Lord Dyer said So in the principall Case and therefore the later Use was utterly void and shall not be raised by intendment But otherwise it had been if it had been by devise Pasch 23. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 10. IT was holden by all the Justices of the Common Pleas That the Queen might be put out of her Possession of an Advowson by two Usurpations And she shall be put to her Writ of Right of Advowson as a common person shall be because it is a transitory thing and that the Grant of that Advowson made by the Queen after the two Usurpations should be void and that was so adjudged upon a demurrer in the point And so it is holden in 47 E. 3. 4. b. Psch 23. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 11. AN Indenture of Covenant was made betwixt I. S. and I. D. in which I. S. did Covenant to Enfeoffe I. D. of his Manor of D. In consideration of which I. D. by the same Indenture did Covenant with the said I. S. to pay him 100 li. The Question is If I. S. will not make the Feoffment whether I. D. be bound to pay the money It was holden by the Lord Dyer Chief Justice and Justice Mead That he is not because the money is Covenanted to be paid Executory to have the Feoffment made and therefore if he will not make the Feoffment he shall not have the money As if I Covenant with one That I will marry his Daughter and he Covenants with me That for the same cause he will make an Estate to me and his Daughter and to the Heirs of our two bodies begotten of his Manor of D he shall not make it untill we are married But if I Covenant with a man That I will marry his Daughter and he Covenants with me To make an Estate to me and his Daughter if I marry another woman or if the Daughter marryeth another man yet I shall have an Action of Covenant to compell him to make the Estate because in this later Case the Covenant was made for another Cause And this difference was so taken by the whole Court 15 H. 7. 10. So if A. grant to B. all the ancient Pale and for that B. grants That he will make a new Pale it is holden in 15. E. 4. 4. by Catesby and affirmed by Littleton That if B. cannot have the ancient Pale that he shall be excused from making the new Pale But if two things are given by two Persons one for the other there if one of them detain the one the other cannot detain the other as is 9 E. 4. 20. and 15 E. 4. 2. It is holden That if one grant Tithes in Fee by one Deed and by the same Deed for the same Grant the Grantee grant to the same Person an Annuity of 20 li That if the Grantor of the Tithes enter into the Tithes yet the Grantee cannot detaine the Annuity because the grant of the Tithes is executed in him and he may have an Action for them if the other enter upon them But in the principall Case The Covenant was but Executory for the other and then if one be not performed the other shall never be performed Windham and Periam Justices conceived the contrary and therefore the case was adjourned and a demurrer in law upon it Pasch 23 Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 12. TEnant in taile the Remainder in Fee the Tenant in taile makes a Lease for life according to the Statute of 32 H. 8. and afterwards dieth without issue and before any entrie he in the remainder grants his Remainder by Fine Whether the Conusee of the Fine may enter upon the Tenant for life and avoid his Lease was the question Fenner Serjeant Hee cannot because when a Free-hold is given by Livery it cannot be defeated without Entrie As If a Parson make a Lease for life rendring rent and dieth and his successor accept the rent the lease is affirmed as it is holden in 11. E. 3. and 18. E. 4. The Case was That a man made a Lease for life the remainder in Fee Tenant for life granted over his estate and then a Formedon was brought against the Grantee and then the first Tenant for life died And by all the Justices except Littleton and divers Serjeants the Writ shall not abate if he in the Remainder hath not entred So in the principall case When he had made a Lease for life and afterwards died without issue living the Tenant for life his estate is not defeated before entrie of him in the Remainder And then when before entrie he in the Remainder grants his Remainder the Grantee shall have it but as a Remainder for so is his grant and so the estate of Tenant for life which was but voidable is made good And so was it holden by Windham and Periam Justices but Meade and Dyer Chief Justice did conceive that by the death of Tenant in taile without issue his Lease made to him for life was void and not voidable because by the death of Tenant in tail his estate out of which the estate of the Tenant for life was derived is determined and therefore the estate for life is determined also Et cessante causâ cessat effectus And Meade compared it to the Case of 21. H. 7. 12 where it was holden That if a man do make a Lease for life upon condition that if he pay unto the Lessee ten pounds at such a day that his estate shall cease Now by the performance of the Condition the estate is determined without entrie Mich. 24. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 13. POLES Case THomas Pole one of the Clerks of the Chancery married a woman who was Executrix to her Husband and in an Action of Debt brought against them in the Common Pleas the said Pole brought a writ of Priviledg to have removed the said Action into the Chancery And by all the Justices the Writ was disallowed and the defendants ruled to answer there because the Wife was joyned in the Action with the Husband and she could not have the priviledg and therefore not the Husband And so it is adjudged by the whole Court 34. H. 6. 29. and 35. H. 6. 3. But see 27. H. 8. 20. where the case was That a man brought an Action in the Common Pleas against Husband and at the pluries returned he and his Wife were arrested into an inferiour Court veniendo to Westminster and because the Husband hath priviledg therefore his Wife shall be in the same condition But Dyer said That the reason there was because the Wife came in aid of her Husband to follow his suit And therefore it is not like the principall Case at the Bar. Mich. 24. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 14. IN Debt upon a Bond of Forty pound for the Payment of Twenty pound at a Day and Place certain The Defendant pleaded That he had paid the said Twenty pound according to the Condition upon which they are at Issue and at
any remedy in this Court. Also he saith That he hath paid but doth not shew where and the other may say nâ—n solvit and so an issue shall be and no place from whence the Visne shall come Godfrey contrary If one be a lay man and the other a spirituall man then the tryall shall be at the common Law as it is holden 31. H 6. and 2. E. 4. And the defendant here is a lay man who makes prescription of a Modus decimandi for the discharge of Tithes in kind As to that which Cook said That he prescribes that he hath used to pay to the Parson and doth not say That it was due to the Parson and if he pay the Vicars Tithes to the Parson he doth wrong to the Vicar He saith That he hath paid and used to pay 4d. to the Parson in full satisfaction c. and reddâ—ndo singula singâ—lis it is good enough As to the doublenesse or repugnancy of the Prescription he said That the prescription is set forth according to the truth of the matter As to the place for that no issue can be taken upon it he answered That he conceived the issue will bee upon the Custome or Modus decimandi And Gawdy Justice agreed to that Suit Justice There is no Modus decimandi alledged for when he saith That he hath paid to the Parson that which the Vicar demands that is no answer Gaudâ— Justice The prescription is repugnant as Cook said and he said That the herbage is for all Kine as well for those which have Calves as those which have not No Prohibition granted Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 64. WINDSMORE and HULBORD's Case THe Case was this A man gave lands to J. S. Habendum to him and to three other for their lives â—t eorum diutius viventi successivè The question was What estate J. S. had and if after his life there were any occupancy in the Case Cooke That J. S. had an estate but for his life onely because he cannot have an estate for his life and for the life of another where the interest commenceth both in praesenti but he may have an estate for his own life in present interest and the remainder thereof for anothers life But this Habendum by no means can create a Remainder And he said that as a Lease to one for life Habendum to him primogâ—nito filio suo was no Remainder primogenito filio although some held to the contrary So a Lease for years Habendum to him and to another was no Remainder to the other Also the word successivè doth not make a Remainder as 30. H. 8. Br. Joynâ—ts 53. where a Lease for life to three or for yeers to three Habendum successivè yet they have a joynt estate and successivè is void for he said It is uncertain who shall have it first and who secondly Also one cannot have an estate for his own life and for the life of another at the same time in present interest for the greater will drown the lesser But if the greater be in praesenti and the lesse in futuro as a lease for his own life the Remainder to him for another mans life it is otherwise As a lease for his own life the Remainder for yeers is good But if I make a lease to you for your own life and 100 years both to begin at the same time the Lease for yeers is drowned and an estate for his own life is greater then an estate for anothers life and shall drown the estate for anothers life Vide 19. E. 3. Surr. 8. where Tenant for life of a Manor did surrender to Tenant for life in Reversion And 12. H. 7. 11. and Perkins 113. That if there be a Lease for life to one the Remainder to another for life and the Lessee for life doth surrender to him in the Remainder it is good So Dyers Reports A lease is made to one for the term of another mans life without impeachment of Waste the Remainder to him for his own life he is now punishable for waste for the first estate is surrendred Gaudy Justice If a lease be made to one for his life and so long as another man shall live quaere what estate he hath 2. If there can be any Occupancy in the Case for if the estate be void the limitation upon the estate is void therefore if the estate for the other mans life be drowned in the estate for his own life that can be no Occupancy Also the Occupancy is pleaded That such a one entred and doth not say claiming as occupant For if one come hawking upon the land he shall not by such entry be an Occupant and in the book of Entries it is pleaded that he entred clayming as Occupant Clenche Justice Every Occupancy ought to be in possession for otherwise the Law casts the interest of it upon him in the Reversion But Gaudy and Suit Justices were utterly against him in that for then they said there should be no occupancy if the party were not in by Lease or such like means Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 65. DIKE and DUNSTON'S Case IN an Action of Trespasse brought the defendant did justifie as Lessee to the Lord Mountagu and said that the Lord Mountagu for him and his Farmors had used to have a way over the land in which the trespass is supposed to be done And that by rooting of a cart wheel the way was so digged and drowned that he could not so wel use his way as before and that therefore he did fill up the cart roots and digged a trench to let out the water upon which the plaintiffe did demur in law For 15. H. 7. is that a Commoner cannot meddle with the soil so is 12. 13. H. 8. So he who hath Warren in the land of another man cannot meddle with the soile and as to that that he could not use his way so well as before it is not good for he ought to have said That he could not use his way at all otherwise the plea is not good As 6. E. 4. One is to lop his tree and he cannot do it unless it fall upon the Land of another there he may well justifie the felling of it upon the others Land because otherwise he could not lop it at all So if I give to one all the fish in my Pond he cannot dig a Trench to draw out the water unlesse he cannot otherwise take the fish as with Nets c. Also he justifies by reason that the Lord Mountagu for him and his Farmors c. And he was a Lessee and paid no rent therefore no Farmor Cowper contrary He shall not have an Action of Trespass for it is no losse or hinderance unto him but it is for his profit for the Land is the worse being drowned with water If a man do disseise me and fells trees upon the Land and doth repair the houses in an
haeredes de corpore and we are not to devise a new form in such case but it is sufficient to shew the speciall matter to the Court. Also the words of the Writ are true for they are Heirs to Sir Roger Lewknor and the count is sufficient pursuant and agreeing to their Writ for they are Heirs although they are not speciall Heirs of the body and so the Court was of opinion that the Writ was good notwithstanding that Exception And Anderson and Periam Justices said That the case is not to be compared to the case in F. Nat. Br. 57. c. for there he cannot shew by whose Demise the Tenant holdeth if he doth not shew the speciall conveyance viz. that the land was given to the Husband and Wife and the Heirs of the body of the Wife Nor is it like unto the case of 26. H. â— 6. for the same cause for alwayes the demise of the Tenant ought to be especially shewed and certainly which it cannot be in these two cases but by the disclosing of the Title also to the Reversion Another Exception was taken because that the Writ doth suppose quod tenuerunt which as they conceived is to be meant that tenuerunt joyntly whereas in truth they were Tenants in common Walmesley contrary because there is not any other form of Writ for there is not any Writ which doth contain two Tenuerunts And the words of the Writ are true quod tenuerunt although tenuerunt in Common But although they were not true yet because there is no other form of Writ it is good enough As Littleton If a lease be made for half a year and the Lessee doth waste yet the Writ shall suppose quod tenet ad terminum annorum and the count shall be speciall 40. Ed. 3. 41. E. 3. 18. If the Lessee doth commit waste and granteth over his term the Writ shall be brought against the Grantor and shall suppose quod tenet and yet in truth he doth not hold the Land 44. Ed. 3. and Fitz. If one make divers leases of divers lands and the Lessee doth waste in them all the Lessor shall have one Writ of waste supposing quod tenet and the Writ shall not contain two Tenets And such was also the opinion of the Court The third Exception was because that the Writ was brought by the two coparceners and the Heir of the third coparcener without naming of the Tenant by the Courtesie And thereupon Snagg cited the Case of 4. Ed. 3. That where a Lease is made for life the Remainder for life and the tenant for life doth waste he in the Reversion cannot have an Action of waste during the life of him in the Remainder So in this case the Heir of the third coparcener cannot have waste because the mean estate for life is in the Tenant by the courtesie And to prove that the Tenant by the courtesie ought to joyn he cited 3. E. 3. which he had seen in the Book it self at large where the Reversion of a tenant in Dower was granted to the Husband and to the Heirs of the Husband and the tenant in Dower did waste and they did joyn in an Action of waste and not good And so is 17. E. 3. 37. F. N. B. 59. f. and 22. H. 6. 25. a. Walmesley contrary for here in our case there is nothing to be recovered by the tenant by the courtesie for he cannot recover damages because the disinheresin is not to him and the term is expired and therefore no place wasted is to be recovered and therefore it is not like unto the Books which have been cited for in all those the tenant was in possession and the place wasted was to be recovered which ought to go to both according to their estates in reversion But it is not so here for in as much as the term is expired the land is in the tenant by the courtesie and so he hath no cause to complain And such also was the opinion of the whole Court viz. that because the term was ended that the Writ was good notwithstanding the said Exception Then concerning the principall matter in Law which was Whether the Writ were well brought against the second Lessee or whether it ought to have been brought against the first Lessee It was argued by Shuttleworth that it ought to have been brought against the first Lessee for when he granted over his term excepting the trees the Exception was good Ergo c. For when the Land upon which the trees are growing is leased out to another the trees passe with the Lease as well as the Land and the property of them is in the Lessee during the term and therefore when he grants his term hee may well except the trees as well as the first Lessor might have done And that is proved by the Statute of Marlebridge Cap. 23. for before that Statute the Lessee was not punishable for cutting downe the trees and that Statute doth not alter the properties of the trees but onely that the Lessee shall render damages if he cut them down c. Also the words of the Writ of Wast proveth the same which are viz. in terris domibus c. sibi dimissis Also the Lessee might have cut them down for reparations c. and for fire-wood if there were not sufficient underwoods which he could not have done if the trees had been excepted And in 23. H 8. in Brooke It is holden that the excepting of the trees is the excepting of the Soile And so is 46. E. 3. 22. Where one made a Lease excepting the woods and afterwards the Lessee did cut them down and the Lessor brought an Action of Trespasse quare vi armis clausum fregit c. and it was good notwithstanding that Exception was taken to it And it is holden in 12. E. 4. 8. by Fairfax and Littieton That if the Lessee cut the trees that the Lessor cannot carry them away but he is put to his Action of Waste Fenner and Walmesley Serjeants contrary and they conceived that the Lessee hath but a speciall property in the trees viz. for fire-boot plough-boot house-boot c. And if he passe over the Lands unto another that he cannot reserve unto himselfe that speciall property in the trees no more then he who hath common appendant can grant the principall excepting and reserving the Common or grant the Land excepting the foldage The grand property of the trees doth remain in the Lessor and it is proved by 10. H. 7. 30. and 27. H. 8 13. c. If Tenant for life and he in the reversion joyne in a Lease and the Lessee doth wast they shall joyne in an Action of Wast and Tenant for life shall recover the Free-hold and the first Lessor the damages which proves that the property of the trees is in him As to that that he was dispunishable at the common law that was the folly of the Lessor and although it was so at the
Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 146 LONDON doth prescribe to have a Custom That after Verdict given in any of the Sheriffs Courts or such like Court there that the Maior may remove any such Suit before himself and as Chancellor secundùm bonam sanam conscientiam moderate it and it was moved whether it were a reasonable custom or not because that after tryal by ordinary course at Law he should thereby stay judgment Gaudy Justice It ought to be before judgment otherwise it cannot be for the Statute of 4. H. 4. is that judgment given in any Court shall not be reversed but by Error or Attaint Vide Rastal Tit. Judgment Mich. 28. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. Rot. 2619. 147 GREENE and HARRIS Case IN an Ejectione firme upon a special Verdict it was found that one John Brenne was seised of a Manor where there were Copyholders for life and by Indenture leased a copyhold called Harris Tenure parcel of the Land in question to Peter and John Blackborow for eight years to begin after the death of Brenne his Wife and by the same Indenture leased all the Manor to them as before The Copyholder did surrender and Brenne granted a copy to hold according to the custom of the Manor Brenne and his Wife died So as the lease of Blackborow was to begin Peter entred and granted all his Interest unto a stranger and died John entred into the whole as Survivor and made a lease thereof to the Plaintiff and the Copyholder entred and he brought the action Shuttleworth for the plaintiff The question is whether the plaintiff shall have Harris Tenure as in gross or as parcel of the Manor and he conceived that because it is named by it self that it shall pass as in gross for so their intent appeareth to be In 33. H. 8. Dyer 48. A Feoffment was made of a Manor to which a Villein was Regardant by these words viz. Dedi unam acram c. And further Dedi concessi Villanum meum and there it was holden that the Villein should pass as in gross and that they were several gifts although there was but one Deed. The same Law shall be of an Advowson appendant 14. and 15. El. Dyers Husband and Wife were joint-tenants in Fee of a Manor out of which the Queen had a Rent of twenty pound per annum and she by her Letters patents in Consideration of Money paid by the Husband did give grant release and remise unto the Husband and his heirs the said twenty pound Rent habendum percipiendum to him and his heirs The Husband did devise the Rent unto another and his heirs and dyed There it is debated whether the Wife should pay the Rent or not and it was holden that she should pay it for the deed having words of grant and release it shall be referred to the Election of the Husband and for his best avail how he will take it and there is no necessity that the Rent be extinguished in his possession for it is a maxime in Law that every grant shall be taken beneficially for the grantee so is it if it contain words of two intents he may take that which makes best for him 21. and 22. H. 6. A deed comprehending Dedi concessi was pleaded as a Feoffment In 5. E. 3. A Rent issuing out of Lands in Fee was granted to Tenant by the courtesie to have and to hold to him and his heirs It shall not be taken as extinct but the Rent shall go to his heires although he himself could not have it Then in our Case because it is more beneficial for the Termor he shall have it in gross And so he shall avoid the Estate of the Copyholder afterwards and here is an Election made by Peter so to have it by the grant of his Interest over Our Case is not like unto the Case of 48. E. 3. 14. Where a Cessavit was brought supposing that the House was holden of the Plaintiff by five Shillings and the Defendant pleaded that the Ancestor of the Plaintiff by his deed which he shewed forth gave the house to him and a shop which are holden by one intire service and demanded judgment c. And there it was holden that that deed did not prove but that the shop might be parcel of the house and not a shop in gross by it self And there Finchdon saith That if a man grant the Manor of F. to which an Advowson is appendant and the Advowson of the Church of F. so as it is named in gross yet it shall pass as appendant I yeild to that for there it is not more beneficial for him the one way or the other as it is in our Case It may be perhaps objected That the Plaintiff here shall not recover at all for the cause alleadged in Plo. Comm. 424. in Bracebridges Case because that the action is brought for a certain number of Acres as one hundred Acres and it is found that the Plaintiff hath right but to a moyty of them But it hath been ruled against that viz. that he shall recover Walmesley Sergeant contrary Notwithstanding that this Copy-hold be twice named yet it shall pass as parcel of the Manor and not as a thing in gross and there is but one Rent one Tenure and one reversion of both 45. E. 3. A Fine was levyed of a Manor unto which an Advowson was appendant wherein a third part was rendred back to one for life with divers Remainders over And so of the other two parts with the advowson of every third part as abovesaid and there it is debated who shall have the first avoidance And it is holden notwithstanding the Division as aforesaid and the naming of one before the other that they are all Tenants in common of it So as if they cannot agree to present that Lapse shall incurre to the Bishop and there no Prerogative is given to him who is first named nor any prejudice to the last named for being by one Deed it shall passe uno flatu 14. H. 8. 10. A Lease was made for a year Et sic de anno in annum c. And there it was debated whether it were a severall Lease for every year and it was ruled That an Action might be brought supposing that he held for one and twenty years if in truth by force of the same Demise the Lessee occupy the Land so long And if I by my Deed grant unto A. and B. the services of I. D. and by the same Deed the services of I. S. are also granted unto them they are Joyn-tenants of the Services or Seignories So if I lease a Manor reciting every parcell of the Land of the Manor for the whole consists in severall parcels In 33. H. 8. before remembred It is said That the Advowson shall be appendant if the whole Manor be granted c. But if it be admitted that there be severall Leases and that it passeth as a thing in grosse
And Warburton held that the heir should have the Rent as a Freehold descended and for that he cited 26. H. 6. Statham Recognizance But Foster said that he should not have the Rent at all Warburton and Walmesley doubted whether the Rent were devisable by the Statute and they said that although the heir should have it by descent yet it should not be in the nature of a descent of Inheritance for he should not have his Age. Cook and Daniel were absent Pasch 8. Iacobi in the Common Pleas. 239 HEYDON and SMITH's Case IN an Action of Trespass the Plaintiff declared of breaking of his Close and cutting down of a Tree viz. an Oak The Defendant pleaded that it was his Free-hold The plaintiff in his Replication shewed that he held of the Defendant by Coppy of Court Roll a Tenement whereof the place in question is parcell And that the Custome of the Manor is That all the Copy-holders within the Manor have used to take wood for house-bote hay-bote c. et pro ligno combustibili in dicto tenemento And said that he had alwayes preserved the wood and trees growing upon the said Tenement And that he had nourished and fostered the said Oake And that sufficient wood was not left upon the said Tenement for house-bote c. upon which the Defendant did demurre in Law Foster Justice Judgment ought to bee given for the plaintiff I hold that a Copy-holder of common right without any Custome shall have wood for Reparations and for fire-bote and so is 9. H. 4. Fitz. Wast 59. the opinion of Hall And I hold that the plaintiff hath an Interest in the Trees according to Palmers Case C. 5. part And 2. H. 4. 12. is That a Coppy-holder may bring An Action of Trespass for the Trees And I hold That without a Custome the Lord cannot fell the trees growing upon the Copy-hold no more then upon a Lease for years But in this Case by Implication of Custome the Lord may take the Trees if he leave sufficient for Reparations c. For the Custome is That a Copy-holder shall have sufficient for Reparations by which is implyed that he shall not have more and then the Rest the Lord shall have And I am of opinion that in this Case and in case where the trees are excepted upon a Lease that the Lord and the Lessor may enter and take the Trees although there be not any clause of ingresse or regresse But in the principall Case because there are not more Trees then are sufficient for Reparation the Lord cannot take them but Trespasse lieth against him Warburton Justice The matter of prescription is not materiall in this case for of common right a Copyholder ought to have Trees for Reparations and to that purpose he hath a speciall propertie But the onely question in this Case as I conceive is If one who hath a speciall property may bring an Action of Trespasse against him who hath the generall propertie And I conceive that he may well enough As if I lend my horse for a week and within the week I take him again Trespasse lieth Walmesley Justice For the substance I am of opinion for the Plaintiff but I doubt For I would not that Copyholders have so great libertie and he hath prescribed to take all trees and to take them ad libitum is too great a liberty And I hold that a Copyholder hath no greater property then one who ought to have Estovers And in this case hee ought to have said quando opus fuerit and he ought to have shewed that the houses were in decay for want of Reparations for which cause opus fuerat c. And so for the pleading I hold that it is not sufficient Cook chief Justice The Plaintiff ought to have Judgment For I hold cleerly That the Lord cannot take trees without leaving sufficient for Reparations no more then he can pull down or overthrow the house of the Copyholder For of common right without Custome or prescription the Trees do belong unto the Copyholder for Reparations and for that purpose hee may take them without any Custome and the Lord cannot take the Trees without leaving sufficient for the Copyholder if there be not a speciall Custome so to do But I hold that without any custome the Lord may take the Trees if he leave sufficient to the Copyholder for the Reparations Mich. 25. 26. Eliz Doylies Case A Copyholder who hath used to take Timber for Reparations brought an action of Trespasse Trinit 26. Eliz. An action of Trespasse was brought by a Copyholder against the Lord. Pasch 37. Eliz. the Case of Mutford Wood. Trinit 40. Eliz. Stebbings Case but there the action was an action upon the Case To the Exceptions taken by Justice Walmesley that the Plaintiff ought to have shewed that the houses wanted Reparations I hold as hee said That if the action had been brought against him and hee justifie the cutting hee ought to have shewed that the houses wanted Reparations But in our Case he brings the Action against another which lyeth although that the houses were not then in decay And for the signification of the word House-boot c. Bote is an ancient Saxon word which signifies in some case Recompence and in some case Reparatio For the manner of prescription That all the Tenants may take wood pro ligno combustibili in dicto Tenemento the same is no good prescription That all shall take to burn in that Tenement But for the reasons beforesaid Judgment was given for the Plaintiffe Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 240 NEWTON and RICHARD's Case IT was ruled by the whole Court in an Action of Trespasse Quare clausum fregit cuniculos suos vel ipsius A. c. cepit c. was good Pasch 8. Jacobi In the Common Pleas. 241 MEERES and KIDOUT's Case UPon an Evidence to a Jury in this Case it was Ruled by the whole Court That if there be Copyholder for life and the Lord leaseth for years and the Copy-holder commit a forfeiture that the Lessee may enter for the forfeiture And Cooke Cheife Justice said That if there be Tenant for life the Remainder for life If the Tenant for life committeth a forfeiture he in the Remainder for life may enter and that the Case 29. Ass 64. is not Law For the particular estate in possession is determined by the forfeiture And if hee in the Remainder could not enter then it should be at the will of the Lessor whether hee should ever have it The same Law is if the Remainder be for yeers Foster Justice The reason that is given for an Entrie for a forfeiture is because that the Reversion or Remainder is devested by the Feoffment But in this Case because it is but interesse termini nothing is devested For notwithstanding the Feoffment the Interesse termini may be granted to which Cook agreed But Foster said that hee did agree in opinion with Cook
