had said that he took money for ingrossing of Feodaries which is desceit without question that had been actionable but there may not be Couzning without desceit And he cited Boxes case where one said of an Attorney that he was a maintainer of suits and a Champerter action lies for it shall be taken to be a scandal to him in his profession for though an Attorney may maintain suites yet he ought not to be a Champerter and he further said that he who will maintain an action for words ought to be scandalized in his publick profession and he cited a case which was in the Kings Bench Brad against Hay and the Plantiff declared that he was Bailiff to such a one and that he had the buying and the selling of his Corn and that the Defendant said of him that he sold by false measures and adjudged that no action lies for it is not a scandal to him in his publick profession and so 36. Eliz. one said of a Merchant that he kept a false debt book and because he may be a Merchant without a debt book it was ruled that an action doth not lie but if he had said of him that he deceived men by buying and selling these words had been actionable and he said that two things are required to every publick profession science and fidelity and when a man who hath a publick profession is scandalized in either of those an action of the case lies and cited Palmers case of Lincolns Inne he being a Lawyer 't was said to him by one that he had as much Law as a Iackan-apes and adjudged to be actionable for it is a scandal to him in his profession and so Sir Miles Fleetwoods case where he who is Plantiff in this action was Defendant in that he being receiver of the Court of Wards one said to him Mr. deceiver hath Couzned the King and hath dealt falsly with him and adjudged that an action upon the case lies and yet he did not shew wherein he had Couzned him or dealt deceitfully with him but yet because it appears to the Court that he might deal deceitfully and Couzen the King therefore actionable and he cited Birchleys case you have dealt corruptly an action lies and yet he did not shew wherein he had dealt corruptly and here he had said he was a Couzner by the receipt of money which is an express scandal to him in his office Winch accordingly to every office of trust is a condition in Law annexed that he deal honestly and justly and he cited Wingates case in the Kings Bench one said to another is Wingate your Attorney and the other said that he was and the other replied take heed and follow him well for else he will make you throw your purse over your bosome and it was adjudged that an action lies for it is a scandal to him in his profession and it shall be taken as much as if he had said he will make you spend all the money in your purse if you look not the better to him and so applied this to the principal case and in this case judgement was commanded to be entered for the Plantiff in the action if no other cause be shewed before such a day An action upon the case was brought for these words the Plantiff did load a ship of my Fathers with Barley and did steal and Couzned 7. quarters thereof in measure and upon not guilty pleaded it was found for the Plantiff and now it was moved in arrest of judgement that the word Cozned being joyned with the word stole had taken away the force of that and made it but Cozning but Hutton contrary and that it shall be understood that he stole 7. quarters in measure and quantity and Winch seemed to agree and it was adjourned and an other day awarded that an action lies Godfrey Wade Alias Mack-Williams case GOdfrey Wade and others in an ejectione firme and the case upon a special verdict was to this effect Henry Mack-Williams the father was seised of land and being so seised he conveyed that to the use of himself for life the remainder to his wife for life the remainder to the heires of their two bodies engendred the remainder to the heires of the bodie of Mack-Williams the Feoffor and the remainder to his right heirs in fee and he had a son by his wife named Henry and 5. daughters and he died and afterwards the son in the life of his Mother by deed indented leased to White-Head for 31. years rendring rent and afterwards he leavies a fine to the use of himself and his heirs in fee and died and after whose death the Mother suffered a recovery within six moneths in which 4. of their husbands were vouched and the recovery was to the use of the feme for life the remainder to every one of the daughters in fee and the sole doubt was whether the lease made by Henry the son is defeated by this recovery and it was argued by Harvey Serjeant that the lease shall stand good notwithstanding this recovery suffered by the Mother for he said that Henry Mark-Williams being issue in tail and also being heire to the remainder in fee who made this lease by indenture in this case this lease issues as well out of the estate taile as out of the reversion in fee and the fine leavied in the life of his Mother binds and bars the estate taile at the time of the fine and then the lease being drawn out of the reversion in fee which discended to the daughters after the death of their brother this reversion shall be charged with the lease and the recovery had not destroyed that and this case will differ from Capels case for it is agreed if tenant in tail bee the remainder in fee and he in remainder in fee granted a rent charge and after Tenant in tail suffer a recovery by this the rent is destroyed for there he who suffered the recovery was Tenant in tail in possession but in our case when the son had leavied a fine in the life of his Mother by this fine the tail is destroyed and the Mother is become Tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct which is only an estate for life in quantity and then though she suffers a recovery yet this doth not destroy the lease made by Tenant in tail when there was also a fine leavied to confirm that Secondly he argued that when the issue in tail in the life of his Mother made a lease for yeares by indenture and then leavied a fine and died and then the Mother being Tenant in tail and joyntress within the Statute of 11. H. 7. as in our case she is and she suffers a recovery and vouches the daughters in reversion and lessee for years enters after the death of the feme by force of 11. H. 7. for lessee for years is a person who may enter within the express words of that Statute which gives entrie to any person
the lessee of the Mannor or to the Bishop was the question and it was argued by Serjeant Hendon that this appertaines to the Plantiff and not to Wood and as to that the single point is a Bishop is seised of a Mannor in the right of his Bishoprick and lets parcel of that for life whether the reversion of this parcel be alwayes parcel of the Mannor notwithstanding this lease and he argued that it was not and yet he agreed that if another let as aforesaid the reversion continues alwayes parcel of a thing in possession and that in the case of the King himself as appears by Dyer 230. if the King lets parcel of a Mannor for life the reversion of this parcel passeth to the King for the reversion had all times continuance in the same capacity and no alteration is made of this by force of the lease but where the lease for life is a discontinuance there he gaines a new reversion and this shall not be parcel of the Mannor and for that if a man is seised of a Mannor in the right of his wife and he lets parcel for life this is a discontinuance and he had gained the reversion in his own right and for that reason the reversion may not be parcel of the Mannor as appears by 18. Assises and also he held if Tenant in taile lets parcel of a Mannor for life that were the reversion of this parcel is not parcel of the Mannor for the cause aforesaid and so in our case when the Bishop granted parcel which is not grantable by the Statute now he had discontinued the reversion and had gained a new fee simple which may not be parcel of the Mannor so long as this new fee simple had a continuance and this was his first reason And secondly he argued from the intent of the parties because the intent was that the lease to Wood shall be good and if the reversion of the 20. acres pass to Wood this will make all the lease void for no rent may be reserved out of the reversion but out of the land it self 3. Assise Placito ultimo a Bishop let land and a hundred rendring rent the rent issues out of the land and not out of the hundred and so here it issues out of the land and not out of the reversion which made the lease all void and so he concluded the first point that the reversion of the 20. acres did not pass to Wood the lessee of the Mannors Secondly when the Bishop lets 20. acres of ground rendring rent and this is not confirmed by the Dean and Chapter as it ought and after he lets the Mannor and the successor accepts the rent of the Mannor this acceptance shall not make the lease of the 20. acres to be good admitting that the reversion do pass and when the Bishop had made a lease for 3. lives he may not contract for the reversion and when a lease is meerly void in the creation there no acceptance afterwards may make that good but admitting this to be against him yet the lessee shall not have the Herriot for they are not appendant to the reversion but due only by way of Covenant and the words are yielding c. and this being a Collateral thing it shall not go with the reversion and the Herriot here may not be had without it be delivered by the lessee for life Secondly it is paid only in the name of a Herriot and this is not Herriot service Thirdly it is to be paid upon the death of a stranger and not upon the death of the lessee and all this proves this Herriot to be collateral and he cited Rawlins case a lease for years paying for a fine 20. l. this is a summe in gross and shall not pass with the reversion and so he prayed judgement for the Plantiff Attoe contrary and yet he agreed the case of the husband and wife and of the Tenant in tail for here the lessor gaines a new fee simple but in our case when the Bishop lets for life this is not any wrong for the successor may enter and he shall have this lease not in his natural capacity but alwayes in his politique capacity and for that there is an apparent difference between the cases and for that reason he held that the reversion was parcel of the Mannor and so passed to the lessee and as to that which had been said that the intent of the parties was only that the Mannor in possession and not the parcel in reversion should pass to the lessee for that is most beneficial to the lessor to this he answered that by express words this is granted and no construction shall be made contrary to the very express words of the grant and here though the Defendant had not any title at all to the Herriot yet the Plantiff shall not have a trover and conversion for this because that he himself had not right to this and for that reason judgement shall be given for the Defendant and he also argued that the lease of the reversion is not meerly void but voidable and then the acceptance extends to this see 37. H. 6. the lease of a Priâ—r 2. E. 6. Bâ— Abbots case Vpon which authorities he said cleerly by the Common Law this lease of the reversion is not meerly void but voidable and for that the confirmation of the Dean and Chapter after the Statute of the first of Eliz. had not altered that and for that a lease after the Statute shall not be meerly void and see Lincolns Colledge case Coo. 3. and in our case there is a possibility that the lessee of the Mannor may survive the cestui que vies of the 20. acres and that possibility is sufficient to make this good out of the reversion for then the lessor may distrain for his rent but where no possibility of a distress is there no rent may be reserved as in Iewels case the lease was void for there was no possibility that the lessor shall ever distrain but in our case the lease for years is good for the lessor is not without his remedy for he may have an action of debt upon this reservation 1. H. 4. 2. there a measnalty in gross was let rendring rent and good for by possibility the Tenant may die without heires and yet this is a remote possibility 12. E. 3. execution 112. a reversion granted by fine in tail rendring rent is good and Coo. 5. Elmers case that a reversion being let for life rendring rent is a good reservation at the Common Law and he held without question that where a Bishop is seised of a Mannor which consists part of freeholders and part of Copiholders that a lease of the Mannor rendring rent is good and in our case the reservation of the rent is intire and shall bind the successor and as to that which had been said that the Herriot is Collateral and shall not go with the reversion to this he
after the promise and the 14. l. paid and he said there is a difference where a thing is a present dutie and where it is a dutie upon request or upon any Collateral Act there the request is traversable otherwise when it is a dutie upon a contract or upon an obligation there Licet saepius c. is sufficient and according to this it was adjudged Hill 18. Iac. Rot. 1894. debt upon an arbitrement between one Prideaux and Walcot for the payment of 340. l. upon request and it was alledged there that he had not paid that Licet saepius requisitus and it was adjudged that in this case it was not sufficient because it was not a dutie presently but upon the request and the place where the request was made ought to be put in certain and he cited another case H. 16. Iac. between Hill and Moor adjudged in this point of assumpsit as in our case for where it becomes to be a debt payable upon request there ought to be alledged a time and place of the request and so H. 30. Eliz. one Welborns case where a man promised to pay so much money for costs of a suit when he should be requested to pay that and there after verdict judgement was arrested and Hobert said that the request is part of the cause of the Action and for that it ought to be set down precisely and there ought to be a promise broken and such a promise upon which an issue may be taken Bubles case IT was argued in the case of Buble who was Administrator during the minoritie of an Infant that the Court of the Marches of Wales have no Authoritie to force such an Administrator to accompt before them but only the Ecclesiastical Court and if they intermeddle in any such thing this Court may grant a Prohibition The great case of Cooper and of Edgar in Ejectione firme I In Ejectione firme between Cooper and Edgar for diverse lands in Norfolk upon a lease made by Downey and his wife for 5. years and upon the general issue the jury gave a special verdict to this effect that one Henry Foyne was seised ofland in his demeasne as of fee and 9. April 34. Eliz. infeoffed Iustice Windham and others to the use of Anne his wife for life the remainder to him and his right heirs in fee and then Henry died and that the reversion discended to Robert Foyne as son and heir to Henry and he being so seised of the reversion 11. Iun. 10. Iac. by indenture made between Robert and Anne his Mother who was Tenant for life it was agreed that Robert should levie a fine of that in Trinity Term and this fine was to be to the use of Anne and her heirs for ever if Robert did not pay or cause to be paid to Anne 10. l. upon the first of September next and if he pay then it shall be to other uses S. to the use of the same Anne for life of that part of which she was seised and of the residue to the use of Robert and his heirs and they found over that the fine was levied to the same uses the same term and they found over that Robert died at the age of 20. years and a 11. moneths and this was before the first of September and it was found that one Anne and Elizabeth under whom the Plantiff did claim were sisters and heirs to Robert and that they had not any notice of the use nor of the indenture and that they did not pay the money upon the first of September but that afterwards they entred and made the lease c. and the Defendant claimed under Anne who is now the Lady Cesar and now if upon all the matter the Defendant be guilty was the question And Crawley Serjeant argued for the Plantiff and the substance of his argument was in this mannor and first he said that he conceived the points to be upon the special verdict either to concern the antient estate or the new estate of the Lady Cesar and here we are also to consider whether the uses are well created and stand good by the indenture and by the fine without the help of the special verdict and first I will not dispute when an Infant levies a fine and dies before the reversal of that whether his heir may avoid that and this is ruled in Cooks Reports 10. H. 7. 16. that this may not be because that this trial ought to be by inspection which now may not be when he is deed but that which I will insist upon in the first place is this when an infant made an indenture to declare the uses of a subseqent fine and he doth after that at another time levie a fine generally without expressing of any use in the fine whether he may any wise enter and avoid the uses of the same fine or whether the law of necessity doth adjudge the fine to be to the same uses without the help of any Averment and I hold that he may avoid those uses which do stand upon this difference that it is incongruous to reason that if the law admits a man to be of abilitie to levie a fine then at the same instant or after he may declare the uses because it it is intended that he is of full age and if this had been a fine with grant and render in which there is alwayes an use expressed as 26. H. 8. 2 that the grant of an Infant is absolutely void but I do agree the case in Beckwiths case of a feme Covert Cook 2. or of a man of nonsane memory that their declaration of that subsequent use is good because that the fine which is levied by them is a perpetual Bar and conclusion and by such means there disposal doth conclude them for ever but it is otherwise of an infant for he may avoid the fine by error during the minoritie and the opinion of the book of 46. Ed. 3. 34. is that if an infant do alien a rent he may bring a dum fuit infra aetatem which seems to infer that the grant of an infant is not absoluely void I answer that is but the admission of the Court and 15. 7. 4. if an infant made a deed and at full age he inrolled that this is a conclusion for him to denie that for this inrolment is an affirmance of that and the reason of that is because this is an affirmance of the same thing but here the fine and the uses are distinct and for that they are voidable and for the other point the derdict had found that the fine was levied to the uses aforesaid whether that had established the uses and made them unavoidable so long as the fine is in force and I hold that it had not for it is no more then ad usus supra dictos and it had not bettered the uses for they had no reference to aide the uses like to the case of the Earl of Leicester
