here to forbear to Sue generally but to stay a Suit against the Defendant whom he could not Sue To which it was answered That after a Verdict it shall be intended there was cause of Suit as Hob. 216. Bidwell and Cattons Case And Attorney brought an Assumpsit upon a Promise made to him in Consideration that he would stay the Prosecution of an Attachment of Priviledge and there held that it need not appear that there was cause of Suit for the Promise argues it and it will be presumed And here 't is a strong intendment that the Bond was made in Common Form which binds the Heirs But Iudgment was given against the Plaintiff for the Court said it might be intended that there was cause of Action if the contrary did not appear which it doth in this Case for the Bond cannot be intended otherwise than the Plaintiff himself hath expressed it which shews only that the Ancestor was bound And whereas it was said by the Plaintiff's Counsel that this would attaint the Jury they finding Assumpsit upon a void Promise Hale said there was no colour for that conceit The Plaintiff having proved his Promise and Consideration as 't was laid in the Declaration which is the only thing within their charge upon Non Assumpsit modo forma Bulmer versus Charles Pawlet Lord Saint John IN an Ejectment upon a Tryal at Bar this question arose upon the Evidence Tenant for Life Remainder in Tail to J. S. joyn in a Fine J.S. dies without Issue whether the Conusee should hold the Land for the Life of the Tenant for Life Serjeant Ellis pressed to have it found Specialy tho' it is resolved in Bredons Case that the Estate of the Conusee shall have Continuance but he said it was a strange Estate that should be both a Determinable Fee and an Estate pur auter vie and he cited 3 Cro. 285. Major and Talbots Case where in Covenant the Plaintiff sets forth that a Feme Tenant for Life Remainder in Fee to her Husband made a Lease to the Defendant for years wherein the Defendant covenanted with the Lessors their Heirs and Assigns to repair and they conveyed the Reversion to the Plaintiff and for default of Reparations the Plaintiff brought his Action as Assignee to the Husband And resolved to be well brought because the Wives Estate passed as drowned in the Fee The Court said Bredons Case was full in the point but the Reason there given Hale said made against the Resolution for 't is said that the Remainder in Tail passes first which if it does the Freehold must go by way of Surrender and so down but they shall rather be construed to pass insimul uno flatu Hob. 277 In Englishes Case it was resolved it Tenant for Life Remainder in Tail to an Infant joyn in a Fine if the Infant after Reverse the Fine yet the Conusee shall hold it for the Life of the Conusor 1 Co. in Bredons Case and he resembled it to the Case in 1 Inst a Man seized in the right of his Wife and entituled to be Tenant by the curtesie joyns in a Feoffment with his Wife the Heir of his Wife shall not avoid this during the Husbands Life Nevertheless he told Ellis That he would never deny a Special Verdict at the request of a Learned Man but it appearing that he Plaintiff had a good Title after the Life should fall the Defendant bought it of him and the Jury were discharged Sacheverel versus Frogate PAs 23 Car. 2. Rot. 590. In Covenant the Plaintiff declared That Jacinth Sacheverel seized in Fee demised to the Defendant certain Land for years reserving 120 l Rent And therein was a Covenant that the Defendant should yearly and every year during the said Term pay unto the Lessor his Executors Administrators and Assigns the said Rent and sets forth how that the Lessor devised the Reversion to the Plaintiff an for 120 l Rent since his decease he brought the Action The Defendant demanded Oyer of the Indenture wherein the Reservation of the Rent was yearly during the Term to the Lessor his Executors Administrators and Assigns and after a Covenant prout the Plaintiff declared and to this the Defendant demurred It was twice argued at the Bar and was now set down for the Resolution of the Court which Hale delivered with the Reasons He said they were all of Opinion for the Plaintiff For what interest a Man hath he hath it in a double capacity either as a Chattel and so transmissible to the Executors and Administrators or as an Inheritance and so in capacity of transmitting it to his Heir Then if Tenant in Fee makes a Lease and reserves the Rent to him and his Executors the Rent cannot go to them for there is no Testamentary Estate On the other side if Lessee for a 100 years should make a Lease for 40 years reserving Rent to him and his Heirs that would be void to the Heir Now a Reservation is but a Return of somewhat back in Retribution of what passes and therefore must be carried over to the Party which should have succeeded in the Estate if no Lease had béen made and that has béen always held where the Reservation is general So tho' it doth not properly create a Fee yet 't is a descendible Estate because it comes in lieu of what would have descended therefore Constructions of Reservations have been ever according to the Reason and Equity of the thing If two Joynt-teants make a Lease and reserve the Rent to one of them this is a good to both unless the Lease be by Indenture because of the Estoppel which is not in our Case for the Executors are Strangers to the Deed. 'T is true if A. and B. joyn in a Lease of Land wherein A. hath nothing reserving the Rent to A. by Indenture this is good by Estoppel to A. But in the Earl of Clare's Case it was resolved That where he and his Wife made a Lease reserving a Rent to himself and his Wife and his Heirs that he might bring Debt for the Rent and declare as of a Lease made by himself alone and the Reservation to himself for being in the Case of a Feme Covert there could be no Estoppel altho' she signed and sealed the Lease There was an Indenture of Demise from two Joynt tenants reserving 20 l Rent to them both one only sealed and delivered the Deed and he brought Debt for the Rent and declared of a Demise of the Moiety and a Reservation of 10 l Rent to him And resolved that he might Between Bond and Cartwright which see before and in the Common Pleas Pas 40. Eliz. Tenant in Tail made a Lease reserving a Rent to him and his Heirs It was resolved a good Lease to bind the Entail for the Rent shall go to the Heir in Tail along with the Reversion tho' the Reservation were to the Heirs generally For the Law uses all industry imaginable to conform
the Reservation to the Estate Whitlocks Case 8 Co. is very full to this where Tenant for Life the Remainder over so setled by Limitation of uses with power to the Tenant for Life to make Leases who made a Lease reserving Rent to him his Heirs and Assigns Resolved That he in the Remainder might have the Rent upon this Reservation So put the Case That Lessee for a 100 years should let for 50 reserving a Rent to him and his Heirs during the Term I conceive this would go to the Executor 'T is true if the Lessor reserves the Rent to himself 't is held it will neither go to the Heir or Executor But in 27 H. 8. 19. where the Reservation is to him and his Assigns It is said that it will go to the Heir And in the Case at Bar the words Executors and Administrators are void then t is as much as if reserved to him and his Assigns during the Term which are express words declaring the intent and must govern any implied construction which is the true and particular Reason in this Case The Old Books that have been cited have not the words during the Term. Vid. Lane 256. Richmond and Butchers Case indeed is judged contrary in point 3 Cro. 217. but that went upon a mistaken ground which was the Manuscript Report 12 E. 2. Whereas I suppose the Book intended was 12 E. 3. Fitz. Assize 86. for I have appointed the Manuscript of E. 2. which is in Lincolns Inn Library to be searched 6 Co. 62. and there is no such Case in that year of E. 2. The Case in the 12 E. 3. is A Man seized of two Acres let one reserving Rent to him and let the other reserving Rent to him and his Heirs and resolved that the first Reservation should determin with his Life for the Antithesis in the Reservation makes a strong Implication that he intended so In Wotton and Edwins Case 5 Jac. the words of Reservation were Yeilding and Paying to the Lessor and his Assigns And resolved that the Rent determined upon his Death In that case there wanted the effectual and operative Clause during the Term. The Case of Sury and Brown is the same with ours in the words of Reservation and the Assignee of the Reversion brought Debt Lane 255. and did not aver the Life of the Lessor And the Opinion of Jones Croke and Doderidge was for the Plaintiff Latches Rep. 99. The Law will not suffer and Construction to take away the energy of these words during the Term. If a Man reserves a Rent to him or his Heirs 't is void to the Heir 1 Inst 214. a. But in Mallorys Case 5 Co. where an Abbot reserved a Rent during the Term to him or his Successors it was resolved good to the Successor It is said in Brudnels Case 5 Co. that if a Lease be made for years if A. and B. so long live if one of them dies the Lease Determines because not said if either of them so long lives So it is in point of Grant But it is not so in point of Reservation for Pas 4 Jac. in the Common Pleas between Hill and Hill The Case was a Copyholder in Fee where the Custom was for a Widows Estate made a Lease by Licence reserving Rent to him and his Wife during their lives and did not say or either of them and to his Heirs It was resolved First That the Wife might have this Rent tho' not party to the Lease Secondly That tho' the Rent were reserved during their lives yet it should continue for the life of either of them for the Reversion if possible will attract the Rent to it as it were by a kind of Magnetism Hoskins versus Robbins A Replevin for six Sheep The Defendant makes Conusance c. for Damage Fesant The Plaintiff replied That the place where was a great Wast parcel of such a Mannor within which there were time out of mind Copyhold Tenants and that there was a Custom in the Mannor that the said Tenants should have the sole and several Pasture of the Wast as belonging to their Tenements and shews that the Tenants licenced him to put in his Beasts The Defendant Traverses the Custom and found for the Plaintiff The exceptions moved in Arrest of Judgment were now spoken to again First That the Custom to have the sole Pasture and thereby to exclude the Lord is not allowable It hath béen ever held That such a Prescription for Common is not good and why should the same thing in effect be gained by the change of the name That Prescription for Pasture and Prescription for Common is the same thing Vid. 3 Cro. Daniel v. Count de Hertford 542. and Rolls tit Prescription 267. It is held a Man may claim Common for half a year excluding the Lord and that one cannot prescribe to have it always so is not because of the Contradiction of the Term for if the sole Feeding be but for half a year 't is as improper to call it Common but the true reason seems to be because it should in a manner take away the whole profit of the Soil from the Lord and he should by such usage lose his greatest Evidence to prove his Title for it would appear that the Land was always fed by the Beasts of others and it would be very mischievous to Lords who live remote from their Wasts or that seldom put their Beasts there as many times they do not so that by the Tenants solely using to feed it they should lose their Improvements provided for the Lords by the Statute and so come at last for want of Evidence to lose the Soil it self Secondly This Custom is laid To have the sole Feeding belonging to their Tenements and 't is not said for Beasts levant and couchant or averred that the Beasts taken were so 15 E. 4. 32. and Rolls tit Common 398. Fitz. tit Prescription 51. A Man cannot prescribe to take Estovers as belonging to his House unless he Avers them to be spent in his House Noy 145. So 2 Cro. 256. tho' the Prescription was there to take omnes Spinas for it is necessary to apply it to something which agrees in nature to the thing Brownlow 35. Thirdly Here the Plaintiff justifies the putting in his Beasts by a Licence and doth not say it was by Deed whereas it could not be without Deed and so is the 2 Cro. 575. Fourthly Those defects are not aided by the Verdict for they are in the right and of substance But the Court were all of Opinion for the Plaintiff First They held the Prescription to be good and being laid as a Custom in the Mannor it was not needful to express the Copy-hold Estates it doth not take away all the profit of the Land from the Lord for his interest in the Trees Mines Bushes c. continues Co. Inst 122. a. is express that a Prescription may be for sola separalis pastura ' and if
there be not an Entry immediately a Livery within the View is not good and in this case by the Marriage he becomes seised in the Right of his Wife and cannot by his own Act divest himself of that Estate or work a prejudice to his Wife by putting the Estate out of her Which makes it differ from the Case of the 38 E. 3. 11. b. Where a man made Livery of the within View to a Woman and before she Entred married her and claimed the Estate in Right of his Wife there held to be a good Feoffment For in that case there is no Alteration of the Estate consequent upon the Intermarriage Neither is it like the Case of 2. R. 2. quoted in Forse and Hemling's Case in the 4 Co. Where a Woman grants a Reversion to a Man and they Intermarry before Attornment For there the Grant is to be perfected by the Act of a Stranger which in reason should be more available to a man than his own Act. But it was Resolved by all the Court that this Livery was well Executed after the Marriage For an Interest passeth by the Livery in View which cannot be countermanded The effectual part of it viz. Go Enter and take possession was before the Marriage tho' the Estate is not in the Feme while Entry She hath done all on her part to be done and hath put it meerly in the Foffor's power and when he Enters it hath a strong retrospect to the Livery and shall be pleaded as a Feoffment when she was sole If two Women Exchange Lands and one marries before Entry this shall not defeat the Exchange The Cases of 2 R. 2. and 38 Ed. 3. are as strong Emerson versus Emerson TRin. ult Rot. 1389. Error of a Judgment in the Common Pleas in an Action of Trespass by the Plaintiff as Executor upon the Statute of 4 E. 3. De bonis asportatis in vita Testatoris The Plaintiff declared that the Defendant blada crescentia upon the Freehold of the Testator messuit defalcavit cepit asportavit Vpon Not Guilty pleaded a Verdict and Judgment was for the Plaintiff and assigned for Error That no Action lay for Cutting of the Corn for that is a Trespass done to the Freehold of the Testator for which the Statute gives the Executor no Action and while the Corn stands 't is to many purposes parcel of the Freehold So that if a man cuts Corn and carries it away presently tho' with a Felonious intent 't is no Felony Otherwise if he let it lye after 't is Cut and at another time comes and steals it So that it appears for parcel of the Trespass no Action lyes then entire Damages being given as well for the Cutting as Carrying away the Corn the Judgment is Erroneous But all the Court were of another Opinion 9 Co. 78. for 't is but one entire Trespass the Declaration only describes the manner of Taking it away Indeed if it had been quare clausum fregit blada asportavit it had been naught or if he had Cut the Corn and let it lye no Action would have lain for the Executor So if the Grass of the Testator be Cut and carryed away at the same time because the Grass is part of the Freehold but Corn growing is a Chattel The Statute of 4 Ed. 3. hath been always Expounded largely Mr. Amhurst's Case of Grays-Inn SErjeant Maynard moved for a Mandatory Writ to the Mayor and Court of Aldermen of London upon the Statute of 13 Car. 2. c. 11. to give Judgment according to the late Act of 22 nunc Regis The Case was That the Act appoints a Market to be on certain Ground set out in Newgate-Market and in all such cases for the satisfaction of the Owners of the Ground if the City cannot agree with them for it it Impowers the Mayor and Aldermen to Empannel a Jury who shall Assess and Adjudge what satisfaction and recompence shall be given to the Owners and says That the Verdict of such Jury on that behalf to be taken and the Judgment of the said Mayor and Court of Aldermen thereupon and the Payment of the Money so awarded or adjudged c. shall be binding and conclusive to and against the Owners c. Now there was Fifteen thousand Foot of Amhurst's Ground taken away for this purpose and a Jury had been Empannelled and had assessed and awarded him Two shillings a Foot but the Mayor and Court of Aldermen refused to give Sentence or Judgment thereupon This says he is a Ministerial thing and this Court will interpose when any Officers will not do Iustice or will out-go their Authority For there is the same Reason to command to do Justice as to prohibit Injustice A Bishop of Exon had Fallen-out with a Town in Cornwal and denyed them Chrisme and a Mandamus went hence to command him to give it them Mr. Noy brought in a Copy of it Sir William Jones This somewhat resembles a Procedendo ad Judicium this is stronger than the Case of commanding a Bishop to grant Administration there this Court commands them to observe a Statute tho' it be in a Matter this Court has no Cognizance of We can't have an Action on the Case Hale If they don't make you Satisfaction your Interest is not bound Maynard But that is taken away by the same Act Pag. 143. 4. We are Lessee to â—he Dean and Chapter of St. Pauls Hale 'T is not Enacted That they shall give Judgment but that is implyed I never knew a Writ commanding to grant Administration tho' the Opinion has been so Sir William Jones That was done in Sir G. Sandy's Case after great Debate Then a Rule was made to shew Cause why a Writ should not go Afterwards the Court granted a Writ but willed them to consider well of the Form and to whom to direct it Loyd versus Brooking TRin. ult 1046. The Case was Tenant for Life Remainder to his first Son in Tail Remainder to J. S. for Life Remainder to his first Son in Tail c. Tenant for Life after the Birth of his first Son accepts a Fine from J. S. to certain uses and then makes a Feoffment after which the Son of J. S. is Born and whether his Contingent Remainder were destroyed or should vest in him was the Question And it was Resolved by the whole Court upon the first Opening that the Contingent Remainder was not destroyed the acceptance of the Fine displaced nothing the Feoffment divested all the Estates but the Right left in the first Son in Remainder supported the Contingent Remainders My Lord Coke's Case 2 Rolls 796 797 is stronger He Covenanted to stand seised to the use of himself for Life Remainder to his Wife for life Remainder to his Daughter for Life when born Remainder to her first Son in Tail And minding to disturb the arising of the Contingent Estates attempted it by these two Means First He grants the Reversion and in the
that time this made an Estate Tail But if it had béen and after their decease to their Children then the Children should take by Purchase tho' born after 'T is true that case is variously reported in the Books but I adhere to my Lord Coke presuming that being brought before all the Judges in the Argument of VVilds Case it was a true Report As for the second Point 't is plain that the power is extinguished for by the Recovery the Estate for Life to which it was annexed in privity is gone and forfeited so that 't is not necessary to dispute the third Point whether well executed or no But upon the whole I agree with my Brother Rainsford that the Plaintiff ought to have Judgment Hale I differ from my two Brothers and tho' I was of their Opinion at the finding of the Special Verdict yet upon very great Consideration of the Case I am of Opinion for the Defendant I shall proceed in a different method from my Brothers and begin with that Point which they made last and I agree with them admitting that Bernard had but an Estate for Life that the power was destroyed also here the Recovery does not only bar the Estate but all powers annexed to it for the recompence in value is of such strong Consideration that it serves as well for Rents Possibilities c. going out of and depending upon the Land as for the Land it self So Fines and Feoffments do ransack the whole Estate and pass or extinguish c. all Rights Conditions Powers c. belonging to the Land as well as the Land it self Secondly I agree with my Brother Rainsford that if Bernard had but an Estate for Life by the Devise the power was not well executed Where Tenant for Life has a power to make Leases 't is not always necessary to recite his power when he makes a Lease but if he makes a Lease which will not have an effectual continuance if it be directed out of his interest there it shall be as made by virtue of his power and so it was resolved in one Roger's Case in which I was Counsel Again Tho' it be here by Covenant to stand seized an improper way to execute his power yet it might be construed an Execution of it Mich. 51. In this Court Stapleton's Case where a Devise was to A. for Life Remainder to B. for Life Remainder to C. in Fee with power to B. to make his Wife a Joynture B. covenanted to stand seized for the Joynture of his Wife reciting his power tho' this could not make a legal Joynture yet it was resolved to enure by virtue of his power quando non valet quod ago ut ago valeat quantum valere potest But in this Case Bernard has got a new Fee which tho' it be defeasible by him in Remainder yet the Covenant to stand seized shall enure thereupon and the use shall arise out of the Fee Thirdly I was at the first opening of the Case of Opinion that Bernard had but an Estate for Life but upon deep Examination of the Will and of the Authority and Considerations of the Consequences of the Case I hold it to be an Estate Tail And first to ease that Point of all difficulties if cannot be denied but a Devise to a Man and the Heirs of his Body by a second Wife makes an Estate Tail executed tho' the Devisee had a Wife at the time As the Case often cited Land given to a Married Man and a Married Woman and the Heirs of their Bodies We are here in case of the Creation of an Estate-Tail where intention has some influence voluntas Donatoris c. and may help words which are not exactly according to legal form 39 Ass 20. Land given to a Man and his Wife haeredi de corpore uni haeredi tantum this judged an Entail Again we are in case of an Estate Tail to be created by a Will and the intention of the Testator is the Law to expound the Testament therefore a Devise to a Man and his Heirs Males or a Devise to a Man and if he dies without Issue c. are always construed to make an Entail It must be admitted that if the Devise were to B. and the Issue of his Body having no Issue at that time it would be an Estate Tail for the Law will carry over the word Issue not only to his immediate Issue but to all that shall descend from him I agree it would be otherwise if there were Issue at the time Tayler and Sayer 41 Eliz. rot 541. a Devise to his Wife for Life 1 Cro. 742. Remainder to his Issue having two Children it was held the Remainder was void being to the Issue in the singular number for incertainy which should take But that was a little too rank for Issue is nomen collectivum Again I agree if a Devise be made to a man and after his death to his Issue or Children having Issue at that time they take by way of Remainder And that was the only Point adjudged in Wild's Case and there also against the Opinion of Popham and Gawdy This way being made I come to the Case it self and shall briefly give my Reasons why I hold Bernard has an Estate Tail First Because the word Issue is nomen collectivum and takes in the whole Generation ex vi termini and so the Case is stronger than if it were Children And where 't is said to the Issue that he shall have of the Body of the second Wife that is all that shall come of the second Wife For so 't is understood in common Parlance Secondly In all Acts of Parliament Exitus is as comprehensive as Heirs of the Body In Westm 2. de donis Issue is made a term of equivalence to Heirs of the Body for where it speaks of the Alienation of the Donee 't is said quo minus ad exitum discenderet So in 34 H. 8. of Entails setled by the Crown 'T is true in Conveyances c. the wisdom of the Law has appropriated the word Heirs as a Term of Art In Clerke's Case A Lease was made to commence after the death of his Son without Issue the Son had a Son and died and then that Son died without Issue It was Resolved both in the Kings Bench and the Exchequer that the Lease should commence for Issue being nomen collectivum whenever the Issue of the Son failed the term of Commencement did happen But now to see the difference Tyler's Case Mich. 34 Eliz. B.R. He had Issue A. B. C. and D. and Devised to his Wife for Life and after her death to B. his Son in Tail and if he dies without Issue then to his Children A. had Issue a Son and died and B. died without Issue Resolved that the Son of A. should not take as one of the Children of the Testator Which Case I cite to shew the odds between the word Issue and the
