that it was collaterall warrantry where in truth it was a lineall warranty and it was held naught because the warranty was in Law a lineall warranty the Case was that Land was givenby Feoffment made to the use of the Feoffer for life remainder in Tail Tenant for life dies Tenant in Tail had Issue a Son and two Daughters and the Father and Son joyn in a Feoffment with warranty and after the Father and Son die without issue and the Daughters bring a Formedon and this is a lineall warranty PIt versus Staple Trin 14 Jac. rotulo 112. Formedon in le discender against three which plead non-Tenure and issue thereupon joyned and found specially that two of them were Lessees for life the remainder to the third person and whether the three were Tenants as is supposed by the writ was the question and the better opinion was that it was found for the Demandant for the Tenants should have pleaded severall Tenancy and then the Demandant might maintain his writ but by this generall non-Tenure if any be Tenant it is sufficient but in some Cases the Precipe may be brought against one who is not Tenant as a morgagor or morgagee COmes Leicester versus Comit. Clanriccard In Formedon upon a Judgement given in part for the Demandant and part for the Tenant the Tenant brought a writ of Error and had a Supersedeas upon it and afterwards the Demandant prosecuted a writ of Seisin and delivered it to the Sheriff and he executed the writ and immediately afterwards the Tenant delivered the Supersedeas to the Sheriff and the Tenant moved the Court and prayed a writ of restitution and it was granted him because the Tenant had done his indeavour and had not delayed the prosecuting the writ of Error COmes Clanriccard Francisca uxor Ejus Demandants versus R. S. milit vicecomit Lyple for three messuages c. which R. late Earl of Essex and Frances late wife of the said Earl by Fine in the Court of the Lady Elizabeth late Queen of England before her then Justices at Westminster levied and gave to William Gerrard Esquire and F. Mills Gentleman and the Heires of the said W. for ever to the use of Elizabeth Sydney Daughter and Heir of P. S. Milir and the Heirs of the Body of the said E. comming and for default of such issue to the use of the said F. then wife of the said Earl and the heirs of the said Fr. and which after the death of the said Eliz. ought to revert to the said Fr. by form of the gift aforesaid and by force of the Statute in such case provided because the said Eliz. died without Heir of her Body The Tenant pleaded in abatement of the writ because the writ ought to revert to the woman alone and it should have been to the Husband and wife and upon a demurrer Judgement was that he should answer over the writ may be either to revert to the Husband and wife or to the wife alone and herein the Tenant vouch two vouches and one is Essoined and an idem dies given to the other and Serjeant Harris demanded of the Court if he should Fourcher by Essoin because the Statute of Westminster the first is that Tenants Parceners or Joint Tenants shall not fourcher in Essoin therefore they two should not fourcher by Essoin but the Court held that before appearance it could not appear to the Court whether they were Tenants or not and therefore before appearance they shall have severall Essoins and Westminster the first is expounded by Gloucester the tenth which is that two Tenants shall not fourcher after appearance and at the day of the adjournment of the last Essoin the Tenant was Essoined and such Essoin was allowed and adjudged by the whole Court and the reason hereof seemed to some to be because the Tenant might be informed of the Vouchee that he vouched was the same person or no for he might be onother person for if he should be an estranger and demand the place and the Demandant could not hold him to the warranty the Demandant should loose his Land and they held that upon severall Processe to wit upon the view and upon the summons to warranty which are divers Processes the Tenant ought to be Essoined and the Court held that this Essoin was at the Common Law if the Tenant and the vouchee at the day given to the Tenant and the vouchee make default Judgement shall be given against the Tenant to wit a petty Cape and nothing against the vouchee SHotwell versus Corderoy In Formedon the Tenant prayes in aid â—nd the prayee in aid and Tenant vouch and the Vouchee was essoined and adjourned and at that Day the Attorney of the Tenant without the Prayer in aid cast an Essoin and an Idem dies given the Prayee in aid and it was quashed for they shall not have severall Essoines but joynt Essoines A Formedon brought of Lands in A. B. C. The Tenant pleads a Fine of all by the name of the Mannour and Tenements in A. B. And it was objected that he said nothing to the Land in C. but the Courtheld that by the name of the Mannor the Land in all the Villages would pass and the Demandant may if he will plead as to the Land in C. that it was not comprised in the Fine Hill 7. Jacobi rotulo 76. vel 69. Formedon in the Discender the Writ was general that J. L. gave to T. L. and the Heirs Males of his Body upon the Body of D. V. Widow lawfully to be begotten which D. the said T. afterwards took to Wife and which after the Death of the said T. c. Son and Heir Male of the Body of the said T. upon the Body of the said D. lawfully begotten to the said J. L. younger Son and Heir of the said J. L. Son of the said T. ought to descend by form of the Gift aforesaid c. and whereof he saith that the said T. was seised c. and 2 Eliz. of the said Tenements did infeoff the Plaintiff in Fee to the use of the said T. L. and his Heirs c. and note in the Count no mention made of the Marriage If a Gift be made in tail to D. and his Heirs Males the Remainder to A. in tail D. discontinues in the Life of A. and D. dies without Issue and the Heir of A. brought his Writ as the immediate Gift to A. his Ancestor who never was seised in his Life and for that cause the Writ was naught but if A. had been seised of the Land then it had not been necessary to have shewed the first Gift to D. by the opinion of the whole Court Actions upon the Statute of Hue and Cry NEedham versus Inhabitant Hundredi de Stoak Trin. 8. Jac. rotulo 534. Action brought upon the Statute of Hue and Cry by the Servant who was robbed in his own name and part of the Goods
BAnks against Barker Hill 12. Jac. rotulo 1979. In an Action of Trespass the venire facias was well awarded upon the case of the venu in Westown and of the Mannor of D. and the Writ of Venire was mistaken to wit of the venu of Westown and exception being taken after tryall the Court was moved for the amending of the venire facias by the roll and it was denyed because the Jury did come of another venu then they ought by the Law of the Land to come and therefore could not be amended but afterwards the Court seemed to be of an opinion that the awarding of the venu in the roll was mistaken because it was of the venu of the Villiage and Mannor and it should have been of the Mannor only being to try a custome of the Mannor FOrrest against Headle Hill 13. Jac rot 1123. An Action of Trespass brought and a continuando of the Trespass unto the day of the shewing forth the Plaintifs Originall to wit the 20. day of November which day was after the shewing forth of the Originall and because the Jury gave damages for the whole time which ought not to be it was proved that the Judgment upon the verdict might stay but by the whole Court the videlicet was held idle and Judgment given for the Plaintiff COcks against Barnsley Hill 10. Iac. rotulo 2541. An Action of Trespass brought and a speciall verdict found and the question was whether Land held in ancient Demesne was extendable for debt and an action of Trespass brought for that cause And Justice Nichols held it was extendable for otherwise if it should not be extendable there would be a fayler of Justice for if a Judgment should be had against a man that had no other Land but what was in ancient Demesne and that it could not be extendable there would be a fayler of Justice which the Law doth not allow of but an Assize or a re-disseisin doth not lye of Land in ancient Demesne because of the Seisin that must be given by the Common Law and it would be prejudicial to the Lord which the Law allows not and Wynch and Hubbard were of the same opinion For ancient demesne is a good plea where the Free-hold is to be recovered or brought in question but in an action of Trespass it is no plea. And note that by this execution neither the Free-hold nor Possession is removed but only the Sheriffe enters to make execution upon a Judgment had in the Common bench in debt which is a proper Action to be brought there WRight and his Wife against Mouncton Hill 12. Iac. rotulo 43. An Action of Trespass brought to which the Defend pleaded not guilty And the Husband only made a challenge that he was servant to one of the Sheriffs and prayes a processe to the Coroners and the Defendant denies the challenge and therefore notwithstanding the challenge the Venire issued to the Sheriffs and after a tryall exception was taken because the woman did not joyne in the challenge and it was held that the Husband and Wife should joyn in the challenge although the cause of challenge proceded from the Husband only but after tryall it was helped by the Statute of Ieofailes and judgment given for the Plaintiff BIde against Snelling Hill 16. Iac. rotulo 1819. An Action of Ejectment brought and also a Battery in one and the Writ and after a verdict it was moved in Arrest of Judgment because the Battery was joyned with the Ejectment The damages were found severally and the Plaintiff had released the damages for the Battery and prayed Judgment for the Ejectment Winch held the Writ naught but Judgment was given for the Plaintiff notwithstanding STeward and his Wife against Sulbury An Action of Trespass brought wherefore by Force and Armes the Close of the Wife while she was sole at D. hath broken and the wood of the said D. to the value of 1005. there lately growing hath cut down and carried away and in his Count shews that he hath cut downe two acres of wood and exception was taken because he declared of so many acres of wood and not of so many loads of wood to wit twenty c. loads and held by the Court to be a good exception BLackeford against Althin Trin. 14. Jac. rotulo 3376. An action of Trespass brought wherefore by Force and Armes a certain Horse of the said Plaintiffs took away c. The Defendant conveys to himselfe a certain annuity granted to him by one John Hott The Plaintiff shews that one William Hott Father of the said Iohn Hott the Grantor was seised of Land in Fee which Land was Gavel-kind Land and devised it to his Wife for life the remainder to Iohn Hott the Elder and Iohn Hott the Younger his Sonne and the Heirs of their bodies And afterwards William dyed and the Woman entred and was seised for life and the two sonnes entred and were seised in tayl and being so seised Iohn Hott the younger had issue Iohn Hott c. and traverses without this that Iohn Hott the Father at the time of granting the annuity was seised of the Tenements aforesaid with the appurtenances in his Demesne as of fee as c. And the Defendant as before saith that the said J. H. the Father at the time of the granting the annuity aforesaid was seised and after the tryall it was moved in Arrest of Judgment supposing it was mistried because the issue was that the said J. H. the Father at the time of the grant c. And it doth not appear that the said J. H. was nominated Father neither could it appear that the said J. H. was the Father and so the word Father was idle and the Court were of opinion that it was helped by the Statute of Ieofailes and the word Father was idle and judgment was given for the Plaintiff A. brought an Action of Battery against the Husband and Wife and two others the Wife and one of the others without the Husband pleads not guilty and the Husband and the other pleaded seu assault demesne and tryed and alledged in arrest of Judgment because the Woman pleaded without her Husband and Judgment was stayed and a Repleader alledged and this case was confirmed by a case which was between Yonges and Bartram HArvy against Blacklole Trin. 8. Jacobi rotulo 1749. An Action of Trespass brought wherefore by force and Armes his Mare so strictly to a Gelding did fetter that by that fettring the Mare aforesaid did dye If a stranger take a Horse that cometh and strayeth into a Mannor the Lord may have his action of Trespass If my stray doth stray out of my Mannor and goeth into another Mannor the day before the yeare be ended I cannot enter into the other Mannor to fetch out the stray If I take an Horse as a stray and onother taketh him from me the Action lyeth not by the Owner against the second taker
any private Prison And it seemes if any do against this Statute that an action of false Imprisonment lies For every one ought to be committed to the Common Goal to the intent that he may be dilivered at the next Goale delivery and also if any be committed to any of the Counters in London unlessthat it be for debt that an action of false Imprisonment lieth for that for these are private Prisons for the Sheriffes of London for Debt only Note in Debt for ten pound the Defendant confesseth five pound and for the other five pound pleades that he oweth nothing by the Law and at the day the Plaintiff would have been nonsuited And it was agreed by all that if he be nonsuited that he shall loose all as well the debt confessed as the other Note the yeare of the Reigne of the King was mistaken in the Record of nisi prius but the Record which remaines in the Court was very well and it was amended For insomuch that it was a sufficent and certaine Issue this was sufficent Authority to the Justices of nisi prius to proceed but nothing being mistaken but the yeare of the Reigne this shall be amended for it is only the misprision of the Clark see Dyer 260. 24 25. 9. Eliz. 11. H. 6. Note also if Tenant in Dower be disseised and the Disseisor makes a Feoffment the Tenant in dower shall recover aâ—l their dammages against the Feoffee for she is not within the Statute of Glocester chapter 1. By which every one shall answer for their time Hillary 8. Jacobi 1611. in the Common Bench. Reyner against Poell See Hillary 6. Jacobi fol IN second deliverance for copy-hold in Brampton in the County of Huntington the case was copy-hold Lands were surrendered to the use of a woman and the Heires of her Body and she took a Husband the Husband and the Wife have Issue 2. Sonnes and after Surrenders to themselves for their lives the remainder to the eldest Son and his Wife in fee the Husband and the Wife dye the eldest Son dies the youngest Son enters and Surrenders to the use of a stranger And the sole question upon which they relied if the Wife was Tenant in tayl or if she had fee simple conditionall and it was argued by Nicholls that the Wife was Tenant in tayl and to prove that he cited 2. cases in Littleton where it is expresly mentioned who may be Tenant in tayl see Sect. 73. 79. And who may have a Formedon see in the discender sect 76. And he grounded that upon reason for that that it cannot be denied But that fee simple might be of copy-hold according to the custome and as well as fee simple as well it may be an estate tayl for every greater containes his lesse and he said that this is grounded upon the reason of other cases as if the King grant to one to hold Plea in his Court of all actions of debt and other actions and then one action of debt is given in case where it lieth not at the common Law yet the Grantee may hold Plea of that But if a new action be framed which was not in experience at the time of the grant but is given after by Statute the grant shall not extend to that and to the Objection that copy-hold is no Tenement within the Statute of gifts c. As to that he saith that that shall be very well intended to be within the Statute as it is used and 4. H. 7. 10. A man makes a gift in tayl by deed the Donee hath an estate tayl in the deed as well as in the Land so Morgan and Maxells case Commentaries 26. And so of Office Honour Dignity and copy-hold also and Dyer 2 and 3. Phil And Mary 114. 61. It is found by speciall verdict that copy-hold Lands have been devisable by copy in tayl and so it is pleaded 2 and 3 Eliz. Dyer 192. b. And when a lesser estate is extracted out of a greater that shall be directed and ordered according to the course of the Common Law and for that the Wife shall have plaint in nature of a Cui in vita and 15. H 8. b. Title Tenement by copy of Court Roll it was said for Law that tayl may be of a copy-hold and that Formedon may well ly of that in descender by protestation to sue in nature of a Formedon in descender at the Common Law and good by all the Justices for though that Formedon in descender was not given but by Statute Yet now this Writ lieth at the Common Law and shall be intended that this hath been a custome time out of mind c. And the Demandant shall recover by advise of all the Justices and the like matter in Essex M. 28. H. 8. And Fitz. affirms that in the chamber of the Dutchy of Lancaster afterwards and also he saith that when custome hath created such Inheritances and that the Land shall be descendable then the Law shall direct the discent according to the Maximes and Rules of the Common Law as incident to every estate discendable and for that shall be possessio Fratris of a copy-hold estate 4. Coke 22. a. Brownes Case b. And there 28. a. Gravener and Tedd the custome of the Mannor of Allesley in the County of Warwick was that copy-hold lands might be granted to any one in fee simple and it was adjudged that a grant to one and the Heires of his Body is within the Custome for be that Estate Tayl or Fee simple conditionall that is within the Custome So he may grant for life or for yeares by the same Custome for Estate in Fee simple includes all and it is a Maxime in Law to him that may do the greater it cannot be but the lesse is lawfull and over he said that in all cases where a man was put to his reall action at the Common Law in all these cases a copy-holder may have plaint with protestation to prosecute in â—…re of the same action and to the objection that there cannot be an Estate tayl of copy-hold Land for that that the Tenant in tayl shall hold of him in revertion and shall not be Tenant to the Lord to that he said that this Estate may be created as well by Cepit extra manus Domini as by Surrender and then there is not any reversion or remainder but it is as if Rent be newly granted in tayl but he said there may be a reversion upon an Estate tayl as well as upon an Estate for life and he did not insist upon the Custome but upon this ground that if the Custome warrant the greater Estate which is the Fee simple the lesse shall be included in that And he did not argue but intended that it would be admitted that discent of copy-hold Land shall not take away entry nor Surrender of that nor shall make discontinuance so prayed Judgement and â—…rne Harris the youngest Serjeant argued for the Plaintiff that it shall be
shall be said conclusion and agreement within the said Provision and for that as it seemes it is so uncertain as going about but admitting that it is good yet it shall be good but to some purpose but not to restraine the Daughter which was Tenant in taile to do lawfull Acts as to suffer a Recovery or to levy a Fine as it is resolved in Mildmayes case 6 Coke 40. By which it appears that she hath as well power to dispose that by Recovery as of Fee simple notwithstanding that the Reversion remaines in the Giver as it appears by 12 Ed. 4. 3. For all lawfull Acts made by Tenant in taile shall binde the Issue as 44 Ed. 3. Octavian Lumbards Case Grant of Rent for Release of right is good and shall binde the Issue for there are foure incidents to an Estate tayle First That he shall not be punished for Waste Secondly That his Wife shall be indowed Thirdly That the Husband of the Wife Tenant in Tayle shall be Tenant by the Courtisie Fourthly That Tenant in Tayle may suffer common recovery So that a Condition which restraines him so that he cannot suffer a common Recovery is void for it is incident to his act and it is a lawful Act and for the benefit of the Issue as it is intended in respect of the intended recompence and he said that a Feoffment to a woman covert or infant shall be conditionall that they shall not make a Feoffment during their disability is good for that the Law hath then made them disable to make a Feoffment so a Lease for life or years upon condition that he shall not alien is good in respect of the confidence that was reposed in them by the Lessor and so concluded that the Condition in this Case which restraines Tenant in Taile generally from alienation First was uncertain in respect of the words conclude and agree Secondly for that it was against Law so void and for that prayed Judgment for the Defendant Hutton Serjeant for the Plaintiff he argued that the verball agreement of the Wife shall bind her notwithstanding the Coverture for that that this is for her benefit for in performance of the said agreement she suffers a recovery to the use of her selfe and her Heires and so Dockes the remainder and he agreed the cases put by the other part which concerne free-hold but he said in cases of Limitation of Estates as if Limitation be if a Ring be tendred by a woman that the Land shall remaine to her and she takes a Husband and after that she and the Husband tender the Ring this shall be sufficient tender and it shall be intended the Act of the wife and 10. H 7. 20. a. A man devises his Lands to a married woman to be sold she may sell them to her Husband And though that it be not any agreement of the Husband only yet here is an act done in a Precipe brought against the Wife and she vouches over for that is not only an agreement but an Act executed upon which the Estate Limited to the eldest Sister shall take effect and the 2. Coke the 27. a. Beckwiths Case If the Husband and the Wife joyne in a Fine of Land of the Wife the Wife only without the Husband may declare the use of that And he intended it was a Limitation and not a condition and so it might be well at this day in case of devise and then the Act shall be that the Estate is Limited to have beginning being made the Estate of the youngest Daughter which made the Act shall be destroyed and determined for if it be a condition then all the Daughters shall take advantage of that and this was not the intent of the Devisor for they are the parties which should be restrained by the devise from Alienation And also he cited Wenlocke and Hamonds Case cited in Bractons Case 3. Coke 20. b. Where a Copy-holder in fee of Lands devisable in Burrough English having three Sons and a Daughter deviseth his Lands to his eldest Son paying to his Daughter and to his other Sons forty shillings within two yeares after his death the Devisor maketh surrender according to the use of his Will and dieth the eldest Son admitted and doth not pay the money within the two yeares and adjudged that though the word paiment makes a condition yet in this case of devise the Law construes that to a Limitation and the reason is there given to be for that that is it shall be a condition then that shall discend upon the eldest Son and then it stands at his pleasure if the Brothers or Sister shall be paid or not and 29. Assis 17. cytes in Nourse and Scholasticas Case Commentaries 412. b. where a man seised of Lands in Fee devisable deviseth them to one for life and that he should be Chapleine and single for his Soule all his life so that after his decease the sayd tenements should remaine to the Commonalty of the same Towne to finde a Chapleine perpetuall for the same Tenements and dyed and adjudged that this shall not be a condition of which the heir shal take advantage but limitation upon which the remainder shall take effect and also he cyted S. E. Clâ—ers Case 6 Coke 18. a. b. 11 H. 7. 17. Pennants Case 3 Coke 65. a. That if a man makes a Lease for years upon a condition to cease that after the condition is broken grantee of reversion may take advantage of that so he said in the case at the Bar when the first Estate is determined and destroyed by the limitation then he to whom the Remainder is limited shall take advantage of that and not the Heire for as he intended an Estate of Inheritance may as well cease by limitation of devise as tearme as in 15 Ed. 4. Lands are given to one so long as he hath heires of his body the remainder over and if he dye without heires of his body the remainder over shall vest without entry and the Free-hold shall vest in him and 2 and 3. Phil. and Mary Dyer 127. and 56. Fisher and Warrens Case If a man devise Lands to one for life the remainder over upon condition that if he do such an act that his estate shal cease and he in remainder may immediately enter there he in remainder shall take advantage though he be a stranger for that that the Estate determines there without re-entry And he saith that the Case of Wellock and Hamond cyted in Barastons Case was a stronger Case then this for there the limitation was upon Fee-simple and here it is upon an Estate tayle and the Law hath favourable respect to devises as in Barastones Case is alteration of words for the better exposition of that for Shall is altered to Should and also see 16 Eliz. Dyer 335. 29. for the marshalling of absurd words in a Will for the expounding of that and 18 Eliz. Cheekes Case he cyted to be adjudged that
is now out of the Statute for the advancement ought to be continuing until the death of the Father And so he saith also it was adjudged in Butler and Bakers Case that if a man devise Socage Lands and after sell to a stranger for good consideration his Lands held by Knights service this devise is now good for all for hee hath not any Land held by Knights service at the time of his death and so he concluded that the devise was good and prayed Judgement for the Plaintiff Houghton Serjeant for the Defendant he thought the contrary and hee argued that before the statutes of 32. and 34. of H. 8. men were disabled to devise any Land and for that they cannot provide for their Wives Children or for payment of their Debts and for remedy to that Feoffments to uses were invented and then to dispose the use by their Wills and then experience finds that to be inconvenient and then the statute of 27. H. 8. transfers the use into possession and then neither use nor land was deviseable without speciall Custome and then this was found to be mischeivous after five years experience and then was the statute of 32. H. 8. made and where by the statute of Marlebridg of those which did enfeoff their begotten sons a Feoffment by the Father to his son and Heir was void for all Now by this statute this is good for 2. parts and void only for the 3d part that for the good of the Lord but as to the party that is good for all as it is agreed in Mightes case 8 Coke Then to consider in the case here if all things concur that the statute requires and to that here is a person which was actually seised of Land held by Knights service in 12. Eliz. So that it is a person which then was having within the statute 2. If here be such conveyance for advancement of his children as is intended within the statute and to that he seemed that so notwithstanding that it may be objected that here is no execution to the youngest children insomuch that it is first limited to such Farmers and Tenants c. But he intended that this is no impediment Secondly also there is a limitation to the use of his last Will. Thirdly also there is a limitation to the use of such persons to whom he devises any estate by his Will But these are no impediments for the last is no other but a devise to himselfe and his heirs and there is not any other person knowne but meerely contingent and it is not like to a remainder limited to the right heirs of I. S. for there the remainder is in Abeiance but here it is only in contingency and nothing executed in Interest till the contingency happen and the not having of a son at the time shall not make difference as in 38. Edw. 3. 26. in formedon in Remainder where the gift was in one for life the remainder to another in tayle remainder in fee to another stranger and he in remainder in tayle dyes without Issue in the life time of the Tenant for life he in remainder in fee may have formedon in remainder without mentioning the remainder in tayle But here he intends that the devise shall be void in respect of the Lands first conveyed which were held in cheife by Knight service for the words of the statute are by act executed either by devise or by any of them and they are conjoyned and it is not of necessity that the time of the Conveyance shall be respected but the time of the value And notwithstanding that the Testator doth not mention any time But in so much as the provision of the statute is to save primor seisin and livery to the King as if the man had 20 l. by year in Socage and one acre in cheife and makes a conveyance of all that it shall be void first to the livery and priâ—or seisin to the third part So if he make conveyance of the 20 l. by yeare and leave the said acre held in cheife to discend and after that purchase other Lands to the value of the third part of all the conveyance of the 20 l. land notwithstanding which for the advancement of his Wife Children or payment of his Debts for he had a full third part at the time of his death which discended And he supposed that the having of a dry reversion depending upon the estate tall is sufficient having within the words and letter of the Statute and yet he agreed the ease put in Butler and Bakers case that if a man devise his Socage Lands and after alien his Lands held in cheife by Knight service to a stranger bonafide this is good So if he had made a reservation of his Lands held in chiefe to himselfe for his life in so much that his estate in that ended with his life and hee remembred the case cyted in Bret and case Comment That if a man devise a Mannor in which he hath nothing and after hee purchaseth it and dyes the devise is good if it be by expresse name But when a man hath disposed of two parts of his Land the Statute doth not inable him to devise the Residue but he hath done all and executed all the authority which the Statute hath given to him But he agreed also that the reversion is not such a thing of value which might make the third part discend to the Heir but it is uncertaine as a hundred and the other things of uncertain value contained in Butler and Bakers Case And also he intended that the remainder could not take effect insomuch that the condition is precedent and it is not found that the eldest Sonne hath aliened and then dead without Heir male and so he concluded and prayed Judgment for the Defendant In Replevin the Defendant avows for 9 s. Rent the Plaintiff pleads a Deed of feoffment of the same Land made before the Statute of quia emptores terrarum by which 6 s. 8 d. is only reserved and demands Judgment if he shall be received to demand more then is reserved by the Deed See 4 Ed. 2. Avowry 202. 10. H. 7. 20. Ed. 4. 7. Edw. 4. Lung 5 Ed. 4. 22 H. 6. 50. This Deed was without date and it was averred that it was made before the Statute of quia emptores terrarum which was made in the 18. of Edw. 1. And also it ought to be averred to be made after the beginning of the Reign of Richard 1. For a writing after the beginning of his Reign checks prescription But if a man hath a thing by grant before that he may claim by prescription for hee cannot plead the grant insomuch it is before time of memory and a Jury cannot take notice of that and for that the pleading before with the said averments was good If debt be due by Obligation and another debt be due by the same Debtor to the same Debtee of
appears by 9 Edw. 4. 33. 37 H. 6. 32 H. 6. 1. Ed. 4. 2. 50. Ed. 3. And he conceived that the burying is not any Administration nor the taking of the goods into his custody to preserve them no more then in Trover and Conversion when a man takes the goods for to preserve them And he agreed that where a man intitles himselfe to goods by Administration committed by any but by the Bishop he ought to pleade specially that he which committed it had power to doe it But here it is not so but only conveiance and for that need not here such precise pleading of that insomuch it is only execution of Administration and for that it is good without intitleing the Arch-Deacon And he agreed that an Executor of his owne wrong may pay Debts due to another and shall be discharged And he agreed also that the Confession of one Executor shall bind his Companion and that Judgement shall be given upon that for the Plaintiff And they all agreed that the pleading that the Defendant hath no goods besides the goods which do not amount c. it was not good and for these causes they all agreed that Judgement ought to be given to the Plaintiff Trinity 10. Jacobi in the Common Bench. Tyrer against Littleton 9. Jacobi Rot. 299. IN Trespasse for taking of a Cow c. Upon not guilty pleaded by the Defendant the Jury gives speciall Verdict as it followes that is that the Husband of the Plaintiff was seised of eighty Acres of Land held of the Defendant by Harriot service that is the best Beasts of every Tenant which died seised that he had at the time of his death and that the Husband of the said Defendant long time before his death made a Feoffment of that Land in consideration of marriage and advancement of his Son to the use of his Son and his Heires with such agreement that the Son should redemise to his Father for forty yeares if he so long lived and that after the marriage was had and the Son redemised the Land to his Father and the Father injoyed that accordingly and paied the Rent to the Lord and after died and that the Plaintiff had no notice of his Feoffment and that the Husband at the time of his death was possessed of the said Cow and that the Defendant took it as the best Beast in name of Harriot and also found the Statute of 13. Eliz. of fraudulent conveiances to deceive Creditors and so praied the direction of the Court and this was agreed by the Plaintiff aforesaid Nicholls Serjeant first that all conveiances made upon good consideration and Bona Fide are by speciall Proviso exempted out of the Statute of 13. Eliz. chap. And he conceived that this is made upon good consideration and Bona Fide and for that it is within the said Proviso and also he said that as upon the Statute of Marlebridge there is fraud apparent and fraud averrable as it appeares 12. H. 4. 16. b. Where in ward the Tenant pleads that his Father levied a Fine to a stranger the Lord replies that this was by Collusion to re-enfeoff the Heire of the Tenant at his full age and so averred that to be by Collusion to out the Lord of his Ward and this is fraud averrable But if the Tenant had enfeoffed his Tenant immediately in Fee-simple this is apparent without any averment and the Court may adjudge upon it And so upon the Statute of 27. Eliz. chap. 4. it appears by Burrells Case that the Fraud ought to be proved in Evidence or confessed in pleading or otherwise this shall not avoid conveiance for it shall not be intended 6 Coke 78. a. and see 33. H. 6. 14. b. Andrew Woodcocks case upon which he inferred that this is but a fraud averrable if it be a fraud at all and of this the Court could not take notice if it be not found by the Jury and he said upon the Statute of 32 H. 8. Of Devisees as it appeares by Knights Case 8 Coke and 12. Eliz. Dyer 295. 8 9 10 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17. And so he concluded and praied Judgement for the Plaintiff Harris Serjeant for the Defendant argued that the Circumstances which are found in the speciall Verdict are sufficient to satisfie the Court that it is fraud for as well as the Court may give direction to the Jury upon Evidence that it is fraud and what not as well may the Court Judge upon the special matter being found by special Verdict at large as in 9 El. Dyer 267. and 268. that is the special matter being found by special verdict at large as in 9 El. Dyer 267. 268. that is the speciall matter is found by Inquisition upon Mandamus and leave to the Court to adjudge if it be fraud or not and in 12 El. 294. and 295. 8. the speciall matter was found by Jury upon Eligit directed to the Sheriffe and by him returned to the Court And in Trinity 27. Eliz. between Saper and Jakes in Trover the Defendant pleades not guilty and gives in Evidence as assignement of a Tearme to him with power of revocation And the Court directed the Jury that this was fraudulent within the Statute of 27. Eliz. to defraud a purchasor and in Burrells Case 6. Coke 73. a. before the fraud to the Court upon Evidence to the Jury and the Court gave direction to the Jury that it was fraud and that upon the Circumstances which appeares upon the speciall Evidence And so in this case he conceived that insomuch the circumstances appear by the Verdict that the Jury may very well adjudge upon it and so he concluded and praied Judgement for the Defendant Coke cheife Justice that the Statute of 13. Eliz. Doth not aid the Defendant insomuch that the Feoffment was made for good consideration and for that shall be within the said Proviso for if that shall be avoided at all that shall be avoided by the Statute of Marlebridge which is ouly affirmance of the Common Law and this is the reason that not withstanding the Statute speakes only of Feoffment by the Father to his Son and Heire apparent yet a Feoffment to a Cosin which is Heire apparent is taken to be within the Statute and in the 24. of Eliz. in Sir Hamond Stranges Case It was adjudged that if the Son and Heire apparent in the life time of his Father purchase a Mannor of his Father for good consideration this is out of the Statute and so it was adjudged in Porredges Case also he said that the Law is an Enemie to fraud and will not intend it being a conveiance made for consideration of a marriage to be fraudulent no more then if the Father had made a Feoffment to the use of a stranger for life the remainder in Fee to his Son and Heire the which is not within the Statute of Marlebridge as it is agreed in Andrew Woodcocks Case 33.