had two sons and he do Covenant in consideration of natural affection that if the eldest return from Rome by such a day that then he will stand seised to his use and if he do not return then he will stand seised to the use of the youngest son now if in this case the eldest die before the day so that it is become impossible that he should return yet that will not hinder the raising of the use to the youngest son and so in Dyer 331. the limitter may not have any estate against his own limitation of his uses for this is his own fact and so in our case it is his own default to make such a limitation and now for the fourth point whether any notice is requisite to the heirs and first I agree that in many cases a man shall not lose a thing except he had notice but there are two exceptions from this rule upon which I will put some cases and then I will applie them and first the ordinary may present by laps and he needs not to give notice for it s supposed in law that the ordinary will in 6. moneths see whether the cure is served or no nay if the patron was a Purchasor and a stranger present he had lost his inheritance and yet no notice ought to be given and the 12. H. 7. if the Tenant of the Lord do die without heir and a stranger do enter and Abates and dies seised now the Lord had lost the benefit of the escheat and yet perchance he had no notice of that and so was the opinion of Dyer and Welch 4. Eliz. that if two Copartners make partition in this case the Lord ought to take notice at his peril and secondly when one is bound to take notice at his peril as in Westby's case Cook 3. the new Sheriff ought to take notice of the Execution upon the prisoners when he takes them and so is the first of H. 7. 4. a man being bound to perform an arbitrement he ought to take notice of that at his peril but in our case here is a presumption in law that he had notice for he had the land from his ancestor and in the same degree and so the law doth intend that he had notice of the conditions and if he had not it is the default of his Ancestor that he had not left his deeds with him Secondly the heir is privie to the condition this doth descend to him and therefore he ought to take notice of that and put the case that an Action of debt is brought against the heir upon the obligation of his father and he pleads he had nothing by discent and it is found that he had a reversion expectant upon a Term for life of which he had not notice of yet that will not excuse for the law intends that he had notice and that he shall be charged as if it were his own debt and also the deed after the death of his Ancestor doth appertain to him and if the deeds are kept from him he may have an action for them and besides here no man is bound to give him notice for if it should be given it ought to be given to the heir or to the Executors for they may both save the land by the performance of the condition nay if there be 20. Coheirs there ought to be notice given to them all because they are to lose their inheritance by that and it is not like to the case which was adjudged where there are two obligors to make such an assurance as the obligee shall devise there a devise to one is sufficient because this concerns a personal thing but otherwise when this doth concern an inheritance as here but I relie upon the reason of the first forming of the deed if I am not bound to give notice at the time of the making of the deed I shall not be bound to give notice by any matter ex post facto and yet I do agree that in many cases where a thing is certain at the first and doth refer to some future agreement that in such cases there ought to be notice given to the partie as Hill 12. Iac. in this Court Rot. 109. where a promise was made upon a consideration Trin. 22. Jac. C. P. that the other will with draw his suit which he had in the Exchequer that then he will give to him so much when he came into Somersetshire and adjudged that the partie ought to give notice when he came in to Somersetshire but in our case every thing is certain at the time of the making of the deed 38. Assises 7. if a feofment is made upon condition to regrant to the feoffor and his heirs if in this case the feoffor do die he is not bound to regrant to his heirs without a request another reason is who shall give notice to the Lady that Foyn is dead she is bound to take notice of that at her peril and also if the Lady had died who shall give notice to the Executors that they may attend to receive the money for if they do not attend this is a peremptory refusal and for that reason it is equitie that if no notice is to be given of one side then there shall be none given of the other side and so I conceive that there doth not need any notice and now for the last point c. of the estate for life whether if no fee do arise whether she had lost her estate for life and first this is no Forfeiture for here he in reversion is partie but it is said that this is extinct but let us examine if this had been before the Statute of uses no more use will result then was before and for the estate for life that is saved and it was resolved Trin. 5. Iac. that if Tenant for life grant his estate by fine to another and yet he doth express no use that it shall be to the use of the partie because that the Law intends that by this it is disburthened of the danger of waste but in our case the estate of the Conusee is saved by the Statute of the 27. H. 8. for this saves all rights titles possessions c. of those who shall be seised to any use and so was it adjudged in Cheny and Oxenbridge his case that the Term for years was saved but the doubt in that case was not whether a Term was saved which he had to his own use but that which he had to the use of his wife and adjudged that this was saved and 32. Eliz. it was ruled in the Chancery between Tates and Willers that if he in reversion do infeof lessee for years and two others there it was ruled that the Term was saved and so it was adjudged Trin. 17. Iac. Rot. 246. Francis Priors case that where the lessee for years is and he in reversion levies a fine to the lessee to the intent that he suffer a
Kingsmil agreed to this In evidence to the Iury in a replevin brought by I. S. against one Bennet for the taking of beasts and the Defendant made Conusance and he said that Mr. Potts was seised of 6. acres of land and granted a rent charge out of that to one William Pots his son in taile and for rent behinde he avowed and the issue was that the rent did not pass by the grant and Hobert said that in this case the avowant ought to prove that the grantor was seised of 6. acres or more and not of 4. or 5. acres if he will maintain his issue in this case Action upon the case for words he innuendo the Plantiff stole the Tobacco out of his Mrs. shop Finch moved the declaration was not good because he had not averred that there was a communication concerning him before and where the person is incertaine there the innuendo is void Hobert and Winch held that to be good but then Hobert moved that the declaration was not good because he said the Tobacco in his Mrs. shop and had not averred that there was Tobacco there to which also Winch agreed but if he had said that he had stolen Tobacco out of his Mrs. shop such declaration without any averment is good but here the words the had altered the sense and so there ought to be an averment and Winch said that if he had said that he had stole 2 or 3 pound of Tobacco out of his Mrs. house this had been good without any averment for the certainty appears and it was adjourned Trin. 19. Jac. Sir George Stripping in Wast SIir George Stripping brought an action of waste and an estrepment was awarded to the Sheriff of Kent to prohibit him to make waste and the Sheriff returned the writ executed accordingly and now there was an affidavit made to the Court that since the estrepment he had cut down certaine Willowes which grew upon the bank of the River by which a bank fell down and a meadow adjoyning was overflowed and upon this affidavit Davies moved for an attachment against the Defendant for it appears by this affidavit that waste is committed for the cutting of willowes in this case is waste because that they support the bank as if they grew neer a house Hobert and Winch being only present that this is a waste in law but yet no attachment shall be awarded because that this appears only by affidavit and is only the collection of the party and this doth not appear by pleading or by the recorâ— of the Sheriff and Brownlow said that in this case he ought to have a Pond which was granted Maior against two Bayliffs ACtion of false imprisonment was brought by Major against 2 Bayliffs of a corporation who pleaded not guilty and at the nisi prius the Plantiffe was nonsuite and now Serjeant Richardson moved upon the Statute of cap. 5. 7. Iac. for double costs and that upon the very words of the Statute and the question was whether the costs ought to be taxed by this Court or by the Iustices of Assize Hobert said that upon the nonsuite the Iustices of Assize might have commanded the Iury to have taxed the single costs and then the same judge might have doubled them and that within the words of the Stat. but if the judge grants this then upon his certificate the double costs shall be assessed for otherwise the party shall be without any remedy and Brownlow ch Prothonotary agreed with that as to the certificate that this Court shall assesse the Costs and Brownlow had a president according Mich. 19. Jac. Grice against Lee. GRice against Lee in an action upon the case and the Plantiff declared that he being long time before and still is seised in fâ—e of certain messages and lands in Layton Buzard in the County of Bedford and that to these messuages he had a common appendant time beyond memory c. in 600 acres of waste called Layton Heath and had common in 600 acres of wood in Layton aforesaid and that the Defendant had made certaine conney borroughs and which the aforesaid couneys where he had not made any mention of any conneys before eat up the grass and that the Defendant had inclosed the said wood by which the Plantiff had lost the profits and the Defendant as to the digging of the heath for coneys said that E. 3. granted to the Dean and Cannons of Windsor that they and their successors haberent in omnibus terris dominicalibus liberam Warrennam sibi tunc et successor et in posterum conferendam And that the 20. E. 4. the Duke of Suffolk and his wife granted to them the said Mannor of Layton whereof the said Heath is parcel and said that 22. E. 4. it was enacted by Parliament that all charters made by King E. 3. to the Deane and Canons of Windsor shall be good and that the said Deane and Cannons of Windsor being so seised of the Mannor of Layton and of the Heath in the 3. H. 7. erected a free warren and that by mean conveyance the said D. and C. conveyed that to the Defendant and so justified the making of the said coney borroughs by vertue of the charter of E. 3. and as to the 600. acres of wood he justified by the licence of the father of the Plantiff who then was seised of the common and upon these pleas in barre the Plantiff demurred and Serjeant Richardson took exception because that it is not expressy alleadged that hee was seised of the house and land to which the common is appendant at the time of the making of the conney borroughs for he only said that a long time before the erection of the conney borroughs and yet he is seised which immplies that he was seised before and after but not at the time of the warren made and for this he cited the Book of entries where waste was brought and he counted of a lease for life to the Defendant and a grant of the revertion and an attornment of the Tenant and that the Defendant had made waste and ruled to be evil because he had not alleadged that this was after the attornement and so in Stradlings and Morgans case and he cited a judgement 5. Iac in C. B. Adkinson brought an action of trespass against I. S. and declared quod per multos Annos jam preteritos he had exercised marchandize and that the Defendant such a day said of him that he was a Bankrupt and it was adjudged that the declaration was evil because he had not alleadged that he exercised marchandize at the time of the speaking of the words and he said that the cause of the judgement was entered upon the roll and the same case he could shew to the Court and Hobert desired to sâ—e that for he doubted much of the law of the same case to which Winch and Hutton agreed and Richardson said that as to that which may be said that a fee
the very Common Law see Ouleys case 19. Eliz. in Dyer but Hutton doubted whether this bond is void by the Common Law because the Statute of the 23. H. 6. inflicts so great specialty upon the Sheriffs for extortion and after judgement was Commanded to be entred for the Defendant in the action if no other matter be shewed to the contrary before such a day In trespas quare vi et armis one such being his servant cepit et adduxit at D. in Essex the Defendant pleaded that he was a vagrant in the same Countie and he not having notice that he was servant to another he retained him and it was moved by Finch if I retain the servant of another man in the same Countie where I and his Mr. inhabit this is not justifiable though in veritie I had not notice of that and this according to the express book of the 19. Ed. 3. 47. Hobert the book may not be law for it is a hard matter to make me take notice of every servant which is retained in the same Countie and yet perchance if this retainer be upon the Statute of labourers at the Sessions this is notorious and I ought to take notice of that at my peril but it is otherwise of a private retainer for though it is within the same Countie yet being a private matter in fact the Law will not compel me to take notice of that at my peril otherwise if this be matter of record 2. H. 4. 