excused yet 't is merely void as to the Party Et Ad jornatur Norton versus Harvey THe Case was an Executor being possessed of a Term let part of it reserving a Rent and died And the Question was whether his Executor should have the Rent or the Administrator de bonis non It was argued for the Executor that this Rent is meerly due by the Contract and not incident to the Reversion and the Administrator is in Paramount it being now as if the Testator had died Intestate and therefore before the Statute of this King such Administrators could not have had a Scire facias upon a Judgment obtained by the Executor tho' in the Case of Cleve and Vere 3 Cro. 450 457. 't is held that he may have a Liberate where the Executor had proceeded in the Execution of a Statute so far as an Extent for there the thing is executed and not meerly Executory as a Judgment If a Man that hath a Term in the right of his Wife le ts part of it reserving a Rent the Wife surviving shall not not have the Rent On the other side it was said that this case differed from that because the Reservation here is by him that had the whole Right executed in him Another objection against the Action was that here in the Declaration being in Covenant for Non payment of Rent there is not any demand alledged But that was answered because the Covenant was to pay such a Sum for the Rent expresly but if the Condition of a Bond be for performance of Covenants expressed in such a Lease one of which is for payment of Rent in that case the Bond will not be forfeit without a demand and of that Opinion were the Court and that the Executor should have the Rent but when recovered Hale said it should be Assets in his Hands And accordingly Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Termino Sanctae Trinitatis Anno 26 Car. II. In Banco Regis Silly versus Silly DOwer of 300 Acres of Land 200 Acres of Pasture 100 Acres Meadow The Tenant pleaded Non Tenure The Jury found him Tenant as to 320 Acres of Land and as to the rest that he was not Tenant And the Iudgment was that the Demandant should recover the 320 Acres Error was assigned in this Court that the Verdict and Judgment were for more Acres of Land than were demanded But on the other side it was said Land was a general word and might include Meadow and Pasture Curia In a Grant Land will extend to Meadow Pasture c. but in Pleading it signifies Arable only and here in regard they are distinguished in the Count the Verdict and Judgment must be reversed for the whole Tho' Hale said antiently such Iudgment would have been reversed but for the surplusage Vid Post Batmore Vxor versus Graves TRover for a 100 Loads of Wood upon a Special Verdict the Case was this Copyhold Land was surrendred to the use of J. S. for years Remainder to the Brother of the Plaintiff's Wife who died before the Term expired and so was not admitted any otherwise than by the admission of the Tenant for years And it was resolved First That the admittance of him that had the Estate for years was an admittance for him in the Remainder 4 Co. 23. a. 3 Cro. 504. Fine sur Grant and render to A. for Life Remainder to B. Execution sued by A. serves for B. So an Attornment to Tenant for Life serves for him in Remainder and this brings no prejuduce to the Lord for a Fine is not due until after admittance and the Lord may Assess one Fine for the particular Estate and another Fine for the Remainder But Wild said he need not pay it until his Estate comes in Possession after a Surrender the Estate remains in the Surrender before admittance of the Cestuy que use yet where Borough English Land was Surrendred to the use of J. S. and his Heirs and he died before admittance It was held that the younger Son should have it Secondly It was resolved that the Possession of the Tenant for years was so the Possession of him in Remainder as to make a Possessio Fratris But then it was moved that the Conversion was laid after the Marriage and so the Feme ought not to have joyned with her Husband in the Action But the Court held that in regard the Trover was laid to be before the Marriage which was the inception of the cause of Action the Wife might be joyned as if one has the Custody of a Womans Goods and afterward Marries her she may joyn in Detinue with her Husband for in case of Bailment the Proprietor is to some purposes in Possession and to some out of Possession Hale said in this case the Husband might bring the Action alone or joyntly with his Wife And so Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Anonymus IN Debt upon a Bond the Condition was to save the Obligee harmless from another Bond. The Defendant pleaded Non damnificatus The Plaintiff replies that the Money was not paid at the day and he devenit onerabilis and could not attend his business for fear of an Arrest The Defendant rejoyns that he tendred the Money at the day absque hoc that the Plaintiff devenit onerabilis to which it was Demurred and the Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff for the Money not being paid at the day the Counter Bond is forfeited Vid. 1 Cro. 672. 5 Co. and the Traverse in this case is naught The Mayor and Commonalty of London versus Dupester IN Debt for a Duty accruing to the City for Timber imported called Scavage The Declaration was that they were and had been a Corporation time out of mind and their Customs were confirmed by Act of Parliament Temps R. 2. c. The Defendant tendred his Law and Co. Entries 118. was cited where in Debt for an Amerciament in a Court Baron tho' the imposing of it was grounded upon a Prescription yet Wager of Law was admitted But notwithstanding in this case the Court overruled the Wager of Law for here the Duty it self is by Prescription and that confirmed by Act of Parlimant Debt for a Duty growing by a By-Law if the By-Law be Authorised by Letters Patents no Wager of Law lies So in Debt for Toll granted by Letters Patents 20 H. 7. Termino Sancti Michaelis Anno 26 Car. II. In Banco Regis Silly versus Silly THe Case was moved again And the Court said that the Demandant might have taken Judgment for the 300 Acres only habito nullo respectu to the rest and released all the Damages But this was not proper for an Amendment the Mistake being in the Verdict but if it could have been amended in the Common Bench the Court might here have made such Amendment Ante. Burfoot versus Peal A Scire facias was brought against the Bail who pleaded that the Principal paid the Debt ante diem impetrationis Brevis
Trover inter al' de uno Instrumento ferreo Anglicè an Iron Range After Verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in Arrest of Judgment that Instrumentum ferreum was too uncertain and that a Range was the same with a Grate for which Crates was a proper Latin word Sed non allocatur For Crates is such a Grate as is before a Prison But a Fire Range was not in use in the Romans time and therefore Instrumentum ferreum is well enough with the Anglicè Twisden said Trover de septem libris has been held good without saying what they were Blackman's Case IT was assigned for Error that the Venire was to Summon probos legales homines instead of liberos and so a material Variance and alledged that many Judgments had been Reversed for it But the Court here being informed that the Presidents were generally probos instead of liberos would not allow the Exception The King versus Armstrong Harrison al' c. THey and others were Indicted for Conspiring to Charge one with the Keeping of a Bastard Child and thereby also to bring him to Disgrace After Verdict for the King it was moved in Arrest of Judgment that the bare Conspiring without Executing of it by some Overt act was not subject to Indictment according to the Poulterers Case in the 9 Co. And it doth not appear that he was actually Charged with the Keeping of a Child nay 't is alledged 't was but a pretended Child neither was he by Warrant brought before a Justice of Peace upon such an account but only that they went and affirmed it to the party himself intending to obtain Money from him that it might be no further disclosed Sed non allocatur For there was as much Overt act as the nature and design of this Conspiracy did admit in regard there was no Child really but only a Contrivance to Defame the Person and Cheat him of his Money which was a Crime of a very heinous nature Then it was alledged That this was tryed at the Old-Baily commonly called Justice-Hall in London and the Jury came de Warda de Faringdon extra London which appeared to be out of the Iurisdiction Sed non allocatur For the Name of the Ward is Faringdon extra to distinguish it from Faringdon infra but both are known to be in London Whereupon Judgment was Entred up against them and Armstrong which appeared to be the principal Offender was Fined 50 l and the other 30 l Burrough's Case HE and others were Indicted for that they being Church-wardens Overseers of the Poor and a Constable did contemptuously and voluntarily neglect to Execute diversa Praecepta Watranta directed to them by the Bayliffs of Ipswich being Justices of the Peace under their Hands and Seals c. It was moved to quash it for that the nature and tenour of the Warrants were not expressed in the Indictment For unless the parties know particularly what they are charged with they cannot tell how to make their Defence And for that Reason it was quashed by the Court. Note The Court never gives Costs for not Executing of a Writ of Enquiry of Damages tho' Notice be given Anonymus AN Indictment of Forcible Entry into certain Lands in the possession of J.S. was quashed for not shewing what Estate J.S. had and tho' the word Disseisivit were in the Court held that tho' that might be taken to imply a Freehold yet it was not sufficient Vid. Mo. 481. And another was quashed because it was said possessed pro termino But the Court held that if it had been pro termino annorum tho' not said for how many years it had been well Note A Bayliff caught one by the Hand whom he had a Warrant to Arrest as he held it out of a Window And the Court said that this was such a Taking of him that the Bayliff might justifie the breaking open of the House to Carry him away Kent versus Harpool AN Ejectment The Case came hither by a Writ of Error out of the Kings-Bench in Ireland and divers Points were in it which concerned the Act for Settlement of Lands in Ireland But the Case was as to the great Point at Common Law to this effect Father Tenant for Life Remainder to the Son for Life Remainder to first Son of that Son who was not born Remainder to the Heirs of the Body of the Father the Father died before the first Son was born and Whether the Descent of the Entail to the Son did prevent the Contingent Remainder was the Question It was Argued that it did not because the Inheritance came to the Son by Act in Law And the Opinion in Cordal's Case in the 1 Cro. 315. was cited the great Reason in Chudley's Case and other Cases wherein Contingent Remainders have been held to be destroyed was for the preventing of Perpetuities which would have been let in if Contingent Remainders had been preserved whatever Act had been done by those which had the Actual Estate But there is no such necessity of making the life Construction upon Acts in Law If Lessee for years makes the Lessor Executor the Term is not drowned But if the Executor that hath a Lease purchases the Inheritance the Term is gone because it is his own act but in the other Case the Law shall not work that which must be construed a Devastavit In Lewis Bowles's Case in the 11 Co. and Co. Litt. where there is an Estate for Life Remainder to the first Son Remainder in Fee to the Tenant for Life the Estates at first close and open again upon the Birth of the first Son which should take the Remainder And so it may be here But the Court seemed to be of Opinion that the Contingent Remainder was destroyed by the Descent of the Estate Tail And Rainsford Chief Justice relyed upon Wood and Ingersol's Case in the 2 Cro. 260. where a Devise was to the first Son for Life Remainder to the Son which should survive and there three Judges against one held that the descent of the Fee upon the first Son prevented the Contingent Remainder to the Survivor Et Adjornatur Note In Lewis Bowle's Case the Estates were united at the first upon making of the Conveyance Smith versus Tracy IN a Prohibition the Case was One died Intestate and whether his Brother of the Half-blood should come in for Distribution upon the new Statute of 22 23 Car. 2. cap. 10. was the Question It was Argued that the Half blood should have no share for the Words are The next of Kindred to the Dead person in equal Degree which the Half-blood is not The Words likewise are Those which legally represent their Stocks and that must be intended in an Act of Parliament such as the Common Law makes to be Representatives and not the Civil Law For then it would be that the Bastard eigne should come in for Distribution For their Rule is that subsequens matrimonium facit
meant by the name of Son As to Beckford's Case the Words are full to carry all and therefore it had been impertinent to have wrote over the Will again So where a man has two Sons named John it may be well averred that he meant the younger Son for nothing in the Will is inconsistent with such meaning The Court took time to deliver their Opinions And afterwards the Chief Justice delivered the Opinion of the Court That neither the Republication nor Parol Declaration could operate as a Devise to R. c. the Grandson Pepis's Case A Mandamus to restore him to his Place of Recorder of the Town of Cambridge The Return was That they were Incorporated by the Name of Mayor Aldermen c. with a Power to chuse a Recorder Habend ' pro termino vitae aut ad voluntat ' eligentium That Mr. Pepis was Chosen Recorder ad voluntat ' eligentium and that afterwards by the Votes of the greater number of the Electors he was removed and the Lord Allington constituted a Recorder under their Common Seal c. Vpon this Return it was moved for Mr. Pepis that altho' they had alledged a Power to Chuse a Recorder at Will yet they should have shewn Cause for his Removal being a Judicial Office which the Court takes notice of and that none had such a Power but the King to remove Judges ad libitum Again A Corporation aggregate cannot determine their Will but under their Common Seal and that is not shewn here Curia Where a Recorder is at Will they may remove him at pleasure as it is in Blagrave's Case and several other Cases As to the other Point it does not appear that he was Constituted under their Common Seal perhaps then they must have determined their Will under their Common Seal but now 't is well enough my Lord Allington is Constituted under their Common Seal which Act removes the other so it was adjudged against Mr. Pepis Termino Sancti Michaelis Anno 31 Car. II. In Banco Regis A Prohibition was prayed to the Court of Admiralty upon a Suggestion that the Suit was there upon a Contract made upon the Land The Case was thus A Bargain was made upon the Land with severl Seamen to bring up a Ship from a Port in England to London for a certain Sum to them to be paid And for the Prohibiton 't was alledged that this being upon the Land and a Contract with divers joyntly for a Sum in Gross it could not be within the ordinary Rule of Mariners Wages which is permitted to be Sued for in the Court of Admiralty in favour of the Mariners because they may all joyn in that Court and not be put to the inconvenience of Suing severally as they must at Law but as this Contract is they are to sue joyntly at Common Law But the Prohibition was denied for this must be taken as Mariners Wages And therefore tho' the Contract were upon the Land yet they have Jurisdiction Besides the Party comes after Sentence and therefore in the Courts discretion whether they will then grant a Prohibition Note A Rump Act was made to enable Mariners to Sue for Wages in the Admiralty but yet the Law was taken to be so before Vid. 3 Cro. Anonymus A Prohibition was prayed to the Ecclesiastical Court where the Libel was for these words You are a Whore and Ply in Moorfields And the Suggestion was that the words were spoken in London where an Action lies for such words and for that Cause a Prohibition was granted otherwise Suits might have been in the Court Christian for such words tho' not singly for the word Whore being a common word of brabling otherwise where joyned with words which shew the intent to Defame in that kind Anonymus AN Indebitat ' Assumpsit was brought for Goods sold and delivered The Action was laid in London and a Motion was made to change the Venue upon an Affidavit that the Sale was in Kent But on the other side it was said the delivery was in London and that were the Matter consists of two parts in several Counties the Plaintiff shall have his Election to which the Court agreed Anonymus A Man Covenants with his intended Wife to give her leave to dispose of so much by her Will and then they Intermarry the Husband having given Bond to a third person for the performance of these Covenants after the death of the Wife the Husband is Sued upon the Bond for not permitting her Will to be performed And upon Oyer of the Condition it was insisted on for the Defendant that these Covenants were discharged by the Marriage and so the Bond likewise loseth its force Vid. Hob. 216. Et Adjornatur Anonymus A Motion was made to quash an Inquisition of forcible Entry it was Inquisitio capta per Juratores super Sacramentum suum coram T. S. J. N. Justiciariis c. qui dicunt super Sacramentum praed ' And it was objected That qui dicunt c. referring to the last antecedent it was that the Justices say Sed non allocatur for super Sacramentum praedict ' makes it certain Note The Caption of an Indictment may be amended the same Term it comes into Court Anonymus AN Indictment for not taking upon him and executing the Office of a Constable to which he was chosen by the Leer The question was Whether a Tenant in antient Demesne were obliged to that Office And the Court held that he was Termino Sancti Hillarij Anno 31 32 Car. II. In Banco Regis Anonymus IN Ejectment upon a Special Verdict the case was thus A Lease was made A. and B. for their Lives Remainder to the first Son of A. c. Remainder to the Heirs of A. B. conveys his part to A. The question was Whether the Contingent Remainder to the first Son were destroyed Holt argued that it was For a Contingent Remainder must have some particular Estate of Freehold to support it and by the Release of B. his Estate was gone and there became an intire Fee in A. For by whotsoever means a Joynt tenant for Life conveys his Moiety to his Companion it does not enure by Grant of the Estate but by Release as Eustace and Scawens Case 2 Cro. 696. A. and B. Joynt tenants for Life A. Levy's a Fine to B. B. dies there shall be no Occupancy of the Moiety of A. during the Life of A. Jones 55. and the Case of Lewis Bowels 11 Co. is not to be objected where an Estate for Life was made to B. and F. the Remainder to their first Son that they should have in Tail Remainder to B. and F. in Tail here tho' an Estate in Tail is executed in B. and F. until a Son Born yet after upon the Birth of the Son the Contingent Remainder shall vest and split and divide the former Estate 2 Co. 60.61 but here the Fee becomes executed by several Conveyances but there the Estate
makes a Lease for the Life of the Lessee not warranted by the Statute and dies leaving B. in Remainder his Heir B. let ts for 99 years to commence after the death of the Tenant for Life reserving Rent and then the Tenant for Life surrenders to B. upon Condition and dies B. suffers a Recovery with single Voucher and dies the Lessee for years enters the Heir of B. distrains for the Rent and the Lessee brings a Replevin and upon an Avowry and Pleadings thereupon this Case was disclosed to the Court of Common Bench and Judgment given there for the Avowant and Error thereupon brought in this Court For the Plaintiff in the Error it was Argued That the Lease being derived out of a Reversion in Fee which was Created in A. upon the Discontinuance for Life and the New Fee vanishing by the Surrender of the Tenant for Life for it was urged he was in his Remitter altho' the taking of the Surrender was his own Act that the Lease for years by consequence was become void Again It was Objected against the Common Recovery that the Tenant in Tail and a Stranger which had nothing in the Estate were made Tenants to the Praecipe and therefore no good Recovery Again In case B. were not remitted after acceptance of the Surrender then he was Seised by force of the Tail and so no good Recovery being with single Voucher On the other side it was Argued to be no Remitter because the acceptance of the Surrender was his own Act and the Entry was taken away But admitting it were a Remitter because by the Surrender the Estate for Life which was the Discontinuance was gone and it was no more than a Discontinuance for Life For if Tenant in Tail letts for Life and after grants the Reversion in Fee if the Lessee for Life dies after the Death of the Tenant in Tail so that the Estate was not executed in the Grantee during the Life of the Tenant in Tail the Heir shall immediately Enter upon the Grantee of the Reversion Co. Litt. It seems also to be stronger against the Remitter in this case because 't is not Absolute but only Conditional However the Lease may be good by Estoppel for it appears to have been by Indenture and if the Lessor cannot avoid the Lease the Lessee shall without question be subject to the Rent But it was Objected against the Estoppel that here an Interest passes and the Lease was good for a time As if the Lessee for Ten years makes a Lease for Twenty years and afterwards purchaseth the Reversion it shall bind him for no more than Ten. To which Pemberton Chief Justice said The difference is where the party that makes the Estate has a legal Estate and where a Defeasible Estate only for in the latter a Lease may work by Estoppel tho' an Interest passed so long as the Estate out of which the Lease was derived remained undefeated As to the Recovery it was held clearly good altho' a Stranger that had nothing in the Land was made Tenant to the Praecipe with the Tenant in Tail for the Recompence in Value shall go to him that lost the Estate and being a Common Assurance 't is to be favourably Expounded Et Adjornatur Termino Sancti Hillarij Anno 33 34 Car. II. In Banco Regis Anonymus IN Error upon a Judgment in Ejectione Firmae in the Common Pleas where the Case was That the Bishop of London was seized injure Episcopatus of a Mannor of which the Lands in question were held and time out of mind were demised and demisable by Copy of Court Roll for Life in Possession and Reversion and J.S. being Copyholder for Life in Reversion after an Estate for Life in Ann Pitt and J.N. being seized of the Mannor by Disseisin J.S. at a Court holden for the Mannor in the name of J. N. surrendred into the Hands of the said J.N. the Disseisor Lord to the used of the said Lord. Afterwards the Bishop of London entred and avoided the Disseisin Ann Pitt died and an Ejectment was brought by J. S. And it was adjudged in the Common Bench that he had a good Title and now upon a Writ of Error in this Court the Matter in Law was insisted upon by Pollexfen for the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error That this Surrender to the Disseisor Lord to the Lords own use was good for all the Books agree a Copyholder may Surrender to a Disseisor of the Mannor to the use of a Stranger and why not to the Lords own use As if Lessee for years be ousted and he in Reversion disseised and the Lessee Releases to the Disseisor this extinguishes his Term. Here is a compleat Disseisin of the Mannor by Attornment of the Freeholders without which the Services cannot be gained and the Copyholders comeing to the Disseisors Court and by making Surrenders c. owning him for their Lords tantamounts Serjeant Maynard contra And he insisted that this Surrender was not good for the Disseisor had no Estate in this Land capable of a Surrender for the Copyholder for Life continuing in Possession and never having been ousted there could be no Disssesin of that And he endeavoured to distinguish it from a Surrender to a Disseisor Lord to the use of another for in such Surrenders the Lord is only an Instrument and does but as it were assent and until admittance the Estate is in the Surrenderer And he resembled it to the Attornment of a Tenant when è converso a Seigniory is granted and he put Cases upon Surrenders of Leases that they must be to one that hath the immediate Reversion as an under Lessee for part of the Term cannot Surrender to the first Lessor and he cited a Case of Lessee for years Remainder for Life Remainder in Fee to a Stranger he that had the Fee enfeoffed the Tenant for years by Deed and made Livery and the Conveyance held void for it could not work by Livery to the Tenant for years who was in Possession before and a Surrender it could not be because of the intermediate Estate for Life and it could not work as a Grant for want of Attornment He said it had been commonly received that a Common Recovery cannot be suffered where the Tail is expectant upon an Estate for Life not made Tenant to the Praecipe which he said was true in a Writ of Entry in the Post which are commonly used And the true reason is because such Writ supposes a Disseisin which cannot be when there is a Tenant for Life in Possession But as he said a Common Recovery in such case in a Writ of Right would be good Pemberton Chief Justice said his reason of Desseisin would overthrow Surrenders to the use of a Stranger for if the Possession of the Copyholder would preserve it from a Disseisin then was it pro tempore lopped off or severed from the Mannor and then no Surrender could be at all Et Adjornatur Berry