H. 6. 14. b. Also he conceived that the Feoffment in consideration of marriage naturall love to his Son and that the Wife of the Sonne shall be Indowed and that the Son should redemise that to his Father for forty yeares if he so long lived and that the Father should pay the Rent to the Lord these he intended to be good considerations and for that should be within the said Proviso of the Statute of 13. Eliz. otherwise if it had been to defraud Creditors But if it had been to such intent that is to defraud Creditors this shall not be extended to other intent that is to defraud the Lord of his Harriot And in the 28. of Eliz. it was adjudged in the Kings Bench if a man make a Feoffment in Fee to the use of himselfe for life remainder to his Son in tayl with divers Remainders over with power of Revocation and after bargaines and sells to a stranger upon condition and after performes the Condition that yet the first conveiance remaines fraudulent as it was at the time of the making of it But this is only as to the purchasor and not as to any other And in Goodhers Case 3. Coke 60. a. In debt against Heire which pleads nothing by discent day of the Writ purchased the other joynes Issue and gives in Evidence fraudulent conveiance and upon speciall Verdict adjudged that it was very good See also 4. Coke 4. b. c. Vernâ—ns Case the Collusion to have Dower and Joynture also And so he concluded that Judgement should be given for the Plaintiff Warburton Justice agreed that the fraud shall not be intended if it be not found no more then if a man grant an Annuity to another Quam diu se bene gesserit in Annuity for that he need not to averr that he hath behaved himselfe well for this shall be intended if the contrary be not shewed of the other party So here insomuch that it is not found to be fraudulent it shall be intended to be Bona fide And he agreed that if it had been fraudulent at the first If the Son had made a Feoffment over in the life of the Father as it is agreed in Andrew Woodcocks Case 33 H. 6. 14. that then the fraud is determined So here when the Son hath made a Lease to his Father this determines the fraud if any be and so he concluded that Judgment should be given for the Plaintiff Wynch Justice agreed insomuch that it is expresse consideration found by the Verdict and for that other consideration shall not be intended and also that it shall not be intended that the Conveyance was made to defraud or to deceive the Lord of such a Peccadell as Harriot is which is of small consequence but if it be a fraud within the Statute of 27 Eliz. apparent that is if it containe power of revocation which is declared to be apparent fraud by the Statute the Court may take notice of that without any averrment And he saith That in the 2. and 3. Eliz. Dyer Wainsfords Case 193. a. and 9 Eliz. Dyer 267 268. there is no averrment of fraud but expresse Issue joyned upon the Fraud and for that he need not any other averrment And so he concluded also that judgement should be given for the Plaintiffe and so it was Ruled accordingly if the Defendant did not shew other matter to the contrary at such a day which was not done Trinity 10. Jacobi 1612. In the Common Bench. Strobridge against Fortescue and Barret IN a Replevin the case was this A man seised of Lands in Fee devises Rent out of it with clause of Distress and dies his Son and Heire enters and dyes the Rent is behind the Son of the Son dyes and his Son enters and makes a Feoffment to the Plaintiff and the Devisee of the Rent releases all Actions Debts and Demands to the Feoffor and after distraynes the Beasts of the Feoffee for the Rent behinde before the Feoffment and it seemes the Release is not good insomuch that the Devisee had no cause of Action at the time of the Release made against him to whom the Release is made nor Demand against him otherwise if the Release had been made to the Feoffee for he was subject to the distress and this is a demand Trinity 10. Jacobi 1612 In the Common Bench. Case of Cinque Ports NOTE that Coke said that it hath been adjudged by three Judges against one in a Case of Cinque Ports that the Cinque Ports cannot prescribe to take the Body of a Freeman in Withernam as they use for another for this is against the Statute of Magna Charta Quod nullus liber homo Imprisonetâ—r nisi per Legate Judicium and also against the liberty of a Subject but they more inclined that they might take the Goods of one in Withernam when another is arrested and them retain and this seemes the more reasonable Custome and Prescription The Case was Tenant for life the Remainder for life with warranty the first Tenant for life was impleaded and he vouches him in Reversion but he first prays in aid of him in Remainder and if this aid prayer shall be granted this was the question And it seemes by Nicholls Serjeant that it shall not be granted see 11 H. 4. 63. Where it is agreed that if a man makes a Lease for life Remainder for life Remainder in fee and the first Tenant for life hath ayd of him in remainder for life and he in Fee joyntly and 44 Edw. 3. 20. in Trespasse against a Miller which takes Toll where he ought to grind Toll-free the Defendant saith that J. had the Mill for life and that he is his Deputy the reversion to W. in Fee and prays ayde of the Tenant for life and of the Tenant in reversion and had it of the Tenant for life and not of him in reversion and this for default of Privity as it seems to Brooke Ayde 30. Haughton conceived that it should be granted for Tenant for life notwithstanding that he may plead any Plea yet he doth not know what Plea to plead without him in reversion but by the ayde praying al the Estate shall be reduced into one and the warranty shall come and for that he conceived that the first Tenant for life shall have ayde of him in remainder for life Wynch Justice conceived that ayde shall not be granted against the first Tenant for life against him in remainder for life for he conceived that ayde is alwaies to be granted when the defects of him and his Estate which prays it are to be supplyed by him which is prayed that this is the reason that he may have ayde of his Wife and where there are many remainders the first Tenant may have ayde of them all otherwise where he is Tenant for life the remainder for liâ—e and the reversion expectant for the Tenant for life cannot supply his
this shall passe for him which pleads the demise of the Mannor Then if in Judiciall proceeding the Law makes such favourable construction to make that passe by a Mannor which is no Mannor in truth because it hath been usually known by the name of a Mannor then it seemes to him a Fortiore that no more beneficiall construction shall be made in conveiances which allwaies shall be construed to the intent and meaning of the parties and so it seemes to him that the Common remaines and Crooke Yelverton and the cheife Justice Flemming conceived that in reason he shall have the Common but they did not give any absolute opinion as to that But Williams Justice to the contrary and that the Lessee for yeares cannot have more then he contracted for in his Lease and then the Vsitatum void and the Lessees have taken that by wrong And this Grant having reference to a void and wrongfull usage is not good and it is adjourned Hillary 7. Jacobi 1609. In the Kings Bench. Stydson against Glasse Stydson brought an Ejectione Firme against Glasse and upon speciall Verdict the case was this that is That one Holbeame was seised of the Land in question in Fee and made a Lease for life to Margret Glasse and after covenanted with John Glasse Husband of the said Wife Lessee that before such a day he would Levie a Fine to A. B. and to the Heires of A. of the same Lands which Fine should be to the use of the said Glasse for sixty yeares to begin after the death of the said Margeret Glasse with Proviso within the same Indentures that if the said Holbeame at a certaine day should pay to the said John Glasse a hundred pounds that then the Lease should cease and then of that the Conusees should stand seised to the use of the said John for his naturall life and after the said Holbeame disseised the said Margeret Glasse the Lessee and made a Feoffment to the use of himselfe and one Alice with whom he intended to marry and to the Heire of their two bodyes begotten the remainder to the right Heires of the Feoffor and after the sayd Feoffor and Alice intermarried and after the said Holbeam tendred a hundred pound to the sayd John Glasse the Lessee for years and after the sayd John Glasse assigned over his Tearme and after the sayd Holbeam by Deed indented and inrolled bargained and sold the said Land to the said John Glasse and his Heir and after Iohn Glasse dyed and the Inheritance discended to the said Margeret Glasse Lessee for life the Conusor dies his Wife enters and lets to the Plaintiff the Defendant enters upon him and the Plaintiff re-enters and brings Trespass against the Defendant which justifies as servant to the Assignees of the Tearm and if upon all the matter c. And it was argued by Nicholls Serjeant for the Plaintiff and he moved three points in the case First if by this feoffment upon such condition as this is had been Extinct at the Common Law or remaines to the Feoffor notwithstanding the feoffment for if he have interest in the Land then it is extinct by the Livery for it is given of the Feoffor and past out of him and yet the Feoffee cannot have and for that it is extinct but if it were but Authority as in 15 H. 7. Authority to sell the land of the Devisor then the Authority remaines and is not extinct by the Feoffment of the land so power of Revocation to a stranger which is but authority is not extinct by a feofment Albaines case Coke 112. a. But if it be right in Interest then it is extinct by the feofment as power of revocation to the Party himself resolved to the point in Albains case so of Title to a Writ of Deceit 38 Ed. 3. So of a title to be Tenant by the Curtesie 9 H 7. 1. But by 42 Edw. 3. by a Feoffment made by a Parson of Land of his Rectory the Tythes of that Land are not extinct but remaines notwithstanding the Feoffment for that it was collaterall to the title of the Land as the Cases of Authority are which were put before then if this power to alter a Lease by payment of a hundred pound be not any right nor Interest but a collaterall power and the authority not extinct by the Feoffment but remaines but admitting that it is in nature of an ordinary Condition and that before the Statute it should be extinct by the Feoffment for that it is the gift of the Feoffor and yet it is not transferable to the Feoffee If now by the Statute of 32 H. 8. which inables Grantees of reversions to take advantage of Conditions if the condition be not transferred to the Feoffees and so over to he to whose use that then by consequence this remaines to the Feoffor which was the he to whose use and then the tender of the money after well may alter the Lease it seems that so for before the Statute if a Lease for yeares had been made upon condition to cease and after the Lessor enters upon the Lessee and makes a Feoffment and the Lessee re-enter and breakes the condition the Feoffee shall take advantage of that condition being by way of ceasing of an Estate so after the Statute the Feoffee of the Lessor shall take advantage of the condition of Re-entry and of every other condition annexed to the reversion as well as of one condition to cease before the Statute and as well that every Grantee shall doe since the Statute for though that he comes in by Feoffment which is wrong to the Lessee yet after the re-entry the Lessee is in nature of a Grantee And he cyted the Case of Clyfford Error 7. Ed. 6. to be that Lessor entred upon his Lessee and made a Feoffment if the Lessee re-enter the Rent and the Condition are revived againe and the Feoffee shall have both see Cliffords Error 7. Ed. 6. Dyer the last case and 1. M. Dyer 96. 43. but there is not any such matter and for that it seemes that he hath another report of this case of Cliffords Error or otherwise he meant some other case and not Cliffords Error so is our case the condition being inherent to the reversion shall passe with the reversion be that by grant or feoffment and when the reversion is revived by the entry of the Lessee the condition shall be revived also and it is the more strong insomuch that the Condition is that upon the payment of the money the Lease for years shall cease and not that the Lessor shall re-enter that such Feoffee shall take advantage of a condition by way of ceasing of that at the Common Law 2. point and for the second point he would not argue against that that he took to be cleer and for that he conceived the Law to be against his Clyent in this point though that after the Disseisin and Feoffment the free-hold could not accrue
of the Lessor But he agreed the case of Littleton that an Assignee of an Estate may perform a condition in preservation of an Estate otherwise of an Assignee of a Reversion in destruction of an Estate so at the Common Law it is clear that the Feoffee cannot perform the condition and by him it is cleerly out of the Statute of 32 H. 8. for this Statute doth not extend to a collaterall condition as it appears by Spencers case 5. Coke and so hath been many times after this adjudged and this is a collaterall condition Ergo c. And so concluded and prayed Judgment for the Defendant Nicholls Serjeant to the contrary and that this Disseisin hath not suspended the condition but that he may pay the Money and make the Estate to cease notwithstanding the Disseisin for-that that the condition is collaterall like to the 20 of Ed. 4. and 20 H. 7. That where a Feoffee upon a collaterall condition takes back an Estate for years yet this shall not suspend the condition but it may be performed or broken notwithstanding the Lease for that that it is collaterall so in our case for suppose that the condition had been if he marry Mistris Holbeam that then his Estate shall cease and as well it shall be upon the Tender of the Money here and he said that this case was late in the Common Bench. This feoffment was made to the use of the Feoffor for life Remainder to another for life the Remainder to the third in tayl the Remainder to the right Heirs of the Feoffor in fee with power of Revocation and after the Feoffor lets for years and during the Tearm he revokes the mesne Remainders and it seems to the Justices that well he may for that that the Lease for years goes only out of the Estate for life as he sayd and for that the power of Revocation as to the Mesne Remainders was not suspended Quere of the truth of this case in the common Bench for perchance it is not truly collected but so entred and so he prayed Judgment for the Plaintiff Flemming cheife Justice sayd that the point of the principall case would be if by the wrong of the Lessor the Estate of the Lessee shall be prevented to accrue then he might perform the condition to determine the ancient Estate that is the Lease for years and it is adjourned Pasch 8. Jacobi 1610. In the Kings Bench. Earle of Shrewsbury against the Earle of Rutland IN a Writ of Errour the Earle of Rutland brought an Assise of Novel Disseisin against the Earle of Shrewsbury and four others and the Plaint was of the office of the keeping of the Park of Clepson and of the vailes and fees of the sayd Parke and of the Herbage and Paunage of the same and the Demandant made his title and alledged that the Queen Eliz. was seised of Clepsam Park in fee in right of her Crown and that she being so seised by her Letters Patents under the great Seal granted unto one Markham the keeping of the Park of Clepson with the vailes and fees and the Herbage and Paunage of the same Park for his life after the Queen Eliz. reciting the Grant made to Markham and that Markham was alive gave and granted by her Letters Patents to the Earl of Rutland the Office of the keeping of the sayd Clepson Parke with the Fees and Wages to that appertaining to have and to hold to him for his life after the death of Markham or after the surrender or forfeiture of his Letters Patents and further granted the Herbage and Paunage to the sayd Earle of Rutland for his life and doth not say when this shall begin after which the Queen Eliz. died and the Eee-simple discended to our Lord the King which-now is as lawfull Heir to the Crown of England which granted that to the Earle of Shrewsbury after which Markham dyed and the Earle of Rutland entered and was seised till the Earle of Shewsbury with four others entered upon him and dissersed him and to that the Tenants alledged no wrong no disseisin and when the Assise was to be taken in the Country the Array was challenged by the Tenants for that that one of the Tenants in the Assise had an Action of Trespasse hanging against the Sheriff and this challenge was not allowed and the Assise being perused at large for the Herbage and Paunage they found that the said Queen Eliz. was seised of Clepson Park as aforesaid and by her Letters Patents as afore is rehearsed granted the Keeping of this to Markham for his life and further by the same Letters Patents granted to him the Fees and Wages to that belonging and further granted by Letters Patents and doth not say Easdem to him the Herbage and Paunage of the sayd Park and that the Queen after the reciting the Grant made to Markham and that Markham was alive granted to the Earle of Rutland the keeping of the sayd Park and vailes and fees to have and to hold after the death surrender or forfeiture of the Letters Patents of Markham for his life And further by the sayd Letters Patents shee granted the Herbage and Paunage of the same Park to him for his life as more fully appears by the Letters Patents and it was not expressed as to the Herbage and Paunage when that began and they found the death of Markham and that the Earle of Rutland put two Horses into the sayd Park to take seisin of the sayd Herbage and Paunage and they found further the grant of the King to the Earle of Shrewsbury of the fee-simple and of that prayed the advise of the Court and to the keeping of the Park they found the seisin and disseisin of that and of the fees and wages to the Dammages c. And this being adjourned into the Common Bench was remanded into the Country and there Judgment was given for all for the Demandant and after this it came into the Kings Bench by Writ of errour and the Errours assigned by the councell of the Tenants and argued at the Barr were foure The first was that the Earle of Rutland himself between the verdict and the Judgment hunted in the Park and kild a Buck and took a shoulder of that for his fee and so he hath abated his Assise and so the Judgment was given upon a Writ abated and therefore they cannot plead that in abatement insomuch that it was mesne betwixt the Judgment and the verdict they assigned that for errour The second was because the principall challenge was not allowed where that ought to have beene allowed and the challenge was that one of the Tenants had an Action or Trespasse hanging against the Sheriff before the Assise The third was Because the Jury have found the Letters Patents made to Markham and that the Queen granted to him by her Letters Patents the custody of the Parke of Clepson in Clepson And further by the same Letters Patents granted the vailes
Lessee for years or life surrender before the performance of the condition the Fee doth never increase as it is 14. H. 8. 20. and the Lord Chandois Case 6 Coke But the Estate tayl remaines after the condition performed and then hath the Fee dependant upon the Estate tayl and that there is a necessity that there shall be an office as it was in Nicholls Case in the Com because of the right and that after the condition performed then the Fee shall vest Ab Initio and this corporates together partly by the Letters Patents and partly by the performance of the condition and so it is in Butler and Bakers case that it is not a Grant in futuro but one immediate Grant to take effect In futuro see 2. H. 7. for the execution of Chantrey and Grendons Case in the Com. and 2. H. 7. If the King grant Land to J. S. for life the remainder to the right Heires of J. R. which is in life the remainder is good as well as in case of a common person and so he seemed that Judgement shall be given for the Plaintiff Walmesley Justice agreed that it shall be remainder and not reversion as if Lands begin to the Husband and the Wife and to the Heires of the Body of the Husband the Husband dies this is a remainder in the Heires Males and not a reversion for it cannot grow higher and it was not in the King as one distinct Estate before the Grant and Formedon in remainder lieth for it and though it be misrecited yet it shall be good and ayded by the Statute of Misrecitalls and grant of a thousand is suffered to convey the reversion of a thousand by the common Law and if the recitall were that it was a reversion depending upon the Estate tayl it was good without question and the King may grant five hundred reversions if he will and that the last Damus is ex certa scientia et mêre motu nostris Damus et concedimus that if the Patentee pay twenty shillings Tunc sciatis quod nos de ampliori gracia ea certa scientia et mero motu nostris concedimus c. and that the word Volumus will amount to a Covenant or a Release as 32. H. 6. The King by his Patent by these words Nolent that he shall be impleaded and this amounts to a release and so words which intends expresly words of Covenant may be pleaded as a Grant in case of the King as it is 25 Ed. 4 So is a common person license another to occupy his Land this amounts to a Lease of Land if the time be expressed so if a man grants to another that he shall have and injoy his Land to him and his Heires that by that Fee passeth And if the King grant reversion to begin at Michaelmasse the Grant is void for that it is to begin totally at Michaelmasse and doth not looke back to any precedent thing But if it relate to any precedent Act then that shall be good by relation and shall passe ab Initio see Com. Walsinghams Case 553. b. that in such case the performance of the condition divests the Estate out of the King and there is no difference in this case betwixt the King and a common person and agreed in the case of Littleton Where a man makes a Lease for yeares upon condition to have Fee that the Fee shall not passe till the condition be performed and with this agrees 2. R. 2. But if a man makes a Charter of Feoffment upon condition that if the Feoffee injoy the Land peaceably for fifteen years that the Feoffment shall be void In this case the Fee-simple determineth by the performance of the Condition and in this case the Fee passeth ab Initio by the Livery as in 10. Assise 18. Assise 1. 44. Assise 49 Assise And he agreed that the words Habeat et Teneat the Reversion passes and this is good Fee-simple and this refers to the first Damus et Concedimus and so concluded that he seemed that Judgement shall be given for the Plaintiff Coke cheife Justice accordingly and he conceived that there are two questions upon the substance of the Grant And to the first objection that hath been made that is that reversion was granted and increase of an Estate cannot be of a reversion and in all these cases which have been put they are of an Estate in possession and so is the case of Littleton also and he agreed that it shall not be good if it be not good ab Initio that though there be not other words then Reversionem predictam That it shall be good And to the second point upon the former He conceived that the Grant is but a Grant and that the condition is but precedent Limitation when the Estate of Fee-simple shall begin and so it is said by Montague in Colthurst and Brinskins Case in the Com. And further he saith that there are four things necessary for increasing an Estate First that it ought to be an Estate upon which the increasing Estate may increase Secondly the particular Estate ought to continue for otherwise it is grant of a reversion in Futuro Thirdly That the Estate which is to increase ought to vest by the performance of the Condition for if there be disturbance that it cannot then vest then it can never vest Foutthly that both the Estates as well the particular Estate as the Estate which is to increase ought to have their beginning by one self same Deed or by diverse Deeds delivered at one self same time And to the first and to prove that he cyted 44 Ed. 3. Attaint 22. Lessee for yeares upon condition to have Fee granes his Estate the Fee doth not increase upon the performance of the condition for then it shall passe as a Reversion and so the particular Tenant surrenders his Estate as it is sayd 14. H. 8. For if the Privity be destroyed the Fee will never increase but there is no such â—ycity but that if the substance of the Estate remains though it doth not remain in such form as it was at the first Reversion the Estate may well increase as if Lands be given to the Husband and wife and to the Heirs of the Husband upon the Body of the Wife to be begotten the Wife dies and the Husband is Tenant after possibility of Issue extinct yet he may well perform the condition for the Estate remaines in substance and with this agrees 20 H. 6. Ayd and so it is if a Lease be made to two for years upon condition to have fee one dies the other may perform the Condition and shall have Fee-simple as it is agreed by 12. Assise 5. the reason is that the privity remaines and the Estate also in substance Thirdly As to that also it seems that it ought to vest upon the performance of the condition which is the time limited for the beginning of the Estate and if it do not vest
omit to take them every other year I cannot take them in the third year But for Rent and such other things that are in the Render I ought to have it when ever I demand it as it best pleases me And note that in such case one prescribed for eight Loads of Wood to be cut and taken as appertaining to a Messuage which was held naught by the whole Court for the Prescription should be laid for Estovers to be imployed upon Repairs of the said Messuage or to be spent in it for a man cannot prescribe to have a Prescription to come and cut down my Wood which is as much as I that have the Free-hold can do For the claim to take and sell my Wood cannot be good And the Court held it a good Prescription to prescribe to have Common every other year although you shew not the Commencement as to shew what time of the year when it begins If a man hath Common of Pasture in divers Closes and parcels of Ground where he hath some Land of his own there and in all other cases where one is to prescribe he need not to make his Title to every peice but to say he hath Common in loco in quo c. in t alia and need not to speak of the rest of the Land in the residue of the Feild because he hath Land of his own Common appendant belongeth to arrable Land not to Pasture Land If two Issues be joyned and in the awarding the Venire facias these words Videlicet Quoad triandum tam exit istum quam praedictum alium exit superius junct were omitted and after a Verdict such Default was moved in Arrest of Judgement and the Exception over-ruled and held good notwithstanding that omission The whole Court were of opinion that local things shall not be made transitory by laying the Action in a forrain Shire as for Corn growing in one Shire and an Action of Trover brought in another COmes Cumbr. versus Comitem Dorset It was moved by the Defendant that whereas the Plaintiff had prosecuted a Distring Jur. and onely eleven of the Jury appeared and the Inquest remained to be taken for want of Jurors and that at such time neither Plaintiff nor Defendant desired a Tales and afterwards the Defendant in another Terme prayed a Tales of that Writ which the Plaintiff had prosecuted and the Court denied to grant it because he prayed not a Tales when the Distress was retorned and if he would have a Tales he must purchase anew a Plur. distring and if then the Jury fill not the Defendant may pray a Tales and the Court ought to grant it And note upon the first Habeas Corpus the Defendant shall not have a Tales but in Default of the Plaintiff IF the Chamberlain of the County Palatine of Chester make an insufficient Return to the Court of Common Pleas upon a Writ issued out of that Court the Sheriff shall be amerced because the Sheriff is the Officer responsible to the Court. The King hath power to make and create a Leet anew where none was before A Distress is incident of Right but in a Court Baron a Prescription must be laid to distrain J. Rogers versus Powell My Lord Cook held that the Surrender of a Copy-hold in Tail is not any Discontinuance and Justice Foster of the same opinion In Doctor Husseys case in a Ravishment de gard wherein the Judgement is penal the Habeas Corpus was denied by the Court to be amended being a blank Writ after a Verdict but was adjudged Error For the Proviso in the Statute of Jeofailes 18 Eliz. excepts Actions upon penal Statutes One Jury was impannelled of the Town of Southampton and called to the Bar and made Default and the men of that Town shewed to the Court a Grant made to the Inhabitants of that Town that no Return should be made of the men of that Town to be of any Jury and prayed the Allowance of their Charter and the Court appointed them to plead their Charter and it was done accordingly TRier versus Littleton A special Verdict was found whether Fraud or not Fraud and the Jury did not finde the Fraud expresly but they found Circumstances that the Deed might seem thereby to be fraudulent but the Court will not adjudge it Fraud where the Jury do not expresly finde the Fraud for the Judges have nothing to do with matter of Fact and so by the whole Court no Fraud Tenant for Life Remainder for Life Remainder in Tail Remainder in Fee the first Tenant for Life suffereth a Recovery the Remainder in Tail is barred although the second Estate for Life be no party Baron Feme seised of the Wives Land for Life of the Wife Remainder to the Husband and Wife in Tail and afterwards the Husband doth bargain and sell the Land by Deed inrolled and a Precipe is brought against the Bargainee and he voucheth them in Remainder this is a good Recovery to barr the Estate Tail If an Information be brought against three upon the Statute of Maintenance and two of them appear and the third doth not appear the Plaintiff may declare against the two that do appear before the other appears for it is but a Trespass and Contempt as in Trespass and Conspiracy but it is otherwise in Debt upon a joynt Contract for there the Plaintiff cannot declare against one untill the Process be determined against the other by the opinion of the whole Court If Judgement be entred in Trespass of Oct. Hillarii the Writ to inquire of Damages may bear teste of any other Return of that Terme besides of Octab. Hillarii for the Terme is as one Day and so hath been adjudged upon a Writ of Error in the upper Bench but it is otherwise held in the Common Pleas. If a Bargain and Sale be void in part it is void in all If an Officer or priviledged person of the Court of Common Pleas sue another priviledged man of any other Court whatsoever yet he of the Common Pleas that first sued shall force the other priviledged person to answer in the Common Pleas but if a priviledged man be sued with another as Executor no Priviledge lies Summons and Severance lies between Executors Plaintiffs and if one of the Executors be outlawed or excommunicated he may be demanded and if he comes not shall be severed by an award without Process after he hath appeared and the other shall proceed without him but if he had not appeared then Summons and Severance shall issue out against him FLetcher versus Robson An Extent upon a Statute Merchant issued out against Robson the Cognisor and the Sheriff returned that the Cognisor was possessed of divers Goods and seised of Lands which he delivered to the Cognisee and that the Cognisee accepted of the Land and because the Sheriff did not return that he had not any other Lands Goods or Chattels it was
folio 367. To the contrary is not Law two Tenements in Common joyne in a Lease for years to bring an Ejectment and declare that whereas they did demise the Tenements and it was held nought for it is a severall Lease of moities and if they had declared that one of them had demised one moity and the other another moity it had been good WIlson versus Rich Pasch 44. Eliz. The Husband and Wife joyn in a Lease by Indenture to A. rendring Rent and this is for years and make a Letter of Attorney to seal and deliver the Lease upon the Land which is done accordingly A. brings an Ejectmentand declares upon a Demise made by the Husband and Wife and upon Evidence to the Jury ruled by Popham Fenner and Yelverton that the Lease did not maintain the Declaration for a Woman covert could not make a Letter of Attorney to deliver a Lease upon the Land although Rent was reserved by the Lease and so the Warrant of Attorney is meerly void and the Lease is onely the Lease of the Husband which is not made good by the Declaration by the opinion of the Court. STretton versus Cush Pasch 1. Jacobi J. L. leased a House for fourscore years in which Lease there is one Condition that the Lessee his Executors and Assignes should keep and maintain the House in reparation and if upon lawfull warning given by the Lessor his Heires and Assignes c. to enter the Lessee for fourscore years leases the House to A. for thirty years and A. leases it to Wilmore for fifteen years the Assignee of the Reversion came to the House and seeing it in decay gave warning to Wilmore then possessed of that House to repair it which was not done within six Moneths by reason whereof the Assignee entred for the Condition broken and upon a Not guilty pleaded the matter before recited was found by a special Verdict and adjudged against Sir William Wade the Assignee of the Reversion for the warning given to Wilmore to repair who was but an under tenant was not good for he was not Assignee of the terme nor had but a pety interest under the grand Lease upon whom no Attorney could be made for the Rent nor any Action of Waste brought against him for there wanted the immediate privity and in this Case there is a difference to be taken between a rent and a Condition for reparations for the Condition is meerly collateral to the Land and meerly personal and therfore warning is not of necessity to be given at the House but notice of Reparations ought to be given to the person of the Lessee who had the grand interest And a Difference is to be taken between a time certain in which a thing is to be done and a time incertain for in the Case of Rent reserved at a Day certain Demand thereof must be made upon the Land onely because the Land is the Debtor for Popham said that if the Lessor should come and demand his Rent and there should meet with J. S. a stranger and should say to J. S. Pay me my Rent this is no good Demand of the Rent having mistaken the person who is chargeable with it but in this Case one general Demand of Rent without reference to any person who is not chargeable is good And he was of opinion that if a man lease Land rendring Rent for a year whensoever the Lessor should demand it in this Case the Lessor come and demand it before the end of the year his Demand upon the Land is not good except the Lessee be there also for the time being incertain when the Lessor will demand it he ought to give notice to the Lessee of it And if the Lessor come to the Lessee in person and demands the Rent yet it is not sufficient for although notice is to be given the Lessee in person yet the Land is the Debtor and therefore the Law ties the Lessee to the Land as to the place in which he shall be paid but if the Lessor stay nntill the eud of the year then the Lessee at his peril ought to attend upon the Land to pay it for the end of the year is time of payment prescribed by the Law which was granted and Judgement was given for the Plaintiff CLerk versus Sydenham Pasch 4. Jacobi An Ejectment brought by the Plaintiff of a Lease made of Land by P. and B. and Not guilty pleaded and the Evidence of the Defendants part was by reason of a Lease of the Land in Question made by the Abbot of Cleeve before the Dissolution to W. D. and Jo. his Wife and F. their Daughter for their Lives by Indenture and by the same Indenture the Abbot covenants grants and confirmes to the three Lessees that the land should remain to the Assignee of the Survivor of them for ninety years Fr. survived and took to Husband one Hill who the 20 Eliz. grant their Estate for life to J. S. and all their interest in the Remainder and all their power for all the term and this by mean Assignements came to the Defendant and whether any interest passed in Remaindor by the Lease of the Abbot was the Question and by all the five Judges it was held to be a good interest in possibility and to be reduced into a certainty in the person of the Survivor as where Land is given to three and the right Heirs of the Survivor this is a good limitation of the Inheritance presently but it is in expectancy untill the Survivor be known for then the Fee is executed in him And Popham vouched a Case in his experience 17 Eliz. in which Serjeant Baker was of Counsel and it was a Lease was made to Husband and Wife for life and for forty years to the Survivor of them the Husband and Wife joyn in Grant of this Interest and although it be certain one of them shall survive yet the Grant is void because at the time of the Grant there was not any interest but onely a possibility in either of them and although in the Case in Question the Remainder is not limited to any of the three Lessees but to the Assignee of the survivor yet the Court was of opinion that this was not a bare nomination in the survivor to appoint what person he pleased but a terme and an interest and Popham took this difference if a Lease be made to J. S. for life and after his death to the Executors and Assignes of J. S. this is an interest in J. S. to dispose of it but if it had been limited to J. S. for life and afterwards to the Executors and Assignes of J. D. here this is a bare power in J. D. and his Executors because they are not parties or privies to the first interest which was agreed and it was also agreed that whether it was an interest or a word of nomination it was all saved to the party by the Statute of
may take the power of the County to make a replevin upon the plures replevin a replevin will not lye of deeds or charters concerning Land and no return habend lyes upon a justistification and if a discontinuance be after a second deliverance the return habend shall be irreplegiable And if the Defendant after an advowry will not gage deliverance he shall be imprisoned for the contempt no disclaimer lies upon a justification but upon an advowry And if the replevin was sued by writ and the Sheriffe return thereupon that the cattell are not to be found then a withernam shall be awarded against the Defendant and if a nihil be returned then a capias alias plur withernam and thereupon an Exigent and if hee do at the return of the exigent find pledges to make deliverance and be admitted to his Fine then the Plaintiff shall declare upon an uncore detent and goe to tryall upon the right of the cause of distress and if it be found for the Plaintiff he shall recover his costs and dammages And if for the Defendant he shall have a return habend But if upon the return of the Plures repleg the Defendant appear then no withernam lies but he must gage deliverance or be committed and the Plaintiff shall count against him upon an uncore detent and so proceed to the rightfull taking of the distress And if it be found for the Plaintiff if the Cattell be not delivered he shall recover the value of the goods and costs and dammages if for the Defendant costs and dammages and a return habend WIlkins versus Danre Trin. 6. Jacobi rotulo 930. The Defendant avowed a rent charge granted to his Father in fee with a clause of Distress the Plaintiff demands Oyer of the deed which was a grant of the rent to one and his heirs to hold to him his Heirs Executors and Assigns to the use of the said H. and his Assigns during the life of a stranger And whether it was in fee or for life was the question and whether the habendum be contrary to the premises or do stand with the estate If the habendum had been to him and his Heirs during his own life this had been void but it was held otherwise for a strangers life and no occupancy can be of a rent CHappell versus Whitlock Mich. 6. Jac. rotulo 1316. The question was upon a liberty in the deed to make Leases provided they shall not exceed the number of three lives or twenty and one years and the lease was made for 80. years if two live so long if he make a Lease absolute it must not be above twenty and one years but in this case it is uncertain MAnning versus Camb Pasch 7. Jacobi rotulo 341. in Replevin the Defendant avows damage fesant by reason of a devise made to the Advowant by will for one and twenty years by one Lockyer who was seised of the Land in fee The Plaintiff saith that true it is that Lockyer was seised in fee of the Land in question and by the said Will devised the Land to the said D. for the said years in confidence only to the use of it if she should remain unmarried and afterwards and before the taking dyed thereof seised J. L. being then Sonne and Heir of the said Lockyer after whose death the Land descended to the said J. as Son and Heir c. after whose death the Legatees entred into the Land and were thereof possessed to the use and confidence above said the reversion belonging to the said J. L. And the woman took Manning to her Husband by reason wherof the said term devised by the said L. to the said A. and J. to the use and confidence above-said ended the said being under the age of 14. years to wit of the age of two years by reason whereof the custody of the Heir did belong to the Husband and Wife by reason whereof they seised the Heir and entred into the Land and maintained their count the Defendant confessed the Will and the devise for years in confidence and further that after the term he devised the Land to his sonne in fee and a demurrer The condition must go to the estate and not to the use COuper versus Fisher Trin. 6. Iac. rotulo 513. The Defendant as Administrator of Foster advows for rent reserved upon a Feofment made in fee of the Mannor reserving rent in fee to the Feoffer in the name of a Fee-farm-rent with a clause of Distress for the not paying of it and that the rent did desend to the issue of the Feoffer And for the rent due to the Heir the Feoffer in his life advows the Plaintiff in his barre to the Advowry saith that neither the intestate nor his Ancestors nor any other whose estate the said T. hath in the rent were ever seised of the same rent within forty years then last past before the taking c. And a demurrer pretending that he ought to alledg seisen in the Advoury with forty years And it was held by the whole Court that the seisin is not to be alledged being it was by deed made within the time of prescription neither is the seisin but where the seisin is traversable there it must be alledged and in no other case and the Judgment was given for the Advowant Mich. 8. Jacobi An Advowry was made for an amerciament in a Court leet and shews that he was seised of the Mannor in Fee and that he and all c. have had a Court leet and the Plaintif traverses that he was seised of the Mannor in Fee and the Court held If the Defendant had a reputed Mannor it would maintain the Avowry though he had indeed no Mannor in truth REynolds versus Oakley The Defendant avows for rent reserved upon a lease for life and the Plaintiff shews that the place in which c. did adjoyn to the close of the Plaintiff and that the Cattell against the Plaintiffs will did escape into the other close and that he did presently follow the Cattell and before he could drive them out of the close the Defendant did distrain the Plaintiff's Beasts And whether the Distress were lawfull or not was the question And the Court held in this case because the Beasts were always in the Plaintif's possession and in his view the Plaintiff would not distrein the Cattell of a stranger but if he had permitted the Beasts to have remained there by any space of time though they had not been levant and couchant the Lessor might have distreyned the Beast of a stranger BLown versus Ayer Hill 40. Eliz. rotulo 1610. In a Replevin the question was upon these words to wit the said Abbot and Covent granted to the said R. that he and his Assigns Fierboot Cart-boot and Plowboot sufficient by the appointment c. without making wast under the penalty of forfeiting the devise whether those words make a condition or no and