64. and Hobert and Winch seemed to agree and then Finch moved that the Plantiff had charged the Defendant with his servant by cepit et adduxit and the Defendant excused himself and never traversed cepit et adduxit see 11. H. 4. Hutton and Hobert the receiving and the entertaining of a servant may not be said to be vi et armis Mr. Spencers case HArvy Serjeant came to the barre and demanded this question of the Court in the behalf of Mr. Spencer a man was seised of land in fee and sowed the land and devised that to I. S. and before severance he died and whether the devisee shall have the Corn or the executor of the devisor was the question and by Hobert Winch and Hutton the devisee shall have that and not the executor of the devisor and Harris said 18. Elizabeth Allens case that it was adjudged that where a man devised land which was sowed for life the remainder in fee and the devisor died and the devisee for life also died before the severance and it was adjudged that the executor of the Tenant for life shall not have that but he in remainder and Winch Iustice said that it had been adjudged that if a man devise land and after sowe that and after he dies that in this case the devisee shall have the Corn and not the executor of the devisor nota bene Dodderidge against Anthony Entred Mich. 19. Jac. Rot. 1791. ENt. Mich. 19. Jac. Rot. 1791. Peter Dodderidge brought an action of accompt against one Anthony and he declared that he deâ—ivered to the Defendant so many pieces of cloath called Bridge-water red to be sold at Bilbo in Spain and the Defendant said that he sold the same cloath at Bilbo in Spain for 40. l. 18. s. English to be paid in May next insuing the sale which was in November before and over he alledged the Custome of Merchants to be that if any Merchant had goods in the same Kingdome to be sold to another Merchant and he sell the goods to be paid at a day to come and this is done before a publick Notary and thereby a Bill signed and acknowledged to him in his name who sold the goods and that if the Merchant who so sold the goods delivered the Merchant who was owner of the goods this Bill so taken in his name this shall be a discharge to him of the goods and he averred that he sold them to a Spanish Merchant and that he took a Bill accordingly and at London offered that Bill to the Plantiff who refused that and upon this plea the Plantiff demurred Attoe argued that the plea is not good because he had not alledged that the partie who takes such a Bill may plead that and the Custome is also alledged with an if if the party sell and if he take the Bill and not with positive averment that he may so sell and may so take the Bill which being delivered to the owner of the goods shall be a discharge to the factor who sold the goods and here this custome is not good by the Common Law for if I deliver goods to another to sell and he sell them to be paid the money at a day to come this is not good for he ought by his sale to make a compleat contract and if I sell my horse for 10. l. I may retain the horse till the money is paid for till then the contract is not compleat and so in this case and here the Plantiff shall have an action of accompt upon this delivery and if he sell them otherwise or do not sell them for ready money he had gone beyond his Commission and this Custome is unreasonable that the Bill shall be taken in his name who sold the goods but perchance if the custome had been alleadged to take the Bill in the name of the owner of the goods this had been good but in our case the owner of the goods may not sue nor have any remedy for his goods except the factor will go into Spain and sue the said Bill and it is unreasonable to leave this to the pleasure of my factor whether I shall have any remedy for my goods sold and it is very unreasonable that I shall be paid with a Bill which may not be sued and here the Plantiff is a stranger to the Custome of Spain and shall not be bound by that Serjeant Harris to the contrary the Custome which is alledged is good among Merchants though it is not good according to our Common Law and so if two Merchants trade joyntly and one of them dies before severance of the goods yet his executor shall have his part and not the Survivor and so by the law of Merchants a man cannot wage his law in debt upon a simple contract by which it is apparant that the laws of Merchants differ from our laws and indeed the laws of Merchants are National laws and that this is the Custome in Spain is confessed by the demurrer and then we may not examine that by the reason of our laws and the laws of Merchants ought to be favoured for trading sake which is the life of every Kingdome and by the law of Merchants a Bill without seal is good and yet by our law it is but an escrowl and so I pray judgement for the Defendant Hobert chief Iustice when the Merchant had delivered goods to the factor to sell he had made the factor negotiator gestorum and for that
that then his two sons shall pay them and if it happen that either of them die before his debts and legacies paid or before either of them do enter into his part that thou the other shall have all the land in fee and after the devisor died and in the life of the mother the eldest son released to the youngest all his right title Claim and demand to the land which was devised to him by his father and after the wife died and two points came in question in this case First whether this limitation is good Secondly whether the release is good and it was argued by Richardson Serjeant that this limitation of the Statute by way of devisee is good and he vouched Dyer 330. Clarks case and 4. Eliz. Goldley and Buckleys case a man devised to his son and his heirs provided that if his personal estate did not suffice to pay his debts and legacies that then his lands shall be to another and he vouched Brown and Pells case which was adjudged in Banco Regis the case was that a man had two sons William the eldest and Thomas the youngest and he devised his lands to Thomas his son and his heirs provided that if Thomas died without issue living that then William shall have the land and it was resolved that this was good to William by way of executory devise and in that case doubt was moved whether if Thomas suffer a recovery whether this shall take away the estate of William and it was holden by all the Court except Doderidg that it shall not but all agreed that this devise upon the future contingency is good and so he concluded that if the youngest son die in the life of the Mother and before the legacies are paid the land shall remain to the Plantiff according to the intent of the devisor but the other doubt is when the Plantiff did release all his right and claim to the other whether this release will extinguish this future possibility and he held that it will not and he said that he had seen the case of Lampet Coo. 10. and there the release of a possibility is penned as in our case and if any word discharge this possibility it is this word right but if the resolution of that book had not been against him he would have argued that this right was not sufficient to extinguish this future possibility but that there ought to be a more apt and proper word but he said he would not argue against books but he said that which he would insist upon was the distinguishing of possibilities for there are two manner of possibilities the one is Common and ordinary the other is more remote and forreigne And first there is a possibility which is Common and necessary and this depends upon an ordinary casualty as a lease for life the remainder to the right heirs of I. S. for it is apparant that the right heirs of I. S. may take by this and such a possibility may be released and a possibility which is remote and forreigne is as if a lease be made for life the remainder to another during the life of the lessee for life or a lease for life the remainder to the Corporation of B. those remainders are void but yet by possibility they may be good for in the first case the Tenant for life may enter into religion and in the latter case the King may make Corporations and yet because such possibilities are not usual the remainders are void see Coo. 2. Chamleys case where such a remote possibility may not be released if a man give land to one which is married and to another woman which is married and to the heirs of their two bodies ingendred this is a good estate tail for there is a common possibility that they may intermarry but if the gift be to a man and to two women who are married and to the heirs of their bodies ingendred they shall not have an estate tail executed for it is a remote and forreigne possibility and an imbrodery of estates which the law will not allow nor respect see the Rector of Chedingtons case that such a possibility as in our case may not be released for first here the mother ought to be dead before the Plantiff shall have land Secondly legacies ought to be paid Thirdly Thomas ought to be dead and till all these possibilities hap the Plantiff shall have nothing in the land and for that it is a remote possibility which is not gone by the release for as it is said when a possibility shall be gone by a release there ought to be a good foundation upon which the release may operate secondly the possibility which is released ought to be necessary and Common but in our case it is not necessary that the son shall enjoy it in the life of his mother and also the mother may in a short time pay the legacies and then neither of the sons shall have the land by which circumstances it is apparant that this is not a Common or an ordinary possibility but is a remote and forraigne expectancy which shall not be gone by this release and this differs from Lampets case for there was a possibility of a Chattel which as it may easily be created so it may easily be destroyed but in our case it is a franktenement which as that requires a greater ceremony in the creation and for that it will require a greater matter to destroy and to extinguish that and it is said in Woods case cited in Shelleys case Coo. 1. that if a man covenant with A. that if I. S. infeoffed him of the Mannor of D. that then he will stand seised to the use of him and his heirs of the Mannor of B. and the Covenantee died and the said I. S. infeoffed the Covenantor in such case the heir shall be inward and yet it is only a possibility which descends which possibility of an use may not be discharged or released and yet in that case there was a possibility which is more Common and ordinary then in our case for there was a possibility that I. S. should make the feofment and so say a good foundation upon which the release may operate and he put the case that I. shall let for so many years as I. S. shall name if I. S. name it is good and yet he held if I. S. release before the nomination that this release is meerly void because he had only a possibility and as to Digs case Coo. 1. there a power of Revocation may be released and good reason for the Covenantor who released had the bird in his own hand and for that it was no remote possibility but there it is said that if the power be limited to an estranger there the stranger may not release and he also agreed Albanies case for there the power to release was upon the death of a man only but in our case it is upon death and other
in capite and others in Soccage and he made a devise of all his fee simple lands and left only his lands in tail to descend to the heir which doth not amount to a full third part this is a good devise of all the fee simple lands and this case was also admitted that where the Lord Norrice gave land to Sir Edward Norrice his youngest son and to the heirs of the bodie of the father and then the Lord Norrice died and after Sir Edward died without issue that the son of the eldest Brother who was then dead shall take that as heir in tail and that he in this case had that by a descent from Sir Edward Norrice his Vncle which also doth clearly prove that in this Sir Edward Norrice son of the Lord Norrice was in this case Tenant in tail The residue of Easter Term in the two and twenty year of King James Stephens and Randal IN replevin between Stephens and Randal who made Conusance as Bailiff to the Earl of Bath and he shewed that such land was parcel of such a Chantrey which came to King Edward 6. by the Statute of 1. Edward 6. and also he pleaded the saving of the said Statute by which the right of others was saved and pleaded all incertain and shewed that so much rent was behinde upon which he made Conusance as c. to which the Plantiff replied that the land is out of the fee and signiorie of the Earl of Bath c. and this was ruled to be no plea for he confessed so much in his avoury and this avoury is not for rent service for the signiorie is extinct by act of Parliament but this is for rent reserved by the saving of the act of Parliament and this is a rent seek and yet is destrainable for the priviledge which was before but he may traverse the tenure that at the time of the making of the Statute nor never after this was holden of the said Earl of Bath Priest and King Priest and King in an action of which was entered between them Trin. 21 Iac. Rot. 3595. and this was debated between the Iudges and the Prothonotaries and the case was that two were bound for the appearance of an other and judgement was given against the debtor now if upon the capias he come and offer his bodie and the Plantiff refuse that yet that discharges the sureties but the Prothonotaries said that notwithstanding this refusal he may take a Capias against him within the year because that at the first he might have had a fierie facias or an elegit quere of that but Winch thought that in this case he ought to have a fierie facias but if he had come upon the Capias and had no suerâ—tes and he refuse to take him and this is so entred now quere if he had not discharged him Hendon moved the Court for a prohibition to the spiritual Court and suggested that one had libeld in the spiritual Court for a legacie and the Executor shewed that he had not assets to discharge the debts of the Testator and that Court would not allow this allegation and upon this he prayed to have a prohibition and it was the opinion of the Court that no prohibition shall be granted for the legacie is a thing meerly which is determinable in the spiritual Court and no other Court may have Conusance of that and this is also a thing which doth consist meerly in the discretion of the Court and resolved that in a thing which meerly doth rest in discretion of the Court in this case no prohibition shall be granted Henry Good against Thomas Good IT was agreed in the case by the Court between Henry Good and Thomas Good that if the devisee of 500. l. sue in the Marches of Wales for this legacie that a prohibition is grantable for though the Court of the Common pleas had no power to hold plea of that yet because that the thing is only triable in the Ecclesiastical Court a prohibition may be granted to reduce that to its proper Court and though the instruction of the Court of the Marches be to hold plea of all such things wheresoever there is no remedie at the Common Law yet this is to be understood of matters of equitie and not to take the jurisdiction from the spiritual Court for in verity the King may not do that by his Letters pattents but yet the Court agreed that if the Executor do suffer a decree against him in the Court of the Marches and not come to them at the first to be releived it is now meerly in the descretion of the Court whether they will grant that or no for that is a means to lengthen suits and to make the more delay before he do recover his legacie If a Capias ut legatum issueth to the Sheriff to take the partie and to enquire what lands and Tenements he had and the Sheriff findes by inquisition that he is seised of many lands and continues possession in them and the Sheriff do out me I shall have an action of trespass John Marriots case SErjeant Crawley moved this case in arrest of judgement in the case of Iohn Marriot and he declared upon a contract to table with the Plantiff at Ashton in Northamptonshire ad tunc ibidem superse assumpsit to pay 4. s. by the week for his diet and Crawley moved that this ought to have bin tried in Northamptonshire for these words ad tunc et ibident refer to Northamptonshire which was next before and not to London Hutton said that it ought to refer to London otherwise it was idle and it is to be intended of the time and the place where the promise was made but it was said if the issue had been whether he was tabled or no this shall be tried there Giles Bray against Sir Paul Tracie GIles Bray brought an action of waste against Sir Paul Tracie and in his declaration he conveyed a good tearm to the Defendant and a reversion to himself and upon a general issue a special verdict was found to this effect that Sir Edmund Bray was seised of this land in his demeasne as of fee and he being so seised 16. Eliz. made this lease for divers years to I. S. and he being so seised of the reversion conveyed that to the use of himself for life without impeachment of waste and then to the use of Edward Bray his eldest son and to Dorothie his wife and to the heirs males of the said Edward upon the said Dorothie to be ingendred and then Edward died having issue in tail the Plantiff and then this lease was assigned to Tracie and then Dorothie died and then the waste was committed and then Edmund the Grandfather died and the question was whether in this case an action of waste will lie or no. The argument of Serjeant Harris HArris argued that the waste doth lie for the priviledge or despensation which was annexed to the