certain Farme Lands called Estons and that a Fine was levied of Lands in Eslington Eston and Chilford whereas Eston lay in another Parish appell D. Calthrope argued That the Land in Eston did passe by the Fine although the Parish was not named for that the Writ of Covenant is a personall Action and will lie of Lands in a Hamlet or lieu conus 8. E. 4 6. Vide 4. E. 3. 15. 17. Ass 30. 18. E. 3. 36. 47. E. 3. 6. 19. E. 3. Brev. 767. 2. He said That it was good for that the Plea went only to the Writ in abatement but when a Concord is upon it which admits it good it shall not be avoided afterwards 3. He said That a Fine being a common assurance and made by assent of the parties will passe the Lands well enough 7 E. 4. 25. 38. E. 3. 19. And he vouched Pasch 17. Jacobi in the Kings Bench Rot. 140. Monk and Butlers Case Where it was adjudged that a Fine being but an arbitrary assurance would passe Lands in a Lieu conus and so he said it would do in a common recovery And Richardson said That if a Scire facias be brought to execute such a recovery Nul tiel ville ou Hamlet is no plea and the Fine or recovery stands good Vide 44. E. 3. 21. 21 E. 3. 14 Stone And the opinion of the Court was That the Lands did well passe by the Fine Mich. 8. Caroli in the Kings Bench 509 CAWDRY aud TETLEY's Case CAwdry being a Doctor of Physick the Defendant Praemissorum non ignorans to discredit the plaintiff with his Patients as appeared by the Evidence spake these words to the plaintiffe viz. Thou art a drunken Fool and an Asse Thou wert never a Scholer nor ever able to speak like a Scholer The opinions of Jones and Crook Justices were that the words were actionable because they did discredit him in his Profession and hee hath particular losse when by reason of those words others do not come to him And Palmers Case was vouched Where one said of a Lawyer Thou hast no more Law then a Jackanapes that an Action did lie for the words Contrary if he had said No more Wit And William Waldrons Case was also vouched where one said I am a true Subject thy Master is none that the words were actionable Mich. 4. Caroli in the Kings Bench. 510 The King and BAXTER SIMMON's Case THE Case was this Tenant in tail the Remainder in taile the Remainder in Fee to Tenant in tail in possession Tenant in tail in Remainder by Deed enrolled reciting that he had an estate tail in Remainder Granted his Remainder and all his estate and right unto the King and his Heirs Proviso that if he pay ten shillings at the Receipt of the Exchequer that then the Grant shall be void Tenant in tail in possession suffers a common Recovery and afterwards deviseth the Lands to I. S. and dieth without Issue 18. Jacobi Afterwards 21. Jac. he in the Remainder in tail dieth without issue but no seisure is made nor Offence found that the lands were in the Kings hands Noy who argued for the King The first Point is When Tenant in taile recites his estate and grants all his estate and right to the King and his Heirs what estate the King hath And if by the death of Tenant in tail without issue the estate of the King be so absolutly determined that the Kings possession needs not to be removed by Amoveas manum And he argued That when the Lands are once in the King that they cannot be out of him again but by matter of Record 8. E. 3. 12. Com. 558. And a bare entry upon the King doth not put the King out of possession of that which was once in him And so was it adjudged 34. Eliz. in the Lord Paget's Case as Walter chief Baron said And Noy took this difference 8. H. 5. Traverse 47. and 8. E. 2. Traverse 48. If a particular estate doth determine before that the King seise there the King cannot afterwards seise the Lands But if the King hath once the Lands in his hands or possession there they cannot be devested out of him but by matter of Record So F. Nat. Br. 254. If a man be seised of Lands in the right of his Wife and be outlawed for Felonie for which the Lands come into the Kings hands and afterwards hee who is outlawed dieth there a Writ of Diem clausit extremum shall issue forth which proveth That by the death of the Husband the Lands are not immediately out of the King and setled in the Wife againe 22. E. 4. Fitz. Petition 9. Tenant in taile is attainted of Treason and the Lands seised into the Kings hands and afterwards Tenant in taile dieth without Issue he in the Remainder is put to his Petition which proveth that the Lands are not presently after the death of Tenant in taile without issue out of the King But he agreed the Cases If Tenant in taile acknowledgeth a Statute or granteth a Rent charge and dieth that the Rent is gone and determined by his death as it is agreed in 14. Assisarum The second point argued by Noy was That although that there was not any seizure or Offence found which entituled the King Yet the Deed enrolled in the Chancery which is returned in this Court did make sufficient title for the King as 8. E. 3. p. 3. is The Judges of Courts ought to Judge upon the Records of the same Courts In 8. H. 7. 11. a Bayliff shewed That a Lease was made to T. his Master for life the Remainder to the King in Fee and prayed in Ayd of the King And the Plaintiff in Chancery prayed a Procedendo And it was ruled That a Procedendo should not be granted without examination of the Kings title Thirdly he said That in this case he who will have the Lands out of the possession of the King ought to shew forth his title and in the principall case it doth not appear that the Defendant had any title Vide 10. H. 7. 13. Athowe Serjeant argued for the Defendant he said That in this case the King had an estate but for the life of Tenant in tail And therefore he said That If Tenant in tail grant totum statum suum that an estate but for his own life passeth as Litt. is 145. and 13. H. 7. 10. acc So If Tenant for life the remainder in taile bee and he in the Remainder releaseth to Tenant for life in possession nothing passeth but for the life of Tenant in tail 19. H. 6. 60. If Tenant in tail be attainted of Treason or Felonie and Offence is found and the King seiseth the lands he hath an estate but for the life of Tenant in tail And he cited 35. Eliz. C. 2 part 52. Blithmans case Where Tenant in tail Covenanted to stand seized to the use of himself for his own life and after his death to the use
of his eldest son in tail and afterwards he married a wife and died that the wife should not be endowed for when he had limited the use to himself for his life he could not limit arâ— Remainder over And Edwards Case adjudged in the Court of Wards which was That there was Tenant for life the Remainder in tail he in the Remainder granted his Remainder to I. S. and his heirs and afterwards Tenant for life dyed and then the grantee dyed his heirs within age it was adjudged that the heir of the garntee should not be in ward because the Tenant in tail could not by his Grant grant a greater estate then for his own life But he said That in the principall Case it appeareth That the Tenant in tail in Remainder hath particularly recited his estate And where it appeareth in the Conveyance it self that he hath but an estate in tail a greater estate shall not passe As if Tenant for life granteth a Rent to one and his heirs the same at the first sight seems to be a good Rent in Fee but when it appeareth in the Conveyance that the grantor was but Tenant for life there upon the Construction of the Deed it self it cannot be intended that he granted a Fee but that an estate for life passed only in the Rent Secondly he argued That although the estate in tail in the principall case was an abeyance Yet a Common Recovery would barr such estate tail in abeyance And therewith agreeth C. 2. part Sr Hugh Cholmleys Case 3. He said That the estate was out of the King and vested in the party without any Offence found as 49. E. 3. Isabell Goodcheaps case A man devised houses in London holden of the King in tail and if the Donee dyed without Issue that the Lands should be sold by his Executors The devisee died without Issue The bargain and sale of the Lands by the Executor doth divert the estate out of the King without Petition or Monstrans de Droit So If there be Tenant in tail the Remainder in tail and Tenant in tail â—n Remainder levieth a fine of his Remainder to the King and afterwards dyeth without Issue the Kings estate is determined and there needs no Petition or Monstrans de Droit 4. He said That in the principall case nothing was in the King because it doth not appeare that there was any seisure or Offence found to entitle the King And the Tenant in tail in the Remainder died in the life of King James and then if the Kings estate were then determined as before by the death of the Tenant in taile the King which now is never had any title And hee said that he needed not to shew a greater title then he had And hee took a difference when Tenant in taile doth onely defend or make defence and when he makes title to Lands in the one Case he ought for to shew That the Tenant in taile died without issue and in the other Case not And therefore in the principall case he demanded Judgment for the Defendant The Case was adjourned to another day Mich. 4. Caroli in the Star-Chamber 511 TAILOR and TOWLIN's Case A Bill was preferred against the Defendant for a Conspiracy to Indict the plaintiff of a Rape And the Plaintiff aleadged in his Bill That an Indictment was preferred by the Defendant against the Plaintiff before the Justices of Assise and Nisi prius in the County of Suffolk And did not lay it in his Bill that the Indictment was preferred before the Justices of Oyer and Terminer and Gaole delivery and the same was holden by the Court to be a good Exception to the Bill for that the Justices of Assise and Nisi prius have not power to take Indictments But afterwards upon veiw of the Bill because the Conspiracy was the principall thing tryable and examinable in this Court and that was well layd in the Bill the Bill was retayned and the Court proceded to Sentence And in this Case Richardson Justice said That in Conspiracy the matter must bee layed to be falsè et malitiosè and if it be layed for a Rape It must be layd that there was recens persecutio of it otherwise it will argue a Consent And therefore because the Defendant did not preferre an Indictment of Rape in convenient time after the Rape supposed to be done but concealed the same for half a years time and then would have preferred a Bill of Indictment against the plaintiff for the same Rape he held that the Indictment was false and malitious And Hyde Chief Justice said That upon probable proof a man might accuse another before any Justice of Peace of an Offence and although his accusation be false yet the Accuser shall not be punished for it But where the Accusation is malitious and false it is otherwise and for such Accusation he shall be punished in this Court Trinit 8. Caroli in the King Bench. 513 JONES and BALLARD's Case AN Action upon the Case was brought for these words viz These Jones are proper Witnesses they will sweare any thing They care not what they say They have already forsworn themselves in the Chancery and the Lord keeper Committed them for it Jermyn took Exceptions because it was not said to be in the Court of Chancery nor that it was in any Deposition there taken upon Oath But it was adjudged per Curiam That the Action would lie and Jones Justice said that the Addition in the Chauncery was as much as if he had said he was perjured there And Hâ—msies case was vouâ—hed by him Where one said of a Witness presently after a Tryall at the Guild Hall in London You have now forsworn your self That it was adjudged that the words were actionable Trinit 8. Caroli in the Kings Bench. 513. SYMME's and SMITH's Case A Woman being entituled to copyhold Lands of the Manor of D did covenant upon reasonable request to be made unto her to surrender the Copy-hold Land according to the Custome of the Manor And it was found That the Custome of the Manor is That a surrender may be made either in person or by Letter of Atturney and that the plaintiff did request the woman to make the surrender by a Letter of Atturney which shee refused to do And whether shee ought to surrender presently or might first advise with her Councell was the Question It was argued for the plaintiff that shee ought to do it presently And Munser's Case C. 2. part and 16. Eliz. Dyer 337. Sir Anthonie Cooks Case were vouched that she was to do it at her perill And the Election in this Case was given to the Covenantee and hee might require it to be done either in Court in person or by Letter of Atturney And C. 2. part Sir Rowland Heywards Case and C. 5. part Hallings Case was vouched to that purpose Rolls contrary for the Defendant And he said That the woman was to have convenient time to do it and
of the Justices was That the Fee was executed for a moitie Manwood If the Land be to one for life the Remainder for yeers the Remainder to the first Tenant for life in Fee there the Fee is executed so as if he lose by default he shall have a Writ of Right and not Quod ei deforceat for the term shall be no impediment that the Fee shall not be executed As a man may make a lease to begin after his death it is good and the Lessor hath Fee in possession and his wife shall be endowed after the Lease And I conceive in the principall case That the term shall not be extinct for that it is not a term but interesse termini which cannot be granted nor surrendred Mounson If he had had the term in his own right then by the purchase of the Fee the Term should be extinct But here he hath it in the right of another as Administrator Dyer If an Executor hath a term and purchaseth the Fee the term is determined So if a woman hath a term and takes an husband who purchaseth the Fee the term is extinct Manwood The Law may be so in such case because the Husband hath done an act which destroyes the term viz. the purchase But if the woman had entermarried with him in the Reversion there the term should not be extinguished for the Husband hath not done any act to destroy the term But the marriage is the act of Law Dyer That difference hath some colour But I conceive in the first case That they are Tenants in common of the Fee Manwood The Case is a good point in law But I conceive the opinion of Manwood was That if a Lease for yeares were to begin after the death surrender forfeiture or determination of the first lease for yeares that it shall not begin in that part for then perhaps the term in that part shall be ended before the other should begin Pasc 20. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 3. A Man seised of Copyhold land descendable to the youngest Son by Custome and of other Lands descendable to the eldest Son by the common Law leaseth both for yeers The Lessee covenanteth That if the Lessor his wife and his heirs will have back the land That then upon a yeers warning given by the Lessor his wife or his heirs that the Lease shall be void The Lessor dieth the Reversion of the customary Land descends to the younger son and the other to the eldest who granteth it to the younger and he gives a yeers warning according to the Covenant Fenner The interest of the term is not determined because a speciall heir as the youngest son is is not comprehended under the word Heir but the heir at common Law is the person who is to give the warning to avoid the estate by the meaning of the Covenant But Manwood and Mounson Justices were cleer of opinion That the interest of the term for a moity is avoyded for the Condition although it be an entire thing by the Descent which is the act of Law is divided and apportioned and the warning of any of them shall defeat the estate for a moity because to him the moity of the Condition doth belong But for the other moity he shall not take advantage by the warning because that the warning is by the words of the Condition appointed to be done by the Lessor his wife or his heirs And in that clause of the Deed the Assignee is not contained And they agreed That if a Feoffment of lands in Borough-English be made upon condition That the heir at common Law shall take advantage of it And Manwood said that hee would put another question Whether the younger son should enter upon him or not But all Actions in right of the Land the younger son should have as a Writ of Error to reverse a Judgment Attaint and the like quod nota Pasc 22. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 4 IT was holden by Meade and Windham Justices of the Common Pleas That a Parsonage may be a Mannor As if before the Statute of Quia emptores terrarum the Parson with the Patron and Ordinary grant parcel of the Glebe to divers persons to hold of the Parson by divers Services the same makes the Parsonage a Manor Also they held That a Rent-Charge by prescription might be parcel of a Manor and shall passe without the words cum pertinentiis As if two Coparceners be of a Manor and other Lands and they make partition by which the eldest sister hath the Manor and the other hath the other Lands and she who hath the Lands grants a Rent-charge to her sister who hath the Manor for equality of partition Anderson and Fenner Srjeants were against it Hill 23 Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 5. THis Case was moved by Serjeant Periam That if a Parson hath Common appendant to his Parsonage out of the lands of an Abby and afterwards the Abbot hath the Parsonage appropriated to him and his Successors Whether the Common be extinct Dyer That it is Because he hath as high an estate in the Common as he hath in the Land As in the case of 2 H. 4. 19. where it is holden That if a Prior hath an Annuity out of a Parsonage and afterwards purchaseth the Advowson and then obtains an Appropriation thereof that the Annuity is extinct But Windham and Meade Justices conceived That the Abbot hath not as perdurable estate in the one as in the other for the Parsonage may be disappropriated and then the Parson shall have the Common again As if a man hath a Seignorie in fee and afterwards Lands descend to him on the part of the Mother in that case the Seignory is not extinguished but suspended For if the Lord to whom the Land descends dies without issue the Seignorie shall go to the heir on the part of the Father and the Tenancy to the heir on the part of the Mother And yet the Father had as high an estate in the Tenancy as in the Seignory And in 21 E. 3. 2. Where an Assize of Nusance was brought for straightning of a way which the plaintif ought to have to his Mill The defendant did alledg unity of possession of the Land and of the Mill in W. and demanded Judgment if c. The plaintif said that after that W. had two daughters and died seised and the Mill was allotted to one of them in partition and the Land to the other and the way was reserved to her who had the Mill And the Assize was awarded And so by the partition the way was revived and appendant as it was before and yet W. the Father had as high an estate in the Land as he had in the Way Hill 23 Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 6. A Man makes a Feoffment in Fee of a Manor to the use of himself and his Wife and his heirs In which Manor there are Underwoods usually to be cut every one and twenty yeers and
agree in the Services Walmesley He shall have the traverse for the mischief which otherwise would follow for if he should traverse the seisin thereby he should confesse the Tenure Periam concessit and said That the difference which is commonly taken in our Books is That where they agree in the Tenure there the Seisin is traversable but where they do not agree in the Tenure there the Tenure is traversable So is 26. H. 8. 6. 7. E. 4. 27. 12. E. 4. 7. 20. E. 4. 16. And he conceived here that the payment at two dayes doth alter the tenure so as now it is another tenure then before Also he said That if Wh. acre and Bl. acre be adjoyning and are holden the one of I. S. and the other of I. D. and I. S. distrein and avow for both acres that he may well traverse the tenure Meade 8. H. 7. 5. a. It is said by Brian That if avowry be made for a tenure of two acres by twenty shillings and the Plaintiffe saith that he holdeth these two and two other acres by twelve shillings without that that he holdeth the two acres by twenty shillings that that is good for that he cannot do otherwise And it is no reason that for a false avowry the Plaintiffe should be at a mischief But the Book is not ruled for Keble is contrary Vide Librum Trinit 26 Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 35 SAVELL and CORDELL's Case HEnry Savell Lessee for years of the Manor of M. grants the same Manor Habendum for so many years which should be to come after his death to Cordell Master of the Rolls if Dorothy his Wife so long should live And afterward Henry Savell and he in the Reversion levied a Fine The Case went by many Conveyances further But two points were here moved 1. If it were a good Grant for so many yeers c. Shuttleworth argued that it was But Cooke contrary And Cooke said to that which hath been said That Leases which have uncertain beginning may be by act of matter ex post facto made certain and so good As a lease for so many years as I. S. shall name if he name it is a certain lease but if the Lessor die before I. S. name and after hee name all is void as it is in the Commentaries put by Weston and granted by Dyer 273. And the reason is that it behoves that the interest passe out of the Lessor during his life and the Deed ought to have its perfection in the life of the Lessor But in our case here the Lessor or Grantor is dead before the certaintie of the beginning is known and before any perfection of interest out of him and therefore the reason in the common case 40 Ass and 16. E. 3. that there behoveth to be Attornment in the life of the Lessor proves our case for the reason of that is that it behoveth that some interest passe out of the Lessor or Grantor during his life and that perfection of his Grant be in his life or else the Grant is void Vide 31. E. 3. alb 20. and 33. E. 3. Confirmation 22. If the Chapter confirm the Grant of the Bishop after his death it is void for it ought to have perfection in the life of the Bishop otherwise it is void And upon that reason is the case put by Popham Com. 520. b. That where a man grants all his term which shall be to come after his death that it is a void Grant because no interest passeth during the life of the Grantor And to this purpose is 7. E. 6. Br. Leases 66. Temps H. 8. 339. If a man will take by Livery within the view it behoves the Feoffee to enter during the life of the Feoffor and yet that is a more strong case for by the Livery being a ceremony of the Law it is presumed that the land passed and yet there ought to be an entry to fortifie the Grant otherwise it is void The second point was If by the Fine levyed the possibilitie aswell as the right of possession of the term did passe And I conceive that it doth therefore we see in many cases a man may grant by his Deed a possibility to come As 19. H. 7. 1. where a man seised in the right of his Wife made a Feoffment in see and after they had issue and the Wife died that he should not be Tenant by the Courtesie and yet the Wife was remitted but by his own Grant he had granted from him the possibility he might have had to be Tenant by the courtesie And here If Cordell had entered and made a Feoffment in fee or levied a Fine the possibility which he had to have the term had been cleerly gone 39. H. 6. 43. If I disseise my Eather and make a Feoffment in fee and afterwards my Father dieth although that a new Right descends unto me yet I shall be barred of this possibilitie which I had at the time of the Grant But otherwise it had been if this discontinuance or grant had been defeated by entry or otherwise in my life by my Father or any other in that case I may shew the speciall matter as 15. E. 4. 5. is and so avoid my own Deed. And 44. E. 3. 4. is That tenant for years and he in the Reversion disclaim and it is holden a good Disclaimer which proves that a possibility may also pass by Disclaimer And 21. E. 3. and 35. H. 6. is That if he who hath cause to have a Writ of Error if he enter into the Land and make a Feoffment the Writ of Error is gon for ever so by these Cases it is proved and appeareth That a Possibility may passe by grant And so in the Principall Case the Possibility to have the terme is by this Fine granted and the Grant is a good Grant And it was adjourned Pasch 26. Eliz. in the Kings Beneh 36. LUDDINGTON and AMNER'S Case Intratur Mich. 25. Eliz. Rott 495. IN a Writ of Error the Case was this Perepoynt possessed of a Lease for 99 years devised the same unto his Wife for Life and that after her Decease that it should go to his Children unpreferred the Wife took Sir Thomas Fulster to her Husband and the Lease was put in Execution by Fiery facias for the Debt of Sir Thomas Fulster and afterwards Sir Thomas died and the Wife died The Administrators of Sir Thomas Fulster did reverse the Judgement upon which the Lease was taken in Execution And afterwards A. the Daughter of Perepoynt entred supposing her selfe to be the only Daughter of Perepoynt alive unpreferred by her Father in his life time And the Pleading was That the Wife of Perepoynt was his Executrix and that she entred into the Lease after the death of Perepoynt Virtute legationis donationis praedict Cook There is a difference in our Books That the Devise of the Occupation of a Term may be with the Remainder over but not a Devise
commit his house to his servants and the one doth assent to the Livery and departeth the house if the other do continue there and Livery be made it is no good Livery of Seisin Mich. 6. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 216 IT was holden for Law in this Court That if a man do offend against any Penal Law the Informer ought to begin his Suit within one year after the Offence done otherwise he shall not have the moity of the Penalty And if the Informer hath put in his Information although that the party be not served with Process to answer it yet the same doth appropriate the Penalty unto him Hill 6. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 217 PEREPOYNT'S Case PErepoynt procured one to convey the daughter of a Gentleman and to marry her to a Ploughman in the night and procured a Priest to marry them and was there present for which matter he was excommunicate by the Ordinary of the Diocess and after absolution he was for the same committed to Prison by the High Commissioners It was holden by the Court That matters concerning Tithes Marriage or Testaments are not examinable before them yet because that he had suffered imprisonment for such things and that neither the Statute of 23. H. 8. nor the Cannon doth extend to the High Commissioners it was resolved That if upon submission to the Commissioners they would not set him at liberty that this Court would do it Mich 6. Jacobi in the Star-Chamber 218 IT was resolved by the whole Court of Star-Chamber That if a man doth assist one who is a Plaintiffe in that Court that it is not maintenance because that it is for the benefit and advantage of the King But if a man do assist an Informer in another Court in an Information upon a Penall Law the same is such a Maintenance for which he may be punished in this Court 6. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 219 IT was adjudged in this Court That if Land which was sowed be leased to one for life the Remainder to another for 〈◊〉 That if the Tenant for life dieth before the severance of the Corn 〈…〉 in the Remainder shall have the Corn. Mich. 6. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 220 THE Lessee of a Copy-holder was distrained for rent behind in the time of his Lessor and the Lessee did assume and promise That he would satisfie the Lord his rent if he would surcease the suing of him It was adjudged by the whole Court That it was a good Assumpsit and a good consideration Mich. 7. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 221 PIGGOT and GODDEN's Case NOte It was in this Case agreed by the whole Court and so adjudged That in an Ejectione firme a man shall not give colour because the Plaintiffe shall be adjudged in by title Mich. 7. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 222 TWo Tenants in Common brought an Action upon the Case for stopping of a water course against a Stranger whereby the profits of their Lands were lost and it was shewed in pleading that the water had run time out of minde ante diem Obstructionis and Judgment was given for the Plaintiffs And two Exceptions were taken by Coventry First that Tenants in Common ought to have several Actions and not have joyned Secondly that the Custom ought to have been pleaded to continue ante usque die Obstructionis and both the Exceptions were dissallowed by the Court and it is not like the Case of Falsefails in which Action they must join because the same is in the Realty Mich. 7. Jacobi In the King 's Bench. 223 CROSSE and CASON's Case AN Action of Debt was brought upon due Obligation the condition of which was that the Obligee the 18. of August anno 4. Jacobi should go from Algate in London to the Parish Church of Stow-Market in Suffolk within 24. hours and the Obligee shewed that he went from Algate to the said place and because he did not shew in his Declaration in what Ward Algate was It was holden not to be good Mich. 7. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 224 NOte That it was adjudged to be Law by the whole Court that if a man bail goods to another at such a day to rebail and before the day the Bailee doth sell the goods in market overt Yet at the day the Baylor may seise the goods for that the property of the goods was alwaies in him and not altered by the Sale in market overt Mich. 7. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 225 ZOUCH and MICHIL's Case AN Enfant Tenant in tail did suffer a Recovery by his Gardian It was holden by the Court that the same should binde him because he might have remedy over against the Gardian by Action upon the Case But otherwise if he suffer a Recovery by Attorney for that is void because he hath not any remedy over against him as it was adjudged 4. Jacobi in Holland and Lees Case Pasch 8. Jacobi In the Common Pleas. 226 WILSON and WORMAL's Case IN an Evidence given to a Jury it was admitted without Contradiction that if judgment in an action of Debt be given against Lessee for years and afterwards the Lessee alieneth his Term and after the year the Plaintiff sueth forth a Scire facias and hath Execution That the Terme is not lyable to the Execution if the Assignement were made bona fide Also in that Cook Chief Justice said that if Lessee for years assignee over his Terme by fraud to defeat the Execution And the Assignee assigneth the same over unto another bona fide that in the hands of the second Assignee it is not lyable to Execution Also in this Case it was said for Law That if a Man who hath goods but of the value of 30. pound be endebted unto two Men viz. to one in 20. pound and to another in 10. pound and the Debtor assignes to him who is in his debt 10. pound all the goods which are worth 30. pound to the intent that for the residue above the 10. pound debt he shall be favourable unto him This Assignement is altogether void because it is fraudulent in part But Foster Justice said that it shall not be void for the whole but onely for the surplusage as Twynes Case C. 3. part 81. Quaere Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 227 BRISTOW and BRISTOWE's Case IN an Action of Covenant the Case was this Lessee for 90. years made an Assignement for part of the Term viz. for 10. years and the Assignee covenated to repair c. The first Lessee devised the Reversion of the Term and dyed the Devisee of the Reversion brought an Action of Covenant against the Assignee for 10. years and the question was If the Devisee of the Reversion being but a Termor were within the Statute of 32. H. 8 of Conditions Secondly whether the Action would lye because no notice was given of the grant of the Reversion Dodderidge Serjeant to the first point said that this