Indicted of Perjury in a voluntary and Extra judicial Oath and cited a late Case where one had stole away a mans Daughter and went before a Justice of the Peace and Swore that he had the Fathers Consent and this in order to get a Licence to marry her and he was Indicted and Convicted thereupon And all the Court said that it was not the course to quash Indictments of Perjury Nusance or the like but to put the party to plead to them Termino Paschae Anno 36 Car. II. In Banco Regis Duncomb versus Walter IN an Indebitat ' Assumpsit by an Assignee of Commissioners upon the Statute of Bankrupts upon Non assumpsit a Special Verdict was found upon which the Case appeared to be thus One Staly was Arrested by an Executor of his Creditor 6 Sept which was before Probat of the Will and within two or three days after he paid 1000 l to the Defendant to whom he stood Indebted in such Sum and after the 18th of September he yielded himself to Prison upon the said Arrest The Question was Whether the Defendant should be obliged to Refund this Money which was paid unto him as aforesaid First Whether the Arrest before the Probat was a good Arrest It was said If an Executor hath a Reversion in a Term upon which a Rent is reserved and Distrains c. he may avow for the Rent before the Probat Vid. 1 Roll. 917. tit Executors where an Executor brings an Action before Probat yet if he shews the Probat upon the Declaration 't is well enough Secondly Whether when he yields himself to Prison it shall not relate to the first Arrest to make him a Bankrupt from that time This depends upon the Statute of 21 Jac. cap. 19. where it is said that in the Cases of Arrest and lying in Prison he shall be adjudged a Bankrupt from the time of his first Arrest Object This Relation doth not prejudice Strangers Answ Dame Hales's Case Pl. Com. 293. If one giveth another a mortal Wound and then sells his Land and the person dies there shall be such Relation as to make the Land forfeit from the first Stroke Note This Case came by Writ of Error out of the Common Pleas where Judgment was given for Walter and the said Judgment was affirmed in this Court principally upon the point of Relation For the Court said that it would be a great mischief if it should relate to the first Arrest as to the payment of Money to Strangers Termino Sancti Hillarij Anno 1 2 Jac. II. In Banco Regis Herring versus Brown Quod vid. ante Michaelmas 35 Car. 2. THe Case upon a Special Verdict was to this effect That J. S. being Seised in Fee had made a Conveyance of his Estate to the use of himself for Life with divers Remainders over to other persons with a power of Revocation by Writing under his Hand and Seal c. Afterwards the said J. S. having a purpose to Revoke the said Uses and make a new Settlement of his Estate he levied a Fine and after the Fine he made a Deed wherein he expressed that he Revoked the former Uses and so proceeded to a new Limitation by that Deed and declared that the Fine by him limited should be to the Vses of the said Deed. The sole Question was Whether the Fine had extinguished his Power and by consequence forfeited his Estate or Whether the Fine and Deed should be taken as one Conveyance and so be a good execution of his Power and new limitation of the Uses And after many solemn Arguments it was Resolved by the Chief Justice Herbert Holloway and Wright that the Fine was an extinguishment of his Power and that the Deed came too late contrary to the Opinion of Justice Withens Vido ante ADDENDA Termino Sanctae Trinitatis Anno 26 Car. II. In Banco Regis Pibus versus Mitford Intratur Trin. 20 Car. 2. Rot. 703. IN an Ejectment the Jury find a Special Verdict to this effect viz. That Michael Mitford was seiz'd of the Lands in question and of divers other Lands in Fee and having Issue Robert by one Venter and Ralph by Jane his second Wife did 23 Jan. 21 Jac. by Indenture Covenant to stand seized of some of the Lands to the use of himself for Life Remainder to Trustees for years for several purposes Remainder to Jane his second Wife for Life Remainder to Ralph and the Heirs Male of his Body And as to the Lands in question he Covenants to stand seiz'd To the use of his Heirs Male begotten or to be begotten on the Body of his second Wife and died And then the Jury made this Special Conclusion If any Use did arise by the Deed to Ralph then they find for the Defendant and if not they find for the Plaintiff This Case was Argued several times at the Bar and now the Judges delivered their Opinions seriatim Wild Justice for the Defendant We are to give our Opinions upon a Deed of Uses made for the Provision of younger Children not otherwise provided for But if the Case were not so It is a safe way when the Words are ambiguous to follow the Intention of the party appearing in the Deed. I shall not maintain that Ralph is a Purchaser and so make this an Executory Use I agree a man cannot either by Conveyance at Common Law by Limitation of Uses or Devise make his right Heir a Purchaser I agree also Griswold's Case in Dyer 156. and if this Case had operated by Transmutation of Possession this Limitation to the Heirs of the Body of the Covenantor had been void and no Use should have risen But here in the Case of a Covenant to stand seiz'd nothing moves out of the Covenantor he retains the Land and directs the Use and keeps sufficient in him to maintain this Use There 's a great difference between a Conveyance at the Common Law and a Conveyance to Uses At the Common Law the Heir cannot take where the Ancestor could not but otherwise it is in case of Uses 2 Rolls 794. and so is Wood's Case 1 Co. 99. a. cited in Shelly's Case This I say to shew that the Intent of the Parties shall be the Guide and that there is a difference between Conveyances at the Common Law and Conveyances to Uses Horwood's Opinion in Hussey's Case 37 H. 8. comes to our Case There 's no great difference between a Covenant to stand seiz'd and a Feoffment to Uses I will not Argue to prove that this Deed shall enure as an Executory Use because 't is against a Rule in Law taken by my Lord Hobart and so Agreed before his time But here Ralph is Tenant in Tail Michael his Father being Tenant for Life Remainder to his Heirs Male begotten on the Body of Jane his second Wife For the Law to preserve this Limitation to the use of his Heirs Male c. will by Implication create an Estate for Life in Michael
because the Intent of the parties appears that it should be so There 's no great difference between the Construction of a Deed of Uses and a Will 13 H. 7. The Wife takes an Estate for Life by Implication where the Land is devised to the eldest Son after her decease Manning and Andrew's Case in 1 Leon. 259. The Reason of these Cases is the fulfilling of the Intention of the Parties and here this Limitation cannot be made good by way of a Future Use nor by any other way but only by creating of an Estate for Life in Michael the Father by Implication and this is according to the nature of a Covenant to stand seiz'd For the Use is not to pass out of the Covenantor till the proper time for the subsequent Estate to commence As to my Lord Paget's Case 't was his Intention to have the Use during his Life And my Lord Coke was certainly very well satisfied with the Resolution in Fenwick and Mitford's Case when he wrote his Institutes for he Argued before to the contrary as appears by the Report of that Case in Moor. Rainsford Justice to the same Intent If no Use rises immediately to Ralph yet if a Use rises by the Deed so that he has the Land any way be it by discent from his Father 't is within the Conclusion of the Verdict By the scope of the Conveyance it appears that it was intended that Robert should never have his Land till Twelve hundred Pound was paid for the provision of younger Children so that if Robert should have it it would be against the Intention of Michael There are two Reasons and Grounds in Law by which we may make this Deed agree with the Intention of the Parties First Because it is in the Case of an Estate Tail ubi voluntas donatoris observari debet Secondly It is in a Conveyance setled by way of Use and in Cases of Uses the Intention of the parties ought to be pursued And this is in Case of a Use that rises by Covenant to stand seiz'd which makes the Case the stronger And I conceive this is not a void Limitation but such an one as gives an Estate to Ralph In speaking to which I shall observe what my Lord Coke in the 1 Inst 23. says viz. That so much of the Use as the Owner of the Land does not dispose of remains in him c. and so in Cownden and Clark's Case in Hob. 30. And this is the Reason of Bingham's Case 1 Co. 91. Now here when Michael Covenanted to stand seiz'd to the Vse of his Heirs Male on the Body of his second Wife begotten I conceive he shall retain the Land as parcel of his ancient Vse during his Life for non est Haeres viventis according to Archer's Case 1 Co. And that Michael shall retain an Estate for Life is prov'd by my Lord Paget's Case 1 Co. 154. Dyer 310. N. 79. 1 Co. Chudleigh's Case 129. 2 Rolls 788. 21 H. 7. 18. From my Lord Paget's Case upon which I shall rely and the other Cases it appears that were there 's a Limitation to one after the death of another the Covenantor shall retain the Land during the Life of the other and here in our Case this Estate not taking effect till after the Death of Michael he shall retain the Estate and shall be Tenant for Life of the old Vse Now the Question is Whether Ralph shall take by Discent or Purchase And I conceive this Estate for Life with the Remainder in Tail makes but one Estate Tail in Michael and that he becomes Tenant in Tail and so Ralph shall take as Heir in Tail I shall not trouble my self whether Ralph may take here as a Purchaser because in Cownden and Clark's Case in Hob. it is Resolved that he cannot take as Heir Male of the Body by Purchase because all the words are not verified in him for he is not Heir I shall rely upon the First Point That here is an Estate Tail executed in Michael For when an Estate for Life is in the Auncestor by way of Retainer and an Estate is afterwards limited to his Heirs this is within the Rule put in Shelley's Case in 1 Co. where the Auncestor takes an Estate of Freehold and by the same Conveyance an Estate is limited to his Heirs Mediately or Immediately they are Words of Limitation and not of Purchase because the Heir is part of his Father Our Case is stronger that Fenwick and Mitfords Case It s true the same Reason for that Case is not given by Anderson and More which is given by my Lord Coke More 437. There the Reason is because the Limitation to the right Heirs is merely void here Michael hath an Estate in Tail of the ancient Use therefore 't is not necessary for the Law to create an Estate for Life Obj. That this cannot be an Estate Tail executed in Michael because the Estate for Life is not by the same Limitation but by Construction of Law But my Lord Coke says in Fenwick and Mitfords Case 1 Inst 22. b. that there is no difference where the Estate is created by Law and where by the Deed. 1 Anderson 259. and the Law retaining an Estate in Michael for Life our Case is the same as if the Estate had been limited to him with the Remainder to his Heirs Male begotten on his second Wife which would be an Estate Tail executed in Michael and would have discended to Ralph Twisden Justice for the Plaintiff I hold there 's no Use raised to Ralph by this Deed. We are here in the construction of a Deed and not of a Will It may be an Estate should be raised in such a case by a Will altho' my Lord Hobart is of a contrary Opinion I agree the Case of Hodgkinson and Wood Cro. Car. 23. but it cannot be argued from thence that it shall be so in a Deed for a Devise is not to take effect till after the Death of the Devisor and then 't is apparent that he is Heir Male of his Body It hath been agreed that Heirs Male of the Body are words of purchase It is plain that Ralph cannot take as Special Heir unless by Purchase and that he cannot do because he who shall take by virtue of such a Limitation ought to be Heir as well as Issue Male and Ralph here cannot take by vertue of the Statute de Donis Conditionalibis because none can take as Special Heir but where his Ancestor took before and therefore this Limitation is utterly void To make this Limitation good divers ways have been urged First That this Deed has an operation by way of returning of the Use and it has been compared to my Lord Pagets Case which differs from it here cannot be any part of the old Use in Michael for if he hath an Estate for Life it ought to be a new Use It cannot be a returning Use for the Limitation to the Heirs Male of the Body
Estate Tail in Michael First Because in this Case the Use returns by operation of Law and executes an Estate in Michael for Life which being conjoined to the Estate limited to the Heirs Male of his Body makes an Estate Tail This Estate for Life rising by operation of Law is as strong as if it had been limitted to him for his Life and after his decease to the Heirs Male of his Body Secondly Because that a Limitation to the Heirs Male of his Body is in Construction of Law a Limitation to himself and the Heirs Male of his Body There is a great difference when he who has the Use limits it to A. for Life the Remainder to the Heirs of the Body of B. here no Estate can rise to B. because nothing moved from him but where he who has the Estate limits it to the Heirs Male of his own Body ut res valeat he shall have it for his Life Thirdly It is plainly according to the intent of the Parties the intent perfectly appears that the Issue by the second Wife should take and that Robert the eldest Son should not take till so much Money be paid therefore if we can by any means serve the intent of the parties we ought to do it as good Expositors For as my Lord Hobart says Judges in Construction of Deeds do no harm if they are astuti in serving the intent of the Parties without violating any Law Obj. Here the Use being never out of Michael he hath the ancient Use which is the Fee simple and consequently being the ancient Use and this being a new Limitation to the Heirs Male of his Body the ancient use and the new one cannot be piec'd to make an Estate Tail executed in Michael but it shall be a Contingent Use if any which ought to rise to the Heir Male of his Body and so remains the ancient Fee simple And it hath been compared to these Cases If a Man Covenants to stand seized to the Use of J.S. or of his Son after his Marriage or after the Death of J. D. these are Contingent Limitations and there is a Fee simple determinable in the Covenantor to serve the future Uses Resp 'T is true if a Man Covenants to stand seized to such Uses as that he leaves a discendible Estate in himself As if a Man Covenants to stand seized to the Use of his Son from and after his Marriage this is purely a Contingent Use because t is possible the Marriage may never take effect and nothing is fetch'd out of the Covenantor so if he Covenants to stand seized to the Use of J. S. after 40 years there is a Fee simple determinable in the Covenantor and therefore those Cases are not to be resembled to our Case where the Estate of Michael cannot continue longer than his Life And this without any wrong done to any Rule of Law may be turned to a Use for Life and therefore such construction shall be Object 2. Here is an Estate to rise by way of Use by a Deed and not by a Will which shall not be by Implication by a Deed. Resp It s a certain truth But we are not here upon raising an Estate by Implication but qualifying an Estate that is now in the Father which by this new Deed is to be qualified to be an Estate for Life to preserve the Estate Tail so that the Cases of Implication are not to the purpose Object 3. In this Case Michael shall be in of his ancient Estate in Fee simple which is in him and not of a new Estate created by Implication of Law and it hath been compared to the Devise of Land to a Mans Heir he shall not be in by the Devise but of his ancient Estate that would have descended to him Resp True But in this Case a Man may qualifie his Estate as in Gilpins Case Cro. Ca. 161. Devise to his Heir upon Condition that he shall pay his Debts in a year the Heir is a Purchasor so here is a qualification to turn the Estate of Michael into an Estate for Life ut res valeat Object 4. Michael had not an Intention to have an Estate for Life for in the Limitation of the other Lands he has limited them expressly to himself for Life and if he had intended to have had an Estate for Life in the Lands in question he would also have so expressed it Resp The intention will not controul the operation of Law his main intent was to settle the Lands upon his younger Children this the Law serves but not his secondary intentions If a Man Covenants to stand seized to the Use of himself for Life without impeachment of Wast and afterwards to the Use of the Heirs Male of his Body the Law supervenes his intention and makes him to be Tenant in Tail And in our Case there was a necessity to limit the other Lands to himself for Life because there was another Estate to intervene the Estate for Life and the Estate Tail The Reason given by my Lord Coke in Fenwick and Mitfords Case is plain enough and it appears that he was of that Opinion afterwards by the Report of Pannel and Lanes Case 13 Jac. in Rolls Rep. 1 part 238. The Case upon which I shall rely which has not been answered is my Lord Pagets Case adjudged by all the Judges of England Tho. Lord Paget Covenants in consideration of the discharge of his Funerals Payment of his Debts and Legacies out of the profits of his Land and for the advancement of his Son Brother and others of his Blood that he and his Heirs would stand seized of divers Mannors to the Use of T.F. one of the Covenantees for the Life of my Lord Paget and after his Death to the Use of C. Paget for the term of 24 years and then to the Use of W. Paget his Son in Tail with Remainders in over and afterwards the Lord Paget was aâ—â—â—nted of Treason And it was adjudged that the Lord Paget himself had an Estate for his Life for the Remainder being limited after his Death the Estate cannot pass out of him during his Life and there in Case of a Covenant to stand seized he himself hath an Estate for Life And this is not because the Estate returns as my Brother Twisden has said but because the Estate was never out of him and cannot return either from the Heir or the Covenantee otherwise where should it be during the Life of the Lord Paget who was attainted the Book is that it was never out of him but was turn'd into an Estate for Life So that now it is all one as if he had Covenanted to stand seized to the Use of his eldest Son after his Death And the question is What Estate he has during his Life It is adjudged that he has an Estate for Life for if there had been a Contingent Fee simple in the Lord Paget his Heir could never have had an Amoveas manus
Usage in England is that the Archbishop is Guardian of the Spiritualties in the Suffragan Diocess 225 234 Blasphemy Blasphemous Words not only an Offence to God and Religion but a Crime against the Laws State and Government and Christianity is parcel of the Laws of England 293 Bond. See Obligation What Bond a Gaoler may not take of his Prisoner 237 The Condition of a Bond or Covenant may in part be against the Common Law and stand good in the other part ibid. C. Certiorari PRisoners cannot be removed by Certiorari from a Country Gaol till the Indictment be found below 63 Lies to remove an Indictment of Manslaughter out of Wales to be Tryed in the next English County 93 So of Murder 146 Challenge What is good Cause and where Cause shall be shewn 309 Where the Kings Council shall shew Cause ibid Chancery Tryals directed out of Chancery the Course 66 Answer in a Court of Equity Evidence at Law against the Defendant 212 Churchwardens Bring Account against their Predecessor for a Bell whether it shall be said to be de bonis Ecclesiae or de bonis Parochianorum 89 Whether they may refuse to take the Oath to present and how to proceed 114. 127 General VVords to present Offenders do not extend to the Church-warden himself but relate only to the rest of the Parish 127 May make Rates themselves if the Parishioners are Summoned and refuse to meet 367 Common See Pasture Where Common is claimed for Beasts Levant and Couchant on certain Land no other Beasts ought to be put on the Common but those of the Tenant of the Land to which it is appendant or those which he takes to compester his Land 18 A Man cannot prescribe for Common by a Prescripeion that is unreasonable 21 Common apurtenent for Beasts Levant and Couchant how pleaded 54 Common in another Mans Soyl how to be claimed 383 A Commoner cannot prescribe to exclude his Lord 394 The Comencement of Commons 395 In a Title of Common for Beasts Levant and Couchant the Levancy and Couchancy is not Traversable 385. Nor material among Commoners 397 Condition What Words make a Condition what a Limitation and what Conditional Limitation 202 203 Conspiracy If one be acquitted in an Action of Conspiracy the other cannot be guilty but where one is found guilty and the other comes not in upon Process or Dyes yet Judgment shall be against the other 238 Indictment lies for Conspiring to charge with a Bastard Child and thereby also to bring him to disgrace 305 Constable See Attorney Tenant in Antient Demesne not excused from serving Constable 344 Contingency See Grant Remainder Conveyance Contingent Estates what and how destroyed 215 334 Whether a Descent in Tayl prevents a Contingent Remainder 306 Contract A Verbal Contract cannot create a Penalty to oblige the Heir 76 Conveyance The Modern VVays of Conveyancing to prevent the disappointing Contingent Estates 189 VVhere a Conveyance is good before Inrolment and where not 360 Difference between a Conveyance at Common Law and a Conveyance to Uses 373 378 Copyhold See Pasture Admittance of Tenant for years is an Admittance of him in the Remainder 260 VVether Copyholder for Life in Reversion after an Estate for Life in being can Surrender to a Lord Disseizor 359 Coroner VVhere a Melius Inquirendum shall be granted after a Coroners Inquisition super visum Corporis 182 A Coroners Inquisition that finds a person Felo de se non Compos may be Traversed 278. And quasht 352 Corporation VVhat they can do without a Deed and what not 47 48 Costs See Assault and Battery Treble Costs in an Action on the Stat. 8 H. 6. of Forcible Entry 22 Costs where payable in a VVrit of Error 88 VVhere payable by an Executor 92. and Administrator 110 116 If an Executor be sued and the Plaintiff Non-suit he shall have Costs but an Executor Plaintiff shall pay no Costs upon a Non-suit 94 Costs and Damages not to be given in an Action Popular 133 Costs de Incremento 337 362 Covenant VVhat Collateral matters shall be implied upon a Covenant 26 44 45 Thô a Covenant be made only to a Man his Heirs and Assigns yet if a Breach be in his Life time his Executors may bring the Action for Damages 176 VVhere a Covenant shall bind notwithstanding a subsequent Act of Parliament 175 176 Covenant with an Intended VVife whether discharged by subsequent Marriage 344 Courts See Jurisdiction Inferiour Courts cannot make a Continuance ad Proximam Curiam but always to a Day certain 181 Customs See Prescription To maintain a Common Key for the unlading of Goods and therefore every Vessel passing by the said Key to pay a certain Sum a void Custom as to those Vessels which did not unlade at the said Key 71 A Custom that Lands shall descend always to the Heirs Males tho' of the Collateral Line Good 88 D. Damages See Costs NOne but the Courts at Westminster can increase Damages upon View 353 Date See Lease Demurrer The old way of Demurring at the the Bar 240 Devastavit See Executor Return Devise Whether a Termor may Devise in Remainder and limit a Possibility upon a Possibility 79 To Dr. V. during his Exile from his Country what Estate passes 325 Divers parcels of Lands being devised whether these words the said Lands pass all the parcels or only the last mentioned 368 A Devise of Lands to two equally to be divided makes them Tenents in Common 376 Discents The various Kinds of Discents or Hereditary Successions and the Rules whereby they are to be governed 414 The Discent from a Brother to a Brother thô it be a Collateral Discent yet it is an immediate Discent 423. And therefore two Brothers Born in England shall Inherit one the other tho' the Father be an Alien 429. Secus in Cases of Attainder 416 417 If the Son purchase and have no Kindred on his Fathers side but an Alien his Estate shall discend to the Heir on the part of his Mother 426 Distress Whether in Distress for Rent Horses may be severed from a Cart 36 An Information lies not against a Landlord for taking excessive Distress of his Tenents 104 Hindring the Carrying off a Distress a provocation to make killing no more than Homicide 216 Dower The regular proceedings therein 60 Whether a Suit for Dower may be commenced by Plaint in an Inferiour Court without special Custom 267 E. Ecclesiastical Persons PRivilidges from Offices 105 Death of a Parson c. doth not make such a Non-residence as shall avoid a Lease 245 What Leases they may make and what not 245 246 Clergy Men are liable to all publick charges imposed by Act of Parliament in particular for reparation of the Highways 273 Of the Induction of Clerks by whom to be made 309 319 Election Where a thing depends upon Election what course is to be observed 271 Entry Where in Ejectment actual Entry is necessary 332 Error See Executors To reverse a Judgment