because this is for Merchants and the Statute was made for their securitie and by intendment they are men of forraign imployment and so have the less occasion to know the Law and these Statutes of traffick are to be cherished and not be pared to the verie quick and we all agree that every substantial matter ought to be pursued but not circumstances and then the question is whether this be substance or circumstance and we also agreed that there ought to be a time certain when the money shall be paid and that is either an actual time or a legal time and for the material points that ought to be acknowledged before an officer and in the Statute of Acton Burnel this word Maior is in that and no other principal officer and yet there is no doubt but that this may be taken before another who is a principal officer of a corporation though he be not a Maior Secondly this ought to be also before the Clark Thirdly it ought to contain words obligatorie Fourthly there ought to be a person bound Fifthly this ought to contain a summe but it may be a doubt if an action of debt will lie for that Sixthly it ought to be under the seal of the partie Seventhly it ought to be under the seal of the King Eightly the inrolments is also necessarie and this Statute is such a remedy as the Common Law never gave to the King himself so all assurances in this kind are to be made to the Merchants and certainly in our case the day is not so material but the time which the law will take notice of for the ignorance of the Maior must not make any Statute void and I do not grant the case that if this was to pay 10. l. after the death of S. P. this will not make that void but if the Statute be to pay at several dayes then then it is a quere in law whether it be payable till all the dayes of payment be past as of a bond and for the writ it is but to proportion our actions according and to do after this way or manner and so upon the whole matter I conclude that the Statute is good and that the audita querela doth not lie and judgement per Curiam was commanded to be entered against the Plantiff The case of Giles Bray was moved again in arrest of judgement and Hendon said that the Plantiff had declared of a waste made after the death of the said Edmund Bray the Grandfather which was to his disinheritance c. and the Iury did finde the original lease and assignment and they found that the waste was made before such a day which was before the death of the Grandfather and now he said that because it is found generally that before the death of the Grandfather the waste was made and this was found precisely and it is not found precisely that at the time of the waste made he was termor in possession and that is not good for it may be that he made that before the assignment and then it is not punishable of waste and if the waste was made in the life of the Grandfather he ought so to have declared for otherwise it was not immediately to his disinheritance nay the Grandfather might have during his life released or confirmed to the Tenant and so have determined the waste and then he in reversion shall not recover like to the case where an Abbot declares of the waste against the lessee of his predecessor and declares of waste generally this is not good for if this was made in the time of his predecessor then he may not punish that and so in our case perchance the Grandfather had released and then he in reversion may not recover but as to the first exception the Court seemed that because the Plantiff shewed expresly that he was possessed by vertue of the lease and he being so possessed made waste the finding of the jury shall be agreeable to that and so this exception was over ruled and for the other the rule of the Court was that whether this waste was committed in the time of the Grandfather or after his death this waste was to his disinheritance and the Grandfather by his release might not by any means discharge that waste for he may not transfer that priviledge and so the judgement was given for the Plantiff The residue of Trinity Term 22. Jac. C. P. NOw the case of Sir Robert Napper and Sir Thomas Earsefield was moved again in which the Plantiff assigned the breach because that after Sir Thomas and his wife did live asunder the land was not open nor subject to distress of Sir Robert Napper and upon the opening of this to the Court the Court conceived that this rent was granted to be paid immediately and to distrain for that but afterwards there is a clause that it shall not begin in point of payment till Sir Thomas and his wife did live asunder and then it shall be paid the first day which was limited after and Crawley Serjeant said that the intent was that it should begin presently and that it should be subject to distress and therefore to make that an entire covenant is against the very intentions of the parties for covenants in nature are several also if they shall be construed otherwise the partie shall be without the remedy which was intended S. a distress but the Lord Hobert and Winch were of opinion that if Sir Thomas Earsefield had received his estate truly that he had but a reversion expectant upon a term for years and then had made such a grant and such covenants then in this case the covenant had not been broken and then the meaning would be that he should not have any rent till he had one to grant but it doth not appear here and therefore is a difference and the covenant is broken and Winch said that the intent was that the wife shall have that for her maintenance when they did live asunder so that then it shall be paid to the use of his wife for this was in trust for her and for that reason they ought to be several covenants of necessitie for the state of the Mother of Sir Thomas Earsfield did not appear in those indentures and then he ought to take that as it is at this time and the appearing of that now is not material and if any other construction shall be made then the parties to the indentures shall be deframed Hutton of the same opinion that they are several covenants in the intent and meaning of the parties and they are of several natures for the first covenant is in the affirmative the second is in the Negative and the third is in the affirmative and it is all one as if the word covenant had been to every clause in express words for he did not say that this should be alwayes open and lyable to distress according to this estate for then it had been but
ought to maintain the award but to shew the breach for it shall be otherwise if it be found against him and then Hendon answered to the other exception that this is not for direct usury but is rather for the damage which he sustained by the forbearance of the money and yet if it were for interest it is good and then as to that which now had been agreed by my brother Bridgman that contracts and obligations for usury are good I say then by the same reason an award for that is good for whatsoever a man may contract for the same thing may be awarded if the contract will bear that and usury is not malum in se but only malum prohibitum and is good by our law and here in this case though the Arbitrator was deceived in the summe yet after the award made it is altogether certain and an implied recompence is sufficient in this case but the Court said that the casting up of the accompts did not make an award for it is not a good Calculation but the ending of the controversies that doth make the award but yet the opinion of the Court in this case was that the award was good for an Arbitrement shall not be taken absolutely upon the bare words and the Court did command the parties to come before them upon the morrow in the Treasury and as it seems this was for mediation to make an agreement for the opinion seemed to be for the Plantiff The case of Hilliard and Sanders argued by the Court. IUstice Harvey this Term did argue the case of Hilliard and Sanders which see before and after a brief recital of the case he said that his opinion was that the avowant shall not have return because that by the fine of the lands the rent is extract and I am induced to be of this opinion by two things the first is the agreement and tâ—e other is the favourable exposition of the Statute of fines to settle repose and quiet and I will first shew the efficacie of fines at the common law 21. Ed. 4. the Pryor of Binghams case it is laid for a ground and rule in law if a thing be contained in a fine either expresly or implicitly this is very good and so is 44. Ed. 3. 22. 37. H. 6. 5. for a fine is no more then an agreement and therefore it is called in latin Concordia and then see if by any words you may pass this rent by the fine and though the word rent is not there yet if it be so infolded in the lands that is good with that it is very good and for that 3. H. 7. 16. 17. 21. H. 7. proves that by a feofment of the land the rent doth pass and wherefore not by fine then and this shall be within the Statute of 4. H. 7. and 32. H. 8. and a case may be out of the Statute of 32. H. 8. and yet be within the Statute of the 4. H. 7. as the 2. Ed. 3. in Dyer though the feme after the death of the husband she may enter upon the discontinues of the husband yet if she do not within 5 years she shall be barred and now you see that the construction of these Statutes was alwayes to settle repose and quietness for if such a construction should be made according to the opinion of Chornton in Smith and Stapletons case then it will be mischievous and for his opinion it was only in the way of arguing and yet I conceive he had the good opinion of the Reporter and without all question it is a case of as hard a construction as that is of Archers case where the heir who nothing had in the land in the life of his father did levie a fine this is a bar for ever and the reason is because it is of a thing which is intailed and he cited a case in Bendloes Reports where a discontinuee was disseised by Tenant in tail who levied a fine and the discontinuee entred and then proclamations passed that in this case the issue was barred truly I do agree the case of 36. H. 8. that that a fine levied of land did not bar him who had title of Common or a way the reason is because there is no privitie but in our case there is a privitie and by Margaret Podgers case a Coppiholder is within this Statute and in our case the rent passeth especially in regard of the agreement as in the Lord Cromwels case and he cited a case primo Jacobi between Gage and Selby in an ejectione firme where Gage was Tenant in tail and he levied a fine to I. S. in fee and after he levied another fine to the use of himself for life the remainder over and his brother brought a writ of error to reverse the first fine and ruled that he may not for the second fine had barred him of any writ of error and so I conclude the fine had extinguished the rent The argument of Justice Hutton to the contrary HUtton contrary the fine had not barred the rent in which I will consider the nature of fines at the Common Law and they were of mightie and great esteem and force as appears by the great solemnitie which is used in them as is prescribed in the Statute of fines 18. Ed. 1. de modo Levandi fines and he agreed that such a fine by Tenant in fee simple will pass that inclusively for by the release of all his right in the land a Signiorie is gone I agree also that a fine is but an agreement but yet it must work according to the nature of the thing as upon a writ of Measne or of right of advowson a fine may be levied and yet it is not levied of the lands but of the advowson or Signiorie and so if the writ of covenant be one thing and the agreement of another thing then it is not good and first I will prove that at the Common law fines have been rejected when the writ of covenant did not contain the thing of which the fine is to be be levied and if at the Common law a fine was levied of rent there ought to be a writ of covenant of that 18. Ed. 2. fines 123. and there the rule is given that it is against reason to hold covenant of that which never was and the rent there never was before but ought to begin then and yet it is clear a man may create a rent by fine but he shall not have a writ of covenant of that when it was not in esse before and because the concord may not varie from that therefore it was not received 38. Ed. 3. 17. Knevet put the rule that a fine may not be of more then is in the writ of covenant and when a fine is properly levied of that it is by way of release Fitz. fine 100. and so I conceive here the rent doth not pass Secondly here no man may plead that any fine is levied of
simple shall alwayes be supposed to have continuance if the contrary is not shewed to that he answered that is not so for the book of the 7. H. 7. 8. if in barre of assise the Tenant said that I. S. was seised and gave this is not good because he had not shewed quod fit seisitus existens dedit c. which being in a plea in barre is more strong then in a declaration to prove that a fee shall not be intended to have continuance without an express allegation and so he concluded that the declaration is naught but by Hobert Winch and Hutton it is very good notwithstanding this objection and Winch cited the 13. Eliz. in Ejectione firme where the life of the person was not cleerly alleadged but the declaration only was that the lessor was and yet is seised which was a sufficient averment of the life of the person and so the declaration is good and another exception was taken to the declaration by Hitcham Serjeant because that the Plantiff had declared that the Defendant had made conney borroughs and with the aforesaid conneys had eat up the grass where he had not alleadged any storeing of the coney borroughs before with coneys and then it is impossible they should eat up the grass to the prejudice of the Plantiff but to this it was answered by Serjeant Attoe that though the declaration as to that is naught yet the diging of the coney borroughs is to his prejudice and sufficient to maintaine the action which the Court granted and as to the matter in law Attoe argued for the Plantiff and recited the case to be that E. 3. granted to the Deane and Chapter of Windsor that they shall have free warren in the lands which yet they had not purchased and of which they were not seised at the time whether this is a good grant and shall extend to take effect after the purchase see Buckleys case and be argued that it is not a good grant and he put a difference between a warren and other priviledges which are flowers of the Crown which may be granted infuturo but a warren never was a flower of the Crown and for that reason a grant de bonis et cattallis fellon et fugitivorum may be granted and yet not be in esse at the time of the grant for it is a flower of the Crown and it is said 44. E. 3. 12. that the King may not grant a warren in other mens lands but only in the land of the grantee and upon this he concluded that this grant shall not extend to land after purchased and the rather because it is in the nature of a licence which shall be taken strictly see 21. H. 7. 1. 6. And Hobert chief Iustice said that this word demeans is derived of the French words en son manies and though the Lord of the mannor had the waste in his hands yet he had not the common and as to the confirmation by Ed. 4. they all agreed that this will confirm nothing to him but what was granted by E. 3. himself and then as to the licence pleaded that is of no effect for first the licence is pleaded to be made to one Sir Cha. Haydon and the Defendant did claime under him and this licence was made by the father which will not binde the son who had the land to which the common is appendant after the death of his father for a common may not be extinguished without deed and Hobert and all the Court agreed that the licence of the father will not binde the son and by the Court if nothing is shewed to the contrary within a week judgement shall be given for the Plantiff Davies against Turner DAvies brought a replevin against Turner and he declared of the taking in a place called the Holmes and the Defendant made conusance as bayliff to Sir George Bing for that one Clap held certain land of him by 20. s. rent and suite of Court and for the rent he avowed and alleadged seisin by the hands of Clap the Plantiff said that Chap held 40. acres of land by 9. s. rent fealty and suite of Court absque hoc that he held modo et forma and upon this it was demurred and the single point was this in auowry the Tenant alleadged c. and the question is whether he ought to traverse the tenure or the seisin and it was argued by Henden Serjeant that he ought to traverse the seisin and that the traverse of the tenure is not good and besides here is double matter for the conclusion sounds in barre of the avowry and in abatement of the avowry see a good case 18. H. 6. 6. for the falsness of the quantity of the land and the falsness of the quantity of rent the on goes in barre the other in abatement of the avowry 47. E. 3. 79. 5. H. 6. 4. and affirmed for good law And as to the second point he held the seisin to be traversable and not the tenure and first he said there was a difference between pleading in barre of avowry and in the abatement of the avowry for in barre of the avowry there the seisin is is not traversable by Frowick 21. H. 7. 73. which opinion he held for good law for it is agreed in Bucknels case Co. 9. he may not say that he held of a stranger absque hoc that the avowant was seised but otherwise it is when that goes in abatement of the avowry Secondly he said that the seisin is the principal thing and the principal thing ought to be traversed for if a man had seisin of many services seisin shall never be ayded till the Stat. of magna charta see Bucknels case Cook 9. and here the seisin is the most meterial thing and the most proper see 37. H. 6. Bro. Avowry 76. ne tiendra is no plea for a stranger to the avowry but he ought to answer to the seisin Thirdly the cause for which the seisin is traversable see a notable case per Danby 7. E. 4. 29. for the beginning of the services may be time beyond memory c. and for that reason may not be tried see 20. E. 4. 17. 22. H. 6. 3. 26. H. 6. 25. by Newton he may traverse the tenure Attoe contrary 13. H. 7. 25. to this it was answered that the number Rolle may not be found 5. H. 7. 4. 13. H. 6. 21. 21. H. 7. 22. by Frowick and Kingsmil Harvey to the contrary the case was that the Defendant made conusance as Bayliff to Sir George Bing for this that Chap held a messuage c. by certain rent and by suite of Court and the other said that he held 40. acres by 9. s. and suite of Court absque hoc that he held the messuage and the land modo et forma and he argued that it was a good traverse of the tenure and not double which was granted by Hobert and by Winch being only present and Hobert said true
