there be an Heir when the particular Estate ends But I see not how when Land or Rent is granted to a man and his Heirs pur auter vie the Heir should take by special limitation after the Grantees death when the whole Estate was so in the first Grantee that he might assign it to whom he pleas'd and so he who was intended to take by special limitation after the Grantees death should take nothing at all But to inherit as Heir a descendible Freehold when the Father or other Ancestor had not dispos'd it agrees with the ancient Law as appears by Bracton which obiter in Argument is denied in Walsinghams Case Si autem fiat donatio sic Bract. l. 2. de acquirendo rerum dominico c. 9. Ad vitam donatoris donatorio haeredibus suis si donatorius praemoriatur haeredes ei succedent tenendum ad vitam donatoris per Assisam mortis Antecessoris recuperabunt qui obiit ut de feodo Here it is evident That Land granted to a man and his Heirs for the life of the Grantor the Grantee dying in the life of the Grantor the Heirs of the Grantee were to succeed him and should recover by a Writ of Mordancester in case of Abatement which infallibly proves the Heir takes by descent who died seis'd as of a Fee but not died seis'd in Fee 1. Hence I conclude That if a man dye seis'd pur auter vie of a Rent a Tithe an Advowson in gross Common in gross or other thing whereof there can be no Occupancy either directly or by consequence as adjuncts of something else by the death of the Grantee in all these Cases the Grant is determined and the Interest stands as before any Grant made 2. If any man dye seis'd of Land pur auter vie as also of many of these things in gross pur auter vie by distinct Grant from the Land The Occupant of the Land shall have none of these things but they are in the same state and the Grants determine as if the Grantee had died seis'd of nothing whereof there could be any occupancy But I must remember you that in this last part of my Discourse where I said That if a Rent a Tithe a Common or Advowson in gross or the like lying in Grant were granted pur auter vie and the Grantee died living Cestuy que vie that these Grants were determin'd my meaning was and is where such Rent Tithe or other things are singly granted and not where they are granted together with Land or any other thing out of which Rent may issue with Reservation of a Rent out of the whole For although a Rent cannot issue out of things which lye in Grant as not distrainable in their nature yet being granted together with Land with reservation of a Rent though the Rent issue properly and only out of the Land and not out of those things lying in Grant as appears by Littleton yet those are part of the Consideration for payment of the Rent Cok. Litt. f. 142. a. 144. a. as well as the Land is In such case when the Rent remains still payable by the Occupant it is unreasonable that the Grant should determine as to the Tithe or as to any other thing lying in Grant which passed with the Land as part of the Consideration for which the Rent was payable and remain to the Lessor as before they were granted for so the Lessor gives a Consideration for paying a Rent which he enjoys and hath notwithstanding the Consideration given back again And this is the present Case being stript and singled from such things as intricate it That Doctor Mallory Prebend of the Prebendary of Woolney consisting of Glebe-land
a House Barns and Tithe of Woolney and thereof seis'd in the right of his Prebendary makes a Lease to Astly of the Prebend una cum the Glebe House Barn and Tithe for Three Lives rendring the accustomed and ancient Rent of Five pounds Twelve shillings Astly demiseth to Taverner the House Glebe and Barn for a year reserving Twenty shillings and dies the Cestuy que vies living As I concluded before Taverner is Occupant of the House Barn and Glebe-land and consequently lyable to pay the whole Rent being Five pounds twelve shillings yearly though the Land House and Barn be found of the yearly value of Twenty shillings only but because the Rent cannot issue out of Tithes or things that lye in Grant it issues only out of the House Barn and Land which may be distrain'd on 2. If Taverner being Occupant of the Land shall not have the Tithes which remain'd in Astly according to his Lease for three Lives at the time of his death and whereof by their nature there can be no direct Occupancy It follows that the Lease made by Doctor Mallory is determin'd as to the Tithe for no other can have them yet continues in force as to the Land and House and all the Rent reserv'd which seems strange the Land and Tithe being granted by the same Demise for three Lives which still continue yet the Lease to be determined as to part 3. Though the Rent issue not out of the Tithe yet the Tithe was as well a Consideration for the payment of the Rent as the Land and Houses were and it seems unreasonable that the Lessor Doctor Mallory should by act in Law have back the greatest Consideration granted for payment of the Rent which is the Tithe and yet have the Rent wholly out of the Land by act in Law too which cannot yield it 4. Though Doctor Mallory could not have reserv'd a Rent out of the Tithe only to bind his Successor upon a Lease for Lives more than out of