that he should suffer a Recovery his Term is not drowned 195 Tenant for Life with power to make a Jointure suffers a Recovery the Power is extinguished 226 227 Good tho' a Stranger that hath nothing in the Land be made Tenant to the Praecipe for a Recovery being a Common Assurance is to be favourably expounded 358 Whether a Recovery can be suffered where the Tail is expectant upon an Estate for Life the Tenant for Life not being made Tenant to the Praecipe 360 Release See Obligation Of all Demands its effect 314 Remainder Contingent Remainder by what Act destroyed 188 306 334 345 No Cross Remanders upon Construction in a Deed tho' sometimes in a Will 224 Rent Difference between a Rent and a Sum in Gross 99 Lease by Tenant in Fee and Rent reserved to the Lessor Executors Administrators and Assigns the words Executors and Administrators void 162 A Rent may be reserved by Contract without Deed 242 Where Rent shall be suspended and where apportioned by the Lessors Entry 276 277 Reputation Lands repurted parcel of a Mannor shall pass in a Recovery under the Word Appurtenances 52 Retorn Sheriff amerced for retorning Non est inventus on the Writ brought against his Bayliff 12 24 Sheriff retorns that Goods came to the Executors hands elongavit vendidit disposuit ad proprium usum suum convertit this tantamounts to quod devastavit 20 221 Sheriff retorns upon a Fi. fa. that he had taken Goods and that they were rescued from him not good 21 Action against Sheriff for a false Retorn of Cepi Corpus 85 Revocation What shall be a good Revocation upon a Power reserved 278 infra S. Scandal See Action upon the Case for Slander Scandalum Magnatum I do not know but my Lord of P. sent G. to take my Purse Action lies 59 Difference between an Action on the Statute of Scandalum Magnatum and a Common Action of Slander the Words in one Case shall be taken in mitiori sensu and in the other in the worst sense against the Speaker that the Honour of Great Persons may be preserved 60 Sewers Commissioners of Sewers and their Proceedings subject to the Jurisdiction of the King's Bench notwithstanding the Clause in Statute 13 Eliz. cap. 9. 67 Sheriff Sheriff may bring Trover for Goods taken in Execution and after taken away by the Defendant in the first Action 52 Soldiers Every Officer and Soldier as liable to be arrested as a Tradesman or any other person whatsoever 251 A Captain and Serjeant committed to Newgate for a great Misdemeaner in rescuing a Soldier ibid. Statutes When a Statute makes an Offence the King may punish it by Indictment but an Information will not lie when a Statute doth barely prohibit a thing 63 31 Ed. 1. Statute of Winton in an Action upon this Statute what taking shall be sufficient to discharge the Hundred 118 235 4 Ed. 3. cap. 7. Action lies for Executors upon this Statute for cutting and carrying way Corn 187. This Statute hath been always expounded largely ibid. 3 H. 7. cap. 2. A Wife forcibly married contrary to this Statute shall be admitted to give Evidence against her Husband 244 5 Eliz. cap. 4. For using a Trade not being Apprentice thereto 8 51 142 326 346 364. This Statute in relation to Apprentices expounded 174 31 Eliz. cap. 7. Of Cottages no Offence against this Statute to erect a Cottage if no body inhabits therein 107 43 Eliz. cap. 2. Poor By this Statute that enables Justices of Peace to tax a Neighbouring Parish the Justices may tax any of the Inhabitants and not the whole Parish 350 21 Jac. cap. 26. Of Felony to Personate 301 12 Car. 2. Of Ministers A good Act being made by King Lords and Commons and any defects in the Circumstances of calling them together ought not to be pried into 15 This Act extends only to Benefices with Cure ibid. 14 Car. 2. cap. 10. 16 Car. 2. cap. 3. Harth-mony Smiths Forges shall pay 191 192. So empty Houses 312 14 Car. 2. cap. 33. Of Printing Seditious Books 316. 16 Car. 2. cap. 7. Of Gaming Articles for above 100 l at a Horse Race within this Statute 253 254 17 Car. 2 cap. 2. Of Non Con-Ministers explained 328 29 Car. 2. Of Frauds and Perjuries No Promise made before the 24th of June within this Act 330. What Contracts within ths Act 361 31 Car. 2. Habeas Corpus Prayer must be made by Council wiihin the first Week after the beginning of the Term 346 T. Tail THO' a Term in gross cannot be entail'd yet where man hath a Term in point of Interest and at the same time the Trust of the Inheritance here he may entail the Trust of the Term to wait upon the Inheritance 194 What Words create an Estate Tail and what in Remainder contingent or vested 215 230 231 Estates Tail how forfeitable for Treason 299 infra A Devise to a Man and the Heirs Males of his Body with a proviso if he attempts to alien the Estate to cease the Condition void 321 322 A Limitation in Tail how it operates 378 Tender Tender and refusal is as much as payment 167 Tender where not good 252 261 Teste Where the Teste of a Writ before it was taken out is notwithstanding good 362 Tythes May be paid of a Warren by Custom 5. So of Doves and Fish ibid. Whether an Executor may bring Debt upon the Statute 2 E. 6. for Tythes due to the Testator 30 31 Where and what Modus shall bar the Recovery of Tythes in specie 32 A Prescription cannot be suggested time out of mind to pay a Modus for Tythe Hops since they were not known in England till Queen Elizabeth's time 61 Tythes of VVood tho' not Fewel payable unless exprest to be burnt in a House for the maintenance of Husbandry 75 Treason In Coyning and Clipping the Judgment 254 For raising a Rebellion in Carolina 349 Trespass See Pleading Quare Clausum fregit and threw down his Fences what Plea in Justification good 221 Continuando in Trespass where good and where not 363 Trust See Tayl. A Use in former time the same with what a Trust is now 130 Where a Trust for Life Remainder over with Power of Revocation is forfeitable and where not 128 infra Whether a Trustee is compellable to produce Writings or the Key of the Box wherein they are against the Interest of the Party for whom he is Trustee 197 Tryal See Venue What shall be Cause for new Tryal what not 30 Justices of Assize may try Informations tho' commenced before the Justices of a former Assizes 85 181 V. Venue WHere a Deed is forged at S. and given in Evidence at D. from whence the Venue ought to come in an Information thereupon 17 A Breach of Covenant assigned in Barwick the Venue shall arise from the next place in Northumberland 58 Judgment by Nihil dicit reverst after a Writ of Enquiry executed because no
to be done where there has been only a right of Action as in Sawle and Clerke's Case in Jones 211. and Cro. Car. where the Case as to this Point is to this effect A Remainder upon an Estate Tail was divested by the Fine of Tenant in Tail who had made an Estate for Life warranted by the Statute and died without Issue He in the Remainder was barred from bringing a Formedon in the life of the Tenant for Life within Five years after the Fine and had not a new Five years after the death of Tenant for Life tho' he could not Enter in the life of the Tenant for Life And the Reason given in Crook's Reports is because he had no other Right after the Death of the Tenant for Life than he had before and this plainly distinguisheth that and the Case at the Bar from the Cases that have been cited of June and Smye's Case in the 1 Cro. 219. and Laund and Tucker 254. for there the Fine was Levied by the particular Tenant which was a Forfeiture which he in Reversion might choose whether he would take advantage of and as the case might be it would be to his prejudice to take advantage of it where the particular Tenant has charged the Land and therefore if he would he should have Five years after the Estate determined to claim as of his Reversion which is another distinct Right from that of the Forfeiture And this was the standing difference that made the distinction where there should be a new Five years given to him in Reversion after the particular Estate determined and where not as we see in Margaret Podgers Case in the 9 Co. 106. If the Tenant for years were ousted and a Fine levied by the Disseisor he in the Reversion was bound by the first Five years Non-claim because tho' he could not enter as if the Estate for years had been determined or as in the Cases before of the Forfeiture yet he might have immediately brought an Assize with which Sawl and Clarke's Case exactly agrees and goes upon the same Reason As for Freeman's Case the Resolution goes wholly upon the Circumstances of Fraud appearing in the Case the principal of which was That the Lessee continued in possession and paid the Rent I confess they have gone a little further of late and now it is taken That he in Reversion shall have Five years after the Term is ended by effluction of Time tho' there were no Forfeiture incurred at the Levying of the Fine Nor no such plain Circumstances of Fraud as appears in Fermer's Case and the Case put before and cited out of Margaret Podgers Case is not held to be Law The contrary whereof is taken to have been Resolved in Folley and Tancred's Case in the 24 Car. 2. and I do not intend to shake the Authority of that Case but admit it to be good in Law yet I crave leave to observe That it is a Resolution carried beyond the words of the Statute for the Right is not pursued within Five years next after it first came For it is agreed in Fermer's Case fo 79. that there the Construction was against the Letter of the Statute and I must say it is a Construction by Equity which is a little extraordinary to weaken the force of a Statute which was made for the quieting of mens Possessions and to add force to Fines which were of so great regard in Law and especially to make a Construction by Equity contrary to the Reason of the Common Law which took no care of a future Right at all for he in the Reversion in case of a Fine Levied at the Common Law depended wholly upon the Entry or Claim of the particular Tenant and in default of that lost his Estate as in the 1 Inst 262. b. and in Plowden's Commentaries in Stowell's Case I say again I do not design by this to oppose any Case that hath been setled But I confess I should not have gone so far if I had not been led by Authority and am not willing to go a step further And now I shall endeavor to shew that this Case goes a great deal further and would be a greater strain upon the Statute than yet has been And First I Observe that upon all or most of the Cases of a Fine where there has been an Estate for Life or Years in being at the time of the Fine that the Possession has held still in the particular Tenant so that he in Reversion had no reason to suspect any Fine or other thing done upon the Estate there being no alteration of the Possession And this agrees somewhat with the Reason of the Common Law in case of a Fine Executory he that had Right was not bound to claim till there were an Execution of the Fine and Transmutation of the Possession thereupon as in Plowden's Commentaries 257. b. in Stowell's Case But here it is found that the Conusor and not the Conusees or the Tenants by Extent or either of them were in possession so that the Land being in the possession of a Wrong-doer they which had Right ought to have watched and might well suspect that Fines should be Levied to the prejudice of their respective Rights It is said in Fermer's Case If a meer Wrong-doer having got the Possession levieth a Fine on purpose to bind the Right this shall bind notwithstanding his unjust Design But the Differences that I chiefly rely upon to distinguish the Case before us from the Cases of Reversions upon Estates for Life and Years or the like particular Estates are these 1. That in those Estates there is either by an express Limitation of the Parties or an operation of Law a certain and particular Term or End of the Estate which until it happens it has not its proper determination which an Estate by Extent has not I know it is has been much insisted on that the natural and proper determination of an Extent is satisfaction by a perception of Profits according to the extended Value whereas I cannot see but a release of the Debt or satisfaction by a sudden Accident is as properly a determination of the Extent as if it were run out by perception of Profits according to the extended Value For when the first Extent is out of the way the second is immediately to take place or why this acknowledging Satisfactoin on Record should be the natural and proper determination of the Extent more than a Release of the Debt by the Conusee or destroying of it by a Fine which is an higher Record than the Statute or the Entry of Satisfaction acknowledged thereupon 2. To let him that has the Reversion upon an Estate by Extent have Five years to claim after the first Extent run out by perception of Profits or Satisfaction acknowledged is to let in a Claim after an Estate that no man can see to the end of For when it shall be satisfied by the Profits no man can tell and can
Grant recites the former Settlement which Grant was without Consideration And Secondly makes a Feoffment And it was Resolved that the Grant should not hinder the arising of the Contingent Use because the Grantee had Notice and was therefore subject to the Covenant to stand seized by the Grantor and that the Feoffment should not destroy the Contingent Estate because the right of Remainder for Life in the Daughter upon which she might have entred for the Forfeiture did support it tho' indeed the Remainder for Life in the Wife would not for the Feoffment by the Husband tolls her Right during the Coverture cui contradicere non potest upon which reason is Biggot and Smiths Case adjudged 3 Cro. Now this is stronger than the Case at Bar because the Settlement was by way of use but here Act executed The Case of my Lord Cooke was adjudged by Roll in Banco Regis and after by Glyn. It hath béen the most common way of Conveyancing to prevent the disappointing Contingent Estates to make Feoffments c. to the use of the Husband c. for Life Remainder to the use of the Feoffees for the Life of the Husband and so on to Contingent Remainders and the more modern ways have béen to make the first Estate but for years but in both Cases he which hath the first Estate cannot destroy the Remainders It hath been a question Whether a right of Action would support a Contingent Estate but never doubted but that a right of Entry would Vid. Archers Case 1 Co. Katherin Austins Case AN Indictment was found against her that she vi armis a certain part of the Kings High-way leading from Shorditch Church to Stoke Newington thorough Hogsdon postibus repagulis inclusit c. Vpon a Tryal at Bar the principal question was Whether the place where the obstruction was were an High way Hale said If a way lead to a Market and were a way for all Travellers and did communicate with a great Road c. it is an High-way but if it lead only to a Church to a Private House or Village or to Fields there 't is a Private way But 't is a matter of Fact and much depends upon Common Reputation If it be a publick way of Common right the Parish is to repair it unless a particular person be obliged by Prescription or Custom Private ways are to be repaired by the Village or Hamlet or sometimes by a particular person In the Case at Bar it was found no High-way Ante. Castilian versus Platt ERror of Judgment in Communi Banco in Scire facias against three Executors the Error assigned was that one was an Infant Hale No doubt a Scire facias lies against him and seeing this case is that he did not appear Iudgment was well given against him Symon Morse versus Willam Sluce MIchael ' ult Rot. 421. An Action upon the Case was brought by the Plaintiff against the Defendant and he declared that whereas according to the Law and Custom of England Masters and Governours of Ships which go from London beyond Sea and take upon them to carry Goods beyond Sea are bound to keep safely day and night the same Goods without loss or substraction ita quod pro defectu of them they may not come to any damage and whereas the 15 of May last the Defendant was Master of a certain Ship called the William and John then riding at the Port of London and the Plaintiff had caused to be laden on Board her three Trunks and therein 400 pair of Silk Stockings and 174 pound of Silk by him to be transported for a reasonable reward of Fraight to be paid and he then and there did receive them and ought to have transported them c. but he did so negligently keep them that in default of sufficient care and custody of him and his Servants 17 May the same were totally lost out of the said Ship Vpon Not guilty pleaded a Special Verdict was found viz. That the Ship lay in the River of Thames in the Port of London in the Parish of Stepney in the County of Middlesex prout c. That the Goods were delivered by the Plaintiff on Board the Ship prout c. to be transported to Cadiz in Spain That the Goods being on Board there were a sufficient number of Men for to look after and attend her left in her That in the night came 11 persons on pretence of pressing of Seamen for the Kings service and by force seized on these Men which were 4 or 5 found to be sufficient as before and took the Goods That the Master was to have Wages from the Owners and the Mariners from the Master The She was of the Burden of 150 Tunn c. So the question was upon a Tryal at Bar whether the Master were chargeable upon this matter It was insisted on for the Plaintiff that he who took Goods to carry them for profit ought to keep them at his peril To which it was answered That there was no negligence appeared in the Master By the Civil Law if Goods were taken by Pirates the Master shall not answer for them and this is not the Case of a Carrier for tho' here the Goods are received at Land yet they are to be transported and being one intire Contract they shall not be under one Law in the Port and another at Sea the Master is not liable in case of Fire or Sinking the Ship Owen 57. every one knows the Ship is liable to inevitable accidents and there is no Case of this nature in experience And Serjeant Maynard added that this differed from the case of a Carrier for that he is paid by the Owner of the Goods but here the Master is Servant to the Owner of the Ship and he pays him and not the Merchant The Court inclined strongly for the Defendant there being not the least negligence in him but it was appointed to be Argued but since I 've heard it was compounded It was agreed on all hands that the Master should have answered in case there had been any default in him or his Mariners Anonymus UPon a motion for Restitution after the Reversal of an Outlawry Hale said that he must plead the Reversal to the seisure in Scaccario Puckle versus Moor. MIchael ult Rot. 461. A Promise was made seven years since to pay Money within three Months after The Defendant pleaded Non Assumpsit infra sex annos ante exhibitionem Bille whereas it should have béen causa Actonis non accrevit infra sex annos tho' in this case it appears within the Declaration that the time of payment was not within six years before yet because the Defendant had not pleaded it he cannot have advantage of it Goff versus Loyd MIchael ult Rot. 268. Trespass quare domum fregit and took away so many Nails c. The Defendant pleads Specially and sets forth the two Acts for Hearth-Money 14 Car. nunc cap. 10. and 16
import the Heir For he could have neither benefit or loss by the Condition The Two Cases which have been chiefly relyed upon for the Defendant were first France's Case which differs because it was in case of an Heir Secondly the Case of Sanders and Carwell 8 Jac. in a private Report of Sir Geoffrey Palmer the Attorney General in which there is no clear account of the Case and we cannot find the Roll It was a Devise to his Wife for life Remainder to his Daughter in tail upon Condition to pay Money and it was held that the Non-payment would be no breach unless she had Notice First It was an Opinion only upon Evidence and Lea and Chamberlain only in Court Secondly For ought appears the Daughter might be Heir and then 't is good Law Thirdly It appears there was a foul Concealment of the Will for Four years time within which time for ought appears the Condition was to have been performed Twisden was of the same Opinion but I omit his Argument because I could not hear him perfectly Hale was of the same Opinion As to the first Point I shall discharge the Case of it as not fit to be called in question For without peradventure tho' the word Condition be used yet limiting a Remainder over makes it a Limitation for so 't is plain the Testator meant and 't is as much as if he had said And if she Marries c. then to remain without the word Condition And this hath received as many Resolutions as ever any Point did viz. Wiseman and Baldwin's Case 2 Leon. 51. Owen 412. 1 Leon. 383. 18 Eliz. 1 Rolls 412. Hains worth and Pretty 3 Cro 833. and 2 Cro. Pells and Browne's Case with a great many more and nothing but the Opinion in Mary Portington's Case 10 Co. against it When Fynch Attorney General Argued this Case he observed that Coke himself was of another Opinion in the 3d Report in Wellock and Hammond's Case cited in Boraston's Case For tho' there 't is the word Paying only which is adjudged a Limitation yet Coke saith the Quaere in Dyer 317. is upon that well Resolved and the Case in Dyer is upon the word Condition expresly Then to proceed to the other Matters Here is an Estate Tail devised to the Defendant subject to Two Limitations the one of Law viz. Dying without Issue the other express and in Fact viz Marrying without the consent c. and both are coupled together so that whenever she Marries without Consent c. her Estate determines and is transferred to him in Remainder without either Entry or Claim 'T is all one as if the Estate had been devised to her for Life and if she Marries then to remain which had been but an Estate quamdiu sola vixerit And it is to be observed that if her Marriage here be no breach of the Conditional Limitation for so 't is properly called because she had no Notice then it can never be broken So that the Question must be Whether such a Marriage shall discharge the Estate of it and make it become absolute 'T is true where the Condition requires such an Act to be done as may be done after Notice in hath been questioned whether the Law shall not protract the Time limited for performance until Notice be had 1 Cro. Alford's Case which was a Condition for Payment of Money But this is a thing of that nature that being done no subsequent Notice can ever retrieve Then 't is to Enquire How far the want of Notice will excuse It must be considered that 't is a Will made by a person now dead who can give no Notice neither can any come to the knowledge of it without Enquiry and one hath the same means to obtain it with another and the person who would take advantage of it must make the best Enquiry he can If a Devise were made to the Defendant it was her Concern to Enquire upon what terms until then how can it be ascertained whether she will take it And so it was Porter's Business to Enquire no difference between them in this respect So that upon these Five Accounts it will appear that no Notice is requisite to be given in this Case First Because the Testator hath not appointed any Notice to be given than he which was the Disposer might give upon what terms he pleased and this Matter of Notice shall not be added unless it were in a Case wherein the Law would very strongly require it Secondly Because there is no Person who can reasonably be engaged to give Notice viz. not the Heir for he is Disinherited not the Executors for they are not concerned in the Freehold nor the Trustees for they have but their labour for their pains nor Porter for he is no more bound to give than she to take Notice Thirdly Because each Party have the same means of Informing themselves of the Will i.e. by Enquiry Fourthly It more imported the Defendant to know it as relating to her own Interest the Will which gives the Estate gives it upon this Conditional Limitation Corbet's Case 4 Co. comes very close where if the Devisee stays while the time wherein the Money might be raised is elapsed he shall never raise it after Suppose a man dies possessed of a Term upon which a great Rent is reserved shall the Executor after that he hath proved the Will throw up the Term as pretending not to have known of it An Estate is devised to one durante Viduitate shall she Marry and because she had do Notice of the Will hold the Estate absolutely for her Life There is the same Reason in this Case for this Proviso is a part of the Limitation of the Estate it self No man is presumed to be ignorant of his own Interest and as he must take Notice to acquire so of the manner of the Estate he gains He that gave it thus was not obliged to do so much Fifthly It was not impossible for the Defendant to have made Enquiry and she must not take advantage of her Latches A Bond with Condition to pay 50 l when the Obligee shall marry the Obligor's Kinswoman in Debt upon this it was Resolved that the Obligee was not bound to give Notice of the Marriage tho' it lay in his own privity because the Obligor might have known it by other means Hill 1650. Between Try and .... Rot. 1081. B. R. It was proper for the Defendant to have Enquired whether her Grandfather gave her any thing And so it was for him that should marry her Ante. Harwood's Case Adjudged here Hill ult was upon this Reason He married a City Orphan in Kent and was fined by the Court of Orphans because he had not first applied himself to them for their Licence c. according to the Custom of the City And the Fine was Resolved here to be well imposed tho' he had no Notice that she whom he married was an Orphan because it was his
Respondeas Ouster But because the Plaintiff said he would be content with the latter that was not Resolved Anonymus IN Trespass Quare clausum fregit 't is a Plea in Abatement to say That the Plaintiff is Tenant in Common with another But cannot be given in Evidence upon Not Guilty as it may where one Tenant in Common brings Trespass against the other Peters versus Opie THe Case was moved again and Hale held clearly that the Promise being pro labore tho' there was also a Counter-Promise did carry in it a Condition precedent viz. That the work should be done first And he said that in Cases tried before him where the Declaration was upon Reciprocal Promises if it appeared upon the Evidence that the Intention was that the Plaintiffs part was to be performed before the Defendants he directed against the Plaintiff and would not have the Defendant driven to his Cross Action Twisden strongly to the contrary Pro labore says he is no more than would have been implied if those Words had been omitted then 't is within the Case of Reciprocal Promises The Case cited in Ughtred's Case 7 Co. A. Covenants to B. to serve him in the Wars B. Covenants to pay him so much for it an Action lies for the Money without averment of the Service done because of the mutual Remedy Hale was now of Opinion that the Plaintiffs saying parat ' fuit obtulit to do the Work tho' he did not say and the other refused yet it was a sufficeint Averment after a Verdict The Case of Vivian and Shipping 3 Cro. 384. in an Assumpsit upon a Promise to perform an Award the Plaintiff said licet He had performed all on his part c. which tho' no good Averment in Form yet held it aided by the Verdict Wherefore tho' they could not agree in the other matter yet Judgment was given for the Plaintiff Ante. King versus Melling IN an Ejectment the Case was thus found in a Special Verdict John Melling was seised in Fee and had Issue Barnard and John and by his Will in Writing devised to Barnard for and during his Natural life and after his decease to such Issue as he should have of the Body of his second Wife his first then being alive and if no such Issue hapned then to John Melling provided that Barnard might make a Joynture to his Wife which she should enjoy for her Life The Devisor dies Barnard suffers a Recovery to the use of himself in Fee and after Covenanted to stand seised to the use of his Wife for her Joynture for Life and died without Issue by any second Wife The Question was Whether the Wife had a good Estate or that J. Melling in Remainder had the Right It was Argued for John Melling First That Barnard Melling had only an Estate for Life by this Devise Indeed if it had been to him and his Issue which he should have by the second Wife that would have been an Entail but here 't is expresly given to him for his Life The Case of Wiat Wield 8 Co. 78. b. is full to this A Devise to a man and his Children is an Estate Tail if he hath none at the time But if the Devise were to a man for his Life and after his Decease to his Children there whether he had Children or no at the time they take by way of Remainder either contingent or vested So Archer's Case 1 Co. 1 Rolls 837. A Devise to his Son for Life the Remainder to the Sons of his Body lawfully begotten the Son takes only an Estate for Life because so expresly limited Then the Recovery destroys this Contingent Remainder and so also the power of appointing a Joynture to his Wife For 't is not a bare Collateral Power but annexed to his Estate and therefore extinguishes in the Conveyance of it But admitting it were still in him yet he did not well execute it which should have been in such manner as it might have taken effect by the Will and not to arise upon a Covenant to stand seised On the other side it was Argued that it was an Estate Tail in Barnard Melling and no Remainder contingent to the Issue For there a Remainder is said to be contingent where the first Estate may fail before 't is ascertained whether the Contingent will happen or no here if it be an Entail Barnard Melling hath it for his Life and the Issue had nothing until after his decease So 't is but an Expressio eorum quae tacite insunt Again The Power remains notwithstanding the Recovery for 't is collateral to the Estate If Executors have Authority to make a Feoffment for the payment of the Testator's Debts if they should first make a Feoffment to another purpose this would not determine their Power but they might afterwards execute it in performance of the Will 1 Co. in Albany's Case Hale It seems very strong upon Weild's Case that Barnard Melling hath but an Estate for Life if it were devised to him and after his decease to his Issue I should think that to be an Estate Tail but here the express Words are for his Life A Devise to one for his Life and after his decease to his Heir that hath been held a Fee for Heir is nomen Collectivum But Archer's Case 1 Co. is a Devise to A. for his Life and after to his Heir and the Heirs of that Heir there because the words of limitation were put to the Heir therefore Heirs was taken to be but designatio personae and Resolved he should take by Purchase Vid. Anderson 110. Construction must be according to the express words of the Will A Devise to Two equally to be divided between them and to the Survivor of them makes a Joyntenancy upon the express import of the last Words Twisden A Devise to one for Life in perpetuity makes but an Estate for Life only 15 H. 7. Hale 'T is considerable also that he adds a Power to make a Joynture which would have been useless if he had intended him in an Estate Tail And this Power is in the nature of an Emolument annexed to his Estate which seems to be destroyed by the Recovery neither hath he well executed his Power for after the Recovery he became seised in Fee so the Covenant to stand seised may work upon that Estate and so shall not be taken in pursuance of his Authority which possibly it might have been if he had but an Estate for Life for without reference to that it would have been ineffectual quando non valet quod ago ut ago valeat quantum valere potest And this is agreeable to the Learning in Sir Edward Clere's Case in the 6 Co. The Court seemed pretty clear in these Points but because it was upon the first Argument they gave leave to the parties to speak to it again if they thought fit Et Adjornatur Post Goffe's Case A Trial at Bar was had upon an Indictment