be quashed and exonerated and discharged in the possession of the King For it is out of the Rule which is in C. 10 part 48 for the cause of quieting and repose of the Terre-Tenants otherwise it would be a cause of Suits But all Rights Tythes Actions c. might for the same reasons viz. for the quiet of the Terre-Tenants and the avoidance of Suits and Controversies be released to the Terre-Tennants By the same reason here the right of Action of Francis Bigot shall be discharged and exonerated by this forfeiture viz. for the quiet and repose of the Terre-Tenants for the Law delights in the quiet and repose of the Terre-Tenants If Francis Bigot had granted a Rent the ancient right of the tail had been charged C. 7. part 14. Where Tenant in tail makes a lease for life and grants a Rent charge and Tenant for life dieth he shall not avoid his charge although he be in of another Estate because he had a defeisible possession and an ancient right the which c. so as they could not be severed by way of conveyance and charge and no lawfull act Then I admire how he will sever this from himself by his unlawfull act viz. the Feoffment the discontinuance Lit. 169. If a man commit Treason he shall forfeit the Dower of his wife yet he doth not give the dower of his wife but it goes by way of discharge in those Lands 13 H. 7. 17. Tenant by the Curtesie in the life of his wife cannot grant his Estate of Tenant by the Curtesie to another but yet he for Felony or Treason may forfeit it viz. by way of discharge A Keeper of a Park commits Treason there the King shall not have the Office of Keeper for a forfeiture because it is an Office of trust but if he had been Keeper of the Kings Park and had been attainted there he should forfeit his Office by way of discharge and exoneration This Statute of 26 H. 8. hath been adjudged to make Land to revert and not strictly to forfeit Austin's Case cited in Walsingham's Case Tenant in tail the reversion in the King the Tenant makes a Lease for years and dies the issue accepts of the Rent and commits Treason the Lease is avoided for the King is not in by forfeiture by the Statute of 26 H. 8. but by way of Reveter by the Statute of 26 H. 8. It was objected that if Tenant in tail maketh a Feoffment and takes back an Estate for life and is attainted of Treason that he shall not forfeit his old right I agree that Case For indeed it is out of the Statute of 26 H. 8. which speaks of Inheritance and in that Case the Tenant hath but a Freehold The Statute of 26 H 8. saith that it shall be forfeited to the King his heirs and Successors And if in our Case the old right should remain then it should be a forfeiture but during the life of the Testator When the Common Law or Statute Law giveth Lands it gives the means to keep them as the Evidences So here the King is to have by force of this Statute of 26 H. 8. the Evidences The forfeiture of right is expresly within the Statute of 26 H. 8. as the forfeiture of Estate as by any right title or means for the old Estate tail is the means of Estates since 6 H. 8. And if you will take away the Foundation the Building will fall For all the Estates are drawn out of the old Estate tail The Statute of 26 H. 8. is not an Act of Attaindor for none in particular is attainted by the Act but the Act of 31 H. 8. doth attaint Francis Bigoâ— in particular It was objected that here in this case there needed not to be any express Saving I answer that there are divers Statutes of Forfeitures yet the Statutes have Savings in them so as it seems a saving in such Acts were not superfluous but necessary The Act of 33 H. 8. for the attainder of Queen Katharine there is a saving in the Act and yet an Act of Forfeiture Dyer 100. there the land vested in him in the Remainder by force of a saving in the Act so the saving is not void but operative C. 3. part Dowlies Case vid. the Earl of Arundels Case there the saving did help the wife so it appears savings are in Acts of Parliaments of Forfeiture and Acts of Attaindor Dyer 288 289. The Bishop of Durham had Jura Regalia within his Diocese and then the Statute of 26 H. 8. came now whether the Forfeiture for Treason should be taken away from the Bishop by reason of that Statute and given to the King was the doubt It was holden that of new Treasons the Bishop should not have the Forfeitures for those were not at the Common Law as the Forfeitures of Tenant in tail but that he should have the Forfeitures of Lands in Fee within his Diocese and that he had by force of the saving in the Statute so that a Saving is necessary and operative Com. Nichols's Case there Harpers opinion that there needs no saving to strangers but yet a saving is necessary for the Partie and the Issue if they have any thing as well as strangers vid. C. 3. part Lincoln Colledg Case It is the Office of a good Interpreter to make all the parts of a Statute to stand together Com. 559. By these general words Lose and Forfeit and by excluding of the heir in the saving the heir is bound So the Judges have made use of a Saving for it is operative 2 Ma. Austin's Case cited in Walsinghams Case Tenant in tail the Reversion in the Crown Tenant in tail made a Lease for years and levied a Fine to the King the King shall not avoid the Lease for the King came in in the Reverter but in such Case if he be attainted of Treason then the King shall avoid the Lease So a Statute of Forfeiture is stronger then a Statute of Conveyance By this Statute of 26 H. 8. Church Land was forfeited for so I find in the Statute of Monasteries which excepts such Church Lands to be forfeited for Treason Dyer Cardinal Poole being attained did forfeit his Deanary and yet he was not seised thereof in jure suo proprio for it was jus Ecclesiae 27 E. 3. 89. A writ of Right of Advowson by a Dean and he counteth that it is Jus Ecclesiae and exception that it is not Jus suae Ecclesiae But the Exception was disallowed for the Jus is not in his natural capacitie but in his politique capacitie and yet by this Statute of 26 H. 8. such Church Land was forfeited for Treason this is a stronger Case then our Case Vide C. 9. part Beaumont's Case Land is given to husband and wife in tail and the husband is attainted of Treason the wife is then Tenant in tail yet the Land is forfeited against the issue although it be but a possibility for the whole estate
and Slingbyes case 361 Londons case 374 Ludlow and Stacies case 377 Loxe case 345 Lee and Grissels case 442 Leonards case 451 Lone and Hills case 458 Litfield and Melhers case 459 Langley and Stotes case 478 Lancaster and Kigleys case 507 Lovegrave and Brewens case 514 M MOuntjoyes Case 24 Macrowes Case 38 Marsh and Palfords Case 53 Megods Case 77 Miller and Gores Case 122 Mayes Case 173 Mannocks Case 191 Meâ—r and Ridouts Case 241 Marriots Case 248 Morris Case 265 Mounteagle and Pemeddocks Case 266 Meades Case 274 Miller and Reignolds Case 293 Manwoods Case 301 Maior of Yorks Case 360 Mildmays Case 416 Morgans Case 416 Morris and Clarks Case 435 Mellon and Herns Case 435 Mills Case 464 Marshes Case 465 Manns Case 471 Mutle and Does Case 480 Mole and Carters Case 484 Monk and Butchers Case 508 Moor and Hawkins Case 486 N NOrris and Salisburies case 154 Newton and Richards case 240 Newmans case 242 Newman and Babbingtons Case 250 Norton and Lysters case 291 Norton and Symms case 303 O OSborne and Trittels Case 99 Occoulds case 268 Owen alias Collins case 363 Owfield and Sheirts case 430 Ognels case 483 Offlies case 517 P POles case 13 Prideaux case 44 Plymptons case 116 Proctors case 168 Pinders case 185 Peto and Chitties case 193 Perepoints case 217 Piggot and Goddens case 221 Pitts and Wardels case 230 Prrrot and Kebles case 281 Porters case 302 Paynes case 308 Piggot and Pigots case 330 Prat and Lord Norâ—hs case 358 Paginton and Huets case 370 Plotts case 380 Pollyes case 403 Sir Iohn Parkingtons case 416 Pritchard Williams case 423 Philpot and Fielders case 427 Pye and Bonners case 443 Peters case 456 Pits and Horkley's case 458 Proctor and Cliffords case 468 Payn and Colleges case 490 Parks case 502 Palmers case 509 Perpoynt Thimblebys case 513 Pages case 717 Plats case 518 L. Pagets case 510 Q Quodds case 246 R ROots case 139 Rushwels case 186 Royley and Dormes case 260 Read and Hewes case 269 Rosseâ— and Walshes cass 296 Reorsbies and Cuffs case 316 Roe and Gloves case 332 Roberts and Hills case 434 Randal and Harveys case 452 Royden and Moulstons case 458 Roper and Roydons case 491 Roy and Hills case 517 S Skipwiths case 22 Savel and Cordels case 35 Sydenham Worlingtons case 40 Savacres case 47 Stargies case 75 Smith and Smiths case 88 Shotbolts case 91 Stransam and Colborns case 97 Strangden and Barcels case 163 Sayland and Ridlers case 177 Skipwith and Sheffields case 178 Stowels case 182 Sir John Spencer and Poyntz case 203 Stebbings case 239 Stones case 247 Sancford and Havels case 263 Sprat and Nicholsons case 283 Seymors case 307 Stowhridge Archers case 311 Smiths case 317 Sherloes case 347 Sheriff and Bridges case 349 Simpsons case 364 Smith and Staffords case 379 Slyes case 390 Spicer and Spicers case 398 Stewry and Stewryes case 410 L. Sheffield Ratcliffs case 417 Sadlers case 417 Snell and Bennets case 426 Shooter and Emets case 435 Stone and Roberts case 435 Sely and Flayles case 448 Seignior and Wolmers case 453 Stanton and Barneys case 458 Sherrington Worsleys case 465 Suttons case 476 Symmes case 477 Samson and Gatefields case 482 Scots case 487 Sommers case 489 Shortridge and Hills cases 492 Shirtford and Berrowes case 502 Syms and Smiths case 513 Simpsons case 518 Shackbolts 495 Spurlings case 479 T. THrogmorton and Terringhams case 37 Taylor and Ribera's case 90 Taylor and James case 195 Traherns case 321 Totnam and Hoskins case 445 Taylor and Askies case 455 Tollyn and Taylors case 469 Tanfield and Hirons case 486 Treventries case 488 Tucker and Carrs case 491 Taylor and Tomlyns case 511 Tennants case 507 Tompsons case 369 U. VIcar of Pancras case 63 Vernon and Grays case 145 Vaughans case 327 Veseys case 406 Vrry and Bowyers case 479 Vinior and Viniors case 515 W. VVEbb Potters case 25 Windsmore Hulberts Case 64 Wiseman and Wallmyers case 107 Wood and Ashes case 135 Warrens case 138 Widdal sir John Ashtons case 142 Winkefields case 152 Warners case 183 Whitlock and Hartwells case 184 Wilson and Wormels case 226 Woolseys case 249 Wekers case 257 Wright and Wrights case 262 Wetherell and Greens case 280 Wedlock and Hardings case 295 Wheelers case 315 Wormleighton and Hunters case 338 Whorewoods Case White and Moores case 340 Wrotesley Candishes case 354 Winscomb and Dunches case 376 Webb and Tucks case 392 Waite and Inhabitants of Stokes case 397 Webb and Paternosters case 401 Williams and Gibbs case 409 White and Edwards case 412 Wiseman and Denhams case 424 Waterer Montagues case 429 Wheeler Appletons case 434 Waterman and Cropps case 467 Whittie and Westons case 479 VVillis case 483 VVilliams and Floyds case 495 VValdrons case 509 Y. YArram and Bradshawes case 145 Yate and Alexanders case 408 Young and Englesfields case 422 Z. ZOuch and Bramports case 165 Zouch and Mitchels case 225 Zouch and Moores case 491 Mich. 17. Eliz. In the Kings Bench. 1. THis Case was moved to the Court. If an Abby hath a Parsonage appropriate in D. which is discharged of payment of Tithes and afterward the Abbot purchaseth part of the lands in the same Town and Parish where the Parsonage is That this land so purchased is discharged of Tithes in the hands of the Abbot For the Tithes were suspended during the possession of the Abbot in his own hands But after that the Abby was surrendred into the hands of the King Anno 30. H. 8. And afterwards the same possessions c. were given to King H. 8. by the Statute of 31. H. 8. cap. 13. as they were in the hands of the Abbot The question was Whether the Land so purchased by the Abbot before the surrender were discharged of payment of Tithes by the Statute or not And the opinion of Mr. Plowden was That they were not discharged of Tithes by the Statute For that no lands are discharged by the Statute but such lands as were lawfully discharged in right by composition or other lawfull thing And the lands in this case were not discharged in right but suspended during the possession of the Abbot in his own hands And so hee said it is when the Land is purchased by one and the Parsonage by another the right of Tithes is revived and the lands charged as before the purchase of the Abbot And so he said it had been adjudged Pasc 17. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 2. A Man makes a Lease for Life and afterwards makes a Lease unto another for Years to begin after the death of Tenant for life The Lessee for yeers dieth intestate The Ordinary commits Administration The Administrators and the Tenant for life joyn in the purchase of the Fee-simple Two questions were moved The first was Whether the Fee were executed in the Tenant for life for any part 2. Whether the Term were gone in part or in all And the opinion
afterward the Husband suffers the wood to grow five and twenty yeers and afterwards hee dieth The question was Whether the Wife being Tenant for life might cut that Underwood And it was moved What shall be said seasonable Underwood that a Termor or Tenant for life might cut Dyer Chief Justice and all the other Justices held That a Termor or Tenant for life might cut all Underwood which had been usually cut within twenty yeers In 11. H. 6. 1. Issue was taken If they were of the age of twenty yeers or no. But in the Wood-Countries they may fell seasonable wood which is called Sylva caedua at six and twenty eight and twenty thirty years by the custome of the Country And so the Usage makes the Law in severall Countries And so it is holden in the books of 11. H. 6. and 4. E. 6. But they agreed That the cutting of Oakes of the age of eight yeers or ten years is Waste But by Meade Justice the cutting of Hornbeams Hasels Willows or Sallows of the age of forty yeares is no Waste because at no time they will be Timber Another question which was moved was That at the time of the Feoffment it was seasonable Wood and but of the growth of fourteen or fifteen yeers If this suffering of the Husband of it to grow to 25 years during the Coverture should bind the Wife so as she cannot cut the Woods Gaudy Serjeant said That it should not bind the Wife For if a Warranty descend upon a Feme Covert it shall not bind her So if a man seized of Land in the Right of his Wife be disseised and a Descent be cast during the Coverture it shall not bind the Wife but that she may enter after the death of the Husband But by Dyer Chief Justice and all the other Justices This Permission of the Husband shall bind the Wife notwithstanding the Coverture for that the time is limited by the Law which cannot be altered if it be not the custome of the Country As in the case of 17. E. 3. Where a man makes a Lease for years and grants that the Lessee shall have as great commoditie of the Land as hee might have Notwithstanding these words he cannot dig the land for a Mine of Cole or Stone because that the Law forbids him to dig the land So in the principall Case The Wife cannot fell the Wood notwithstanding that at the time of her estate she might and afterwards by the permission of the Husband during the coverture the time is incurred so as she cannot fell it because the Law doth appoint a time which if it be not felled before such time that it shall not be felled by a Termor or a Tenant for life but it shall be Waste Hill 23. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 7. A Man makes a Lease of a Garden containing three Roodes of Land and the Lessee is ousted and he brings an Ejectione firme and declares that he was ejected of three Roods of Land Rodes Serjeant moved That by this Declaration it shall be intended that he was ejected of the Garden of which the Lease was made and so the Ejectione firme would lie And it was holden by the Lord Chief Justice Dyer That a Garden is a thing which ought to be demanded by the same name in all Precipes as the Register and Fitz. N. Brevium is And this Action is greater then an Action of Trespasse because by Recovery in this Action he shall be put into Possession But Meade and Windham Justices contrary And they agreed that in all reall Actions a Garden shall be demanded by the name Gardinum otherwise not But this Action of Ejectione firme is in the nature of Trespasse and it is in the Election of the Party to declare as here he doth or for to declare of the Ejectment of a Garden for a Garden may be used at one time for a Garden and at another time be ploughed and sowed with Corn. But they conceived that the better order of pleading had been if he had declared that he was ejected of a Garden containing three Roodes of Land as in the Lease it is specified Hill 23. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 8. SErgeant Fenner moved this case That Land is given to the Wife in tail for her Joynture according to the Statute of 11. H. 7. The Husband dieth the Wife accepts a fine Sur conusans de droit come ceo c. of a Stranger And by the same fine grants and renders the Land to him for an Hundred years whether this acceptance of a Fine and Render by the Wife were a forfeiture of her estate so as he in the Reversion or Remainder might enter by the Statute Mead and Dyer Justices it is a forfeiture and Mead resembled it to the Case in 1 H. 7. 12. where it is holden That if Tenant for life do accept of a Fine Sur conusans de droit come ceo c. that it is a forfeiture and the Lessor may enter But Fenner asked their opinions what they thought of the principall case But haesitavernut because they said it was a dangerous case and is done to defraud the Statute of 11. H. 7. Pasch 23. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 9. A Man made a Feoffment in Fee to two to the use of himself and his wife for the term of their lives without impeachment of waste during the life of the Husband the remainder after their decease to the use of I. his son for the term of his life And further by the same Deed Vult concedit that after their three lives viz. of the Husband Wife and Son that I. S. and I. D. two other Feoffees shall be seized of the same Land to them and their heirs to the use of the right Heirs of the body of the Son begotten It was moved That by this deed the two later Feoffees should be seized to the use of the right Heirs of the body of the Son begotten after the death of the Husband Wife and the Son But it was holden by all the Justices That the second Feoffees had not the Fee because by the first part of the Deed the Fee-Simple was given to the first Feoffees and one Fee-Simple cannot depend upon another Fee-Simple Notwithstanding that after the determination of the former uses for life the Fee-Simple should be vested again in the Heires of the Feoffer and that the words That the second Feoffees should be seized should be void But Dyer Chief Justice and the other Justices were against that because there wanted apt words to raise the later use As if a man bargain and sell his Reversion of Tenant for Life by words of Bargain and Sale only and the Deed is not Enrolled within the six months but afterwards the Tenant for Life doth attorne yet notwithstanding that the Reversion shall not passe because Bargain and Sell are not apt words to make a Grant And that Case was so adjudged in the Common Pleas as the
the Nisi Prius the Defendant gave in Evidence That he had paid the Money to the Plaintiff before the day and that the Plaintiff had accepted of it all which Matter the Jury found specially and referred the same to the Justices And it was said by the whole Court That that payment before the day was a sufficient Discharge of the Bond but because the Defendant had not pleaded the same Specially but Generally that he had paid the Money according to the Condition the Opinion was That they must find against the Desendant for that the Speciall Matter would not prove the Issue and the Lord Dyer Chief Justice said That the Plaintiffs Councel might have demurred upon the Evidence Mich. 24. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 15 AN Action was brought upon the Statute of 1 2 Phil. Mar. And the Statute is That no Distresse shall be driven out of the Rape Hundred Wapentake or Laith where such distresse is or shall be taken except it be to the Pound Overt within the said County not exceeding three Miles distant from the place where the Distresse was taken and the Plaintiff declared of a Distresse taken in a Hundred in such a County and that he drove it six miles out of the County and because a Hundred may be in diverse Counties and the Statute is That the driving ought not be more then 3 miles out of the Hundred and that it might be that the driving was six miles from the place where the Distresse was taken in another County and yet not three miles from the Hundred where the taking was for that Cause it was not adjudged against the party And that was after Verdict in arrest of Judgment Pasch 24. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 16. A Feme sole seized of a Manor to which there were Copyholds One of the Copyholders did entermarry with the woman and afterwards he and his wife did suffer a Recovery of the Manor unto the use of themselves for their lives and afterwards to the use of the heires of the wife The Question was Whether the Copyhold were extinct And Anderson the Chief Justice said That if a Copyholder will joyn with his Lord in a Feoffment of the Mannor that thereby the Copy-hold is extinct The same Law is if a Copyholder do accept a Lease for years of his Copyhold which was agreed by the whole Court Pasc 24. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 17. I. N. Doth Covenant with I. S. by Indenture to pay him forty pounds yearly for one and twenty years and afterwards I. S. doth release to I. N. all Actions The Question was Whether the whole Covenant were discharged And it was holden by all the Justices that only the Arrerages were discharged because the Covenant is executory yearly to be executed during the Term of one and twenty years for he may have several Actions of Covenant for every time that it is behind and if it be behind the second year he may have a new Action for that and so of every year during the Term several Actions for nothing shall be discharged by the release of all Actions but that which was in Action or a Dutie at the time of the release made As in 5. E. 44. and L. 5. E. 4. 41. In debt for Arrerages of an Annuity the defendant pleaded a release of all Actions which bore date before any arrerages were behind And the opinion of the Justices was there That it was no Plea and so it was adjudged for it is not a thing in Action nor a Duty untill the day of paiment comes And it is there holden by Arden That if a man make a Lease for two years rendring Rent and that the Tenant shall forfeit twenty shillings nomine poenae for not paiment at the day there a release of all Actions personals made to the Tenant before the penalty be forfeited is no Bar for it is neither Duty nor thing in Action before the failer of paiment And in 42. E. 3. 33. A man did release to his Tenant for term of life all his Right for the Term of the life of the same Tenant for life And that he nor his heirs might any right demand nor challenge or claim for the life of the Tenant for life in the said Land and afterwards he died and the Tenant committed Waste and the heir brought an Action of Waste and the Tenant pleaded the same Release and it was holden no Plea for nothing was extinct by the same Release but that which was in Action at the time of the Release made and that the Waste was not Rhodes Serjant put a Case which he vouched to be adjudged 4. Eliz. which was That if a man Covenant with I. S. that if he will marry his daughter that then he will pay him twenty pounds If a Release were made by I. S. before the marriage the same will not determine the twenty pounds if he marry her afterwards because it was not a Duty before the marriage So in the principal Case notwithstanding that the Covenant was once broken for the non-paiment at the first day yet because a several Action of Covenant lieth for every day that it was arreare the Release shall extinguish but only that which was Arreare at the time of the Release made And so Note That a Release doth not discharge a Covenant which is not broken Pasch 24. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 18. UPon a special Verdict in an Action of Debt The Case was this I. S. and I. N. did submit themselves to the Award Order Rule and Judgemant of A. and B. for all Matters Quarrels and Debates and the Bond was made to perform the Award Order Rule and Judgement ment made by them And they Award Order Rule and Adjudge That I. S. shall pay to W. N. who was a Stranger twenty shillings The first Question was Whether the Award were good And it was holden by Anderson Chief Justice Meade and Periam Justices That the Award was void because it was out of their Submission for they cannot Award a man to do a thing which doth not lye in his power for in this Case W. N. to whom the money is to be paid is a Stranger and it is in his Election if he will accept of the money or not And so it is holden in 22. H. 6. 46. and 17. E. 4. 5. but vid. cont 5. H. 7. 2. Then if the Award be void The second Question was If yet the Bond to performe it be good or not And it was holden by the whole Court that it was void also against the Book of 22. H. 6. 46. because that the Condition was to performe that which was against the Law Quaere that Case for it seemes not to be Law at this day And it was then holden That Awards concerning Acts to be performed by them which have not submitted are void And in all Cases where each of the parties which submit have not some thing the Award is void Pasch
24. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 19. IN an Action upon the Case upon a Promise The consideration was Where I. S. had granted a Term to I. D. That afterwards upon the request of I. S. I. D. did make to W. an Estate for four years upon which W. brought his Action And after Verdict it was moved in stay of Judgement that there was no good consideration and a difference taken where the Promise was upon the Grant and where afterwards If it were before then the Condition was good but if it were afterwards it was not good And it was adjudged That the Plaintiffe Nihil capiat per billam Pasch 24. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 20. AN Action upon the Case upon a Promise was The Consideration was That in consideration that the Plaintiffe Daret diâ—m solutionis the Defendant Super se assumpsit and because he doth not say in facto that he had given day It was adjudged that no sufficient Consideration was alledged But if the Consideration were Quod cum indebitatus c. the same had been a good Consideration without any more for that implies a Consideration in it self Pasch 24. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 21. IT was said by Cooke That the Chancellor or any Judge of any of the Courts of Record at Westminster may bring a Record one to another without a Writ of Certiorare because one Judge is sufficiently known one to the other as 5. H. 7. 31. where a Certificate was by the Chancellor alone and to this purpose is 11. H. 4. But that other Judges of base Courts cannot do nor Justices of the Peace as 3. H. 6. where the certificate by Suitors was held void Pasch 25. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 22. SKIPWITH'S Case IT was found upon a speciall verdict in an Action of Trespass that the place where c. was Copy-hold land And that the Custome is That quaelibet foemina viro cooperta poterit devise lands whereof she is seised in Fee according to the custome of the Manor to her Husband and surrender it in the presence of the Reeve and six other persons And that I. S. was seised of the land where c. and had issue two Daughters and died and that they married husbands and that one of them devised her part to her husband by Will in writing in the presence of the Reeve and six other persons and afterwards at another day shee surrendred to the Husband and he was admitted and she died and her Husband continued the possession And the Husband of the other Daughter brought an Action of Trespasse Rodes Serjeant The Custome is not good neither for the Surrender nor for the Will for two causes One for the uncertainty of what estate shee might make a Devise and because it is against reason that the Wife should surrender to the Husband Where the Custome shall not be good if it be uncertain he vouched 13. E. 3. Fitz. Dum fuit infra aetatem 3. The Tenant saith that the lands are in Dorset where the Custome is that an Enfant may make a Grant or Feoffment when he can number twelve pence And it was holden that because it is uncertain when he can so do the Custome is not good 19. E. 2. in a Ravishment of Ward the defendant pleaded that the custome is that when the Enfant can measure an ell of cloth or tell twelve pence as before that he should be out of Ward and it is holden no good custom for the cause aforesaid 22. H. 6. 51. a. there a man prescribed That the Lord of D. had used to have Common for him and all his Tenants And because it is not shewed what Lord whether the Lord mediate or immediate it is adjudged no good custome And as to the Surrender it is against reason that the Wife should give to the Husband for a Wife hath not any Will but the Will of her Husband For if the Husband seised in the right of his Wife make a Feoffment in Fee and the Wife being upon the land doth disagree unto it saying that shee will never depart with it during her life yet the Feoffment is good and shall binde during the life of the Husband as it is holden in 21. E. 3. And therefore it is holden in 3. E. 3. Tit. Devise Br. 43. That a Feme covert cannot devise to her Husband for that should be the Act of the Husband to convey the land to himself And in the old Natura Brevium in the Additions of Ex gravi quaerela it is holden so accordingly And the Case in 29. E. 3. differs much from this Case For there a woman seised of lands devisable took an Husband and had issue and devised the lands to the Husband for his life and died and a Writ of Waste was brought against him as Tenant by the Courtesie and it was holden that it did lie and that he is not in by the Devise for the reason there is because he was in before by the Courtesie But as I conceive that Case will disprove the Surrender for in as much as he had it in the Right of his wife he could not take it in his own Right Also he took another Exception in the principal Case because that the wife was not examined upon the Surrender but none of the Justices spake to that Exception but when the Record was viewed it appeared that it was so pleaded Further He said That the devise was void by the Statute of 34. H. 8. Cap. 5. where it is said It is enacted That Wills and Testaments made of any Lands Tenements c. by women Coverts or c. shall not be taken to be good or effectual in Law And he said That this Statute doth extend to customary Lands And as to that all the Justices did agree That it is not within the Statute And as to the Statute of Limitations Andâ—rson chief Justice said That if a Lease for years which perhaps will not indure sixty years shall be taken strong this shall Anderson moved That if the Lord Lease Copyhold land by Word Whether the Lessee might maintain an Ejectione firme and he conceived not for in an Ejectione firmâ— there ought to be a Right in Fact And although it be by conclusion it is not sufficient for that the Jury or Judge are not estopped or concluded And he conceived That if Tenant at Will make a Lease for years that it is no good lease betwixt him and the Lessor but that he may well plead that he had nothing in the land Meade contrary but they both agreed That the Book of 14. E. 4. which saith That if Tenant at Will make a lease for years that he shall be a Disseisor is not Law Anderson said That the prescription in the principal Case was not good for it is Quod quaelibet foemina viro cooperta poterit c. and it ought to be that feme Coverts possunt and by the Custome have used to devise to the