of the obligation and so had disabled himself afterwards and the obligor is bound that a fine shall be leavied this is to be understood of a good and a lawfull fine and not a fine in name only and he put the case that I let for years and after Covenant to make a feofment to I. S. this lease for years is a breach of the Condition though at the time of the Covenant made the lease for years was made Iustice Winch thought the contrary for this disability is by the act of a stranger and for that the obligor may not take any certain notice of that and therefore if I am obliged to you that I. S. shall enfeoffe you of his Mannor and at the time I. S. had made a feoffement of two or three acres of the same Mannor yet if he enfeoffe you of that which he was seised at the time of the obligation this is a good performance of the Condition though that 2. or 3. acres were disjoyned from that before and so in this case the obligor being a stranger to the estate of I. S. if I. S. make such an estate as he had at the time of the obligation made this is sufficient upon which he concluded that the Plantiff shall not have judgement but afterward judgement was commanded to be entered for the Plantiff according to the opinion of Hobert and Hutton Hoels case HOels case upon a special verdict was to this effect a man was seised of 2. acres of land in fee and had 2. sones and he devised both the acres to his wife for life the remainder of one acre to his eldest son in fee the remainder of the other acre to his youngest son in fee upon this condition in manner and form following if either of my sonnes die before my depts and legacies are paid or before either of my sonnes enter into their part that then the longest liver shall have both parts to him and to his heires in fee and the devisor died and Hoel the Plantiff being the eldest sonne in the life of his mother released all his interest and his demand in this to his younger brother and the doubt was whether this condition was gone by this release and Attoe argued that it was gone for Littleton saith that every land may be charged one way or other see Anne Mayowes case Release Coo. 1. Albaines case power of revocation released see more of this afterwards Trin. 20. Jac. C. P. Whitgift aganist Sir Francis Barrington IN Replevin the Defendant avowed as Baliff to Sir Francis Barrington and that Whitgift the Plantiff held certaine land of Sir Francis Barrington by escuage et quendam reditum and that the said Sir Francis was seised by the hands of Whitgift his very Tenant and for homage he avowed and upon this the Plaintiff demurred first because he had avowed for homage and had not shewed how nor in what manner the homage is due whether in respect that the tenancy come to him by discent or by purchase and for that this general allegation is naught for by Hendon Serjeant all the presidents in such avowryes made mention of the title to the homage as 4. E. 4. in avowry for homage the tenure is shewed and a discent alleadged or a purchase of the land and in no book or in any president that he ever yet saw did he see such a general allegation in avowry for homage but he agreeth the book of the 44. E. 3. 42. if the avowry is upon tenant by the curtesie this general allegation is good but otherwise of a tenant in fee simple and for that he alledged the second E. 3. avowry in a replevin the Bishop avowed for homage due by the Plantiff and exception was taken because it was not shewed in whose time the death of the ancestor was whether in his own time or the time of his predecessor and ruled to be evill for his avowry being his title he ought to shew that in certaine and so in our case Hobert this case doth not prove our case for in our case prima facie it is certain to all intents and purposes and I cannot see how an avowry may be better made and Finch at the barre vouched a president in the book of entries title horse de son fee secondly where such a avowry as in our case is made and then Hendon moved that the avowrie is not good for he had shewed the tenure by homage and by escuage and rent de quo quidem redditu he was seised c. and this is also repugnant for when he said that he was seised of the rent by the hands of the Plaintiff this is a seisin of the homage as Bevils case is and then by his own shewing because the seisin of the rent is a seisin of the homage he shall not have the homage of the Plantiff Thirdly admitting this point against him and that the seisin of the rent is not seisin of the homage yet the pleading is not good for when he expresly alleadged seisin of the rent in this manner de quo quidem redditu he was seised this excluded the seisin of any other services but only of the rent which is expresly alleadged and therefore in our case he ought to have alleadged generally de quibus serviciis he was seised and to leave this to the construction of the Law and he vouched 13. H. 7. 31. Serjeant Harvy to the same intent for though perchance no good reason may be given wherefore the pleading shall be such and that the seisin of the homage ought to be expressed yet because all the presidents are so the course of pleading shall not be altered and all the presidents shew a seisin of the homage see the book of entries 597. and 598. Serjeant â—owse to the contrary the book of the 19. E. 2. Recovery 224. is that the alleadging of the seisin or escuage as in our case of tent is a sufficient avowry for homage and 29. H. 3. such an allegation of the seisin of rent was made in avowry for fealty and good Hutton if the book of the 19. E. 12. be as Towse had alleadged it is all one with our case Hobert seems the avoury is good notwithstanding this last exception for perchance he was not actually seised of the homage by the hands of the Tenant himself and then by his own shewing his avowry shall abate and he demanded of Brownlow if there were any such president of an avowry who answered no. Hobert if the continual pleading be as my brother Harvy had alleadged we will not alter the course of pleading but in my opinion in reason none may plead in better manner or form and Hutton being only present agreed and then Hobert commanded the presidents to be searched concerning that matter and Finch at the barre being of Councel with the avowant said that till the resolution in Bevils case it was a great question whether the seisin of the rent was the
son and his wife and upon a demurrer the question was whether this Covenant did raise a present use to the Son and to his wife or whether this only rests in Covenant and Harris Serjeant argued that no present use will arise by this Covenant for first all other Covenants in the indenture are in the future for the words are that the lands shall remain and come c. and therefore till the death of the Covenantor the fee simple is in him and no use will arise for it shall be in the election of the Covenantor what estate he will make to his Son for he himself shall interpret his intent and the difference in our books is when the words are in the present tense and when in the future and for this he cited 22. H. 7. by Iustice Rede if a man Covenant that land shall discend remain or revert he said this did not give any present interest because the wors are in the future and it is in the election of the Covenantor how and in what manner the land shall pass and there he put the case that if I give my horse or my Cow to I. S. there the Donee had election to take at his pleasure the one or the other because the words are in the present tense but if the words are that I will give a horse or a Cow there the Donor had election which he shall have because the words are in the future the Lord Borroughs Covenanted 34. H. 8. Dyer 55. with another in frank marriage with his son that immediately after his death his son shall enjoy the use of his land of inheritance according to the course as then they stood and the question was whether the see simple was presently out of the Covenantor and the opinion was that it was not because it was but a Covenant and did not change the fee simple and so is Dyer 96. Sir Thomas Seymor promised and Covenanted by indenture in consideration that the Covenantee had granted land to him that he would leavy a fine to Wimbish and Pennoy of other lands which fine should be to Sir Thomas Seymor for life the remainder to the Covenantee in taile and no fine was levied and the question was whether any use was raised by this Covenant to the Covenantee and the opinion of the book is that not because it is in the future and he cited the 20. H. 7. 10. the Duke of Buckingham in consideration that the Lord Henry his brother was to marry the Lady Wiltshire he Covenanted with Bray and with others that the Mannors of D. and of S. shall be to the Lady and to her heirs of her body begotten by the said Lord and after the Duke granted to the Lord Henry and his wife for their lives and it was argued whether this second grant is good or no for if it is then the first Covenant will not work to raise an use to the feme and the book left that as a quere and if it be then he argued that in the principal case no present use is raised but that this rests meerly in Covenant and so he prayed judgement for the Plantiff Serjeant Hendon to the contrary for he thought this will raise a present use and that this was the intent of the parties that this should raise a present use for the intent was to advance them first during their lives with the rent and after the death of the Covenantor and his wife with the land it self and therefore of necessity this will raise a present use for a bare action of Covenant may not be any advancement at all and the rather here because they who take benefit of this are strangers to the Covenant and not Preston himself for as it appears by 3. H. 7. a stranger shall not take benefit by a Covenant and therefore he said the intentions of the parties was to raise an use for otherwise there shall be no advancement at all And further the words in the indenture are Covenant and grant and if no use is raised then this word grant is idle and every word shall be so expounded that they may take effect and the word Covenant is insufficient of it self to pass an estate in land or to have any estate in signification other then to a meer Covenant and to be obligatory as is put Co. 2. Cromwels case Tirrels case there vouched a lease for years provided and it is Covenanâ—ed and agreed there the Covenant is a condition and also a Covenant and 8. Ass 1. 12. it is agreed that if I Covenant that an other shall have my land for 7. years this a good lease of the land it self and it was adjudged here Tr. 2. Jac. Rot. 1696. accordingly and in our case this word Covenant and grant is also sufficient to raise an use and to give an interest in the land it self and yet he agreed that if there was an other act to be made by the Covenantor or the Covenantee that then no use will arise but it shall rest only in Covenant Dyer 162. there are Covenants between the Lady Vere and Sir Anthony Wingfield her son that the said Lady would convey to her son by a recovery and that after 6. moneths the said Sir Anthony shall make an estate to his Mother for life and there it is doubted whether the use is changed within the 6. moneths and it was holden that it was not Mich. 20. Jac. C.P. for then it is impossible that the Covenants should be performed and in that case it is in the power of the Covenantor to make an act that the Covenants shall not be performed and therefore Covenants will not raise an use but in our case no act of the Covenantor may hinder that this use shall arise and therefore good and for that the difference is Dyer 296. which is entered 11. Eliz. the Roll of which I have seen the father upon the marriage of his son promised to the friends of his wife that after his death his son shall have his land to him and his heirs and the book is ruled that this did not change the use and the reason was this Covenant was by words and not in writing but it was not doubted if this Covenant had been by writing but that the Covenant will raise an use which is all one with our case and so was Callard and Callards case 37. Eliz. stand forth Eustace reserving to my wife and my self I give to thee and thy heires and there it was doubted whether any use will arise to the son and ruled that not because this was by words only but it was also agreed that if these words had been by writing they had been sufficient to raise an use to the son and he cited Dyer 232. before the Statute of the 27. H. 8. A Covenanted and agreed with B. that upon the marriage of his son with the daughter of the other that he would retain his land for life and that
who hath an interest and see for that Coo. 3. Lincoln Colledge case and Dyer 148. Thirdly he held that though it should be so that lessee for years may not enter by force of the Statute of the 11. H. 7. yet he may falsifie a recovery by the Statute of the 21. H. 8. which enables lessee for years to falsifie as well as lessee for life and it appears by the verdict that the sole intent of this recovery was to defeat the lease for years for this was suffered within 6. moneths after the death of Henry Mark-Williams the son and also the recovery was to the very same uses which they were before and therefore the lessee may falsifie the recovery it is true in Capels case the lessee of him in remainder may not falsifie a recovery suffered by Tenant in tail though it was suffered of purpose to defeat the lease for years but in our case the lease for years doth not enure by vertue of the estate tail for that is bound by the fine but this issues out of the reversion in fee and for that reason the lessee shall falsifie this recovery in an ejectione firme or in an avowry and he cited Kings case Hill 37. Eliz. B. R. Rot. 293. Tenant in tail infeoffed his son and after he disseâ—sed him and afterward leavied a fine of that with Proclamations the son entered upon the Conusee and made a feofment and the Proclamations passed and the feoffee of the son let for years and then the father and the son died and the issue in tail brought a formedon and recovered and it was agreed that lessee for years may falsifie this recovery and he said that he had seen a Note in Iustice Manwoods Study that it was agreed in his Circuit that lessee for years to begin at a day to come may falsifie a recovery and so be concluded his argument Hendon Serjeant to the contrary and he divided the case in three points First when Tenant in tail had issue a son and a daughter or two sons and the eldest son in the life of his father who is Tenant in tail levies a fine and dies without issue whether this shall binde the youngest son and he thought that it should not and yet he agreed that an estate tail may be barred by a fine though he who leauied the fine was not seised at the time of the estate tail and this by the very words of the Statute of the 32. H. 8. see the case of fines Coo. 3 and Grants case vouched Lampets case and so is the case of Hunt and King 37. Eliz. cited by my brother Harvey and so he agreed cleerly if the son who leavies the fine survives the father who was Tenant in tail that then in this case this binds the estate tail for ever and the reason is upon the very words of the Statute of 32. H. 8. or any was intailed to the Ancestor of the issue in tail and in this case when the issue doth survive the Ancestor and dies this shall binde the issue because it was intailed to him who leavied the fine who was his Ancestor for he may not make any Conveyance to the estate tail except he make mention of him who leavied the fine because that he survived the father who was Tenant in tail but when he who leavies the fine dies in the life of his father viz. the eldest son then the youngest son may convey an estate taile to him without making mention of his eldest brother and this appears by the 46. E. 3. 9. 4. H. 6. 10. 11. H. 7. 6. see the case of Buckner Coo. 8. from which cases he inferred that if the youngest brother may have an action at the Common Law without making mention of his eldest brother then such a construction shall be made of this word Ancestor in the Statute of 32. H. 8. that it shall be taken for such an Ancestor by whom the issue in tail claimes and for no other Ancestor and for this he put the case if land be given to a man and to his heirs females begotten of his body and he had issue a son and a daughter and the son leavied a fine and died this shall barre the estate tail for the cause aforesaid and for authorities in this kinde he cited the reports of Dallison of Eliz. printed at the end of Ashles Tables in Stamfords case in the end of the same case where the very difference is agreed Mich. 29. Jac. C. P. where the eldest son dies in the life of the father and where not and Hobert demanded of him by what warrant those reports of Dallison came in print And then Hendon cited the opinion of some of the judges in the case of Zouch and Banfield and see Coo. 3. the case of fines according to this difference and he said that Sir George Browns case will warrant that in the very letter of it for there it is said that no issue inheritable by force of the tail may enter after the fine by which he inferred that if he is such an issue that is not inheritable he is out of the Statute and so he concluded the first point that the fine being leavied by the eldest son in the life of his Mother that shall not barre the estate tail Secondly he argued that as this case is the feme is not within the Statute of the 11 H. 7. because that at the time when she suffered a recovery she was seised of an estate in general tail by force of the remainder which was limitted to her and her husband and to the heirs of their two bodies ingendred which took effect in the feme at the time of the death of the husband and this being an estate in tail of the purchase of the huband which took effect in remainder this may not be a joynture within the Statute of of the 27. H. 8. and then if she be not a joynteress within that Statute though this estate was of the purchase and of the acquisition of her husband yet this is out of the danger of the Statute of the 11. H. 7. for the words are any woman who had any estate in dower or in tail joynt with her husband of the purchase and of the acquisition of the husband which words of the purchase of the husband had relation to Tenant in dower or to a woman who was a joyntress and was not the intent of the Statute to make such a remainder to be within the danger of the Statute when the husband himself in his life may dock this by a recovery and therefore it is not within the Statute And as to the Third point he argued that admitting that she was a joyntress within the Statute of the 27. H. 8. yet when the feme suffers a recovery with the assent of him in remainder in fee this recovery is out of the body of the Statute of 11. H. 7. any which shall discontinue or release with warranty and