a Fair though it were as the ancient Rent and had been usually answered for the Fair as is resolv'd in Jewel Bishop of Sarum's Case Jewell's Case 5 Rep. Yet in this Case where the Tithe together with Land out of which Rent could issue was demis'd for the accustomed Rent the Successor could never avoid the Lease either in the whole or as to the Tithe only 13 Eliz. c. 10. This seems clear by the Statute of 13 Eliz. cap. 10. which saith All Leases made by any Spiritual or Ecclesiastical persons having any Lands Tenements Tithes or Hereditaments parcel of the Possessions of any Spiritual Promotion other than for One and twenty years or three Lives whereupon the accustomed yearly Rent or more shall be reserv'd shall be void Cokes Litt. f. 142. a. f. 144. a. Whence it is apparent this Statute intended that Leases in some sense might be made of Tithes for One and twenty years or Three Lives and an ancient Rent reserv'd but of a bare Tithe only a Rent could not be reserv'd according to Jewell's Case for neither Distress nor Assise can be of such Rent though an Assise may be de Portione Decimarum as is clear by the Lord Dyer 7 E. 6. and the difference rightly stated Therefore a Lease of Tithe and Land out of which a Rent may issue and the accustomed Rent may be reserved must be good within the intention of the Statute or Tithe could in no sense be demis'd 5. Taverner the Lessee being Occupant here by his possession becomes subject to the payment of the Rent to Waste to Forfeiture Conditions and all things that Astly the Lessee or his Assignee if he had made any had been subject to Also Coke's Litt. 41. He must claim by a que Estate from Astly he must averr the Life of Cestuy que vie so as he becomes to all intents an Assignee in Law of the first Lessee 6. Without question the Occupant being chargeable with the Rent shall by Equity have the Tithe which was the principal Consideration for payment of the Rent when no man can have the benefit of the Tithe but the Lessor Doctor Mallory who gave it as a Consideration for the Rent which he must still have Therefore I conceive the Reason of Law here ought necessarily to follow the Reason of Equity and that the Occupant shall have the Tithe not as being immediate Occupant of the Tithe whereof no occupancy can be but when by his possession of the Land he becomes Occupant and the Law casts the Freehold upon him he likewise thereby becomes an Assignee in Law of Astly's Lease and Interest and consequently of the Tithe An ancient Rent reserv'd within the Statute of 1. or 13. of the Queen upon a Lease of One and twenty years or Three Lives is by express intention of that Statute a Rent for publique use and maintenance of Hospitality by Church-men as is resolv'd in Elsemere's Case Elsmers C. 5. Rep. the 5. Rep. and therefore if the Lessee provide not an Assignee to answer the Rent to the Successors of the Lessor for the ends of that Law the Law will do it for him and none fitter to be so than the Occupant in case of a Lease pur auter vie as this is And if the Occupant being Assignee hath pass'd all his Estate and Interest to the Plaintiff hath good cause of Action for the Tithe converted by the Defendant Pasch 22 Car. II. Judgment for the Defendant Three Justices against the Chief Justice Trin. 20 Car. II. C. B. Rot. 2043. Harrison versus Doctor Burwell In a Prohibition for his Marriage with Jane the Relict of Bartholomew Abbot his Great Uncle The Questions are Quest 1 WHether the marriage of Thomas Harrison the Plaintiff with Jane his now wife being the Relict of Bartholomew Abbot his great Vncle that is his Grand-fathers Brother by the Mothers side be a lawful marriage within the Act of 32 H. 8. cap. 38 Quest 2 Admitting it to be a lawful marriage within the meaning of that Act Whether the Kings Temporal Courts are properly Judges of it because the unlawfulness or lawfulness of it by that Act doth depend upon its being a marriage within or without the Levitical Degrees For if within those Degrees it is not a lawful marriage by that Act. And the right knowledge of marriages within or without those Degrees must arise from the right knowledge ot the Scriptures of the Old Testament specially the Interpretation of which hath been and regularly is of Ecclesiastick Conizance and not of Lay or Temporal Conizance in regard of the Language wherein it was writ and the receiv'd Interpretations concerning it in all succession of time Quest 3 Admitting the Kings Temporal Courts have by that Act of 32. or any other special Conizance of the Levitical Degrees and of marriages within them And though this be no marriage within the Levitical Degrees it being articled in general to be an Incestuous marriage