the Justices did agree that the assignement was good but that the two assignees could not work severally but together with one stock or such workmen as belonged to them both And Cook who reported the opinions of the Justices was of Counsel with the Lord Mountjoy And note in that case it was said That Proviso being coupled with other words of covenant and grant doth not create a Condition but shall be of the same nature as the other words with which it is coupled Pasch 25. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 25. WEBBE and POTTER'S Case In an Ejectione firme the Case was this JOhn Harris gave Land in Frankmarriage to one White And the words of the Deed were Dedi concessi I. W. in liberum maritagium Joannae filiae suae Habendum eidem J. W. haeredibus suis in perpetuum tenendum de Capitalibus Dominis fâ—odi c. with warranty to the Husband and his heirs Periam Justice although the usuall words of gift in Frankmarriage are not observed yet the Frankmarriage shall not be destroyed for the usuall words are In liberum maritagium cum Joanna filia mea in the ablative case And it was holden by all the Justices that notwithstanding that the Frankmarriage was good Also a gift in Frankmarriage after the espousals is good as it was holden by all the Justices And see Fitz. Tit. Taile 4. E. 3. and 2. H. 3. Dower 199. And he said That a gift in Frankmarriage before the Stat. of Donis c. was a Feesimple but now it is but a special tail and if it should not be in law a gift in Frankmarriage then the Husband and Wife have an estate but for their lives for they cannot have an estate taile for that there are not words of limitation of such estate in the gift And hee cited 4. E. 3. and 45. E. 3. 20. to prove his opinion and hee much relyed upon the intent of the Donor which ought to be observed in construction of such Gifts according to the Statute And because the Habendum is repugnant to the premisses and would destroy the Frank-marriage it is void and the premisses shall stand good and to prove that he cited 9. E. 3. 13. E. 1. 32. E. 1. Tit. Taile 25. 3. H. 4. by Hill And he took this difference Where a Remainder is limited upon a Gift in Frankmarriage to a stranger and where it is limited to one of the Donees for in the first case the Remainder is good for the benefit of the stranger but in the second case it is void And he said that if a Rent be reserved upon such a Gift that it should be void during the four degrees but afterwards the Reservation should be good And if the Donor grant the Reversion over and the Donee in Frank-marriage attourn now he shall pay rent to the Grantee for by Littleton he hath lost the Priviledg of Frankmarriage viz. the Aquitall and no privitie is betwixt the Grantee and the Donees 10. Ass 26. 4. H. 6. That it is not any taile if it be not Frankmarriage Windham Justice Although it be no estate in Frankmarriage yet is it an estate taile and he cited 8. E. 3. although there want the word Heirs Also if a man give lands to another semini suo it is good 45. E. 3 Statham taile If it be not Frankmarriage yet it is a good estate in taile 19. Ass Land was given to Husband and Wife in Frank-marriage infra annos nubiles and afterwards they are divorced the Wife hath an estate in taile Meade Justice did agree with Windham and said That although there be not any Tenure nor any Aquitall yet it may be a good Frankmarriage as if a Rent Common or Reversion be given in Frankmarriage it is good and yet there is not any Tenure nor aquitall Dyer Chief Justice conceived That it is not Frankmarriage because that the usuall words in such Gifts are not observed for he said that the gift ought to be in liberum Maritagium and not Joannae filiae suae for that is not the usuall form of the words And he said That if the word Liberum be omitted that it is not Frankmarriage for that he said is as it were a Maxime and therefore the usuall words ought to be observed And by the same reason such a Gift cannot be with a man but ought to be with a woman also such a Gift ought to be with one of the blood of the Donor who by possibilitie might be his Heir Also there ought to be a Tenure betwixt the Donor and Donee and also an Aquitall And if these grounds and ceremonies be not observed it is not Frankmarriage Also if it once take effect as a Frankmarriage and afterwards the Donor granteth the Reversion over or if the Reversion doth descend to the Donees yet it shall not be utterly destroyed but shall remaine as an estate taile and not as an estate for life because it once took effect in the Donees and their issues as a Frankmarriage 31. E. 1. taile 116. If a man give lands in Frankmarriage the remainder to the Donees and the heirs of their bodies yet it is a good Frankmarriage And if a man give Lands in Frankmarriage the Remainder to another in taile it shall not destroy the Frankmarriage because that the Donor hath the Reversion in Fee in himself and the Donees shall hold of him and not of him in the Remainder in taile but if the Remainder had been limited to another in Fee simple then it had been otherwise Also if the Donor grant the Services of the Donees in Frankmarriage reserving the Reversion to himself it is no good Grant although that the Donees attourne for that the Services are incident to the Reversion but if he grant the Reversion then they do passe And he concluded That the Husband had the whole and that the Wife had nothing for she was no purchaser of the premisses because that the Gift did not take effect as a gift in Frankmariage And he said that he doth not construe it so by the intent of the Gift for here is an expresse limitation of the Fee to the Husband and his heirs which shall not be contradicted by any intendment for an Intendment ought to give way to an expresse Limitation as a consideration implyed ought to give place to a consideration expressed And afterwards this yeer it was adjudged that it was not a Frankmarriage nor a Gift in taile but that it was a Fee simple And the Justices said that although the old books are That where it takes not effect as a Frankmarriage that yet it shall take effect as an estate taile those Books are against Law But they agreed That where once the Gift doth take effect as a Frankmarriage that by matter ex post facto it might be turned to an estate in taile Pasch 26. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 26. MEade and Windham the other Justices being absent were of opinion That a
could be if it were not of Land holden in Socage and therefore that tenure is implyed Contrary When a man is to plead a Devise but where the Verdict doth not strongly imply a thing it shall not be good as in Scolasticas Case Plo. Com. 411. Exception was taken that the Jury did not find That the Devisor had not any Heir Male alive praeter the said John and Francis for if he had the wife of the Plaintiffe had no cause of Action And it was there holden by Harper That it was not a good Verdict for the incertainty so in our Case Cook contrary 1. The Grant is not good and the Rectory is no part of it nor can they passe by the word Portion 1. By the Etimology of the word for Portion is a thing in grosse by it selfe and cannot passe by that thing which is intended Nomen Collectivum as a Rectory is So of a Manor if a man grant totam illam portionem Manerii hee being seised of a Manor nothing passeth for portio is no more then partio as the Latinists say and then if a man grant all that part of his Manor or part of his Tithes in D. and he be seised of the whole Manor of D. or of the Rectory of D. nothing passeth Also the words after expound the Queens mind for the words precedent are coupled with a Cum after scil Cum omnibus aliis c. So as the first part shews the grant of Tithes and the later part shews what Tithes viz. those which were in the Occupation of John Corbet so as but part is granted and in the Kings Grant a part shall not be taken for the whole and so in no case if not by the Figure Synecdoche which cannot be in cases of Grants at the common Law Also the words are totam illam portionem c. and not totam meam portionem c. and the word illa or that ought to have a word What which is a word shewing in whose possession the portion was Also the Kings Letters Patents ought for the most part be taken according to the meaning of the King for the case was in the Exchequer That where the King granted all his Tenements in D. that nothing passed by that Grant but the Houses Otherwise it is in the case of a common person So 22. Ass where the King grants goods of Felons quorumcunque damnatorum it shall not extend to Treason nor to murder of the Kings Messenger So 8. H. 4. 2. If the Grant be of all the goods of those who pro aliqua transgressione sive delicto c. forisfacere deberent it shall not extend to those who are felo de se Also the Non obstante doth not help the matter For I take this difference When nothing passeth by the words precedent Ex vi termini there nothing is helped by the Non obstante But if any thing passe by the precedent words Ex vi termini there a Non obstante may make the thing good which otherwise should be void As if the King grant to J. S. the Manor of D. Non obstante that he is seised for the term of life thereof it is a void Grant But if the Grant were of the Manor of D. notwithstanding that I. S. hath it for life here the Non obstante makes the Grant good which otherwise should be the ignorance of the King to make a Grant of that of which he is excluded by the Non obstante because thereby he takes knowledg of the particular estate and so he is not deceived As to the matter moved against the Verdict I conceive that it makes against the other side for it was on his part to prove the Occupation and if there be no Occupation at the time of the Lease the Grant is void and he was to prove it being in the affirmative And then in re dubia majus inficiatio quà m affirmatio intelligenda and a May be may be intended in every case And if such construction should be in speciall Verdicts I dare affirm that by such May bees all speciall Verdicts shall be quashed But the Law is to give a favourable construction of them according to the meaning of the Jurours Snagg contrary and by him these words cum omnibus aliis c. are void in the Kings case and vouched the case of 29. E. 3. 9. before vouched Where the King had granted to the Earl of Salisbury the custody of the Lands of the Prior of Mountague being seised into the Kings hands as a Prior Alien and afterwards the Earl died his Heir within age whereby the said Lands and others and Advowsons came to the Kings hand by reason of minority and afterwards the King granted to the Son all the Lands and Advowsons which were Patris sui ac omnes terras ac omnes advocationes of the said Prior which the King had before given to the father of the said son And it was there holden That although that the Advowsons passed not to the Father yet by that grant they did passe and that these woads which he granted to his father were meerly void Clâ—nche Justice Nothing passeth by this word Portion for it is a thing in gross and a thing in gross cannot contain another thing and a word which signifies a thing in grosse cannot passe another thing As if a man grant all his Services in D. it is to be intended Services in grosse and if he have not any Services but those which are parcell of a Manor nothing shall passe by those words But I conceive That those Tithes which are parcell of the Rectory shall passe by these words Cum aliis c. For although that the words are in the tenure of John Corbet yet if they were not in his tenure the Non obstante will help it for it is Non obstante any misnaming of the Tenants or of the quantity or quality of the Tithes so as these words imply as much as if the Grant had been in the tenure of John Corbet or of any other in L. or elsewhere Gaudy Justice If the words Totam illam portionem were left out of the Book the other words Cum omnibus aliis shall passe nothing and those words Totam illam portionem are as nothing to passe a thing not in grosse and by consequence nothing shall passe by the other words And afterwards Judgement was given That nothing passed by the Letters Patents Hill 28 Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 43. CROPP's Case CRopp made a Lease for years reserving rent at Mich. upon Condition That if the rent be behind at Mich. and a Month after that he might enter The Lessee after Mich. and before the Month ended sent his servant to the house of Cropp to pay the money to Cropp the servant coming to Cropps house found him not for he was not at the House the Servant delivered the Rent to one Margery Briggs who was his Daughter in Law to deliver the
a Prohibition And Suit and Clenche Justices He shall have a Prohibition for he claims onely a portion of Tithes and that by prescription and not meerly as Parson or by reason of the Parsonage but by a collaterall cause viz. by Prescription which is a Temporall cause and thing And it is not materiall whether it be betwixt two Parsons Vide 20. H. 6. 17. Br. Jurisdiction 80. and 11. H. 4. and 35. H. 6. 39. Br. Jurisdiction 3. Where in Trespasse for taking of Tithes the Defendant claimed them as Parson and within his Parish and the Plaintiffe prescribed That he and his predecessors Vicars there had had the Tithes of that place time out of minde c. And the opinion of the Court was that the right of Tithes came in debate betwixt the Vicar and the Parson who were Spirituall persons who might try the right of Tithes And therfore there the Temporall Court should not have the Jurisdiction Mich. 28 29 Eliz. In the Kings Bench. 56 IN an Indictment upon the Statute of 8. H. 6. of Forcible Entry the Case was this One was Lessee for yeers and the Reversion did belong unto the Company of Goldsmiths And one was indicted for a forcible Entry and the words of the Indictment were That expulit disseisivit the Company of Goldsmiths quendam I. S. tenentem expulit Cooke took exception to the Indictment and said that a disseisin might be to one although not in possession as to a Reversioner upon a term for yeers or upon a Wardship but he could not be expulsed if he were not in possession for privatiâ— praesupponit habitum And after it saith that the Tenant was expulsed and two cannot be expulsed where one onely was in possession therefore it ought to have said that the Tenant of the Free-hold was disseised and the Termor expelled and it applyes the word expulit to both And Fuller took another Exception that the Cart is set before the horse For he who had the Free-hold could not be disseised if his Termor were not first ousted and the Indictment is That the Tenant of the Free-hold was expulsed and disseised and then the Termor was expelled But Sui Justice as to that said that the later clause scil et quendam I. S. tenentem c. is but surplusage For if one enter with force and expell the Tenant of the Free-hold it is within the Statute of 8. H. 6. Then Fuller moved that the Indictment doth not shew the place where he expelled him But Cleâ—ch Justice said that that was not material for he could not expell him at another place then upon the Land As a man cannot make a Feoffment by livery and seisin at another place but upon the Land unless a Feoffment with Livery within the view And as to the Objection of Cook that the Indictment is that he disseised and expelled the Tenant of the Free-hold out of the possession of the Free-hold To that he answered that the possession of the Termor is the possession of him in the Reversion Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 57 A Man seised of a Copy-hold in Fee made his Will and thereby he devised the same unto his Wife for her life and that after her death his Wife or her Executors should sell the Land He surrendred to the use of his Wife which was entred in hac forma viz. to the use of his Wife for life Secundùm formam ultimae voluntatis The Woman sold the Land during her life The question was Whether she might sell or not Suit Justice said That the intent doth appear that she might sell during her life for when it saith That she or her Executors should sell after her death it is meant the Estate which is to come after her death for the Wife after her death could not sell The second Point was When the surrender is to the Wife for life secundùm formam ultimae voluntatis Whether here she have the Land for life and the Fee also to sell Clenche If she had not the Fee to sell then the words Secundùm formam ultimae voluntatis should be void for the Surrender to the use of the wife for life gives her an Estate for life without any other words Suit If it were ad usum ultimae voluntatis without speaking what Estate the Wife should have no doubt but shee should have for her own use for life and that afterwards she might sell the Land but he said As the Case is put it is a pretty Case And it was adjourned Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 58 THis Case was moved in Court A Copy-holder committed Waste by which a forfeiture accrued to the Lord who afterwards did accept of the Rent The question was Whether by this acceptance he were concluded of his Entrie for the Forfeiture Cook said He was not for it is not as the Case 45 E. 3. where a Lease is made upon Condition that the Lessee shall not do Waste and he commits Waste and then the Lessor accepts the Rent there he cannot enter But otherwise is it of a Copy-hold for there is a condition in Law and here in Fait and a condition in Fait may save the Land by an Acceptance but a condition in Law cannot for by the condition in Law broken the Estate of the Copyholder is meerly void And the Court agreed That when such a Forfeiture is presented it is not to Entitle the Lord but to give him notice for the Copy-hold is in him by the Forfeiture presently without any Presentment A man made a Lease for years upon condition that he should not assign over his Lease and it was reserving Rent and after he did assign it and then the Lessor accepted the rent there he shall not enter for the condition broken Lessee for years upon condition that he should not do Waste and the Lessor accepts of the Rent for the quarter in which the Waste was done yet he may enter but if he do accept of a second payment of the Rent then it is otherwise but if it were upon condition That if he do waste that his Estate shall cease There no acceptance of the Rent by the Lessor can make the Lease good It was adjourned Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 59 THE Lord Admirall did grant the Office of Clark or Register of the Admirall Court to one Parker and Herold for their lives eorum diuâ—ius viventi And Herold bound himself in a Bond of Five Hundred Pound to Parker that the said Parker should enjoy the Office cum omnibus proficuis during his life And afterwards Herold did interrupt the said Parker in his Office upon which he brought an Action of Debt upon the Bond. The Defendant pleaded That such is the custome That the Admirall might grant the same Office for the life of the Admirall only and that he is dead and so the Office void and that he did interrupt him as it was lawfull
not shew what trees nor how many he might cut and that he hath cut down more then he ought and also he doth not shew when the cutting of them was Vide 6. E. 4. By prescription they may prescribe to hold a Court before the Steward but if there be no custome or Prescription to warrant it then as 4. H. 6. is it is coram Senescalio Sectatoribus Gaudy Every Court Baron is to be holden before the Suitors if there be no Prescription to the contrary But a Leet alwayes before the Steward The Action of Debt was upon the Presentment and the Error is brought upon the defects in the Presentment for if that be not good all is naught Notwithstanding it was said by one at the Bar That the forme of pleading in the book of Entries is That the Court was holden before the Steward if the Action be for debt or Trespass for Amercements or such personall things But if the Action be brought for reall things then it is before the Suitors But notwithstanding that the Judgement for the Causes aforesaid was reversed Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 84 BARKER and FLETWEL'S Case BArker of Ipswich brought an Action of Covenant against the Assignee of his Lessee for years one Fletwell And set forth That whereas he had made a Lease for years reserving Rent with re-entry for non-payment of the Rent and that the Lessee did covenant to build a house upon the Land within the first ten years and that he assigned over his terme And he brought the Action against the Assignee who pleaded That the Lessor did enter and had the Possession for part of the ninth year and if thereby the Covenant were discharged was the demurrer in Law Godfrey Who argued for the Lessor said That by this entrie of the Lessor the Covenant was not suspended As 20. E. 4. 12 BY. Extinguishment 34. The Abbot of D. did grant to W. S. a Corrodie viz. so much bread c. for the term of his life faciend ' talia servitia prout J. N. alii usi sunt focere The Grantee leased back again the Corrodie unto the Abbot for 10. years rendring 3â— rent per annum and he brought Debt for the rent and the Abbot said That he did not the Services and the Grantee said That he was not bound to do them for that by the Lease the Corrodie was suspended And it was holden that it was not suspended Godfâ—â—y held the reason to be because that the service is a Collaterall thing And therefore he said He ought to do it notwithstanding that the Abbot had the Corrodie So in 8. H. 7. 7. Br. Conditions 134. Where Tenant in taile makes a Feoffment in Fee and takes back an estate in Fee and afterwards was bounden in a statute Merchant and then made a Feoffment in Fee upon Condition and died his Issue within age who enters for the Condition broken he was remitted notwithstanding that execution upon the statute was sued against the Father in his life So if Lease be made of a Manor except Herriots Fines and Amercements and that the Lessee shall collect them during the Term although that the Lessor entreth yet the Lessee ought to collect them during the term Also he pleades here That Barker did enter and that generall pleading is doubtfull and the Plea shall be taken strictly against him that pleadeth it and it may be that he entred by wrong and so it may be that he entred by right viz. for not payment of the Rent as in truth his entry was And if Barker did enter lawfully then it was no suspension or extinguishment of the Covenant As 19. R. 2. If Lessee for life commit waste and afterwards alieneth and the Lessor entreth for the Alienation yet after his entry he shall have an Action of Waste against the Lessee So 8. H. 6. 10. Waste 8. but with this difference If the Lessor enter wrongfully there although Waste be done before he shall not have Waste to punish it but otherwise if he enter for the Forfeiture done by the Tenant Also if the Covenant was suspended it was only for the time that the Lessor had the Possession and the Party hath not answered for the time before or after As 16. H. 7. If one be bound to find a Chaplain to say Divine Service within such a Chappel and the Chappel fall down it is a good excuse for the time but if it be built again he must find a Chaplain there Clarke contrary If Lessee for years covenanteth to repair the houses I grant that the same shall charge his Assignee But a Collateral thing as if the Lessee covenant to pay such a sum in gross or to enfeoffe him of the Manor of D the same shall not charge the Assignee no more shall a Covenant to build a new house But here it was said That he had time to build it both before and after the entry of the Lessor Barker To that he answered Not so for if he once disturbed the Covenant is destroyed Godfrey This Case was this Terme in the Common Pleas. Lessee for five years covenanted to build a Mill within the terme and because he had not done it the Lessor brought an Action of Covenant and the Defendant pleaded That within the last three years the Lessor forcibly held him out c. so as he could not build it and by the Opinion of all the Justices he ought to plead That the Lessor with force held him out otherwise it would be no Plea Cook As amicus curiae vouched 35. H. 6. Tit. Barr. If one be bounden to enfeoffe me of such land before Michaelmas there the Obliger in Debt brought upon the Bond pleaded That the Obligee before the day had entred with force into the land so as he could not enfeoffe him and there it was holden That he ought to prove that he was holden out by force Gaudy In the principall Case he ought to have shewed That he would not suffer him to build And the other Justices seemed to be of the same Opinion but yet they said That they would advise upon the Case Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 85 OWen took Exception to a Declaration in an Ejectione firme because it was à Possessione sua ejecit where it ought to be according to the supposal of the Writ Quod à firma sua ejecit Also it was of three closes naming them with a Videlicet containing by estimation 30. Acres and that he said did contain no certainty where he ought to have alledged in Fact that they did contain so many Acres But it was holden by all the Justices That although he doth not put in the Declaration the certainty of the Acres if he give a certain name to them as Green-Close c. that it is good And as to the other Exception viz. Ejecit à Possessione inde that the word inde had relation to the Farme and shall be as much as
Condition that if the Rent be behinde the Feoffor might enter and retain quousque there the estate shall be determined pro tempore and afterwards revived again Windham There the Feoffor shall have the land as a distress and the Free-hold is not out of the Feoffee Fenner The Book proves the contrary for the Feoffor had an Action of Debt for the Rent Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 121 IN a Formedon the Tenant pleaded a Fine with proclamations The Plaintiff replyed No such Record It was moved that the Record of the Fine which remained with the Chyrographer did warrant the Plea and the Record which did remain with the Custos Brevium did not warrant the Plea and both the Records were shewed in Court and to which the Court should hold was the question Shuttleworth To that which was shewed by the Custos Brevium and he cited the Case of Fish and Brocket where the Proclamations were reversed because that it appeared by the Record which was shewed by the Custos Brevium that the third proclamation was alledged to be made the seventh day of June which seventh day of June was the Sunday and yet hee said It appeared by the Record certified by the Chyrographer that it was well done and yet the Judgment reversed Rodes Justice There is no such matter in the same case And 26. El. by all the Justices and Barons of the Exchequer in such case the Record which remains with the Custos Brevium shall be amended and made according as it is in the Record of the Office of Chyrographer Windham agreed And afterwards the said President was shewed in which all the matter and order of proceedings was shewed and contained and all the names of the Justices who made the Order And by the command of the Justices it was appointed that the said President should be written out and should remain in perpetuam rei memoriam And the reason of the said Order is there given because the Note which remains with the Chyrographer is principale Recordum Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 122. AN Infant was made Executor and Administration was committed unto another durante minore aetate of the Executor and that Administrator brought an Action of Debt for money due to the Testator and recovered and had the Defendant in Execution and now the Executour is come of full age Fenner moved that the Defendant might be discharged out of Execution because the Authority of the Administrator is now determined and he cannot acknowledge satisfaction nor make Acquittances c. Windham Justice Although the Authority of the Plaintiffe bee determined yet the Recovery and the Judgement do remaine in force But perhaps you may have an Audita querela But I conceive That such an Administrator cannot have an Action for he is rather as a Bayliff to the Infant Executor then an Administrator Rodes agreed with him and he said I have seen such a Case before this time viz. Where one was bound to such a one to pay a certaine sum of money to him his Heirs Executors or Assignes And the Obligee made an Infant his Executor and administration was committed during his minority and the Obligor paid the money to that Administrator And it was a doubt whether the same was sufficient and should excuse him or not And whether he ought not to have tendred the money to them both Fenner That is a stronger Case then our Case One who is Executor of his own wrong may pay Legacies and receive Debts but he cannot bring an Action Windham Doth it appear by the Record when the Infant was made Executor and that Administration was committed as before Fenner No truely Windham Then you may have an Audita querela upon it Fenner said So we will Note Hil. 33. Eliz. in the Exchequer Miller and Gores Case An Infant pleaded in a Scire facias upon an Assignement of Bonds to the Queen That Saint-Johns and Eley were Administrators during his minority And it was holden by the Court to be no plea. But he ruled to answer as Executor Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 123 SUggestion was made that a Coroner had not sufficient Lands within the Hundred for which a Writ issued forth to choose another and one was chosen It was moved by Serjeant Snag If theâ—eby the first Coroner did cease to be Coroner presently untill he be discharged by Writ Rodes and Windham Justices He ceases presently for otherwise there should be two Officers of one Coronership which cannot be Also the Writ is Quod loco I. S. eligi facias c. unum Coronatorem and he cannot be in place of the first if the first do not cease to be Coroner So if any be made Commissioners and afterwards others are made Commissioners in the same cause the first Commission is determined Snagg said That in the Chancery they are of the same Opinion but Fitz. Nat. Brevium 163. N. is That hee ought to be discharged by Writ Mich. 28 29 Eliz in the Common Pleas. 124 IN an Action of Debt brought against Lessee for years for rent he pleaded That the Plaintiff had granted to him the reversion in Fee which was found against him Walmesley Serjeant moved Whether by that Plea he had forfeited his terme or not Rodes and Windham Justices He shall not forfeit his Term and Rodes cited 33. E. 3. Judgement 255. Where in a Writ of Waste the Tenant claimed Fee and it was found against him that he had but an Estate for life and yet it was no Forfeiture Fenner and Windham It is a strong Case for there the Land it selfe is in demand but not so in our Case Rodes The Tenant shall not forfeit his Estate in any Action by claiming of the Fee-Simple but in a Quid juris clamat Walmesley and Fennèr Where he claimes in Fee generally and it is found against him there perhaps hee shall forfeit his Estate but where he shewes a speciall conveyance which rests doubtfull in Law it is no reason that his Estate thereby should bee forfeited although it be found against him Rodes 6. R. 2. Quid juris clamat 20. The Tenant claimed by speciall conveyance and yet it was a forfeiture But in the principall Case at Bar he and Windham did agree cleerly That it was no forfeiture Mich. 28 29 Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 125 AN Action upon the Case was brought because that the Defendant had spoken these words viz. That the Plaintiffe hath said many a Masse to J. S. c. Anderson Chief Justice Primâ facie did seem to incline That no Action would lie for the words although that a Penalty is given by the Statute against such Masse-Mongers For he said That no Action lieth for saying That one hath transgressed against a Penall Law Periam Justice contrary Anderson If I say to one That he is a disobedient Subject no Action lieth for the words Windham Justice That is by reason of the generality Puckering
the Land unto another Shuttleworth moved it to the Court Whether the Patentee ought to shew the Letters Patents and he conceived He need not because he hath not any interest in them but the same do belong only to the Earle As if a Rent be granted to one in Fee and he taketh a wife and dieth and the Wife bringeth a Writ of Dower she is not bound to shew the first Deed by which the Rent was granted to her Husband because the Deed doth not belong unto her So hee who sues for a Legacie is not tied to shew the Will because the same belongs to the Executor and not him Periam Justice The Cases are not alike for they are Strangers and not Privies but the Lessee in the principall Case deriveth his interest from the Letters Patents and therefore he ought to shew them Rodes Justice remembred Throgmorton's Case Com. 148. a. where a Lease was made by an Abbot to J. S. and afterwards the same Abbot made a Lease unto another to begin after the determination of the first Lease made to J. S. and exception was taken That he ought to have shewed the Deed of the first Lease and the Exception was disallowed by the Court Periam That case is not like this case and he said That as he conceived the Lessee in this case ought to shew forth the letters Patents and if any Books were against his Opinion it was marvellous Mich. 28 29 Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 134 ONE intruded after the death of Tenant for life and died seised and the land descended to his Heire and a Writ of Intrusion was brought in the Per against the Heir and Gawdy Serjeant prayed a Writ of Estrepment against the Tenant And first the Court was in doubt what to do but afterwards when they had considered of the Statute of Gloucester Cap. 1. in the end of it Anderson said If the Writ be in the Per take the Writ of Estrepment but if the Writ be not in the Per we doubt whether a Writ of Estrepment will lie or not Mich. 28 29 Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 135 WOOD against ASH and FOSTER CErtain Lands with a Stock of Sheep was leased by Indenture and the Lessee did covenant by the same Indenture to restore unto the Lessor at the end of the Terme so many Sheep in number as he took in Lease and that they should be betwixt the age of two and four years Afterwards the Lessee granted the same Stock unto a Stranger viz. to Elizabeth Winsor who was the wife of Ashe whereas in truth all the ancient Stock was spent And it was holden by all the Justices upon an Evidence given unto a Jury at the Bar That when such a Stock of Sheep is leased for years the principall Property doth remain in the Lessor as long as those Sheep which were in esse at the time of the Lease should live but if any of them do die and other come in their roomes then the property of those new Sheep doth belong to the Lessee and therefore they held that the second Lessee should have so many of the Sheep as were left and did remaine at the end of the Lease and no other And yet it was objected by Walmesley That the Stock was entire and that as soon as any other came in the room of the ancient Sheep which were dead that they were accounted part of the same stock and although they be all dead and so changed successively two or three times yet he said it shall be said the same stock And he resembled the same to the case of a Corporation which although all the Corporation die and other new men come in their places it shall be said the same Corporation But notwithstanding his Opinion all the Justices were of opinion as before Walmesley said That agreeing with his opinion was the opinion of all the civill Lawyers but the Court was angry and rebuked him that he did in such manner crosse their opinions and that he cited the opinion of Civilians in our Law and they resolved the contrary and they said there is a difference betwixt the Lease of other Goods and a lease of live Cattel for in the first Case if any thing be added for mending repairing or otherwise by the Lessee at the end the Lessor shall have the additions for of them he hath alwayes the property and they are annexed to the principall but Lambs Calves c. are severed from the principall and are the Profits arising of the Principall which the Lessee ought to have else he should pay his Rent for nothing And as to the issue upon the Cepit by Foster it was shewed That he did but stay the Sheep in his Manor where he had Fellons Goods Waifes and Strayes and that the Sheep were stayed upon a Huy and Cry and that he had taken Bond of one to whom he had delivered the Sheep to render them to him who had the right of them And that stay was holden by the Court to be out of the point of the Issue For that he who doth stay doth not take Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 136. The Heirs of Sir ROGER LEWKNOR and FORD's Case Intratur Pasch 28. El. Rot. 826. SIR Roger Lewknor seised of Wallingford Park made a lease thereof unto Ford for years and died the Lessee granted over his term to another excepting the Wood the term expired and now an action of Waste was brought against the second lessee by the two Coparceners and the Heir of the third Coparcener her Husband being tenant by the courtesie And Shuttleworth and Snag Serjeants did argue that the action would not lie in the form as it was brought And the first Exception which was taken by them was because the action was generall viz. Quod fecit Vastum in terris quas Sir Roger Lewknor pater praedict ' the plaintiffs cujus haeredes ipsae sunt praefat ' defend ' demisit c. and the Count was that the Reversion was entailed by Parliament unto the Heirs of the body of Sir Roger Lewknor and so they conceived that the Writ ought to have been speciall viz. cujus haeredes de corpore ipsae sunt For they said that although there is not any such form in the Register yet in novo casu novum remedium est apponendum And therefore they compared this case to the case in Fitz. Nat. Brevium 57. c. viz. If land be given to Husband and Wife and to the Heirs of the body of the Wife and the Wife hath issue and dieth and the Husband committeth Waste the Writ in that case and the like shall be speciall and shall make speciall recitall of the estate And so is the case 26. H. 8. 6. where Cestuy que use makes a lease and the lessee commits Waste the action was brought by the Feoffees containing the speciall matter and it was good although there were not any such Writ in the Register cujus