But since H. 8. time it had béen for the most part administred by the Dean and Chapter and the Verdict was here for the Dean and Chapter King versus Melling IN an Ejectment upon a Special Verdict the case was this R. Melling seized in Fee having Issue four Sons William Robert Bernard and John devised the Land in question in this manner I give my Land to my Son Bernard for his natural Life and after his decease I give the same to the Issue of his Body lawfully begotten on a second Wife and for want of such Issue to John Melling and his Heirs for ever Provided that Bernard may make a Joynture of all the Premisses to such second Wife which she may enjoy during her Life R.M. dies Bernard in the life of his first Wife suffered a Recovery to the use of himself in Fee and after her decease Marries a second Wife and then by Indenture covenants to stand seized to the use of himself for Life and after to the use of his Wife for her Life for her Joynture and dies J.M. Enters and makes a Lease to the Plaintiff And this Term after Arguments at the Bar the Court gave their Opinions Rainsford for the Plaintiff First I hold in this Case that B. M. takes but an Estate for Life with a Contingent Remainder to the Issue by his second Wife for the Devise is by express words for Life as in Archers Case 1 Co. a Devise to R. A. for Life and after to the next Heir Male of R. and the Heirs Males of that Heir Male Resolved to create but an Estate for Life to R. A. I rely mainly upon Wilds Case 6 Co. which was brought before all the Judges of England where the Devise was to a Man and his Wife and after their decease to the Children and resolved to be but an Estate for Life 't is true there were Children at the time of the Devise but in the end of the Case 't is said that in such Case if there were no Children the Children born after might take by remainder and the first Estate to be but for Life Clerk v. Day 1 Cro. 313. the Devise was to Rose his Daughter for Life and that if she married after his Death and had Heir of her Body then that the Heir after his Daughter's Death should have the Land and to the Heirs of their Body begotten and if his Daughter died without Issue then to a Stranger It was held by Gawdy and Fenner that Rose had but an Estate for Life in this Case 1 Rolls 837. Devise to his eldest Son for Life and after his decease to the Sons of his Body lawfully begotten the Son resolved to have but an Estate for Life The Second point Whether the power to make a Joynture be destroyed by the Common Recovery these powers to make Estates are of two sorts either Collateral as when Executors have power by a Will to sell Land and such a power cannot be destroyed as appears in Diggs's Case 1 Co. or powers appendant to Estates as to make Leases which shall continue after the Estates to which the power is annexed determins and the power in the Case at Bar to make a Joynture are of this second sort and are destroyed by the alteration of the Estate to which it is annexed in privity as 1 Co. Albany's Case is so that the Common Recovery being a Forfeiture of the Estate for Life by consequence 't is an extinguishment of the power Thirdly But admitting the power continues whether it be well executed and I hold that it is not for being seized in Fee at the time of the Covenant to stand seized to the use of his Wife for her Joynture and this without any reference to his power the use shall arise out of his Interest and not be executed by vertue of his power according to the resolution in Sir Ed. Cleeres Case 6 Co. Twisden of the same Opinion As to the first Point it must be agreed that these words Issue of the Body ex vi termini make not an Entail if they were in a Conveyance by Act executed no more than Children as the words were in Wilds Case 'T is true in a VVill a Devise of Land to a Man and his Issue creates an Entail if the Devisee had no Issue at that time for otherwise those words would be void for in regard they are limited to take presently the Issue born after cannot take as by Remainder there being none to take in praesenti they must be intended to be words of Limitation as a Devise to a Man and his Heirs Males makes an Entail or otherwise the word Males must be rejected then seeing the words in themselves are not proper to make an Entail the next thing to be considered is the intention which is to be known by the expressions in the VVill and not any averment dehors the words are J will give my Land to my Son for Life and after his decease I will give the same to the Issue c. so that the Land is given to him expresly for Life Devise of Land in perpetuum makes Fee but if Land be given by Deèd in perpetuum there an Estate only for Life will pass 15 H. 7. A Devise to one paying 10 l this is a Fee 6 Co. Coliers Case But a Devise to one for Life paying 10 l makes but an Estate for Life the Case of Furse and VVinter was Mich. or Trin. 13 Regis Caroli Rot. 1339. A Devise to his two Daughters equally to be divided between them and to the Survivor of them and to the Heirs of the Body of the Survivor This was so expresly to the Surviror that it was resolved to be a Joynt Estate and not in Common The words here are after the decease of Bernard I give the same to the Issue of the Body c. implying that the Issue should take by Purchase as a Gift and not by Descent Again The power given to Bernard to make a Joynture shews that he could not do it by Virtue of his Estate and therefore needed a power to be annexed And tho' such powers are usually affixed to Estates Tail yet when the construction is doubtful what Estate shall pass the giving such a power is an argument that 't is such an Estate that cannot make a Joynture or the like by any other means The words go further and for want of such Issue then to J.M. 'T is true if Land be devised to a Man and if he dies without Issue then to remain over the Devisee shall have an Entail Owen 29. But it shall not be so in this Case because that Clause is crowded in with other Clauses directly to the contrary I rely mainly upon VVilds Case 6 Co. and the Case quoted out of Bendlowes in the end of that Case A Devise to Baron and Feme and to the Men Children of their Bodies begotten because it did not appear that there were any more Children at
word Children My second Reason is from the manner of the Limitation which is to his Issue and of his Body lawfully begotten upon the second Wife Phrases agreeable to an Estate Tail and the meaning of a Testator is to be spelled out by little Hints It is admitted in Wild's Case in the 6 Co. 17. that if the Devise had been to the Children of their Bodies it would have been an Entail Thirdly It appears by the Devise that the Testator knew there could be no Children at that time and shall not be supposed to intend a contingent Remainder Fourthly It appears that the Testator did not intend to prefer the Children of the first Wife of Bernard but did the Children of the second and therefore cannot be thought to mean that John the younger Brother of Bernard should take before failure of the Issue which Bernard should have by his second Wife And to this purpose is Spalding's Case 3 Cro. 185. A Devise to his eldest Son and the Heirs of his Body after the death of his Wife and if he died living the Wife then to his Son N. And devised other Lands to another Son and the Heirs of his Body and if he died without Issue then to remain c. The first Son died living the Wife It was strongly urged that his Estate should cease for being said If he died living the Wife this was a Corrective of what went before But 't was Ruled by all the Court that it was an absolute Estate Tail in the first Son as if the words had been If he died without Issue living the Wife for he could not be thought to intend to prefer a younger Son before the Issue of his eldest Fifthly The words are further and for want of such Issue then to John which words in a Will do often make an Estate Tail by Implication As 4 Jac. Robinson's Case A Devise to A. for Life and if he died without Issue then to remain A. took an Entail So Burley's Case 43 Eliz. A Devise to A. for Life Remainder to the next Heir Male and for default of such Heir Male then to remain Adjudged an Estate Tail 'T is true Dyer 171. is where Lands were Devised to a man and the Heirs Males of his Body and if he died without Issue c. these last words did not make a Tail General to the Devisee For an Implication of an Estate of Inheritance shall never ride over an express limitation of an Inheritance before being 't is said here for want of such Issue the Land should remain 't is plainly meant that it should not before the Issue failed and then the Issue must have it so long for none else can and so 't is an Estate Tail I come now to Authorities 6 Eliz. Anderson num 86. Moor pl. 397. A Devise to his Son for Life and after his decease to the Men Children of his Body said to be an Estate Tail and so cited by Coke in that Book and so contrary to his Report of it in Wild's Case Bendloes num 124. But that Case is not so strong as this for Children is not so operative a word as Issue Rolls 839. A Devise to his eldest Son for Life non aliter for so were the words tho' not printed in the Book and after his decease to the Sons of his Body it was but an Estate for Life by reason of the words Non aliter Hill 13 Car. 2. Rot. 121. Wedgward's Case A Devise to his Son Thomas for Life and after his decease if he died without Issue living at his death then to the Daughter c. it was held to be an Estate for Life But were it an Estate Tail or no it was not necessary to be Resolved the Case depending upon the destruction or continuance of a Contingent Remainder which would have been gone had the Devise made an Estate Tail again there being an express Devise for Life they would not raise a larger Estate by Implication Again Wild's Case where Lands were Devised to A. for Life Remainder to B. and the Heirs of his Body Remainder to Wild and his Wife and after their decease to their Children And the Court of Kings-Bench were at first divided Indeed it was afterwards adjudged an Estate for Life to Wild and his Wife First Because having limited a Remainder in Tail to B. by express and the usual words if he had meant the same Estate in the second Remainder 't is like he would have used the same words Secondly It was not after their decease to the Children of their Bodies for then there would be an Eye of an Estate Tail Thirdly The main Reason was because there were Children at the time of the Devise and that was the only Reason the Resolution went upon in the Exchequer Chamber And tho' it be said in the latter end of the Case That if there were no Children at that time every Child born after might take by Remainder 't is not said positively that they should take And it seems to be in opposition to their taking presently but however that be it comes not to this Case For tho' the word Children may be made nomen collectivum the word Issue is nomen collectivum of it self Hill 42. and 43 Eliz. Bifield's Case A Devise to A. and if he dies not having a Son then to remain to the Heirs of the Testator Son was there taken to be used as nomen collectivum and held an Entail I come now to answer Objections First 'T is objected that in this Case the Limitation is expresly for Life and in that respect stronger than Wild's Case And this is the great difficulty But I Answer That tho' these words do weigh the Intention that way yet they are ballanced by an apparent Intention that weighs as much on the other side which is That as long as Bernard should have Children that the Land should never go over to John for there was as much reason to provide for the Issue of the Issue as the first Issue Again A Tenant in Tail has to many purposes but an Estate for Life Again 'T is possible that he did intend him but an Estate for Life and 't is by consequence and operation of Law only that it becomes an Estate Tail 1651. Hansy and Lowther The Case was A Copyholder surrendred to the use of his Will and Devised to his first Son for Life and after his decease to the Heir Male of his Body c. This was Ruled to be an Estate Tail and this differs from Archer's Case in the 1st of Co. for that the Devise there was for Life and after to the Heir Male and the Heirs of the Body of that Heir Male There the words of Limitation being grafted upon the word Heir it shews that the word Heir was used as Designatio personae and not for Limitation of the Estate So is the Case of Clerk and Day 1 Cro. 313. Another Objection was That there being a Power appointed
to Bernard to make his Wife a Joynture it shews that it was intended he should have but an Estate for Life which needed such a Power and not an Estate Tail for then he might have made a Joynture without it I Answer That Tenant in Tail cannot by virtue of such Estate make a Joynture without discontinuing or destroying his Estate Sed Judicium pro Quer ' There being Justice Twisden and Justice Rainsford against the Chief Justice Termino Sancti Hillarij Anno 24 25 Car. II. In Banco Regis Anonymus A Prohibition was prayed to the Ecclesiastical Court for that they Cited one out of the Diocess to Answer a Suit for a Legacy But it was denied because it was in the Court where the Probat of the Will was For tho' it were before Commissioners appointed for the Probat of Wills in the late Times yet now all their Proceedings in such cases are transmitted into the Prerogative Court And therefore Suits for the Legacies contained in such Wills ought to be in the Archbishop's Court for there the Executor must give account and be discharged c. Note When a man is in custodia Marescalli any man may Declare against him in a Personal Action and if he be bailed out he is still in custodia to this purpose viz. quoad Declarations brought in against him that Term For the Bail are as it were Delegated by the Court to have him in Prison Hob. Error is not well assigned That there was no Bail filed unless added That the Defendant was not in custodia Debt IN an Action of Debt upon a Sheriffs Bond the Case was this A man was Arrested upon a Latitat in placito Transgr ' ac etiam bille pro 40 l de debito And the Condition of the Bond given to the Sheriff was to appear at the Day of the Return of the Writ to answer to the Plaint in plito debito And it was urged that this made the Bond void by the Statute of 23 H. 6. for the Condition should have been to Appear at the Day to Answer in the Action upon which the Process went out and that was in this Case but an Action of Trespass and the adding the Ac etiam debiti c. is but to satisfie the late Act and for Direction to the Sheriff to what Value he shall require Bail And it was usual to Endorse the Cause of Action before the Statute upon the Latitats that the Sheriff might insist upon Bail accordingly So this is a material Variance from the Statute and not like some of these which are remembred in Beaufage's Case in the 10 Co. and Dyer 364. And to this the Court inclined And Hale Cited a Case between Button and Low adjudged Mich. 1649. An Attachment went out of Chancery to answer Coram nobis in Cancellaria ubicunque c. and the Sheriff took a Bond Conditioned to Appear Coram Rege in Cancellaria ubicunque c. apud Westmonasterium And for the addition of Westminster the Bond was held to be void Anonymus THe Court was moved for a Prohibition to the Archbishop's Court to stop their Proceedings in a Cause belonging to the Jurisdiction of Durham upon a Suggestion that the Dean and Chapter of Durham Sede vacante have Cognizance there as Guardians of the Spiritualties And the Court granted a Prohibition for the Right of Jurisdiction was tryed between the Archbishop and Dean and Chapter the last Term and found against the Archbishop and therefore he was concluded by the Verdict until the Record was reversed by Error or Attaint Thodie's Case THody and two others were Indicted for that Conspiratione inter eos habita they enticed J. S. to play and cheated him with False Dice Thody pleaded and was found Guilty the others not having pleaded It was moved that Judgment might not be Entred against him until the others came in for being laid by way of Conspiracy if the rest should chance to be acquitted no Judgment could be given against him And so is 14 H. 6. 25. Hale said If one be Acquitted in an Action of Conspiracy the other cannot be Guilty But where one is found Guilty and the other comes not in upon Process or if he dies hanging the Suit yet Judgment shall be upon the Verdict against the other And so is 18 E. 3. 1. and 24 E. 3. 34. Wild said The difference was where the Suit was upon Conspiracy wherein the Villanous Judgment was to be given and where the Conspiracy is laid only by way of Aggravation as in this Case Hale said It would be the same in an Action against two upon the Case for Conspiracy but not in such Actions where tho' there be a Charge of Conspiracy yet the Gift of the Action is upon another matter But the Court said They would give him two or three days for the bringing in of the other two and defer the Entry of the Judgment in the mean time Methyn versus the Hundred of Thistleworth THe Case was moved again by North Solicitor He urgrd for the Plaintiff That the Issue being Whether they took the Felon upon Fresh Suit It being not found that there was any actual Taking or that the Fresh Suit continued until Sir J. Ash found the Felon in the presence of Sir P. Warwick Also it was found that Sir J. Ash was a Justice of Peace and therefore it was his duty to Apprehend him To this it was Answered That the Statute of Winton upon which the Action is founded and not upon the 27 of Eliz. and therefore it is ill if it concludes contra formam Statutorum doth not say shall Take but shall Answer the Bodies of the Offenders which is Answer them to Justice And therefore if the Felon be taken upon another account and the Country finding him in Prison cause him to be Indicted this satisfies the Statute Goldsb 55. Again it was more decent for Sir John Ash being concerned as an Inhabitant of the Hundred to leave this Matter to the other Justice of the Peace for it has been known that Justices of the Peace have been Censured in the Star-Chamber for being too forward to interpose in their own business But if it were an omission of the Duty of his Office that could not be Objected to him as an Inhabitant having done enough to satisfie the Statute of Winton Wild said That the Defendant should have Demurred because the Issue is ill joyned viz. absque hoc that he took him super eadem recenti insecutione For if he were not immediately taken upon Fresh pursuit it were sufficient but the Verdict finding Fresh Suit was made it may be taken by Intendment which shall help out a Special Verdict that it was directed this way and continued until the finding of him in the presence of Sir P. Warwicke Et sic Judicium pro Def. Ante. Dacres versus Duncomb IN Trover after Imparlance the Defendant pleaded That the Plaintiff with two others brought Trover for the
Court the Woman was a Witness tho' married as here and Rainsford cited my Lord Castlehavens Case where the Countess gave Evidence that he assisted the committing a Rape upon her But Hale said he was not governed by that case because there was a Wife de jure the Evidence being clear as to all the Points of the Statute viz. First That the taking was by force Secondly That the Woman had substance according to the Statute Thirdly That Marriage ensued tho' it did not appear she was deflowred the Jury found him guilty Whereupon Judgment was given and he was hanged Note 39 Eliz. cap. 9. takes away Clergy from this Offence Bayly versus Murin IN an Ejectment upon a Special Verdict the Case was to this effect One Cooper Vicar of Granbrook in Kent being seized of an House and Lands thereunto appertaining parcel of the Endowment of his Vicaridge situate in a Market Town in the year 1672 lets it for three years and one year of the said Lease being expired the 11 of Sept. 1673. lets it for 21 years to begin from Michaelmas following reserving the Rent during the Term payable at the usual Feasts or within ten days after this Lease was confirmed by the Archbishop Patron of the Vicarage and Dean and Chapter of Canterbury Some years after Cooper dies and the Question was Whether Buck the succeeding Vicar could avoid this Lease The first Point was Whether the Lease became void within 80 Days after the death of Cooper by the Statute of Non-residence 13 Eliz. 20. And as to that all the Justices were of Opinion that Death would not make such a Non-residence as should avoid the Lease for the Intention of the Statute was to oblige the Incumbents to Residence First By imposing of the Forfeiture of a years Value of their Benefice if they did not Reside Secondly By making their Leases void which tho' prima facie seemed to be to their advantage yet was not so in the consequence for none would be induced to Farm their Lands because it was in their power to defeat their Leases by Non residence Again 'T is plain the Statute meant a Wilful Absence because it says The party so offending the Statute of the 13th of Eliz. that allows Leases of Houses c. in Market Towns for 40 years would be of no effect if Death should be interpreted a Non-residence and the Confirmation of Patron and Ordinary would be to no purpose Butler and Goodale's Case in the 6 Co. 21. b. is that where the Incumbent is absent upon an Inhibition or for the sake of his Health he is not within the Penalty of that Law There is only one single Authority against this viz. Mott and Hale's Case in the 1 Cro. 123. which Twisden doubted whether it were so adjudged because my Lord Coke mentions it no where supposing so Notable a Point would not have escaped his Observation especially in a Case wherein he was Counsel But Hale said It was Adjudged by the Opinion of three Judges tho' in Moor 't is said the Court was Divided but it was a hard Opinion And in the 38th of Eliz. B.R. Moor 609. the very Point was adjudged contrary The second Point Whether it were void because the Rent was reserved at the usual Feasts or within Ten days after For it was urged that the Term ending at Michaelmas would be expired before the last Payment And for the other payments 't is for the Successor's advantage because the Predecessor may dye within the Ten days But the Court were clear of Opinion in regard the Reservation was during the Term that there should be no Ten days given to the Lessee for the last payment according to Barwicke and Foster's Case in the 2 Cro. 227 233. The third point Whether this were a Lease in Reversion and so not warranted by the Statute of the 14 of Elizabeth And all the Court held that it was This Statute repeats that of the 13th of Eliz. as to Houses in Market Towns which Liberty was given as Twisden said to render those places more populous but excepts Leases in Reversion which this is being to commence at a Day to come where a Power is annexed to an Estate for Life to make Leases in possession A man cannot make a Lease to commence in futuro In the 6 Co. Fitz William's Case 4 E. 3. tit Waste 18. the Lessor made a Lease to commence after the death of the Tenant for Life and notwithstanding maintained an Action of Waste And Co. Lit. citing that Case distinguishes between a Grant of the Reversion and a Lease in Reversion as that Case was In Plowden's Commentaries Tracy's Case A Lease made to commence at a Day to come is given as a most proper Instance of a Lease in Reversion In the 1 Cro. 546. Hunt and Singleton's Case a Lease of an House for 40 years there being 10 years unexpired of a former Lease by the Dean and Chapter of St. Pauls was held not warranted by the 14th of Eliz. The like was Resolved in C. B. 14 Car. 2. in the Case of Wyn and Wild of a Lease of the Dean and Chapter of Westminster and there the Court denied the Opinion in Tomson and Trafford's Case Poph. 9. And two of the Judges seemed to be of Opinion and Twisden strongly that if the Lease in the Case at Bar had been made to commence presently it yet would have been void there being another Lease in being so that for so many years as were to come of the former Lease it would be a Lease in Reversion And that the 18th of Eliz. that permits a concurrent Lease so that there be not above three years in being shall not in their Opinion make any alteration of the 14th of Eliz. but it only extends to the 13th of Eliz. because it recites that but not the former And so is the Opinion of Hobart in the Case of Crane and Taylour 269. and it hath been often held that it does not extend to the Statute of 1 Eliz. concerning Bishops But of this Hale doubted and rather conceived the contrary viz. That the Lease had been good if it had been made to commence presently there being less than three years to come of the former Lease And that of the 18 of Eliz. did give a qualification to Leases made upon the 14th as well as the 13th First Because the 14 of Eliz. is a kind of an Appendix to the 13th of Eliz. and does not repeat it but sub modo a little enlarging it as to Houses in Market Towns Wherefore the 18th of Eliz. reciting the 13th does by consequence recite the 14th also Secondly There is such a Connexion betwixt all the Statutes concerning Leases of Ecclesiastical persons that they have been taken into the Construction of one another The Statute of the 32d of H. 8. is not recited neither in the 1st or the 13th of Eliz. yet a Lease is not warranted upon those Statutes unless it hath the Qualifications