the remainder to John D. bastard in Tail the Remainder to the Defendant Ro. Duckmonton in Fee the woman married with Ro. D. the Defendant the Term expired Jo. D. Tenant in Tail in remainder releases to the Husband and whether this should alter the estate of the Husband he being Tenant at sufferance was the question and adjudged by the whole Court that the Release was void and it was cheifly void because the Release was made to him in the Remainder to take effect as upon the Remainder and there was no privity and he had but a bare possession and no Freehold and 10 Eliz. Dier Lessee for years surrenders and afterwards the Lessor releases to him and held a void Release for the reason aforesaid and 31 and 32 Eliz. it hath been adjudged between Allen and Hill where a Devise was made to the woman for life if she would inhabite and continue in the house and he went and inhabited in Surrey and the Heire released to her and it was held void because she was but Tenant at sufferance and so no privity but Yelverton and Tanfield that such estate for life was not determined without Entry and Yelverton Justice demanded that when the Husband continued in possession after the Lease determined whether he should be in the Right of his Wife and so remain Tenant at sufferance whether he should be in his own Right or be as an intruder Disseisor and then the release made to him was good but no answer was given to him but Judgement was given that the release was void and Fennor put this Case Tenant for life remainder in Tail remainder in Fee he in the remainder in Fee released to Tenant for life a void release because of the mean remainder in Tail and cited 30 E. 3. and no answer was given to it and Yelverton said that if Tenant for life release to him in the remainder in Fee it is void because it shall be void as a surrender and this word release shall not recite as a surrender HOldesden versus Gresill Mich. 5 Jacobi An Action of Trespass brought for breaking the Plaintiffs Close called B. at L. and for taking of two Conies the Defendant to the whole Trespasse but the entring in the Close pleads not guilty and as to the Close justifies because he Common in the Close called B. for five Cowes and because very many Conies were there feeding and spoiling the Common the Defendant in preservation of his Common entred to chase and kill the conies to which the Plaintiff demurred in Law and Judgement was given that the justification was naught for a Commoner cannot enter to chase or kill the Conies for although the owner of the Soil hath no property in the Conies yet as long as they are in his Land he had the possession which is good against the commoner for if the Lord surcharge the common with Beasts the commoner cannot chase them out but the owner may distrain the Beasts of an estranger or dammage feasant or chase them out of the common for the stranger hat no colour to have his Beasts there and also conies are a matter of profit to the owner of the Soil for Housekeeping and therefore because it appears that the cause of Entry was to chase and also to kill which are not lawfull as against the Lord who is Plaintiff therefore the matter of the justification is not good for if the Lord surcharge the Soil with conies the commoner may have an Action of case against him for that particular dammage which is a sufficient remedy against the Plaintiff upon a full and deliberate considera-of all the Judges JEnnings versus Haithwait Mich. 5 Jacobi An Action of Trespass brought to which the Defendant pleaded not guilty the Jury found the Defendant Vicar of D. and that he such a day leased his vicaridg to J. S. for three years rendring rent which J. S. assigned one Acre parcell thereof to the Plaintif and the Defendant was absent severall quarters in one year to wit sixty dayes in every quarter but they did not find the Statute of 13 Eliz. adjudged for the Defendant for the Statute of the 13 Eliz. is a generall Law for although it extends but to those which have cure of Souls yet in respect of the multiplicity of Parsonages and vicaridges in England the Judges must take notice of it as a generall Law and adjudge according to the said Statute and so is the Statute of the 21 H. 8. for non-residence DRewry versus Dennys Mich. 5. Jacobi An Action of Trespass brought against a man and his Wife and the Plaintif declares that they did beat one Mare of the Plaintifs and committed diverse other Trespasses and upon not guilty pleaded the Jury found that the Woman beat the Mare and for the residue they found for the Defendant and the Verdict adjudged naught by the Court for it is altogether imperfect for they have found the Woman guilty of the beating the Mare and have given no Verdict concerning that for the Husband either by way of acquittall or condemnation and the finding the Defendant not guilty as to the residue doth only extend to the other Trespasses contained in the Declaration and not to the beating of the Mare And Williams and Cooke Justices said that where a Battery is brought against Husband and Wife supposing that they both beat the Plaintif or the Mare of the Plaintif and upon not guilty pleaded it is found that the Woman onely made the Battery and not the Husband this Verdict is against the Plaintif for it now appears that the Plaintifs Action was false for the Husband in this case shall not be joyned for conformity onely and there is a speciall Writ in the Register for this purpose and is not like a Battery charged upon I. D. and I. S. for there one may be acquitted and another found guilty and good because they are in Law severall Trespasses SAnds and others versus Scullard and others Mich. 5. Jacobi The Plaintiffs brought an Action of Trespass against the Defendants for entring their Close and Judgement was entred against Dawby one of the Defendants by nil dicit Scullard pleaded not guilty whereupon a Venire facias was awarded upon the Roll between the parties as well to try the Issue as to inquire of the damages And the Plaintiffs took their Venire facias to try the Issue between the two-Defendants and the two Plaintiffs And according to that was the Habeas Corpus and Distringas but the Plaintiffs knowing Dawby to be dead took their Record of Nisi prius against Scullard onely and he was found guilty And Yelverton moved in Arrest of Judgement and shewed the Venire facias and that there was no Issue joyned between the Plaintiffs and Dawby for Judgment was given against him by Nil dicit and the Writ ought to have made mention onely of the Issue between the Plaintiffs and Scullard And their ought to have been
although his Estate be ended And the like if a Lease be granted to a Woman so long as shee shall live sole or shall behave her selfe wel if shee commit Waste the Writ shall be brought in the Tenet ad terminum vite and the Count shall be speciall If Tenant in Dower grants over his Estate to a Stranger and commits Waste yet the Action lyes against the Tenant in Dower but otherwise it is if the Heire grants over his Estate And the like for Tenant by the Curtesie If Waste be brought against two and one appear upon the Distringas and the other make default the Plaintiff shall have a Writ to inquire of the Waste but shall declare against him that appears for a man shall not recover by moities in Waste as one shall recover in a Precipe quod reddat against two for in waste the Land shall not be lost by default by an Action tryed and if a waste be committed between the Judgement and Execution a writ shall be awarded to inquire of the waste but Quaere thereof If a woman while she is sole commits waste and marries the writ shall be that the woman while she was sole committed waste and if Tenant in Tail in remainder brings an Action of waste against Tenant for life the writ may be which he holds of the Tenant in Tail although they hold of him in the Reversion in Fee and so it was adjudged Pasch first James that the writ was good An Action of waste lies against Executors for waste for waste committed by the Testator and if a man have Land in the Right of his Wife and waste is committed and the woman dies now no Action of waste lies against the Husband after the death of the wife In waste if the Term be ended and nothing be recovered but damages there a concord with satisfaction is a good plea and if the Lease for years determines pending the writ the Plaintiff shall recover nothing but damages and not the place wasted The Defendant may disclaim in his Action if he that hath the fee pleads no waste done this is a forfeiture of his Estate the Defendant may plead no waste done and give in Evidence that the Tenements at the time of the Demise were ruinous ancient Demesne is no Plea in Waste If a Guardian in Socage in the Right of his wife commits waste the writ shall be brought against the Husband onely Mich. 27. Ed. 1. rotulo 329. If an Action of waste be brought against the Husband and wife and the Husband appear upon the Distringas and the wife maketh default this shall be the default of both of them Mich. 20. H. 4. rotulo 393. the Plaintif may abridge the waste assigned in part so that he aabridges not the whole as if writ be of waste in houses and wood he may abridge part of the assignment in the houses and woods but not the whole and if Issue be joyned for part and demurrer for another part the Issue may be tryed before the Demurrer adjudged If an Indenture to raise uses upon good consideration be made and he that hath the Estate for life commits waste he to whom the reversion is limited by the same Indenture may have a generall writ of waste by saying generally that he hath demised it or a speciall writ at his pleasure and Mich. 27 H. 7. it was held by all the Judges that it is an ill return for the Sheriff to return upon a writ to inquire that he hath commanded his Bailiff because the Sheriff is both Officer and Judge which power cannot be committed to the Bailif of the Liberty and the writ is a Non omittas in it self but Quaere for there are divers Presidents against it the Lessee may cut down Trees for the repairing of houses when the Lessor is bound by covenant to repair and doth not and it is no good Plea for the Lessee in waste brought against him by his Lessor to say generally that he hath nothing in the Reversion but he must shew how the Reversion is not of him but upon a grant of the Reversion and waste be brought by the Grantee nothing in Reversion is a good Plea Upon no waste pleaded the Defendant cannot give in Evidence that the Tenements were sufficiently repaired before the writ brought If an Issue arises iâ— a forreign County the Jury shall not be examined of the view and if the Jurors be not examined of the View when they should be examined it is Error If my Father leases Land for term of life the writ of Waste shall be of houses c. which the said A. Father to him demised and so in a Writ of waste of a Lease made by my Predecessor but if the Abot or the Son himself bring the writ it shall be of Houses which he holds for a Term c. if waste be made sparsim in a Close or wood the Plaintiff shall recover the whole Close or wood and the treble value shall be levyed by Fieri facias or Elegit and not by Capias because a Capias lies not upon the Originall the Sheriff may take a Posse Comitatus to stay the Tenant from doing of waste upon an estrepment Two Tenants in Common one of them makes a Lease for years to the other An Action was brought against Tenant for years by him in the Reversion the Case was that the Lessorafter the Lease made granted another Lease in Reversion for yeares and this matter pleaded in abatement pretending that the Lease in Reversion was an impediment against the Plaintiff inbringing his Action but otherwise adjudged for if a Lease be made for life the Remainder for years and waste be committedby Tenant for life notwithstandingthe Lease for years in remainder waste lies SKeate against Oxenbridge and his wife Trin. 12 Jac. rotulo 849. waste brought of Lands and Gardens in L. of which E. K. was seised in his Demesne as of Fee and being so thereof seised after the fourth of February 27 H. 8. thereof infeoffed E. S. and others to the use of the said E. S. dead and of the said E. for Term of their lives and the longest liver of them and after the decease of the said E. S. and the said E. then to the use of the Heirs of the body of the said E. S. to be begotten upon the body of the said E. of which said E. S. dead the now Plaintiff is Son and Heir begotten on the body of E. committed waste and in the Declaration he shewed the Feoffment made to the Feoffees and the habend to them and their Heirs and because the word Heirs was omitted in the writ exception was taken but because it was in the Declaration it was adjudged good and note in this Case the woman was received upon the default of the Husband and pleaded to Issue If the Feoffees have but an Estate for life then they cannot convey an Estate in Fee simple over SAunders against Marwood H. 41. El. rot
opinion without argument Coke cheif Justice that the agreement is void to a Woman married for then she was married to a Husband whom in her life she could not contradict and a Devise upon Condition that if she conclude or agree as this Case is is void for it is a bare communication upon which the Inheritance doth not depend and so he said it hath been twice adjudged 6 in Corbets Case and Germins Case and Arscots Case and Richells Case in Littleton it was upon condition that he should not alien and this was adjudged to be void but yet if the condition were if he alien and not if go about or intend or conclude or agree as in the case at the Bar for there is no such case in all our Bookes as this Secondly For that that the Words are if they do any act that then the Estate shall cease and this is repugnant for when the Act is done then the Estate tayle is Barred and cannot cease but if it had been but a Feoffment then the right had remained and he said that such a condition had been void before the Statute of Donis Conditionalibus when it was but Fee simple Conditionall be it a Condition or a Limitation and he said that Scholasticas Case is of Fine which is only discontinuance till the Proclamations are past and if dead before may be avoided by Remitter in Germins and Arscotts Case the Condition was that if he go about or indeavour and this was adjudged to be void though that it be in devise in respect of the uncertainty and he said that the agreement or conclusion is so uncertain and may be well compared to that for here the Estate shall cease by the agreement as well as it may cease by the going about also he seemed that the Freehold cannot cease without entry for if use cannot cease without entry as he intends much lesse a Free-hold cannot though it be by Devise and he seemed that it shall be no limitation but a Condition and Judgment accordingly if cause be not shewed the next Tearm and in Trinity Tearme then next insuing this Case was argued againe by Dodridge Serjeant of the King for the Plaintiff and he said that there are three questions to be disputed First If it be a good limitation Secondly If the recovery be a breach of that Thirdly Admitting that it may be broken if the agreement of the Husband and the wife shall be said to breake it and to the first he seemed that it is a limitation and not a condition and such a Limitation that well might be with the Law and that it is a Limitation it is agreed in Scholasticas Case Commentaries and the reason of the Judgment there is that if the intent of the Devisor appears that another shall take benefit of that and not the Heire that then it shall be but a limitation and not a Condition and he in remainder shall take benefit of that and for that in the principall case Mary the Eldest Daughter to whom the Remainder was limited shall take benefit of that and with this agrees the case of Fitz. Na. Bre. Ex gravi querela last case that if a man devises Lands to his Wife for life upon condition that if she marry that the Land shall remain over and after she marryes and he in Remainder sues by Gravi querela by which it appears that it is a limitation and not a condition and with this agrees 2. and 3. P. and M. 127. Dyer Jasper Warrens Case where a man devises land to his Wife for life upon condition to bring up his Sonn Remainder over and agreed to be a limitation and not a condition and so he concluded this first point that it is a limitation and not a condition Secondly that it is a lawfull limitation for there is not any repugnancy in that as it is in Corebts before cited for there are no words of going about for he agreed that this is absolutely uncertain and void and so is Germin Arscots case where ther is not only a going about but repugnant going about for he ought to go about and before discontinuance and then his Estate shall be void from the time of the going about and before discontinuance but here it is upon conclude and agree plainly and apparently and conclude and agree is issuable and a Jury may try that and it will not invegle any man but the Law will not suffer Issue upon such uncertainty as going about or purposing but Attornements and Surrenders are but agreements and yet are Issuable And so in the principall case and in Mildmayes Case 6 Coke it is agreed that a condition that a Tenant in taile shall not suffer a Recovery is void for Recovery is not restrained by the Statute of Westminster 2. but here it is not so but in generall that he shall not conclude or agree to alien or discontinue but that which cannot be a condition good in the particular may be good in the generall as Littletons Case gift in taile upon condition that he should not alien is good otherwise of Fee simple with which 10 H. 7. 11. and 13 H. 7. 23. 24. accordingly Thirdly That it is a breach of the limitation Condition that alienation and discontinuance be by Recovery which is a lawfull act and it is a priviledge incident to the Estate taile and though that the agreement was made by the Husband and the Wife during the Coverture and so should be if the Husband and the Wife had levied a Fine see 10 H. 7 13. Condition that if the condition had been expressed that they should not levy a Fine had been void and here this verball agreement betwixt the Husband and the Wife and the third person shall be for Forfeiture of their Estates for this is the agreement of the Wife as well as of the Husband as it appears by Becwithes Case 2. Coke before cited where the Husband and the Wife agree to levy a Fine and that the Fine shall be to the use of the Connusee this is good declaration of the use though that it be of the Land of the Wife and during the Coverture and cannot be avoided by the Wife after the death of her Husband for it was the agreement of the Wife though it be not by any Indenture to declare the use of the Fine so many acts in the Country made by the Husband and the Wife shall be intended the act of the Wife as well as of the Husband as in the 17 Ed. 3. 9. The Abbot of Peterboroughs Case the Husband and Wife granted Rent for equality of partition and this shall binde the Wife after the death of the Husband for it is her act as well as the act of the Husband and shall be intended for her benefit and so here by the Recovery the Wife shall be Tenant in Fee simple which was Tenant in taile before and 34 Ed. 3. 42. feoffment to a married Wife upon
to whom the private damage is done may have action And he said that the Register contains many Writs for publique wrong when that is done to private men as fol. 95. A man fixes a pale crosse a navigable River by which a Ship was cast away and the Owner maintained action of Trespasse And fol. 97. A man brought Trespasse against one which cast dung into a River by which his Medow was drowned so if the River be infected with watering Hemp or Flax he which hath fishing there may maintain action of Trespasse and 2 H. 4. 11. Action of Trespasse by one for ploughing of Land where one had a common way and so it is 13. H. 7. 17. One brings an action of Trespasse against another for erecting a Lyme Kill where many others are annoyed by that So by an assault made upon a servant the Master and servant also may have severall actions and so in the other cases many may have actions and yet this is no reason to conclude any one of them that hee shall not have his action for in truth those are rather actions upon the Case then actions of Trespass for the truth of the Case is contained in the Writ Also in this case it doth not appeare that there are any other Commoners which have Common there and for that this Objection is not to the purpose and it appears by Heisman and Crackesoods Case 4 Coke 31. That Copy-holder shall have Common by prescription in the demesnes of the Lord and so he concluded and prayed Judgment for the Plaintiff Coke cheife Justice said that it was adjudged in this Court Trinity 41 Eliz. Rot. 153. b. between Holland and Lovell where Commoner brings an action upon the Case as this Case is against a stranger which pleads not guilty and it was found by verdict for the Plaintiff and it was after adjudged for the Plaintiff for insomuch that the Plaintiff may take them damage feasant that proves that he hath wrong and this is the reason that he may distraine doing dammage And by the same reason if the Beasts are gone before his comming he may have action upon his Case for otherwise one that hath many Beasts may destroy all the Common in a night and doe great wrong and shaâ—l not be punished and it is not like to a Nusance for that is publique and may be punished in a Leet but the other is private to the Commoners and cannot be punished in another place nor course and he also cyted one Whitehands case to be adjudged where many Copy-holders prescribe to have Loppings and Toppings of Pollards and Husbands growing upon the Waste of the Lord and the Lord cuts them and one Copy-holder only brings his action upon the Case and adjudged that it was very well maintainable notwithstanding that every other Copy-holder may have the same remedy And he said also that so it was adjudged in the Kings Bench Hillary 5 Jacobi Rot. 1427. in George Englands Case And 2 Edw. 2. b. Covenant 49. If a man Covenant with 20. to make the Sea banks with A. B. and every one of them and after he doth not doe it by which the Land of two is drowned and damnified and they two may have an action of Covenant without the others Quere for it seems every one shall have an action by himselfe But Foster and Wynch Justices seemed that the Plaintiffe ought to sue in his Court that the Beasts of the stranger escaped in the Common or were put in by the Owner for it may be they were put in by the Lord which was owner of the Soile or by a stranger in which cases the Owner of the Beasts shall not be punished But Coke and Warburton seemed the contrary and that this ought to be averred and pleaded by the Defendant in excuse of the Trespasse as in action of Trespasse why he broke his Close And so it was adjourned see Gosnolds case 490. see Judgment Pasche 1612. 10. Jacobi in the Common Bench. Henry Higgins against George Biddle IN Replevin the Defendant made Conusance as Bayliff to Sir Thomas Leigh and Daine Katherine his Wife intimating that Isabel Bradburn was seised of the place where c. in their demesne as of Fee and so seised the first of June 15 H. 8. gives this to the Lord Anthony Fitzherbert and Maud his Wife and to the Heirs males of their bodies which have Issue Thomas Fitzherbert Knight John Fitzherbert and William Fitzherbert Anthony and Maud dyed and the said place where c. discended to Sir Thomas Fitzherbert as Heire to the Donees to the Intayl and the said Thomas Fitzherbert the 5. of Aprill 6 Edw. 6. of that enfeoffed Humphrey Swinnerton Ralph Cotton and Roger Baily to the use of William Fitzherbert and Elizabeth his Wife for their lives and after to the use of Sir Thomas Fitzherbert and the Heirs of his body the remainder to the use of the right Heirs of the said William Fitzherbert William Fitzherbert dyed Sir Thomas Fitzherbert disseised the said Elizabeth and the said John Fitzherbert had Issue Thomas and dyed Sir Thomas Fitzherbert dyed without Heir of his body and the said place where c. discended to the said Thomas as Cousin Heir of the said Sir Thomas and Son and Heir of the said John Fitzherbert which enters and was seised to him and to the Heirs Males of his body as in his Remitter And the said Thomas Fitzherbert 4 of Novemb. 39. Eliz. by Indenture of Bargain and Sale enrolled in the Chancery within six moneths bargained and sold the said Land to Sir William Leighton his heirs and Sir William Leighton 5 of Novemb. 43. Eliz. by Indenture enrolled within six moneths for 4000. l. bargained and sold the said land where c. to Sir Thomas Leigh and Dame Katherine as aforesaid and so avowed the taking for doing damage And the Plaintiff for Barr to the said Avowry pleads that well and true it is that the said Sir William Leighton was seised of the said place where c. in his Demesne as of Fee as it was alledged by the Defendant But further hee saith that the said Sir William Leighton so being thereof seised 1 Decemb 44 Eliz. enfeoffed the Plaintiff in fee and by force of that the Plaintiff was seised and put in his Beasts into the said place where c. without that that the said Sir William Leighton bargained and sold the said Land in which c. to the said Sir Thomas Leighton and Katherine his Wife as in the Conusance hath been alledged by the Defendant upon which the Defendants joyn Issue and it was agreed by all the Justices that notwithstanding this admission of the Parties is an Estoppell by the pleading yet as well the Plaintiffe as the Defendant were admitted to give another evidence to the Jury against their own pleading that is that Sir William Leighton was not seised and so nothing passed by the bargain and sale and also
shall be barred And the second those which have Right title or interest accrued after the Fine levied by reason of any matter which preceded the Fine and in both cases the Estate which is barred ought to be turned into a right or otherwise it shall not be barred the which cannot be here for the estate is given by the Custome and it is to have his beginning after the Death of the first Tenant and though that the first Tenant commit Forfeiture yet he in remainder cannot enter for his time is not yet come as in 45 Ed. 3. is a collaterall Lease with warranty to the Tenant for life in possession this shall not be a barr insomuch that it is made to him which hath possession so if a man make a Feoffment upon condition and the Feoffee levy a Fine with proclamations and five yeares passe and the condition is broken the Feoffee may enter at any time otherwise if the Fine had been levied after the condition broken and so if the Lord be intituâ—ed to have Cessavit and Fine is levied by the Tenant and five yeares passe he shall be barred and this was the cause of the Judgment in Saffins case insomuch as the Lessee had present interest to enter and this was altered into a Right by the Feoffment and then the Fine was a Barr but here he in Remainder hath no right till after the Death of him which was the first Tenant and then his right to the possession begins and then if a Fine had been levied with proclamation this shall be a Barr and so he concluded that Judgment should be entered for the Plaintiffe Coke cheife Justice accordingly and he agreed also that the sole question is if by acceptance of a Bargaine and sale by the first Tenant for life the Remainder be turned into a right and he sayd that right sometimes sleepeth but it never dyes but this shall be intended the right of the Law and not right of Land for that may be barred by Writ of Right at the Common Law and he intended that Copy-holdes are within the Statutes of Fines be they Copy-hold for life yeares in tayl or in fee for the third part of the Realme is in Copy-holdes and two parts in Lease for yeares and if these shall not be within the Statute then this doth not extend to three parts of the Realme and it is agreed in Heydons case 3 Coke 8. a. That when an act of Parliament doth not alter the Tenure Service Interest of Land or other thing in prejudice of the Lord or of the custome of the Mannor or in prejudice of the Tenant there the generall words of such act of Parliament shall extend to Copy-holds and also it is resolved to be within the Statute of 32 H. 8. Of Maintenance and also it is within the expresse Letter of this which containes the word Interest and Copy-holder hath interest and so also of Tenant by Statute Merchant then the question will be if the acceptance of a Bargaine and sale turnes that to a right and he intended that his Estate for life remaines though that it is only passive in acceptance of Bargain and sale and for that it shall not be prejudice more then if Tenant at will accepts a Bargaine and Sale for his Estate at will this notwithstanding remaines but if Lessee for years or life accepts a Fine upon conusance of right this is a forfeiture insomuch that it is a matter of record and it shall be an estoppel to say that he did not take Fee by that doth not admit the Reversion to be in another also insomuch that the Bargain and sale was executed by the Statute for this cause it shall not be prejudice as it was adjudged in the Lady Greshams case in the Exchequer 28 Eliz. Where two severall conveyances were made with power of Revocation upon tender of ten pound and adjudged by act of Parliament that a revocation was good and also that no license of alienation shall be made insomuch that it was by act of Parliament which doth no wrong and it is for the Trespasse for which the party ought to have license and if it be not Trespasse there need no license before hand nor pardon afterwards So if a man makes a Lease for yeares remainder for yeares the first Lessee accepts Bargaine and Sale this shall not turn these in remainder to prejudice Thirdly it seemes to him also that notwithstanding the acceptance of the Bargain and Sale the first Copy-hold Estate for life remains in Esse and is not determined For this differs from an Estate of Land for it shall not be subject to a Rent granted by the Lord the first Estate remaines till all the remainders are determined for the first tenant for life cannot surrender to the Lord also it is customary estate for by the Common Law this being granted to three successively this shall be determined and extinct for the third part for they three take into possession and the word successively shal be taken as void but here the Custome appoints that the remainder shall not have his beginning till the death of the first-Tenant and that they should take by succession and for that there is a difference between this customary Estate and other Estates at the Common Law and other surrenders for if a Copy-holder surrender to the use of another for life nothing passeth but for life only the Lord hath not any remainder by this Surrender and if this Tenant for life commits forfeiture he in reversion shall not take advantage of that and if at the Common Law Tenant for life remainder for life or in fee be and the first Tenant for life makes a Feoffment and after levies a Fine and resolved that he in reversion should not be bound till 5 years are incurred after the death of the 1. Tenant for life for then his title of Entry first accrues in apparancy and before that is in secrecy of which he in remainder is not held to take notice and so in this case he in remainder shall not be bound till five yeares are incurred after the death of the first Tenant and the rather insomuch as the first Estate remaines for that that the first Tenant was only passive and not active and so he concluded that Judgement shall be given for the Plaintiff insomuch that the Fine was no Bar and upon this concordance of all the three Justices in opinion no other Justices being present this Tearm Judgment was entered accordingly Pasche 1612. 10. Jacobi in the Common Bench. Danyell Waters against the Deane and chapter of Norwich IN covenant The case was this in 37 H. 8. the then Deane and Chapter of Norwich made a Lease to one Twaits for fifty yeares which ended 35 Eliz. in time of Ed. 6. The then Dean and Chapter surrendred all their possessions to the King which those newly endowed and incorporated by the name of Deane and Chapter of the foundation
defects and with this agreed the expresse Booke of 11 Edw. 3. Fitz. Ayde 32. and so he concluded that it should not be granted Warburton Justice doubted and insomuch that the granting of ayde where it is not grantable is no error but otherwise of the denying of that where it ought to be granted he would be advised But he conceived that the cause for which ayde is granted is not the feeblenesse of the Estate of him which prays it onely but to the intent that they may joyne together and one defend the other for Tenant for life may plead some Plea which he in reversion may plead saving the joyning of Issue in a Writ of Right and he had a Manuscript of the 11 Rich. 2. where Tenant for life the remainder for life the remainder for life was and the first Tenant for life had ayde of them both in remainder and so concluded Coke cheif Justice that aid ought not to be granted in this Case insomuch that he which is the first Tenant hath greater Estate then he in Remainder for his Estate in Remainder is more Remote and uncertaine and to the Book of 11 R. 2. He agreed that the ayd was granted of all in Remainder but there they in Remainder had Estate tayle and he sayd that ayd is to be granted in two Cases in personall Actions to maintain Issue and when Tenant for life prays in ayd of him in Remainder or Reversion without which they cannot answer nor plead nor Issue cannot be deduced but so it is not here for the first Tenant for life may answer and plead to the Issue as well without him in Remainder for life as with him for if Tenant for life Remainder in tayl Remainder in fee if the first Tenant for life be impleaded he shall have ayd of him in Remainder in tayl otherwise if the Reversion had been to the first Tenant for life with a mesne Remainder in Tayle 41 Ed. 3. 42 Ed. 3. 10 Ed. 3. And 11 Ed. 3. Receit 118. Tenant for life Reversion for life Remainder in fee was he in Reversion for life shall be received upon default of the first Tenant for life and if he will not then he in Remainder in fee shall be received and yet he shall not have Wast as it appears by 24 Ed. 3. for this destroyes the first Estate but the receit maintains and preserves it and he sayd that the 11 Ed. 3. Ayd 32. before cited rules this case and so of 4 H. 6. And so he concluded and insomuch that Warburton doubted of it it was adjourned Trinity 10. Jacobi 1612. In the Common Bench. Yet Rowles against Mason See before 57. WINCH Justice argued that the Defendant is not guilty and that the Plaintiff shall take nothing by his Writ for he conceived that the verdict is uncertaine insomuch that it is not found that Livery and Seisin was made upon the Lease for three lives of the Mannor but onely one Memorandum that it was made in the house of the Lord but it is not found that this House was parcell of the Mannor but after it is found that the Lessee by force of this was seised by which it is implyed that it was very well executed and this being in speciall verdict would be very good he conceived there were two principall matters in the Case First Upon the Bargaine and Sale of Trees if they be re-united to the Mannor or remaine undivided Secondly Upon the two customes the which he conceived depend upon a question for the first warrants the second And to the first When a man devises a Mannor for three lives and by the same Deed in another clause bargaines and sells the Trees and then insues the Habendum and this is of the Mannor only and limits Estate of that for three lives without mention of the Trees hee conceived that the Trees passe before the Habendum absolutely and it is not like to a Bargaine and Sale of a Mannor with Trees or Advowson appendant and here the purpose and intent appeares that they shall pass together and as appendant But in the first case they shall passe as a Chattell immediately upon the delivery of the Deed before any livery made upon this to pass the Mannor and if Livery had never been made yet he shall have the Trees see 23 Eliz. 379. 18 Dyer Where a man devises and grants a mannor and trees Habendum the Mannor for one and twenty yeares without mention of the Trees and yet by Windham Periam and Meade against Dyer the Lessee cannot cut and sell the Trees for there was all in one sentence that is the grant of the Trees and the Demise of the Mannor see the 8 Coke Pexells Case how a Grant shall be construed and where that shall be intended to pass Inheritance and where to pass but a Chattell where a man grants a Chattell and ten pound yearly to be payd and in 7 Ed. 4. If a man hath Inheritance and a Lease in one Town and he by one and the same Deed gives Grants Bargaines and sells all to one Habendum the Inheritance to him and his Heires this is no forfeiture of the Lease insomuch that the Fee doth not passe of that so in the Principall Case Fee-simple passeth in the Trees and Free-hold in the Mannor and he conceived that by the Demise over the Land and Trees are not re-united and this he collected out of Herlackendens Case 4. Coke and 12. Eliz. Bendlowes a man made a Lease for anothers life and bargaine and sold the Trees to him for whose life Lessee dyes he for whose life becometh occupant of the Land he shall have severall Estates one Estate in the Land and another Estate in the Trees and so in Ives Case 5 Coke 11. a. Lessee takes a Lease first of Land except the woods and after takes a Lease of the Woods and Trees and they remaine distinct and though that after there are generall words in the Lease that is of all Meadowes Pastures Profits Commodities c. That is not materiall for these shall be referred to all such things which belong to the Land and so he concluded this point that the Trees remain severall from the Land and do not passe to Hoskins by the Demise of the Copy-hold only and so he cannot take advantage of the forfeiture otherwise he did not doubt but that the particular Sum might take advantage of the forfeiture Secondly for the customes he conceived that the first that is that the Copy-holder for life might nominate his Successor and is good and so for the second that such Copy-holder may cut and sell all the Trees growing upon his Copy-hold and he conceived that the validity of the custome ought to be adjudged by the Judges and the Truth of that by the Jury and when it is found true by a Jury and that it hath such antiquity that exceeds the memory of man then this obtaines such priviledge as the
Thirdly The third point was that after the disseisin of the Tenant for life he that had future Interest of a Tearme to begin after the death of the Lessee for life during the disseisin assignes over all his Interest if this assignement be good or not and he argued that not for by him the disseisin of the Tenant for life the future Interest to commence after the death of the Tenant for life is converted into a Right and Right of a Tearme cannot be transferred over for though that Lessee for years to begin presently may grant over his Interest before his Entry and it is well for that that it is an Interest forth with yet if before his Entry the Lessor be disseised by a stranger yet by him now he cannot grant his Interest over for that it is converted into a Right of a Tearme but he ought to re-enter before that the Lessee may grant over his Tearme so in our case though that before the disseisin of the Lessee for life the future Interest was transferrable over for that that it was Interest though that it was not a Lease in posaession yet when the Tenant for life was disseised then his Interest of a Tearme was turned into a Right of a Tearme and then it is not transferable over till the re-entry by the Lessee for life and he said that it was resolved by the 2. cheif Justices in the Star-chamber as he hath heard that if Lessee for years be and before his entry a stranger enters and disseises the Lessor that now the Lessee cannot grant his Tearme before that the Lessor hath entred or he himselfe hath gained the Tearme in posaession And so it seemes to him that the future Tearme doth not passe by this assignement and then it is extinguished by the purchase which commeth after and then the Justification of the Defendant as Servant to the Assignees not good And so upon all the matter he praied Judgement for the Plaintiff Williams Justice said that it was cleer if a man have a Lease for years to begin after the death of a Lessee for life as is the case at the Barr that though that the Lessee for life be disseised yet the Interest remaines good Interest to the Lessee and is not turned into a Right of a Tearme and for that he may grant it over notwithstanding the disseisin and so is Sapphins case 5. Coke 104. Otherwise if the Lessee for years had been any time in posaession by force of his Lease and it is Adjourned At another day the same Tearme the case was argued againe by Yelverton of Grayes Inne of the other part that is for the Defendant and first he said that the Plaintiff which claimes under the Wife of Hlobeame hath not any right to one Moytie cleerely for the Husband and the Wife were Joynt-Tenants before the coverture So that they take by Moyties and not by Intirities and when the Husband bargaines and sells all that is a seperation of the Joyntenancy and his Moytie is gone for ever as it appeares by 3. M. Dyer 149. 82. So that for one moytie it is cleer that the Plaintiff hath not any right any way how ever the case prove for the other Moytie and this Moytie which was conveied by the Husband is discended to the Defendant which hath no speciall outer found by the Verdict But only that he entered which he well might having the other halfe and then no Trespasse found by the Jury and also the Damages found by the Jury are Intire and then being no cause of Damages for part there shall be no Judgement for the residue And the first point that he moved was if after this disseisin and feoffment over the Feoffor might tender the money to cease the first Estate and it seemes that not for the Free-hold cannot accrue as it seemes to him by any tender after his disseisin and so it hath been agreed to him as he said by the Councell of the other part and then by him this condition consisting of two parts this is Disseisin of one Estate and Accruing of the other Estate if by this desseisin the condition be distroied for the accruing of the Estate it seemes also that it shall be distroied as to the ceasing of the first Estate for if a condition be distroied in part it shall be distroied in all for it is Intire and cannot be apportioned and by consequence if one Estate cannot accrue the other shall not cease And he resembled it to the cafe in the 14. H. 8. 17. And Perkins condition being in the Coppulative one part being dispenced with the other was a discharge so when a man hath election to do one of two things if one be discharged though that it be by the Act of God as by death c. Yet the other shall be discharged by the Law as it was in Langtons Case 5. Coke 22. a Fortiore when one is discharged by the Act of the party also by him if he had made any Feoffment after this desseisin yet the very disseisin would destroy the accruing of the Estate for though that he do not gaine Fee by the disseisin but only Estate for life and retaines his old reversion in him according to 9. H. 7. 25. Yet the Fee and the Free-hold are so conjoyned by discent of that Estate alters an entry as it appeares by 3. Ed. 3. Entry Congeable 58. And if he in reversion disseise Tenant for life the Contingent uses shall never rise by Chidleys Case first of Coke 158. Condition that he retaine his old remainder no more of the accruing of the Fee in our Case for by him it appeares by 10. Assis and Nicholls Case Com. That Estate ought to accrue upon posaession or at least upon an Estate in being and not upon a right of an Estate only And for that he cited 6. R. 2. Pleasingtons Case Lease for years upon condition that if the Lessee be outed he shall have Fee though that he be outed yet he shall not have Fee for that that at the time of the condition performed he had but a right of Tearme and no Tearme in posaession so is our case after the disseisin he having but right the Estate cannot accrue Secondly if the Grantee or he to whose use may performe the Condition either by the Common Law or by Statute Law And he conceived that none of these might performe that for first at the common Law though that Grantees of reversions may take advantage of a Condition by way of cesser of Estates upon the condition performed yet this is only when the condition was to be performed of the part of the Lessee and so was the case cited by Serjeant Nicholls of 11 H. 7. but if the condition were of the part of the Lessor otherwise it was as the Book is in 26 H. 6. Entries And then a Fortiori here the Assignee of a Disseisor cannot performe the condition which may be performed of the part