by the Verdict 7 Car. afore the Act by which it is found he died seised of the Rectory of Kingston in Reversion and of the Advowson of the Vicaridge and died without Heir and that the same escheated to the King and if all the lands in question were held of the King it being found he died without Heir the proviso will save all to the King 3. Whether Nicholas Ramsey under whom the Plaintiffs claim be the person who had title to the lands in question if any had Because 1. The death of Robert the elder Brother is not sufficiently found before the Act of Naturalization for then he and not Nicholas was heir to John 2. Because if Robert the elder were dead before yet he left Issue three Daughters who were naturalized as well as Nicholas by the Act and are the heirs to the Earl being the Issue of his elder Brother If Robert had died after the Irish Act made this Verdict had been as true as now it is Therefore it is not sufficient to find him dead before the Act. Et Juratores ulterius dicunt quod praedictus Robertus filius primogenitus natu maximus praedicti Roberti patris postea obiit tempore mortis suae habens relinquens tres filias de corpore ipsius Roberti filii legitime procreatas viz. Margaret Isabel Janam Alienigenas natas in Regno Scotiae ante accessionem praedict Quae quidem Margaret Isabella Jana primo die Octobris Anno Regni Domini Caroli nuper Regis Angliae primi quarto decimo in plena vita fuerant habent exitus de carum corporibus exeuntes modo superstites in plena vita existentes apud Kingston super Thames praedict As to the second part in the Case of Aliens nothing interrupts the common course of Descents but Defectus Nationis as Bracton terms it Therefore that being taken away by naturalization they shall inherit as if it had not been and then the eldest Brothers Issue had inherited before the second Brother 1. It is admitted and will easily appear That one naturalized in Scotland since the Union cannot inherit in England 2. Ireland then differs from Scotland in a common difference with Gernsey Jersey Isle of Man Berwick and all the English Plantations for that they are Dominions belonging to the Crown of England which Scotland is not 3. If this difference which was never discussed in Calvin's Case alter not the Case from a naturalizing in Scotland it remains whether by Act of Parliament of England though not extant Ireland in this matter be not differenc'd from other Dominions belonging to England 1. He that is priviledg'd by the law of England to inherit there must be a Subject of the Kings 2. He must be more than a local Subject either in the Dominion of England or out of the Dominion of England for meer Aliens when locally in England or any other Dominions of the Kings are local Subjects 3. He must be otherwise a Subject than any Grant or Letters Patents of the King can make him 7 Rep. Calvins C. f. 7. a. 36 H. 6. Tit. Deniz Br. 9. Therefore a Denizen of England by Letters Patents for life in tayl or in fee whereby he becomes a Subject in regard of his person will not enable him to inherit in England but according to his Denization will enable his Children born in England to inherit him and much less will his Denization in any other Dominion Whence it follows That no Laws made in any other Dominion acquired by Conquest or new Plantation by the King's Lieutenants Substitutes Governours or People there by vertue of the King's Letters Patents can make a man inherit in England who could not otherwise inherit For what the King cannot do by his Letters Patents no delegated power under him can do by his Letters Patents It follows likewise upon the same reason That no tenure of Land by Homage Fealty or other Service in any other Dominion of the Kings acquired by Conquest or otherwise by any Grant or Letters Patents can make a man inherit in England who could not otherwise inherit Calvins Case f. 6. b. for that is not Homagium ligeum but Feodale as is rightly distinguished 4. A man born a Subject to one that is King of England cannot therefore inherit in England for then the Antenati in Scotland had inherited in England they were born Subjects to King James who was King of England but not born when he was King of England 5. A Subject born in any Dominion belonging to the Crown of England is inheritable in England as well as native Englishmen So the natural born Subjects of Ireland Gernsey Jersey Berwick and all the English Plantations inherit but the specifique reason of their inheriting in England is not because they are born in Dominions belonging to the Crown of England for if so none could inherit who wanted that and then the Postnati of Scotland should not inherit for Scotland is not a Dominion belonging to the Crown of England but to the King of England It remains then according to the Resolution and Reasons of Calvin's Case That the specifique and adequate cause why the Kings Subjects of other his Dominions than England do inherit in England is because they are born his natural Subjects as the English are he being actually King of England at the time of their birth when their subjection begins Cok. Rep. Calvins Case and so are born Liege-men to the same King But then since all Liegeance and Subjection are acts and obligations of Law for a man owes no liegeance excluding all Civil Law but a man is said a natural Subject because his Subjection begins with his birth that is as soon as he can be subject and a King is said to be a mans natural Prince because his Protection begins as soon as the Subject can be protected and in the same sense that a Country where a man is born is his natural Country or the Language he first speaks is his natural Tongue why should not an Act of Law making a man as if he had been born a Subject work the same effect as his being born a Subject which is an effect of law 1. The Reason is That naturalization is but a fiction of Law and can have effect but upon those consenting to that fiction Therefore it hath the like effect as a mans Birth hath where the Law-makers have power but not in other places where they have not Naturalizing in Ireland gives the same effect in Ireland as being born there so in Scotland as being born there but not in England which consents not to the fiction of Ireland or Scotland nor to any but her own 2. No fiction can make a natural Subject for he is correlative to a natural Prince and cannot have two natural Soveraigns but may have one Soveraign as a Queen Soveraign and her Husband in two persons no more than two natural Fathers or two natural