c. be indicted for not repairing of a Way within their Precinct they cannot plead Not guilty and give in Evidence that another by Prescription or Tenure ought to repair it for they are chargeable de communi Jure and if they would discharge themselves by laying it elsewhere it must be pleaded Error ERror to Reverse a Judgment in Debt upon a Bond given in Norwich Court where by the Custom the plea of the Defendant was quod non dedicit factum sed petit quod inquiratur de debito First It was moved to be Error for that the Venire was XII Men c. in figures Sed non allocatur for being in these letters XII and not in the figures 12. it was well enough Secondly It was ad triandum exi tum whereas there was no Issue joyned wherefore it ought to have been ad inquirend ' de debito c. Sed non allocatur for the Presidents are as the Case is here Thirdly The Condition of the Bond was to pay at Alborough and that ought to have been shewn to be within the Jurisdiction of the Court Sed non allocatur for the Plea here is not payment secund ' formam Conditionis but the Jury is to inquire by the custom of all manner of payments and discharges Fourthly In the Record it was continued over to several Courts and in the Court where the Judgment is given 't is said in Curia praedicta and so incertain which but notwithstanding these matters the Iudgment was affirmed Anonymus THe Case upon Evidence at a Tryal in Ejectment was this a Dean and Chapter having a right to certain Land but being out of Possession Sealed a Lease with a Letter of Attorney to deliver it upon the Land which was done accordingly and held to be a good Lease for tho' the putting the Seal of a Corporation aggregate to a Deed carries with it a delivery yet the Letter of Attorney to deliver it upon the Land shall suspend the operation of it while then Tenant for Life being in Debt to defraud his Creditors commits a Forfeiture to the end that he in Reversion may enter who is made privy to the contrivance The Opinion of Hale was that the Creditors should avoid this as well as any fraudulent Conveyance Anonymus IN an Ejectment upon a Tryal at Bar for Lands in antient Demesne there was shewn a Recovery in the Court of antient Demesne to cut off an Entail which had been suffered a long time since and the Possession had gone accordingly But there was now objected against it First That no sufficient Evidence of it appeared because the Recovery it self nor a Copy of it was shewn for in truth it was lost But the Court did admit other proof of it to be sufficient and said if a Record be lost it may be proved to a Jury by Testimony as the Decree in H. 8. time for Tythe in London is lost yet it hath been often allowed that there was one Secondly It appeared that a part of the Land was leased for Life and the Recovery with a single Voucher was suffered by him in Reversion and so no Tenant to the Praecipe for those Lands But in regard the Possession had followed it for so long time the Court said they would presume a Surrender as in an Appropriation of great Antiquity there has been presumed a Licence tho' none appeared Thirdly It was objected That the Tenant in Tail which suffered the Recovery having first accepted of a Fine sur Conusans de droit come ceo his Estate Tail was changed for he was estopped during his Life to say that he had any other Estate than Fee then he being made Tenant to the Praecipe the Recovery was not of the Estate Tail and so should not bind But the Court held clearly that the acceptance of this Fine made no alteration of his Estate If Tenant for Life accepts such a Fine 't is a Forfeiture because he admits the Reversion to be in a Stranger but it does not change his Estate so where two joynt-Joynt-tenants in Fee accept a Fine which is to the Heirs of one of them yet they continue Joynt-tenants in Fee as they were before Fourthly The Writ of Right Close did express the Land to lie in such a Mannor and a Praecipe that demands Land ought to mention the Vill in which they lie for a Praecipe of Land in Parochia or in Manerio is not good But this exception was disallowed by the Court for Hale said the Writ of Right Close is directed Ballivis Manerij c. quod plenum rectum teneant of the Land within the Precinct of the Mannor and it is not to be resembled to another Praecipe But if a Praecipe be faulty in that Point unless exception be taken to it in Abatement it cannot be assigned for Error but if it were Erroneous the Recovery would bind until reversed Note After Judgment quod computet tho' it be not the final Judgment yet no motion is to be admitted in Arrest of Judgment and after such Judgment a Scire facias lies against the Executor of the Defendant Note In an Action of Debt against the Lessee he may plead nil debet and give the expulsion in Evidence Anonymus IN an Assumpsit the consideration appeared to be that the Defendant promised to pay a Sum of Money which he owed this is no good consideration tho' after a Verdict unless it appeared that the Debt was become remediless by the Statute of Limitations but payment of a Debt without Suit is a good consideration Anonymus A Justice of the Peace brought an Action of Slander for that the Defendant said He was not worth a Groat and that he was gone to the Dogs and upon motion in Arrest of Judgment notwithstanding that it was urged to maintain it that the Statute of H. 6. requires that a Justice of Peace should have 40 l a year And therefore in regard an Estate was necessary to his Office that the Action would lie yet the Judgment was stayed for such words will not bear an Action unless the person of whom they are spoken lives by buying and selling Anonymus IT was returned upon Elegit that the Sheriff had delivered medietatem Terrar ' Tenementorum in extent and after the Filing and Entry of it upon the Record the Plaintiff moved to quash it because it was insufficient for the Sheriff ought upon such Execution to deliver the Possession by Metes and Bounds Wild held that it being entred upon the Record there was no avoiding of it but by Writ of Error But Hale held that in regard it appeared by the Record to be void it might be quashed as if upon an Ejectment to recover Possession upon such a return it appears upon the Evidence that there was more than the half the Land delivered this shall be avoided So if a Fieri facias be not warranted by the Judgment upon which it is awarded tho' the Sheriff shall be
have admitted Wager of Law and therefore lies not against the Executor It was difficultly brought in that Debt should lye against the Executor upon a Surmize of a Devastavit by himself But that Point is now setled but no Reason to extend it further And he cited a Case where Debt was brought against A. Executor of B. Executor of C. who pleaded that he had not of the Goods of C. in his hands To which the Plaintiff Replied That B. had Wasted the Goods of C. to the value of the Debt demanded Vpon which Issue was joyned and found for the Plaintiff and he had Judgment to recover de bonis B. in the hands of A. But that Judgment was Reversed Anonymus IF A. Engages that B. shall pay for certain Goods that B. buys of C. this is good to charge him upon a Collateral Promise but not upon an Indebitat ' Assumpsit for it doth not create a Debt Anonymus IN an Information for a Riot it was doubted by the Court whether it were Local being a Criminal Cause And it was observed that divers Statutes in Queen Elizabeth and King James's time provided that Prosecutions upon Penal Laws should be in their proper Counties Which was an Argument that at the Common Law they might have been elsewhere Taylor 's Case AN Information Exhibited against him in the Crown Office for uttering of divers Blasphemous Expressions horrible to hear viz. That Jesus Christ was a Bastard a Whoremaster Religion was a Cheat and that he neither feared God the Devil or Man Being upon this Trial he acknowledged the speaking of the Words except the word Bastard and for the rest he pretended to mean them in another Sense than they ordinarily hear viz. Whoremaster i. e. That Christ was Master of the Whore of Babylon and such kind of Evasions for the rest But all the Words being proved by several Witnesses he was found Guilty And Hale said That such kind of wicked Blasphemous words were not only an Offence to God and Religion but a Crime against the Laws State and Government and therefore punishable able in this Court. For to say Religion is a Cheat is to dissolve all those Obligations whereby Civil Societies are preserved and that Christianity is parcel of the Laws of England and therefore to reproach the Christian Religion is to speak in Subversion of the Law Wherefore they gave Judgment upon him viz. To stand in the Pillory in Three several places and to pay One thousand Marks Fine and to find Sureties for his Good Behaviour during Life Walker versus Wakeman THe Case was An Estate which consisted of Land a Rectory c. was conveyed to the use of one for Life c. with a Power to Lett the Premisses or any part of them so as 50 l Rent was reserved for every Acre of Land The Tenant for Life Demised the Rectory reserving a Rent which Rectory consisted of Tythes only and whether this was within the Power was the Question Serjeant Pemberton Argued That this Lease is not warranted by the Power for a Construction is to be made upon the whole Clause and the latter Words that appoint the Reservation of the Rent shall explain the former and restrain the general Word Premisses to Land only for if it shall be extended further the Settlement which was in Consideration of a Marriage Portion is of no effect for the Rectory As in case it should de Demised reserving no Rent which it might be if not restrained to the latter words and they applied only to the Land But it was Resolved by the Court that the Lease of the Rectory was good for the last Clause being Affirmative shall not restrain the Generality of the former And this Resolution was chiefly grounded upon Cumberford's Case in the 2 Rolls 263. where a Conveyance was made to Vses of divers Mannors and Lands with a Power to the Cestuy que use for Life to make Leases of the Premisses or any part of them so that such Rent or more were reserved upon every Lease which was reserved before within the space of Two years and a Lease was made of part of the Lands which had not been Demised within Two years before And Resolved it was a good Lease and that thereupon any Rent might be reserved because the Power was General To Lease all and the restrictive Clause should only be applied to such Lands as had been demised within Two years before Termino Sanctae Trinitatis Anno 28 Car. II. In Banco Regis MEmorandum The last Term Sir Richard Rainsford was made Chief Justice Hale Chief Justice quitting it for infirmity of Body and Sir Thomas Jones was made one of the Justices of the Court of Kings Bench. Anonymus IN an Action upon the Case brought against the Defendant for that he did Ride an Horse into a place called Lincolns in Fields a place much frequented by the Kings Subjects and unapt for such purposes for the breaking and taming of him and that the Horse was so unruly that he broke from the Defendant and ran over the Plaintiff and grievously hurt him to his damage c. Vpon Not guilty pleaded and a Verdict for the Plaintiff It was moved by Sympson in Arrest of Judgment that here is no cause of Action for it appears by the Declaration that the mischief which happened was against the Defendants Will and so Damnum absque injuria and then not shewn what right the Kings Subjects had to walk there and if a man diggs a Pit in a Common into which one that has no right to come there falls in no Action lies in such Case Curia contra It was the Defendants fault to bring a Wild Horse into such a place where mischief might probably be done by reason of the Concourse of People Lately in this Court an Action was brought against a Butcher who had made an Ox run from his Stall and gored the Plaintiff and this was alledged in the Declaration to be in default of penning of him Wild said if a Man hath an unruly Horse in his Stable and leaves open the Stable Door whereby the Horse goes forth and does mischief an Action lies against the Master Twisden If one hath kept a tame Fox which getts loose and grows wild he that kept him before shall not answer for the damage the Fox doth after he hath lost him and he hath resumed his wild nature Vid. Hobarts Reports 134. The Case of Weaver and Ward Anonymus IN Trespass in an inferiour Court if the Defendant plead son frank Tenement to oust the Court of Jurisdiction It was said by Wild that they may enforce the Defendant to swear his Plea as in case of Foreign Plea negat Twisden and as in this Court where a Local justification in Trespass c. is pleaded the Defendant must swear it But the Court held no Indictment will lie for Perjury in such Oath no more than upon a Wager of Law Anonymus IN Trover the Hab. corpora
it will be agreed he might have released it or by cutting of the Wood might have taken away all the right of Action Again it does not appear by the Record that the Defendant was here and so no benefit by the forbearing to cut the Wood. Rookwoods Case cited on the other side 1 Cro. 163. 1 Leonard 192. is that the Promise was made to the younger Brothers and the Consideration that they would consent but here the Plaintiff who was to have the Money had no share in the Consideration or Meritorious Act as where the Father promises J. S. if his Son will Marry his Daughter he will give him 1000 l the Son may bring the Action because the Consideration moves from him Hetlys Rep. 20. the Case was to this effect A Man promises a Woman whom he was to Marry upon a certain Consideration that if he had a Son by her he should have a Term whereof the Woman was then possessed and if it were a Daughter she should have the Moiety of the Goods c. they Intermarry and after the death of the Husband the Daughter born between them brings an Action against the Executor of the Husband and resolved that it would not lie tho' they did not think the Agreement made with the Wife to be discharged by the Intermarriage but only suspended which is a Quaere in my Lord Hobart Yet the Daughter being no Party to the Promise or to the Consideration could not bring an Action The Case of Norris and Pine before cited is stronger for there he that made the Promise had a benefit for it was in Consideration of Marriage On the other side it was said that tho' it doth not appear that the Defendant was Heir yet it may be intended after Verdict however 't is not nudum pactum for if the Defendant had no benefit yet there was a restraint upon the other and that is Consideration enough And for the objection of releasing that holds where J. S. promises J.N. if his Son will Marry his Daughter he will pay him 1000 l J.N. may Release but 't is doubtful whether he can after Marriage because then 't is vested in the Son as Scroggs Chief Justice said 1 Roll. 31. The Uncle of an Infant delivered J.S. 12 l who promised to pay the Infant when he came of Age and the Action was well brought by him after his Age. So Goods sold to A. to pay 10 l to B. B. may Sue Vid. 1. Roll. 32 Starkey and Mills The Court said it might be another Case if the Money had béen to have been paid to a Stranger but there is such a nearness of Relation between the Father and Child and 't is a kind of Debt to the Child to be provided for that the Plaintiff is plainly concerned And so by the Opinion of them all viz. Scroggs Wild Jones and Dolben Judicium pro Querente Ante. Anonymus A Prohibition was prayed to the Sheriffs Court of London for that an Action was there Commenced to which the Defendant pleaded That the cause of Action did not arise within the Jurisdiction and offered to swear his Plea but it was refused The Counsel for the Plaintiff objected against the Prohibition that the Plea came too late for it was after an Imparlance But it being proved by Affidavit that the Plea was tendred within two days after the Declaration was delivered and that immediately upon delivering the Declaration there is an Imparlance of course The Court granted the Prohibition and said that the other side might Demurr if they thought fit for the liberty of the Subject was infringed by bringing him within a private Jurisdiction when the Matter arises out of it and Attorney's in such places are sworn to advise no Plea to the Jurisdiction nor that none shall be put in by them And whereas 't was said that the Party had not prejudice for he might remove his Case by Habeas Corpus The that the Court answered coming by Habeas Corpus Bail must be put in above tho' the Cause otherwise did not require it Note It appeared here that there was no defence made in this to the Jurisdiction and Co. Inst was quoted that defence should be made tho' not full defence But the Court said it was not necessary and that Presidents were otherwise especially where the Court have no Jurisdiction of the matter otherwise where not of the person James versus Richardson IN Ejectment the Case upon a Special Verdict was thus A. devised the Lands to B. and his Heirs during the Life of J. S. and after to the Heirs of the Body of R. D. now living and to such other Heirs was should after be Born the Devisee for Life levied a Fine in the Life of him to whose Heirs the Remainder was limited but he had a Son at the time of the death of the Testator The question was Whether it was a Contingent Remainder the consequence whereof was to be destroyed by the Fine and that it was vested in the Son Scroggs Chief Justice Wild and Jones held it a Remainder vested by reason of the words now living which was a sufficient Designation of the person that was to take in a Will tho' improper to call him Heir But Dolben Contra for by this Construction the Heirs Born after are excluded and the Son would take but an Estate for Life tho' it were devised to the Heirs in the Plural Number Note Vpon a Writ of Error in the Exchequer Chamber this Iudgment was reversed Hillary 31 32. Car. 2. Termino Paschae Anno 31 Car. II. In Banco Regis A Mandamus was prayed to the Ecclesiastical Court to grant the Probat of a Will under Seal c. The Case was the Executor named in the Will had taken the usual Oath but after a Caveat entred and then Refused and another endeavoured to obtain Letters of Administration the Executor came after to desire the Will under Probat and contested the granting of Administration Which was Adjudged against him supposing that he was bound by his Refusal And after an Appeal to the Delegates this Mandamus was prayed and granted by the Court for having taken the Oath he could not be admitted to Refuse and the Ecclesiastical Court had no further Authority and the Caveat did not alter the Case Note The Oath was taken before a Surrogate yet it was all one Anonymus A Prohibition was prayed to a Suit for Tythes upon the Suggestion that the Lands out of which they were demanded say out of the Parish and the Bounds of Parishes are tryable at the Common Law But the Court denied the Prohibition because it did not appear that a Plea thereof had been offered in the Ecclesiastical Court Anonymus A Prohibition was prayed to stay a Suit against J. S. Lessee of a Rectory out of which a Pension was demanded It was suggested that the Lord Biron had three parts in four of this Rectory upon which the Pension was chargeable and that
of Jane the second Wife is void and it cannot be returning where the Use is not setled in any Person I agree my Lord Pagets Case because there the Estate was vested in William Paget and the other Use returned by operation of Law and the Estate setled could not be divested but here the Limitation to the Heirs Males being void the ancient Use remained yet in Michael for nothing was out of him he having limited a thing which cannot be And as to a returning Use tho' all be done in an instant yet there is a priority of time in the Eye of the Law for it ought to vest first in him in Remainder and then Return but here nothing vests in the Remainder Secondly It hath béen urged That it shall be made good by Implication of Law and so shall amount to a Covenant to stand seized to the Used of the Covenantor for Life c. and the rather as it has béen said by Wild because Uses are guided by Equity But I answer we are here in case of a Deed where an Estate shall not be raised by Implication as it shall by a Will Cro. Car. Seagood ad Hone 366. A Deed differs greatly from a Will for if a Man Surrenders Copyhold Land to two equally to be divided they are Joynt-tenants but such a Devise would have made them Tenants in Common Admit in some Case an Estate shall be raised by Implication in a Deed yet it shall not be so here for it would be to the disinheriting the Heir As to the case of 13 H. 7. I agree that a Devise to the Eldest Son after the Death of the Wife gives an Estate for Life to the Wife but otherwise it would be upon such a Devise to the Younger Son for there the Eldest Son and not the Wife should have the Estate in the mean time Cro. Jac. Horton and Horton 57. We are not herein Favorabili materiâ and therefore no construction shall be made which does not appear by the words It hath béen strongly urged that this being by way of Use which is a matter of Equity shall be favoured Admit it yet it shall be guided by the Common Law for aequitas sequitur legem There never shall be a Settlement by way of Use to make one capable who is not capable by the Common Law I do not see any difference between a Feoffment to Uses and a Covenant to stand seized for if a Feoffment be made to the use of one for Life the Use shall return which is not disposed of as well as upon a Covenant to stand seized Thirdly It has been urged if these severally cannot support this Limitation yet the intention operating with the Deed will both together make an Estate for Life in Michael But I do not see his intent here to have it for Life the intention even in a Will which is much stronger ought to be collected out of the words of the Will. Cro. Car. Spirt and Bence 368. agreed by the whole Court that words in a Will ought to have an apparent intent to disinherit an Heir and here there is not any apparent intent but rather to the contrary for of some Lands Michael Covenants to stand seised to the Use of himself for Life Remainder c. but of the Lands in question he makes a difference in the Limitation And the words of the Deed are to be considered He Covenants to stand seized to the Uses mentioned declared and limited in the Deed and if Michael shall have an Estate for Life he must have it by operation of Law There was a like case between Flavil and Ventroise in the Common Pleas in which the Court was divided but the same Point came afterwards in question in the Case of Mr. Tape of Norfolk and it was adjudged to be the ancient Use And no Case can be shewn that the Law will create an Estate in the Covenantor where the Use is not vested in any Person but the ancient Use remains in him As to the Cases cited on the other side I have answered my Lord Pagets's Case already And as to my Lord Cokes Case 1 Inst 22. b. I agree the Use returns and the Son is in by discent and so it was adjudged in Fenwick and Mitfords Case there cited But the Paraphrase he makes there I do not understand It is said there when the Limitation is made to his right Heirs and right Heirs he cannot have during his Life the Law doth create an Use in him during his Life Wherefore is this said to make the Heir in by discent No doubt without this he is in by discent and so was the Iudgment in that Case for what Reason then should there be an Estate for Life raised by the Law to be merg'd by the Fee as soon as raised And there 't is said Till the future use come in Esse I do not conceive then where it is so long as the Father lives and what he means by the Future Use I do not know for it always was in Esse and never was out of the Feoffor and this was so adjudg'd in that Case of Fenwick and Mitford and not the construction of my Lord Coke And t is strange that no other Reports should mention his construction Hale Chief Justice for the Defendant If Ralph takes either by Discent from Michael or by Purchase the one way or the other answers the Verdict and the Issue is for the Defendant I shall divide the Case into two Points 1. If he takes by Discent 2. Admitting he does not If he may take by Purchase as this Case is I shall Premise two or three things First It has been agreed if an Estate for Life be raised to Michael the Remainder being to his Heirs Male of the Body of Jane his second Wife the Estate Tail is executed in him be the Estate for Life raised by Implication or express Limitation Secondly It is plain quacunque via It be rais'd that the Estate was long'd in Michael till Ralph the Son be in a capacity to take it either by Discent or Purchase for be it part of the ancient Use or a new Use it ought to be in Michael during his Life for there is nothing to bring it out of him Thirdly In all Cases touching Uses there is a great difference between a Feoffment to Uses a Covenant to stand seized and a conveyance at the Common Law If a Man by Feoffment to uses conveys Land to the use of J.S. for Life he may remit the Use to himself and the Heirs Male of his Body by the same Deed and so alter that wich was before a Fee simple and turn it into another Estate but if A. gives Land to B. for Life Remainder to A. and the Heirs Male of his Body because a Man cannot give to himself the Remainder is void for a Man cannot convey to himself by a Conveyance at the Common Law These things being premised I conceive here is an