then it shall never vest and if it do not vest without Office in this case it shal never vest at all but it is for the Honour of the King that his grant shall have his effect and 49 Ed. 3. 16. Isabell Goodcheaps case she devised her Lands to her Executors to be sold and dyes without Heir the King hath that by Escheat yet the Executors may sell it and for that divest the Estate out of the King and so was the Lord Lâ—vells Case and the reason is for the necessity for the Prerogative of the King shall do no wrong and there need no continuance of the Estate of the part of the Lessor but of the part of the Lessee and for that if the Feoffor make a Feoffment or grant his Estate this shall not make prejudice or alteration of the Estate and for that if the King refuse to receive the Money yet if it be tendered the Fee-simple shall vest in the Patentee and the simple upon that shall shall increase see 31 Ed. 1. Feoffments and Deeds B. 32. Quid Iuris Clamat be And to the fourth it seems also that both the Estates ought to be created and granted by one self same Deed or by divers delivered at one time Quia quae in continenti fiunt pro uno habeantur reputentur as if a man makes a Lease for years upon Condition to have in tayl upon condition to have in Fee this second condition is void for it ought to be all one Crant and cannot be intire upon the privity of the first grant and it is not material though that the first Estate be drowned upon the performance of the condition as if the King makes a Lease for life the Remainder in tayl upon condition that if the Tenant for life pay twenty shillings that he shall have Fee this shall be a good Grant and the Fee well vested by the performance of the condition though that the particular Estate for life shall not be drowned And to the second point that is that the Grant of the King shall not be good for that that it is by the words Reversion aforesaid he agreed that if the King makes a Grant to one intent that shall not enure to another intent But this shall enure to the intent for which it is made Vt res magis vale et quam periat and it is for the dishonor of the King to make an unconscionable Grant And to the Objection which is made that the King is not understanding of Law to that he answered that the King is Caput Legis and for that shall not be intended to be ignorant of it and for that if a grant may have two intendments one to make the Grant good the other to make the Grant voyd it shall be intended and expounded in the better sense that is to make the Grant Good and not to make the Grant voyd for this was Iniquae expositio and also he sayd that the Grant shall be good for the first word Concedo though it had not been subsequent also as if a man grant a Rent charge and if it be behinde that the Grantee may distrain for the first Grant and the Grant is not of a Reversion In futuro but grant that if the condition be performed that then the Fee doth pass In futuro and it seemed to him that it was a good devise to prevent that the Estate tayl should not be discontinued by Fine nor otherwise untill the Condition were performed and so of recovery also for if the King grant an Estate tayl and after grants the Reversion in tayl this second intayl is within the intent of the Statute and when the Issue of the first Tenant in tayl shall not be barred the Estate of the Tenant in tayl in Remainder shall not be barred see the Lord Barkleys case in the Com. fol and 7 Ed. 4. and as to the pleading he sayd that when the Issue is offered which depends upon matter in Law there is no necessity to take travers upon the matter in Law for it doth not belong to lay men to decide the matter in Law and for that he concludes that the Grant in substance is good and in form exquesite and that the Issue in tayl in Reversion shall not be barred for Quod non in principio valet non valebit in accessario and that Judgment ought to be for the Plaintiff which was done accordingly IN Ejectione firme against Gallop after Verdict and Judgment for the Plaintiff a Writ of Habere facias Possessionem was awarded and executed and returned and fyled and after the same Defendant re-entred and outed the Plaintiff and Attachment was awarded and it seems that if the Writ had not been returned that then a new Writ shall be awarded and the Attachment was awarded upon Affidavit IN Action upon the case against Trotman the words were Thou sayest thou art an Attorney but I think thou art no Attorney but an Attorneys Clark in some Office but if thou be an Attorney I will have thee pickt over the Barr the next Tearme and thy Eares nailed to the Pillory and it seems that these words are not Actionable IN waging of Law of Summons in Dower In petit Cape there ought to be two summons only and if it be Grand Cape then there ought to be two Summoners and two Veiwers and Summons upon the Land is sufficient to give notice of the Demandant of the thing demanded and the day in Court That in Waging Law the Lord Coke sayd that the Defendant himself ought to swear De fidelitate and elevâ—n others which are named in the Statute of Magna Charta chapter Testes fideles ought to swear De credulitate IF Tenant for life be the Remainder in tayl to another the Remainder in Fee to the Tenant for life and the Tenant for life releases to the Tenant in Tayl the Release is good to passe the Remainder in Fee to the Tenant in Tayl for to this purpose the Tenant in tayl hath sufficient possession upon which the Release may enure but it shall not be good to pass the Estate for life and 19 H. 6. and 9 H. 7. If Tenant in Tayl in Remainder Disseise Tenant for life he doth not gain Fee-simple by Fulthorp but if there be Grand-Father Father and Sonn and the Father makes a Feoffment the Grand-Father dies the Father dies the Sonn is barred so if the Sonn had levied a Fine being Tenant in tayl 33 and 39 H. 6. 43. a. 21 Ed. 4. Discontinuance Pasch 7 Jacobi 1609. In the Common Bench. Warbrooke and Griffin BEtween Warbrooke and Griffin a Guest brought a Horse into an Inne in London to be kept the which stayed there so long till he had eaten out his Worth and then the Inn-Keeper caused the said Horse to be prysed and then sold him according to the custome of London and it seems well he might do it and that the Sale was
is appurtenant or appendant the Grantee shall have Common Pro Rata but if a commoner purchase parcell of the Land in which he hath Common appurtenant that this extincts all his Common And it was agreed that Common may be appendant to a Carve of Land as it appeares by the 6 Ed. 3. 42. and 3. Assise 2. as to a Mannor but this shall he intended to the Demesnes of the Mannor and so a Carve of Land consists of Land Meadow and Pasture as it appeares by Tirringhams case 4. Coke 37. b. And Common appendant shall not be by prescription for then the Plea shall be intended double for it is of common Right as it appeares by the Statute of Morton chap. 4. And the common is mutuall for the Lord hath Right of Common in the Lands of the Tenant and the Tenant in the Lands of the Lord And it was urged by Nicholls Serjeant that the Common shall be apportioned as if it were Rent and that the Lessee shall have Common for his Lease and then the Lessor hath no Common appurtenant or appendant to the two Virgats of Land and for that the Prescription was not good Coke cheife Justice if it had been pleaded that he had used to have Common for the said Beasts Levant and Couchant upon the said Land there had been no question but it should be apportioned for the Beastes are Levant and Couchant upon every part as one day upon one part and another day upon another part and for that extinguishment or suspention of part shall be of all as if a man makes a Leafe of two Acres of Land rendring Rent and after bargaines and sells the reversion of one Acre there shall be an apportionment of the Rent as well as if it had been granted and attornment And he agreed that if a man have Common appurtenant and purchase parcell of the Land in which he hath Common all the Common is extinct but in this case common appendant shall be apportioned for the benefit of the Plow for as it is appendant to Land Hyde and gain And in the principall case there was common appendant for it was pleaded to be belonging to two Virgats of Land and for commonable Beastes And he conceived also that the prescription being as appertaining to such Land that this shall be all one as if it had been said Levant and couchant for when they are appurtenant they shall be intended to Plow Manure Compester and Feed upon the Land And also he conceived that the right of Common remaines in the Lessor and for that he may prescribe for after the end of the Tearme shall be returned and in the intermin he may Bargain and sell and the Vendee shall have it and shall have common for his Portion And Walmesley Justice agreed to that and that during the Tearme the Lessor shall be excluded of his Common for his proportion Foster Justice agreed and that the possession of the Lessee is the possession of the Lessor but he conceived when the Lessor grants to the Lessee six acres of Land in such a feild where the Land lies and then the Beasts were taken in another feild And so they agreed for the matter in Law and also that the pleading was ill and so confesse and avoid the prescription But upon the traverse as it is pleaded the Jury shall not take benefit of it and Judgement was given accordingly Termino Pasche 7. Jacobi 1609 In the Common Bench. THOU art a Jury man and by thy false and subtill means hast been the Death and overthrow of a hundred men for which words Action upon the case for slander was brought and it seemed to Coke cheife Justice that it did well lye if it be averred that he was a Jury man and so of Judge and Justice for Sermo relatus ad personam intelligo debet de qualitate persone as Bracton saith and in the like Action brought by Butler it was not averred that he was a Justice of Peace and resolved that an Action upon the case doth not lye But Walmesley Justice conceived that an Action doth not lye for one Juror only doth not give the Verdict but he is joyned with his Companions and it is not to be intended that he could draw his Companions to give Verdict against the truth and false and subtill means are very generall Warburton Justice agreed with Coke and conceived that the Action well lies being averred that he was a Jury man as if one calls another Bankrupt Action well lies if it be alledged that the Plaintiff was a Tradesman and it is common speaking that one is a Leader of the Jurors and a man may presume that other Jurors will give Verdict and may take upon him the knowledge of the Act. Walmesley conceived that the Action did not lye for that the words are a hundred men which is impossible and for that no man will give any credit to it and for that it is no slander and for that Action doth not lye no more then if he had sayd that he had kild a thousand men But Coke Warburton Daniell and Foster agreed that the number is not materiall for by the Words his malice appears and for that they conceived that the Action doth well lye Pasch 7. Jacobi 1609. In the Common Bench. Denis against More ANthony Denis Plaintif in Replevin William More Defendant the case was this Two joynt Lessees for life were the Remainder or Reversion in Fee being in another person he in Reversion grants his Reversion Habendum the aforesaid Reversion after the death surrender or forfeiture of the Tenant for life it hapneth that the Lease determines for the life of the Grantee and Remains to another for life and resolved that this shall be a good grant of the Reversion to the first effect of Possession after the Deaths of the Tenants for life according to the 23 of Eliza. Dier 377. 27. And it shall not be intended to passe a future interest as if it were void of the other party and so was the opinion of all the Court see Bucklers case 2. Coke 55. a. and Tookers case 2. Coke 66. Upon a Fine the first Proclamation was made in Trinity Tearm 5. Jacobi And the second in Michaelmas Tearm 5. Jacobi And the third in Hillary Tearm 6. Jacobi where it should be in Hillary Tearm 5. Jacobi And the fourth and fifth in Easter Tearm 6. Jacobi And this was agreed to be a palpable Errrour for the fourth Proclamation was not entered at all and the fifth was entered in Hillary Tearm 6. Jacobi where it should have been in Hillary Tearm 5 Jacobi and it shall not be amended for that it was of another Tearm and the Court conceived that this was a forfeiture of the Office of the Chirographer for it was an abusing of it and the Statute of 4. H. 4. 23. and Westminster 2. Are that Judgement given in the Kings Court shall stand untill
pair of Stones in your Mill and pay a Rate for them then if you put on another pair of Stones new Tithes must be paid in kinde If one in Fee make a Lease for Life and after granteth a Rent-charge if the Grantors Cattle come upon the Ground I may distrain them although I cannot distrain the Tenant in Possession but the Grantor cannot avoid it If the condition of a Bond be to discharge a Messuage of all Incumberances then one may plead generally that he did discharge it of all Incumberances but if it be to discharge it of such a Lease then I must shew how If a man devise his Trees to his Executors to pay his Debts the Executor must in convenient time cut down the Wood. And so if a man sell his Trees the Vendee must sell them in a convenient time If I grant you out of my Mannour 10. l. per ann and recite but five pounds the Recitall shall not diminish the Grant And so if I grant you ten pounds out of my Mannor and recite 20. l. this shall not inlarge it If I infeoff two of Land habendum to me in Fee and habendum to the other in Fee they are Tenants in common In the Court of Wards one Dymack was a Purchasor by Bargain and Sale and before inrolment D. dies and after his Death the Indenture was inrolled the Question was whether his Son shall be in Ward for the Land and it was adjudged that he is Heir to the Land and is in by the Statute of 27 Eliz. of Bargains and Sales and not by the Statute of Uses My Lord Hobard held that if an Executor pay a Bond made upon a usurious Contract it shall be a Devastavit in the Executor and if he be bound to present one to a Church and he present one upon a Simonaical Contract the Bond is broken Hill 10. Jac. Resolved if one make a Lease of a Mannour reserving Rent and afterwards the Lessor grants the Reversion of forty acres thereof now if an Action of Debt be brought by the Grantee he may aver the rate of the Acre and if the Defendant plead Nil debet per patriam the Jury shall rate the value and although the value be found less by the Jury then the Plaintiff surmiseth yet the Plaintiff shall recover after the proportion For Acts in Law no Attornement is necessary as if a Lease made for years reserving a Rent which is assigned to a Woman for Dower she shall have the Rent without Attornement In Cambels case upon an Elegit returned that the Lessor was seised in Fee and that by vertue of the Judgement the moity was delivered to the Plaintiff and for the Rent reserved upon the Lease for years before Judgement If a man top a Tree under the growth of 21. years and suffer the body to grow and afterwards when the boughes are grown out again he doth lop and top it again I shall pay no Tithes although the Tree was not priviledged at the first cutting by the opinion of the whole Court If a Debt be recovered in a Court of Record that Debt cannot be assigned over to any man by the opinion of the whole Court Mich. 10. Jac. Pasch 14. If Money be to be paid upon proof made there the triall shall be the proof to be made before but if it be to pay Money within 3. Moneths after proof there proof must be made first but if it be upon proof before A. then proof being made before A. this extending proof shall tie the party but Warburton held the contrary and he resembled this to a surmise to have a prohibition which is no binding proof for the Jury may pass against the proof in the surmise when a Bond is to pay Money upon proof this is a legal proof by Law if it be laid generally to be paid by proof if it were by proof before two Justices or two Aldermen this shall be intended a sufficient proof when the Action shall be brought upon the Bond and if the Defendant say that due proof was not made then they shall say that before the two Justices c. it was proved by testimony before them and then the Judges shall judge whether it be a sufficient proof or not If I devise Lands to my Executors for three years for the payment of my Debts this is Assetts in the Executors hands but if I devise my Land to be sold for the payment of my Debts it is no Assets before it be sold Mich. 9. Jacobi It was held in the Common Pleas by the whole Court that in the Kings case the consideration of the Money paid is never to be proved Likewise in a common case of Bargain and Sale in consideration of Money paid where in truth none was paid yet it is good and the Bargainee is not tied to prove the Payment for the Bargainer may have an Action of Debt If a Legacy be granted out of Leases and a Suit in the Spiritual Court for this shall not be prohibited but otherwise it is if it were out of Fee Simple Lands HE le versus Frettenden Resolution upon two Cases upon the Statute of E. 6. for not setting forth of Tithes Videlicet A man possessed of Corn sels it and before two Witnesses sets out his Tithes and afterwards privately takes away his Tithes and the Parson sues him upon the Statute of treble Damages for not setting forth of Tithes and the Defendant proves by Witnesses that he set forth his Tithes yet this Fraud is helped for the words are without fraud or deceit In the second case one secretly sels his Corn to one who was not known and afterwards the Vendee commands the Vendor to cut the Corn which he doth and takes away the whole Corn without setting forth his Tithes and the Question was who should be sued for the Tithes and the Court held the first Vendor should be sued for it was fraudulent If a man be found guilty of Felony and after receives his Pardon he shall not be Legalis home to pass upon a Jury If a Venire facias be against an Arch-bishop the Venire facias shall be Tam milites quam alios liberos c. because he is a Lord of the Parliament If a man be obliged in a Statute staple his Copy-hold Land is not extendable but it is upon a Statute of Bankrupt If a man have Common in three Acres and purchase one of the three Acres his Common is extinct If a man of the Cinque Ports shall come to London he may be there arrested and shall not have the Priviledge of the Cinque Ports Difference between those things which are in the Prender and such things that are in the Render for if I take not such things as are in Prender according to my Prescription it is void If I have Estovers in Woods to be taken every other year if I
that is naught for it is a several Lease of their Moities and you must declare Quod cum one of them demised one moity and the other the other moity and good If a Tenant in Socage hath Issue and die his Issue being under the age of 14. years the next Freind of the Heir to whom the Inheritance cannot descend shall have the Guard of the Land untill the Heir come to the age of 14. years and he is called Guardion in Socage and in pleading a Lease for Life you are never to alleadge the place where the Lease was made because it passeth by Livery which was executed upon the Land He that pleads a Demise ought to shew that the Lessee entred and he that pleads a Descent ought to shew that he entred and an Exchange is a good Plea in Bar but it shall never be adjudged a good Exchange except this word Escambium be used in the Charter of Exchange HOpkins versus Radford A Defendant shall take no benefit of his own wrong In Sir James Harringtons case the Original was returned Quinque Pasch and the issue joyned that day and the Venire facias returned that day and held naught by the Court upon the first motion A future Lease cannot be surrendred but drowned For things in Action a Deed of Gift is void as Debts without Specialty although he say Goods Chattels and Specialties but for other Debts by Specialty and Goods it is good and for the Debts in Action after the Death of the Party Administration is to be granted and the Administrator is to have the Goods RAiner versus Mortimer One had Judgement upon a Scire facias to have Execution and a Capias ad satisfaciendum returnable 15. Martini and that Writ was returned Album Breve and a Testatum thereupon and the Defendant taken and this matter was moved to the Court and a Supersedeas prayed that the Testatum issued out erroneously because the Capias was not returned and it was granted by the whole Court because the Capias was not returned One seised in Fee may bargain and sell grant and demise Land to others and their Heirs to the use of one for years because he hath a Fee-simple but Lessee for years cannot bargain and sell his Lease to the use of one for years If a Marriage is intended between two men and one of them in consideration that the other hath upon the Marriage assured Land to his Son he doth assume to pay to my Son such a Summ immediately after the Marriage if the Money be not paid the Son must have the Action and not the Father MIch 5. Jacobi 61. One Jury-man appear in Court and when he came to the Barr to be sworn he informed the Court that he was eighty years old and prayed to be dischargâ—d and the Court could not grant it nor pass him by and swear others without committing Error except the Parties would consent for it is Error to skip a Juror who is returned if he appear and therefore the Juror was drawn by the consent of the Parties TRin. 6. Jacobi Upon a Levari facias out of a Court Baron Goods cannot be sold without a Custome to sell the Goods and if Goods be attached by Pone out of a Court Baron the Defendant shall not lose his Cattle otherwise it is if it be a Process out of the Common Pleas then the Defendant loseth his Cattle for not appearing if you lay that you have a Court time out of minde to be held before a Steward you must shew what Pleas you have used to have Conusance of A Sheriff returned but 21. onely upon a Venire facias and at the Triall ten onely appeared and a Decem tales was awarded and tried and Verdict for the Plaintiff and this matter was moved in Arrest of Judgement for that the Sheriff had returned but 21. and the Court were of opinion that if 12. of them had appeared that it had been good notwithstanding but because 10. onely appeared of the principal therefore it was naught and Judgement arrested for that cause If a Juror be sworn of the principal and the Jury remain when the Jury comes again he shall be sworn again TRin. 6. Jac. rotulo 251. Dunnall versus Giles A special Verdict and the Question was a man being possessed of a terme devises the whole terme to A. for Life and if he dies within the terme to B. during the minority of C. and that C. when he comes to full age shall have the Remainder of the terme and held a good Devise To devise Land or Terme or Lease all one it is an Executory Devise If one surrender Land to the use of an Estranger that is to resty the use in Reversion for the Land is in him immediately If a man hath a Rent in esse you cannot grant that in Reversion after your Death but if I surrender to the use of one after my Decease is not good by his opinion of Warburton and Daniel If the Sheriff shall by vertue of a Fieri facias levy the Debt and Damages of a man and make a Return that the said Goods remain in his hands for want of Buyers the Property remains still in the Defendant although the Sheriff hath Possession of the Goods A Sheriff may sell Goods levied upon a Fieri facias out of his County In Watermans case the Issue was whether a Copy-holder in one Town had Common in Land lying in another Town and the Plaintiff shews that he is Lord of the Hundred of C. within which Hundred one of the Villages lie and prayes a Venire facias of the Town next adjoyning to the said Hundred and it was granted and tried and Exception to the Triall for that the Venire was not of both Villages An Alien born being no free Denizen may defend and bring a Writ of Error and it is no Plea to say that he is an Alien born Note by the Common Law the Lord of the Mannour may come and take away a Tree cut down upon the Copy-hold Land by his Copy-holder without laying a special Custome for it If there be an unlawfull Marriage as the Brother doth marry his Sister and they have Issue and one of them dieth before any Divorce had between them now after the Death of one of them the Issue cannot be bastarded as in Cordies case 39 E. 43. 22 E. 4. After a general Imparlance one cannot plead an Outlary in Barr to an Action of Trespass or Case but it must be pleaded in abatement except he be outlawed after the last Continuance for you shall plead nothing in Barr but what goeth to the pit of the Action now the Damages in Trespass or Case are not forfeited by Outlary as Debt because of the incertainty To the Owner of the Soil on both sides of the way of common right belong the Trees that grow in the Lane whether
matter of form For if the Jury finde a prior grant of the Queen to the Plaintiffs Lessor although it be at another Court it is sufficient and so by consequence the day is not materiall in substance which mark But Williams Justice and the rest held the traverse to be naught for by that the Jury should be bound to finde the Copy such a day by such a Steward which ought not to be and that it was matter of substance not helped by the Statute of 18 Eliz. DArby versus Bois Hill 5. Jacobi An Ejectment brought for an House in London and upon not guilty pleaded The Jury found a speciall Verdict And the case was Tenant in tail of divers Messuages in London 7 January 44 Eliz bargains and sels the said Houses to J. S. and delivers the Deed from off the Land the 8. of January the same yeer Indentures of Covenants were made to the intent to have a perfect recovery suffered of those houses and the ninth of January after a Writ of right is sued in London for those Messuages returnable at a day to come And the tenth of January the same yeer the Tenant in tail makes livery and seisin to J. S. of one of those Houses in the name of all And the other Messuages were in Lease for yeers and the Lessees did not atturn And the question was if the Messuages passed by the bargain and sale or by the livery And it was adjudged that they passed by the bargain and sale And Yelverton took a difference between severall Conveyances both of them Executory and where one of them is executed presently as in Sir Rowland Heywoods Case where divers Lands were given granted leased bargained and sold to divers for yeers the Lessees were at election whether they would take by the bargain and sale upon the Statute of 27 H 8. or by the demise at the Common Law But otherwise it is if one be executed at first for then the other comes too late as it is in this Case for by the very delivery of the bargains and sale the Land by the custome of London passes without inrollment for London is excepted and this custome was found by the Verdict And therefore it being executed and the Conveyance being made perfect by the delivery of the Deed without any other circumstances the livery of sesin comes too late for it is made to him that had the Inheritance of the Messuage at that time And the possession executed hinders the possession executory for if a bargain and sale be made of Land and before inrollment the bargain takes a deed of the said Land this hinders the inrollment because the taking of the livery did destroy the use which passed by the bargain and sale which was granted by the Court. And another reason was given because it appeared that the intent of the parties was to have the Land passe by the bargain and sale because it was to make a perfect Tenant to the Precipe as appears by the subsequent acts as the Indentures Covenant and the bringing the Writ of Right c. All which will be made frustrate if the livery of seisin shall be effectuall and when an Act is indifferent it shall be taken most neer to the parties intents that may be if a man hath a Mannor to which an advowson is appendant and makes a Deed of the Mannor with the appurtenances And delivers the Deed but doth not make livery of seisin yet now although the Deed in it self was sufficient to passe the Advowson yet because the party did not intend to passe it in Posse but as appurtenant if the Mannor will not passe no more shall the Advowson passe alone as it was agreed 14 Eliz in Andrews Case Which mark And the whole Court gave Judgment accordingly that the Defendant who claimed under the bargain sale should enjoy the Land CHalloner versus Thomas Mich. 6. Jacobi A Writ of Error was brought upon a Judgement given in Ejectment in the Courâ— of Carmarthen and Yelverton assigned the Error because the Ejectment was brought de aquae cursu called Lothar in L. and declares upon a Lease made by D. de quidam rivulo aquae cursu And by the opinion of the whole Court the Judgement was reversed for rivulut seâ— aque cursus lye not in demand nor doth a precipe lye of it nor can livery and seisin be made of it for it cannot be given in possession but as it appears by 12 H. 7. 4. the Action ought to be of so many Acres of Land covered with water but an Ejectment will well lye by if a stang for a precipe lies of them and a woman shall be indowed of the third part of them as it is 11. E. 3. But if the Land under the water or River do not pertain to the Plaintiffe but the River onely then upon a disturbance his remedy is onely by Action upon the Case upon any diversion of it and not otherwise Which observe VVIlson versus Woddell Mich. 6. Jacobi The Grand-father of the Plaintiffe in an Ejectment being a Copy holder in fee made a surrender thereof to L Woddell in fee who surrendred it to the use of Margery I. for life who is admitted c. But L Woddell himself never was admitted The Grandfather and Father dye the Son who is Plaintiffe was admitted and enters upon the Land Margery being then in possession and the Defendant then living with her as a servant in those Tenements and this was the speciall verdict And Judgment was given for the Plaintiffe And the Court was of an opinion that the Defendant was found to be a sufficient Trespassor and Ejector though he be but a Servant to the pretended owner of the Land because the Verdict found that the Defendant did there dwell with Margery And in such case he had the true title and had made his entry might well bring his Action against Master or Servant at his election And perhaps the Master might withdraw himself that he could not be arrested And secondly it was adjudged that the surrender of J. S. of a Copy-hold is not of any effect untill J. S. be admitted Tenant And if I. S. before admittance surrender to a stranger who is admitted that that admittance is nothing worth to the estranger For J. S. had nothing himself and so he would passe nothing and the Admittance of his grantee shall not by implication be taken to be the admittance of himself for the admittance ought to be of a Tenant certainly known to the Steward and entred in a Roll by him and it was held that the right and possession remained still in him that made the surrender and that is descended to his Heir who was the Plaintiffe And they took a difference between an Heir to whom the Copy descended for he may surrender before admittance and it shall be good because he is by course of the Law foe the custome that makes him Heir
Exchequer where the Record was would not award the Venire Facias of all the three Villages named in the Record if it did not appear judicially to them that the Close did extend in all the Villages and it doth not appear for parcell if the premises doth not necessarily extend to all the Villages but may well be and so presumed in one Village onely and therefore it is matter of substance And the Judges had not power after their Commission determined to amend the Plea DAvis versus Pardy Mich. 8. Jacobi The Plaintiffe declared of a Lease made by one Cristmas the sixth of May Anno 7. of one Messuage c. In D. by reason whereof the Plaintiffe entered and was possessed untill the Defendant afterwards to wit 18. of the same month Anno sexto supradicto did eject him And not guilty being pleaded a verdict was found against the Plaintiffe And Yelverton moved in Arrest of Judgement to save Costs that the Declaration was insufficient For that Action was grounded upon two things first upon the Lease secondly upon the Ejectment and both those ought to concur one after the other And in this case the Ejectment is supposed to be one year before the Lease made for the Lease is made Anno 7. and the Ejectment supposed to be done Anno 7. 6. And therefore the Declaration naught And Yelverton vouched the case between Powre and Hawkins Anno septimo Termino Pasch Where the Plaintiffe declared upon the Lease of Edw. Ewer 27. April Anno sexto and laid the Ejectment to be 26. April Anno 6. And the Court held then that the Declaration was naught yet in the case in question the Declaration was adjudged good And the word sexto to be void for the day of the Ejectment being the 18. of the same month of May it cannot be intended but to be the same year in which the Lease is supposed to be made by the opinion of the whole Court AYlet versus Chippin Mich. 8. Jacobi The Plaintiffe declares upon a Lease made by John Aylet for one year of certain Land in C. in the County of E. by vertue whereof he entred and was possessed untill the Defendant did eject him The Defendant pleads that the Copihold Land is parcell of the Mannor of D. c. of which one Jo Aylet the Lessors Father was seised in Fee according to the Custome and that he made a surrendor thereof to the use of his Will and by his will devised the Land in question to John the lessor and H. Aylet his sons and to their Heirs Males of their Bodies and willed that they should not enter untill their severall ages of 21 years And further willed that W. B. and H. B. his Executors should have the Lands to perform his Will untill his said Sons Jo and H. came to their severall Ages of one and twenty years c. To which Plea the Plaintiffe replies and confesses the Will but shews further how that such a day and year before the Lease Jo his Lessor attained to his full Age of one and twenty years and entred and made a Lease thereof to him c. To which Plea the Defendant demurred and adjudged for the Plaintiffe For although the Estate to Jo and H. precede in words and the devise to the Executors insues in construction yet the estate to Io Executors precedes in possession And is as if he should have demised the Land untill his Sons Io and H. should attain to their severall Ages of one and twenty years And afterwards to them and their Heirs Males c. to be enjoyed in possession at ther severall Ages so that the Executors have onely a limited estate determinable in time when either Son severally should attain to his full age for his part For so it appears the Devisors intent was that either Son might enter when he attained to the age of one and twenty years And although it was objected by Justice Williams that the two Brothers are joyntenants by the Will and if one should enter when he comes to his full Age the other Brother being under age that would destroy the intent of the devise for then they should not take joyntly but the Court as to that said that the entry of him that attained to his full age doth not destroy the juncture but that they are joyntenants notwithstanding For that entry in the intent of the Devisor was only as to thâ— taking of the the profits and the possession and not as to the estate in joyntenancy and this is proved by 30 H. 6. Devise 12. where a devise was to foure in Fee and that one of them should have all during his life and this was adjudged good and it was as to the taking of the profits onely which observe by the whole Court but Williams RIce versus Haruiston Pasch 10. Jacobi The Plaintiffe declares of a Lease made by Jo. Bull c. The Defendant pleads that the Land is Copihold Land parcel of the Mannor of c. Whereof the King was seised and is seised and that the King by his Steward such a day granted the Land in question to him in Fee to hold at will according to the custome of the Mannor by vertue whereof he was admitted and entred and was seised untill the lessor entred upon him and outed him and made a Lease to the Plaintiffe and then he entred and did eject him c. The Plaintiffe replies that long before the King had any thing in the Mannor Queen Eliz. was thereof seised in Fee in right of her Crown and before the Ejectment supposed by the Defendant by her Steward at such a Court did grant the Land in question by Copy to him in Fee to hold at Will according to the custome of the Mannor who was admitted and entred and further shewed the descent of the Mannor to the King and how the Lesser entred and made a Lease to the Plaintiffe who entred and was thereof possessed untill the Defendant did eject him Upon which Plea the Defendant did demurr because he supposed that the Plaintiffe ought to traverse the grant alledged by the copy of the Defendant in his Barr. But the Court held the replication good for the Plaintiffe had confessed and avoided the Defendant by a former Copy granted by Queen Eliz under whom the King that now is claimed and so the Plaintiffe need not traverse the grant to the Defendant but such a traverse would make the Plea vitious for which see Hilliais Case 6. Rep. And 14 H. 8. Dotknis Case 2 E. 6. Dyer And Brooks title confesse and avoid for as no man can have a Lease for years without assignment no more can a man have a Copy without grant made in Court Which observe SHecomb versus Hawkins Pasc 10 Jacobi The case was in an especial verdict in Ejectment that one Mrs. Luttrel Tenant in fee of the Mannor of L. leavied a Fine to the use of her self for life and after death to
were his Masters and part his own proper Goods and found guilty as to his own Goods and a special Verdict as to the Goods of his Master and Judgement for the Plaintiff COnstable versus Inhabitant in dimid Hundred de VValsham in Comitat. Essex Trin. 15. Jacobi rotulo 2244. The Action wabrought for a Robbery the Defendant is found guilty and it was alleadged in Arrest of Judgement that the Action would not lie because it was not brought against the whole Hundred and it was answered on the Plaintiffs behalf that the half Hundred is a Hundred by it self and the Court held the Writ should have been brought against them in this manner Inhabitantes in Hundredo de W. called the half Hundred of Waltham but the Writ was held good for the Writis so shall be intended to be brought against the men inhabiting in the half hundred of W. Judgement for the Plaintif in a special verdict the Jury found that the robbery was done upon the Sunday and it was held in the Kings Bench that the Hundred was liable NOrris versus Inhabitantes in Hundredo de G. Hill 14. Jacobi rotulo 431. And the Plaintiff declares upon a Robbery done the ninth day of October An. 13 Jacobi And the Originall bears Teste the ninth of October 14 Jacobi and after a Verdict Serjeant Harvey moved to stay the Judgement because the Writ was not brought within one year after the Robbery done according to the forme of the Statute of 27 Eliz. And the Court held it a good Exception CAmblyn versus Hundredum de Tendring Trin. 15. Jacobi rotulo 1952. The Plaintiff in his Declaration had mistaken to alleadge the very Day of the Robbery for he shewed the Robbery to be committed in October where in truth it was committed in September and the Court was moved that the Record which was taken out for Triall but never put in might be amended for the notice given to the Hundred as the Record is would appear to be before the Robbery and they granted that it should be amended Actions in Partition THe Process in Partition are Summons Attachment and Distress and the Process are returnable from fifteen Dayes to fifteen Dayes and if the Writ be brought against two or more several Essoines will lie but no View and the Sheriff upon the Distress is compellable to return the value of the Land from the teste of the Original untill the Return thereof and if the Writ be against two or more Deâ—eâ—â—iants and onely one appears the Plaintiff cannot declare against him untill the residue of the Defendants appear and Partition lies by the Statute of 31 H. 8. cap. 32. between Joint-tenants Tenants in Common Tenants for Life or for years but at the Common Law Partition was onely between Coparceners his Petit. is no Plea in Partition and in this Action there are two Judgements the first is that Partition shall be made and if the Plaintiff die after the first Jugement and before the second Judgement the Writ shall not abate but his Heir shall have a Scire facias against the Defendants to shew cause why Partition should be made and a Writ of Partition will not lie of the View of Frank Pledges and the Death of one of the Defendants abates the Writ And note the Plaintiff may have a general Writ but a special Count and if the Defendant confess part and plead Quod non tenet insimul pro indiviso for the residue the Plaintiff may have Judgement upon the Confession and a Writ to make Partition upon the Confession before the Triall and afterwards try the Issue for the residue or else he may respit his Judgement upon the Confession untill the Issue be tried but this is dangerous for if the Plaintiff be non-suit at the Assise then the whole Writ will abate and if the Sheriff return the Tenant summoned when in truth he was not an Action of Deceit lies not but an Action upon the Case because the Plaintiff shall not recover the Land by default and you shall never have a Writ of Partition against one where he cannot have one against the other thirteen men joyn in a purchase of a Mannour the Conveyance was of the moity to one of them in Fee and the other moity to the other twelve men in Fee the twelve make a Feoffment to one of twelve several Tenements and Land and that Feoffee makes twelve several Feoffments to those twelve men now the thirteenth man which had the other moity bringeth one Writt of Partition against them all pretending that they held insimul pro indiviso and by the opinion of the whole Court it would not lie but he ought to have brought several Writs and Mich. 6. Jacobi in Partition because both of them are in Possession he that is not prohibited may cut down all the Trees and no Estrepment will lie COcks versus Combstoks The Plaintiff declares that one A. was seised in Fee and demised for years to J. and L. and to the Plaintiff for term of Life and one of them demised to one of the Defendants for years the Defendant as to part pleads that he did not demise and the other pleads Non est informat and a Demurrer to the Plea of Non demisit because it is but argumentative Quod non tenet insimul and it was adjudged a naughty Plea a Writ of Error lies in Partition upon the first Judgement before the Writ be returned MIll versus Glemham The Defendant pleads that he before the purchasing of this Writ had brought a Writ of partition for the same Land against the Plaintiff which yet depends and demands Judgment if the Plaintiffs Writ were brought And the Court held that the Writ last brought is well brought for if the first Plaintiff will not proceed upon his Writ and the Defendant shall confess the Action yet the Defendant cannot sue a Writ to make partition upon that Plaintiffs Writ and therefore it is reasonable that the Defendant in the first Action may sue out a Writ to make partition and that the Defendants plea is naught and the last Writ is well prosecuted Actions upon Quare Impedit THe Process in this Action are Summons Attachment and Distress peremptory by the Statute of Marlborough cap. 13. the Sheriff must summon the Defendant by good summoners and return their names upon the original Writ and not return common summoners as John Doo and Richard Roo for a Writ of deceit lyeth in this Writ if the summons were not made indeed The Writs hereupon are returned from 15. days to 15. days The summons upon the first Writ may either be made at the Church door to the person of the Defendant And although a nihil be returned upon the first summons Attachment and Distress yet if the Defendant make default upon the Distress a Writ shall goe to the Bishop upon the title made by the Plaintiff but at the common Law
sides they shall recover costs and dammages LEe versus Edwards Trin. 19 Jacobi rotulo 470. The Case was in Replevin a Copy-holder claims Common in another mans Land the Lord infeofleth the Copy-holder of his Copy-hold Land whether he hath now lost his Common and held that he had but if a Copy-holder hath Common in the Lords waste and the Lord inseofeth him of the Copy hold with all Commons the Common is not gone Oabel versus Perrot Hill 9 Jacobi rotulo 2734. Tenant in Tail hath power to make a Lease for 89 years if three persons live so long and reserving the old Rent due and payable yearly and he maketh a grant in Reversion for years and whether that be good or no was the Question there being a Lease for life in possession the second Lease was for 89 years if three live so long for the matter in Law the Court held the Lease good but for want of an averment of the life of c. the Plea was not good ROberts versus Young Hill 9 Jacobi routlo 1835. the Defendant in a Replevin pleads that he offered amends and doth not shew that he offered it before the impounding of the Cattle and adjudged an ill Plea and the offer of amends cannot be made to him that maketh cognisance BAcon versus Palmer Trin. 12 Jacobi rotulo 3947. A Copy-holder in Replevin prescribes to have Common of pasture appurte nant to the Copy-hold the other party pleads an Extinguishment of Common because the Lord had inclosed Land lying in another field in which field and in the other field the Lord had Common by cause of vicinage and note that in Common for cause of vicinage if one inclose part it is an extinguishment of all the Common SHarp versus Emerson Mich. 12. Jacobi The Defendant makes avowry for Homage Fealty and Rent the Plaintiff prayes in aid and hath a Summmons in aid and at the return of the Summons the Prayee in aid was Essoined and after the Ession the Defendant moved the Court that the Homage might be put out of the Avowry which was entred with by consent of parties was raised out of the Will ARundell versus Blanchard and Jackson Pasch 13 Jacobi rotulo 2037. The taking in Replevin was supposed to be at Southwark and one of the Defendant pleads non cepit and the other Bailiff of the Governors of the possessions revenues and good of the Free-Grammar-School of c. for the Parishoners for the Parish of Saint Olaves in Southwark in the County of Surrey and the Advowry was made for damage fesant the Plaintiff prescribed for a way belonging to his house in the Parish of Saint Olaves in Southwark and the Venire facias was of Southwark in the Parish of Saint Olaves in Southwark and exception taken to that and held good because one Defendant had pleaded non cepit and another exception was because he had not shewed when the Corporation begun and held an idle exception for one need not shew when they were incorporated another exception was because the name of one of the Jury was mistaken because in the Return of the Venire it was to Lisney of Croydon and in the Pannell of the Habeas Corpus it was written to John Lisney of Croydon and because in sound it is all one and the Sheriff made oath that he was the man that was returned in the Venire facias the Return was amended in Court and Judgement given by the whole Court for the Plaintiff PAin versus Mascall Hill 12 Jacobi rotulo 3400. The Lord avows the taking of one Mare as for Rent behind so for the fourth part of a Releif and doth not expresse the same due for the releif and for the Rent the Plaintiff pleads tender and demurres for the Releif because he had not expressed the same and because he had distrained one thing for the Rent and Releif pretending that if one cause passe against him and another for the Avowant that he could not have a Return habend but the Court were of a contrary opinion but if two men shall distrain one and the same Mare for two severall causes and one hath Judgment for himselfe and the other for himselfe In this case no return habend can be made of the Mare BRown versus Goldsmith Trin. 13. Jacobi rotulo 607. A Court of Pipowders is incident to a Fine and a Court Baron to a Mannor And a Court Baron cannot be separated from a Mannor for it is a wealth to a Mannor the like of a Court of Pipowder to a Fair by the grant of a Mannor with cum pertinencijs the Court passes for it is an incident inseparable to the Mannor and a man cannot grant his Court but he may grant the profits of his Court. MAgistri socij Collegij Emanuel is in Cambridg The writ was adjudged naught in replevin because they had distrayned in their proper names for a Corporation as Maior and Comonalty cannot distrain in their own persons but by their Bayliff The Court held that the Sheriff could not take a Bond in replevin but must take pledges according to the old custome JVid versus Bungory Trin. 8. Jac. rotulo 3059. The Defendant shews that one was seised of Land in fee and held it by Knights service of a Mannor and for the rent of two Cocks and two Hens and the Lord grants the third part of the Mannor to another who avows for the seruice and the Cocks and Hens and held he could not alone avow for that joynt service but the other should joyn with him WEnden versus Snigg Trin. 11. Jac. rotulo 1137. In replevin the question was upon a Lease for life made to three to have and to hold to them the said A. B. and C. and every of them for the term of their lives and the longest liver of them successively one after another as they are writ in order And the question was whether this was a remainder or no and it was held to be a remainder upon the reading of the Record but if the grant had been only successively not saying as they are named in the writing it had been naught because he could not tell who should begin THorold versus Hadden Trin. 11. Jac rotulc 451. In replevin a Juror was returned by the name of Payly and in the distress the name was T. P. and in the Pannell he was written Baily and tryed by that name of Baily and moved in arrest of Judgment for the mistaking of the name And the Court held that if the right name was sworn yet notwithstanding the mistake it was good for if the name in venire was not mistaken all was good and the Sheriff ought to amend his misprision and the Court demanded if any one could swear that Paly was sworn and one then present in Court made oath that Paly was sworn and the Court ordered that it should be amended