that all such recoveryes shall be void and shall be taken for fained recoveries and this may not be imagined a fained recovery where he in remainder in tail is vouched by him who is Tenant for life Jennings case Coo. 10. and such recovery as is there resolved is out of the Statute of the 14. Eliz. and is good by the Common Law and so in our case but admitting this to be within the Statute of the 11. of H. 7. yet the proviso of the same Statute had made that good for there is an express proviso that a recovery with the assent of the heir inheritable if this appear upon Record this shall not be within the Statute and in our case this is with the assent of the heir inheritable and also this appears to be of record and so the recovery is out of the danger of the Statute of the 11. H. 7. See Doctor and Student a book which was written but a litle time after the making of this Statute and Dyer 89. Vernons case and he said that the intent of the same Statute and of the proviso of the same Statute was to have issues and heirs and not termors who had only a future interest to falsifie recoveries and so he concluded that the recovery is out of the same Statute and that the proviso of the same Statute had made that good by the assent of the heir but admitting this should be against him that this recovery shall be within the Statute yet the lessee in our case shall not falsifie nor take advantage of the forfeiture by force of the same Statute but it hath been objected by Harvy that the wife in this case had only an estate for life or Tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct and he answered that the resolution in Beamounts case Coo. 119. is contrary for it is there expresly agreed that she was Tenant in tail after the fine leavied by the issue and so was it also resolved in Pophams case 9. Eliz. but there it was doubted whether she was Tenant in tail within the 32. H. 8. who might make a lease but all agreed that she was Tenant in tail who may suffer a recovery and binde the remainder and then when the feme suffers such a recovery as in our case that recovery shall take away a term for years which was made by the issue in tail Mich. 20. Jac. C. P. in the life of his mother notwithstanding she was a joynteress within the 11. H. 7. also he said that this lease for years being made by Henry Mark-Williams the son who was heir to the estate in tail and also to the reversion in fee being made by deed indented rendring rent this shall be a lease which issued out of the estate in fee simple and not out of the estate tail and this shall be out of the estate tail by estoppel being by deed indented for an estate shall not enure partly by way of interest and this lease to begin after the death of the feme he may not take advantage of the forfeiture for though the words of the Statute are that all such recoveries shall be void yet this shall not be void without entry and he who will have benefit by this ought to be mabled to enter presently so soon as the recovery is suffered for as there ought to be a person in esse who shall take benefit of the same Statute as appears by Coo. 3. Lincoln Colledge case so there ought to be a present estate in esse at the time of the recovery for the words of the Statute are to whom the interest shall appertain but in our case the interest doth not appertain to the lessee who had only a future term and therefore he shall not take the benefit by any forfeiture within the Statute of 11. H. 7. and the rather in our case because there is a rent reserved also all this matter is found by special verdict what estate the son haâ— when he made the lease by indenture Dyer 244. Coo. 155. and Bredons case in Treports case lessee for life and he in reversion by indenture let for years this is no estoppel and it shall be said to be the lease of one and the confirmation of the other and here the lease shall be said to issue out of the reversion in fee and not out of the estate tail and he vouched a case adjudged 10. Jac. when Flemming was chief Iustice of the Kings Bench between Errington and Errington and the case was that a man conveyed land to the use of himself and his wife in tail the remainder to his right heirs and had issue a son and a daughter and he died and the son let for years to begin after the death of his Mother and he died without issue and the daughter leavied a fine and the wife who was Tenant in tail died and the question was whether this lease for years issued out of the estate tail by way of estoppel for then the Conusee shall not avoid this but it was adjudged this lease was drawn out of the reversion in fee and the Conusee of the daughter shall avoid that which is all one with our case but admit that this lease is good by estoppel out of the estate taile yet he shall not take benefit of the forfeiture within 11. H. 7. and this differs from Sir George Browns case for there the Conuser entered by vertue of a remainder and not by the estate tail which passed to him by estoppel and upon that he concluded that if this is an estate meerly by estoppel he shall not have benefit by that Pope and Reynolds before NOw the case between Pope and Reynolds which see before was moved again by Ashley for the Plantiff in the prohibition and the case was that he was owner of a Park and the Park had been time beyond memory replenished with deer till the 10th of Eliz. at which time that was disparked and that the owners had used before the disparking to pay a Buck in Summer and a Doe in winter in full satisfaction of all Tithes due to the Vicar and the Parson had libelled in the Ecclesiastical Court for Tithes in kinde and also traversed the prescription and it was found for the Plantiff in the prohibition and it had been moved in arrest of judgement that notwithstanding this prescription is found for the Plantiff yet he shall not have judgement for two causes First because gross Tithes belong to the Parson and not to the Vicar for the Vicaridge is derived out of the Parsonage to this he answered that for the most part every Vicaridge is derived out of the Parsonage but it is a meer non sequitur that this doth for the Vicarage and the Parsonage may have several patrons Fitzh 45. also a Vicarage may be time beyond memory as in our case 40. E. 3. 2. 7. and Fitz. juris utrum a Vicar may have a juris utrum and
reason the factor may sell the goods without ready money and this is good reason for perchance the goods are of that nature that they will not keep without perishing by which clearly it appears that if I deliver goods to another to Merchandise and to sell he may sell them without ready money but if my factor or Bailiff will sell them to one which he knows wâ—ll prove a Bankrupt without ready money this is not good but secondly he held the custome as it is here alledged not to be good for then the partie shall have no remedy for his money except the factor will go into Spain and sue the Bill and the laws of Merchants are special laws for their benefit and not for their prejudice and this custome as it is alledged is too large but if he had alledged that such Bill taken by the factor shall be as good and effectual to the Mr. as if it had been taken in his own name this had been good besides the custome is not good for it is alledged to be that when the factor had delivered the Bill to the owner of the goods this shall be a discharge to him who was the factor and here is no time set within which this may be delivered and so for ought is shewed it may be delivered 10. years after which may be good and to that which had been said that the laws of Merchants are national laws he denied that for every Kingdome had its proper and peculiar laws and though this is the law of Spain and national to them yet this ought to be reasonable or else it shall not binde and judgement was commanded to be entered for the Plantiff Hobert and Winch being only present It was ruled that he who had land in a parish who did not inhabit there shall be chargable to the reparation of the Church but not to the buying of ornaments of the Church for that shall be levied of the goods of the parishioners and not of their lands by Sir Henry Yelverton and said to be so formerly adjudged In trespas the Defendant pleads that one such was possessed of a term for years and bring so possessed by his last will and Testament devised that to the Defendant and died after whose death the Defendant entered and was possessed by vertue of the devisee upon which plea the Plantiff demurred generally and Hutton thought this plea prima facie to be good though the Defendant had not expresly alledged that the devisee died possessed but his plea implies that for he had said that he entered by vertue of the devisee and was possessed and this only matter of form and not matter of substance and no cause of general demurrer which Winch also granted that this was also matter of form and not matter of substance Gage against Johnson for his fees GAge brought an action against Iohnson as his servant and Solicitor to the Defendant in a suit in the Kings Bench taking for every Term 3. s. 4 d. for his fees and for this he brought his action of debt and Serjeant Hitcham moved in arrest of judgement and he urged the case of Samuel Leech an Attourney of this Court in an action upon the case brought by him upon a promise to pay so much for the solliciting of a cause of the Defendant and the opinion was that the action will not lie for it is in nature of maintenance for a Solicitor may not lay out money for his Clyent and if an action upon the case will not lie then much less an action of debt and Hobert said that a Councellor may take fees of his Clyent but he may not lay out or expend money for him and the same law of an Attourney for if he did disburse money for him he doubted much what remedy he should have and he further said a servant may follow business for his Mr. and may take money for his labour for if I retain my servant generally he is not bound to follow my suits at law except at his pleasure for that is an extraordinary service and for that if I will say to my servant that if he will follow my business at Westminster I will give him so much for his pains my servant in this case is not without his remedy but if his service is coupled with Soliciting to take money for his pains his opinion was that no action will lie to which the other justices also agreed and they arose Wright against Black before NOw the case of Wright and of Black was moved again and the case was that Wright had brought an action upon the case against Black and Black for that the Defendants intending to make away his good name and to cause him to lose his goods did maliciously and without cause at Norwich in the County of Norfolk prefer a Bill of indictment at the Sessions of peace containing that the Plantiff stole two bundles of fetches and also did cause and entice one I. S. to give in evidence that the indictment was good and true by reason of which he was bound to Answer that at the next Assiles and there he was accquitted and whether the action was maintainable was the question and Attoe argued that the action is maintainable though it is not shewed that the Bill of indictment was found and he vouched a case which was Hill 10. Iac. B. R. Rot. 921. between Whorewood and Cordery and his wife Defendants which case and judgement was after affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber upon a writ of error and the case was that the Plantiff declared that the Defendants intending to take away his good name did charge him to have ravished Dorothie Coxe and maliciously exhibited a Bill of indictment containing that the Plantiff did felloniously ravish the said Dorothie their daughter and did give this in evidence to the Grand jury who found Ignoramus and yet it was adjudged that an action lies and he cited a case the 19. Iac. in B. R. Deney against Ridgy where was only an indictment preferred concerning the stealing of a horse and no more and yet an action lies Hobert chief Iustice said that if seemed to him that it is actionable for this is as great a scandal to give this in evidence to the Grand jury as to publish this upon an Alebench and as the course of Iustice ought not to be stopped so neither ought the good name of man in things which concern his life be taken away without good cause and I have heard that judgement was given another Term for the Plantiff but quere better of that Hoes case HOes seised of land in fee he devised that to his wife for life the remainder of one parcel of that to Thomas his eldest son the remainder of the other parcel to his youngest son in fee and this devised was with proviso that the feme shall pay his legacies and also his will was that in case his wife died before the payment of his debts and legacies
contingencies by which these remote possibilities shall not be released Hoes case Coo. 5. there a release of all actions and demands to the Bailee made this void and in the case of Brown and Pell which was remembred before it was the opinion of all the Court against Judge Doderidge that where the devise was to the son in fee and if he died without issue living that then his eldest brother shall have that if in this case the second son suffer a recovery yet this had not destroyed the possibility which the eldest brother had to have the land and if a common recovery which is matter of record and the common assurance of the realm will not take away this possibility a fortiori a release which is but matter of fact and so he concluded and prayed judgement for the Plantiff Bawtry to the contrary and he said that if this remainder shall be good then the inconvenience which the judges had alwayes endeavoured to take way shall be on foot again as in the case of Chamley and Corbets of springing uses for if it shall be lawful for a man to limit a fee upon a Collateral condition or limitation then there shall be a perpetuitie and for this if any litteral construction shall be made upon such conveyances this will introduce dangerous events to inheritances and for that he held that limitation to the Plantiff to be meerly void for when the land is devised in fee this devisee by this had an absolute estate in fee and it shall be strange to give this to another though this be by way of devise for though the will of every man shall be supplied by the intent of the devisor yet his intent ought to stand with the rules of the law and otherwise his intent shall revert and for that he cited 29. H. 8. a man made two executors provided that one of them shall not administer here the intent did plainly appear and yet because the intent is contrary to the power which the law gives to every executor therefore it is void and it is put for a bare rule in Corbets case that such a conveyance which a man may not make in his life time by act executed he may not make by his Will but a man may not make such a conveyance by act executed in his life time for as it is said in Colthirsts case if a man let for life the remainder for life upon condition that if the first lessee do such a thing that then the land shall remain over to a stranger this remainder is void for when the land is given before this second limitation is meerly void and also the case is put that if a man give lands in fee upon condition the remainder over this remainder is void for the other had an estate in fee before by which it is apparant that when an estate is one time lawfully vested in any certain person there no limitation may give that to a stranger by any act executed in his life at the common law and then it shall not be good by way of devise 28. H. 8. Dyer a term was devised for years the remainder over and it was adjudged by Baldwin and by Shelley that the remainder in that case is void for when the devisor had given his term he may not limit this remainder over though this be by way of devise and this may be good law notwithstanding Lampets case for there the lease was devised and not the land and for that reason may be a difference and he vouched the case which was remembred by Richardson 29. H. 8. 