it is not shewed that he used any other rite or Ceremony c. for there ought to be some Positive thing 3. He doth not shew the Place or Parish where he persisted in it and that is materiall and issuable The fourth Exception was Because it was Inquisitio câ—pta coram Johanne Peter Waltero Mildmay and so named four of them by vertue of a Commission directed to them and to others and doth not shew what others nec quod illi fuerunt praesentes and then if the Commission were to them all jointly and two only were present then it was coram non judice and so void 5. The Statute saies That if any Parson or Vicar but doth not say being Minister Dei. The sixth was That it was at another Church c. Wray Chief Justice If this Evasion should be allowed the Statute were not to the purpose The seventh was That it doth not shew where the persisting was for that is a speciall thing and materiall and issuable Wray Chief Justice conceived That that only was a materiall Exception and that the other Exceptions were but frivolous and were not good Hill 29. Eliz. In the Kings Bench. 138 WARREN's Case ONE Warren demanded by a Writ of Debt in the Common Pleas Forty Pound and upon his Declaration did confess himselfe satisfied of Twenty Pound and thereupon Error was brought in the King's Bench And the Judgement reversed because by his Declaration he had abated his Writ and he ought to have Judgement according to his Writ and not according to his Declaration The Error assigned was in the Outlawry and it was holden by all the Justices That if the principall Record be reversed for Error that the Outlawry which is grounded upon it shall be reversed also Hill 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 139 ROOTE 's Case THE Case was in a Prohibition touching Tithes and the libell in the Spirituall Court was for Corn and Hay and other things and the Tenant of the land did prescribe to pay in one part of the land the third part of the tenth and in another part the moity of the tenth of Corn for all manner of Tithes And the Court did incline that the same was a good prescription And a Prohibition was granted to the Ecclesiasticall Court Hill 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 140 A Man was possessed for the terme of six years of a Tavern in London and leased the same unto another for three years and it was convenanted betwixt them that during the three years quolibet mense monthly the lessee should give an Account to the lessor of the Wine which he sold and should pay unto him for every Tun sold so much money And afterwards the lessor granted the three years which were remaining of the six years to another and he did request the lessee to account and he would not whereupon he brought an Action of Covenant and the Defendant pleaded That he had accounted to the Assignee of the three years and upon that there was a Demurrer joyned And the better opinion of the Court was that it was no Plea because it was not a Covenant which did go with the land or the Reversion but was a collaterall thing and did not pass by the assignment of the three years Hill 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 141 IT was adjudged That the bringing of a Writ of Error to reverse a Fine by an Infant during his nonage is not sufficient but the Fine by Judgement in the Writ of Error must be reversed during his Nonage Hill 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 142 WIDALL and Sr. JOHN ASHTON's Case A Writ of Error was brought by Widall against Sr. John Ashston because in the other action being an action of Wast The Plaintiff there did declare that he was seised and so seised demisit pro termino annorum c. and did not shew of what estate he was seised And yet he did suppose that it was ad exhaeredationem ejus c. And the same by Beamount was taken for an exception as 7. H. 6. A man pleaded a Feoffment to two haeredibus and doth not say suis it is uncertain And in the principal Case it shall be supposed that he hath but an estate for life for it shall not be intended that he hath an estate of Inheritance without expressing of words to carry an Inheritance As 7. Ass If I grant a Rent to I. S. and do not name what estate he shall have in it he shall have but an estate for life But he said that the Presidents are that if the word seised had been left out it had been good enough For by the Book of Entries a man may say demisit without saying that he was seised demisit But if a man will plead a thing which is not necessary to be pleaded and mistake it it shall make his Plea naught as in Patridges Case Where a suite was upon the Statute of Maintenance It is sufficent to say contra formam Statuti But if he will plead specially the day and place of the Statute and mis-plead it it makes all naught Suit Justice I conceive that that is a fault incurable But upon the other side it was argued that in 21. H. 7. It is holden that he might plead quod demisit without that that he was seised and demisit as there in an Action of Debt And therefore it is but surplusage in the principal Case Vide 15. E. 4. A good Case where surplusage shall not hurt because it is not traversable And he urged that by the Statute of 18. El. the Declaration doth not abate for matter of form And he said that Counts and Declarations shall be taken by Intendment and it shall be intended that if bringeth Wast that he hath such an estate that he may maintain such Action In Adams Case in the Commentaries One shewed that such an Abbot was seised and that the Land came unto the King by Dissolution and that the King being seised did grant the same and did not shew of what estate the King was seised and yet it was holden good See a good Case to this purpose 18. E. 3. Formedon 58. And he said that the Defendant had pleaded Nul wast fait and therefore he had by his Plea affirmed the Declaration to be good Beamount He ought to have said reversione inde sibi haeredibus c. Clenche Justice I conceive that the Statute of 18. El. helps that Suit Justice No truly It was adjourned Hill 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 143 AN Action of Covenant was brought by a Man against another who had been his Apprentize The Defendant pleaded that he was within age The plaintiff did maintain his Action by the Custome of London Where one by Covenant may binde himself within age And Exception was taken to it That that was a Departure Daniel It is no Departure for by 18. R. 2. an Infant brought an Action against Gardian in Socage and the
Gardian pleaded that the plaintiff was within age And the plaintiff did maintain his Declaration that by the Custome of such a place An Insant of 18. yeares might bring an Action of Account against his Gardian in Socage and it was there holden to be no Departure I conceive that an Infant cannot have an Account against his Gardian before his full age But I conceive that they held that it was by Statute That an Infant should not have an Account against Gardian in Socage until he was of the age of 21. yeares Wray Chief Justice was of opinion that it was no Departure For he said it should be frivolous to shew the whole in his Declaration viz. That he was an Infant And that by Custome he might make a Covenant which should beinde him But quaere of his opinion for that many doubt of it Vide the Case 118. R. 2. Hill 29 Eliz. in the King's Bench 144 CONEY's Case AN Action of Trespass was brought against John Coney for digging of the plaintiffs Close and killing of 18. Coneys there The Defendant Pleaded as to all the Trespas but killing of two Coneys Not Guilty And as to them he said that the place where c. the Trespass is supposed is a Heath in which he hath common of pasture and that he found them eating of the Grass and that he killed them and carried them away as it was Lawfull for him to do c. Cook The Point is Whether a commoner having common of pasture may kill the Coneys which are upon the ground and he said hemight not And first he said it is to be considered what interest he who hath the Freehold may have in such things as are ferae Naturae Secondly What authority a commoner hath in the ground in which he hath common To the first he said that although such Beasts are ferae Naturae yet they are reduced to such propertie when they are in my ground by reason of my possession which I then have in them that I may have an action of Trespass against him who takes them as 42. E. 3. 24. If one have Deer in his Park another taketh them away he may have an action of Trespas forthe taking 12. H. 8. If a Forrester follow a Buck which is chased out of the Park or Forrest although that he who hunteth him killeth him in his own ground yet the Forrester or Keeper may enter into his ground retake the Deer for the propertie and possession which he hath in it by the pursuit 7. H. 6. 38. It is holden that if a wilde Beast go out of the Park then the owner of the ground hath lost the propertie in it Brook thereupon collects that he had a propertie in it whilest it was in his Park 18. E. 4. 14. It is doubted whether a man can have propertie in things which are ferae Naturae But 10. H. 7. 6. It is holden that an Account lieth for things ferae Naturae Vide 14. H. 8. 1. The Bishop of Londons Case and 22. H. 6. 59. as long as they are in his ground they are in his possession and he shall have an Action of Trespass for the taking of them and the Writ shall be damas suas by Newton And in the Register 102. It is Quare ducent's cuniculos suos precij c. cepit But it is said that he hath common there What then Yet he cannot meddle with the Wood Sand Grass but by taking of the same with the mouthes of his Cattel If he who hath the Freehold bring an action against the Commoner for entring into his Land If he plead Not guilty he cannot give in Evidence that he hath Common there 22 Ass A Commoner cannot put in Cattel to Agist So is 12. H. 8. And of late it was holden in this Court That where the Commoners did prescribe that the Lord had used to put but so many of his Cattel upon the Lands That it was a void prescription Godfrey Contrary That it is Lawfull for the Commoner to kill them And he agreed the Cases which were put by Cook And he said that the owner of the ground had not the very propertie but a kind of propertie in them 3. H. 6. and F. N. B. If the Writ of Trespass be Quare cuniculos suos c. The Writ shall abate And yet he hath a propertie in them or rather a possession of them I grant that against a stranger he might have this Action of Trespas but not against the Commoner for he hath a wrong done unto him by their being upon the Land and therefore he may kill them although he may not meddle with the Land because he hath not an Interest in it and yet he may meddle with the profit of it as 15. H. 7. A Commoner may distrain damage feasant 43. E. 3. Coneys dig the Ground and eate the Grass of the Commoner c. I grant that it is not lawfull for the Tenant for life for to kill the Coneys of him who hath a free Warren in the ground For if a man bring an Action of Trespas Quare Warranem suum intravit cuniculos suos cepit c. It is no Plea that it is his Free-hold L. 5. E. 4. In Trespass Quare clausum fregit cuniculos cepit The Defendant said that the plaintiff made a lease at will unto such a man of the Land and he as his Servant did kill the Coneys and it was holden no Plea and yet it is there said that by the grant of the Land the Coneys doth not pass but the reason as I conceive is because it tends to his damage and therefore that he may kill them And so in this Case 2. H. 7. and 4. E. 4. If I have Common of pasture in Land and the Tenant plougheth the Land I shall have my Action upon the Case in the Nature of a quod permittat 9. E. 4. If one hath Land adjoyning to my Land and levy a Nusans I may enter upon his Land and abate the Nusans So if a man take my goods and carrie them into his own Land I may enter thereupon and retake my goods So if a Tenant of the Freehold plough the Land and sow the same with Corn the Commoner may put in his Cattel and there whit eate the Corn growing upon the Land and may justifie the same because the wrong first begins by the Tenant So if a man do falsly imprison me and put me in his house I may break his house to get forth 21. H. 6. in Trespass All the Inhabitants of such a Town do prescribe to have Common in such a field every year after harvest And one froward fellow amongst the rest will not gather in his Corn within convenient time If the Townsmen put in their Cattel and they eate the Corn he hath no remedie for it And he asked what remedie the Commoner should have for the eating of the Grass which his Cattel is to have if he
Statute to enclose For the Statute is When any man fels trees in his proper soile so that he not being owner of the ground he is not within the Statute and that was the effect of his argument And as to the other point he did not speak at all Cook chief Justice I hold that the plaintiffe ought to have judgment all the matter doth consist upon the Statute of 22. E. 4. which is to be considered And first is to be considered what was the common Law before that Statute and that was That one who had a Wood within a Forrest might fell it as it appeareth by the Statute de Forresta and the Statnte of 1 E. 3. 2. by licence and also he might enclose it for three yeers as it appeareth by the Statute of 22. E. 4. but the enclosure was to be cum parvo fossato haia bassa as it appeareth by the Register in the Writ of Ad quod damnum so as before that Statute there was an enclosure But the Law is cleer That before that Statute by the enclosure the Commoner shall not be excluded Then wee are to consider of the Statute And first Of the persons to whom the Statute doth extend and that appeareth by the preamble to be betwixt the King and other owners of Forrests and Chases and the owners of the Soil so as a Commoner is not any person within the meaning of the Statute And for the body of the Statute you ought to intend that the sentence is continued and not perfected untill the end of the Statute and the words Without licence c. prove That no persons were meant to be bounden by the statute but the Owners of the Forrests and Chases and not the Commoners Like the case in Dyer And although you will expound the words of the bodie of the Statute generally yet they shall be taken according to the intent of the preamble and therefore the Case of 21. H. 7. 1. of the Prior of Castleacre although it be not adjudged in the Book yet Judgment is entred upon the Roll which Case is Pasch 18. H. 7. Rot. 460. By which case it appeareth that although that a Statute be made which giveth Lands to the King yet by that statute the Annuity of a stranger shall not be extinguished And the Case which hath been put by Justice Foster upon the Statute of 18. Eliz. was the case of Boswel for the Parsonage of Bridgwater That although that one who hath a lease for years of the King which was void for misrecitall might by the said Statute hold it against the King yet the Patentee in Fee shall not be prejudiced by the said Statute So I conclude That the Commoner is not a person within this Statute of 22. E. 4 Secondly It is to be considered if a Wood in which any one hath Common be within the Statute and I hold it is not but onely severall Woods For as I have said the Wood which before the Statute might be enclosed for three years was onely a severall Wood and not such a Wood in which any one had common And the statute of 22. E. 4. doth extend onely to such Woods which might be felled and enclosed for three yeers and I conceive contrary to my Brother Warburton That the Deer of the Forrest shall well enough be said to be beasts and cattell And whereas by the common Law before this statute the enclosure was onely to be as I have said cum parvo fossato haia bassa by which the Deer were not excluded now by this statute I hold that they may make great hedges to exclude aswell the Deer as other beasts And I agree with Justice Foster that if he will take advantage of the Statute that hee ought to have pleaded that first hee felled and afterwards enclosed and è contrà upon the Statute of 35. H. 8. scil that hee ought first to divide and afterwards to fell c. And also I agree with him that in that point the Statute of 35. H. 8. being contrary doth repeal the Statute of 22. E. 4. if by that Statute the Commoner shall be excluded But I am of opinion with my Brother Warburton cleerly That hee is a Vendee of the Trees and so within the Statute for it is not neeessary that in the Grant there be the word Sell or that money by given nor that it be a contract for a time onely and not to have cantinuance as it is in our case But he who hath the Trees to him and his heirs shall be said to be a Vendee well enough As to the other matter which hath been moved Whether the Statute of 22. E. 4 be a generall law or not I hold cleerly that we are to take knowledg of it although it be not pleaded because it concerneth the King for it is made for the Kings Forrests and of all the Acts made between the King and his subjects wee ought to take knowledg for so was Stowel's Case And also it was adjudged that wee ought to take knowledg of the act concerning the Creation of the Prince because it concerneth the King And Cook in his argument said That if there had not been a speciall proviosin for the Commoner in the Statute of 35. H. 8. the Commoner had not been excluded by that Statute And afterwards Judgment was entred for the plaintiffe Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 236 NOte That it was holden by three of the Justices viz. Walmâ—sley Warburton and Foster Cook and Daniel being abâ—ent for law cleerly That a Tenant at will cannot by any custome make a Lease for life by licence of the Lord and that there cannot be any such custome for a lease for life as there is for a lease for years Pasch 8. Jacobi In the Common Pleas. 237 BERRY's Case NOte That upon an Evidence given to a Jury in a Case betwixt Berry and New Colledg in Oxford it was ruled by Walmesley Warburton Foster Justices in an Action of Trespass If it appear upon the Evidence that the plaintiff hath nothing in the land but in common with a stranger yet the Jury ought to finde with the Plaintiff and if the Defendant will have advantage of the Tenancy in common in the plaintiff he ought to have pleaded it Nichols Serjeant was very earnest to the contrary and took a difference where the Plaintiffe and Defendant are Tenants in common and where the Plaintiff is tenant in common with a stranger But he was over-ruled the action was an action of Trespass Quare clausum fregit c. Cook and Daniel were absent Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 238 IT was holden by Walmesley Warburton and Foster Justices That if a Rent be granted to one and his heirs for the life of another man and the grantee dieth that his heir shall not be an occupant of the Rent And Foster said that the reason was because he cannot plead a Que estate of a Rent
afterwards he granted the Reversion for eighty years reserving the ancient rent The question was Whether he had pursued his Authority because by the meaning of the Proviso a Power was That the Conusor should have the rent presently or when the Term did begin But the opinion of the Court was That he had done lesse then by the Proviso he might have done for this Grant of the Reversion doth expire with the particular estates for life But if he had made a Lease to begin after the death of the Tenants for life the same had been more then this grant of the Reversion And Cook chief Justice said That the Grantor may presently have an Action of debt against the Grantee of the Reversion for the rent But because it was not averred that any of the Cestuy que viei were alive at the time when the Grantor did distrain for the rent Judgement in the principall case was respited Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 282 UPon the Statute of Bankrupts this Case was moved to the Court If a Bankrupt be endebted unto one in Twenty Pounds and to another in Ten Pounds and he hath a Debt due to him by Bond of Twenty Pounds Whether the Commissioners may assigne this Bond to the two Creditors jointly or whether they must divide it and assigne Twenty Marks to the one and Twenty Marks to the other And the Court was of opinion That it was so to be divided as the words of the Statute are viz to every Creditor a portion rate and rate like c. And then it was moved How they might sue the Bond whether they might joine in the Suit or not ad quod non fuit responsum by Cook Warburton Justice said That when part of the Bond is assigned to one and part to another that now the Act of Parliament doth operate upon it and therefore they shall sue severally for he said That by the custome of London part of a debt might be attached And therefore he conceived part might be sued for Trinit 10. Jacobi In the Common Pleas. 283 SPRAT and NICHOLSON's Case SPrat Sub-Deacon of Exeter did libel in the Spiritual Court against Nicholson Parson of A. pro annuali pensione of Thirty Pound issuing out of the Parsonage of A. and in his Libel shewed How that tam per realem compositionem quam per antiquam laudabilem consuetudinem ipse predecessores sui habuerunt habere consueverunt praedictam annualem penfionem out of his Parsonage of A. Dodderidge Serjeant moved for a Prohibition in this Case because he demands the said Pension upon Temporall grounds viz. prescription and reall composition But Cook Chief Justice and the other Justices were of opinion That in this Case no Prohibition should be granted for they said That the party had Election to sue for the same in the Spirituall Court or at the common Law because both the parties were Spirituall persons but if the Parson had been made a party to the Suit then a Prohibition should have been granted Vide Fitz. Nat. Brev. 51. b. acc And they further said That if the party sueth once at the common Law for the said Pension that if he afterwards sue in the Spirituall Court for the same that a Prohibition will lie because by the first Suit he hath determined his Election And Cook cited 22. E. 4. 24. where the Parson brought an Action of Trespass against the Vicar for taking of Under-Woods and each of them claimed the Tithes of the Under-Woods by prescription to belong unto him and in that Case because the right of the Tithes came in question and the persons were both of them Spirituall persons and capable to sue in the Spirituall Court the Temporal Court was ousted of Jurisdiction But he said That if an issue be joined whether a Chappel be Donative or Presentative the same shall be tryed by a Jury at the common Law And in this case it was said by the Justices That the Statute of 34. H. 8. doth authorize Spiritual persons to sue Lay-men for Pensions in the Spiritual Courts but yet they said That it was resolved by all the Judges in Sir Anthony Ropers case That such Spiritual persons could not sue before the High Commissioners for such Pensions for that Suits there must be for enormious Offences only And in the principall case the Prohibition was denyed Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 284 Sir BAPTIST HIX and FLEETWOOD and GOT's Case FLeetwood and Gots by Deed indented did bargain and sell Weston Park being three hundred Acres of Lands unto Sir Baptist Hix at Eleven Pound for every Acre which did amount in the whole to Two thousand five hundred and thirty Pounds and in the beginning of the Indenture of Bargain and Sale it was agreed betwixt the parties That the said Park being much of it Wood-land should be measured by a Pole of eighteen foot and a halfe And further it was covenanted That Fleetwood and Gots should appoint one Measurer and Sir Baptist Hixe another who should measure the said Park and if upon the measuring it did exceed the number of Acres mentioned in the Indenture of Sale that then S. Baptist Hixe should pay to them acording to the proportion of 11l. for every Acre and if it wanted of the Acres in the deed that then Fleet ' and Gots should pay back to S. Baptist the surplusage of the mony according to the proportion of 11. l. for every Acre And upon this Indenture Sir Baptist Hixe brought an Action of Covenant against Fleetwood and Gots and assigned a Breach that upon the measuring of it it wanted of the Acres mentioned in the Deed 70 Acres And upon the Declaration the Defendants did demurre in Law and the cause of the Demurrer was because the Plaintiff did not shew by what measure it was measured And therefore Sherley Serjeant who was of Councel with the Defendants said that although it was agreed in the beginning of the Deed that the measure should be made by a Pole of 18 feet and a half Yet when they come to the covenants there it is not spoken of any measure at all and therefore he said it shall be taken to be such a measure which the Statute concerning the measuring of Lands speaks of viz. a measure of sixteen foot and a half to the Pole and he said that by such measure there did not want any of the said three hundred Acres mentioned in the Deed. Dodderidge Serjeant contrary for the Plaintiff and he layed this for a ground That if a certainty doth once appeare in a Deed afterwards in the same Deed it is spoken indefinitely the same shall be referred to the first certainty and to that purpose he vouched the case in Dyer Lands were given by a Deed to a man haeredibus masculis and afterwards in the same Indenture it appeared that it was haeredibus masculis de Corpore and therefore it was holden but an estate in
parcel of it for in the one Case the Visne shall be of the Manor in the other not Vide 9. Eliz. Dyer ar But it was said That in this Case the Modus did extend only to things in Stangrave and therefore the Visne should be of Stangrave only Nichols Justice said That although the Parish be a Town and of one name yet the Visne shall be from the Parish to which the Court agreed And in the principall Case the Pleading was That the Manor was in Parochia and the Modus alledged to be in Parochia and the Prohibition de Parochia and therefore the Venire facias ought to be de Parochia and not de Manerio or de Villâ—â— Cook cited 4. E. 4. and 23. E. 4. that in Trespass de Parochia is a good addition for it shall not be intended that there are two Towns in one Parish And it was said by the Court in this Case That before the Statute of 2. E. 6. all Prohibitions to the Spirituall Court were quia secutus est de Laico feodo for when a man had a Modus dicimandi the Corn and other things were lay things Then it was moved by a Serjeant at Bar That at the Assizes where the tryall of the Modus decimandi was one of the principal Panel did appear only upon the Venire facias and the question was If in such Case a tales might be awarded de circumstantibus And it was holden by the Court that such tales might be well awarded and 10. Eliz. Dyer vouched to prove the same It was also said by the Court That at the common Law if not in appeal the tales might be of odd number as quinque tales or novem tales but now since the Statute of 35. H. 8. the tales may be even or odd as pleaseth the party But it was adjudged in this Case That in no Case where a triall is at the Bar shall any Tales de circumstantibus be awarded And so are all the Presidents Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 292 LEIGHTON against GREEN and GARRET THomas Leighton an Administrator durante minori 〈◊〉 of J. S. did libell in the Court of Admiralty against the Defendants and shewed in the Libel That there were Covenants made betwixt them by a Charter party they being Owners of the Ship called the Mary and John of Lynn that the Defendants should victuall the said Ship for a Voyage into Denmark and that the Ship should be staunch and without leak And shewed in his Libel that the Ship being upon the Seas did spring a leak by reason of which the Plaintiff did lose a great part of the Freight of the said Ship consisting in divers Commodities viz. Coney skins The Defendant pleaded That the Covenants were made infra Portum de Lynn And further pleaded That the Plaintiffe had before that time brought an Action of Covenants against the same Defendant upon the same Deed in which Action the Plaintiffe was Non-suit and it was adjudged That it was a good Plea in Bar and thereupon a Prohibition was awarded to the Court of Admiralty Cook Chief Justice in this Case said That charter party est charta partita and is all one in the Civil Law as an Indenture is in the Common Law And in this Case it was adjudged That the Triall should be there where the contract was made and so was it adjudged in Constantine and Gynns Case Where the Originall Act was in England and the subsequent matter upon the Sea the Tryall shall be where the Originall Act is done And so it was agreed in this Case that the Tryal should be Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Star-Chamber 293 MILLER against REIGNOLDS and BASSET SIr Henry Mountagu the Kings Serjeant did informe the Lords in the Star-Chamber How that the Defendants had conspired and practised Malitiosè to draw the Plaintiffs life in question being a man of One thousand Pounds per annum and otherwise very rich The Case was shortly thus Basset the Defendant was Tenant unto the Plaintiffe of a house in R. in Kent rendring a Rent the rent was behind and the Plaintiff demanded his Rent of him the Defendant told him That he was not able to satisfie him the Rent but he promised to give unto the Plaintiffe all his Goods in satisfaction of the Rent or so many of them as should countervaile the Rent and it was agreed betwixt the Plaintiff and the Defendant Basset that the Goods should be apprised by two men which was done accordingly and the Plaintiff came to the Defendants house at the time the said Goods were apprised but it was deposed and proved did not go out of the room where the apprisement was made at the time he was in the said house which was the 10 of May 7. Jacobi ar Afterwards the Defendants Reignolds being an Atturny at Law and Basset did conspire to accuse the Plaintiffe because that when he came to the Defendant Bassets house at the time of the apprising of the said Goods that the Plaintiffe went up into an upper Chamber in the said house and broke up a Chest and out of the same took a Gold Ring 10. s. in Money and the Defendant Bassets Lease of his house and thereupon brought the Plaintiff before divers Justices of the Peace who upon Examination of the matter found no ground of suspicion against the Plaintiff and therefore they did not bind him over to the Sessions to answer the same Accusation After this the Defendants made severall motions to the Plaintiff that he would give unto them 300l. and so he should be acquitted and there should be no proceeding against him and because the Plaintiffe refused so to do they told him that divers Courtiers had begged his Estate of the King and that the same was granted unto them when as in truth there was not any thing moved to any Courtier of any such matter but all this was said in a shew only to the end they might get great sums ef mony from him And in that matter they layed the scandall upon S. Rob. Car then Viscount Rochester that he was made privy to it who then was the Kings Maj. great Favorite And when all this could not prevail to gain any Composition from the Plaintiff the Defendants did prefer a Bill of Indictment at the Assizes in Kent against the Plaintiff and there upon Evidence given unto the Grand Jury they found an Ignoramus upon the Bill and divers other plots and divises were contrived by the Defendants all to the end the Plaintiff might lose his life his estate And this matter came to Sentence before the Lords and the Bill proved in every point and circumstance as well by the confession of the Defendants themselves as by divers writings depositions of witnesses and letters read and shewed in open Court and it was said by the whole Court of Lords in this case that this was a very great offence and an offence in Capite and that if such