Winch held that the Plaintiffe should not be barred for the Misnomer and for the second he held that his house was within the Statute of Chaunterys and so the interest in the King H. 6. And so the Lease made by the Master of the Hospitall void Dyer 246. 287. And Warburton held the Plaintiffe should be barred upon both points SWynerton versus Mills Hill 14 Jacobi rotulo 2049. In a Replevin the Defendant a vows for a rent charge reserved by a Copiholder who is seised in Fee and made a Lease by the license of the Lord reserving Rent at foure Feasts or within one and twenty days being lawfully demanded and afterwards the Copiholder surrendred one moity in Fee to a stranger and afterwards surrendred the reversion of the other moity to another to which the Termer atturned and so avowed for Rent The Plaintiffe pleaded in Barâ— that he was seised of a Close adjoyning to the place in which c. and put therein his Cattell and that they escaped by fault of inclosure and issue taken upon that And after a Verdict by default those exceptions were taken to the Avowry in Arrest of Judgement First because it appeared by the Advowry that the Copiholder had surrendred a Reversion which could not be because a Copiholder is a Tenant at will and so could not have a reversion for he cannot make a Lease for yeers without the license of the Lord but this exception was over-ruled by the Couâ—t Secondly because there was no Atturnment alledged in the first surrender And it was held no exception because the Rent for which he avowed was reserved by the Copiholder by the second surrender to which the Termer had atturned And also the Court said that an Atturnment is not necessary for a Copiholder because there is no time when the Terme should atturn For before the surrender he cannot atturn and after the surrender and admittance it is too late And the Copihold estate is like an estate raised by uses or devise in which an Atturnment is not necessary As also in an estate raised by Fine and the like an Atturnment is not necessarie for if the Termer will not atturn he is compellable by Law as by a Quid juris clamat but a Copiholder hath no means to make the Termer atturn if he refuse And thirdly in the conclusion of the Advowry he doth not say that the Rent was behind such a day and one and twenty dayes after at least and this exception was disallowed because the distresse is a sufficient demand of the Rent and it appears that the day of the taking of the distresse was one and twentie dayes after the Feast at which the Rent was due and Judgment was given for the Advowant and note that a Covenant to distrain is idle for a man may distrain of common right HOwell versus Sambay Mich. 13 Jacobi rotulo 2009. In Replevin the Defendant a vows for a Rent charge and a Nomine pene granted by Tenant in tail generall and one Fine levied afterwards and the use expressed the Plaintiffe replies and saies that the Grantor had only an interest for life and so makes inducement and traverses the use of the Fine The Defendant demurrs And held by the Court that the Grantee was not seised in tail nor to the use of the Fine And it was said that in this case that it was necessary for the Advowant to plead the Fine with the estate tail for if the Tenant in tail grant a Rent charge and dye no Fine being levied and the estate tail discends the issue in tail is not chargable with the Rent And note the Advowry was as well for the Rent as for the Nomine pene and no speciall demand was alledged in pleading the Rent and it was adjudged by the Court a naughty advowry as to the Nomine pene but good for the Rent as it hath been adjudged in one Mildmaies Case COtterell versus Harrington Pasch 6. Jacobi rotulo 545. In a Replevin the Defendant avows for an Annuity for 20 d. granted for yeers payable upon demand and alledges a demand the Plaintiffe demands either of the Deed and by the Deed it appeared that for a hundred and ten pound one Rent of twenty pound was granted for eight yeers and another for 20 l. for two yeers if E. R. and T. should so long live the Plaintiffe pleads the Statute of Usury and sets forth the Statute and a speciall usurious Contract If it had been layed to be upon a loan of Money then it was Usury but if it be a bargain an Annuity it is no usury But this was alledged to be upon a lending VVOod versus Moreton Hill 6 Jacobi rotulo 1802. In Replevin the Defendant advows to have Common Appendant out to his house and Land the Plaintiffe saith that he had Common Appendant to his House and Land And the Defendant to avoid the Common saith that the Commoner sold to the Plaintiffe five Acres of the Land to which the Common is appendant pretending that he should not have Common for that Land being but parcell of the Land to which the Common was appendant Common Appurtenant cannot be to a House alone purchasing of part of Common Appendant doth not extinguish the Common otherwise it is of Common Appurtenant And it was pretended to be Common Appurtenant because it is to a House and Land whether by severance his Common is gone and held to be common Appendant and Judgment given for the Plaintiffe MOrse versus Well Replevin for Common of Pasture the casewas that the Father was seised of two yard Land with Appurtenances and had Common of Pasture for four rother Beasts three Horses and sixty Sheep and he demised part of the said two yard Lands in being And whether the Common should be apportioned and if it should be apportioned whether the Prescription failed because the issue was taken that he and all those c. had Common in the said two yard Land A Release of Common in one Acre is a Release of all If I have Common Appurtenant and purchase part the Common is gone but otherwise it is of Common Appendant And note this Common was Common Appendant and the purchasing of Common Appendant doth not extinguish the Common and Judgment was given for the Commoner by the whole Court HVghes versus Crowther Trin. 6 Jacobi rotulo 2220. In a Replevin a Lease for years made to Charles H. and the said A. T. to have and to hold from c. for sixty years if they live so long Charles dyed in this case Judgment was given that the Lease was ended by the death of Charles but otherwise it had been if it had been for life BIcknall versus Tucker Trin. 9 Jacobi rotulo 3648. in a Replevin the case was whether a Fine with five years will bind the Copy-holder in remainder there was a Copy-hold granted to three for lives to have and to hold successively the
first had the Free hold granted to him by the Lord of the Mannor And then he leavied a Fine and five years passe whether he in the Remainder be Barred or no those whose estates are turned to rights either present or future are meant by the Statute to be barred of a Copy-hold for years be put out of possession and a Fine Leavied and no entry by him he is barred by the Statute by the Bargain and Sale he in the Remainder is not put out of possession if a man make a Lease to begin at Easter next and before Easter a Fine is leavied and five years passe this Fine will not barr because at the Leavying of the Fine he could not enter for then his right was future if the Lease had been in possession and the Lessee had never entered he had been barred A Lease for years Remainder for years if the first man taketh for life the first estate is not so determined but that the Remainder standeth if a Copy-hold surrender for life there passeth no more from him then so much as maketh the estate and no more and the rest remaineth in him CRantley versus Kingswel Pacsb 15 Jacobi rotulo 710. The Defendant makes cognisance as Bailiff of Kingswell his Father for Rent service due to his Father at such a Feast And shews that Cramley holds of him by fealty and rent paiable at such a Feast and for Rent due at such a Feast made Cognisance the Plaintiffe in Barr saies that he at the said Feast offered the Rent upon the Land and that no body was there to receive it And the Plaintiffe saith that afterwards he demanded the Rent upon the Land and the Plaintffe made a Replevin pretending the Lord should make a personall demand but the whole Court was against him And Warburton took acception against the pleading the Tender because he saith that he offered the Rent to pay when as he was not present And the question was whether the Lord for a Rent service did not demand it at that day whether he can distrain without a demand of the person and held he might for the Tenant is yet bound to tender and the Land is debter and the Lord may resort thither when he pleases to demand the Rent upon the Land but if he tender his Homage and the Lord refuses it he cannot distrain without a demand of the Person and Judgment for the Defendant STokes versus Winter Trin. 15. Jacobi rotulo 2242. In Replevin the Defendant makes cognisance as Bayliff to Tenant for life to whom the Annuity was granted for life to begin by will after the death of the devisor And alledges the death of the devisor but not the day of the death after whose death the said H. was seised of the yeerly rent aforesaid in his demesn as of his Free-hold for terme of his life by vertue of the devise aforesaid And because seven pounds of the Rent aforesaid for one yeer ended at the Feast c. and by the space of 14. dayes then next following were behinde to the said T. the said time with c. the said T. as Bayliffe of the said H. doth make cognisance of the taking of the cattell aforesaid in the said place in which c. for the said 7 li. for the yeerly Rent aforesaid being so behind c. and issue was taken whether the said I. at the time of his death was seised of the said six Acres of Land in his demesne as of Fee as c. And after tryall exception was taken to the Advowry because it was not alledged that the annuity at such a Feast after the death of the devisor was behinde but it was over-ruled because there is so much expressed and Judgment given for the Defendant HVmfrey versus Powell Trin. 12. Jacobi rotulo 2791. Replevin wherein the Defendant avows for one Annuity granted to the Defendant to whom the office of Catorship of the Church of Roffen in Kent was granted by the Dâ—an and Chapter of that Church for life with an Annuity of 6. pounds for the exercising of that Office with a clause of distresse by vertue of which grant he was possessed and avowes for the Annuity and avers that it was an ancient Office pertaining to the Dean and Chapter of Roffen and doth not aver that the Annuity was an ancient Annuity The Defendant pleads the Statute of the 13 Eliz that all Devises Donations Grants c. made by any Master and Fellows of any Colledge Dean and Chapter c. other then for the terme of twenty and one yeers or three lives from the time of this Devise c. should be totally void And shews that the old Dean died and another was elected And a Demurrer thereupon And Judgement that the Grant was void HYen versus Gerrard Mich. 13. Jacobi rotulo 752. The Defendant in Replevin avows that one being seised in Fee made a Lease to him and avows for Damage feasant The Plaintiffe in Barr pleads and maintains his Declaration and traverses the Lease upon the Avowant demurrs and adjudged a goodtraverse IEnyx versus Applefourth Trin. 17. Eliz rotulo 543. The Defendant avows for a Rent charge the Plaintiffe in Barr pleads that the Defendant had presented a Writ of Annuity And that he had an Imparlance thereunto And demands Judgement if the Defendant did well make cognisance to the taking of the cattell in the said place in which c. in name of a distresse for the rent aforesaid by vertue of the said writing as Bayliffe of the said R. the said Writ of Annuity being prosecuted c. upon the said writing in form aforesaid c. And a Demurrer thereupon and Judgement by the whole Court for the Plaintiffe it is not needfull to lay a prescription to distrain for an Amerciament in a Court Leet but it is otherwise for an Amerciament in a Court Baron by the whole Court DArcy versus Langton The Defendant avows for a Rent charge and for a Nomine penae and no mention made in the Avowry of the Rent charge and the Plaintiffe was non-suit and afterwards in Arrest of Judgement this matter was alledged and at first held to be a good exception but afterwards Judgement was entred an Advowry is in the nature of a Declaration if that be vitious no Judgement can be given for the Advowant TRin. 9. Jacobi Regis rotulo 2033. Replevin for the taking of Cattell at Andover in a certain place there called R The Defendant makes cognisance for damage feasant the Plaintiffe saies that he was seised of the Messuage c. in C. in the Parish of A to which he claimed Common of Pasture And issue taken upon the prescription and a Venire Facias of A. and exception taken because it was not tryed of C. and A. or of the Parish of A. but it was adjudged to be good TRinbone versus Smith Trin. 12. Jacobi rotulo 626. In Replevin foure and twenty were returned upon the
because he doth not shew from what place nor to what place the passage or way is for although a way be in grosse yet it ought to be bounded and circumscribed to some certain place especially when it appears to ly in usuage time out of mind for that ought to be in a place certain and not in one place to day and another to morrow but constant and perpetuall in one place Thirdly the Plea in Barr is not good because he doth not shew what manner of passage it was whether a Foot-way or Horse-way or Cart-way and therefore it is altogether incertain and Judgement given accordingly TRoughton against Gouge Mich. 7 Jacobi An Action of Trespass brought for entring into the Plaintiffs Close called Wild Marsh and for mowing and cutting five Loads of hay to his damage of c. the Defendant saith that the Close aforesaid did contain twelve Acres whereof a long time before the Trespasse done and at the time the Mayor of c. of Lincoln were seised in Fee and being so seised Leased it to the Defendant for years before the Trespass committed by reason whereof he entred and was posaessed untill the Plaintiff claimed by Deed of the Maior c. for life whereas nothing passed and entered and the Defendant the time aforesaid re-entred as it was Lawfull for him to do the Plaintif replied that the Close in which the Trespass is supposed to be done contained one Acre and three Roods and abutts it East West North and South and one of the abutnals were upon the twelve Acres mentioned in the plea in Barr and concludes it is another Close the Close mentioned in the Plea in Barr containing twelve Acres whereupon the Defendant demurres and the Court were of opinion at the first opening the matter that the replication was not good because it answers not to the matter supposed in the Barr for when the Plaintiff in his Declaration gives the place a certain name as he hath and the Defendant by his Plea in Barr agrees the place as here he doth to wit that the Close aforesaid to wit Wild Marsh is the inheritance of the Mayor c. and he as Lessee to them for years makes a Title to himself the plaintiff ought to answer to the Title or avoid it which he doth not by his replication for the plaintiff by that indeavors to assign a new place which he cannot do when they are agreed of a place before and therefore he ought to have pleaded that there were two Closes called Wild Marsh the one containing twelve Acres as the Defendant had alledged and the other containing one Acre and three roods whereof the Plaintiff was seised and that the Close where the Plaintiff supposed the Trespass to be committed and the close called Wild Marsh contained one Acre and three roods which mark and see 21 E. 4. LEe against Atkinson and Brooks Hill 7. Jacobi An Action of Baâ—tery brought against the Defendants at London for assaulting the Plaintiff to wit in such a Parish and Ward and beate wounded and evill intreated him to his damage of an hundred pounds the Defendant as to the force pleads not guilty and as to the residue that Atkinson the time in which c. at Gravesend in the County of Kent was possessed of a Gelding and being so thereof possessed the Plaintiff the time in which c. at Gravesend c. came to the Defendant to hire the Gelding for foure shillings for two dayes in which the Plaintiff would ride from Gravesend aforesaid to Nettlebed in the same County and from thence to Gravesend within the sayd two dayes by reason whereof the Defendant for the consideration aforesayd the time in which c. lent the Gelding to the Plaintiff who had it and in a direct line rode for the space of a mile to Nettlebed aforesaid upon the Gelding untill the Plaintif the time when c. intending to deceive the Defendant of his sayd Gelding went forth of his way to N. and rode towards London by reason whereof Atkinson in his owne right and Brook as his servant came to the Plaintif and at the same time in which c. required the Plaintif then riding upon the sayd Gelding towards London to deliver the Gelding which he refused to doe by reason whereof Atkinson in his owne right and Brook as his servant and by his command the time in which c. to repossess himselfe of the sayd Gelding layd hands upon the Plaintif and took him from the Horse back and would have taken the Gelding from the Plaintif by reason whereof the Plaintif did by force and Armes assault the Defendant and by strong hand kept the Gelding by reason whereof the Defendant did defend the possession of the Horse against the Plaintif as it was lawfull for him to doe And further say that if any damage hapned to the Plaintif it was of his owne assault and in defence of the possession of the Gelding and Traverses that he was not guilty in London or any where else out of Kent c. and the Plaintif demurs and adjudged for the Plaintif for the Battery is confessed and did arise from the evill behaviour of the Defendant for it appeared by their owne Plea in barr that the Plaintif had hyred the Gelding for two dayes and that they within these two dayes disturbe the Plaintif of his possession of the Horse and thrust him off his back which was not lawfull for the Plaintif had a good speciall property for the two dayes against all the World and although the Defendant pretends that the Plaintif had misbehaved himselfe in riding to another place then was intended yet that was to be punished by an Action of the Case but not to seise the Horse Which observe KNieveton against Roylie Mich. 8. Jacobi An Action of Trespass brought for breaking the Plaintifs Close called G. in Woodthorpe in the County of Derby to the damage of c. The Defendant pleads that the Close was known as well by the name of G. as by the name of D. And that it was and had been time out of minde parcell of the Wigenworth and pleads his freehold in the Mannour The Plaintif maintaines his Declaration and traverses that the place where c. was not parcell of the Mannor and upon this they are at Issue and a Venire facias awarded of Woodthorpe onely and moved in Arrest of Judgment by the Defendant the Verdict being for the Plaintif and urged that it was a mistryall for the Venire facias ought to have been as well of the Mannor as of Woodthorpe for although the parties be agreed that the place where the Trespass was committed lyes in Woodthorpe yet that being supposed indeed to be parcell of the Mannor of Wigenworth the Venu of the Mannor by intendment have a more perfect and better knowledge of it then the Villiage of Woodthorpe onely which was granted by the whole Court and a new Venire awarded to
of his confirmation and not by the first see 11. R. 2. Grants 9. Ed. 3. 4. 12. R. 2 Feoffments 58. See Perkins fol. 8. b 9. a. Grants 10. Eliz. Dyer 279. 4. Hillary 8. Jacobi 1610 In the Common Bench. Styles against Baxter STyles brought an Action upon the case against Baxter for calling him perjured man the Defendant justified that he was perjured in such a Court in such a deposition and so pleaded that certainly and it was found for the Defendant at the Nisi prius and Judgment was given accordingly and the Defendant afterwards published the same words of the Plaintiff upon which he brought a new Action for the new publication in which the Defendant pleaded in Barr the first Judgment upon which the Plaintiff demurred and it was adjudged without any Contradiction that it was a good Barr. Hillari 8. Jacobi 1610. In the common Bench. Andrewe against Ledsam in the Star Chamber ANdrewe exhibited his bill in the Star Chamber against Ledsam the matter Andrew being a rich Usurer delivered to Ledsam being a Scriâ—ener one thousand pound to be imployed for him for Interest that is for ten pound for the use of every hundred pound for every yeare Ledsam being a Prodigall man as it seemes spent the Money and delivered to Andrewe diverse severall obligations every of them containing three severall persons well known to be sufficient being some of them Knights others Gentlemen and Esquires of great Estates and the other good Citizens without exceptions were bound to Andrewe in two hundred pound for the payment of one hundred sixty pound to Andrew at a day to come within six Moneths then next comming as Andrew had used before to lend his Money and delivered the Obligations with Seales unto them and the names of the parties mentioned to be bound by that subscribed and his own name also subscribed as witnessing the sealing and delivery of them as a publique Notary aâ— the good and lawfull obligations of the Parties which were mentioned in them where indeed the parties mentioned in them had not any notice of any of them But Ledsam had forged and counterfeited them as he hath confessed upon his Examination upon Interrogatories administred by the Plaintiff in this Court and at the hearing of the Cause and sentence of that it was moved if Ledsam shaâ—l loose both his Eares or but one for if it be but one forgery then by the Statute of 5. Eliz. Admitting that the Bill is grounded upon this Statute he shall loose an Eare and pay the double dammageâ— and cost to the party greeved And also if Andrew being but the Obligee and not any of the parties in whose names the Obligations were forged if he be such a party greived which shall have double costs and dammages and these doubts were resolved by Coke cheife Justice of the Common Bench where they were moved and Flemming cheif Justice of the Kings Bench that Ledsam should loose but one eare for that shall be taken as one forgery for that it was made at one time and also that Andrew was the party greived within the Statute but Coke said that the Bill was generall that is against the Lawes and Statutes of the Realme and not precisely upon the Statute of 5. Eliz. For he said that when a Bill is founded upon an Act of Parliament that this ought to containe all the branches which are mentioned in the Act the which wants in this Bill but insomuch that it was adjudged in Parliament what punishment such offenders shall have they inflicted the same punishment which is appointed by the Statute and added to that that he should be Imprisoned till he found good Suerties for his good behaviour and also that hee shall be brought to every one of the Kings Courts at Westminster with great Papers in his hatt containing his offence in Capitall letters but the Lord Chancellor expounded the double dammages in such manner that is that they shall not be intended double Interest but only the Principall Debt Note that if Execution be directed to a Sheriffe to Arrest any man or to make Execution within a Liberty And the Sheriffe direct his Warrant to a Bayliffe of the Liberty for to make Execution of the Processe which makes it and after is a Fugitive and not able to answer for that the Lord of the Franchise shall answer for that and shall be liable to answer for his Bayliffe by all the Justices Burdett against Pix IN Debt upon a single Bill by Burdett against John Pix as administrator of Freewen the case was this that is Freewen was bound in an Obligation of thirty four pound to Burdett the Plaintiff and was also bound to one William Pix in 80. l. Freewen dyed Intestate and the Letters of Administration of his Goods were Committed after his Death to the said John Pix the Defendant and the said William Pix also made the said John Pix the Defendant his Executor and died and the Defendant in this Action pleads that the said Freewen was indebted to the said William Pix and that he was his Executor and that he had Goods of the said Freewens sufficient to satisfie the said debt the which he retained for the satisfaction of that and that over that he hath not of his to satisfie him upon which the Plaintiff Demâ—…or that that the Defendant doth not plead that he hath â—…is election to retaine the said goods for the satisfaction of â—…own said Debt before the Action brought and by all the Justices he ought to make his election before the bringing of the Action otherwise he shall be charged with the other Debt See Woodward and Darcyes Case Commentaries 184. a. and 4. Cook 30. Coulters Case Hillary 8. Jacobi 1610. in the Common Bench. Bone against Stretton THe case was this A man seised of two Acres of Land makes a Lease for years of one Acre to one and another Lease for yeares of the other Acre to another and then he enters and makes a Feoffment and severall Liveryes upon the severall Acres and one of the Lessees being present doth not assent to the said Livery and the use of the said Feoffment was not the use of his last Will and then he declares his last Will and by that recites the said Feoffment and then declares the use of that to be to the use of himself for life the remainder over to a stranger and after the Tenant for years which did not assent to the Livery grants his Estate to the Feoffor and the Feoffor dies and Nicholls Serjeant moved first That this enures as a grant of a reversion and that the grant of the perticuler Tenant enures first as an Attornement and then as a surrender of his Estate as if it had been an expresse surrender and all the Justices agreed that this doth not enure to make Attornement and surrender as expresse surrender will for an expresse surrender admits the reversion to be in the Grantee to whom the surrender is made
if a man devise his Lands to his Wife and after her death to his Son and the remainder to his sayd Wife in Fee-simple the Husband of the Wife having Issue shall not be Tenant by the Curtesie for alwayes the Judges have made such favourable construction of Wills that if Estates devised by Will might be created by act executed in the life of the party then it should be good by devise and to the objection that conclusion and agreement is uncertaine and so for that shall be voyd he saith that it is not so uncertaine as going about or resolve and determine an attempt or procure as in Corbets Case first of Coke 83. b. or as attempt or endeavour as in Germins and Arscotts Case there cyted fol. 285. a. See 6 Coke 40. a. Mildmayes Case and also the words subsequent are repugnant that the Estate tayle shall cease as if the Tenant in tayle were dead and not otherwise which is absurd and repugnant for the Estate tayle doth not determine by his death if he doe not dye without Issue And also he sayd that it is more reasonable that the perpetuity in Scholasticas Case for here the limitation depends upon agreement which is a thing certaine upon which the Issue may be joyned and also the condition doth stand with the nature of the Estate tayle and for the preservation of it and Recovery is against the nature of it for this destroyes the Estate tayle and is onely a consequent of it and not parcell of the nature of the Estate and this is the reason that Littleton saith That an Estate tayle upon condition that he should not alien is good for that preserves the Estate and also preserves Formedon for him in reversion if there be a discontinuance and with that agreed 13 H. 7. 23. 24. and he sayd that there was a Judgement in the point for his Clyent for another part of the Land and he cyted 31 Edw. 5. Fitz. Feoffment placito the last and Fitzherberts Natura brevium Ex gravi querela last Case and so concluded and prayed judgement for the Plaintiff and this Case was argued againe by Shirley Serjeant for the Defendant and he intended that the agreement is voyd to the Wife and shall be intended the agreement of the Husband onely for a marryed Wife cannot countermand Livery 21 Assis 25. and if a Woman makes a Feoffment upon condition to enfeoff upon request made by her and she takes a Husband she cannot make request after coverture 35 Assisarum So that he intended that this shall be intended the agreement of the Husband onely and not of the Wife and yet he argued that Declaration of a use by a marryed Wife shall be good according to Beckwiths Case But he sayd That the reason of that is for that that she is party to the Recovery which is a matter of Record and as long as the Record remaines in force so long the Declaration of the use shall be good and also he argued that if the condition being that if the Wife conclude or agree to any act to make discontinuance that then c. that that shall be intended unlawfull acts and Recovery is no unlawfull act and for that shall not be within the restraint of the Condition as the Earl of Arundels Case 17 Eliz. Dyer 343. and admitting that it is a limitation yet it shall be of the same nature as a condition and as well as a condition that Tenant in tayle shall not suffer Recovery is voyd So also is such Limitation void and so it was intended before the Statute of Donis Conditionalibus and it appeares by the pleading that the parties did not intend to take advantage of the agreement for it is pleaded that at the time of the Recovery suffered the youngest Daughter was seised of an estate tayl the which could not be if her estate were determined and destroyed by the agreement and conclusion so that the last words make the Forfeyture for the first are not unlawfull and before the execution of the Recovery the estate tayl is determined and so he concluded and praied Judgement for the Defendant Barker Serjeant argued for the Plaintiff It shall be intended a Limitation and not a condition for a Will shall have favorable construction according to the intent of the Devisor for a Joyntenant may devise to his Companion 49. Ed. 3. and Fitz. Na. Bre. Ex gravi querela last case A man devises Land to his Wife for life upon condition that if he marry that it should remain over to his Son in tayl and the Wife marries and the Son in remainder sues Ex Gravi querela by which it appeares that it was a Limitation and not a condition and 34 Ed. 3. devise was to one for life upon condition that if his Sonn disturbed him that then it should remaine over in taile upon disturbance he in Remainder in tail brings Formedon by which it appears it was a Limitation and with that agrees all the Justices in 29 Assisarum 17. And Wellock and Hamonds Case cited in Barastons Case before and 18. Eliz. Dyer If Land be limited to no third person by the Devise then the Heir shall enter for breaking the condition and also he said that it appears by Littleton and 13 H. 7 23. and 24 and 20 H. 7. and 17 Eliz. 343. the Earle of Arundells case which conditioneth that Tenant in taile shall not alien standeth with his Estate but not with Fee simple and so it is adjudged in Nowes and Scholasticas Case which is adjudged in the point which as he saith cannot be answered and the Words of the Condition are not that her Estate taile shall cease as if shee had been dead but as if she had not been named which is not so repugnant or absurd as the other and this compared to 34 Ed 3. Where the Estate was limited till it was disturbed And he also argued that the agreement of the Wife shall be a forfeiture notwithstanding the coverture for when the Estate is granted upon such condition he which hath the estate shall take it subject to the condition as if two Lessees are and one Seals the Counterpart onely yet the other shall be bound by the Covenants contained in it and 33 H. 6. 31. a Woman disavows to be Executor notwithstanding that shee was marryed and if Precipe had been brought against the Husband and Wife the default of the Husband shall binde the Wife and so she shall be punished for waste made during the coverture and so concluded and prayed judgement for the Plaintiff Foster Justice that an Estate of Free-hold shall not cease by agreement or conclusion without entry for it is a matter of Inheritance and Free-hold and it is not like to 33 H. 6. 31. which concerns Chattels and Goods and Walmesley Justice accorded with him Warburton Justice it hath been adjudged in Scholasticas Case that the condition was good and therefore he would not deliver his
condition to re-enfeoff and she with her Husband makes the re-enfeoffment it is good so a Woman being Lessee for Life and with her Husband attorn upon a Grant of Reversion is good and shall binde the Wife after the Death of the Husband 3 Ed. 3. 42. 4 Ed. 3. Attornment 12. 15 Ed. 3. Attornment also this Estate was made to the Wife when she was sole and for that it shall be accounted her folly that she would take such a Husband that would forfeit her Estate but with that agreed the reason of the Booke of 20 H. 6. 28. Where a woman Tenant was bound by the ceasing of her Husband and so he concluded and prayed Judgment for the Plaintiff and so it was adjourned see another argument of this case in Michaelmas Tearm 9. Jacobi 1611. by Haughton and Nicholls Serjeants Pasch 9. Jacobi 1611. In the Common Bench. Pitts against Dowse IN an Ejectione firme upon not guilty pleaded The Case was this A man makes his Will by these words I bequeath all my Lands to my Son Richard except my Chauntery Lands And I devise all my Chauntery Lands to be devided amongst all my Children men and women alike except my Son Richard And if Richard die without Issue the remainder to A. My second Son the remainder to B. My third Son the remainder to C. My fourth Son the remainder to my next of blood and so from Heire to Heire And so likewise I would to be done upon my Chauntery Lands and Tenements in case all my aforesaid Children die without Issue Then I would the one halfe of my Chauntery Lands to remaine to the next of kin and the other half to the Hospitall of M. And the question was what estate the Heire of the eldest Son shall have in the Chauntery Lands and it was argued by Dodridge the Kings Serjeant that the Heire of the eldest Son shall have estate tayl in the Chauntery Lands the Devisor devises no estate to Richard his eldest Son in the Chauntery Lands nor limitts any estate of that in certaine and for that he seemed that the youngest Sons and Daughters shall be Tenants in Common for life and by this manner of Interpretation every part of the Will shall be for first he excludes Richard himselfe so that he shall have nothing in that and then by the Limitation to the younger Children to be equally divided between them makes them Tenants in Common see 28. H. 8. 25. Dyer 155. And he cited Lewin and Coxes Case to be adjudged Michaelmasse 41. and 42. of Eliz. Pasche 42. Eliz. Rot. 207. Where a man devises Lands to his two Sons to be equally divided and adjudged that they are Tenants in Common so devise to two part and part like and equally divided and equally to be divided is all one and for that there is no other words to make an estate of Inheritance it shall be an estate for life and the remainder shall be directed according to the estates limited of the other Land And he seemed that the words in the last sentence all my aforesaid Children shall extend to Richard his eldest Son as well as to the others and so all the Will shall stand in his force which may be Objected that Richard the eldest Son shall be excluded out of the Possession and for that see 6. Eliz. Dyer 333. 29. Chapmans Case and also he cited one case to be adjudged Trinity 37. Eliz. Rot. 632. betweene Bedford and Vernam where a man deviseth all his lands in Alworth and afterwards purchaseth other Lands in the same Town and afterwards one comes to him to take a Lease of this Land newly purchased which the Testator refused to Let. And said that these Lands newly purchased should goe as his other Lands And upon his Death bed adds a Codycell to his Will but saith nothing of his purchased Lands and adjudged that the purchased Lands shall passe and so concluded and praied Judgement Harris Serjeant that it is a new Sentence and Richard is excluded and it shall be a good Estate tayl to the youngest Children and foresayd Children shall be intended them to which the Chauntery Lands are limited see Ratcliffes case 3. of Coke adjudged that they shall be Tenants in Common by the devise to he equally divided and thall not be surviving but every youngest Children shall have his part in tayl though that the first words do not containe words of Inheritance yet the last words in case all my Children die without Issue declares his intent that they should have an estate tayl see the 16. of Eliz. Dyer 339. 20. Claches Case that when he hath disposed of part devised to Richard then disposeth of the residue and the sentence begins with And so likewise and that shall be intended in the same manner as he had disposed of the Lands devised to Richard for he hath devised the remainder otherwise that is to an Hospitall and so concludes and praies Judgement accordingly Coke cheife Justice saith that it was adjudged between Coke and Petwiches 29. Eliz. that if a man devise a house to his eldest Son in tayl and another house to his second Son in tayl and the third house to the third Son in tayl and if any of them die without Issue the remainder to the other two equally this shall be but for life for this enures to the quantity of the Land and not to the quality of the Estate And he said that Richard is excepted without question for it is but a Will and every of the youngest Sons therein shall have the Chauntery Land one after another and Richard shall have no part and the Chauntery shall have nothing till they all are dead and he likened that to Frenchams Case where Lands were given to one and to his Heires Males and if he died without Issue the remainder over the Issues Females shall not take though that it be if they die without Issue for expresse it makes to cease only and so it was adjourned Petoes Case PEto suffers a common Recovery to the use of himselfe for life the remainder to his eldest Son in tayl with diverse remainders over to the intent that such Annuities should be paid as he by his last Will or by grant declares so that they did not exceed the summ of sixty pound and if any of the said Rents be behind then to the use of him to whom the Rent shall be behind till the Rent be satisfied with clause of distresse Rent of twenty pound was granted to his youngest Son for his life the grantee distraines for the Rent and in Replevin avowes the Plaintiffe replâ—es that by the non-paiment the use riseth to the youngest Son by which it was objected that the Rent shall be suspended Quere if without demand or if the distresse shall be demanded or that the use shall not rise till after the distresse and to the distresse well taken and agreed by all that the Plaintiff shall take nothing by
brings an action of Trespasse and the first Nonsuit pleaded in Barr and adjudged a good Barr 12 Edw. 4. accordingly Foster Walmesley and Warburton agreed without any doubt but they sayd that if the first execution had been had by Covin then it should have been otherwise In Debt upon buying of diverse severall things the Defendant confesseth part and for the residue the action being brought by an Executor in the Detinet onely the Defendant pleads he oweth him nothing and upon this Tryall was had and Verdict for the Plaintiff and after Verdict it was moved that this misjoyning of Issue was ayded by the Statute of Jeofailes but it was resolved by all the Justices that it was not ayded for it was no misjoyning of the Issue but no Issue at all but if there had been Issue joyned though that it were not upon the direct matter yet this shall be ayded and at the end the Plaintiff remitted the part that the Issue was joyned and prayed Judgment for the residue and this was granted but if the Plaintiff had been nonsuited that would go to all Administrators during the minority had Judgment in debt and before execution sued the Executor came to his age of seventeen yeares and how this execution shall be sued comes the question for the power of the Administrator was determined by the attaining of age of 17. yeares by the Executor and the Executor was not party to the Record and for that he could not sue execution but it seems that the Executor may sue speciall Scire facias upon the Record and so sue execution in his owne name See 27 H. 8. 7. a. Action upon the Case for these words He hath stolne forty Staure of Lead meaning Lead in Stauce from the Minster and resolved by all that action doth not lye for it shall be intended that the Lead was parcell of the Minster and the Innuendo shall not helpe that Pasche 9. Jacobi 1611. In Common Bench Crane against Colepit THomas Crane Plaintiff in Replevin against Bartholemew Colepit the only question was if Tenant by discent of the age of twenty years and more ought under one and twenty yeares to attorn to a Grant of the signiory or not and it was adjudged that the Attornement is good for three reasons First For that he gives no Interest and for that it cannot be upon condition for it is but a bare assent Secondly His Ancestors held the same Land by the payment of the Rent and making of their Services and it is reason that the Rent should be payd and the Services performed and for that though that he shall have his age for the Land yet for the Rent he shall not have his age and though that it is agreed in 32 Ed. 3. That he shall have his age In per que servitia yet after his full age the Grantee shall distraine for all the arrerages due from the first so that the Attornement is no prejudice for this Infant and he is in the number of those which shall be compellable to attorn see 41 Ed. 3. age 23. 26 Ed 3. 32. 32 Ed. 3. and 31 Ed. 3. Per que servitia 9 Ed. 3. 38. 32 Ed. 3. Infant of the age of three years attorned and good and 3 Ed. 3. 42. Husband attornes and that shall bind the Wife 12 Ed. 4. 4. 18 H. 6. Attornement of an Infant is good to binde him for that it is a lawfull act Thirdly The Attornement is a perfect thing of which the Law requires the finishing that is the grant of the signiory which is not perfect till the Tenant attorn and Foster Justice said that so it had been adjudged in this Court in the time of the Reigne of Elizabeth in which Judgment all the Justices agreed with one voyce without any contradiction See 26. Ed. 3. 62. Pasch 9. Jacobi 1611. In the Common Bench. As yet Rowles against Mason see the beginning Michaelmas 8. Jacobi DOdridge Serjeant of the King argued for the Plaintiff he saith that there are two Copies first that a Copy-holder for life under a 100. l. may nominate his Successor Secondly That such Copy-holder after such nomination may cut down all the Trees growing upon his Copy-hold and sell them and he saith that it hath been adjudged that the custome that Copy-holder for life may sell the Trees growing upon his Copy-hold is void between Popham and Hill Hillary 45 Eliz. in this Court so if the first custome doth not make difference by the nomination the second is resolved to be void and it seemes to him that the first custome doth not make difference and to the objection that the first custome hath been adjudged to be good between Bale and Crab he saith that the custome adjudged and this custome as it is found differs in many points First It was found that every Copy-holder for life solely seised without Remainder but here is sole Tenant in possession and this may be where there is a Remainder so that uncertainty in this makes the custome void as in 6 Ed. 3. custome that an Infant at the age of discretion may alien is void for uncertainty also in the case here it is found that the Copy-holder may name who shall be next Tenant to the Lord and doth not say to whom the nomination shall be made but in the first case the custome is found to be that the nomination ought to be to the Lord in the presence of two Copy-holders also in the first it is found that if they cannot agree of the Fine that the Homage shall assess it but in this custome here found there is not any mention of that he ought to seek to be admitted and doth not say at what court the which ought to be shewed in certain as it is resolved in Penimans Case 5 Coke 84. Where custome that a Feoffment ought to be inrolled is expressed shall be inrolled at the next court also in the first case to be found that after the Fine is payd or offered he which is named shall be admitted and here is not any mention of that so that he concluded that this is a new custome and not the same custome which was in question between Bayle and Colepit also it is found that the trees were cut immediately after nomination of a new Tenant and before any admittance or Fine payd for him so that insomuch that the Benefit was not equall as well as to the Lord as to the Tenant as in 2 Ed. 4. 28. and 22 Ed. 4. 80. For plowing and turning upon the Land of another for that the custome shall be void And to the second custome also it seems that that is voyd and unreasonable First for that when any is alledged in the custome that is inconvenient though that it be not mischeivous yet the custome shall be void as in 4. Assisarum 27. in Assise brought against an Abbot which pleads custome that all the houses of the South side of