taking from another which the word Stealing imports to be lawful unlawful Swearing which Perjury imports to be lawful an unlawful Entry upon a mans House or Land which the word Trespass imports to be lawful and so of the rest So the same thing at the same time would be both lawful and unlawful which is impossible For the same reason a Law making Murther Stealing Perjury Trespass or any the rest of the mala instanc'd in lawful would be a void Law in it self For a Law which a man cannot obey nor act according to it is void and no Law And it is impossible to obey contradictions or act according to them Therefore I may conclude those things to be mala in se which can never be made lawful The instances in that Book of 11 H. 7. are none of these but near them the words are But malum in se the King nor any other can dispense And instanceth Si Come si le Roy voyloit pardon de occider un homme ou de faire nusance in le haut chemin ceo est void Where by the way pardon is mis-printed for pocar done for the King may pardon killing a man but if the King will give power to kill a man or to make a nusance in the High-way it is void And upon the same reason a licence to imprison a man to take his Land his Horse or any thing that is his from him is void For in life liberty and estate every man who hath not forfeited them hath a property and right which the Law allows him to defend and if it be violated it gives an Action to redress the wrong and to punish the wrong-doer Therefore a dispensation that is to make lawful the taking from a man any thing which he may lawfully defend from being taken or lawfully punish if it be must be void For it is a contradiction to make it lawful to take what may be lawfully hindred from being taken or lawfully punished if it be And that were to make two men have several plenary rights in the same thing at the same time which no Law can effect Therefore to do a thing which no Law can make lawful must be malum in se But these instances differ from the former for killing a man or taking from him his Lands or Goods do not import ex vi termini that which is unlawful as Murther and Stealing do for in many Cases killing a man or taking his liberty or goods from him is lawful and where it is not may by a Law be made so which the other can never be As every new capital punishment ordained by Law makes killing a man lawful where it was not before every new aid granted out of mens estate makes a taking from men lawful that was not before But this is because a Law can alter change or transferr a mans property in life liberty estate or any interest as it will which cannot be done without a Law and thereby nothing unlawful is made lawful But the property which a man had and was the subject matter of the unlawful doing or taking before is alter'd or transferred to another either in toto or in tanto So as to violate mens properties is never lawful but a malum per se as that Book is of 11 H. 7. and according to that of Bracton Bract. l. 3. f. 132 Rex non poterit gratiam facere cum injuria damno aliorum quod autem alienum est dare non potest per suam gratiam But to alter or transferr mens properties to others is no malum per se it is daily done by the owners express consent and by a Law without their express consent And as the Law is the Lord of a Villain may transferr his Villains property in Lands or Goods to himself by entry or seisure And it is the signal difference between a Freeman and Villain that it cannot be done to a Freeman nor yet to a Villain to the use of any but his Lord. The Learned and Judicious Grotius in his excellent Work de Jure belli ac pacis is most apposit upon this subject Grot. de Jure belli ac pacis l. 1. c. 1. Sect. 5 6. Sicut ergo ut bis duo non sint quatuor ne à Deo quidem potest effici ita ne hoc quidem ut quod intrinseca ratione malum est malum non sit And then follows after some further explanation of his notion Ita si quem Deus occidi praecipiat aut res alicujus auferri non licitum fiet Homicidium aut furtum quae voces vitium involvunt sed non erit Homicidium aut furtum quod vitae rerum supremo Domino auctore fit And it is the same to say Si quem Lex occidi praecipiat aut res alicujus auferri non licitum fiet homicidium aut furtum quae voces vitium involvunt sed non erit homicidium aut furtum quod a lege vitae rerum potestatem habente auctore fit If any need further satisfaction concerning what hath been said on this occasion he may resort with success to the place quoted of that great Lawyer But it is to be observed That altering or changing property is no subject matter for a dispensation A man is not dispens'd with to do an act which he cannot do but to do an act which simply he can do but the Law prohibits his doing it penally But altering or changing property is an act simply out of his power to do which should be dispens'd with in that behalf And thus we see violation of property is a malum per se by that Book of 11 H. 7. and the reason why it is so and cannot be dispens'd with A third kind of malum per se by that Case of 11 H. 7. 