Pollexfen Chief Justice was of Opinion that it ought to have been shewn in the Declaration that the Racks were set up and fixed But the other Justices conceived that it should be intended that they were Racks fixed for use in the Stable and it would be very remote to give it any other Construction And so Judgment was given for the Plaintiff Anonymus IN an Ejectment it was moved in Arrest of Judgment that the Plaintiff had declared of two Demises viz. That J. S. demised 10 Acres of Land to him an that J. N. had demised 10 other Acres of Land to him habend ' for the Term of Five years c. and that he entred into the Premisses demised to him by J. S. and J. N. in forma praedict ' After Verdict upon Not guilty for the Plaintiff it was Objected That in one of the Demises there is no certain Term or Estate for the habend ' can be referred only to the Demise of J.S. for that begins a New sentence But the Court held that the Habend ' should be a good Limitation of both Demises for Five years and when 't is shewn that the Plaintiff entred into the Premisses demised to him in forma praedict ' that is an Averment that all was demised for Five years for that is the forma paed ' As Lands lett to A. for his life Remainder to B. in forma praed ' this is an Estate to B. for Life And so Judgment was given for the Plaintiff Anonymus IN an Action upon the Statute of Hue and Cry it was after Verdict moved in Arrest of Judgment that in the Recital of the Statute there were Variances from the Statute and Omissions First There was no mention of Burning of Houses in the Recital but that is in the Statute Non allocatur For 't is not necessary to set forth more in the Declaration than is pertinent to the Action Secondly The Statute is That the Country should answer for the Bodies of the Malefactors and the Recital is Quod patria respondeat ê“ Malefactoribus the sense of which is That the Country should stand in their stead whereas the meaning of the Statute is That they should produce their Persons Sed non allocatur For as it is in the Recital of the Declaration it well answers the sense of the Statute Anonymus IN an Action of Trespass quare Clausum fregit and digging up and carrying away of his Trees It appeared upon the Evidence That the Defendant had entred into the Plaintiffs Close and digged up several Roots of his Trees and removed them to a place on the same Ground about two yards distance off And the Question was Whether this were such a Carrying away as that the Plaintiff should have full Costs or only Costs according to the late Statute where the Damages are under 40 s as was in this Case Pollexfen Chief Justice and Rokeby Powell absente were of Opinion that the Plaintiff was to have full Costs because the Roots were carried from the place where they were digged tho' not removed off from the Ground and they said that it had been adjudged Felony to take and removed things with an intent to steal them tho' laid at a small distance from the place and not carried out of the House or the like Ventris conceived That the taking of the Roots and laying them a little way off in the same man's Ground could not be taken as an asportavit and it differed from the Case of Stealing for taking Goods as a Thief is the Felony and it doth not lye in the carrying them off but in the Felonious intent in the taking But by the Opinion of the other two of the Plaintiff had his full Costs Anonymus IT was moved for a Prohibition to the Ecclesiastical Court to stay a Suit for Dilapidations by the Successor against the Executor of the former Incumbent upon the late General Act of Pardon for that all Suits for Offences of Incest Simony or Dilapidations are excepted in the Act unless commenced and depending before such a Day viz. the 20th day of March last and this Suit was commenced since The whole Court upon Hearing of Counsel at the Bar and Consideration of the Matter conceived that the Parliament never intended to take away the Successors Remedy for Dilapidations for that would be to ease the Executor of the last Incumbent who was the Wrong-doer and translate the Charge to the Successor But they would intend this Exception of such Suits as might be in the Ecclesiastical Court ex Officio against the Dilapidator himself to punish it as a Crime against the Ecclesiastical Law and to pardon it unless there were Prosecution before the Day aforesaid And so the Prohibition was denied Nota If a Sheriff of a County in a City be in Contempt the Attachment is to go to the Coroner and not to the Mayor or Chief Officer of the Corporation in such City or Town And if the Offender be out of his Office the Attachment shall be directed to the New Sheriff Gawden versus Draper IN an Action of Covenant the Plaintiff declared upon a Deed of Covenant by Indenture made between the Defendant and him whereby the Defendant Covenanted with the Plaintiff That Sarah Wife of the Defendant should be permitted to live separate from the Defendant until the Defendant and the said Sarah by Writing under their several Hands attested by two Witnesses should give notice to each other that they would again Cohabit And further Covenanted That he the Defendant during the Coverture and until such Notice should be given of their desires to Cohahit as aforesaid would pay to the Plaintiff for the Maintenance of the said Sarah 300 l per Annum at four Quarterly payments and sets forth That the said Sarah form the Date of the said Indenture to the time of the said Suit did live separate from the Defendant and no notice of Cohabitation as aforesaid had been given during that time of either side And for 75 l for one Quarters payment of the said 300 l which was to be paid at our Lady-day last the Action is brought The Defendant pleads in Bar That after the Indenture aforesaid and before the Action brought another Indenture was made between the Defendant and the said Sarah his Wife of the one part and the Plaintiff of the other part which the Defendant ê“fert hic in Cur ' reciting the said first Indenture and further reciting That the Defendant and the said Sarah did then intend to Cohabit and did at that time Cohabit and expressing that it was the true intent and meaning of all the said parties to the said Indenture produced ut supra by the Defendant That so long as the Defendant and the said Sarah should agree to Cohabit the said Annual payment should cease And the Plaintiff did by the said last mentioned Indenture by the appointment of the said Sarah as appointed by her being party thereunto and her Signing Sealing and
Mesuages Lands and Premisses And to the intent that the Contingent Remainder by the said Will limited to the Heirs Males and Females of the Body of the said Robert Durdant might be extinguished and destroyed he the said John Higden by the appointment of the said Robert Durdant did surrender his Estate in the Premisses to the said Gideon Durdant and by the said Deed it was Covenanted That the said Robert Durdant John Higden and Gideon Durdant should levy a Fine of the Premisses which should be to the use of the said John Higden and his Heirs They find that a Fine was levied accordingly in Easter Term 15 Car. 2. They find That Robert Durdant died on the 19th of August 20 Car. 2. and that John Higden after in 20 Car. 2. upon a valuable Consideration in money enfeoffed John Burchet of the Premisses and that the said Burchet died the 1st day of October in the same year and that the Premisses from him came to the Defendant Burchet who entred into the Premisses and became seised prout lex postulat And they find That Robert Durdant as well at the time of the said Will making as at the death of the said Henry Wicks had an only Son called George Durdant who was also Godson to the Testator and that the said George Durdant died and that William Durdant Lessor of the Plaintiff was his Son and Heir and entred and made the Demise prout c. si super totam materiam c. Vpon his Special Verdict Iudgment was given in the Kings-Bench for the Plaintiff And the Court here afterwards having heard the Case thrice Argued did affirm the Iudgment And the first Point spoken to was Whether the Estate did not execute in Robert Durdant by the Statute of 27 H. 8. of Uses For if so he would be seised of an Estate tail and then Burchet would have a good Title It is clear Lands may be Devised to the use of another as in Popham 4. 'T is true a Devise implies a Consideration and will lodge the Estate in the Devisee if no Vse be limited upon it Here it is Devised to John Higden and his Heirs upon trust and confidence that he should permit and suffer c. The word Trust is proper for the Limitation of an Use and the Estate shall Execute unless it be first limited to the use of a man and his Heirs in Trust for another there the Intention is that it should be only a Trust and here Robert Durdant is restrained only from doing waste which shews that he intended he should take an Estate or else he could not commit waste But Lands may be Devised to an Use tho' the Statute of Wills is since the Statute of Uses Mo. 107. 1 Cro. 343. The Court over-ruled this Point and Resolved it to be only a Trust in Robert Durdant for the words are That Higden should permit him to take the profits which shews that the Estate was to remain in Higden And for the restraint of waste it was proper for Higden was to permit Robert Durdant to have the possession but the Testator would not have him to commit waste or spoil The second and principal Point was Whether the Remainder to the Heirs of Robert Durdant now living did vest in George Durdant or was a Contingent Remainder It was much urged That one could not take in the Life of his Ancestor by the name of Heir for nemo est haeres viventis in the 1 Co. Archer's Case A Devise to Robert Remainder to the next heir Male of Robert and to the heirs Males of the Body of that heir Male this is Resolved to be a Contingent Remainder during the Life of Robert and it was said in that Case that the next heir Male is as much a designation of a person as an Heir now living He that will take by purchase by the name of Heir must be a compleat Heir to all intents Co. Littl. 24. b. 2 Leon 70. Chaloner and Bowyer 's Case upon a Devise But it was Resolved that this was a Remainder vested in George Durdant for the Remainder being limited to the Heirs of the Body of Robert Durdant now living and George being found to be then the only Son it was a sufficient designation of the person and as much as if it had been said to his Heir apparent and such an one is called Heir sometimes in proceedings in Law where the greatest strictness of phrase is used as in Writs of Ravishment of Ward Quare filium haeredem rapuit 2 Inst 439. Westm 2. cap. 35. 25 Ed. 3. the Statute of Treasons Treason to kill the Heir of the King The third Point was Whether George Durdant took an Estate Tail or only an Estate for Life for it was Objected that if the words Heirs of the Body were taken for the description only of the person who should take then he must take only for Life But the Court held that they would make an Estate Tail for Heirs is nomen collectivum and is sometimes so taken when 't is only Heir in the Singular Number A Devise to one for life Remainder to the heir Males of his Body for ever this is an Estate Tail in the Devisee Pawsey and Lowther in Rol. Abr. 2. Part 253. But in case the first words viz. Heirs of the Body now living would carry but an Estate for Life to George Durdant yet the subsequent words would make an Entail in him viz. and to such other Heirs Male and Female as he should hereafter happen to have of his Body this would clearly vest an Entail in George he being Heir of the Body of Robert and surviving Robert So the Judgment was affirmed Sed Nota as to the second Point the Lord Chief Baron Atkyns and Justice Powell seemed to be an Opinion that the Remainder was Contingent But in regard the Point had been upon a Writ of Error brought in the House of Lords upon a Judgment given in the Kings-Bench in another Case upon the same Will adjudged to be a Remainder vested they conceived themselves bound by that Judgment in the House of Lords Paschae Anno 2 Willielmi Mariae Memorandum BY an Order of the King and Council 1 Willielmi Mariae the Judges were Ordered to meet and all of them except Gregory Eyre and Turton were assembled at the Lord Chief Justice's Chamber to give their Opinion concerning Colonel Lundy who was appointed Governour of London Derry in Ireland by the King and Queen and had endeavoured to betray it and afterwards he escaped into Scotland where he was taken and brought Prisoner into England and Committed to the Tower Whether admitting he were guilty of a Capital Crime by Martial Law committed in Ireland he might be sent thither from hence to be Tryed there in regard of the Act of Habeas Corpus made Anno 31 Car. 2. which Enacts That no Subject of this Realm shall be sent over Prisoner to any Foreign parts But
his Bill to have the Land Conveyed according to the Agreement above But for the Defendants it was much insisted upon that this being to settle the Lands in case Thomas should dye without Issue it should not be regarded in this Court for the Execution of a Trust of a Remainder or Reversion in Fee upon an Estate Tail shall not be compelled because it is subject to be destroyed by the Tenant in Tail as here Thomas might have done in case he had made a Settlement according to the import of that Writing who therefore could not have been compelled himself to have executed this Agreement But the Lord Chancellor Fynch Decreed the Land for the Plaintiff because it was proved that the Marriage with the Plaintiffs Wife was in expectation of the performance of this Agreement and he was obliged to have left the Land to the Plaintiff if he had had no Issue Termino Sanctae Trinitatis Anno 34 Car. II. In Cancellaria Collet versus Collet WIlliam Fox having three Daughters Mary Elizabeth and Martha the two latter being Married and the first a Widow by his Will devised in these Words Viz. I give unto Martha my Daughter the Sum of 400 l to be paid unto her by my Executors within one year next after my decease But I will and my desire is that Cornelius Collet the Husband of Martha upon the payment of the said 400 l shall give such Security as my Executors shall approve of that the said 400 l shall be laid out within 18 Months next after my decease and purchase an Estate of that value to be setled and assured upon her the said Martha and the Heirs of her Body lawfully begotten And in the Close of his Will were these words following Viz. I Will That after my Debts which I shall owe at the time of my Decease and my Funeral Expences and the Probat of this my Will be discharged then I do give all the rest of my Personal Estate Unbequeathed to purchase an Estate near of as good value as the same Personal Estate shall amount unto within one year next after my my decease Which said Estate so to be purchased I Will shall be setled and assured unto and upon my said three Daughters Mary Elizabeth and Martha and the Heirs of their respective Bodies lawfully begotten for ever or otherwise my said Daughter Mary and the Husbands of my said two other Daughters Elizabeth and Martha shall for such Moneys as they shall receive of my said Executors for the Overplus of my Personal Estate enter into one or more Bonds in the double Sum of Money as each part shall amount unto the same being to be divided into three parts unto my said Executors within 18 Months next after my decease to settle and assure such part or Sum of Money as each of them shall receive and have by this my Will for the Overplus of my Personal Estate unto and upon the Child and Children of my said Daughters Mary Elizabeth and Martha part and part alike Martha the Wife of Cornelius Collet died within six Months after the Testator leaving Issue only a Daughter who died within four Months after the Mother the other two Sisters surviving Cornelius Collet took out Letters of Administration both to Martha his Wife and likewise to his Daughter the Four hundred Pounds and likewise the Overplus of the Personal Estate being unpaid or disposed of Cornelius Collet preferred his Bill against the Executors and the surviving Sisters and thereby demanded the 400 l and likewise a third part of the Overplus which amounted unto 700 l And the Cause came to be heard before the Lord Chancellor upon Bill and Answer who Decreed the 400 l to the Plaintiff but as to the Surplus of the Estate the Bill was dismissed altho ' it was much insisted upon for the Plaintiff that he might have given Bond to secure the Surplus for his Child and so from the Child it would have come to him as Administrator But seeing that no Interest could vest in the Child till the Election were determined it not being material as to this Point whether the Executors or the Husband aâ— the Election the Father could not claim it as Administrator to the Child And then if the Money had been laid out in Land and the Settlement according to the direction of the Will the Husband would have had no benefit for there would have been a Ioynt Estate for Life in the Daughters with several Inheritances and no severance of the Ioynture by the Marriage and having Issue Co. Inst and so no Tenant by the Courtesie Therefore as to the Surplusage the Bill was Decreed to be dismissed Note As to the 400 l the Order of my Lord Chancellor was That Interest should be paid for it from the time of bringing the Bill Termino Sancti Michaelis Anno 34 Car. II. In Cancellaria West versus The Lord Delaware WEST Heir apparent of the Lord Delaware Exhibited his Bill against the said Lord setting forth That upon a Marriage agreed to be had between him and the Daughter of one Mr. Huddleston with whom he was to have 10000 l Portion The Lord his Father Articled to settle Lands of such yearly value for the Wives Ioynture for their maintenance and the Heirs of their Bodies c. That the Wife being now dead and without Issue and no Settlement made the Bill prayed an Execution of the Articles and a discovery of what Incumbrances there were upon the Lands to be setled To this the Lord Delaware Answered That he never intended to settle Lands but for the Wives Ioynture only and that the Plaintiff her Husband was not named in the Articles and so was Advised He need make no Settlement and upon that Reason the Plaintiff could not require him to discover Incumbrances An Exception being taken to the Answer for that it did not discover any thing touching Incumbrances it was Argued before my Lord and for the Defendant it was alledged That by the Course of the Court the time of the Discovery should be when the other Point was determined for if that be for the Defendant then no Discovery can be required but if otherwise that then the Defendant shall be put to answer Interrogatories as is usual in Cases of like nature And it cannot be Objected That the Estate may be charged with Incumbrances since the Bill because they will be of no avail On the other side it was said That this would create great delay for upon the discovery of Incumbrances other parties must be made to the Bill and therefore this Case differed from the Case of Account which concerns the Defendant himself only but the Question now is only for the making proper Parties The Court Ordered That a further Answer should be made Nota If a man deviseth that such a Sum of Money shall be paid out of the Profits of his Lands and the Profits will not amount to the Sum in such case the Land
Nonsuit him Dyer 76. b. for the Defendant could have no Scire facias into Ireland Leech versus Widsley IN an Action of Trespass for Chasing of his Sheep and Impounding of them and there detaining of them until he gave him 12 d per quod one of the Sheep died The Defendant pleads that J.S. was seised in Fee of the place Where and that the Sheep were there Damage feasant and that he by the Command of J. S. leniter chaceavit eas and Impounded them until he gave him satisfaction quae est eadem Transgressio The Plaintiff in his Replication entitles himself to Common there The Defendant Rejoyns and says that the place Where was parcel of a great Waste wherein the Plaintiff had Common appurtenant and that the Lord Inclosed the place Where and that the Plaintiff had tempore quo c. semper postea sufficient Common for all his Sheep levant and couchant To which the Plaintiff Demurs First For that the Bar was Insufficient for the Plaintiff chargeth him with detaining them until he paid him a Shilling and he pleads that he detained them until he gave him satisfaction sed non allocatur Vid. 3 Cro. 384. Hill and Prideaux's Case but here the Plaintiff hath waived that Advantage by pleading over Again He doth not answer to the killing of the Sheep sed non allocatur for he pleads leniter chaceavit so that if the Sheep did dye he is not answerable neither doth the Plaintiff declare of any extraordinary Chasing but alledges the dying of the Sheep only in aggravation of the Damages coming after the Per quod and that is not traversable As in an Action for Beating of his Servant per quod servitium amisit the loss of the Service cannot be traversed But that which was most insisted on was what he alledges in his Rejoynder viz. That the Plaintiff had Common sufficient left him for his Sheep levant and couchant upon the Tenements Whereas he ought to have said Sufficient ad tenementa praedicta For it may be the Ground was understocked Also 't is not set forth that he had free Egress and Regress the Words of the Statute of Merton are Tantam pasturam habeant quantum sufficit ad tenementa sua quod habeant liberum ingressum sed non allocatur for his Sheep levant and couchant is intended as many as the Land will maintain and if there were no Egress or Regress it ought to come on the other side So Judgment was given for the Defendant nisi causa Anonymus AN Infant Executor brings an Action It was said by Twisden That it had been Adjudged that he ought to sue by Guardian Ely versus Ward IN a Writ of Error to Reverse a Judgment given in the Court at Hull upon an Assumpsit the Plaintiff declared That it was Agreed between them at a place infra Jurisdictionem Curiae That upon Request c. and that he Requested him at a place infra Jurisdictionem Curiae It was assigned for Error That this Action ought not to have been brought in Hull because the Request was not appointed to be made within the Iurisdiction by Agreement Sed non allocatur As long as the Agreement and Request were made there tho' the Request might have been elsewhere Another Error was assigned in that the Precept to the Serjeant at Mace for Returning of the Jury was Probos legales homines qui null affinitat ' c. attingen ' whereas the Form of the Venire is attingunt Sed non allocatur For it was held to be as well Tho' Twisden said The Form of a Writ ought not to be altered into another Expression of the same signification Then the Entry was Ad quem diem venerunt the Plaintiff and Defendant Juratores and it should have been Veniunt sed his non obstantibus the Judgment was affirmed Anonymus IT was held That if the Sheriff Returns a Cepi Corpus upon a Capias altho' he hath not his Body in Court at the day of the Return yet no Action can be brought against him but he is to be amerced for it at the Common Law One so taken could not be Bailed but by a Homine Replegiando and now the Statute of the 23th of H. 6. obliges the Sheriff to take Bail however the Return is as at the Common Law Cepi Corpus Freeman versus Barnes TRin. 20 Car. 2. Rot. 554. Error to Reverse a Judgment given in Communi Banco in an Ejectment where upon Not Guilty pleaded the Jury found a Special Verdict to this effect Tenant in Fee makes a Lease for an hundred years in Trust for himself to wait upon the Inheritance the Lessee enters Cestuy que Trust enters and takes the Profits and makes several Leases all which being expired he makes a Lease for 54 years and for the corroborating of it Levies a Fine with Proclamations the Lessee enters 5 years pass And Tyrrel and Archer they being the only Judges in the Common Plea then gave Iudgment That the Fine should bar the Lessee for an hundred years Vpon which a Writ of Error was brought in this Court and Argued this Term by Levins for the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error and Finch Solicitor for the Defendant And for the Reversing of the Judgment Levins Argued That this Lease by the Cestuy que Trust and the Entry of his Lessee did not dispossess the former Lessee and then the Fine and Non-claim could not prejudice his Interest which was not put to a right For first the Cestuy que Trust was at least Tenant at Will So is Littleton Sect. 464. Cestuy que Use may enter and hold at the Will of his Feoffees then his Lease can be no Disseisin because the Inheritance was in himself 'T is true in some Cases a man may do an Act which shall divest his own Estate As if a Stranger disseises Tenant for Life to the use of him in the Reversion and he assents Co. Lit. 180. b. the Law shall not construe a Disseisin against the parties Intention Rolls 661. He that enters by colour of a void Lease is no Disseisor 1 Cro. 188. nor any one that enters by Consent 15 E. 4. 5. b. Neither shall the Interest of the Lessee be divested but at his Election for this Lease works in point of Contract and not so violently upon other mens Interests as Livery doth In Latche's Rep. 75. Sir Thomas Fisher's Case Tenant for years le ts at Will the Lessee makes a Lease for years this works no dispossession If a Copyholder makes a Lease for years without Licence the Entry of the Lessee is no Disseisin to the Lord and he may chuse whether he will take it as a Forfeiture Rolls 830. Lease for years upon Condition to be void upon Non-payment of Rent a demand is made the Lessor may make a new Lease of the Land the former Lessee being still in possession And Blunden and Baugh's Case was cited in 1 Cro.