the street shall be devisable and he claimes by force of a Devise made according to that custome and adjudged that the custome is not good for it is inconvenient that in one self same ancient Town one house shall be devisable and another not and upon that the Plea was amended so here custome that a Copy-holder may sell all the Trees is inconvenient for it doth not appeare that this Custome extended to any other but to him Secondly this Custome is against the Common Wealth for every Custome ought to have preservation and maintenance and that shall not be here for when one Copy-holder hath sold all the Trees the Successor shall not have any Boots nor Fire and so by the same reason he may pull down the house And so this tends to destruction and rests in the will of a man if he will distroy or not And this is inconvenient that such power should be given to one which hath but an estate for life as in 14. Ed. 3. Barr 277. Copy-holder pleads Custome of a Mannor that that Copy-holder which comes first after a windfall falne shall have it and resolved to be void Custome for that it rests in the will of a man if he will finde that or not So in 5. H. 7. 9. Custome that if one find Beasts doing Dammage that he may distraine them and have foure pence for his Dammages and adjudged void Custome for the Dammages are nncertaine and for that it is no reason that the Fine shall be certaine and 19. Eliz. Dyer 358. 46. Custome that all Devises and Leases granted for more then six yeares are meerly void forthwith is a void Custome because contrary to common reason and the liberty of one which hath Fee simple So 2 Hen. 4. 24. Custome that the Tenants of the Mannor shall not use their Common till the Lord put in his Beasts is void for it should not depend on the Will of the Lord So in the principall case the Lord cannot grant Copy-hold Estate in reversion for it depends upon the Nomination of his Tenant and for that the Custome shall be void Thirdly The Copy-holder hath prescribed to do a thing which is contrary to his Estate and doth not cohere with his Estate that is that Lessee for life shall cut the Trees for he hath but a speciall property in that and not the â—bsolute property and it is like to a Case in 19 Ed 3. Feoffments 68. and 19 Assise 9. Where Commander of an Hospitall prescribes that he and his Predecessors which have had the same office have used to make Leases for lives and in an Action brought by the Prior it was adjudged that the custome is void and so by consequence the Lease was void for the Commander hath no Estate to make it so in Forsâ— and Hemlings Case 4. Coke and 3 Ed. 3. F. Dat. Custome that a married Wife may make a Will is void for it doth not stand with the quality of her person so here it is not with the quality of the Estate but it may be objected that it is a greater Estate then an Estate for life for it is perpetuall Free-hold to that it may be answered in this case it is no greater Estate then for life for the Copy-holder hath only made nomination but he which was nominated was not admitted so that the Tenant hath no greater Estate nor the Lord hath granted greater Estate then for life but admit that he be Tenant for life with a Remainder for life to him to whom the nomination is made yet he cannot do such an act and for that the cutting down of the Trees shall be a forfeiture of his Estate by custome by which the Estate is created and copy-hold Lands are not as other Lands which if they were let for Life at the common Law the Tenant were dispunishable for wast till the Statute of Glocester for it was the Folly of the Lessor to make a Lease to such a person which would make wast and for that as the benefit and Priviledge of the copy-holder remaines so the benefit of the Lord shall not be abridged and so he prayed Judgment for the Plaintiff Haughton Serjeant seemeth the contrary for the Defendant and he agreed that Customes ought to be reasonable and if they be generally inconvenient they cannot be reasonable and to the first exception to prove that it is a new Custome that is that it is found that he is onely Tenant in possession without saying Without Remainder as it was in the first Case to that he thought if it were true that the Copy-holder hath such priviledge that he might nominate his Successor it is not materiall and to the lessening of the Fine that is found very certaine for he that is nominated at the first requires admittance and if the Lord refuse that he shall be admitted for such a Fine that the Homage Assess and so it is found and that is very certaine and the rather for that that this is a speciall Verdict Also he agreed as before That Custome ought to be reasonable and if it be generally inconvenient though it be not mischeivous yet it shall not be good and to the Case of 40 Assis 37. Custome to devise the Tenements on the South side of the Street is not good for that that Custome cannot be in one particular place certaine and also he agreed the Case of Windfall for that tended to charge the Lord 3 Eliz. Dyer 299. 57. 58. Custome to have Herriot the best Beast and if that be put out of the way before seisure then the Lord may seise and take the Beast of any other mans there arising and lying downe to his owne proper use and the custome held voyd and unreasonable So the custome in 20 H. 7. to have so much for every Pound-breach is voyd but this custome is meerly between the Lord and Tenant and the custome hath made that discendable Inheritance and also may have reasonable beginning and the Lord hath benefit for that that is his Fine for the admittance of him which is nominated and custome hath created other Estates as Grant to him and his is good by the custome and so the Cases of 21 Ed. 4. and 22 Ed. 4. before cyted for the turning of Plough upon the Land of his Neighbour So the custome if the Lord feed the Beasts of his Tenant that he may Fold them and so he concluded that the first custome to make nomination is good and to the second custome he agreed that bare Copy-holder for life could not Prescribe to cut and sell all the Trees no more then custome that Tenant for life may devise as 35 H. 6. But here the Tenant hath perpetuity in his Estate and may nominate his Successor and as well as the Common Law allows Tenant after possibility of Issue extinct to make waste so may custome allow Tenant for life with such nomination power to cut and sell the Trees Also he intended admitting the custome not good
against the surviving Donee of houses and Lands to him demised and agreed that the Writ was good but it was a question if the Count shall be generall or of a halfe only notwithstanding that both the parties were Tenants in Common of the reversion Michaelmas 1611. 9. Jacobi in the Common Bench. Ralph Bagnall against John Tucker after 83. TRINITY 9. or Micaelmasse 8. Jacobi Rot 3648. The Case was Copy-holder for life remainder for life purchaseth the Frehold and levies a Fine with Proclamations made five yeares-passe and then he died if the remainder were bound by the Fine or not was the question and it seemes that it shall not be Barr for he is not turned out of possession in right So if a man hath a Lease for remainder for yeares and the first Lessee for yeares purchase the free-hold and levie a Fine with Proclamations and five yeares passe this shall not barr the remainder for yeares insomuch that this was Interest of a Tearme and remaines an Interest as it was without any alteration and it was not turned to a Right And yet it was agreed that the Statute of buying of pretenced rights extends to Copy-holds See Lessures Case 5. Coke 125. See Pasche 1612. for the Judgement Note if an Attorney of this Court be sued here by Bill of Priviledge he ought not to find Bayle But if he be sued by Originall and comes in by Capias then he ought to find Bayle In covenant upon a Lease made by the Dean of Norwich Predecessor to the Dean that now is and the then Chapter of the Foundation of Ed. 6. King for injoying of Land devised to the Plaintiff for three Lives discharged of all incumbrances and also to accept surrender of the same Lease and to make a new and for breaking of covenant the same Dean and Chapter in such a yeare of the Raine of H. 8 had made a lease for years not determined by which the lands devised were incumbred upon which the Defendant demurred And Hutton Serjeant for the Defendant argued that the Lease was by the Statute of 13 of Eliz. as to the successor of the Dean which made it for that it was a Lease for years in being at the time of the making of that as it is resolved in Elmers Case upon the Statute of 1 Eliz. if a Bishop makes a Lease for years and after makes a Lease for life the Lease for life is void to the Successor and so it is in the case of Dean and Chapter and though that the words of the Statute are generally that such a Lease shall be void to all intents purposes and Constructions yet he intended that it shall not be voyd against the Bishop himselfe as it was resolved in the case of the next Advowson by the Bishop in Singletons Case cyted in Lincolne Colledge Case 3. Coke 59. b. And he intended if the Lease be voyd against the Successors that then the covenants also are void as it is agreed in the 28 H. 8. 28. Dyer 189. 190. and he cited one Mills case to be adjudged in the 29 and 30. Eliz. in the Kings Bench that if a Parson make Lease and avoid by non-Residence the Covenants also are void as well as the Lease and also he intended that the Lease for life was void insomuch that it was to be executed by a Letter of Attorney and the Attorney had not made livery till after two Rent dayes were past and for that the Livery was not good for when a man makes a Lease for life rendring Rent with Letter of Attorney to make livery here is an implyed condition that Livery shall be made before any day of payment be incurred and it is as much as if a man had made a Lease for life without any Letter of Attorney to make Livery before such a day there if the Attorney do not make Livery before the day but after the Livery is void insomuch as it is contrary to the Condition so in the case here for if Livery made be after a Rent day it may be made after twenty and so immediately before the end of the Tearme and if the Rent be void for this cause the Covenants also are void and if a man bargain and sell his Mannor and the Trees growing upon it the Trees do not passe without Inrollment insomuch that it was the intent of the parties that it should so passe and for that they do not passe without the Mannor also he intended that the Count is repugnant insomuch that that containes that the last Lease for life was made in the time of Ed. 6. and after by the Dean and Chapter of the foundation of Ed. 6. and after that containes that the same Dean and Chapter have made a former Lease in the time of H. 8. Which cannot be if the Dean and Chapter were of the Foundation of Ed. 6. and for that the Count ought to have contained the alteration of the foundation as in case of prescription as in Tringhams case 4. Coke 38. Wyat Wilds Case 8 Coke 79. 2. and 3. Phil. and Mary Dyer 124. A good Case and he intended that a declaration ought to have precise certainty as in 8. and 9. Eliz. 254. Dyer for a thing which cannot be presumed shall not be intended as it is agreed in Pigotts Case 5 Coke 29. a. otherwise of Plea in Barr for that is sufficient if it be good to common intent also he intended that there is variance between the Count and the Covenant for the declaration is that the Dean and Chapter covenanted with the Plaintiffs the Covenant is generall that is that the Dean and Chapter covenant and doth not say with who and for that the Count also shall not be good and so he concluded and prayed Judgment for the Defendant Haughton Serjeant for the Plaintiff intended that the Covenants shall not be voyd notwithstanding that the Lease it self be voyd he intended that a lease made by a Parson shal be good against himself but it shall be voyd by his death to the Successor but a Lease made by a Dean and Chapter shall be void to the Dean himself and the Covenant shall be in force notwithstanding that the Lease be void insomuch that the Covenants are collaterall and have not any dependance upon the Lease but to the inherent Covenants which depend upon the Lease and the Estate as for Reparations and such like shall be voyd by the avoidance of the Lease but he intended that Covenant to discharge the Land from incumbrances doth not depend upon the Interest but it is meerly collaterall and for that it shall not be void and with this difference he agreed all the Cases put of the other part as in 45 Ed. 3. 3. Lease was made to the Husband and Wife the Husband dies the wife accepts the Land and shall not be charged with collaterall Covenants notwithstanding that shee agrees to the Estate insomuch that they do not depend
Daughter or with another person shall make agreement and the other person of necessity shall be intended her Husband and so this agreement by the Husband and the Wife is within the words of the Condition And also he saith that it is argued in Becwiths Case 2. Coke that a married Wife may declare a use of a Fine which is levied of her Inheritance and if the Husband declare uses the Wife may controlle them And if an Estate be conveyed with power that the Husband with the assent of his Wife may revoke that the assent of the Wife to such revocation is good So if Proviso be that a married Wife only without her Husband may make revocation of uses and declare new this is good and revocation made by the Wife and declaration of new uses are very good and he agreed that in matters of Record the Husband cannot prejudice the Wife without her consent as Warrant of Attorney upon a Quid Juris Clamat or Per que servitia or other Act which concernes her Inheritance as in 9. H. 6. 52. 46. Ed. 3. 11. 43. Ed. 3. 5. and 27. H. 8. If a married Wife joyne with her Husband in a Feoffment of her owne Land rendring Rent and after the Husband dies and the Wife accepts the Rent this shall bind her which proves that it was her Feoffment as well as the Feoffment of the Husband Secondly he considered the words of the Condition which are Conclude and agree c the which he intended not to be so uncertaine as going about but they are Issuable and triable as it is agreed in 5. Ed. 4. 6. Com. 56. a. Wyrbish and Taylbois Case consent to a Ravishment within the Statute of 6. R. 2. is Issuable and triable so of consent and agreement within this Condition for though that the words are consent and agree yet it ought to be otherwise an Act subsequent that is reconvey suffer or other such Act or agreement shall not be forfeyture for to make Elopment which shall be a forfeyture of Dower there ought first to be consent but that is not sufficient but there ought to be also departure from the Husband and then the Law adjudges upon all the Act So here when it is an agreement and another Act subsequent which is executed then the Law shall judgeupon altogether and for that this agreement consists of two parts first when the Wife upon the motion of the Husband concludes and agrees to do the Act which is the beginning of the agreement and then when the Husband and the Wife upon that joyne in Deed indent as in this case this is a consummation and makes a breaking of the condition and this is not like the condition in Myldmaies Case where every going about ought to breake that as if he goe to Councell to be advised upon his Estate Thirdly he intenâ—ed that the condition is not repugnant to the Estate in respect that an other thing is to be done before the forfeyture and after the concluding and agreeing for the Wife remaines in Seisin after the agreement till the Recovery or other Act be executed And also he argued that before the Statute of 4. H. 7. of Fynes Tenant in tayl might be restrained of alienation of his Estate for untill that he could not Barr the Issue in tayl So at this day he intended that a gift in tayl upon condition that he shall levie a Fine without proclamations this is good and out of the power which is given to Tenant in tayl to Barr the Estate tayl by the levying of a Fine And levying of a Fine without proclamations is only a discontinuance and so tortious so when a Condition doth not extend to all acts but only to all unlawful acts and for that it doth not extend to a Recovery for that is a lawfull Act as it is agreed in Scholasticas Case 10. H. 7. 10 11. H. 7. 6 7. 21. H. 7. and 28 H. 8. Leomans Case If an ecclesiasticall person hath a Tearme with this condition that he shall not alien and after comes the Estate which inflicts punishment upon him for keeping of a Farme and yet it seemes it is a good condition But so upon the Statute of 4. H. 7. of fines If aman hath agift in tayl with condition that he shal not alien And after the Statute of 4. H. 7. is made which inables him to barr the Estate tayl by fine yet he intended that the condition should restraine him from all unlawfull Alienations And he intended as well as such a condition annexed to a Lease for life is good so is it being annexed to an Estate tayl for as well as it is in one case for the preservation of the reversion So is this in the other case and as in 6. Eliz. Dyer 227. Grant of Rent Proviso that it shall not charge the person of the Grantor shall not extend to the Executors of the Grantor but shall be determined by the death of the Grantor And so as a condition that a married Wife or an Infant shall not alien is good insomuch that this is wrong so he intended that if this were a good condition at the Common Law that Tenant in tayl shall not alien the Estate by 4. H. 7. and 37. H. 8. doth not inable Tenant in tayl to make alienation against such condition And it hath been agreed that if a man make a Feoffment in fee of the Mannor of D. And after makes a gift in tayl of the Mannor of S. upon condition that the Donee shall not alien the Mannor of D. this is a a good condition and in the 21. H. 7. 12. it is agreed that if a man make a Feoffment Causa Matrimonij Prolâ—cuti and after Divorce is sued there the free-hold shall be devested out of the Husband without entry And also he intended that a man might make a thing by devise the which he could not make by Act executed as Authority to sell his Lands to his Executors it good and yet in all cases of Authorities by Acts executed the Authority shall cease with the life of the party And for that there shall be one Law of devises and another Law of Acts executed by the party in his life as 29. assis 17. and Fitz. Na. Bre. in ex gravi querela last case the particuler Estate being created by devise ceases and remainder takes effect And then to the exception that the estate shall cease and remaine to him which had the next remainder the which is repugnant as it was intended and so is Jermy and Arscotts Case But here the words are that the Estate shall cease as if the party to which that is limited were dead without Issue from the time of the Contract and agreement and the remainder to him which hath the next remainder and not the Issue of him which made the forfeyture and also this Remainder from the time of the agreement and conclusion and not from the time of the Act
that Sir Thomas Fitzherbert had the possession by acceptance of the surrender of the estate conveyed to William Fitzherbert and his Wife notwithstanding it was admitted by pleading that he had that by Disseisin And all the Justices agreed that the Jury shall not be concluded by the pleading of the parties insomuch that they are sworn to speake the truth Pasche 1612. 10. Jacobi in the Common Bench. Brook Plaintiff against Cobb IN Wast the Plaintiff assignes waste in cutting down of 20. Oaks in such a Close and 40. Oaks in such a Close c. Upon the Evidence it appears that the said Oaks were remaining upon the Land for standils according to the statute at the last felling of that and they were of the growth of 16. or 20. years and that tithes were paid for it And it was agreed by the Lord Coke and all the Justices that this was no Waste insomuch it was felled as Acre wood And it was said by the Lord Coke that though it be of the age of 20. or 24. yeares yet if the use of the Parties be to fell such for seasonable Wood this shall not be Waste and if Tithes be paid for that it appears that it is no Timber Doctor Mannings Case in the Star-chamber ONe Golding as an Informer and not as party greived exhibits his Bill in the Star-chamber against Doctor Manning Chancellor to the Bishop of Exeter for Extortion Oppression and other offences It was resolved that when a Bill contains any particular offences and after the same Bill contains generall words which includes many offences of the same kind And the Plaintiff proves the particular offences he may examine other particular offences also included within these generall words in supplement and aggravation of the particular offences contained in the Bill and if they be proved the Court will give the greater and high sentence against the Defendant in respect of them notwithstanding that they be not particularly expressed in the Bill But if the Plaintiff hath not proved any of the offences particularly expressed in the Bill the Defendant shall not be censured by the particulars grounded upon the generall words of the Bill And if a man which is not party greived exhibite Bill for offence made to another person as against whom the offence was committed he shall not be allowed as Witnesse insomuch as he is party greived and by that he should be a witnesse in his own Cause Pasche 1612. 10. Jacobi in the Common Bench. William Peacock Plaintiff against Sir George Raynell IN the Sar-chamber the Plaintiff exhibits his Bill against the Defendant for Libelling and Infamous Letters the which was in this manner The Plaintiff being Heire generall to Richard Peacock which was of the age of eighty six yeares and had Lands of Inheritance to the value of 8. or 900. pound per annum and the Defendant had married the Daughter of Sir Edward Peacock which was a yonger brother of the said Richard Peacock and the said Defendant perceiving that the said Richard Peacock had purpose to settle his Inheritance upon the said Plaintiff and intending to remove the affection of the said Richard from the Plaintiff and to settle that in himselfe writes a Letter to the said Richard Peacock containing that the Plaintiff was not the Son of a Peacock and was a hunter of Tavernes and that divers women had followed him from London to the place of his dwelling and that he did desire to heare of the death of the said Richard and that all his Inheritance would not be sufficient to satisfie his Debts and many other matters concerning his Reputation and Credit to that subscribed his name this ensealed directed to the said R. Peacock And it was agreed that this was a Libell and for that the Defendant was Fined to two hundred pound and Imprisonment according to the course of the Court And the Plaintiff let loose to the Common Law for his recompence for the Damages he hath sustained But if the Letter had been directed to the Plaintiff himselfe and not to the third person then it should not have been a Libell or if it had been directed to a Father for Reformation of any Acts made by his Children it should be no Libell for it is not but for Reformation and not for Defamation for if a Letter containe scandalous matter and be directed to a third person if it be Reformarory and for no respect to himselfe it shall not be intended to be a Libell for with what mind it was made is to be respected As if a man write to a Father and his Letter containe scandalous matter concerning his Children of which he gives notice to the Father and adviseth the Father to have better regard to his Children this is only Reformatory without any respect of profit to him which wrote it But in the first case the Defendant intended his profit and his owne benefit and this was the difference Pasche 1612. 10. Jacobi In the Common Bench. Randall Crewe against Vernon IN the Star-chamber it was resolved That if the Defendant do not performe the Sentence of the Court as here he was to make acknowledgement of his offence committed against the Court of Exchequer at Chester and this acknowledgement was to be made at the great Assises at Chester and he did nor performe the Sentence and yet the Defendant could not be fined for this contempt but only Imprisonment and for that he was committed close Prisoner till he performed it But he could not be fined insomuch there was not any Bill upon which this Sentence should be founded Pasche 1612. 10. Jacobi in the Common Bench. Charnocke against Corey See before IN Debt against Administrator The Defendant pleades two Recognisances acknowledged by the Intestate which were not satisfied and that he had not any Goods or Chattells of the said Intestate unlesse Goods and Chattells which did amount to the Debts due by the said Recognisances And it seemed to all the Justices that the Plea was not good But that the Defendant ought to plead according to the Common forme that is that he hath no Goods besides or beyond the Goods to satisfie the two Recognisances or that he hath no Goods to such value which do not amount to the said Sums due by the two Recognisances And in these cases this manner of pleading is Implied confession that he hath Goods of such a value and so they should be assets if the Recognisances be discharged or remaine of Covin and fraud to deceive Creditor Pasche 1612. 10. Jacobi in the Common Bench Bicknell against Tucker see before 75. THE Case was A Copy-hold Estate was granted to one for life remainder to another for his life the first Copy-holder for life accepts a Bargaine and Sale of the free-hold from the Lord and after that levies a Fine with proclamations and five yeares passe and then he dies and if this Fine shall be a Barr to him which
hath the Copy-hold Estate for life in remainder was the question And it was argued by Harris Serjeant that the Estate of Fines in the body of that binds all persons but onely some which have Infirmities and by the saving Rights Titles Claimes and Interests are saved But Title comes in the conditionall perclose of saving that is so that they pursue their Title Claime and Interest c. By way of Act or lawfull Entry within five yeares next after the said proclamations had and made So that in this case the principall matter to be considered is what thing is operated by the acceptance of the Bargaine and Sale for if by that the remainder of the Copy-holder be turned to right then insues that the Fine shall be a Barr And it seemes that this determines the first Estate for life and he agreed that it cannot be a surrender insomuch that there is a mesene remainder as it is 37. H. 6. 17. b. 4. H. 7. 10. But this Lease to commence at a day to come cannot be a surrender but shall be determined and extinct by acceptance of a new Lease as it is there and in 22. H. 7. 51. a. agreed and so it was adjudged in Hillary 30. Eliz. between Wilmottand Cutlers Case that if a Husband which was seised of a Copy-hold Estate in right of his Wife accept an estate for life this determines the copy-hold Estate which he hath in right of his Wife in possession So if Lessee for yeares accept an estate of one which hath no Estate yet this determines his Tearme as it was adjudged Hillary 31. Eliz. Rot. 1428. b. That if Lessee for yeares of a Lease made by the Ancester accept an estate of Guardian in Soccage this determines his Lease which he had of the Ancestor and upon that he concluded that in this case the acceptance of a Bargaine and Sale turnes the Copy-holder in remainder to a Right and then it appeares by Saffins Case 5. Coke 125. That he shall be bound though that he hath only Interest and so of Title also and he said that it appeares by Kite and Quarintons case 4. Coke 26. a. that a Right or Title may be of Copy-hold Estate for it is there said by Wray cheife Justice that it shall be with in the Statute of 32 H. 8. chapter 9. of buying of Titles and so concluded Dodridge the Kings Serjeant agreed that the sole question is if any thing be here done to turn the Copy-hold-Estate in remainder into a right for then he agreed that this shall be barred otherwise not and to that hee intended that the first Estate for life shall be sayd to be in Esse notwithstanding the acceptance of the Bargaine and Sale as to all estrangers and especially when it is to their prejudice as if Tenant grant Rent and after surrenders his estate now between the parties the Lease shall be extinct by the surrender but to the Grantee of the Rent it shall be sayd to be in Esse and if during his life he in Remainder also grants a Rent hee shall hold the Land subject to both the Rents though that the grants be both to one self sameperson so if he in Reversion grants his Reversion with warranty and after the Tenant for life surrenders and the Grantee be impleaded he shall never vouch during the life of the Tenant for life 5 H. 5. Comment 24 Ed. 3. And here also is a custome which preserves the Copy-hold Estate in Remainder and their particular Tenant cannot that prejudice and for that also it shall not be turned into a right as if a Copy-hold Estate be granted to one for life by one Copy and after the Lord grants another Estate for life by another Copy to another and then the first Copy-holder commits forfeiture he which hath the second estate cannot take advantage of that but the Lord shall hold it during the life of the first Tenant for no act made by the particular Tenant shall prejudice him in Remainder for otherwise many Inconveniencies would insue upon that as by secret conveyances or as if a grantee of a Rent charge grant that to the Tenant of the Land for his life the Remainder over the Remainder shall be good notwithstanding that the particular Estate bee extinct and drowned also he intended that the Copy-hold Estate is another thing then the land it self and for that the Fine shall not be a Barr no more then in Smith and Stapletons Case Com. Where a Fine levied of Land shal not be a Barr of Rent insomuch that it is another thing so in this case he intended that the fine shall not be a Barr of the Copy-hold Estate and concluded c. Wynch Justice was of opinion that the Fine shall not be a Barr to the Copy-hold Estate in Remainder for the acceptance of the Bargaine and Sale doth not determine the first Copy-hold Estate for life as to him in Remainder but only to the first Tenant and the Lord and betweene those he agreed that the Copy-hold Estate is determined as in Heydens Case by acceptance of a Lease for years and for that the Remainder shall not be turned to a Right and by consequence shall not be barred and for that he supposed that the reason that the Fine was a Bar in Saffins Case 5 Coke 123. b. was insomuch that the Lessor entered made a Feoffment and after levied a Fine and it is there agreed that the Feoffment turnes the Estate of the Lessee to a Right and for that the Fine shall be a barr and also there the Lease was by limitation of time to have a beginning but if a man makes a Lease for years to begin at a day to come and before the beginning of that makes a Feoffment or is disseised and Fine with proclamation is levyed yet he which hath future Interest shall not be barred for this is not turned to a Right and it was not the intent of the Statute of Fines to make a Barr of right where there was no discontinuance or Estate at least turned to right and this was the cause that at the Common Law Fine with Non-claime was no Barr but where they make alteration of possession and he cited Palmers case to be adjudged that a Fine of Land shall not be a barr for Rent where the case was Lessee for life Remainder for life of Rent The first Lessee for life of the Rent purchaseth Land and levies Fine of that and adjudged that this shall not binde them in Remainder of the Rent no more if he in remainder levy a fine that shall not prejudice the particular Tenant and so he concluded in this case that the Ramainder shall not be barred and that the Plaintiff shall have Judgment Warburton Justice accordingly and he argued that the Statute of Fines containes two parts The first to barr those which have present right and they ought to make their claim within five yeares after the Fine levied or otherwise they
of Ed. 6. and in the 8. Eliz. Salisbury then Deane and the then Chapter made a Lease to Thimblethorpe for 99. yeares to begin after the said Lease for fifty yeares made to Twaits And it doth not appeare by the pleading that Thimblethorpe entred But the succeeding Deane and Chapter in the 42. Eliz. made another Lease to Waters the Plaintiff for three lives rendring the ancient Rent quarterly with warrant of Attorney to make livery and it was not executed till after the end of three quarters of a yeare after the Sealing of it and when the time of three rent daies were Incurred And in this Lease the Deane and Chapter covenanted with Waters to acquit and save harmelesse the Lessee and the premises during the Tearme c. By reason of any Lease made by them or any of their Predecessors or by the Bishop And then the Plaintiff in his Court conveys the Lease made by Thimblethorpe to Doylye and that he intered and disturbed the Plaintiff and so assigned breach of covenant upon which this Action was founded upon which the Defendants demurr in Law And this was agreed by Dodridge the Kings Serjeant for the Defendants First that the Lease made to Waters was void and then the Covenants do not extend to charge the Defendants And he supposed the Lease to be void insomuch that the Attorney did not make Livery untill three Rent daies were incurred and the Lease was made as well for the benefit of the Lessor as for the Lessee for if the Lessee is to have the profits and the Lessor is to have the Rent And insomuch that the Livery was not made before a Rent incurred this tends to the prejudice of the Lessor and for that the Authority is countermanded and the Livery made after void for when a man hath a Letter of Attorney to make Livery he ought to make that in such manner as the Feoffer himselfe would make it and the Lessor cannot make that after a rent incurred for then he should loose that Rent Also Authority ought to be strictly pursued as in 36. H. 8. Dyer 62. 24. Letter of Attorney was made to three joyntly and severally to make Livery and reâ—…ved that two cannot do it see 11. H. 4. For it ought to be made joyntly or severally so here the Attorney ought to make the Livery as his Master will and that ought to be made before any Rent incurred And for this cause he intended the Lease to be void And then as to a Collaterall Covenant which is in effect no other but that the Plaintiff shall injoy the Land during the Tearme which is of an Estate which is nothing for if the Lease be void the Estate is nothing and the Lessee hath not any Tearme or Estate in the Land And he agreed that in the Record of Chedingtons Case 1 Coke 153. b. And in the Commentaries Wrotsleys Case 198. And 2. Eliz. Dyer 178. There is a difference betweene Tirminum Annorum and the time or space of yeares or the life of such a man but there is not any difference between a Tearme and an Estate Also he supposed that the words of the Covenant extend only to save the Plaintiff harmelesse of Leases made by these Defendants or any of their predecessors and this Lease was made to Twaits in time of H 8. Which was before their Corporation for they have been but named a Corporation in the time of Edward 6. and not before And then a Lease made in the time of H. 8. is not made by them nor by their Predecessors and so the Covenant doth not extend to that as it appeares by 8. Ed. 4. in case of prescription if Corporation be changed in manner and forme and the substance of their name remaine yet they ought to make speciall prescription then a fortiori in this case where the substance is changed and so he concluded and praied Judgement for the Defendants Nichols Serjeant for the first argued that the Livrey was well made for these Defendants shall be intended Occupiers and to have the profits of the Land till the Lessee entred or they waved the possession and so no prejudice and the Lessee shall not be charged with Rent till he enters or the Lessor wave the posaession as it was resolved in Bracebridges Case Com. 423. b. and in the Deane and Chapter of Canterburies Case there cited And for that the Livery shall be good and the Lessor not prejudiced by the deferring of it and then to the second that is the Covenant he agreed that if the Estate be created and Covenant in Law annexed to it if the Estate cease the Covenant also shall cease But if expresse Covenant be annexed then the Covenantor ought to have regard to performe it or otherwise an Action of Covenant lies against him notwithstanding that the Estate be avoided But here he intends it against him notwithstanding that the Estate be void But here he intends the Estate continues till Thimblethorp entred But admitting that he had entred yet the covenant shall bind the Covenantor as in 12. H. 4. 5. a. Parson makes a Lease for yeares and after is removed an Action of covenant lies against him and 47. Ed. 3. and 3. Ed. 3. If Tenant in 〈…〉 makes a Lease with expresse covenant and dies and the Issue outs the Lessee the Lessee shall have an Action of Covenant against the Executors of the Tenant in tayl and 9. Eliz. Dyer 257. 13. Tenant for life the Remainder over in Fee by Indenture makes a Lease without any expresse covenant and dies Lessee cannot have an Action of covenant against his Executors otherwise if there had been an expresse covenant See the booke and many Authorities there cited to this purpose and also he cited one Rawlinsons Case to be here adjudged that if a man which hath nothing in land makes a Lease and an expresse covenant for the injoying of that if he which hath right enters by which the covenant is broken Action of covenant lies upon the expresse covenant So that admitting that the Lease is void yet the covenant is good and shall bind the successors and so he concluded and praied Judgement for the Plaintiff and this case was argued at another day by Dodridge the Kings Serjeant by speciall appointment of the Judges and now he supposed that the Count containes that the same Dean Chapter which made the lease to Twaits in 37 H. 8. also made the Lease to Thimblethorp in the 18 El. w ch cannot be insomuch that the corporation was changed in the time of E. 6. for that cannot be the same Deane and Chapter for if a Prior Covent be translated into a Dean and Chapter and the Dean and Chapter will make prescription they ought to make that in speciall manner and not generally as Deane and Chapter as it is resolved 39. H. 6. 14. 15. and in 7. Ed. 4. 32. In Trespasse against the Abbot of Bermondsey it is
and before the originall purchased the Indentnre was by the assent of the Plaintiff and the Defendant cancelled and avoyded and so demands Judgment if action and it seemes by Coke cleerly that the Plea is not good without averment that no Covenant was broken before the cancelling of the Indenture Pasch 12. Jacobi 1612. In the Common Bench. Barde against Stubbing IT was moved in arrest of Judgment that the Venire facias wants these words Et habeas ibidim nemina Juratorum but the words Venire facias duodecim c. were incerted and it seems by all the Justices that it was good and that the first words are supplyed in the last and they are aided by the statutes of Jeofai es after verdict and so it was adjourned In Audita querela sued by the sureties upon an escape made by the principall they being in execution offered to bring the Money into the Court or to put in sufficient Sureties to the Court and so prayed that they might be bayled and it was agreed that if Audita querela be grounded by specialty or other matter in writing or upon matter of Record Supersedeas shall be granted before that the party be in Execution and if he be in execution he shall be bayled but if it be founded upon a matter in Deed which is only surmise he shall not have Supersedeas in one case nor shall be bayled in the other case and so was the Opinion of all the Justices In an Action of Waste for digging of earth to make Brick Estrepement was awarded and upon Affidavit that the Writ of Estrement was delivered to the Sheriff and that he gave notice of that to the party and he notwithstanding that continues to make waste attachment was awarded Pasch 12 Iacobi 1612. In the Common Bench. Fetherstones Case Trinity 1612. IN Ejectione firme The Plaintiff had Judgment and an Habere facias possessionem to the Sheriff of Coventry which returnes that he had offered possession to the Plaintiff and he refused to accept it and it seems that the Plaintiff cannot have Habere facias possessionem insomuch that it appeares by the Record that he hath refused to have the possession The case was A Dean and Chapter being Lord of a Maunor parcell of the Demesnes of the Mannor being severall adjoyned to the Common which was parcell of the wast of the Mannor and one Copy-holder which had Common in the sayd Wast puts his Beasts into the sayd waste to take his Common and they for default of inclosure escape into the sayd Demesnes by which the Lord brings his action of Trespass and upon this the Defendant pleads the speciall matter and that the Lord and all those whose Estate he had in the said place where the trespass is supposed to be made have used to fence the said place which is parcell of the Demesnes of the sayd Mannor against the Commoners which have Common in the sayd Common being parcell of the waste and also of the demesnes of the sayd Mannor and that the Beasts of the sayd Defendant escaped into the sayd place in which c for default of inclosure and so demands Judgment upon which the Plaintiff demurrs in Law In the agreement of which it was agreed by Hutton and Haughton the Serjeants which argued it whether a man by prescription is bound to make fence against Commoners as it is agreed in the 22 H. 6. 7. 8. 21 H. 6. 33. But the doubt which was made in this case by Haughton which demurred was for that that the Lord which by the prescription ought to inclose is owner of the soyle also against which he ought to inclose and so he ought to inclose against himself and for that he supposed that the pleading should have been that there is such a custome there and of time out of minde that the Lord shall inclose against the Common insomuch that by that the Copy-holder would bind the Lord and upon that it was adjourned c. Pasch 12 Jacobi 1612. In the Common Bench. Sir Henry Rowles against Sir Robert Osborne and Margeret his Wife IN Warrantia Charte the case was Sir Robert Osborne and his Wife levyed a Fine of the Mannor of Kelmersh with other Lands in Kelmersh to Sir Henry Rowles against all persons and this is declared for the Lands in Relmersh to be to the use of Sir Henry Rowles for life with diverse Remainders over and for the Mannor no use was pleaded to be declared at all and then a Writ of Entry in the Post was sued against the sayd Sir Henry Rowles which vouched Sir Robert Osborne and his sayd wifeâ— and this was declared for the sayd Lands to be to the use of the sayd Sir Henry Rowles for his life with other Remainders over which were declared upon the Fine of the Lands in Kelmersh only and of the Mannor of Kelmersh no uses were declared upon the Recovery also and upon this Recovery pleaded in barr the Plaintiffe demurred and it was argued by Dodridge Serjeant of the King for the Plaintiffe that the Plea in Barr was not good insomuch that it doth not appeare that the warranty which was executed by the Recovery was the same warranty which was created by the Fine and also the Fine was taken for assurance against the Issue in tayle and the Recovery to Barr the remainders and so one shall not destroy the other and for the first he sayd that a man may have of another severall warranties and severall causes of Voucher and all shall be together for warranty is but Covenant reall and as well as a man may have severall Covenants for personall things as well he may have severall reall Covenants for one self same Land as if the Father infeoff one with warranty and the Sonn also releases to the same Feoffee with warranty or if the Father infeoff one with warranty against him and his Heires and the Sonn release with warranty against all men the Feoffee may vouch one and Rebut against the other so of Warranty of Tenant in tayle and release of an Ancestor collaterall with warranty in Law and expresse warranty as it is agreed in 31 Ed. 1. Fitzh Voucher 289. And upon that he concluded that a man may have severall warranties of one selfe same man and the one may be executed and the other remaine notwithstanding that it be for one selfe same Land and he supposed the effect of these warranties are as they are used for if that may vouch generally and bind himselfe upon the Fine or upon his owne warranty or upon the warranty of his Ancestor notwithstanding that the voucher be generally as it is 31. Ed. 3. Warranty of Charters 22. So if he be vouched as Heire though that it were speciall but if he be Heire within age otherwise it is for that is a good Counter Plea that he was within age and so praied that the word might demur during his nonage 17.