11 H. 7. is that which the Law of the Land admits to be specially prohibited Jure Divino Et Isint le Roy ne nul Evesque ou Presbiter poit doner licence a un de faire Lechery Quia est malum in se saith the Book that is Coition without wedlock which offence when by mutual consent injures no property having two husbands or two wives at the same time but that is also against the property of the first husband or wife marriage within the Levitical degrees 32 H. 8. c. 38. All which are admitted by the Law of the Land to be prohibited Jure Divino and cannot be dispenc'd with For no Human authority can make lawful what Divine authority hath made unlawful without Gods leave and then it is by his authority Many more particulars fall under this head which I shall not now mention Hence I infer mala in se to be only such as imply a contradiction to be made lawful and consequently what may be made lawful by Human Law to be no malum in se as not differing from other things which may be permitted or prohibited occasionally at the
the said William to be begotten of her the said Anne Infeoffed James Lane and John Lane Gentlemen of the said Premisses Habendum to them their heirs and assigns for ever To the use of the said William Vescy the Feoffer and his assigns for term of his life without impeachment of Waste and after to the use of the said Anne the Tenant if the Marriage succeeded between them for term of her life for her Joynture and after her decease to the use of the heirs males of his body on her body begotten forever and for want of such issue to the use of the heirs females of him the said William Vescy upon her body begotten and for want of such issue to the use of the right heirs of him the said William Vescy And bound him and his heirs to warrant the premisses as aforesaid to the said Feoffees and their Heirs to the uses aforesaid By vertue whereof and of the Statute of Uses the said William was seis'd for term of his life with the Remainder over as aforesaid And after the said marriage was had and solemnized between him and the Tenant Arine That William died so seis'd without any issue of his body and Anne surviv'd him and entred and by vertue of the said Feoffment and the Statute of Uses is seis'd in her Demesne as of Freehold for term of her life And that the said warranty of the said William descended from him to the said Elizabeth and Sarah as Cosins and Coheirs of him the said William the Son that is to say Daughters and Coheirs of John Vescy Brother and Heir of the said William the Son and demands Iudgment if against the said Warranty the Demandants shall be received to demand and avers her self and Anne Hewett named in the Feoffment to be the same person The Replication The Demandants reply and confess the Feoffment to uses of William as is pleaded in Barr to Lane and Lane and their heirs with warranty But further say That the said William Vescy the Son after that is the Four and twentieth of December 14 Car. 2. at Tickhill aforesaid died without any issue of his body which they are ready to aver and demand Iudgment if they shall be barred of their Action against the said Anne by the said Feoffment and warranty The Rejoynder Anne the Tenant rejoyns that the Replication is insufficient and demurs thereupon The matter of the Replication is all set forth in the Defendants Plea in Barr but only the time of William Vescy's death which was not material upon which the Demandants ought to have demur'd and not to have replyed impertinently The Case upon the Pleading William Vescy seis'd of the Land in question in his Demesne as of Fee held of King Charles the First in free Soccage as of his Honour of Tickhill by his last Will and Testament devis'd the same to John Vescy his eldest Son and the heirs males of his body and for default of such to Robert Vescy and the heirs males of his body and for default of such to William Vescy his Son and the heirs males of his body and for default of such to Matthew Vescy and the heirs males of his body and died Then John entred and died seis'd without issue male leaving two daughters Elizabeth and Sarah now Demandants together with their Husbands After his death Robert entred and died seis'd without issue male Then William entred and was seis'd and Matthew in the life of William died without issue male William by his Deed Indented in Consideration of an intended marriage with Anne the now Tenant and for other Considerations infeoffed James Lane and John Lane Habendum to them and their Heirs to the use of William the Feoffor for term of his life and after to the use of Anne Hewet now the Tenant for her life then to the use of the heirs males of his body upon her begotten and for default of such to the use of the heirs