6. 30. 18 E. 4. 2. 36 H. 6. 7. Also he said When a Declaration is general the Defendant need not traverse 1 E. 4. 9. 2 E. 4. 28. And further he said That the Statute of 27 Eliz. cap. 5. of Demurs helped that defect for that it is but only in matter of form But the Justices did not argue that point But the Question which they made was Whether the Constitution or Ordinance were lawful or not And as to that it was holden by the whole Court That the said Ordinance was unlawful And it was agreed by the Court That the King might make Corporations and grant to them that they may make Ordinances for the ordering and government of any Trade but thereby they cannot make a Monopoly for that is to take away Free-trade which is the birthright of every Subject And therefore the Case was in 2 H. 5. 5. in Debt upon a Bond upon Condition That one should not use his Trade of a Dyer in the Town where the Plaintiffe did inhabit for one year And there said That the Obligation was void because the Condition was against the Law And he swore by God if the Plaintiffe were present that he should go to prison till he had paid a Fine to the King Yet regularly Modus Conventio vincunt legem 2. It was resolved That although such Clause was contained in the Kings Letters Patents yet it was void But where it is either by Prescription or by Custome confirmed by Parliament there such an Ordinance may be good Quia Consuetudo Legalis plus valet quam Concessio Regalis The King granted unto the Abbot of Whitny the Custody of a Port which is as it were a Key of the Kingdom and therefore the Grant was void and so adjudged And such Grants are expresly against the Statute of 9 E 3. cap. 1. And the Charter granted by King Henry the 8. to the Physitians of London hath the same Clause in it But if it had not been confirmed by Act of Parliament made 33 H. 8. it had been void The King granted unto B. that none besides himself should make Ordnances for Battery in the time of war Such Grant was adjudged void But if a man hath brought in a new Invention and a new Trade within the Kingdom in peril of his life and consumption of his estate or stock c. or if a man hath made a new Discovery of any thing In such Cases the King of his grace and favour in recompence of his costs and travail may grant by Charter unto him That he only shall use such a Trade or Trafique for a certain time because at first the people of the Kingdom are ignorant and have not the knowledge or skill to use it But when that Patent is expired the King cannot make a new Grant thereof For when the Trade is become common and others have been bound Apprentices in the same Trade there is no reason that such should be forbidden to use it And Cook Chief Justice put this Case The King granted to B. That he solely should make and carry Kersies out of the Realm and the Grant was adjudged void which Crook concessit 3. It was resolved That this Charter was void because of the words viz. Nisi ante eos vel duos eorum probationem fecerit c. And therefore it was considered what proof should be sufficient for the party And as to that it was agreed That the proof cannot be upon Oath for such a Corporation cannot admidister an Oath unto the party And then the proof must be by his Indentures and Witnesses and perhaps the Corporation will not allow of any of them For which the party hath no remedy against the said Corporation but by his Action at the Common Law and in the mean time he should be barred of his Trade which is all his living and maintenance and to which he had been Apprentice for seven years Another reason was given because that by this way they should be Judges in their own cause which is against the Law And the King cannot grant unto another to do a thing which is against the Law And afterwards Trin. 12 Jacobi Judgment was entred Quod Querentes nihil capiant per Billam And Judgment was then given for the Defendant Pasch 12 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 352. LINSEY and ASHTON's Case LInsey brought an Action of Debt against Ashton upon a Bond the Condition of which was to perform an Award The Defendant said that the Award was That the Defendant should surcease all suits depending betwixt them which he had done The Plaintiffe in his Replication said That the Arbitrators made such Award ut supra and also that the Defendant should pay unto the Plaintiffe 25l. at the house of J. S. absque hoc that they made the other Award only Upon which the Defendant did rejoyn and said That well and true it is that they made those Awards c. But they further awarded that the Plaintiffe should release unto the Defendant which he had not done And upon the Rejoynder the Plaintiffe did demur in Law And the opinion of the Court was without question That the Plea was a departure 19 H. 6. 19. But it was argued by Finch That the Replication was insufficient For the Plaintiffe ought not to have traversed as this Case is because that a man ought not to traverse a thing alleadged by Implication but ought to traverse that which is alleadged de facto upon which there may be an issue joyned And to prove the Traverse void the Case in 11 H. 6. 50. was put But the Exception was not allowed by the Court Another Exception was taken because the Award it self was void because it was to do a thing upon the Land of another man which he might not lawfully do And although the Arbitrators might award him to do the thing which is inconvenient yet they cannot award him to do a thing which is impossible and against the Law as in 17 E. 4 5. Two were bound to stand to the Arbitrement of J. S. of all Trespasses who awarded that the one should pay unto the other 40. and that he find Sureties to be bounden for the payment of it And by the opinion of the Justices the Award was void because he could not award a man to do that which did not lie in his power and he hath no means to compel the stranger to be bound for him But the opinion of the whole Court was against Finch For first the mony is to be paid apud domum J. S. and not in domo And it might be for any thing that appeareth that the said House is adjoyning to the High-way so as every Stranger might lawfully come unto it although he might not come into it without being a Trespassor But admit it be not adjoyning to the High-way yet he might come as neer unto the house as he could or he might get leave to come thither Secondly It was
it is not known whether he be guilty or not and in Cuddingtons Case it was a general Pardon and that was the cause that the Action did lie for that it is not known whether he committed the Felony or not But they conceived that if it had been a particular Pardon that then in that case the Action would not have been maintainable For the procuring of a special Pardon doth presuppose and it is a strong presumption that the party is guilty of the offence Note it did not appear in the Case of Fines the principal Case whether the Pardon by which Dr. Spicer was pardoned were a general Pardon or whether it were a particular and special Pardon Pasch 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 415. DAVER's Case IN Davers Case who was arraigned for the death of William Dutton Ley Chief Justice delivered it for Law That if two men voluntarily fight together and the one killeth the other if it be upon a sudden quarrel that the same is but Man-slaughter And if two men fight together and the one flieth as far as he can and he which flieth killeth him who doth pursue him the same is Se defendendo Also if one man assaulteth another upon the High-way and he who is assaulted killeth the other he shall forfeit neither life nor lands nor goods if he that killed the other fled so far as he could Quod nota Pasch 21 Jacobi â—n the Court of Wards 416. Sir EDWARD COKE's Case THis Case being of great consequence and concernment The Master of the Court of Wards was assisted by four of the Judges in the hearing and debating of it and after many Arguments at the Barr the said four Judges argued the same in Court viz. Dodderidge one of the Justices of the Kings Bench Tanfield Lord chief Baron of the Exchequer Hobart Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas and Ley Lord Chief Justice of his Majesties Court of Kings Bench The Case in effect was this Queen Elizabeth by her Letters Patents did grant to Sir Christopher Hatton the Office of Remembrancer and Collector of the first Fruits for his life Habendum to him after the death or surrender of one Godfrey who held the said Office then in possession Sir Christopher Hatton being thus estated in the said Office in Reversion and being seised in Fee-simple of diverse Mannors Lands and Tenements did Covenant to stand seised of his said lands c. unto the use of himself for life and afterwards to the use of J. Hatton his son in tail and so to his other sons intail with the Remainder to the right heirs of J. Hatton in Fee with Proviso of Revocation at his pleasure during his life Godfrey the Officer in possession died and Sir Christopher Hatton became Officer and was possessed of the Office and afterwards he became indebted to the Queen by reason of his said Office And the Question in this great Case was Whether the Mannors and Lands which were so conveyed and setled by Sir Christopher Hatton might be extended for the said Debt due to the Queen by reason of the Proviso and Revocation in the said Conveyance of Assurance of the said Mannors and Lands the debt due to the Queen was assign'd over and the Lands extended and the Extent came to Sir Edward Coke and the heir of John Hatton sued in the Court of Wards to make void the Extent And it was agreed by the said four Justices and so it was afterwards decreed by Cranfield Master of the Court of Wards and the whole Court That the said Mannors and Lands were liable to the said Extent And Dodderidge Justice who argued first said that the Kings Majestie had sundry prerogatives for the Recovery of Debts and other Duties owing unto him First he had this prerogative ab origine legis That he might have the Lands the Goods and the Body of the Person his Debtor in Execution for his Debt But at the Common Law a common person a common person could not have taken the body of his debtor in execution for his debt but the same priviledg was given unto him by the Statute of 25. E. 3. cap. 17. At the Common Law he said that a common person Debtee might have had a Levari facias for the Recovery of his Debt by which Writ the Sheriffe was commanded Quod de terris Catallis ipsius the Debtor c. Levari faciat c. but in such Case the Debtee did not meddle with the Land but the Sheriffe did collect the Debt and pay the same over to the Debtor But by the Statute of West 2. cap 20. The Debtee might have an Elegit and so have the moyetie of the Lands of his Debtor in Execution for his Debt as it appeareth in C. 3. part 12. in Sir William Harberts Case Secondly He said That the King had another prerogative and that was to have his Debt paid before the Debt of any Subject as it appeareth 41. E. 3. Execution 38. and Pasc 3. Elizabeth Dyer 197. in the Lord Dacres and Lassels Case and in M. 3. E. 6. Dyer 67 Stringfellows Case For there the Sheriffe was amerced because the King ought to have his Debt first paid and ought to be preferred before a Subject vid. 328 Dyer There the words of the Writ of Priviledg shew that the King is to be preferred before other Creditors By the Statute of 33. H. 8. cap. 39. The Execution of the Subject shall be first served if his Judgment be before any Processe be awarded for the Kings debt In the Statute of 25. E. 3. Cap. 19. I find that by the Common Law the King might grant a Protection to his Debtor that no other might sue him before that the King was satisfied his debt See the Writ of Protection Register â— 81. B. the words of which are Et quia nolumus solutionem debitorum nostrorum caeteris omnibus prout ratione Perogativae nostrae totis temporibus retroactis usitatae c. But that grew such a Grievance to the Subject that the Statute of 25. E. 3. Cap. 19. was made And now by that Statute a common person may lawfully sue to Judgment but he cannot proceed to Execution and so the Kings Prerogative is saved unless the Plaintiffe who sueth will give security to pay first the Kings Debt For otherwise if the Paty doth take forth Execution upon his Judgment and doth levy the money the same money may be seized upon to satisfie the Kings Debt as appeareth in 45. E. 3. title Decies tantum 13. The third Prerogative which the King hath is That the King shall have the Debt of the Debtor to the Kings Debtor paid unto him v. 21 H. 7. 12. The Abbot of Ramseys Case The Prior of Ramsey was indebted to the King and another Prior was indebted to the Prior of Ramsey and then it was pleaded in Barr that he had paid the same Debt to the King and the Plea holden for a good Plea
Tenements of one attainted in a Premunire shall be forfeited to the King Yet Tenant in Tail in such Case did not forfeit his Lands C. 11. part 63. b. as the Statute of West 2. Cap. 1. saith in particular words That Tenant in Tail shall not prejudice his issue Therefore the Statute of 26. H. 8. in particular words saith That Tenant in Tail shall forfeit his Lands for Treason The Right of Francis Bigot is not a right in gross but a Right mixed with a possession The Statute of West 2. Cap. 1. brought with it many mischiefs For by that Statute the Ancestor being Tenant in Tail could not redeem himself out of prison nor help his wife nor his younger children and that mischief continued untill 12. E. 4. Taltaram's Case and then the Judges found a means to avoid those mischiefs by a common Recovery and this Invention of a common Recovery was a great help to the Subject Then came the Statute of 32. H. 8. Cap. 36. which Enacted That Fines levied by Tenant in Tail should be a good barr to the issue of any Estate any way entailed If the Son issue in tail levieth a Fine in the life of his Father who is Tenant in tail it shall be a barr to him who levieth the Fine and to his issues And both these viz. the Common Recovery and the said Statute did help the Purchaser And shall not this Statute of 26. H. 8. help the King The Statute of 26. H. 8. Cap. 13. hath not any strength against the Ancestor but against the Child For the Construction of Statutes I take three Rules First When a Case hapneth which is not within the Letter then it is within the intent and equity of the Statute Com. 366. 464. Secondly All things which may be taken within the mischief of the Statute shall be taken within the Equity of the Statute 4. H. 6. 26. per Martin Thirdly When any thing is provided for by a Statute every thing within the same mischief is within the same Statute 14. H. 7. 13. The Estate tail of Francisâ— Bigot and Katharine his wife is forfeited by the Statute of 26 H. 8. There is a difference when the Statute doth fix the forfeiture upon the person As where it is enacted that J. S. shall forfeit his lands which he had at the time of his Attaindor The Judges ought expound that Statute only to J. S. But the Statute of 26 H. 8. doth not fix the forfeiture upon the person but upon the land it self And Exposition of Statutes ought to extend to all the mischiefs 8 Eliz. Sir Ralph Sadler's Case in B. R. where an Act of Parliament did enact That all the lands of Sadler should be forfeited to the King of whomsoever they were holden Sadler held some lands of the King in that case the King had that land by Escheat by the Common-Law and not by the said Statute Com. 563 The Law shall say that all the rights of the tail are joyned together to strengthen the estate of the King Tenant in tail before the Statute of 1 E. 6. cap. 14. of Chauntries gave lands to superstitious uses which were enjoyed five years before the said Statute of 1 E. 6. made Yet it was adjudged that the right of the issue was not saved but that the land was given to the Crown for the issue is excluded by the saving in the said Statute If Tenant in tail give the lands to charitable uses the issue is barred For the saving of the Statute of 39 Eliz. cap. 5. excludes him And he is bound by the Statute of Donis So the Statute of 26 H. 8. cap. 13. and the private Act of 31 H. 8. do save to all but the heirs of the Offenders The third Objection was That Ratcliffe was not excluded by the saving for it was said That the same doth not extend but to that which is forfeited by his Ancestors body And here Ratcliffe had but a Right and that was saved And the Statute doth not give Rights I answer first The Statute of 26 H. 8. is not to be expounded by the letter for then nothing should be forfeited but that only which he had in possession and use Tenant in tail is disseised and attainted for treason By the words of the said Statute of 26 H. 8. he forfeits nothing yet the issue in tail shall forfeit the lands for the issue in tail hath a right of Entrie which may be forfeited 6 H. 7. 9. A right of Entrie may escheat and then it may be forfeited Secondly The Statute is not to be construed to the possession but if he hath a mixt right with the possession it is forfeited but a right in grosse is not forfeited Tenant in tail of a Rent or Seignorie purchaseth the Tenancie or the Land out of which the Rent is issuing and is attainted He shall forfeit the Seignorie and Rent or the Land for the King shall have the Land for ever And then the Seignorie or Rent shall be discharged for otherwise the King should not have the Land for ever For the King cannot hold of any Lord a Seignorie 11 H. 7. 12. The heir of Tenant in tail shall be in Ward for a Meanaltie descended unto him the Meanaltie not being in esse and yet it shall be said to be in esse because of the King C. 3 part 30. Cars Case Although the Rent was extinguished yet as to the King it shall be in esse The difference is betwixt a Right clothed with a possession and a right in grosse viz. where the Right is severed from the possession there it is in grosse For there the Right lieth only in Action and therefore neither by the Statute of 26 H. 8. nor by the private Act of 31 H. 8. such a Right is not forfeited C. 3. part 2. C. 10. part 47 48. Right of Action by the Common-Law nor by Statute-Law shall escheat and therefore it is not forfeited For no Right of Action is forfeitable because the right is in one and the possession in another Perkins 19. A Right per se cannot be charged 27 H. 8. 20. by Mountague A man cannot give a Right by a Fine unless it be to him who hath the possession C. 10. part Lampits Case Sever the possibility from the right and it doth not lie in grant or forfeiture but unite them as they are in our Case and then the Right may be granted or forfeited for that Right clothed with a possession may be forfeited A Right clothed with the possession 1. It tastes of the possession 2. It waits upon the possession 3. It changes the possession The Bishop of Durham hath all Forfeitures for Treason by the Common-Law within his Diocess viz. the Bishoprick of Durham And if Tenant in tail within the Bishoprick commits Treason and dyeth the Issue in tail shall enjoy the land against the Bishop Dyer 289 a. pl. 57. For the Bishop hath not the land for ever but the Issue
in tail may have a Formedon against the Bishop But in our Case it is otherwise Tenant in tail maketh a Feoffment and takes back an estate unto himself in tail the remainder in Fee to his right heirs The Bishop in such case shall not have the land forfeited for Treason because that the Bishop cannot have the estate tail but in such case the King shall have the Land by the Statute of 26 H. 8. cap. 13. And the Bishop in such case shall not have the Fee because it is one estate and the King shall not wait upon the Subject viz the Bishop The Right waits upon the possession For 11 H. 7. 12. If the son and a stranger disseiseth the father and the father dyeth this right infuseth it self into the possession and changeth the possession And it is a Release in fact by the father to the son 9 H. 7. 25. Br ' Droit 57. A Disseisor dyeth seised and his heir enters and is disseised by A. The first Disseisee doth release unto A. all his right All the right is now in the second Disseisor viz. A. because the right and the possession meet together in A. 40 E. 3. 18. b. Tenant in tail makes a Lease for life with warranty If Tenant for life be impleaded by the heir to whom the warranty doth discend he shall rebut the right in tail being annexed with the possession for that is in case of a saving of the land by that right But where one demands land there all the Right ought to be shewed 11 H. 4 37. If a man be to bring an Action to recover then he ought to make a good title by his best right if he hath many rights But if a man be in possession and an Action be brought against him then he may defend himself by any of his rights or by all his rights 11 H. 7. 21. Tenant in tail maketh a Feoffment to his use upon Condition and afterwards upon his Recognisance the land is extended and afterwards the Condition is performed yet the interest of the Conusee shall not be avoided For although the Extent come upon the Fee and not upon the Tail yet when the Extent was it was extracted out of all the rights C. 7. part 41. A Tenant in tail makes a Lease for life now he hath gained a new Fee by wrong and afterwards he makes a Lease for years and Tenant for life dyeth He shall not avoid his Lease for years although he be in of another estate because he had a defeicible title and an ancient right the which if they were in several hands shall be good as the Lease of the one and the Confirmation of the other And being in one hand it shall be as much in Law as a saving of the Right In our Case the Right and Possession both were in Francis Bigot And Ratcliffe is entitled to the old estate tail and to the new also There is a difference betwixt him who claims the land so forfeited to the King and the heir of the body of the person attainted Littâ—719 Land is given to A and the issue males of his body the remainder to the heirs females of his body If the Father commit Treason both heir male and female are barred for they both claim by the Father but if the heir male after the death of his Father be attainted of Treason the King shall have the lands as long as he hath issue male of his body and then the heir female shall have the lands for she shall not forfeit them because she claimeth not by the brother but by the father Com. in Manxels case A man hath three several rights of estate tails and comes in as Vouchee If the Recovery pass it shall bar all his Rights for one Recompence and they shall be all bound by one possession There is a difference where the Kings title is by Conveyance of the party and where for forfeiture for Treason by this Statute of 26 H. 8. cap. 13. v. the Abbot of Colchesters Case The Abbot seised in the right of his house did commit Treason and made a Lease for years and then surrendred his house to the King after the Statute of 26 H. 8. The question was whether the King should avoid the Lease It was adjudged That the King was in by the surrender and should not avoid the Lease and not by the Statute of 26 H. 8. But if the King had had it by force of the Statute then the King should have avoided the Lease Com. 560. Tenant in tail the reversion to the King Tenant in tail maketh a Lease for years and is attainted of Treason The King shall avoid the Lease upon the construction of the Statute of 26 H. 8. which gives the lands unto the King for ever The third point is upon the Remitter This point had been argued by way of Admittance For as I have argued The ancient right is given away unto the King and then there is no ancient right and so no Remitter There is a difference where the issue in tail is forced to make a Title and where not In point of defence he is not so precisely forced to make his Title as he is in case of demand Whereas the Defendant demands the lands from the King the Discent will not help him because the Attaindor of the Ancestor of Ratcliffe hinders him in point of title to make a demand Dyer 332 b. In this case he ought to make himself heir of the body of Francis Bigot and Katharine C. 8. part 72. C. 9. part 139 140. There Cook couples the Case of Fine levied and the Case of Attaindor together C. 8. part 72. Land is given to husband and wife and to the heirs of their two bodies The husband alone levies a Fine with proclamations Or is attainted of Treason and dyeth The wife before Entry dyeth The issue is barred and the Conusee or King hath right unto the land because the issue cannot claim as heir to them both viz. father and mother for by the father he is barred 5 H. 7. 32 33. C. 9. part 140. Husband and wife Tenants in tail If one of them be attainted of Treason as it was in our Case the lands shall not discend to the issue because he cannot make title And there Cook puts the Case That if lands be given to an Alien and his wife they have a good estate tail and yet it is not discendable to the issue The Consequence then of all this is That if Ratcliffe cannot take advantage of the discent by reason of the disability by Attaindor à fortiori he shall not be remitted And yet I confess that in some Cases one may be remitted against the King Com. 488 489 553. But that is where the King is in by matter of Law by Conveyance but in this Case the King is in by an Act of Parliament and there shall be no Remitter against a matter of Record Another reason is because that
the possession is bound by the Judgment of Attaindor and the Act of Parliament 5 H. 7. 31. 7 H. 7. 15. 16 H. 7. 8. A discent of land shall not make a title against the King or any other who hath the land by an Act of Parliament But then in our Case If there should be a Remitter yet the same is overreached by the Office 〈◊〉 part 10. before the Statute of 33 H. 8. cap. 20. there ought to have been an Office found in the Case of Attaindor of Treason Br. Cases 103. Brook Office Devant c. 17. I do not mean an Office of intitling but an Office declaratory of a conspicuous title C. 5. part 52. There are two manner of Offices One which vesteth the estate and possession of the land c. in the King Another which is an Office of Instruction and that is when the estate of the land is lawfully in the King but the particularity thereof doth not appear upon record And the Office of Instruction shall relate to the time of the Attaindor not to make Queen Elizabeth in our Case in by discent but to avoid all meâ—ne Incombrances And is not this Remitter an Incombrance And for that purpose the Office shall relate For in things of Continuance Nullum tempus occurrit Regi C. 7. part 28. For so the rule of Nullum tempus c. is to be understood of a thing of Continuance and not a thing unica vice v. Fitz. Entre Congeable 53. Trav. 40. where it is said Where the King hath cause to seise for the forfeiture of Tenant for life if the Tenant for life dyeth the Reversion may enter for in that case Tempus occurrit Regi and the King cannot seize after the death of the Tenant for life 35 H. 6. 57. There is no discent against the King and if there be no discent then there is no Remitter The consequence of all this is That the Office doth relate to the Right And that the Monstrans de Droit doth not lie And the want of Office found for all this time was the fault of the Kings Officers and shall not prejudice the King But if the Office should not relate then the Monstrans de Droit would lie because then the King was in but by one single matter of Record We shew in the Office 33 Eliz. That there issued forth a Commission directed to certain of the Privy-Councel to enquire of the Treason and if Francis Bigot upon the Treason were Indicted And in our Case we shew immediately another Commission was directed to the Lord Chancellor and the two Chief Justices c. to arraign Francis Bigot And all that is confessed by Ratcliffe himself viz. modo forma And therefore the Objection which Glanvile made was frivolous viz. That it did not appear that Francis Bigot was attainted by Verdict by Confession or by Outlawry And so he concluded That for these causes the Judgment given in the Court of Common-Pleas ought to be reversed George Crook argued for Ratcliffe and he prayed that the Judgment might be affirmed I will argue only these points following 1. That Francis Bigot had not so much as a right of Action at the time of his Attaindor for he had not any right at all 2. Admit that he had a right of Action If this right of Action be given to the King by the said Statutes of 26 31 H. 8. It was objected That the right being clothed with a possession that the same is given to the King But I will prove the contrary 3. When Francis Bigot being Tenant in tail and being attainted and executed for Treason and then Katherine his wife dyeth being one of the Donees in tail 21 H. 8. and the lands discend to Ratcliff If the Office afterwards found shall relate to take away the Remitter I say it doth not but that his Remitter doth remain to maintain his Monstrans de Droit and he is not put to his Petition The chief point is What right Francis Bigot had at the time of his Attaindor 1. When Ralph Bigot being Tenant in tail 6 H. 8. made a Feoffment in Fee what right remained in Francis his Son The right is in abeyance viz. in nubibus that is in custodia Legis And then Francis Bigot had no right of that entail 21 H. 8. when he made the Feoffment Com. 487. There Jus is divided viz. Jus recuperandi Jus in randi Jus habendi Jus retinendi Jus percipiendi Jus possedendi but here Francis Bigot had not any of these rights Com. 374. if the Discontinuee of Tenant in tail levieth a Fine with proclamations and five years passe and Tenant in tail dyeth the issue in tail shall have other five years because he is the first to the right 19 H. 8. 7. C. 7. part 81. If Donee in tail maketh a Feoffment in Fee in rei veritate the Donee hath not jus in re neque ad rem C. 3. part 29. Litt. 649. There it appeareth that the right to an estate tail may be in abeyance Com. 552. Walsinghams Case There the King gave land in tail to Wyat who made a Feoffment unto Walsingham Afterwards Wyat was attainted of Treason and there the estate tail of Wyat was forfeited but the cause there was because that the reversion was in the Crown and so no discontinuance by his Feoffment because that the reversion was in the Crown In our Case no right of the estate tail was in Francis Bigot after the Feoffment unto his own use but the right is in abeyance It was objected That the Writ of Formedon is Discendit jus and the Monstrans de Droit was so I answer It is so in point of form in the Writ but not in substance C. 7. part 14. Tenant in tail makes a Lease for life and Tenant for life dyeth Now he hath an ancient right and the Donor may avow upon the Tenant in tail notwithstanding his Feoffment but that is by reason of privity and not by reason of any right he hath Jus recuperandi did discend to the issue in tail viz. Francis Bigot 21 H. 8. He who hath a right of Action giveth the same away by his Livery and Feoffment as appeareth by the Cases put in C. 1. part 111. It was objected That Cestuy que use was an Attorney or Servant therefore he doth not passe his own right for he cannot make an Attorney to make Livery and 9 H. 7. 26. was cited to be adjudged so But it is adjudged to the contrary M. 25 H. 8. in the Kings Bench rot 71. betwixt the Bishop of London and Kellet as it appeareth in Dyer 283. and Bendloe's Reports and C. 9. part 75. For there it is expresse that Cestuy que use may make a Letter of Attorney to make Livery which proves that he makes not the Feoffment as a Servant but as Owner of the Land It was objected That Cuesty que use was as an Executor but that I deny 49