Ed. 2. Counter Plea of voucher 111. 21. Ed. 4. 71. Then he supposed here was generall warranty which is executed and also another warranty which remaines notwithstanding any thing which appears to the Court for he hath not demanded any binding 10. Ed. 3. 15. a. b. Also the warranty in the Fine is the warranty of all the Conusees and the warranty upon which the voucher is is only the warranty of Sir Robert Osborne which cannot be intended the same warranty which is contained in the Fine which is by two as it is resolved in 10. Ed. 3. 52. But admitting that it agrees in all that is the voucher and the warranty in the Fine that is in number of persons and quantity of land and all other circumstances yet it shall be no Barr for the Common Recovery is only as further assurance for it is for forfeiture if it be suffered by Tenant for life as it is resolved in Pelhams Case 1. Coke Also he supposed that notwithstanding that the Fine was levied hanging the Writ of entry and â—o Sir Henry Rowles made Tenant yet this is good being by purchase but not if it be by discent or by recovery upon elder Title And he supposed that if the recovery and the warranty might be together by any possible meanes they shall not be distroied insomuch that this is the common case of assurance and for that shall be taken as in Pattenhams Case 4. and 5. Phil. and Mary Dyer 157. and 2. Coke Cromwells Case 77. b. where a man makes a Feoffment upon condition rendring Rent and after suffers common recovery and yet this notwithstanding the condition and Rent remaines And so it seemes that in this case the warranty remaines notwithstanding the Recovery and so he concluded and praied Judgement for the Plaintiff Nicholls Serjeant for the Defendant and he seemed that the warranty is destroied first insomuch that the Recovery was to other uses and the Fine was when proved that there was no further assurance also he supposed that insomuch that it doth not appeare to what use the Recovery was for the Mannor of Kelmersh that for that it shall be intended to the use of Sir Robert Osborne himselfe and then for that also the warranty is distroied insomuch that part of the Land is re-assured to Sir Robert Osborne as in 40. Ed. 3. 13. The Father enfeoffes the Son with warranty which re-enfeoffes the Father this destroies the warranty So if they make partition by their owne Act as it is agreed in the 34. Ed. 3. Also he supposed that the Tenancy in Sir Henry Rowles is distroied before that the Fine was Levied insomuch that this was Executed by voucher and so he did not purchase hanging the Writ for this is also conveied from him by the Recovery in the value before that the Fine is levied and it is all one with the case where a man recovers upon good Title hanging a Writ and he agreed that the recovery had been for further assurance that then it shall be as it hath been objected by the other party and the warranty had remained but this he supposeth it was not insomuch it was to other uses then the Fine was and he intended that if the Estate to which the warranty is annexed be distroied the warranty also shall be distroied 19. H. 6. 59. 21. H. 6. 45. 22. H. 6. 22. and 27. So if the Estate be avoided the warranty is distroied if it be by the Act of the parties named also he supposed that the warranty is executed and that it shall be intended the same tye upon which the warranty is created as it is 10. Ed. 3. 51. Mauxells case Com if he demand no tye but enter generally into the warranty there shall be execution of all warranties and shall bind all his rights for otherwise all the Estates tayl cannot be bound by that But where the Lieu is demanded as where there are three severall Estates tayl limited to one man and upon voucher he enters generally into the warranty all the tayles shall be bound but if he demand the Lieu's which he hath to bind him to warranty there shall be a Barr of that only upon which the voucher is and the remedy is that if he be impleaded by the party that hath made the warranty he shall be rebutted by his owne warranty But if he be Impleaded by a stranger he shall vouche him that warranted that and if warranty be once executed by voucher and Recovery in value though that the Land recoverd in value be a defeasable Title yet the party shall not voucheat another time by the same warranty as it is 5. Ed. 3. Fitz. voucher 249. and 4. Ed. 3. 36. And for that in this case insomuch that the warranty was once executed he shall not vouche againe upon the same warranty Also it is not alledged in the Count that the Plaintiff was Impleaded by Writ of Entry in the Post but in the Per in which he might have vouched and so shall not have this Action where he might have vouched And also he supposed that Sir Henry Rowles shall not have benefit by this warranty without praying aid of those in remainder insomuch that he is but Tenant for life but he supposed that it was no Remainder but reversion for otherwise they are but as an Estate and he may have advantage of the warranty as it seemes without aid praying But not where there is Tenant for life with the reversion expectant And so he concluded and praied Judgement for the Defendant And he cited one Barons Case where Tenant in tayl levies a Fine with warranty and after suffers Recovery And it was agreed by all the Justices that yet the Recovery shall be a Barr to the Remainder notwithstanding that the Estate tayl be altogether barred and extinct by the Fine but Coke cheife Justice said that Wrayâ— cheife Justice would not suffer that to be argued insomuch that it was of so great consequence being the common course of assurances But it seemes that the Recovery shall not be a Barâ— for the Remainders for the causes aforesaid and he said that he was of councell in Bartons Case and thought this Objection to be unanswerable and of this opinion continued Pasche 1612. 10. Jacobi in the Common Bench. Richard Lampitt against Margeret Starkey EJECTIONE Firme upon speciall verdict the case was this Lessee for five hundred yeares devised that to his Father for life the remainder and residue of that after the death of his Father to his Sister the Devisor dies the Sister which hath a remainder takes a Husband the Husband at the request of the Father grants release and surrenders all his Right Tearme and Intrest to the Father which had the Possession And the question was if by that the remainder of the Tearme should be extinct or not And it was argued by Dodridge for the Plaintiff that the remainder remaines that notwithstanding insomuch that this is
a possibility only which cannot be granted surrendred or released and yet he agreed that if Lessee for life grant or demise the land all his Estate passeth without making of any particuler mention of it as it is agreed in 10. Eliz. Dyer And for that when the Lessee hath devised the Lands to his Father for his life that which remaines is only a possibility for it doth not appeare for what yeares the Sister shall have it and for that meerely uncertaine 7. Eliz. Dyer 244. The King Ed. 6. appropriated a Church to the Bishop to take effect after the death of the present Incumbent the Bishop after that makes a Lease for yeares to begin after the death of the Incumbent and void for the uncertainty for the Bishop hath no perfit Estate but future Interest which is meerely impossibility and with that agreed Locrofts Case in the Rector of Cheddingtons Case 1. Coke where Lessee for yeares makes assignement of so many of the yeares as shall be to come at the time of his death and void for the uncertainty insomuch that it is meerely possibility for that which may be granted or surrendred ought to be Interesse Termini at least And he supposed it could not be released insomuch that he to whom the release is made hath all the Tearme if he lived so long and so he concluded and praied Judgement for the Plaintiff Harris Serjeant for the Defendant argued that the first devisee had two Titles one as Executor and another as a Legatee and before entry and after that he had entred also the Law doth adjudge him in as a Legatee and before that he enter he may that grant over notwithstanding that he hath not determined his Election for the Law vests the property and possession of that in him before any entry but to make an election there ought to be some open Act done as it is agreed in Welden Eltingtons Case where that the first devisee which was Executor also made expresse claime to have the Tearm as Legatee and not as Executor and so vested the remainder also see Com. 519. b. And so in Paramore and Yardlies Case Lessee for years devises his Tearme to his Executor during his life to educate his Issues the which the Executor doth accordingly and this open act was resolved to be a good election and in Mannings case 8 Coke 94. b. The Executor which hath the 1. Estate devised to him saith that he to whom the Remainder was limited shall have it after his Death and this resolved to be a good Execution and election and it is there resolved that such Election made by the particular Devisee is a good Execution for him in remainder but here is not this Election to have this as Legatee nor Executor for there is not any overt Act made by which this may be done Secondly he conceived that this is no remainder but Executory devise as it is agreed in Mannings Case and that this may be done by Devise which cannot be done by the party by act Executed and for that he conceived that there is no possibility but an Estate Executed and vested in him which is Executor though there be no election made nor Execution of the Legacy and admitting that it is but a possibility yet he conceived that it is Propinqua possibilitas insomuch that the Tearme is longer then it may be intended that any man might live insomuch that Adam lived but 950. yeares and this is five thousand yeares which is longer then any man in the world ever lived and he said that it is agreed in Fullwoods Case that possibility may be released to a possession and with this agreed the opinion of Strange in the 9 H. 6. 64. And so warranty may be released which is meerly in contingency as it is agreed in Littleton and power of revocation may be extinct by release of him that hath the possession of the Land and so he concluded and prayed Judgment for the Defendant Nicholls Serjeant for the Plaintiff conceived that the Remainder is in Esse and not determined by the Release And first he conceived that the Remainder was executed insomuch that the Release was made at the Request of the Father which was the first Devisee for this shewes his assent and implies that he took notice of his Remainder and assented to it and he sayd it was adjudged in Doctor Lawrences Case that the speaking of these words by the Executors that is that they were glad of the Devise was a good Execution and assent of the Legacy Secondly He conceived that it is only possibility and for that cannot be released or granted and he saith that the Law hath great respect of possibilities that Estates may revert and for that it is adjudged in the 13 of Richard 2. Dower 55. If Tenant for life grants his Estate to him in remainder in tayl for his owne life the Tenant enters takes a Wife and dies she shall not be Indowed but the Tenant for life shall have it againe and it shall be as it had been let to a stranger and to this purpose also he cited 18. Ed. 3. 8. Counter-Plea of voucher 8. And it was adjudged in Middletons Case 5. Coke 28. a. that an Executor before probate of the Will may release a Debt but not an Administrator before Administration granted see Com. 277 278. Fox and Greisbrookes Case and in 6. Ed. 3. Lessee for anothers life rendring Rent the Rent was behind and the Lessor releases to the Lessee all Debts he For whose life dies and there the Release determines and discharges the arrerages for it is a duty and Debitum is Latine as well for Debt as for duty also release bars the Lord and Writ of deceit for reverser of a Fine levied of land in ancient Demesne as it is 7. H. 4 and yet Littleton saith that release of a futrue thing shall not be a barr and for that if Conusee of Statute Merchant release all his Right in the land yet he may extend the Statute 15. assis And so if a mad man release and after come to his wits and dies Quere if the Heire may have a Writ of non compos mentis And he said that it was adjudged in the 25. of Eliz. If an Infant levie a Fine and after he levies another Fine this shall be a Barr in a Writ of error for the reversing of the first otherwise of a release And here to the principall case to a release made by the Son in the life time of his Father without warranty And so upon all these cases he concluded and prayed Judgment for the Plaintiff Shirley Serjeant for the Defendant argued that the acceptance of Release by the first Devisee shall not be execution of the Devise as it was adjudged in Barramores and Yardleys case by the Education of the Issue or a Devise upon condition to pay money and the Executor pays it this is a good execution
Prerogative of a Prince and is part of Law and stands with it and this is reasonable custome and so it hath been adjudged in the Kings Bench the reason is insomuch that the custome is the life of the Copy-hold upon which that depends and the party is but a Conduit to nominate the Tenant and when he is nominated and admitted then he takes by the Lord and that stands with the rules and reasons of the Common Law that is that a man devises that a marryed wife shall sell his Land and she may sell notwithstanding the Coverture for she upon the matter nominates the party and he takes by the Devise and by this reason she may sell to her Husband as it is agreed by the 8 of Assises And also by devise that Executor shall sell Executor of Executor may sell notwithstanding that he is not in Esse at the time of the Devise and so a Lease for life to one Remainder to him that J. S. shall nominate is good after nomination and then he takes by the first Livery as it is agreed in 10 H. 7. and J. S. Only hath the nomination and nothing passes to him and with this also agrees 43 Ed. 3. 19 H. 7. So if a man makes a Feoffment to the use of himself for life with diverse Remainders over and power to himself to make Leases for three lives this is good as it is agreed in Mildmayes Case and Whitlocks Case 8 Coke and yet the Estate doth not passe from him but out of all the Estates and he upon the matter hath only the nomination of the Lessee and of the lives for all the estates apply their forces to make that good and the 2 El. Dyer 192. 23. Custome that the Wife of the Copy-holder for life shall have her Widdows Estate is allowed to be a good custome and there an Estate for life upon the matter is raised out of the estate for life and annexed to it and this is by the Custome and the reason he conceived to be for that that Women should be incouraged to marry with their Tenants and by that the marriage with the Tenant and the custome in this Case doth bind the Lord and so 4 Coke there are divers customes by which the Lord is bound and the 8 Coke Swaines Case where the Copy-holder by custome hath the Trees in Case where the Lord himself hath them not so if the Lord sell the Waste yet the Copy-holder shall not loose his Common in that notwithstanding that the Estate of the Copy-holder be granted after the Wast is severed from the Mannor and it is agreed in Waggoners Case 8 Coke that custome is more available then the Common Law And for that this cnse hath been adjudged in this point between Crab and Varney by three or four Judges he would not further question it And for the second custome he agreed that one bare Tenant for life could not meddle with the Sale or falling of the Trees but here is a Copy-holder for life which hath Aut ority given by the Lord and the Custome to dispose the Trees and he saith that Bracton and the old Laws of England calls Copy-holders Falkland and saith they cannot be moved but in the hands of the Lord they ought to surrender and agreed that this is within the Rules of the Common Law for Consuetudo privat communem legem and the Law doth nor give reason of that for this is as a ground and need not to be proved for the reason of every custome cannot be shewed as it was sayd in Knightly and Spencers Case and he sayd that Mannors are divided into three sorts of Tenures The first holds by Knights Service and this is for the defence of the Lord and they have a great number of Acres of Land and pay less Services The second holds by Socage and this for to plow and manure the Demesnes of the Lord and they shall pay no Rent nor do other services and this was at the first to draw such Tenants to inhabit there and for that they have Authority to dispose and sell the Trees growing upon theit Tenements The third holds by base Tenure and these were at the Will of the Lord and these were to do Services and then these in many Cases have liberty for their Wives in some cases to dispose that for another life and to dispose the Trees and so it is in Ireland at this day where some give more and greater priviledge then others to induce Tenants to inhabite and manure their Land for there every day is a complaint made to the Councell for inticing the Tenants of the Lord and 14 Ed. 3. Bar 277. The Tenant preseribes to have the Windfalls and if the Lord cut the Trees that he may have the Lops and 11 H. 6. 2. The Keeper of the Wood prescribes to have Fee and 46 Ed. 3. is prescription to stint the Lord in his own Soyl and all these are for the Incouragement of Tenants to inhabit upon the Land and time of Ed. 1. Prescription 75. A stranger prescribed to have all the profit of the Land of another for a great part of the yeare and to exclude the giver of the Soyl 6 Ja. It was adjudged in the Kings Bench between Henrick and Pargiter that the Lord may be stinsted for Common in his own Laud and in the Book of Entries 563. It appears that by Custome Copy-hold granted Sibi suis was a good Fee-simple and the reason of all this is shewed in the 4. Coke amongst his Copy-hold Cases where it is agreed that the Life of a Copy-hold Estate is the customes and then if the Custome gives life to the Estate this gives life also to all the Priviledges which are incident to the Estate and the Lord is but the means to convey the Estate from one to another and as in 38 Ed. 3. A man hath a House as Heir to his Mother and after a stranger grants Estovers to him and his Heirs to be burnt in the same House these Estovers shall go to the Heirs of the Mother insomuch that they are incident to the House so of Priviledg incident to a Copy-hold Estate by the Custome and at the Common Law if Tenant for life hath cut the Trees he hath not forfeited his Estate for he was trusted with the Land and was not punishable till the Statute of Glocester and at this day if there be a mesne Remainder for life which remains in Contingency and that shall prevent that the Tenant shal be punished for this waste and to make innovation of this custome will be dangerous and for that he concluded that the Plaintiff shall be barred Warburton Justice agreed And the first Custome that is for the nomination of the Successor he conceived that it is good and that it is good by the Common Law and good by Custome by the Common Law as a Lease for life remainder to him which the Tenant for life shall
Common Law mâ—â— be done by Custome and that an Estate may be created by such nomination it appeares by the case where a Remainder is Limited to him which the first Tenant for life shall nominate and it is very good and to prove that the Custome is good he remembred the custome of Millam in Norfolke where he was borne that is that if any Copy-holder will sell his Land and agree of the price that at the next Court when a surrender is to be made the next of his blood and if he will not any other of his blood may have the Land and so every one shall be preferred according to the neerenesse of his blood and with this also agreed the Leviticall Law as it appeares Leviticus 25. chap. verse 15. which appoints this to be at the yeare of Jubile and the Common Law within one yeare after the Alienation and upon this he infers that if Custome may appoint Heire in the life of the party then a Fortiore he may appoint Successor after his death and he conceived that at the beginning the Copy-holders might have had absolute Fee-simple of the Lord and they rather made choice to have such Estate insomuch that they did not know if their Children would be towardly or not and for that content themselves with the nomination of a Successor only and so is the Custome at Hamm also in Middlesex if any Copy-holder will sell the next Cleivener which is he that dwelleth next unto him shall have the refusall giving so much as another will and he which Inhabits one the East part first and the South and the West and last the North shall be preferred is the only way in his course and there the Successor is nominated by the Heavens and by the quarters of the Earth and so is the custome in Glocester And if any Husband hath an Estate for twelve yeares his Wife shall have it for twelve years also and so ad Infinitum and this makes nomination and so of Free-hold and so if it be good without nomination it shall be good by nomination And if the Estate determine by the Death of the Tenant without nomination when the Lord revives the Copy-hold Estates the priviledge also shall be revived But he conceived that the Tenant cannot nominate part to one and part to another nor that divided in fractions And he saith that this point hath been adjudged in the Kings Bench by foure Judges against Popham 5. Jacobi between Ball and Crabb And so he concluded this point and to the second custome he said he would speake to that Transitive but not Definitve and that it hath been adjudged 45. Eliz. between Powell and Peacock that bare Copy holder for life could not prescribe to cut and â—ell the Trees otherwise of Tenant in Fee-simple for he hath them cherished and fostered And it is against common reason incongruent and against the Common Law that a Copy-holder for life may cut and sell the Trees and custome ought to have reason and congruence for 10. Ed. 3. 5. Leete cannot be belonging to a Church insomuch that it is Incongruent and so in Writes Case 2. Coke Tythes cannot be appurtenant to a Mannor insomuch that it is incongruent and a spirituall thing shall not be pertinent to a temporall and so è Converso And so in the 5. Assis 9. and Hill and Granges Case Com. Turbary cannon be appurtenant to Land insomuch that it is incongruent but it ought to be to a house so in time of Ed. 2. Tenant of the Mannor prescribes to have free Bull and Bare and it is not good for the reason aforesaid otherwise it is of the Lord of a Mannor and 9 H. 5. 45. custome in Leete to present common and adjudged that it it is not good insouuch that it wants congruity for it is not proper to the Court and upon this he concluded that bare Tenant for life cannot prescribe to cut Trees for it is not congruent that such an Estate shall have such a priviledge and this for three reasons First insomuch that Trees growing are parcell of the Inheritance Secondly in respect of the perdurablenesse of them for it shall be intended that they will indure forever and so will not his Estate for this is as a shadow as Job said and 't is absurd that shadow should cut downe the Tree And also it is for necessity of habitation and Plow and Husbandry And it is for the Common Wealth that Copy-holder of Inheritanc might cut them by such custome for otherwise he would not be incurraged to plant and preserve them And notwithstanding that in this Case the custome be generall that the Copy-holder may cut down all yet that shall have a reasonable construction avd that this notwithstanding he leave sufficient for House-boot as if a man grants Common without number yet the Grantor shall not be excluded but shall have his Common there for excesse shall not be allowed As if a man which distraines another for Rent he shall not take excessive distress the Lessee for life excessive Tallage of villaines nor upon excessive Fines of Copy-holders and so it was adjudged in Heyden and Sir John Lenthorps Case that the Lord shall not take all but leave sufficient for reparations and so was the opinion of Wray cheife Justice in the 33 of Eliz. In evidence to a Jury but here he is in nature of Tenant in Fee-simple and it shall be intended that he hath cherished the Timber and every Copy-holders Estate granted is as a new Grant and hath affinity with Tenant in Fee-simple and he agreed that if Lessee for life the Remainder for years Remainder for life be and the first Lessee for life makes a forfeiture he in Remainder for years shall take advantage of that and that it hath been adjudged that the Lord of the Mannor shall take advantage of forfeiture made by the Copy-holder without presentment made by the Homage and in one Bacon and Flotsims Case and so Lessee for yeares of a Mannor shall take advantage of Forfeiture notwithstanding the Imbicillity of his Estate but the principall matter upon which he relyed was that the Trees were severed from the Free-hold and if the Lessee dy his Executors shall have them insomuch that they are meer Chattells and this First in respect of the Words of the Lease that is demise and to farm let the Mannor but bargain sell give and grant the Timber Trees to be felled and carried away at his Will As if a man makes a Lease for years except the Wood and after grants the Trees the Lease determines the Lessor shall not have the Trees again Secondly They are in two divided Sentences and also in respect of divided properties for the Executor of the Lessee shall have them and Quando duo Jura concurrunt in una persona equum est ac si esset in diversis also past at severall times for the Trees pass by the delivery of the Deed and the Land
doth not pass till Livery and Seisin be made Also the intent of the parties is not that they shall pass together for if the intent were otherwise the Law would not devide them as it was adjudged Hillary 15. Eliz. in the Lord Cromwells case where Tenant in Tayl was of a Mannor with the Reversion to his right Heirs and he by his Deed gives and grants the Mannor and the Reversion of that and includes Letter of Attorney within the Deed to make Livery but Livery was not made and yet the Reversion doth not pass for his intent appeares that it should pass by Livery and Seisin and not by grant and also in Androwes case the Advowson appendant to a Mannor shall not pass without inrolment of Bargaine and Sale yet there were words there that that might passe by Grant for this was against their intent otherwise if a man makes a Lease for life or years of a Mannor and grants the Inheritance of the Advowson by the same Deed and so of the case of 23 Eliz. Dyer 374. Lessor deviseth Grants and to farm lets the Mannor and the Trees and they passe joyntly and the Reason is insomuch that it is but a Joynt sentence and not severall as it is here also he intended that the life of the Lessee for life is not averred and for that he shall be intended to be dead and for that it is a severall grant of the Trees of the Free-hold for the Interest of them is setled in his Executors for if he had made Sale of them before that the Copy-holder had cut them down then that had not been forfeiture see 5. H. 7. 15 Ed. 4. 14 Eliz. Dyer And then the Case is this Tenant for anothers life of a Mannor makes a Lease for yeares of the Free-hold of which an Estranger hath a Copy-hold Estate for life in Esse Lessee dies and he conceived that the Copy-holder shall not be an occupant for it ought to be Vacua Possessio and this was the reason of the judgment in Adams Case in 18 Eliz. Where a man makes a long Lease for years and after intending to avoyd this Lease makes a Lease to another old man for anothers life to the intent that the Lessee for yeares should be occupant when the old Lessee died and so drowned his Tearm and after the Lessee died and resolved that the Lessee for years shall not be an occupant insomuch that there was not Vacua Possessio and for this it seems to him that if Lessee for anothers life makes a Lease for years and dyes that the Lessee for yeares shall not be an occupant notwithstanding that he made speciall claim and that for the reason aforesaid but he agreed that a Lessee for anothers life makes a Lease at will and dies there the Lessee at Will shall be an Occupant insomuch that his Estate is determined and yet there is not Vacua Possessio according to 38 H. 6. 27. But he did not say there should be an occupant in these cases but cyted Bracton fol. 8. that if the Sea leave an Island in the midst of that the King shall have it and not Occupanti conceditur and so he concluded that the Plaintiff shall be barred and that Judgment shall be entred for the Defendant which was done accordingly and it was afterwards agreed upon motion in this case whether it would not make difference if the Trees were cut by the Copy-holder before that he hath made his nomination or not notwithstanding it was objected that when he hath made his nomination then he was only bare Tenant for life and the Priviledge executed and he in Remainder was also Tenant for life only for he cannot nominate till he comes to be Tenant in possession but this notwithstanding insomuch that they had power to make nomination that is the first Tenant again if the second died in his life time and the second if the first died in his life time and so the Peiviledge continues all the Justices continued of their opinions and according to that Judgment was entred for the Defendant and that the Plaintiff should be barred and should take nothing by his Writ Trinity 8. Jacobi 1610. in the Kings Bench. The Lord Rich against Franke. THE Lord Rich brought an action of Debt against Franke Administrator of one Franke and this was for a rent reserved upon a Lease for yeares made to the Intestate and the Action was brought in the Debet and Detinet for rent due in the time of the Administrator and verdict for the Plaintiff and after moved in Arrest of Judgement by the Councell of the Defendant that this Action ought to be brought in the Detinet only and not in the Debet and Detinet and Chibborn of Lincolnes Inne conceived that the Action was well brought in the Debet and Detinet and to that he sayd that Hargraves case 5 Coke is so reported to be adjudged but he saith that he hath heard the councell of the other part insisted upon that that this Judgment was reversed and for that he would under favour of the Court speake to that And hee conceived that the Action so brought is well brought for three Reasons The first shall be drawn from the nature of the Duty and to that the Case rests upon this doubt that is if the Administrator is now charged for this Rent as upon his own duty or as Administrator and it seems to him not as Administrator but as upon his own duty for he saith that it is not Debt nor duty till the day of payment as Littleton takes the diversity in his Chapter of Release between Debt upon an obligation and a Rent and the day not being incurred in time of the Intestate this cannot be his duty therefore that ought to be duty in the Administrator and to the cases of 19 H. 8. 8. Where the Executor of a Lessee for twenty years which had made a Lease for ten years rendring Rent brought action of Debt against the Lessee for ten years for rent incurred in the time of the Executor and this is in the Detinet only and the Case of 20 H. 6. 4. Where an Executor brings an action of Debt upon Arrerages of Account of an Assignement of Auditors by themselves in the Detinet only and he sayd that in these Actions the Executors were Plaintiffs and in all actions brought by Executors where they are Plaintiffs and the thing recovered shall be Asset the Action shall be brought in the Detinet but in our case they are Defendants and so the diversity and to the Objection that may be made to this Contract out of which this duty grows and arises it was made by the Intestate and not by the Administrator himself and so this is a duty upon the first Privity of the contract he answered that there is great difference when a thing comes due by the Contract of the Testator alone and ought to be payed in his time in
taken to the title because he saith that he was seised and not saith that he is and yet good by this word Fuit for that shall be intended that he continues seised so he sayd that things which are necessarily to be intended though they be not so particularly expressed yet shall be good by Implication and so he concluded that this is no Error for which the Judgment shall be reversed And to the challenge he conceived that this is not any principall challenge and to that he put this difference that if a man brings an Assise of certain Land and hath an Action of Trespass hanging against the Sheriff for entring into the same Land there shall be a principall challenge to the Array but if it be for entry into other Land not in demand otherwise it is and what is principall challenge and what not he cyted the Bookes of 3 Ed. 4. 12. 6 Ed. 4. 1. 21 Ed. 4. 67. 14 H. 7. 1. 21. Ed. 4. 10. And to the point in question he cyted the Bookes before remembred by Crooke and Williams and no others and for that I omit to recite them and he agreed also that in actions which concern life Honesty Mayme Battery to say that he hath such action hanging against the Sheriff shall be a principall challenge but Trespass for entring into Land not for in Trespass there is no Land to be recovered also no damages but to the value of the Trespass And in Debt a man shall recover more then in Trespasse And yet it is agreed that this is no principall Challenge to say that he hath an Action of Debt hanging against the Sheriff as the Book of 11 H. 4. is which hath been remembred and for this I conceive it no principall challenge And to the seisin of the Paunages if a Horse may take seisin of that it seemes that yea for I conceive that the taking of seisin doth not consist in the eating or not eating of that of which the seisin is to be taken and for that he cited that if a man grant to me the Herbage and Paunage of his Parke and I come into the Parke and take the Grasse and Herbs into my hands or if I gather Akornes this is sufficient seisin for me to have Assise though that I do not eate the Grasse nor the Akornes and for that let us put the case that a man hath Herbage granted to him and he puts in his Beasts and before that they eate the grasse they are driven out none will deny but that that shall be good seisin for so is the Book of the 22. Assise 84. Where a man hath Common granted to him and he takes the Beasts of a stranger and puts them in and them forthwith drive out that shall be a good seisin of the Common to have Assise so that he said that the eating is not to purpose also he said Horses will eate Akornes as well as Cowes And he saith that in the Country where he inhabits being a Wood-land Country they will not suffer the Beasts to go into the Woods at a certaine time of the yeare and this is when Crabs are ripe for then their Beasts will eate Crabs and set their teethes an edge and then not being able to chew Akornes do swallow them whole and then those Ackornes being swallowed whole will grow in the Mawe of the Beast and so kill them And he saith that though that Horses be not so proper Beasts to take seisin of Paunage as Porkes are yet being put in for the same purpose if they are disturbed that shall be Seisin and Disseisin and it seemes to him that when things are granted to one that it shall not be strange to say that seisin of one shall be seisin of both and for that if a man grants all his arrable Land all his Meadow and all his Wood Livery and Seisin in one suffices for all but I conceive that this is in respect of the soyle which passeth and so are all of one self same nature and so he conceives that this is sufficient Seisin and Disseisin found to have Assise And lastly to the Title of the Earle of Rutland he said that this was good and to the Grants of the King he said two things are necessary in all Grants of the King that is a Recitall and a certainty and when a recitall shall be necessary and when not and he said that in all cases when a common person makes a Lease for years or for life and the reversion is conveied to the King if the King will make Estate to another he shall not recite this Lease for this not being of Record the King cannot take notice of it and so he shall not recite But in all cases when the King makes a Lease for life or for years and after will make a Grant to another he ought to recite the first Estate because that is of Record And Justice Yelverton as I heard of those which were next unto him put this case That if the King grants a Lease for yeares rendring Rent and after the King reciting the Lease grants that to another for years or grants the reversion to another and doth not recite the Rent which was reserved upon the first Lease that this second Grant shall be void for the not recitall And the cheife Justice cited one Phillpotts Case to be adjudged in the 2. of Eliz. That where the King made a Lease for one and twenty yeares and after reciting the said Lease grants the reversion to another and before that the second Letters Patents were sealed the first Lessee surrendred And said that the second Grant was adjudged void for the King intended to passe a reversion and now he shall have a Possession and all that which is said to be in case of Land Now let us see how it shall be in case of office and for that if a common person hath â—n office in Fee and grants that for life and after grants the Fee simple to the King and the King will grant that to another there he ought to recite the common persons Grant as well as if it had been his one Grant for there is not properly a reversion of an office as the Book cited by my Brother Williams sayd Secondly if the office be recited in Esse and be not in Esse the Grant is void as Blanyes Case is in the Lord Dyer 3 Eliz. 197. 47. And this sufficeth for recitalls Then for certainty of the Kings Grant it is said in the 2. R. 3. it is said that the Grants of the King ought to be made in certaine and for that where the King there Grants to Sir John Spencer that he shall not be Sheriff this was void for the incertainty of the place But if the Grant had been of such a County or such a County the Grant should be good Also there ought to be certainty of Estates as it is in 18. H. 8. Where the King gives Lands to