females of his body on her begotten and for default of such to the use of his right Heirs And bound him and his Heirs to warrant to the said Feoffees and their Heirs William by vertue of the said Feoffment and of the Statute of Uses was possessed and after he married the now Tenant and died seis'd as of his Freehold without any issue of his body After his death Anne his wife now Tenant by vertue of the said Feoffment and Statute of Uses entred and was posssessed Against whom Elizabeth and Sarah Daughters and Coheirs of John Vescy and Cosins and Coheirs of William the Devisor bring their Formedon in the Reverter Anne the Tenant in possession would rebutt and barr them by the said warranty of William Vescy the Son whose Cosins and Coheirs they are videlicet the Daughters and Coheirs of John eldest Brother of the said William And whether the said Anne Tenant by the said Feoffment and Statute of Uses can rebutt them by the said warranty is the general Question For Resolution of which I must make these previous Questions The first is If before the Statute of 27 H. 8. to Vses Tenant in tayl had made a Feoffment in Fee to uses with warranty to the Feoffees and their Heirs such Feoffees in a Formedon in the Reverter brought against them by the Heirs of the Donor could have rebutted and barr'd them by the warranty of the Tenant in tayl For if the Feoffees to use in such case could not have barr'd the Heirs of the Donor before the Statute by the warranty it is evident the Cestuy que use since the Statute cannot barr them for he can have no more power since the Statute than the Feoffees to use had before the Statute by the warranty I put the Case before the Statute for clearness sake only for though since the Statute there are Feoffees to use as before yet no question can be made upon their rebutter by a warranty because the Estate is out of them by the Statute as soon as it is in them And as to this the Case in effect is no more than Whether the warranty of Tenant in tayl which must be admitted to be a Collateral warranty descending upon the Donor or his Heirs will barr him or them of the Reversion The second Question I make admitting the Heirs of the Donor to be barr'd by the warranty of Tenant in tayl descending upon them is Whether after the Statute of Uses the Cestuy que use can have any benefit of the warranty granted to the Feoffees to use either by way of Voucher or Rebutter Because the Cestuy que use is not in possession in the per by the Feoffees but by the Statute of Uses The third Question is admitting generally that the Cestuy que use shall have benefit of the warranty made to the Feoffees to use Whether yet in this Case Anne the Tenant being a Cestuy que use shall have benefit of the warranty made to the Feoffees Because neither William
the King in Capite 411 31 E. 3. cap. 11. Concerning Executors 1. Though Executors and Administrators are not compelled by the Common Law to answer Actions of Debt for simple Contracts yet the Law of the Land obligeth payment of them 96 2. Upon committing Administration Oath is taken to administer truly which cannot be without paying the Debts 96 3. Oath is likewise taken to make a true account to the Ordinary of what Remains after all Debts Funerals and just Expences deducted 96 1. 34 E. 3. c. 7. of Attaints This Statute granted Attaints in personal Actions 146 1. 2 H. 6. cap. 4. Those born in Ireland are subject to and bound by the Laws of England as those of Calais Gascoign and Guien were 293 1. 7. H. 8. c. 4. of Recoveries If a Common Recovery had been to Uses of Lordships and Mannors before the Statute of the 27 H. 8. the Recoverors had no remedy to make the Tenants Attorn for a quid Juris clamat would not lye upon a Recovery before the Statute of 27 H. 8. which did give remedy 48 1. If a man have a Benefice with Cure 21 H. 8. c. Dispensations whatever the value be and is admitted and instituted into another Benefice with Cure Postea 15. of what value soever having no Qualification or Dispensation the first is ipso facto void and the Patron may present another 131 2. But if the Patron will not present then if under value no Lapse shall incurr until Deprivation of the first Benefice and notice Postea 22. but if of the value of Eight pounds the Patron at his peril must present within the six Months 131 25 H. 8. cap. 21. of Dispensations 1. The Pope could formerly and the Arch-bishop now can sufficiently dispense for a plurality by this Statute Ante. 14. 20 2. A Rector of a Church dispensed with according to this Statute before he is consecrated Bishop remains Rector as before after Consecration 24 25 H. 8. c. 22. 28 H. 8. c. 7. 28 H. 8. c. 16. 32 H. 8. c. 38. of Marriages 1. Neither by this Act or 28 H. 8. cap. 7. no Marriage prohibited before either by Gods Law or the Canon Law differenced from it is made lawful 216 325 2. That the Marriages particularly declared to be against Gods Law cannot be dispensed with but other Marriages not particularly declared to be against Gods Law are left Statu quo prius as to the Dispensations 216 325 3. That neither of these Acts gave Jurisdiction to the Temporal Courts concerning Marriages more than they had before but were Acts directory only to the Ecclesiastical proceedings in matters of Marriage 216 4. Neither of these Acts declare That the Degrees rehearsed in the said Acts thereby declared to be prohibited by Gods Law are all the Degrees of Marriage prohibited by Gods Law ibid. 5. The Levitical Degrees quatenus such are set forth by no Act of Parliament but Marriages which fall within some of those Degrees are said to be Marriages within the Degrees prohibited by Gods Law by 28 H. 8. c. 7. and 28 H. 8. c. 16. 