E. 3 17 a. Persay Executors cannot make a Feoffment but they ought to make a Sale and the Vendee viz. the Bargainee is in without Livery and Seisin But if they do make a Feoffment by the Livery all their right is given away But if an Attorney giveth Livery in the name of his Master nothing of his own right to the same Land is given away by the Livery and Seisin but if he maketh Livery in his own name then he giveth away his own right and the Statute of 1 R. 3. cap. 1. maketh the Feoffment good which is made by Cestuy que use against him and his heirs C. 1. pt 111. By Livery and Seisin his whole right is given away Com. 352. The Feoffees of Cestuy que use are disseised the Disseisor enfeoffeth Cestuy que use who enfeoffs a stranger And the Question was If by this Feoffment made by Cestuy que use the right of the first Feoffees were determined and extinct Fitzherbert held that the right was gone and in that case the Uses were raised after 1 R. 3. and before 27 H. 8. cap. 10. Although Yelverton held that it was meant of a Feoffment before the Statute of 1 R. 3. Jus recuperandi was in Francis Bigot Then the question is Whether this Right were given away by the Statutes of 26 31 H. 8. The Statute of 26 H. 8. 31 H. 8. are several and distinct Statutes The words of the Statute of 26 H. 8. are That the party offending shall forfeit all his Possession and Vse but there is no word of Right in the Statute and that Statute doth not extend to give any land but that which was in possession or use And the cause was because before that Statute of 26 H. 8. Uses were not given unto the King for Attaindor for Treason they being but a Trust and Confidence C. 11. part 36 b. The Statute sayes By any wayes title or means But observe when this Statute was made It is a penal Statute and therefore shall be taken strictly Stamford 129 b. C. 11. part 36 b. The Statute of 5 6 E. 6. takes away Clergy but if a stranger be in the house by licence of the Owner the party shall have his Clergy because out of the words and being a penal Law it shall be taken strictly The Statute of 33 H. 8. cap. 20. forfeits for Treason Right to the Land viz. right of Entry but the Statute of 26 H 8. giveth not any Right Before the Statute of 33 H. 8. a right of Entry was not given to the King for Treason à fortiori a right of Action was not forfeited to the King It is the Statute of 31 H. 8. the private Act which hurteth us which expresly gave Rights But this Right in our Case is not forfeited by this Statute which giveth Rights which a man hath But in our Case Francis Bigot had not the Right but the Right was in abeyance Statutes in points of Forfeiture forfeit no more then a man hath But yet a Statute may give to the King that which a man hath not C. 11. part 13. The statute of Monasteries gave that to the King which was not viz. Monasteries in reputation saving to none but strangers no not to the Donors Hussies Case Tenant in tail doth bargain and sell to the King and a statute gave it to the King saving to strangers but neither the Donor nor his issue were within the saving Old Entries 423. b c d. It was enacted That the Duke of Suffolk should forfeit for Treason all his Lands Rights and Tenements and all such Rights and Titles of Entry which he had But thereby rights of Action were not given to the King but only rights of Entries The statutes of 31 33 H. 8. are alike in words If Tenant in tail the Remainder over forfeit c. the Remainder is saved without words of saving But if the statute giveth the land by name unto the King then the Remainder is not saved but is destroyed If a Right of Action be given unto the King the statutes of Limitation and Fines are destroyed for he is not bound by them C. 485 486. in point of forfeiture Stamf. 187 188. There is a difference betwixt real and personal Rights given to the King C. 3. part 3. A right of Action concerning Inheritances are not forfeited by Attaindor c. But Obligations Statutes c. are forfeited by Attaindor C. 7. part 9. A right of Action is not given to the King by general words of an Act because it lieth in privity And it would be a vexation to the subject if they should be given C. 4. pt 124. Although that a Non compos mentis cannot commit Felony yet he may commit Treason for the King is Caput salus reipublicae If Non compos mentis maketh a Feoffment and then committeth Treason the King shall not have an Action to recover the Land of the Non compos mentis as the party himself may have But if Non compos mentis be disseised and then be attainted of Treason then the King may enter into the Lands because the party himself had a right of Entry which is given to the King It was objected That a right of Action clothed with a possession might be given to the King Tenant in tail discontinues and takes back an estate and is attainted of Treason This right of Action shall not be forfeited to the King for his right of Action was to the estate tail In our Case the right of Action was to Katherine for she was Tenant for life The Attaindor was 29 H 8. and the Act which forfeited the Right was made 31 H. 8. and then the right and possession were divided 30 H. 6. Grants 91. The King may grant the Temporalties of a Bishop before they happen to be void And so he may grant a Ward But the King cannot grant the Lands of J. S. when he shall be attainted of Treason for the Law doth not presume that J. S. will commit Treason The Devise of a Term the Remainder over is good But if the Devise be of a Term to one in tail the Remainder over the Remainder is void because the Law doth presume that an estate in tail may continue for ever C. 8. part 165 166. The Law did not presume that Digby at the time of the Conveyance intended to commit Treason It was objected That whatsoever may be granted may be forfeited I deny that C. 3. part 10. by Lumley's Case If the issue in tail in the life of his Father be attainted of high Treason and dyeth it is no forfeiture of the estate tail But if the issue in tail levieth a Fine in the life of his Father it is a bar to his issues C. 3. part 50. Sir George Brown's Case 10 E. 4. 1. there Executors may give away the goods of the Testator but they cannot forfeit the goods of their Testator Com. 293. Osborns Case Guardian in
Soccage may grant the Ward but he cannot forfeit him C. 3. part 3. Right of Actions reals because they are in privity by general words of a Statute are not given to the King v. Dyer 67. String fellow's Case That which is in custodia Legis cannot be taken as a Distress in a Pound overt cannot be taken out of the Pound upon another Distress The third Point is If he were remitted And I conceive that he was remitted When Tenant in tail is attainted of Treason the issue at the Common Law should inherit as if he had not been attainted Lit. 747. C. 1. part 103. for as to the Estate tail there was no corruption of blood C. 10. part 10. If Tenant in tail before the Statute of 26. H. 8. commit Treason the land shall discend to his issue for the issue doth not claim by the Father but per formam doni◠C. 8. part 166. such a discent shall take away entrie But in our Case Ratcliff had both possession and right and therefore is remitted the speciall Verdict finds that he was remitted and the Judgment given in the Court of Pleas in the Exchequer was that he was remitted It was objected that the Remitter was destroyed by the relation of the Office but the same is not so for the Office relates only to avoid Incombrances viz. acts done by himself but to devest the Freehold and to settle the same in the King the Office shall not relate And if it should relate then the King should lose many Lands which he now hath Com. Nichols Case Tenant for life upon condition to have Fee c. If the Office shall relate then the same takes away the Freehold out of the person attainted à principio and then the Fee cannot accrue and so by that means the King should lose the lands A Remitter is no incombrance for it is an ancient right and the Act of the King cannot do wrong C. 1. part 44. b. 27 Ass 30. There Tenant for life with clause of re-entrie is attainted the reversioner entreth the Office shall not relate to take the Freehold out of the reversioner C. 3. part 38. Relatio est fictio juris and shall never prejudice a third person and the Office found in the life of Katherine shal not prejudice him C. 9. part Beamounts Case the husband and wife are Tenants in tail the husband is attainted of Treason and dyeth yet the wife is tenant in tail when it is not to the damage or prejudice of the King there tempus occurrit Regi C. 7. part 28. Baskervile's Case From 29 H. 8. untill 33 H. 8. Katherine and afterwards Ratcliff had the possession and then the Law was taken to be that Ratcliff had a lawfull possession For these reasons he concluded that the Judgment ought to be affirmed In Trinity Term following viz. Trin. 21. Jacobi Regis the Case was argued again and then Coventry the Kings Attorney general argued for the Lord Sheffield That the Judgment given in the Court of Pleas in the Exchequer ought to be reversed He said I will insist only upon the right of the Case Whether upon the right of the Case Ratcliff may maintain a Monstrans de Droit First If by the Attainder the right of the old Estate tail as well as of the new Estate tail be forfeited Secondly Admitting that the old right of entail be not forfeited then if the Office do overreach the Remitter for then a Monstrans de Droit doth not lie but a Petition for the reason of the discontinuance First it is evident that when Ralph Bigot Tenant in tail in possession 6 H. 8. made a Feoffment that that was a discontinuance and it is as clear that the right of the old Estate tail vested in Francis Bigot The Feoffment made by Francis Bigot 21 H. 8. did not devest the right of the old tail First for the weaknesse of the Feoffment Secondly for the inseparableness of the Estate tail which is incommunicable and not to be displaced by weak assurance That Feoffment was made according to the Statute of 1 R. 3. and not by the Common Law but only by force of the said Statute The Feoffment is without Deed and so nothing passeth but only by way of Livery or else nothing at all Also at the time of the Feoffment in 21 H. 8. the Feoffees were in seisin of the Lands and Ratcliff shews in his Monstrans de Droit that Francis Bigot did disseise the Feoffees and so the Feoffment had no force as a Feoffment at the Common Law but only by the Statute of 1 R. 3. For at the Common-Law if Cestuy que use had entred upon the Feoffees and made a Feoffment nothing had passed There is a difference betwixt a Feoffment at the Common Law and a Feoffment according to the Statute of 1 R. 3. which operates sub modo Feoffments are the ancient Conveyances of Lands but Feoffments according to the Statute of 1 R. 3. are upstarts and have not had continuance above 150 years In case of Feoffments at the Common Law the Feoffor ought to be seised of the lands at the time of the Feoffment but if a Feoffment be according to the Statute of 1 R. 3. in such Case the Feoffor needeth not be in possession Feoffments at the Common Law give away both Estates and Rights but Feoffments by the Statute of R. 3 give the Estates but not the Rights In case of Feoffment at the Common Law the Feoffee is in the Per viz. by the Feoffor but in case of Feoffments by the Statute of R. 3. the Feoffees are in in the Post viz by the first Feoffees 14 H. 8 10. Brudnel says that a Feoffment by Cestuy que use by the Statute of 1 R. 3 is like to fire out of a flint so as all the fire which cometh out of the flint will not fasten upon any thing but tinder or gunpowder So a Feoffment by Cestuy que use by force of the Statute of 1 R. 3 will not fasten upon any thing but what the Statute requires 5 H. 7. 5. 21 H. 7. 25. 8 H. 7 8. 27 H. 8. 13. 23. by these books it appeareth that if Cestuy que use maketh a Leafe for life during the Lease he gaines nothing and after the Lease he gains no reversion for the Lessee shall hold of the Feoffees and of them he shall have aid and unless it be by deed Indented in such a Case a Reservation of Rent is void and the Lessor in such a Case cannot punish the Lessee for waste for he makes the Lease meerly by the power which the Statute gives him 8. H. 7. 9. Cestuy que use makes the Feoffment as servant to the Feoffees and if not as servant to the Feoffees yet at least as servant to the Statute of 1 R. 3. If a man entreth upon another and maketh a Lease for life he gains a reversion to himself and shall maintain an Action of Waste but
Cestuy que use when he entreth and maketh a Lease he hath no reversion nor shall punish waste And as it is in the Creation so is it in the Continuance 4 H. 7. 18. If Cestuy que use for life or in tail maketh a Lease for life it is warranted during his own life by the Statute of 1 R. 3. but if Tenant for life at the Common Law maketh a Feoffment or a lease for life there the first Lessor ought to avoid this forfeiture by entrie and it is not void by the death of the second Lessor viz. the Tenant for life 27 H. 8. 23. A Feme Covers is Cestuy que use the husband maketh a Feoffment and dieth the Feoffment is void by his death Br. Feoffments to Uses 48. If Cestuy que use for life levieth a fine it is no forfeiture but good by the Statute of 1 R. 3. during his own life And if in such case Proclamations pass there needeth no claim nor entrie within five years but the Law is contrarie of Tenant for life by the Common Law for if Tenant for life at the Common Law levieth a fine it is a forfeiture Dyer 57. Cestuy que use for life or in tail maketh a Lease for life the Lease is determined by the death of Cestuy que use and the Lessee is become Tenant at sufferance but a Lease for life by Tenant for life at the Common Law is not determined by the death of Lessee for life who was Lessor and his Tenant is tenant for life and not at sufferance as in the Case before and the first Lessor ought to avoid it by entrie Br. Feoffments to Uses 48. A Recovery by Cestuy que use in tail or in fee is ended by his death By these Cases appears a main difference betwixt the validitie of a Feoffment by Cestuy que use and the Feoffment at the Common Law The Statute of 27 H. 8. of Uses doth not execute Uses which are in abeyance C. 1. part Chudleigh's Case 9 H. 6. by the Common Law the Devise to an Enfant in ventre samier is good but by the Statutes of 32 and 34 H. 8. of Wills such a Devise is not good for the Statute Law doth not provide for the putting of lands in abeyance By the Statute of 1 R. 3. All Feoffments and Releases c. shall be good and effectual to those to whom they are made to their uses And this Feoffment in our Case was not made to a man in Nubibus Cestuy que use by this Statute of 1 R. 3. makes a lease for years the remainder over to the right heirs of I. S. the remainder is not good for the Statute doth not put it in abeyance for the remainder ought to be limited to one in esse 21 H. 8. cap. 4. giveth power to Executors to sell that Executor who proveth the Will shall sell and when he selleth if he have any right to the land the right of the said Executor is not gone by that Statute So if Commissioners upon the Statute of Bankrupts sell the Lands of the Bankrupt and one of the Commissioners hath right to the land so sold his right is not extinct And so in this Case the Statute limits what shall pass Upon the Statute of â—3 Eliz. cap. 4. which makes the lands of Receivers liable for their debts if the King selleth the right of the Accomptant passeth but not the Kings right 17 E. 3. 60. An Abbot having occasion to go beyond the Seas made another Abbot his Procurator to present to such Benefices which became void in his absence That Abbot presents in the name of him who made him Procurator to one of his own Advowsons the right of his own Advowson doth not pass but yet it is an usurpation of the Abbot which went beyond sea to that Church What is the nature of this right All rights are not giâ—en away by Feoffments at the Common Law Lit. 672. Land is given unto husband and wife in tail the husband maketh a Feoffment and takes back an Estate to him and his wife both of them are remitted Which Case proveth that the husband hath left in himself a right notwithstanding the Feoffment 41 E. 3. 17. 41 Ass 1. John at Lee's Case So at the Common Law a Feoffment doth not give away all the right This right doth stick so fast in the issue as the Statute of West 2. cap. 1. can back it unto him 2 E. 3. 23. 22 E. 3. 18. At the Common Law if Tenant in tail had offered to levie a fine the Judges ought not to receive it but ought to have refused it if it had appeared unto them that the Conusor was Tenant in tail the same was before the Statute of 4 H. 7. which gave power to Tenant in tail to levie a fine for the Statute of West 2. Cap. 1. saies Quod finis sit nullus 2. E. 2. age 77. 2 E. 3. 33. 3 E. 3. 1. 24 E 3. 25. If Donee in tail levieâ—h a Fine yet there is no remedie against his Tenant for he shall not be compelled to attorn for that the right is in the Donor â— E. 2. Avowry 181. 48 E. 3. 8. Avowry was made upon the Donee in tail notwithstanding that he made a Feoffment and Avowry is in the realtie and right 4 E. 3. 4. 4 H. 6. 28. 10 H. 7. 14. In a Replevin ancient Demesne is a good plea because the Avowry is in the realtie The Donor shall know for homage upon the Donee after that the Donee hath made a Feoffment 7 E. 4. 28. the Donee shall do homage And Litt. 90. saith That none shall do homage but such as is seised in his own right or in the right of another 2 E. 2. Avowry 85. 7 E 54. 28. 15 E. 4. 15 Gard. 116. the issue shall be in Ward notwithstanding a Feoffment by Tenant in tail Com. 561. Tenant in tail maketh a Feoffment yet the right of the tail doth remain in the Tenant in tail 21 H. 7. 40. Tenant in tail of a Rent grants the same in Fee if an Ancestor collateral releaseth with Warranty the same bindeth the Tenant in tail There is a common Rule That a Warranty doth not bind when a man hath not a right The Cases cited in C. 1. part Albonies Case where Feoffments give Rights I agree Barton and Ewers Case A man made a Feoffment of Land of which he had cause to have a Writ of Error he gave away his Writ of Error by the Feoffment I agree all those Cases for that is in Cases of Feoffments at the Common Law but in our Case the Feoffment is by the Statute of 1 R. 3. In our Case there is Jus habendi possedendi recuperandi It is like unto a plant in Winter which seemeth to be dead yet there is in it anima vegitativa which in due time brings forth fruit So the right in our Case is not given away nor is it in abeyance
by prescription have used to have and dig clay there The first point is found for the Defendant and the last issue is found against the Defendant and damages are given generally All the question is upon the Declaration Coepit asportavit the clay which implies a propertie and interest in the clay to be to the Plaintiffe It is not said that the clay was carried over the land I conceive that the property of the clay is in issue and the Commoner hath nothing to do with that So damages being given to him for that which doth not belong unto him I hold the Judgment to be Erroneous and that it ought to be reversed Dodderidge The Declaration is well enough and of necessity it cannot be otherwise Here the Plaintiffe challengeth nothing but Common In an Action upon the Case there ought to be injurie and damage which is the consequent upon injurie For an Action upon the Case will not lie for an injurie without damage Here Bullen doth not complain for any thing but the loss of his Common which is the first wrong The second wrong is the digging of the pit in the which his cattel may fall and perish The third wrong is for carrying away of six loads of clay over the Common which is a great detriment to the Common to carrie it either by Carts or otherwise and for these three wrongs he concludes his damages ratione cujus he could not have his Common in as ample manner as before he was used to have it and he doth not conclude any damage for the clay Every one of these injuries doth increase the damages and so it would have been if he had left the clay to lie upon the land by the pit for thereby so much Common would have been lost Here he makes himself title only to the Common and these Acts do increase the damages only 2. E. 4. 7 E. 4. Where one was unlawfully and falsly imprisoned and being imprisoned compelled to levie a Fine or make a Feoffment or other Deed. In an Action of false Imprisonment the Jurie gave damages by reason of his restraint of his Liberty and increased them by reason of the levying of the Fine or making the Feoffment or other Deed which he then made The Jurie found that he is not to have any clay and coepit asportavit doth not alter the Case for that is a special Action of trespass And by three of the Justices against Haughton the Judgment given in the Court of Common Pleas was affirmed Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 438. CAlthrope Councellor cited this Case to have been adjudged 25 Eliz. The husband seised in the right of his wife of Copyhold Land made a Lease for years and it was holden by the Court then That by the death of the husband the forfeiture of the Copyhold was purged and that the wife should have the land again notwithstanding this forfeiture by the husband by making a Lease for years without Licence And the Court seemed to allow of the said Case to be Law And afterwards this very Term the like Case came in question in this Court betwixt Severn and Smith where in an Ejectione firme a special Verdict found That a Copyholder seised in the right of his wife made a Lease for years and it was a question whether it were a forfeiture of the inheritance of the wife Hitcham Serjeant said it was no forfeiture Dodderidg Justice took this difference Where a Feme Sole is a Copyholder and she takes a husband who makes a lease for years without licence the same is a forfeiture because it is her folly to take such a husband as will forfeit her Land But where a Copyhold is granted to a Feme Covert and the husband maketh a Lease without Licence in such case it is no forfeiture and so in the Case of a Feme Lessee for life at the Common Law against Whitinghams Case C. 8. part 44. It was adjourned Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 439. NOte It was the opinion of all the Justices and so declared That if the Plaintiffe in an Ejectione firme doth mistake his Declaration That the Defendant in such Case shall have his Costs of the Plaintiffe by reason of his unjust vexation Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 440. FOur several men were joyntly Indicted for erecting and keeping of four several Inns in Bathe It was moved that the Indictment was insufficient because the offence of the one is not the offence of the other like unto the Case in Dyer 19. Where two joyn in an Action upon the Case for words 't is not good but they ought for to sever in their Actions because the wrong to the one is no wrong to the other Dodderidge Iustice One Indictment may comprehend several offences if they be particularly laid and then it is in Law several Indictments It may be intended that the Inns were lawfull Inns for it is not laid to be ad nocumentum and therefore not punishable but if they be an anoyance and inconvenient for the Inhabitants then the same ought particularly to appear otherwise it is a thing lawfull to erect an Inn. An Action upon the Case lyeth against an Inn-keeper who denies lodging to a Travailer for his money if he hath spare lodging because he hath subjected himself to keep a common Inn. And in an Action upon the Case against an Inn-keeper he needeth not to shew that he hath a Licence to keep the Inn. If an Inn-keeper taketh down his Signe and yet keepeth an Hosterie an Action upon the Case will lie against him if he do deny lodging unto a Travailer for his money but if he taketh down his Signe and giveth over the keeping of an Inn then he is discharged from giving lodging The Indictment in the principal case is not good for want of the words ad Nocumentum Haughton and Ley Iustices argreed Ley If an Indictment be for an Offence which the Court ex Officio ought to take notice to be ad Nocumentum there the Indictment being general ad Nocumentum contra Coronam dignitatem is sufficient without shewing in what it is ad Nocumentum But for Inns it is lawfull for to erect them if it be not ad Nocumentum c. and therefore in such Indictments it ought to be expressed that the erecting of them is ad Nocumentum c. and because in this Case there wants the words ad Nocumentum the Indictment was quashed Vi. The Lord North and Prat's Case before to this purpose Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 441. BRIDGES and NICHOLS's Case THey were Indicted for the not repairing of such a Bridg and the Indictment was debent solent reparare pontem c. It was moved that the Indictment was insufficient because it is not alledged in the Indictment that the the Bridg was over a Water and no needfull that it be amended Secondly It did not appear in the Indictment that
and for these causes he prayed Judgment for the Defendant Observe Reader the Argument of Calthrope he doth not speak to the point where part of the thing or Contract is upon the Sea and part upon the Land as it was urged by Andrews who argued on the other side The Case was adjourned Pasch 3 Caroli rot 362. in the Kings Bench. 475. IT was cited to be adjudged That if a man purchase the next Avoidance of a Church with an intent to present his son and afterwards he present him that it is Symony within the Statute Pasch 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 476. SUTTON the Chancellor of Gloucester's Case IN the Case of Sutton who was Chancellor of Gloucester and put out of his place for insufficiency in the Ecclesiastical court Trotman moved for a Prohibition to the Spiritual Court and said that the Bishop had power to make his Chancellor and he only hath the Examination of him and the allowance of him as it is in the Case of a Parson who is presented to the Bishop and said that if his sufficiency should be afterwards reexamined it would be very perilous Doddridg Justice If an Office of Skill be granted to one for life who hath no skill to execute the Office the grant is void and he hath no Frank-tenement in it A Prohibition is for two causes First to give to us Jurisdiction of that which doth belong unto us And secondly when a thing is done against the Law and in breach of the Law then we use to grant a Prohibition Jones Justice Brook had a grant of the Office of a Herald at Arms for life and the Earl Marshal did suspend him from the execution of his Office because he was ignorant in his profession and full of Error contrary to the Records and it was the opinion of the Justices that because he was ignorant in such his Office of Skill that he had no Freehold in the Office In the Principall Case the Prohibition was denyed And afterwards Sutton was put out of his Office by Sentence in the Spiritual Court for his insufficiency Pasch 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 477. SYMM'S Case TWo men having speech together of John Symms and William Symms one of them said The Symmses make Half-crown peeces and John Symms did carrie a Cloak-bag full of clippings And whether the Action would lie was the Question because it was incertain in the person For he did not say these Symmses but The Symmses Like unto the Case where one Farrer being slain and certain persons being Defendants in the Star-Chumber one having speech of them said These Defendants did murder Farrer and it was adjudged that the Action would not lie for two causes First because the words These was uncertain in the person And secondly it was incertain in the thing For it might be that they had Authority to do it as in Mills Case 13 Jac. in the Kings Bench Thou hast Coyned Gold and art a Coyner of Gold Thirdly a Cloakbag of clippings that is also uncertain for it might be clippings of Wooll or other things or it might be clippings of Silver from the Goldsmith For the Goldsmith that maketh Plate maketh clippings And fourthly It is not shewed any certain time when the words were spoken And for these causes it was adjudged that the Action would not lie Pasch 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 478. WHITTIE and WESTON'S Case AN Action of Debt was brought upon the Statute of 2 E. 6. and the Plaintiff declared That at the time of the Action brought he was Parson of Merrel and that Weston the Defendant did occupie such Lands and sowed them with corn Anno 21 Jac. and that he did not fet forth his Tythe-corn c. The Defendant pleaded in barr of the Action That W. W. Prior of the Hospital of St John of Jerusalem was of the Order of Hospitalers c. and that he held the said Lands free from the payment of Tythes and that the Priory came by the Statute of 32. H. 8. to the King By vertue of which Statute the King was seised thereof and that the same descended to Queen Elizabeth who granted the Lands unto Weston to hold as amply as the late Prior held and that he was seised of the Lands by vertue of that grant Et propriis manibus suis excolebat Upon this Plea the Plaintiff did demurr in Law Noy argued for the Plantiff There are three points in the Case First If these Lands the possessions of the Hospitalers of St John which they held in their own hands were discharged of Tythes Secondly If there be any thing in the Statute of 32 H. 8. by which the Purchasor of the King should be discharged Thirdly Admitting that it shall be a discharge if the Defendant hath well entitled himself to such discharge or Priviledg First it is not within the Statute of 31 H. 8 cap. 13. for that Statute did not extend to the Order of St John Secondly the Statute of 31 H. 8. cap. 13. doth not discharge any but what was then dissolved Thirdly The Statute of 32 H. 8 cap. 24. gives the possessions of the Hospitalers of St Johns to the King and not the Statute of 31 H. 8. Note that the Defendant did recite the branch of the Statute of 31 H. 8. cap 13. That as well the King his heirs and successors as all and every such person and persons their heirs and assignes which have or hereafter shall have any Monasterie c. or other Religious or Ecclesiastical houses or places shall hold c according to their Estates and Titles discharged and acquitted of the payment of Tythes as freely and in as large and ample manner as the said Abbots c. had or used Also he recited the Statute of 32 H. 8. cap. 7 which Enacts that none shall pay Tythes who by Law Statute or Priviledg ought to be discharged The Statute of 31 H. 8. recites that divers Abbies c. and other Religious and Ecclesiastical houses and places have been granted and given up to the King The Statute enaâ—ts that the King shall have in possession for ever all such late Monasteries c. and other Religious houses and places c. And also enacts that the King shal have not only the said Monasteries c. but also all other Monasteries c. and all other Religious and Ecclesiastical houses which hereafter shall happen to be dissolved suppressed renounced relinquished forfeited given up or by any other means come to the King and shall be deemed adjudged vested by Authority of this present Parliament in the very actual possession and seisin of the King for ever in the state and condition they now be Vi. The Statute And shall have all priviledges c. in as ample manner and form as the late Abbots c. had held or occupied c. The Question then is Whether the men of the Hospital of St John at Jerusalem are intended to be within the