33. and then as to the second point he held that the release was good admitting the first point to be against him for if the eldest son had any right by this release then this word right in the release will destroy and extinguish that and this possibility is not remote and forraigne for the condition or limitation is annexed to the estate and is not a subsequent condition which creates an estate and this depends upon an ordinary casualty which is common to all men and the payment of debts and of legacies is incident and common to every executor and as for Albanies case Coo. 1. the case was that a man had a power to revoke uses upon the death of a stranger without issue and resolved that this power may be released and yet his power depended upon two contingencies death and death without issue and the case is also there put if A. infeoffe B. upon condition that if B. Survive C. and then if A. and his heirs pay to B. 10. l. that then he shall enter in this case there are many contingencies involved in one conveyance and yet it is there said that these contingencies may be released and in Lampets case Coo. 10. there are six reasons wherefore such a contingencie may be released and our case is within all the reasons which are there mentioned for the words in the release as have been remembred by my brother Richardson are all one with our case and the first reason is because this is a Chattel which as it may be easily created so it may be easily destroyed to this he gave answer that this remainder of a Term was an interest to him who released and so in our it is an interest of a remainder to the Plantiff and for that the release is good Secondly it is a maxime in Law that every land may be charged one wayes or another and we are within this reason also for if this estate be in the Plantiff then this may be released Thirdly the foundation of every act ought to be regarded for Grants case there vouched destroyes the possibility with a fine by reason of the original act the fourth reason there remembred is because that if the devisee had been dead his Executor shall have the interest the same reason in our case if the Plantiff had been dead before the remainder or the contingencie hap yet his heir shall have that See Shelleys case the fifth reason is the legacie was in present though this was to take effect in futuro and so in our case the Will is in present though the state is to take effect in futuro and sixthly it shall be against reason to establish such a perpetuity of a Chattel and so in our case it shall be against reason to establish a perpetuity of a franktenement and the release is very well penued for it is of all his title right and claim to the reversion and remainder which the father devised to the Plantiff and so the release is not general but this is a particular and special release of that which was devised to him by his father and Hoes case Coo. 5. is not like to our case for first there the duty was altogether incertain and secondly the condition there did precede the duty but in our case the condition is annexed to the estate and so he concluded and
covenantor shall have an estate for life and so the law makes in that case fractions of estates as the case of the Lord Seymor Dyer 96. seems to accord with this and besides those two books he said he could not finde any book which will warrant that and for that reason he held those two books to be no law for if I Covenant that my son shall have my land after my death this will not raise an estate to me by implication for life and an estate to my son and so by such means to change my estate in fee for an estate for life without more words for the word covenant in his proper and native signification is only obligatorie and yet it had been alwayes conceived sufficient to raise an use to him who is not partie to that as if I covenant with a stranger that I will stand seised of my land to the use of my son this will raise an use to my son and yet neither my son nor the covenantee may have an action of covenant but an use will very well arise to my son as if a man bargain and sell his land in consideration of 100. l. paid by I. S. though in this case the consideration ariseth from a stronger yet that will pass the use to the bargainee and in case of covenant it is not this word covenant only which creats the use but it is rather the agreement of the parties which is testified by the covenant for if sufficient agreement appears there will not need this word covenant as if I will agree and declare to stand seised to the use of my son by which it appears that the word covenant is onely declarative of the intentions of the parties and then in the principal case the covenant is not that the son shall have the land but that the land shall come remain and be to him and those words are incertain as 21. H. 7. redert come or discent and for that reason it is all one with the law of the same case and then void to raise any use for the incertainly and then when Andrew Buckley covenants that his son shall have his lands and no words to inforce his intention and for that reason the intention shall be lyable to an action of covenant and not to change his estate which he had in fee for an estate for life by this covenant but if he had expresly covenanted that in consideration of marriage of his son that he would hold his land for life and after this should be to his son this will change the estate which was in fee for an estate for life but in our case the covenant being general and left to the indifferent construction of the law the word covenant shall be taken in his proper and native signification and this is obligatorie and so he concluded that this covenant being at the first to grant a rent and was executory and the last part of that is executory for assurance and the limitation of the estate to the son being intangled between these two Covenants this shall be of the same nature and by consequence the covenant is obligatorie only and will raise no use to the son and so he concluded that judgement shall be given for the Plantiff and it was commanded to be entered accordingly Sparrow against Sowgate IN debt by Sparrow against Sowgate who declared that the Defendant became Bail for one Richard Sowgate in Banco Regis against whom the Plantiff had brought a Bill of debt of 77. l. and now the Defendant bound himself in a Recognizance of 77. l. upon which the action is now brought that in case judgement should be given against the said Richard Sowgate that he shall satisfie the said judgement or render his bodie to prison for in this case no part was impossible for after the judgement the principal may render himself in B. R. to the Marshal for the redemption of his suretie and that is the Common course there as he said but he agreed the case to be otherwise if a scire facias issue out of the Kings Bench against the Bail for there the death of the principal is a good plea for a scire facias doth not lie there till default is assigned in the principal in his not comming upon the capias ad satisfaciendum which may not be when he is dead Note that but yet before any capias it is clear he may have an action of debt Sir Robert Hitcham Serjeant of the King to the contrary and he alledged this to be the constant course in the Kings Bench that the Bail is never chargable till there is default assigned in the principal upon the recorn of the Capias ad satisfaciendum which may not be here for the principal is dead and he agreed the case of the other side that when a man is to do two things though the one is become impossible yet he ought to perform the other but when it is in the election of one to make either the one or the other then it is otherwise see Dyer 262. and so he concluded for the Defendant Hobert chief Iustice said that it is inconvenient that the Plantiff shall be forced to sue his Capias ad satisfaciendum against the partie before he have execution against the Bail for perchance he will sue a fieri facias or an elegit against him and that the Corps of the partie will not satisfie him and Browlow Prothonotary said that it had been adjudged in this Court that such plea is not good Winch the course of the Kings Bench is that default shall be assigned upon the retorn of the principal before the Bail shall be charged and though the Plantiff refuse to take his bodie after he had made his election to take his fieri facias or elegit he shall never more resort to the Bail which was granted by Hobert and Hutton as to that last point and it was holden by all the Court that if the principal render his bodie though the Plantiff refuse to take that yet that is a discharge of the Bail and also it was agreed by Hutton Hobert and by Winch that if the course of the Kings Bench be such that the Bail shall not be forfeit till there is a default assigned in the principal the same course also shall be followed here and per Curiam if the course of the Kings Bench be such that such Capias is necessary to be awarded that then a convenient time shall be allowed for the principal to render his bodie gratis and if the principal do die before such time the Bail is discharged but it was said by Winch if he die before convenient time and the Capias is awarded that such death shall not discharge the Bail note that Iones Iustice said that he thought in this case that it is necessary that the principal render himself gratis for when he is let to Bail the law supposeth him to be alwayes in custodie
reversion for life of the Grandfather is no dispensation to the estate of the lessee for though the action was suspended during his life yet now it is on foot again and in many cases an estate may be dispunishable of waste and yet by matter ex post facto this shall be punishable viz. where the first privitie of the estate was determined as in case a lease for years be without impeachment of waste and then the lessor releases to the lessee c. the first privity is gone and he is now punishable in an action of waste and here in our case there was no absolute dispensation but only for the time and yet perchance though the estate is subject to waste in the creation yet if the lessor will afterwards by his deed grant that this shall be dispunishable this may priviledge him but here is no such matter in the case at the bar and of this opinion was the Court and Winch said that there was no difference where the Franke tenement is intercedent for if this be not punishable yet the particular estate shall not participate of that priviledge of him in the remainder and Iones Iustice said if the particular estate had been extracted and drawn out of that estate for life in that case that had been dispunishable but it was agreed by Hendon Serjeant that the Plantiff in his declaration had declared of a waste after the estate for life was determined and they found that this was made in the time of him in reversion for life and so differed but the Court was of opinion that this was nothing to the purpose for it is only a variance from the time and not from the matter for it is not material whether this was before his death or after his death because in both cases this is punishable but day was given over to shew other causes Portington and Beamount IT was argued clearly in the case between Portington and Beamount that if the Court of the Councel of York which is a Court of equitie do decree against a maxime in law as against a joynt Tenant who had that by Survivorship that the heir of his companion shall have the Moietie that in this case a prohibition shall be granted except that during the lives of the parties it was agreed that there shall not be any Survivorship and then they hold plea upon that equitie and then good In Dower it was agreed clearly that if the Tenant shew that before the husband any thing had in the land A. was seised of the same land in fee and leâ— that for years rendring rent and granted the reversion to the husband of the Plantiff who died seised of the said reversion and so demanded judgement if the demandant shall have Dower c. this is no plea in bar of Dower but proves she had title of Dower but this saves the lease for years and she shall have judgement only of the reversion and of the rent and also she doth save to the Tenant damages and the demandant shall be indowed of the reversion Summers against Dugs SUmmers brought an action upon the case upon a promise against Dugs and he shewed in his declaration that the Defendant was rector of the Rectorie of D. and that he and all his predecessors had used to have all manner of Tithes and said that he the Plantiff occupied 100. acres of land in the same parish and shewed that the Defendant promised to the Plantiff that in consideration that he would plant his lands with Hops and so make the Tithes to be the better the Defendant promised to the Plantiff to allow him towards every acre which he shall so plant 40. s. towards the charge in planting them and he shewed that he planted an acre at the request of the Defendant and so upon the promise brought the action and now it was moved whether this was a good consideration to ground an action because the Tithes are not bettered by the planting of that with Hops but by the growing of them and the increase of them and he had not averred that the Tithes were of better value then they were before and it was also moved that he may not have an action for the Rood c. but this afterwards was referred to Arbitrement but the Court said if the Plantiff had shewed in his declaration that he might have made more benefit of that by other means then that by the planting of it with Hops the Tithes also being bettered then it had been more cleare Philip Holman against Tuke PHillip Holman was executor of George Holman and he brought an action of debt against George Tuke and declared upon a lease made by himself by the name of Philip Holman executor of the Testament of George Holman deceased of such land and the said land was delivered to him in execution of a Statute by extent which Statute was made to this Testator and this lease was for years if the Plantiff should so long continue seised by force of the Statute and it was rendring 100. l. per annum and for 3. years rent behinde he brought his action in the debet and in the detinet and also in the declaration he averred that he did continue seised so long by vertue of the extent and Serjeant Bing demurred in law because he said the action ought to be brought in the detinet only because he had brought the action as executor but Hendon and the Court c. Iones and Hutton to the contrary because the lease was made by himself and Hutton said in the case there is difference between a personal contract and real and it was said that an executor shall never be forced to bring his action in the detinet only where he need not name himself to be an executor which note well It was agreed in a case by Hobert that where a man brought an action de parco facto and declared upon the breach of a pound and also of the taking out of beasts and the Defendant as to the taking out of the beasts pleaded not guilty and as to the breaking of the pound he said that he was Lord of the Soil upon which the pound stood and thaâ— he brake of the Lock and put a lock of his own and Hobert said in this case that he ought to plead the general issue for in verity this is not any broach of the pound except the beast come out of it and Iones Iustice was of an opinion that if he put out the beasts he may not have this action because the freehold was in him but he ought to have a special action upon the case Entred in Easter Term in the 19th year of King James Rot. 1672. Ellen Goldingham against Sir John Saunds ELlen Goldingham brought an action of Dower against Sir Iohn Saunds to be indowed of the third part of the Mannor of Goldingham and he vouched the son to warranty as son and heir to Christopher Goldingham husband of