Chancellor and University of Oxford commanding them that they should remove the University to such a place till the Parliament should be ended And after he sent his Writ to them againe which was directed to the Chancellor and University by which he wild that they should returne againe the Parliament being ended by which Writ he conceived that it appeares that the University was not Locall And this for two reasons First insomuch that this Writ was directed to the Chancellor and University and every Writ is directed to a person and not to a place Secondly the Writ that he should move and remove the University which is a thing impossible to do if it should be a place The other Record was 49. Ed. 3. And this declares that there was contention between the Schollers of Cambridge and the Townesmen there and the Schollers went to Northampton and there they made a Petition to the King that they might erect a University and the King sent his Writ to the Maior commanding him that he would not suffer the Schollers to remaine there and that he would there erect a University which proves that a University may be erected at the Kings pleasure and so cannot a place then admitting that a Corporation may consist upon a place yet the University not being a place that shall not be any prejudice to omit it And he cited a case which was adjudged as he said in the 26. of Eliz. which was thus The Deane and Canons of Winsor made a Lease for years by the name of Deane and Canons of new Winsor And this was adjudged no variance and the case of 5. Ed. 4. 5. of the Abbot of Saint Maries in York which see there and he said the Lord Norths Case was thus That Christ Church in Oxford was incorporate by the name of Deane and Canons of Christ Church in Oxford And they made a Feoffment by the name of the Deane and Canons of Christ Church in the University of Oxford and adjudged a good Feoffment And he said that in the argument of this case it was said by Gaudy that if a corporation were made of Dale and after Dale is made into a City they may make a Lease by the name of a City of Dale and the Lord Popham as he said put these cases That is that if a Corporation be founded of Oxford And that they made a Lease by the name of c. In the Precincts of Oxford this shall be a good Lease yet a thing may be within the Precincts of another place and not in the place and in the 32. Eliz. was the case of one Jermin and Wylles that if a Corporation be made by the name of Deane and Chapter of Saint Maries in Exceter is good But they agreed in this case as he said that if it appeare that they cannot be intended allone otherwise it should be and he conceived in the principall case that it is not necessarily that it should be intended the same place and for that he conceived in all those cases that the Lease shall be good and he said that there were neer two hundred Leases upon the same Title for which c. And after this it was argued in Michaelmasse Tearme 1609. 7. Jacobi by the Justices And the opinion of Crook and Williams Justices was that the Lease was good But Fenner and Yelverton to the contrary and Flemming cheif Justice argued that the Lease was not good but he said this should not be absolutely his opinion but moved a composition betwixt the parties But insomuch that the matter was not compounded in the same Michaelmasse Tearme Judgement was praied And Williams Justice brought into the Court a decree out of the Court of Wards concerning the Case which is put in 7. Eliz. Dyer and 1. Coke Porters Case And upon the decree appeares that an Information being exhibited there against the Master and fellows of Trinity Colledge in Cambridge concerning certain Land they made Title to by a Devise made to them by the name of Masters Fellows and Schollers of Trinity Colledge in Cambridge and this Devise was made four and five of Phil. and Mary and the Decree recyted that upon this were two great Doubts and Questions conceived First If this Devise were good and also by the Statute of 1. and 2. Phil. and Mary which inabled to devise to spirituall Corporations And the second point was That where they were incorporated by the name of Master Fellows and Schollars De sancta and Individua Trinitate in the University and Town of Cambridge if this devise made to them by the name of Master Fellowes and Schollers of Trinity Colledge in Cambridge was good and the Decree rehearsed that the opinion of all the Justices in England was First That it was a good Devise within the Statute of one and two Phillip and Mary as it is reported in the Booke before cited Secondly That this was not such a mis-naming of the Corporation which made the Devise voyd and Williams Justice produced this Record as he sayd to fortify his opinion And he conceived no difference between a Grant and a Devise nor no difference when an Estate or conveyance made unto them and conveiance made by them and for that he cited the Case in the 19 H. 8. in Dyer where if a man devise Land to the Abbey of Saint Peters where the foundation is Saint Paul this is a voyd devise and so in a grant And Crooke Justice to the same Intent Yelverton Justice to that Decree shewed by my Brother Williams I conceive a great Difference First a Will and a grant for in case of a Will it sufficeth if they be described by a name by which the Intent of the Devisor may be sufficiently known and a man is intended to be Inops consilij at the time of the Devise made and for that that he hath not any to instruct him oâ— the precise name of the Corporation for which c. And Fenner Justice to the same intent and if a man devise to one and his Assignes as it is a Fee-simple in case of a Devise so it is not in grant and so devise to one and his Children is an Estate Tayl in case of Devise but not in a grant Flemming cheife Justice to the same intent and to the Decree he sayd that this is as good Law as ever he heard in his life but yet he conceived also that there is a great difference between a Grant and a Devise as if a man devise to a Monke the Remainder over this is a good remainder so devise to one the Remainder over and the particular Tenant refuse this is good in a Devise contrary in grant and to the case which is put by my Brother Williams out of the 19 H. 8. Dyer there is a great difference where there is not any such person at all to take there the Devise shall be void as where the Devise to the Abbot of Saint Peter where
the foundation is of Saint Paul and where it is a person certain but all the name is not so precisely recyted and to that which is sayd by my Brother Williams that no difference between conveiance made to them and by them I agree to him with this difference that is if conveyance be made to them of what by presumption in Law they are knowing and are parties as a Fine levied to them and such like but of a Devise it is not presumed that they have knowledge of that till the Death of the Devisor and he conceived that the Lease is voyd and this Decree shewed hath not changed his opinion but he moved the parties again to an agreement and would not as yet give Judgment Hitcham the Queens Attorney moved the Court for a Prohibition and the case was this two Merchants covenanted by Deed with their Factor to allow him ten pound a Moneth for his Wages and one Merchant sealed the Deed in England and the other sealed that upon the Sea and the Factor came and sued the Merchants in the Admiralty for his wages and by the Court insomuch that one of them sealed it upon the Land this is not any thing done upon the Deepe Sea and for that Prohibition was granted to him Upon a Motion made by Wincolt of the Middle Temple to dissolve a Prohibition granted to the spirituall Court upon a Libel for Tithes there the Court took this rule that when a Consultation is lawfully granted there a new Prohibition shall not be granted upon the same Lâ—bell and yet they qualified that with this difference that is when a Consultation is granted upon any fault of the Prohibition in form by the Mâ—sprision of the Clark or by mis-pleading of any Statute in that or such like there a new Prohibition may be granted upon the same Libell but if Consultation be granted upon the right of the thing in question there a new Prohibition shall not be granted upon the same Libell see the Statute of 5 Ed. 3. Pasch 9. Jacobi 1609. In the Kings Bench. BRomehead and Spencer Plaintiffs Rogers Defendant where an Action of Debt was brought by the Plaintiffs against the Defendant as Administrator during the minority of one J. S. and the Plaintiffs shew in their count that the said J. S. at the time of the Writ brought was and yet is within age of one and twenty years and verdict passeth against the Defendant and Crewe moved in arrest of Judgment that the Declaration was insufficient for they have declared that the Executor was within the Age of one and twenty years and the Administration during the nonage shall cease when the Infant comes to the Age of seventeen years so that he may be of the age of 17. 18. 19. or 20. years and yet the Administration ceaseth and so of Action against Administrator and so was the Opinion of all the Justices and the Judgment was stayed upon that according to the resolution of Piggotts Case 15. Coke 29. a. PLomer against Hockhead the Plaintiff declares in Ejectione firme upon a Lease made to him by three Husbands and their wives and that the Defendant ejected him and at the Issue upon not guilty and in evidence to prove this Lease and the delivery of that was shewed a Letter of Attorney made by the Husbands and their wives and the councel of the Defendant takes exception to the Declaration for they have declared upon a Lease by three Husbands and their Wives with a Letter of Attourney to make delivery and a married Wife cannot make a Letter of Attorney And so this is not a Lease of the Wives and so the Plaintiff had declared upon no Lease And the opinion of all the Court was that a married Wife could not make a Letter of Attorney And Williams Justice compared this to the case of an Infant as if an Infant makes a Feoffment or a lease and delivers that with his hand this is not but voidable But if it be executed by Letter of Attorney that is a disseisin to him but by Flimming and Williams if the Plaintiffs had declared upon a Lease made by the Husbands only this had been very good Thomas Malin Plaintiff in Replevin against Thomas Tully the case was The Queen Mary was seised of a Park called Eestwood Park in her Demesne as of Fee as in Right of her Crown and so being seised by her Letters Patent's let the said Park to two for their lives and after died And the Queen Elizabeth by her Letters Patents recyting the said Lease for lives and that the said Lessees were alive granted the said Park to Humphrey Lord Stafford and his Wife and to the Heires of the said Lord Stafford of the Body of the said Wife lawfully begotten And by the said Patent the same Queen by these words Ac de Ampliori et Vberiori Gracia Nostris Volumus et Declaramus quod si Predictus Dominus Stafford Solvat seu Solvi faciat prefacto Dominae Reginae 20 s. ad talâ—m Diem Tunc Concedimus quod predictus Dominus Stafford habebit revertionem predictam sibi et Heredibus suis And the Lord Stafford paid the said sum of twenty shillings according to the said Letters Patents and if he shall have Fee-simple or not was the question And it was objected that he shall not have it for the words of the Patent are that if the Lord Stafford paies the money Tunc concedimus the which words seeme that the Grant shall take effect in futuro and it was not a present Grant but when the money shall be paid then shee granted but it seemes to the Justice that it was a good Grant immediatly to take effect upon the payment of the money and the condition was precedent till that be performed the reversion remaines in the Queen Eliz. And the Queen might grant by one selfe same Patent as by diverse See 10. Assise 13. 7. Ed. 3. 8. Ed. 2. Feoffments and that the reversion shall not extinguish the Estate Tayl but they may well be together but otherwise it is of an Estate for yeares or for life Warburton Justice that the King is specially favoured in the Law and for that he shall not be inforced to attend in case as other persons ought to make attendance And for that in case where a common person may make a good Grant the King also may make a good Grant and in the case at the Barr if the Grant had been made by a common Person it had been good without question But the first objection that hath been made was that where a man hath made a Lease for life or for years upon condition to have Fee there the particuler Estate shall be drowned upon the increasiing of the Estate but the Statute of Westminster 2. preserves the Estate tayl that it shall not be drowned and that the Fee in this case doth not vest till the condition be performed for if the
every Knight and that diverse of those Fees were received and this office being litigious were delivered to be detained in Deposito and to be delivered to him which was Officer and the plaintiff brought an Action by the name of Chester as Officer and recovered those Fees and this was resolved good Seisin and also that Seisin after the grant of the Office and before the investing of the Patentee by the Marshall was good for the Investing was but a ceremony it was also resolved that where an office extends to all the parts of England and that here an Assise doth not lie in any County though that the dissesin were made in one County but the Assise be brough for the profit of the office in one County and not for the office it selfe 43. Ed. 3. Feoffments and Deeds That by Grant of the profits of a Mill and Livery the Mill it selfe passes so that taking of the profits is dissesin of the office also it was objected that the Demandant was no officer for though that he hath a Patent of it yet he was not Invested nor Installed in the office which appeares to the Marshall and for that he was no Officer and so hath no cause to have Action And that this is an office which is incident and annexed to the office of Earle Marshall and though that he be not Earle Marshall yet there are Commissioners have his power and authority and for that the Investing and Instalment of the Plaintiff in the said office appeares to the said Commissioners but it was resolved cleerely by all the Justices that the Demandant was Officer by the Kings Grant without any Installation or Investing and that this without that all the Fees and Profits of the office appertayning to him and that the Investing and Installation was but a ceremony in the same manner as if the King hath a Donative and gives that to another the Donee shall be in actuall possession by the gift without any Induction or other ceremony But admitting that the office were annexed to the office of Earle Marshall then it was agreed that the Commissioners cannot give it as the cheife Justice of the Common â—ench hath divers offices appertaining to his place and he may dispose of them But if he die the King in time of vacancy nor the most ancient Judges cannot give or dispose of any of them being void as it appeares by Serrogates Case Eliz. Dyer And so the cheife Justice is made and allwaies hath been made by Patent and so are the other Justices and for that they cannot be made by Commissioners and so the cheife Justice of England hath all times been made by Writ and for that cannot be made by Patent nor by Commission And so in the case at the Barr though that the Commissioners have the power and authority of the Earle Marshall yet they are not Earle Marshall it was also objected that the Fees were not due to the Plaintiff for that he did not attend But to that it was answered and resolved that the Fees were due to the office and for that non attendance of the office was no forfeyture of the Fees And upon these resolutions the Recognitors found for the Demandant according to the direction of the Court. Trinity 7. Jacobi 1609. In the Kings Bench. Godsall GODS ALL and his Wife The Proclamations of the Fyne were well and duly entred in the Originall remaining with the Chirographer But in the Transcript with the Custos brevium was error and it seemeth that this notwithstanding the Fyne was good but the Transcript was amended Trinity 7. Jacobi 1609. In the Kings Bench The Town of Barwicke THE King which now is by his Letters Patents Incorporated the Mayor Bayliffs and Burgesses of Barwicke and granted to them the execution of the Returne of all Writs And after a Writ of Extendi facias was directed to them and they made no returne of that and upon this was the question if that shall be executed by them or by the Sheriff of Northumberland And it seemed to Nicholls Serjeant that argued for the Plaintiff in the extent that desired execution and the returne of that that they ought to make execution and returne for it seemes to him that this was English and that this appeares by the Act of Parliament by which the Incorporation was confirmed and so it appeares also by the Letters Patents of the King by which the Incorporation is made for if it were not English neither the Letters Patents nor the Act of Parliament are sufficient to make Incorporation of that and also they certified Burgesses to the Parliament of England And the Kings Bench sent Habeas Corpus to it and for the not returne of that inflicted a Fyne upon the Corporation See 21. Ed. 3. 49 and 1. Ed. 4 10. But Hutton Serjeant seemed to the contrary and that they ought not to make execution for he said it is a part of Scotland and not part of England and it was conquered from that and it was a Sherifwicke and hath the same priviledges of ancient times which they now have by their new Grant See 24 Ed. 1. and 2. Ed. 2. Obligation c. That one Obligation dated there shall not be tryed in England and also that it is not within the County of Northumberland nor part of it nor the Sheriff of Northumberland cannot meddle in it see 2. H. 7. 31. 26. H. 6. 23. and it is adjourned It seemes that Jacob and James are all one name for Jacobus is-Latine for them both but Walmesley conceived that if he be Christened Jacob otherwise it is as if one be Christened Jacob and another James then they are not one selfe same name Note that Coke cheife Justices said that if Commissioners by force of Dedimus potestatem take a Fine of an Infant that they are Fynable and ransomable to the value of their Lands and that this shall be sued in the Star chamber Trinity 7. Jacobi 1609 In the Common Bench. Robinson RObinsons Case A man devises Lands to his Wife for life the remainder to his Son and if his Son dies without Issue not having a Son that then it should remaine over and it seemed that this it a good Estate tayl and it was adjudged accordingly If a man makes a Lease for three yeares or such a small Tearme to his Son or Servant to try an Ejectione Firme or if it be made to another Inferion by a Superior which cannot countenance the Suit it shall not be intended Maintenance nor buying of Tytles which shall be punished Trinity 7 Jacobi 1609. In the Common Bench. NOte an Attorney of the Common Bench was cited before the High Commission and committed to the Fleet for that he would not swear upon Articles by the Commissioners ministred and Habeas Corpus was awarded to deliver him and a Prohibition to the Court of high Commission see 1. and 2. Eliz. Scroggs case
against three Executors two of them are out lawed and the third pleads and Verdict against him and it was resolved that the Judgement shall be against all by the Statute of 9. Ed. 3. for they all are but one Executor and the Cost shall be against him which pleades if the others confesse or suffer Judgement by default And there shall be but one Judgement and not diverse see 17 Ed. 3. 45. b. 11 H. 6. Upon a Venire Facias awarded the Sheriff returnes but 21. and the Habeas Corpora was against 21. only and this was also returned and upon that ten appeared and upon this Tales was awarded and triall had and but ten of the principall Pannell sworne And this was Error but if twelve of the principall Pannell had appeared and served it seemes that it shall not be error for so it was resolved in Graduers case where twenty three were returned but twelve appeared and tryed the Issue and this was resolved to be good and no error Michaelmasse 7 Jacobi 1609. In the common Bench. Buckmer against Sawyer A Man seised of Land in Gaelvelkind hath Issue three Daughters that is A. B. and C. deviseth all his Land to A. in tayl the remainder of one halfe to B. in tayl the remainder of the other halfe to C. in tayl and if B. died without Issue the remainder of her Moytie to C. and her Heires and if C. died without Issue the remainder of her Moytie to B. and her Heires the Devisor dies A. and B. dies And the question was if C. shall have a Formedon in remainder only or severall Formedons for this Land And it seemed to all the Justices that one Formedon lieth well for all for that that it was by one selfe same conveiance though that the Estate come by severall deaths and this Action was to be brought by the Heire of C. after the death of C. See the three and four Phil. and Mary Dyer Note that after appearance of a Jury and after that divers of them were sworn others were challenged so that it could not be taken by reason of default of Jurors But a new Distringas awarded and at the day of the returne of that these which were sworn before appeared and then were challenged But no challenge shall be allowed for that that they were sworn before if it be not of after time to the first appearance Michaelmasse 7. Jacobi 1609 In the Common Bench. Baylie against Sir Henry Clare BAYLIE against Sir Henry Clare the Writ was of two parts without saying in three parts to be divided And it seemed to Nicholls Serjeant which moved this that it was not good but error But the opinion of the Court was that it was good See 17. Ed. 3. 44. 19. Ed. 3 breife 244. 17. Assise with this difference that if there are but three parts and two are demanded there it is good without saying in three parts to be devided for when parts are demanded it is intended all the parts but one and that it is only one which remaines see the Register fol. 16. 12. Assise And it was adjudged in the Kings Bench in the case of one Jordan that demand of two parts where there are but three parts is good see 39. H. 6. Salford against Hurlston in Formedon which demanded two parts where there is but three and so of three parts where there is but four it is good without saying in three or four parts to be divided But if a man grant his part this shall be intended the halfe for Appellatio partis dimidium partis contenetur and a Writ of Covenant ought to be of two parts without saying in three parts to be divided for so is the forme and if in such case in three parts to be divided be incerted the Writ shall abate see Thelwell in his digest of Writs 146. and by Coke if a man bring Ejectione Firme for ten Acres and by evidence it appeares that he hath but the halfe Ex vigore Juris it shall not be good but he said he would submit his opinion to the Judgement of ancient Judges of the Law which have often time used the contrary Note that the Husband may avoid his Deed that he hath Sealed by the duresse of Imprisonment of his Wife or Son But not of his Servant and so Mayor and Commonalty may avoid a Deed sealed by duresse of Imprisonment of the Mayor for it is Idemptity of person between the Husband and the Wife See 21. Ed. 4. and 7. Ed. 4. A man may avoid Seâ—sin for payment of Rent by coersion of distresse but not his Deed. Michaelmasse 7. Jacobi 1609. In the Common Bench. Payn and Mutton IN an Action upon the case by Payne against Mutton the Plaintif counts that the Defendant called him Sorcerer and Inchantor And agreed by all the Justices that Action doth not lie for Sorcerer and Inchantor are those which deale with charmes or turning of Bookes as Virgill saith Carminibus Circes socios mutavit ulissis which is intended Charmes and Inchantments and Conjuration is of Con et nico that is to compell the Divell to appeare as it seemes to them against his will but which is that to which the Devill appeares voluntarily and that is a more greater offence then Sorcery or Inchantment which was adjudged that Action doth not lie for calling a man Witch and said that he bewitched his Weare that he could not take any Fishes Dodridge the Kings Serjeant saith that an Action lieth for calling a woman gouty pockye Whore and said that the Pox had eaten the bottome of her Belly out and so it was adjudged that it lieth well for these words get thee home to thy pokey Wife the Pox hath eaten off her Nose But for the Pox generally Action doth not lie But if he saiâ—h that he was laid of the Pox then Action well lieth for then it shall be intended the great Pox. Note that in Prohibition and Replevin the Defendant may have nisi prius by Proviso without default of the Defendant for he himselfe is re vera Defendant and there are two Actors that is the Plaintiff and Defendant But the Court appointed that Presidents should be searched the Plaintiff is not bound to prosecute Cum Effectu in this Court as he is in the Kings Bench And it was agreed that the manner of Pleading was agreement as for Returno Habendo in the Replevin and Pro consultatione habenda in the Prohibition Michaelmas 7. Jacobi 1609. In the Common Bench Miller and Francis MYLLER Plaintiff in Replevin against Thomas Francis the case was Richard Francis was seised of Land held in Socage and deviseth that to John his eldest Son for a hundred yeares the Remainder to Thomas his second Sonn for his life and made his four other youngest Sonns his Executors and after made a Feoffment to the sayd uses the Remainder to the sayd John his eldest Son in tayl
charge to the King and to the Common Wealth and the execution of Writs may be prejudicall and penall to the Sheriff himselfe And for that he may well provide that he shall have notice of every execution which are most Penall And also in all the Indenture now made he doth not constitute him to be his under Sheriff but only for to execute the Office and for these reasons he seemed the Obligation is good and demands Judgement for the Plaintiff But it seemes to all the Court that the Covenant is void and so by consequence the Obligation as to the performance of that void but good to the performance of all other Covenants And Coke cheif Justice said that the Sheriff at the Common Law was elligible as the Coronor is and then by the death of the King his Office was not determined and also it is an intire Office and though the King may countermand his Grant of that intirely yet he cannot that countermand by parcells and also that the under Sheriff hath Office which is intire and cannot be granted by parcells and this Covenant will be a meanes to nourish bribery and extortion for the Sheriff himselfe shall have all the benefit and the under Sheriff all the payn for he is visible the under Sheriff and all the Subjects of the King will repaire to him and the private contracts between the Sheriff and him are invisible of which none can have knowledge but themselves And Warburton sayd that in debt upon escape c. are against the Sheriff of Notingham he pleaded Nihil debet and gives in evidence that the Bayliff which made the Arrest was made upon condition that he should not meddle with such executions without speciall warrant of the Sheriff himselfe and his consent but it was resolved this notwithstanding that the Sheriff shall be charged in and in the principall case Judgement was given accordingly that is that the Covenant is void Note that the Sheriff of the County of Barkes was commited to the Fleete for taking twenty shillings for making of a warrant upon a generall Capias utlagatum for all the Justices were of opinion that the Sheriff shall not take any Fees for making of a warrant or execution of that Writ but only twenty shillings and foure pence the which is given by the Statute of 23. H. 6. for it is at the Suit of the King But upon Capias utlagatum unde convictus est which is after Judgement it seemes it is otherwise A man grants a Rent to one for his life and halfe a yeare after to be paid at the Feasts of the Anunciation of our Lady and Michaell the Archangell by equall portions and Covenants with the Grantee for the payment of that accordingly the Grantee dies 2. Februarâ—… and for twenty pound which was a moyity of the Rent and to be payd at the anunciation after the Executors of the Grantee brings an Action of Covenant and it seems it is well maintainable And Coke cheife Justice sayd That if a man grants Rent for anothers life the Remainder to the Executors of the Grantee and Covenant to pay the Rent during the Tearm aforesayd this is good Collective and shall serve for both the Estates and if the Grantee of the Rent grant to the Tenant of the Land the Rent and that he should distrain for the sayd Rent this shall not be intended the same rent which is extinct but so much in quantity and agreed that when a Rent is granted and by the same Deed the Grantor covenants to pay that the Grantee may have annuity or Writ of Covenant at his Election Michaelmas 7. Jacobi 1610. In the Common Bench. Waggoner against Fish Chamberlain of London JAMES Waggoner was arrested in London upon a Plaint entered in the Court of the Maior in Debt at the suit of Cornelius Fish Chamberlain of the sayd City and the Defendant brought a Writ of Priviledge returnable here in the Common Pleas and upon the return it appears that in the City of London there is a custome that no forrainer shal keep any shop nor use any Trade in London and also there is another Custome that the Maior Aldermen and Commonalty if any custome be defective may supply remidy for that and if any new thing happen that they may provide apt remedy for that so if it be congruae bonâ— fidei consuetudo rationi consentiae pro communi utilitate Regis civium omnium aliorum ibidem confluentium and by Act of Parliament made 7 R. 2. All their customes were confirmed and 8 Ed. 3. The King by his Letters Patents granted that they might make By-Laws and that these Letters Patents were also confirmed by Act of Parliament and for the usage certified that in 3 Ed. 4. and 17. H. 8. were severall acts of Common Councell made for inhibiting Forrayners to hold any open shop or shops or Lettice and penalty imposed for that and that after and shewed the day in certain was an Act of Common counsell made by the Mayor Aldermen and Commonalty And for that it was enacted that no Forrayner should use any Trade Mistery or occupation within the said City nor keep any Shop there for retayling upon payn of five pound and gives power to the Chamberlain of London for the time being to sue for that by Action c. in the Court of the Mayor in which no Essoyn nor wager of Law shall be allowed and the said penalty shall be the one halfe to the use of the said Chamberlain and the other half to the poor of Saint Bartholomewes Hospitall And that the Defendant held a shop and used the Mistery of making of candles the seventh day of October last and for that the Plaintiff the ninth day of the same month then next insuing levied the said plaint And upon this the Defendant was Arrested and this was the cause of the taking and detaining c. And upon argument at the Bar by Serjeant Harris the younger for the Defendant and Hutton for the Plaintiff and upon sollemne arguments by all the Justices Coke Walmesley Warburton Danyell and Foster it was agreed That the Defendant shall be delivered and not remanded And the case was devided in to five parts The first the custome Secondly the confirmation of that by Act of Parliament Thirdly the grant of the King and the confirmation of that by Act of Parliament Fourthly the usage and making of Acts of common councell according to this Fiftly the Act of common councell upon which the Action is brought and upon which the Defendant was Arrested And to the first which is the custome it was also said that this consists upon three parts That is first if any custome be difficult Secondly if it be defective Thirdly if Aliquid de novo emergit The Mayor Aldermen and Commonalty Possunt opponere remedium and that there are foure incidents to that remedy First it ought to be Congruum Retione
they be reversed by Errour A man is bound in an Obligation dated the third of January and by Release dated the second day of the sayd Moneth of January releases all Actions c. From the beginning of the World untill this present day and delivered the Release after he had delivered the Obligation And Coke cheife Justice conceived that a Release of all Actions untill the Date shall not discharge duty after but a Release Vsque confectionem presentium that discharges Duties after the Date and before the Delivery But he conceived that the Day of this present time shall be the Day of the Date and it shall not be averred that it was delivered 20. years after and it shall not wait upon the Delivery of the Deed. A Writ of Dower was brought by Frances Fulgham against Serjeant Harris the younger in this manner Precipe c. Quod c. Frances Fulgham Widdow where the form in the Register Que fuit uxor and not Widdow and the words of the Writ are Rationabilem detem Tenementorum que fuerunt Fran. Fulgham quondam viri suâ— and yet it was resolved to be Errour see the Register and yet it doth not vary in substance and 38 Ed. 3. In re nisi sunt all one yet for that the forme in the Register is otherwise The Justices would not amend it John Warren Plaintiff in Trespasse and Ejectione Firme against Cicely Spackman it was resolved that the admittance of a Copy-holder for life was sufficient for him in remainder In a Writ of Dower by Mistris Fulgham upon Ne Vnques couple c. pleaded a Writ was awarded to the Arch-Bishop in the time of the vacation of the Bishoprick of Lychfeild and Coventry who returned that he had a Delegate which made a Commission to Babington Chancellor of the said Diocesse to make inquiry and certificate of the said matter which have certified that they were lawfully coupled in lawfull matrimony And adjudged without question that the return was not good for the Arch-Bishop himselfe ought to execute it and Delegata potestaâ— non potest delegari and for that it was ordered that he should amend her Certificate See the Statute of 5 Ed. 3. That an Arrest Eundo rediundo from celebrating divine service And it seemed to the Justices that such Arrest is not lawfull for he ought to be priviledged rather then a man which comes to any Court to procecute or defend any suit here Pasche 7. Jacobi 1609. In the Exchequer The Duke of Lenox case IN Trespasse the case was this the King by his Letters Patents created the Duke of Lenox Alneger and he made his deputy And the Duke by the said Letters Patents of the King was to measure all Clothes and to have so much for every Peece and to search and to view that if it be well and sufficiently made or not and he made his Deputy which offers to measure search and view certain parcell of Worsted and demanded the duty due to the Alneger for that and for that that the owner refused to pay it he seised certain peeces of Worsted and kept them upon which this Action was brought And Haughton Serjeant for the Defendant conceived that the sole question rests upon these Letters Patents of the King and for that he would first consider First if these duties of Subsidies and Ausnage are due by the Common Law and if they are not due by the Common Law then if they are due by Statute Law And if they be due neither by the Common Law nor Statute Law then if the King by his Letters Patents may grant it And to the first he said That Subsidy is ayd or help And there are two manners of ayd one which is Inheritance in the King as ayd to make his Son Knight or to marry his Daughter and others which are given by grant of others and these are not Inheritances in the King and these duties were not demandable by the Common Law nor by Custome And this appeares by the 25. Ed. 3. 6. Where any prises were demanded which were due by the common Law and some which were not due and subsidie for Woolls were not due by the Common Law but it was granted to the King and is now due but this is by grant and not by the Common Law and in the 14. Ed. 3. A Statute was made for the King for his subsidy for Woolles what part he should have which part was given to him in quantity and in time of H. 6. A Statute was made by which subsidy was given to him during his life and 36 Ed. 3. Subsidy was granted for three yeares and after should not be any subsidy paied as appeares by 45. Ed. 3. And if subsidie were not due by the Common Law for Woolles then may it be concluded that it was not due for clothes for Woolles grow without mans labour and the 11. H. 4. and 13. H. 4. The King makes a grant of Alnage of clothes and a Writ is awarded to the Mayor and Sheriffs of London to give possession to the Patentee which returnes the Writ that the Office was not granted before this time And the Statute of 24. Ed. 3. was the first Statute that gave profit to the King for clothes But he granted that the Office of Alneger was of ancient times and an ancient Office but it was no Office of profit but an Office of Justice and Right and no Fee was due for the exercising of it and that 1. Ed. 2 was a Grant of the Office of the Alneger and 11. H. 4. was a Grant of the Office of Alneger for Canvas but it doth not appeare by any account that the King had any profit for the Alnage it selfe or upon the said Grants either before or after and allowing that there were accounts for Cloth yet it doth not appeare that there were any accounts for Worsteds The Statute of 27. Eliz. gives subsidy of four pence for every broad Cloth so that the Statute made expresse mention of broad Cloth but there was not any mention of Worsteds and this Statute shall not be taken by equity though that the Statute of 1. R. 2. 12. for escapes by the Warden of the Fleet being a penall Statute yet for that that it was for a generall mischeife shall be taken by equity as it appeares by Platts Case in the Comment So the Statute of 9. Ed 3. chap. 3. provideth that where Debt is brought against diverse Executors that they shall have but one Essoyn and the Statute mentions Execurors only yet Administrators are taken within the equity of this Statute as it appeares by 3 H. 6. yet in this case at the Bar the Statute of 27. Eliz. was not for the remedy of a mischeife but is a Grant to the King and Grant of one thing cannot be Grant of another thing as if the King pardon an Offence another Offence cannot be pardoned by this As it appeares