and it is 32. whereas in truth it was 33 H. 8. The second Point then is If the Lease of 36. H. 8. be void then of necessity the Lease of 5. 6. Philip and Mary is void for therein is falsity of three things 1. The thing recited is the custody of the Park with reasonable Herbage and the Patentee would have nothing but pramissa and he trusts the King to give that and he takes from the Queen Herbage leaving out reasonable and so hee takes more then was intended him and therefore hee hath deceived the Queen and if you are to have reasonable Herbage the King may put one to be Overseer that you have that which is fitting and reasonable and the Queen may agister Cattel there but in our Case the Queen can neither set any Overseer nor can she agist Cattel there Dyer 285. 2. H. 8. Killaway 159. He who hath reasonable Herbage cannot inclose but hee which hath Herbage may inclose Then forasmuch as here the Patent is larger then it was before scil that which was surrendred the Patent is void for the Queen Grants more then she took by the surrender For hee did surrender eâ intentione that the Queen should regrant him praemissa and by this new Grant he hath more 2. He recites That hee had a Lease for fifty years absolutely whereas it was determinable upon death and the Queen grants the same for fifty years absolutely and that was by reason of his false Suggestion It may be objected That the Queen is not deceived for the limitation for life is not annexed to the Habendum 20. Eliz. in the Kings Bench Hunts Case The Queen made a Lease to begin at a day to come and afterwards the Queen by the suggestion of the party and for the surrender of the present Lease did make a new Lease unto the party it was adjudged That the new Lease was void So here the Queen was deceived in the quality of the Lease 9. E. 4. 12. Baggots Case The King reciting that Baggot was born in Normandy whereas in truth he was born in France made him a Denizen and the Patent notwithstanding this false recital of the party was adjudged good for the intent was to make him a Denizen That Case was objected against me But put the Case a little further and it is otherwise for if at that time Edward the fourth had had Wars with France then the Patent had been void for it was not the Kings intent to protect a man who was an Enemy and to nourish him in his own bosom If the Queen had made the new Lease to begin after the first fifty years then it had been void C. 1. part the Rector of Chedington's Case It is not the years but the death of the Patentee which determins the Lease C. 2. part 72. In a Deed there is not any proper place where the Proviso shall be inserted then if it come in any place so as it doth not lean upon a Covenant it is a good condition 35. Eliz. betwixt Throgmorton and Sir Moile Finch Queen Mary made a Lease unto Throgmorton for 21 years and in the end of the Lease there is a Proviso That the Lease shall cease if the Rent be behind Popham Chief Justice said That Throgmorton hath such a Lease which is absolute but shortned by limitation in the end of the Lease and he might plead it generally and absolutely That those who will take advantage of the Proviso ought to shew where the Proviso comes in another clause So here Pawlet should have informed the Queen of the Proviso for hee trusts the Queen and the Queen trusts him The third Falsity is It is pretended That the Park of Odiham doth passe with the Manor for the Manor is granted by King Philip and Queen Mary cum pertinentiis and it is found by the Jury that the Park is parcel of the Manor He hath deceived and mis-informed the Queen for in the Lease which he surrendred the Park is excepted and now he would steal it in by the general words cum pertinentiis If the Park doth not passe then the Defendants are Trespassors to the Plaintiffe and if the Manor doth not passe then they are Trespassors so as they are in a Dilemma This Park admit the Manor passeth doth not passe for Queen Mary shortly after made Pawlet a Marquess and then she granted unto him by Letters Patents The custody of the Park and the Interest of the Park cannot stand together in one person and he cannot be the Queens Parker when as it is his own Park C. 8 part 117. The best Expositor of Letters Patents are the Letters Patents themselves joyning one part of the Letters Patents with the other And here in one clause the custodie of the Park is granted by express name and the general words viz. Grant of the Manor cum pertinentiis doth not convey it There is a difference betwixt the Custody of a Park and the Interest of the Park In Com. 399. If a Parker be attainted and pardoned hee loseth not his Park but hee may be a Parker notwithstanding such Attainder but if the Owner of a Park be attainted and pardoned he loseth his Park a Parker is a matter of service and cannot be forfeited but an Interest may 10. H. 7. 6. The Keeper shall render account for the Hawks for it is parcel of the profits of the Park but Lessee for years of a Park shall not render account for them So there is a difference betwixt the Interest in a Park and a Parkership 12. H. 8. 1. Lessee for years of a Park suffereth the Pale to fall down or decay Waste lieth but if a Parker suffereth the Pale to decay he can onely lose his Office Dyer 71. The Owner of a Park may dispark it but he who hath only the Herbage of it cannot A man hath the custody of a house and afterwards he becomes the Owner of the house his custodie therein ceaseth There are four Mischiefs in our Case 1. By expressing himselfe to be Parker hee excludes himselfe from being Owner 2. The Keeper is Accountable but Lessee for years is not 3. If he be only Keeper of it then the Queen might dispark but if he were Lessee the Queen could not 4. Where he is Keeper all will rest upon account as well the Deer which hee findes there when hee became Keeper as those which came after But that makes the Queen in doubt whether the Exception should extend to the Deer then whether to those Deer which came after The third Point was concerning WALSINGHAM'S Lease It is of the Manor and Custodiam Parci First This Lease hath one of the wounds of the former Leases for the Parkership is granted expresly Secondly The leases before being void then this Lease must needs be void also Thirdly This Lease is to take effect upon the end Surrender or Forfeiture of the Lease to Pawlet which was made 5. 6. Philip and Mary and that
Inrollment 7 270 142 Intent Intendment 130 121 381 Common 332 Interest not dividable 18 77 78 Interesse termini 2 3 175 Interruption 22 48 Joyning in action 43 283 90 116 160 345. Husband and Wife 10 Joint-charge 56. 57. Joint-tenants 129. Joinâ—ture forfeited by 11 H. 7. 6. 339. Issue lâ—giâ—tim are born after ten moneths c. 281. Issue not proved by the special matter 10. Of Issues see 23. 286. 92. 100. 108. 154. A thing in Issue not in the verdict 57. Mâ—â— joyned no issue 56. Several issues 57. Repugnant 62. Negative and affirmative 194. tried 233. Jury 334. their finding things 33. 34. 65. 274. 88. 171. 359. Examined sworn 209. Forein matter ibid. Strongly imply a thing 36. Three with Sweet-meats in their pockeâ—s 364. Returned 370. Judges sworn to procure the Kings profit 201. Judgment in a Writ of Error 27 66. in Account 258. Husband and wife 369 80. False 176. depending on another 176. staid 177. joint 448. voidable 96. entred Concessum est 399. Justification 277. 137. Jurisdiction of Courts 45. 240. 427. 163. 196. 197. shewing how 380 381. K. KIng usurped upon 7. 8. adhering to his enemies in France 34. To direct the lawes 237. his Prerogatives 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. Prerogative-law Common-law 295. Lands once in the King 441. 442. devest without Office 443. Intrusion upon the King 133. Knights of S. Johns of Jerusalem 393. Lay 394. their possessions Ecclesiastick 393. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. Templars 394. L. LAches in not entring the Kings silver 139. Laps 129. Lâ—w against the rule of the Common-law to meddle with blood 393. The Law preserves things in its custody 316. Not alterable by grant 201. Leases Term extinguished 2. 3. 5. 268. 129. on Continge â—ie rule 419. 420. Exception of timber-woods and underwoods 98 99. In certain beginning 24. 25. 166. may be avoided 323. 324. and revive 325. within 32 H. 8. 102. Joining to Lease 211. Lease for life by Copyholder 171. of an infant Copyholder 364. of a stock of sheep 113. windfals 117 118. by a Parson 302. by Tenant in tail 9. wants a beginning 419. Legacies for children security to be given 243. A verbal Legacie after the will made 246. 247. To be paid at full age 182. Suit for them 41. Liberty to cleanse a Water-course 98 Licence to erect Dove-cotes 259. 82. 93 93. Limitation by Law statute 5. Limitation of an Estate 19. 103. Of time for actions according to 21. Jac. 437. Livery 9. 25. 84. 93. 301. 158. Right extinguished by it 314. London insolency of the Common-Councel 106 107. Custome there 127. Lunatick M MAâ—hem 67 Maintenance 81 159. 450. hem Mannor 3. 135 Market 131. Marshaâ—sey Judgment there 184. Marriage 2 Is a Release 271. Master and Servants acts of and to the Servant 361 Mines 5. 28. Misnaming 35. 38. 283. Mirâ—cital 36. 170. in the Kings Grant 416 417. 420 421 422. of a Statute 178. Mistake of the day 125 126. of the date 433. Monasteries 1. 392 393. what houses within the Stat. 31 H. 8. there 394 Monstrance of Deeds c. 85. 111 112 114 115. How things are done 61. 126. Of the Place 187 188. 359. 412 413. time 391. Of Letters of Administration 34. Of a Bond must be 39. In what Ward c. 160. Of more then needs and that false 189. That the place is within the Jurisdiction c. that he ought to be priviledged c. 402. Inducement to a matter need not be showne precisely 404. Number and names to be shown 436. before whom c. 437. Monstrance of right 301. 304. Mortmain 192. Murder Manslaughter se defendendo 288 289. within the Stat. of King James 154. N NAme 17. in a Writ 40. 379. 398. Nihil dicit 135 Nisi prius 10. 328. Nomine poenae 12. 154. Non compos 302. 316. 321. Non obstante in the Kings Grants 37. Nonsuit 328. 220. Non use 235. No such Record See Record Notice 23. 162. 339 Nusance 4. 259. 58 59. 183. then when an Action upon the Case when an Assise of Nusance part of an house in Assise abated 233 O OAth putting to a mans Oath 151. Obligation the Condition against Law 13. see 152. 177. see 192. to save harmless 212. not within 13 Eliz. 29. by the High Commissioners 148. Bond to deliver Possession the Assignee of Reversion demands it 272. taken by the Sheriff 136. 212 213. to pay when out of his apprenticeship c. 153. Occupant occupancy 52 172. 220. Offices Officers 21. 47 48. Insufficient 390 391. Coroners 64 89. 105. Regarder 277. Steward of the Leet 71. Office found 312 313. 322. Rights vest without Office 325. void if in deceit of the King 192 Omission of word in a Certificate 407. Ordinarie 30. 191. Ordinances 253. 106 107. Over-sea 268 Outlawry 83. 119. Oyer of a Record not to be denied 186. P PAyment before the day 10 Parceners 3. 129 130. Parceney 3. Park-keeper for what things accountable 419 Forfeits 419. Parker forfeits not his Office by Attainder 418. Parks 237. 425. Chasing 169. beasts of it there 171. Pardon 378. Parliament Summoned at the Kings pleasure only 250. held at the Kings pleasure Writ of Error there must be the Kings Licence 247 by Petition 250 Parsons heretofore Knights 399 Parsonage 34 Partition 3 4. 265. 14 84 85 86. by word 94 Partners in Trade 244. 90. Patents 21. 37. Exposition of them 418. void 254 Perjury 88 89. 179. Perpetuity by devise 102. 350 351. Perquisite 27. Petition of Right 304. Place to be alleadged 48. 187 188 189. 382 384. Plaint entred 266. Pleas 6. 43. 91. 95 96. 145. 121. Certainty 93. in debt 359 360. Amount to a general issue 374. General where they should be specially 10. taken strictly 70. mistaken 121 not entred new Plea 176. Plwalitâ—es 23. 153. Portiâ—n of Tythes 35. Pâ—ssâ—ssion unity 4 Possibility 20. 25. may pass by a grant 26 146 325. Premunire 308 389. Praecipe 6 16. 87. 152. Preâ—ogative see King Presentation 265 179. as Precurator 319. Pâ—â—seâ—â—mentsâ—n â—n Courts c. 59. 〈◊〉 14 15 16. 262. 54 Rules of it there and 237. â—7 184. in a Court 48. one against another 183. Principal and accessory Prâ—vily 19. to sue 377. 379. Prviledg 10. 81. 286. 90 372. Priviledges not transferrable 396 397. of discharge 398. Pleaded 398. time to pray it 404. Probate of Wills Exception of the 23 H 8. 214. Proceedings of Law the form must be kept 201. Procedendo 442. Proclamation 107. Proces 73. Erronious 371. Judicial 328. A Summons for an Attachment 400. Proof 254. Profession trial of it 393. Prohibition 260. 259. 45. 51. 63. 216. 234. 243. 246. 273. 163. 164. 196. 200. 301. 446. 447. Promise 13. 32 271. 94. 134. 349. 350. 216. Property 26 27 117. 118. 193. Changed by tender 330. 331. in things 〈◊〉 naturae 123. Protection 299. 366. Proviso 18. gives power to lease 195. No proper place for it 418. Purchase by
Tenant for life and the administrator of Lessee for years where the term was to begin after death of Tenant for life 1 2. Two named as Joint-purchasers 180. Taking by purchase 363. Q. QVare impedit 263. Quae plura 191. Que estate 172. Quod ei deforceat 2. 448. Quo minus 291 296 297 Quo warranto 91 92 93. R. RApe the Indictment must be preferred in convenient time 444. Raâ—â—shment of Ward 14. 34. 426. Rebutter 310. by that which is sued to be reversed 379. Recognisance 142. Notes only taken 356. for good behaviour 22. 311. Recital of a Statute 86. of the particular estate c. 423. Recâ—rd 103. 356. No such record pleaded there 178. 373. Removed well or not 375. Brought from one Court to another 14. 249. Transcript in Parliament 247. see 328. Recovery common an invention of the Judges found out in Ed. 4 his time 308. All the rights barred 311. before inrolment of the bargain 218. Estoppes 147. by an Infant 161 Recovery in actions 6. Baâ—s 19. 134. Erronious 27. Rectory Glebe c. 35 Recusancie 148. Recusant convict his advowson 216. Relation 270. 313. 317 325. 140. 388. To avoid mean acts 312 Makes acts good before 376. Release of all actions 11. 12. of all his right ibid. where a Covenant is not broken ibid. 29. 30. 310. 220. with Warranty 158. Relief Remainder 19. 51. 52. 265 319. 220. Acts by him in remainder 9. good yet incertain 139. of a term 26. 316. Remitter 69. 312. 320. 326. Rent 3. 279. 146. 156. to cease during minority c. paid to one who has but a right for a time 156. to A. and his heirs for life of B. 172. the word 〈◊〉 449. Replevin 96. 124. 187. Replication 96 insufficient 138. Reputation 17. 353. Request 49. 274. 144. 40â— 438. in an action of the case upon promise 362. Resceit Rescuous 276. 126. Plea in it 91. Reservation 19. 283. 101. Husband leases his wifes Lease reserving rent 279. reservation to the wife 448 449. Restitution upon a Iudgment reversed 27. 376. Retraxit Retorn 217 265. 276. 82. 355. 357. 389. by Coroners one denies 439. general retorn of a Record 408. Reviving 4. of estates and rights 326. Revocation 133 289. Riot 146 438. Rights 301. 313. 314. forfeited 310. 322. 323. given away by conveyance 319. 320. see Livery Executor sels the land hath right c. 31. Robbery on Sunday no Hue and cry 280. S SAle 244. by Executors 77. in a market 160. 349. of goods taken by Pyrats 193. Satisfaction acknowledged 79. 80 Scire fac 79. 83. 155. 371. 379. Seats in a Church 200. sin to be shown 347. 121. Seigniâ—ry services 4â— 28. 38. Sheriffe collects Fines c. after a pardon 178. Simony 390. 202. 435. Slander 40. 43. 239. 241. 242. malitiously spoken there 152. 273. 278. 88. 284. 287. 88. 89. 90. 106. 147. 151. 157. 167. 327. 328. 304. 341. 181. 375. 391. 202. 214. Of a Physitian Lawyer c. 441. Forâ—sworn your self 444. 445. Calling one Bistard 451 Statute-Merch c. General Statutes particular Interests 168. a third person there Statutes 11 H 7. of Jointures forfeiâ—ed 6. 1 2. P and M. of Distresses 11. the Statute of Wiâ—â—es 38 H. exâ—ends not to Copyholds 15 34 H. 8. of Mistakes 416. 32 of H. 8 17. 32 H. 8. of Leases 102. 13 Eliz. of Covenants c. for enjoying spiritual Livings 29 2 M. concerning Preachers 245 4 H 7. Heir of Cestuy que use 79 2 West 1. of Feoffments there 5 Eliz. of Per jury 89 26. H. 8. of Estates tail forfeited for Treason 307 308 309. 27 H. 8. Statuâ—e of Fermors 145 22 E. 4 35 H. 8 of inclosure of Woods 167 Statutes extend not to Superiors unnamed 395 General Statutes bind insants 80 Some particular in 160 Some points 169 Construction where the King is concerned 308 Such Statutes are general 171 of Penal Statutes 315 Savings in Statutes 304. 324 Steward of a Mannor-Court 142 Surety in Debt 149 to pay the Condemnation c. 372 Suit for part 196. in Temporal and Spiritual Courts 447 Sumâ—oâ—s and Severance Sunday 280 Supersedâ—â—s 249 250 Supplicavit for the Peace 355 Surpâ—usâ—ge 248. 73. 434. Surrender 14 15 16. 52. 265. 268. 153. 425 Surrender to the use of A. for ever the Lord admits him in Fee 137 Surrender c. after his death 451 Suspension 4â—9 T TAil-Tenant his Acts Leases 9. 301 302. 308. 323. could not levie a Fine at the Common Law 300 Estate-Tail without the word Heirs 19 Tenant grants Rent acknowledges a Statute 442 Tenant in Tail the remainder in Tail to another who grants his Estate to the King c. 441. 543. tot Stat. suum 442 Forfeited for Treason 307 308 309 321 shewing that the Tenant died without issue 443 the Tenant cannot be barred to alien by common Recovery 351 Tales de circumstantib 204. tried 430 Tenant in common 2. 16. 282 283. 129. Two Lords Tenants in Common of a Waste 156 Tenant by Curtesie 15. 25 cannot grant his Right living his wife 323 In Dower see Dower In Tail after possibility c. at Will Leases c. 15 319. 364. Tender 39. 330 331 332 Tenure 20. 101 Things in action 12 in grols 38 Trade 25 254 Travers 24. 43 56 57 of a Debt 402. to an Office 410. of Discents 411. Rule 253. 111. of Seisin in Fee or the gift in Tail 427 Treason a Papist who after refussing to take the Oath of Allegiance spake these words It is lawfull for any man to kill the King c. 263 264. in the point of Allegiance none must serve the King with ifs and ands ibid. Forfeitures for Treason 322 323 324 a mad man may commit Treason 316 presumed in Law no man will commit Treason 325 Trespass 6. 16. 33. 133. 200. 270 271. barr 134 by one who has special property 173 for taking Conies 174 medling with the Soil 52 53 Pleas 55 Rule 53 Troâ—er 210 Trust not conveyed 64. joynt 77 78 Feoffment in trust 299 broken 432 Tryal 33. 257. 50 51. 196 197. 433 things done in a forrein Port 193 of things done beyond sea 76. 204. see Admiralty Tythes Lands discharged by the Statute 31 H. 8. L. 392. 211. 395 396 discharged by grant 273. 35. 44 45 50 51. 329 330 331. 333 Modus 63. the Parson to have all where 64 Prescription 60. 237 238. 120 after Tythes set out that the owner may carry away 30 sheafs 234 Substraction 245 Leased 333 by Deed 354 not 374 Modus after endowment 180. s 194 of lopping 175 The King to pay no Tythes priviledges of discharge to be taken strictly 396 397 398 V VAâ—iance 248. 88. 362 Valore maritagii 189 Writ of Error 249. 375 Venditioni exponâ—s 276 Venire facias 257. 251. 305. 328. 334 335. 381 382 203. 411 none 194 Verdict 126. 354 Vnperfect 27 incertain 36 special favoured 37 Villein presented to a Benefice by the Lord 179 Visâ—e 48. 54 335. 381 382 383 Void Acts and voidable 311. 318 319 161 Vou 307 Vsage 5 Vse 7. 265 Acts of Cestu que use 303. 306 307. 318 319 makes attorney to make livery 314 Tenant in tail cannot stand seised to an use expressed 269 Superstitious 233 Vsurpation 7 8. 263 W WAger of law 244 79 296 not for part 327 Waife Waining estates 79 100 Wales what Process runs into Wales 214 the Marches 243 President and Councel 437 Ward 79 320 Warreâ— 124 184 Warrant of Attorney 73 74 apparence by it 439 Warrant to receive mony c. 358 Warranting an horse sold 31 a Lease 48 Warranty 5 130 320 368 entring into it 152 Warrantia chartae 152. lies there Waste 5 28 52 70 114 115 116 117 118 132 164 209. When done must be shewn 347 Way drowned 52 Wills 15 construed 363 Witnesses 16 288 326 327 439 Woods underwoods 5 256 inclosed in Forrests according to Statutes 167 168 1â—9 190 171 Words for a grant 7 17 the word portio 35 36. successive 51 Ovile 274 89. omitted in a Writ 286 or 363 Writs not formal divertit for coarctavit 58 the true words not used 64 admitted good 87 demands in them 6 insufficient 347 Two originals 306 408 409 Trespas after the first purchased 407 409. of Right c. 239 Writ mistakes the time of one King for another 399 Of right of advowson 6 263 Writ untrue yet good 115 Writing scandalous words under pretence of a Petition delivered to the King 405. FINIS
yet in the interim during the life of Brenne and his wife it is one entire Manor For if Blackborow had levied a Fine thereof before entry his Interest in the Land had not passed And if a Fine be levied of the Manor and the Conusee render back part to one for life and another part to another for life the remainder of the whole to a third until the Two enter it is one entire Manor in the hands of the Conusee If I devise that my Executors shall sell such Lands which are parcell of a Manor and dye untill they sell it remains parcell of the Manor So if the heir selleth the Manor that Land shall passe for it is but executory and remains parcell untill it be executed Wherefore in the principall Case here the Copy-hold is good The reason of the Case 33. H. 8. Dyer 48. is because before the grant the advowson was not appendant to that acre onely but to the whole Manor and to that acre as parcell of it Also he said that the Copy-hold shall be good against the Lessee being granted before execution of his term when as the Manor was entire For he who hath a Manor but for one year may grant Copies and the grant shall be good to bind him in the Reversion And if one recovereth an acre parcell of a Manor before execution it is parcell of the Manor and by grant of the Manor shall passe Periam Justice But yet now being executed by the death of the Lessor and his wife it is no part of the Manor if they be severall Leases Walmesley But the Defendant is in by Custome by one who is Dominus pro tempore Anderson Chief Justice The Case of 48. E. 3. is like our Case And I conceive clearly here is no severance but if there had been any severance it had been otherwise but I doubt of the other point Periam Justice In 13. H. 4. the difference is taken betwixt a grant of a Manor una cum advocatione and a grant of a Manor et ulterius a grant of the Advowson In 14. Eliz. Dyer 311. in the Case of the Lord Cromwell and Andrews it is moved If a man bargain and sell give and grant a Manor and Advowson to one and afterwards levieth a Fine or inrolleth the Deed Dyer held that the Advowson shall passe by the Bargain and Sale as in gross before that the Deed be enrolled But I conceive that it cannot pass if the Deed be not enrolled and then it shall pass as appendant by reason of the intent of the parties and so in this Case And for the last matter I conceive very strongly that when the Lease which is executory takes effect that it shall avoid the Copy-hold for although at once viz. during the expectancy of the said Lease to begin at a day to come the Copy-hold be not extinct yet now he may say That all times as in respect to him the Copy-hold Custome was broken I hold That a Tenant in Dower shall not avoid a Copy-hold made during the Coverture and so it hath been adjudged in the Kings Bench. But I conceive there is a difference betwixt that Case and the Case in question for in that Case the title of the wife to have Dower is not consummate till the death of the Husband Anderson Chief Justice I can shew you an Authority That if I grant unto you such Land and the Manor of D. there the Land shall pass as parcell of the Manor Periam True there for it doth enforce the first grant But here the intent of the parties doth appear and the same is to be respected Anderson But their intent ought to be according to the Law as in 19. H. 8. it is holden it shall be in a Devise Anderson upon the Argument of this Case said That if a Warranty be to a whole Manor and also to an Advowson the party cannot have Two Warrantia Chartae Periam If he had further said in the Deed That his intent was that it should be severall the same had altered the Case Anderson No truely because his intent did not stand with the rule of Law As if a man devise that his Lands shall be sold and doth not say by whom it is void and yet the intent is expressed If the Lease had been by severall Deeds Periam said The Copy-hold had beene severed Windham denied that If both the Deeds bee delivered at one time It was adjourned Hill 29. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 148 AN Information was upon the Statute of 5. 6. E. 6. for buying of seed Corn having sufficient of his own and not bringing so much unto the Market of his own corn and a generall issue was found upon it And it was delivered for Law to the Jury by the Justices That a Contract in Market for corn not in the Market or which was not there that day is not within the Branch of the Statute But if corn or graine be in the Market although that the Contract be made in a house out of the Market and delivered to the Vendee out of the Market yet it is within the Statute And in the Argument of that Case Anderson said That the Market shall be said The place in the Town where it hath used to be kept and not every place of the Town And a Sale in Market overt in London ought to be in a Shop which is open to the street and not in Chambers or inward rooms otherwise the property is not altered And so it is of all Statutes in open Markets And the Recorder of London said That such was their Custome in London Hill 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 149 It was holden by Anderson chiefe Justice That if one deviseth Lands to the heirs of I. S. and the Clerk writes it to I. S. and his heirs that the same may be holpen by averrment because the intent of the Devisor is written and more And it shall be naught for that which is against his intent and against his will and good for the residue But if a Devise be to I. S. and his heirs and it is written but to the heirs of I. S. there an averrment shall not make it good to I. S. because it is not in writing which the Statute requires anâ— so an averrment to take away surplusage is good but not to encrease that which is defective in the Will of the Testator Mich. 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 150 A Feoffment was made unto A. unto the use of him and his wife dis-punishable of Wast during their lives one died and the Survivor committed Wast It was the opinion of the whole Court that an Action of Wast would not lie by him in the Reversion for it is a Priviledge which is annexed to the Estate which shall continue as long as the Estate doth continue Mich. 29 Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 151 A. grants annualem redditum out of Lands in which he hath nothing The opinion of
because that the particular estate was determined The cause of forfeiture was because that the Copiholder had made a lease for life Pasch 8. Iacobi in the Common Pleas. 242 Dr. NEWMAN's Case IN this Case it was said by Cook Chief Justice That it had of late time been twice adjudged that if Timber trees be oftentimes topped and lopped for fuell yet the tops and lops are not Tithable for the body of the trees being by law discharged of Tithes so shall be the branches and therefore he that cutteth them may convert them to his own use if he please Pasch 8. Jacobi In the Exchequer Chamber 243 KERCHER's Case AN Action upon the Case was brought in the Common Pleas upon a simple contract made by the Testator which afterwards came into the Exchequer Chamber before all the Judges Cook in the Common Pleas was of opinion that the Action would lie Tanfield Chief Baron said That in these cases of Equitie it were most reason to enlarge and affirme the Authoritie of the Common law then to abridge it and the rather because the like Case had been oftentimes adjudged in the Kings Bench and there was no reason as he said that there should be a difference betwixt the Courts and that it would be a Scandall to the Common Law that they differed in opinion Afterwards at another day the Case was moved in this Court And Walmesley Justice doubted if as before But Foster held that the Action was maintainable And Cooke desired that Presidents might be searched And he said That he could not be perswaded but if the Executor be adverred to have Assetts in his hands sufficient to pay the specialties but that he should answer the debt Note the money demanded was for a Marriage portion promised by the Testator Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 244 ADAMS and WILSONS Case Note It was said That when a false Judgement passeth against the Defendant he may pray the Court that it be entred at a day peremtory so as he may have Attaint or a Writ of Error And Cook Chief Justice said That if Judgment in the principall Action be reversed the Judgment given upon the Scire facias shall also be reversed because the one doth depend upon the other Walmesley in this Case said That it had been the usual course of this Court That if one deliver a plea unto An Aturney of the Court as the Last Terme and it is not entred that now at another Terme the Defendant might give in a new plea if he would because the first is not upon Record Pasch 8. Iacobi in the Common Pleas. 245 CULLINGWORTH's Case IF one be bounden in an Obligation That he will give to J. S. all the Goods which were devised to him by his father in Debt brought upon such an Obligation the Defendant cannot plead that he had not any Goods devised unto him for the Bond shall conclude him to say the contrary Vide 3. Eliz. Dyer 196 Rainsford Case Pasch 8. Iacobi in the Common Pleas. 246 QUOD's Case QVod had Judgement in an Action upon the case at the Assizes and damages were given him to Thirty Pound Hutton Serjeant moved in Arrest of Judgement That the Venire facias was de duodecim and that one of them did not appear so as there was one taken de circumstantibus and the entry in the Roll was That the said Jurour exactos venit but the word Juratus was omitted And for that cause the Judgement was stayed Mich. 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 247 STONE 's Case STone an Atturney of the Court was in Execution in Norfolk for One thousand Pound and by practice procured himself to be removed by Habeas corpus before Cook Chief Justice at the Assizes in Lent and escaped to London and in Easter Terme the Bailiffe took him again and he brought an Action of false Imprisonment against the Bailiffe and it was holden by the Court That the fresh Suit had been good although he had not taken him in the end of the year if enquiry were made after him and so by consequence the Action was not maintainable Mich. 8. Jacobi in the Star-Chamber 248 MARRIOT's Case NOte It was agreed in this Case for Law That the Sheriffe cannot collect Fines or issues after a generall pardon by Parliament and therefore one Thorald the under Sheriffe of N. who did so was questioned and punished in the Star-Chamber Mich. 8 Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 249 JOLLY WOOLSEY's Case JOlly Woolsey of Norfolk brought an Action of Trespass against a Constable of Assault and Battery and Imprisonment the Defendant as to the Assault and Battery pleaded Not guilty and justified the imprisonment by reason of a Warrant directed unto him by a Justice of Peace for the taking and to imprison the Plaintiffe for the keeping of an Ale-house contrary to the Statute 12 Feb. 5. El. whereas the Statute was 12 Feb. 5. Ed. 6. and the matter was found by speciall Verdict And it was holden by all the Justices That the misrecitall of the Act was not materiall for it being a generall Act the Justices ought to take knowledge of it And Cook Chief Justice said That a man cannot plead Nul tiel Record against an Act of Parliament although that in truth the Record be imbezelled if the Act be generall because every man is privy to it Mich. 8. Iacobi In the Common Pleas. 250 NEWMAN and BABBINGTON's Case IT was resolved in this Case That if Debt be brought against an Executor who pleads that he hath fully administred and it is found that he hath Assets to 40l. whereas the Debt is 60l l that a Judgement shall be given for the 60l. against the Defendant and upon that Judgment if more Assets come after to the Executors hand the Plaintiffe may have a Scire facias Mich. 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 251 WALLER's Case NOte It was said by Cook Chief Justice That if the King present one to a Benefice and afterwards presenteth another who is admitted instituted and inducted the same is a good repeal of the first presentation And he said That if the Lord doth present his Villain to the Church the same is no enfranchisement of him for that presentation is but his commendation And if the King will present a French man or a Spaniard they shall not hold the Benefice within this Realm for that the same is contrary to a special Act of Parliament Mich. 9. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 252 NOte It was holden by all the Justices That Perjury cannot be commited in the Court of the Lord of Copy-holds or in any Court which is holden by Usurpation otherwise is it in a Court Leet or Court Baron which is holden by Title Trinit 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 253 BURY and TAYLOR's Case IN an Ejectione firme brought upon Not guilty pleaded by the Defendant it was given in Evidence to the Jury to this effect viz. That one J. S. who did