319 6. The 32 H. 8. c. 38. prohibits the impeaching of Marriages only which are absolutely within the Levitical Degrees leaving all other to Spiritual Jurisdiction as before that Act 320 7. A Marriage with the Grandfathers brothers wife by the mothers side is a lawful Marriage by the 32 H. 8. c. 38. 206 207 8. The marriage of the Husband with the Wives sister or the Wives sisters daughter is prohibited within the Levitical Degrees 322 323 9. The 28 H. 8. cap. 16. makes invalid all Licenses Dispensations Bulls and other Instruments purchased from Rome 217 10. This Statute of 25 H. 8. is Repealed by the 28 H. 8 but not for the matter of Marriages there prohibited 215 11. The Statute of 1 2 Phil. Mar. doth not Repeal the 28 H. 8. cap. 7. entirely but only one Clause of it 324 327 12. Some parts of 32 H. 8. c. 38. are Repealed 218 1. 26 H. 8. Concerning Wales By this Statute power was given to the Kings President and Council in the Marchers of Wales Ante 7 9. Postea 18. in several Causes as to Indict Outlaw Proceed against Traytors Clippers of Mony Murtherers and other Felons within the Lordships Marchers of Wales to be indicted in the adjoyning County But this did not extend to the Principality of Wales 413 27 H. 8. concerning Wales 1. The alteration which was made by this Statute as to Wales 414 415 2. To what Counties the Lordships Marchers of Wales are now annext by this Statute Ante 7 9 18. 415 27 H. 8. of Uses 1. A Use cannot arise where there is not a sufficient Estate in possession 49 2. This Statute is properly to give the possession to him who had not the possession but the use only viz. the possession which he wanted before to the use which he had before in such manner as he hath the use 42 3. It was never the intent of the Statute to give the possession to fictitious Conuzees in order to a form of Conveyance but the Statute brings the new uses raised out of a feigned possession in the Conuzee to the real possession which operates according to their intent to change their Estate 42 4. If an Estate for life had been granted to the use of a man and his Heirs an Estate in Fee could not rise out of it by this Statute 49 5. The principal use of this Statute especially upon Fines levied is not to bring together a possession and a use but to introduce a general form of Conveyance by which the Conuzors in the Fine may execute their purposes at pleasure by transferring to Strangers enlarging or diminishing their Estates without observing the strictness of Law for the possession of the Conuzee 50 6. The Conuzee of a Rent granted by Fine to uses cannot have any actual seisin or be in possession of such Rent since this Statute 49 7. A. makes a Feoffment with Warranty to the use of himself for life Remainder to his wife for life Remainder to the use of his right Heirs when by this Statute the possession is brought to these uses the Warranty made by A. to the Feoffees and their Heirs is wholly destroyed 389 1. 32 H. 8. c. 32. concerning Executors This Statute gives Remedy for recovery of such Debts by Executors as were due to the Testator and for which there was no remedy before viz. the Tenants did retain in their hands arrearages of Rents whereby the Executors could not pay the Testators Debts 48 7 E. 6. cap. 5. selling of Wines 1. This Statute never intended that no Wine should be sold nor that it should be with great restraint sold but every man might not sell it And since it restrains not the Kings power to license the selling of Wine it is clear the King may license as if the Act had absolutely prohibited the selling of Wine and left it
to the King to license as he thought fit 355 2. The intent of the Act being That every man should not sell Wine that would his Majesty could not better answer the ends of the Act than to restrain the sellers to Freemen of London to the Corporation of Vintners men bred up in that Trade and serving Apprenticeships to it ibid. 13 El. c. 12 Not reading the Articles 1. Immediately upon not reading the Articles the Incumbent is by this Statute deprived ipso facto 132 2. Upon such Deprivation the Patron may present Ante 14. and his Clerk ought to be admitted and instituted but if he do not no Lapse incurrs until after Six months after notice of such Deprivation given to the Patron 132 3. Where the Incumbent subscribes the Articles upon his Admission and Institution that makes him perfect Incumbent pro tempore 133 4. But if he hath a Benefice and afterwards accepts another and doth not subscribe nor read the Articles then he never was Incumbent of the second and consequently never accepted a second Benefice to disable him from holding the first 132 133 134 1. That all Leases by Spiritual persons of Tythe c. 13 Eliz. cap. 10. Concerning Leases to be made by Ecclesiastical persons parcel of their Spiritual