he was seised in fee and that he had power to alien that and this was to encourage the Purchasers and for the form he needs not aver that this was in the hands of Anne Parker for he had confessed that in the bar that he came lawfully to that and besides the Covenant is broken though he never was seised and so I conceive that the Plantiff shall have judgement Winch to the same intent it is true if it had been all but one Covenant then if it had been no question this had not been broken but I think they are several Covenants like to the case of Sir Robert Napper lately adjudged also the first two Covenants are in the affirmative and the other in the Negative and for that they ought to be answered with several pleas and these kinde of assurances are the Common assurances and therefore they ought to be interpreted favourably for the Purchasers and Iohn was not deceived in these Covenants for they brought down upon the deed an estate in fee and it is also agreed if the word Covenant and grant had been divers times added to the several clauses then they had been several Covenants and now it is all one word and made those to be several Covenants and words of relation never will controul that which is certainly put down before and so he concluded in this case the Plantiff shall have judgement to recover Hobert chief Iustice to the contrary every deed ought to be construed according to the intention of the parties and the intents ought to be adjudged of the several parts of the deed as a general issue out of the evidence and intent ought to be picked out of every part and not out of one Word only and here Peter joyned with his father to strengthen the assurance and Iohn had not only his own estate but the estate of Proud and it is plain he never meant to intangle himself with other Conveyances then those which he and Proud had made and I hold this to be no independent Covenant and it is all bound with one clause S. for any Act or Acts made by them c. and it is confessed if these words had been placed in the forefront that then they should relate to all and it is as clear as if they were and the first reson is that the intent appears only to undertake for himself because he should but have part of the land and for that he was to warrant his evidence and to that end he was to deliver to him his title at large in the said indenture and here he had made the Plantiff privie to every several conveyance of that to inform the Purchaser of it and will you also intangle him with a covenant you might have taken notice of his title and it appears to be the very intents of the parties that you should take notice of the title and inform your selves concerning the same Secondly this is a sentence which may be taken both wayes and I say it is agreed that if it had begun with these words notwithstanding any Act or Acts c. that then it shall be all construed by this and I never saw any difference I grant they are several Covenants in point of fact but not in point of obligation for there are not several words of binding nay I say if he had released this last he had released all but it hath been said that one is in the negative and the other is in the affirmative but I do not value that and it hath been said that this is the Common assurance of the Realm and if other construction shall be made then no man shall be sure of his own we had given him leave to say that no reversion nor remainder is in the King by any Act by him made and the King may not have any reversion and he seised in fee also this clause standing indifferent whether this shall be referred to all or not and then the question is how the Court will adjudge of that for my part I take it that this may stand with the intent of all the parties of the deed but take that as you take it that this destroyes all for if he is absolutely seised in fee what matter is where the reversion is and yet if the reversion was in the Crown and not by his Act you confess that may not charge him which is expresly against the first Covenant if this be distinct by it self but take that indifferently and all the parties will stand together Nappers case hath no affinity with this for questionless there were several Covenants for in that indenture it did not appear what estate Sir Thomas Eearsfield had and for that reason nothing might be collected out of that but he had a present estate but in our case all is contained in the bodie of the indenture and Nokes case is a strong case and stronger then the case at the bar is for thereupon construction of all the parties of the deeds the special warrantie controuls the general warranty and the reason is no man will take an express special warranty when the intent is that he shall have a general warranty there was a case lately ajudged between the Earl of Clanrickard and his wife against the Countess of Leicester where the Lady pleaded that she was Tenant in Dower where in veritie she had the revesion in fee expectant upon a Term for life and they conveyed all the estate the Lady had in Dower and then they covenanted that they would convey all their estate to the Lord of Leicester and his heirs during the life of his wife and then Covenanted that they would convey all their estate to the Earl of Leicester and his heirs for ever in the aforesaid land and it was resolved that though such Covenant will raise an use to the partie who ought to have that and so the reversion will pass if there had been no more words now it was but during the life of the Lady for that third part for the Covenant was but to strengthen an estate and not to convey it and so he concluded that the Plantiff should be hard and after it was said by the Court that this case was not of weight to be brought into the Exchequer Chamber and therefore the Court advised that the parties would agree quere for the residue in the Exchequer Chamber concerning that Entred Hill 18. Jac the case of Comendams Richard Woodley against the Bishop of Exeter and Mannering RIchard Woodley brought a quare Impedit against the Bishop of Exeter and Mannering who was Parson of the said Church and he declared that Arthur Basset was seised of an acre of land to which the said Advowson was appendant in his demeasne as of fee and that he the 13. Octobris 13. Eliz. granted the next advowson to one William Manwood who was then incumbent in the said Church who by his will 20. November made one Harcourt his executor
pleads no award the Plantiff maintaines the award and the breach the Defendant rejoyned that before the time of the award they discharged the Arbitrators 75 Debt by a servant for wages in the debet and detinet and for 2 shirts in the detinet only good without shewing that it was according to the Statue and by several precipes in one writ 75 In Dower the Tenant pleads never seized to have Dower the husband having an estate but by disseizing which was avoided by entrie no Dower 77 In Debt two were bound for the appearance of annother and judgement against the debtor who upon the capias offers his body the Plantiff refuses the suerties are discharged but the Plantiff may take a Capias within the year but if he had come on the capias and had not Suerties and he refused him Quer. if he be not discharged 77 78 Dower of a reversion after a lease for years she shall have the rent and the Defendant pay no damages 80 Dower what judgement shall be given where the vouchee dieth whether absolute or conditional 81 88 Dower where the trial ought to be by witnesses and in what manner 82 Dower the Tenant pleads that the demandant had entred and disseized since the last continuance 90 Where the Demandant shall have judgement and where only a petit Cape 90 Dower against an Infant who pleads a devise to the demandant in satisfaction of Dower and entrie 100 E ERror lieth not for a judgement given in the Stanneries in Cornwal 8 If an Executor be nonsuit he shall pay no costs 10 Executor where he bringeth an action he ought to shew the Will otherwise if the issue be joyned 19 If the Debtor makes the Debtee Executor he may retain and plead fully administred 19 Execution what fees are due to the Sheriff where the debt exceeds 100. l. 21 22 Essoign in a Formedon after the Vouchee appeared 34 Escape against the Warden of the Fleet retaking upon fresh suit good after an action but not after issue joyned 35 Escheat where lands are given to a Monasterie and all the Monks die who shall have it the founders or the Lord of whom it is holden 38 Executor where he or a devisee shall have the Corn 51 If an Executor waste the goods of a Testator and dies intestate his Administrator shall be liable and by the Court 31 Ed. 3. Coo. 11. gives no remedy but against an immediate administrator 65 Estray whether the partie may fetter him or no 67 68 124 An Executor where compellable to plead a general issue and give the special matter in evidence 70 Executor may bring an action in the debet and detinet upon his own contract 80 Executor an action brought against him by Journeys accompts where good 82 Execution where the partie shall be discharged by supersedeas at the Courts discretion 100 101 Execution see purchase 112 F TEnant for life and he in remainder in tail Covenant to levie a fine Tenant for life dies if he in the remainder ought to do it 4 In a Formedon the Tenant pleads that at the day of the writ the Plantiff was seised of the moitie thereof not good 23 Fees where an action of the case lieth for them by a Sollicitor 53 54 G GEneral issue where it ought to be pleaded and where not 70 H HErriot whether it be due to the Lessee of part of the Mannor or to the lessee of the whole Mannor 46 47 57 I INformation for ingrossing a 100. Quarters of Corn and upon inquiry he is found guiltie of a 100. it is good for so much 5 In an idempnitate nominis the Plantiff prayed a superdeas to stay Execution Curia Advisari vult 6 Information for entertaining his apprentice without a Testimonial contrary to 5 Eliz. 25 Joynture the father makes a feofment to the use of himself for life the reversion to his son and his wife intail this is no Joynture though the father die in the life of the son so if it had been for years 33 Infant and Apprentice unto what Covenants lyable 63 64 Issue in a quare impedit is joyned the wife one of the Plantiffs dieth before the venire facias the writ doth not abate because it was a Chattle vested in her husband 73 Infant where he may declare uses upon a fine and what acts are by him void or voidable 104 Infant in a judgement against him where he shall be relieved by audita querela or error and whether against the Attorney who suffered it 114 K VVHere the King may seise without office and where not 9 Where an usurpation gaineth an advowson from the King 14 King where he hath title to present the incumbent being created a Bishop in Ireland and what act is a dispensation thereof and where a Commendam is well granted and the several kindes thereof 94 95 96 97 98 L A Lease of a rectorie excepting the Gleab void otherwise if parcel of the Gleab 23 A Lease for a year and so from year to year this is a Lease for 3. years and if the Lessee hold over Quer. what remedy for the rent 32 A Lease for years by him in remainder in tail if destroyed by a recoverie 41 42 43 In a lease to trie a title of several parcels he ought to enter into them all severally 50 M A Miss-trial is not aided by any Statute of Jeoffales 69 N NUsance by stopping the winde abated 3 Nusance for stopping a light abated 4 Notice to give bond where necessarie and where not 26 27 New Assignment if it be more large then the declaration it is good in Trespass but otherwise in an ejectione firme 65 Notice where ought to be taken and by whom 108 120 O ORdinary what power he hath to dispose after debts and legacies paid 11 An Obligation where good upon the Statute 23. H. 6. 20 21 50 51 P A Prescription to pay the Vicar a Buck in Summer and a Doa in Winter for a Park which becometh Disparked 144 Prescription to have land it self void 6 Prescription See Replevin A Prohibition to the Admiraltie lieth not after judgement given there 8 Protestation where good and where not 13 14 Prohibition where it lies to the Court of Audience for saying thou art a common and base Quean 14 15 Promise by a Lessee or a stranger to pay rent if an action he thereupon 15 A Presentation by the Lord Chancellor where it belongeth to the King is only voidable 19 Prohibition where it lies for a seat in the Church a difference between the Lord of the Mannor and another Person 19 A Protection from a Peer not good in a Capias utlagatum 24 A Prohibition where the parties agree in the modus but varie in the place of payment lieth not 33 A Prohibition awarded against one who sued in the Court of Audience Administrators for a Legacie as Executors 64 65 In a prohibition the Tenants of a Dean and Chapter alledge prescription for non-payment
of Tithes and good because they are a spiritual bodie 65 In a Prohibition upon a suit for a Legacie the Executor shewed he had not assets to pay the debts and the spiritual Court would not allow that allegation yet no Prohibition 78 Prohibition to the Marches of wales because a Legatee sued there for 500. l. good before a decree but not after 78 Prohibition see Court of equitie c. 79 Prohibition to the Marches of Wales for requiring an accompt of an Administrator 103 Proces against two Obligors by several precipes and thereupon several Executions whether the writs are well awarded 112 A parco fracto where it lies against the Lord of the Soil and where not except the Cattle come out 80 81 Prohibition to the delegates a pardon not allowed of there 125 Q IN a Quare impedit adjudged that nothing ought to be questioned after induction the spiritual Court there 63 R TEnant in tail sells to I. S. in fee who sells to the heir of Tenant in tail being of full age the father dies if the son be demitted 5 A replevin c. the Defendant saith that all those c. had used to have pasturage in c. when it was not sowed the Prescription is good 7 In a return of Rescous there needeth no addition 10 Replevin for rent issuing out of six acres the avowant must prove that the grantor was seised of 6. acres or more 15 Replevin in the Plantiff claimeth propertie without that the propertie was in the Defendant the Traverse not good yet judgement for the Plantiff because after verdict 26 In Return of an extent by the Sheriff surplusage hurteth not 27 Replevin the Defendant avowed for homage and shewed not how it was due if good 31 Replication although evil where the Plantiff shall have judgement if the Defendants plea be vitious 37 A Riotous quarrel about an arrest between the Sheriffs Bailiffs and the Bailiffs of the Marches of Wales 72 Release an avowrie not good without pleading it by deed 72 A Rent-charge granted and a Covenant if it happen to be behinde then the land to be alwayes open to distress whether this be a distinct covenant or not 74 87 Replevin for rent the Defendants say that the land was parcel of a Chaunterie which came to the King by the Statute wherein the right of others was saved the Plantiff replies that the land is out of the fee of the Defendant no good plea but he might have Traversed the Tenure that at the making of the Statute the land was not holden of him 77 A Record amended where the bargain and sale and deed of uses were by the right name but the writ of entrie was of another name 99 100 Rent granted in fee by Tenant for life and him in remainder in tail levied a fine a good grant 102 Rent-charge whether it be extinct by a fine of the land to the Ter-tenant and a release unto him 109 110 111 121 122 S SCire facias the Defendant pleads a feofment the Plantiff traverses and the jury found a feofment to other uses whether this shall be intended the same feofment which was pleaded 32 Scire facias by an Executor upon a judgement for the Testator the Defendant cannot plead the Testators death between the verdict and judgement but he must bring a writ of error 48 Simonie a grant of a next avoidance for monie the Parson being readie to die is Simonie 63 A Sheriff by force of a Capias utlagatum to inquire what lands c. cannot put the partie out of possession 78 Statute-Merchant if good in regard no day of payment is limited largely and learnedly argued by the Court 82 83 c. Servant taken away See Trespas T TIthes See Prescription Trespass the Defendant saith that I. S. was seised in right of his wife and that she died seised and that he as heir c. the Plantiff replied that she died not seised he ought to have said that she died not sole seised 7 Trespass in Yorkshire Justification in Durham without that that guiltie in Yorkshire good because it is local 7 A Traverse to a presentation where good and where not 13 14 Tenure where it is Traversable and where the seisin 18 Tithes not due of Cattle for the diarie 33. Trespass for Beasts taken in London Justification upon a lease of land in Kent Replied that the Defendant sold them in London no good plea to bring the trial out of Kent 48 Trespass for taking ones servant lieth not upon a private retainer otherwise if it were at the Sessions 51 Tithe giuen by the Pope to the Vicar and the Copie of the Bull only was shewed in evidence not good 70 Tithes cannot be appurtenant to a Grange except the Grange be the Gleab 72 73 Traverse where good and where not 113 U VEnire facias omitting part of the venue if good 34 Variance between the writ and Declaration where good 35 A feofment to the use of A. for life and after to the use of his daughter till B. pay her 100. l. here the daughter hath no remedie for this 100. l. without a promise 71 A Ventre inspiciendo awarded and returned but the Court would not agree that she should be detained from her second husband but attended by divers women till her deliverie 71 Variance between the venire facias and the Sheriffs return no judgement in that case 73 W IN Waste judgement by nihil dicit and upon an inquirie the jury found 8. s. damages what judgement shall be given 5 Wager of Law upon a Bill of Exchange 24 Writs a difference wherein there is an error in the original and where in the judicial writ that is amendable 73 Waste although for a time it is punishable yet after the action may revive 79 86 Writ against husband and wife as an Inheritrix the husband dies if the writ abate 102 Errata PAge 1. line 2. 27. for do read Doa p. 2. l. 4. r. lieu p. 4. l. 2. 22. r. 300. pa. 8. l. 36. r. Hendon and so throughout p. 12. in the Title r. Duncombe against the Vniversitie of Oxford p. 12. l. 14. r. 38. H. 8. cap. 39. p. 14. in the Title r. Sir George Savile against Thornton p. 15. l. 21. r. communication p. 16. l. 12. r. 7. Jac. cap. 5. p. 17. l. 47. r. Maines and l. 17. r. sic and also p. 17. 18. in the Margent r. Trin. p. 21 l. 51. r. 39. Eliz. p. 23. l. 9. r. till p. 26 l. 28 for writ r. Action and for Action r. writ p. 27. l. 12. for he r. they p. 28. l. 34. r. may not p. 29. in the Margent r. Easter p. 29. l. 33. for S. r. N. p. 33. l. ultim r. Moore p. 36. l. 43. r. Titterels p. 45. l. 20. r. demandable p. 50. l. 35. r. Bar p. 51. l. 22. r. a penalty p. 53. l. 16. r. may not p. 54. l. 44. r. Estate p. 57. l. 19. r. in our case p. 58. l 50 r. 16. E. 4. p. 68. l. 5. r. estray p. 71. l. 26. r. 12. Note in p. 72. l. 7. Wolseys case ought to have been printed by it self p. 77. l. 4. r. avoided p. 88. l. 4. r. Finch p. 90. l. 15. r. continuance p. 100. l. 21. for preservation r. perswasion and l. 34. for entire r. entrie p. 109. in the Margent for Trin. r. Mich. p. 112. l. 25. r. thought p. 114. l. 18. for interested r. interest