Promotions other than for One and twenty years or three Lives reserving the accustomed yearly Rent shall be void 2. This Statute intended that Leases in some sense might be made of Tithes for One and twenty years or three Lives and an ancient Rent Reserved but of a bare Tythe only a Rent could not be reserved for neither Distress nor Assise can be of such a Rent 203 204 3. Therefore a Lease of Tythe and Land out of which a Rent may issue and the accustomed Rent may be reserved must be good within the intent of the Statute 204 7 Jac. cap. 5.21 Jac. cap. 12. For Officers to be sued in the proper County 1. The question upon these Acts was Whether an Officer or any in their assistance that shall do any thing by colour of but not concerning their Office and be therefore impleaded shall have the benefit of these Acts. 2. Or if they are impleaded for any thing done by pretence of their Offices and which is not strictly done by reason of their Office but is a mis-seazante Whether they may have the like benefit 3. Without this Act the Action ought to be laid where the Fact was done and the Act is but to compel the doing of that where an Officer is concerned that otherwise Fieri debuit 114 4. The Statute intends like benefit to all the Defendants where the Fact is not proved to be done where the Action is laid as if the Plaintiff became Non-suit or suffered a Discontinuance viz. that they should have double costs 117 12 Car. 2. cap. 4. For granting Tonnage and Poundage to the King 1. Those Wines which are to pay this Duty according to the Act must be Wines brought into Port as Merchandise by his Majesties Subjects or Strangers 165 2. But Wines which are by their kind to pay Duty if they shall be brought into Ports or Places of this Kingdom neither by his Majesties Subjects nor Aliens they are not chargeable with this Duty ibid. 3. If they are not brought into the Ports and Places as Merchandize viz. for Sale they are not chargeable with the Duty 165 170 4. Wines coming into this Kingdom as Wreck are neither brought into this Kingdom by his Majesties Subjects nor Strangers but by the Wind and Sea 166 5. Wreck'd Goods are not brought into this Kingdom for Merchandise viz. for Sale but are as all other the Native Goods of the Kingdom for sale or other use at the pleasure of the owner ibid. 6. All Goods chargeable with the Duties of this Act must be proprieted by a natural born Merchant or Merchant Alien and accordingly the greater and lesser Duty is to be paid 166 168 7. All Goods subject to this Duty may be forfeited by the disobedience and mis-behaviour of the Merchant-proprietor or those entrusted by him 167 1. The intent of this Statute is to priviledge the Father against common Right 12 Car. 2 cap. 24. To enable the Father to devise the Guardianship of his Son to appoint the Guardian of his Heir and the time of his Wardship under One and twenty 179 2. Such a special Guardian cannot transfer the custody by Deed or Will to any other 179 3. He hath no different Estate from a Guardian in Soccage but for the time the of Wardship 179 4. The Father cannot by this Act give the custody to a Papist 180 5. If the Father doth not appoint for how long time under One and twenty years his Son shall be in Ward it is void for Uncertainty 185 6. The substance of the Statute and sense thereof is That whereas all Tenures are now Soccage and the Law appoints a Gardian till Fourteen yet the Father may nominate the Gardian to his Heir and for any time until his Age of One and twenty and such Gardian shall have like remedy for the Ward as Gardian in Soccage at the Common Law 183 Supersedeas 1. If a priviledged person as an Attorney c. or his Menial Servant is sued in any Jurisdiction forreign to his priviledge he may have a Supersedeas 155 Surplusage 1. Surplusage in a special Verdict 78 Suspension 1. A Suspension of Rent is when either the Rent or Land are so conveyed not absolutely and finally but for a certain time after which the Rent will be again revived 199 2. A Rent may be suspended by Unity for a time and afterwards restored 39 Tayl See Title Warranty 1. SEE an Exposition upon the the Statute de Donis 370 371 372 c. 2. What shall be a good Estate Tayl by Implication in a Devise 262 3. A. having Issue Thomas and Mary deviseth to Thomas and his Heirs for ever and for want of Heirs of Thomas to Mary and her Heirs This is an Estate Tayl in Thomas 269 270 4. A Copyholder in Fee surrenders to the use of F. his Son and J. the Son of F. and of the longest liver of them and for want of Issue of J. lawfully begotten the Remainder to M. here it being by Deed J. had only an Estate for Life but had it been by Will it had been an Estate Tayl by Implication 261 5. The Warranty of the Tenant in Tayl descending upon the Donor or his Heirs is no barr in a Formedon in the Reverter brought by them although it be a Collateral Warranty 364 365 6. The lineal Warranty of Tenant in Tayl shall not bind the Right of the Estate Tayl by the Statute de Donis neither with or without Assets descending 365 Tenures See Title Estates   Testament See Devise 1. A Custody as a Gardianship in Soccage is not in its nature Testamentary it cannot pay Debts nor Legacies nor be distributed as Alms 182 Title 1. When you would