Perkins IN Debt upon a Bond entred into Eliz. Perkins who was the Plaintiffs Wife and he as her Administrator brings this Action The Defendant pleads That he delivered the Bond to one Eliz. Perkins his Sister quae obiit sola innupta absque hoe that he delivered it to Elizabeth Perkins the Plaintiffs Wife And to that the Plaintiff Demurres Specially For if it be taken that there are two of the name the Defendant should have pleaded non est factum for it amounts to no more Or at least he ought to have induced his Plea that there were two Elizabeth Perkins But this Traverse is designed to bring the Marriage in question which is not to be tried now Wherefore the Court gave Iudgment for the Plaintiff Twisden said If the Issue be Whether the Wife of such a Man or no This is to be tried per Pais For if she be a Wife de facto it serves upon the Issue But Loyalty of Matrimony is to be tried by the Certificate of the Bishop only 2 Cro. 102. Dightons Case A Mandamus was prayed to the Corporation of Stratford super Avon to restore Dighton the Town Clerk They returned their Letters Patents of Incorporation whereby they had Authority to Grant the Office of Town Clerk Durante bene placito and that he was amoved from his Office by the Mayor and Burgesses It was said that here appeared no Cause of amoval upon the Return which was manifestly needless having Authority to turn them out at their Pleasure But Twisden said It hath béen held that where any such like Power is to chuse one into a Iudicial Office as an Alderman whose place concerns Judicature that they cannot amove him without Cause But this was in a Misterial Office It was further moved That it did not appear that they had discharged him by any matter in Writing under Seal and it could not be by Parol Sed non allocatur for it is returned to be done by the Mayor and Burgesses and a Corporation cannot do any thing by Parol Post An Executor obtained Judgment in Debt in this Court and was afterwards upon an Information here convicted of Forging the Will It was also made void by Sentence in the Ecclesiastical Court Whereupon the Court was moved to vacate the Judgment which they ordered accordingly and the Cause of Vacuteing thereof to be entred upon the Record Vide Ante in Paris's Case King versus Atkins IN Debt upon a Bond the Condition recited That whereas the Plaintiff was bound with the Defendant being an Excise-Man that he should render a true Account in the Exchequer that the Defendant should save him harmless at all times c. The Defendant pleaded non fuit damnificatus The Plaintiff replied That a Scire facias issued out against him c. To which the Defendant demurred because he did not alledge that he gave notice This being spoken to divers times the Court thought notice not requisite in this Case no more than upon a Promise to pay so much at the others Marriage or return into England vid. Hob. 112 113. 1 Bulst 12 and 13. Where it is held upon a Promise notice is not necessary otherwise upon a Bond because of the penalty Ante Chester versus Wilson TRin. 21 Car. 2. Rot. 498. The Case was two Ioyn-tenants the one Grants Bargains and Sells all his Estate and Interest to the other It was held clearly by all the Court That this amounted to a Release but it must be pleaded quod relaxavit for one Ioyn-tenant cannot grant to another Wilson versus Armorer IN Debt against the Heir upon the Bond of his Ancestor who pleaded riens per discent the Jury find a Special Verdict to this effect That the Father was seised of a Mannor in Fee and made a Feoffment of it excepting two Closes for the life of the Feoffor only and refered it to the Iudgment of the Court whether these Closes descended to the Defendant or not So that the Question was Whether the Closes were well excepted or passed by the Feoffment And it was argued by Levins for the Plaintiff That by these words the two Closes were Totally excepted and that the Law should reject the latter words because they cannot take effect according to the Parties intention to reserve to the Feoffor a particular Estate If one surrendred a Copyhold to the use of J. S. and his Heirs which Estate to begin after his death adjudged in 2 Rolls 261. a present Fee simple passed 3 Cro. 344. A Man said to his Son being upon his Land Stand forth Eustace my Son reserving and Estate for mine and my Wifes Life I do give you this Land to you and your Heirs Resolved there that this is a good Feofment Moor 950. Popham 49. A Man possessed of a Term in an House in the right of his Wife granted it excepting the Cellar pro usu suo proprio and held that by these words it was altogether excepted out of the grant 1 Anderson 129. Serjeant Turner è contra For that it is but one Sentence and cited 38 H. 6. 38. An Addowson was granted saving the Presentation to the Grantor during his life and held void and Pl. Com. 156. where it is said if a Termour granted his Term after his Death it is void But if in two Sentences as to grant his Term Habendum after his Death there the Habendum is only void Er Adjurnatur Postea Love versus Wyndham AN Action upon the Case upon an Issue directed out of Chancery upon a Special Verdict the Case was George Searl being seised of the Mannor of N. Demised the same to Nich. Love for 99 years if 3 Lives should so long live N. Love devised it to Dulcibell his Wife the remainder to Nich. his Son for life and if he the said N. the Son should dye without Issue then to Barnaby Love the Plaintiff The Executor assented and whether the Devise to Barnaby were good was the Question Jones for the Plaintiff this is a good possibility I shall make two points First If a Termor Devise first to one and then to another whether he may Devise it over Secondly Whether the Limitation here after the Death without Issue be a good Limitation over First He may make a third Limitation which is a Possibility upon a Possibility at least he may make 2 or 3 such Limitations over I can't certainly say where it will end It can't be denied but that a Termour may Devise first to one for life and after to another 8 Co. 95. But I say he may go further and that will appear by Reason and Authority First By Reason The Reason given why the Executory Devise in the first case is good is because 't is in Construction of Law as much as if he had Devised it to the last first if the first Man should dye within the Term and then had Devised that the first should hold during life and without such a transposition it cannot
upon that Attainder was penned as amply as this of 12 Car. and the Case of Warner and Harding Latch 25. is very like this W. Shelley enfeoffed divers to the use of himself for Life and afterwards to divers others upon Condition that if a Ring were delivered by the said William Shelley declaring that he intended those uses should be void that then c. it was resolved that nothing was forfeited but during his Life Rainsford I shall speak nothing to the Fraud because that is a pure matter of Fact which is to be found by the Jury and cannot in any Case be presumed by the Court. I am of Opinion that the Judgment ought to be affirmed The power of altering the Trusts reserved by the first Proviso is inseparable from the person of Simon Maine for it is to be by his Will in Moor 193. the Lord Pagetts Case It is resolved that inseparable Powers are not forfeited upon like words as are in this Act and so the second Proviso limits to him a double Power First Of revoking the old Trusts Secondly Of limiting new But this is to be done by Writing under his Hand and Seal in the presence of two Witnesses so the performance of this also is personal The D. of Norfolks Case is the very same unless for that it is there under his proper Hand and Seal and here under his Hand and Seal which certainly is all one But admitting this Power were forfeited yet it is not found that ever it was executed after it come to the King which must be before any Estate could come to the King therefore in Englefields Case it was found that a Ring was tendred in the behalf of the Queen And whereas it was objected That he had jus disponendi and therefore might Forfeit as a Man shall a Term which he hath in right of his Wife as Dame Hale's Case in Plowden is resolved I answer That here he hath not jus disponendi but rather potestatem disponendi but that is qualified and to be executed by certain Circumstances which must be performed to give it effect Twisden As to the Fraud I cannot see how the Jury could have found this fraudulent Settlement made to prevent a Forfeiture enacted by Parliament 20 years after which surely could not be without the Spirit of Prophecy I am of the same Opinion as to the matter with my two Brothers That Simon Maine had only a Trust in him during his own Life and if he had brought a Bill in Equity he could have had the Estate executed no further and therefore can Forfeit no more by this Act and it is not always that a Man that hath power over Land hath a Trust as we may sée in Cranmers Case Dier 308 309. there were as large words in the Act of his Attainder as here Indeed the Argument in Englefields Case 7 Co. rules this for if a Trust had béen implied in the power of Revocation they néeded to have argued that it should have been forfeited as a Condition so the D. of Norfolks Case for tho' the word Use is in that Act and not Trust as in this yet it makes no difference for an Use was then the same with what a Trust is now and tho' the word Power had béen in this Act yet there should have béen no Forfeiture in this case because the Execution of it is so personal and individual Neither is there found that ever there was any Execution and at most the Forfeiture could only be of what was in Simon Maine neither can Smith Execute it by virtue of his Grant from the King for the Kings Patent conveys nothing by implication and shall never work to a double intent Hale Chief Justice of the same Opinion First Crooke is a good Lessor for the other Trustees disagréement makes the Estate wholly his Secondly For the Circumstances of Fraud they are not material to be considered Thirdly The Trust is wholly disposed of after the Death of Simon Main so that he had nothing but during his Life Fourthly Then what is operated by the Attainder Why the Trust during Life is forfeited Vid. the E. of Somerset's Case Hob. 214. 2 Cro. 512. But then this Trust must have béen executed by the Court of Revenue 'T is true the Act doth not only give the Trust but the Term it self to the King that is during the Life of Simon Maine so that by this Act so much of the Term is drawn out of the Trustees as served the Trust which S. M. had but leaves the residue of the Term to serve the other Trusts so that the possibility of the Term returns to the Trustees after the Death of S. M. and this appears by the body of the Act. Also this appears by the saving in the Act. The first saving which saves all the Conveyances made by the Feoffor before the 29 of Sept. 1659. indeed might not help because Conveyances made to the Wives Children or Heirs are therein excepted But there the other Proviso saves the Right Interest c. of all persons whatsoever doth in Law and Equity not derived form the offenders since 25 Mar. 1646. and therein the Interest of Wife or Children and all are saved now this Estate was created before viz. 1643. I come now to the Provisoes The first Proviso determins nothing till the time of Simon Maine's Death and consequently this can revest no more to M. than he had before For the Condition is in expectation till he have a Son living at the time of his Death why then by this there comes nothing to S.M. so much as in point of Execution during his Life By his Will he might have limitted new Uses but he made none and 't is personal No other Man can make his Will Why then all stands as it did and nothing is made void till the time of his Death and then all is immediately executed to the Son by force of the first Conveyance But if the Proviso had béen That if S.M. had a Son there all had revested in S. M. and might have béen forfeited The last Proviso doth not create a Trust to him for if he had not béen Attainted the Trust should not have gon to his Executors c. No it creates a personal power of fetching back the former and declaring new Trusts observing the circumstances upon the same reason that this Estate can be forfeited a bare Executor I mean without a Devise of the residue might forfeit his Estate this is a Power yea and 't is a manacled Power it is a kind of Trust that he may revoke The D. of Norfolks Case is the same with this So Harding and Warners Case which was adjudged in C. Banco tho' there there were two to two and it was confessed by the Kings Attorney in Scaccario and the Kings Attorney doth not use to confess Judgment in Cases of great moment without consultation with the Judges This power was not nor could be passed to the
the first Man for he is only to compound the business if he can Twisden The discharge being set forth in an Order we must intend it duly made 't is the common practice to go to the Sessions first It was moved at first that it did not appear that the Plaintiff had Notice but that Point was waided for being in a judicial proceeding it shall be intended Et Adjurnatur Lucy versus Levington PAsch ult Rot. 96. Covenant by the Plaintiff as Executor of J. S. for that the Defendant covenanted with J.S. his Heirs and Assigns to levy a Fine c. and that they should enjoy the Lands against all persons claiming under Sir Peter Vanlore and then he says that Sir Robert Crooke and Peter Vandebendy in the Testators life time did enter claiming under Sir P. Vanlore c. The Defendant pleads That he had a good and indefeasible Title in the Lands at the time of the Covenant by vertue of certain Fines from Sir Ed. Powel and his Wife but that in 13 Regis nunc there was an Act of Parliament by which these Fines were made and declared to be void and that Sir R. C. and P. Vandebendy had Title and entred by reason of the Act and not otherwise The Act which was pleaded in haec verba recites that certain Men came with armed force and thereby extorted and took the Fines c. And to this the Plaintiff demurred It was urged for the Defendant That this Title was by matter subsequent to the Covenant and not any thing which was in being then as 9 Co. 106. Sir T. Gresham conveys Land to certain uses with power of Revocation and then does revoke and Aliens and dies the Revocation was not warranted by his power but was after made good by Act of Parliament and then Process went out against his Widow for a Fine for the Alienation of Sir T. G. the Lands being of capite tenure but she was discharged because the Alienation had its effectt by an Act of Parliament which can do no wrong Twisden 'T is hard this should be a breach for the Defendant cannot be intended to Covenant against an Act of Parliament a thing out of his power Baron and Feme levied a Fine J. S. Covenants that the Conusee shall enjoy it against all lawfully claiming from B. and F. brings Dower after the Death of B. the Conusee does not plead the Fine but suffers Judgment and brings Covenant against J.S. and adjudged against him for the Covenant shall not extend to a Right which is barred and besides she did not claim lawfully There is an Old Book which says that if an Attainder be reversed by Parliament the person shall have Trespass against him which took the profits of his Land in the interim Hale My Lady Greshams Case is not like this for there the party was in by the Queens consent to the Alienation by the Act she passed but here the Covenant is broken as much as if a Man recover Land and then sell and Covenant thus and then it be evicted in a Writ of Right for this is in the nature of a Judgment Tho' it be by the Legislative power it may be the prospect of this Act was the reason of the Covenant nor has the Defendant reason to complain for the Act was made because of his own fraud and force Every Man is so farr party to a private Act of Parliament as not to gainsay it but not so as to give up his Interest 't is the great question in Barringtons Case 8 Co. the matter of the Act there directs it to be between the Forresters and the Proprietors of the Soil and therefore it shall not extend to the Commoners to take away their Common Suppose an Act says Whereas there is a Controversie concerning Land between A. and B. 'T is Enacted That A. shall enjoy it This does not bind others tho' there be no saving because it was only intended to end the difference between them two Whereupon Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff It was agreed by all the Justices that tho' the Covenant were made only to J. S. his Heirs and Assigns and it were an Estate of Inheritance yet the Breach being in the Testators Life time the Executor had well brought the Action for the Damages Peter versus Opie IN an Assumpsit the Plaintiff declares That there was an Agreement between him and the Defendant that be the Plaintiff should pull down two Walls and build an House c. for the Defendant and that the Defendant should pay him pro labore suo in circa divulsionem c. 8 l and that in consideration that the Plaintiff assumed to perform his part the Defendant assumed to perform his and the Plaintiff avers that he was paratus to perform all on his part but that Defendant had not paid him the Money And after a Verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in Arrest of Judgment That he did not aver that he had done the work Hale Pro labore here makes a Condition precedent and therefore the performance of the work ought to have been averred for tho' in case of a Reciprocal Promise performance need not be averred yet if the Promise refers to an Agreement which contains a Condition precedent the performance of that must be averred as if I should promise one to go to York and in consideration of that he promise to pay me 10 l there needs no averment of my going to York otherwise if the Counter promise were to pay 10 l for my going to York So if the Counter promise were to do a thing after a time ascertained or to be ascertained it must be averred that the time is past Therefore that it is said by way of Reciprocal promise will not concern much for every Agreement is a Reciprocal promise but the matter is what the Agreement is Here tho' the Reciprocal promise be the foundation of the Consideration yet 't is to be considered that it refers to a Conditional promise or an Agreement and the Promise obliges not the Defendant to do it otherwise than according to the Agreement Now to shew this pro labore makes a Condition precedent Suppose the Agreement to be in writing thus Memorand that J.S. agrees and promises to build and J. N. promises to pay him so much for his pains it cannot be taken but that the building must be precedent to the payment 'T is the common way of Bargaining and in common dealing men do not use to pay before the work be done it would be inconvenient to give cross Actions in such cases especially since 't is likely that the Workman is a poor Man 'T is true if there be a time limited for the payment which time may fall out before the work or thing be done there the doing it is not a precedent Condition Vivian and Shipping 3 Cro. An Award that one should pay 10 l and in Consideration thereof the other should become bound
the Earl of Warwick and the Earl of Manchester or the major part of them And in case she Marries without such Consent or happen to dye without Issue then I give and bequeath it to George Porter viz. the Lessor of the Plaintiff The Earl of Newport dies and the Lady Anne Knolles being of the Age of 14 years marries with Fry without the Consent of her Grandmother or either of the Earls and it was found that she had no Notice of the Will until after the Marriage and that George Porter at that time was of the Age of 8 years and that after the Death of the Countess she Entred and George Porter Entred upon her and made the Lease to the Plaintiff This Case having been twice Argued at the Bar viz. in Michaelmas Term by Sir William Jones for the Plaintiff and Winnington for the Defendant And in Hillary Term last by Finch Attorney General for the Plaintiff and Sir Francis North Solicitor General for the Defendant It was this Term Resolved by the Court viz. Hale Twisden and Rainsford Moreton being absent for the Plaintiff upon these Reasons Rainsford Here have been three Questions made First Whether the words in the Will whereby the marriage of the Defendant is restrained make a Condition or Limitation If a Condition then none but the Heir can Enter for the Breach But 't is clear that they must be taken as a Limitation to support the intent of the Devisor and to let in the Remainder which he limits over 1 Rolls 411. Secondly Whether the Infancy of the Defendant shall excuse her in this Breach and clearly it cannot For a Condition in Deed obliges Infants as much as others 8 Co. 42. Whittingham's Case the difference between Conditions in Fact and Conditions in Law Especially in this Case the nature of the Condition shewing it to be therefore imposed upon her because she was an Infant Thirdly and the main Point of the Case Whether the want of Notice shall save the Forfeiture of the Estate As to that Let the Rules of Law concerning Notice be considered First I take a difference where the Devisee who is to perform the Condition is Heir at Law and where a Stranger The Heir must have Notice because he having a Title by Discent need not take notice of any Will unless it be signified to him And so is Fraunce's Case 8 Co. Where the Heir was Devisee for 60 years upon Condition not to disturb the Executor in removing the Goods and Resolved that he should not lose his Estate upon a Disturbance before he had Notice of the Will But where the Devisee is not Heir as in this Case he must inform himself of the Estate devised to him and upon what terms Another Rule is When one of the Parties is more privy than the other Notice must be given but where the Privity is equal Notice must be taken by the party concerned A Bargainee shall not Enter for a Condition broken before Notice for the Bargain and Sale lies in his Cognizance and not the Lessees So if a Lease be made to commence after the end of the former if the first be surrendred the Lessor shall not Enter for a Condition broken for Non payment of Rent until Notice given of the Surrender 3 Leon. 95. And therefore there shall be no Lapse to the Ordinary upon a Resignation without Notice If a man makes a Feoffment upon Condition to Enter upon payment of such a Sum at a place certain he must give Notice to the Feoffee when he will tender the Money Co. Lir. 211. a. Dyer 354. And upon this Reason is Molineux's Case 2 Cro. 144. where a Devise was that his Heir should pay such Rents and if he made default then his Executors should have the Lands paying the said Rents and if they failed of Payment then he devised the Land to his younger Children to whom the Rents were to be paid It was Resolved Non-payment by the Executors should be no Breach until they had Notice that the Heir had failed which was a thing that the younger Children must be privy to But in 22 E. 4. 27 28. Tenant for Life Lets for years and dies the Lessee must remove in convenient time to be reckoned from the death of the Tenant whether he had Notice of it or no For he in Reversion is presumed to be no more privy to it than himself So Gymlett and Sands's Case 3 Cro. 391. and 1 Rolls 856. where Baron and Feme were Tenants for Life Remainder to the Son in tail Remainder to the right Heirs of the Baron the Baron makes a Feoffment with Warranty and dies then the Feme and Son joyn in a Feoffment this is a Forfeiture of the Estate of F. tho' she had no Notice of the Feoffment or Warranty whereby the Right of the Son was bound So Spring and Caesar's Case 1 Rolls 469. A. and B. joyn in a Fine to the use of A. in Fee if B. doth not pay 10 l to A. before Michaelmas and if he doth then to the use of A. for Life Remainder to B. B. dies before Michaelmas the Heir of B. is bound to pay the 10 l without any Notice given by A. The Reason given which comes home to our Case is For that none is bound to give Notice and then it must be taken tho' indeed a second be added For that B. from whom his Heir derives had Notice The Mayor and Comminalty of London aganst Atford 1 Cro. where a Devise was to six Persons to pay certain Sums for the Maintenance of an Almshouse c. and if through Obliviousness or other Cause the Trusts were not performed then to J. S. upon the same Condition and if he failed by two Months then to the Mayor and Comminalty of London upon the same Trusts The six did not perform the Trusts J.S. enters J. N. enters upon him and a Fine with Proclamations was levied and Five years passed and the better Opinion was that the Mayor and Comminalty of London were bound to pay the Money appointed by the Will altho' they had no Notice that the six persons or J. S. had failed tho' indeed the Case is adjudged against them as being barred by the Fine and Non-claim Sir Andrew Corbet's Case 4 Co. is very strong to this purpose where a Devise is to J. S. until he shall or may raise such a Sum out of the Profits of the Land If a Stranger Enters after the death of the Devisor tho' the Devisee had no Notice of the Will yet the time shall run on as much as if he had the Land in his own possession These Rules being applied to the present Case it will appear no Notice is to be given First The Defendant is as privy to the Will as any one else viz. as George Porter who is found also to be an Infant It is not found whether there were any Executors if it had they were not concerned to give Notice nor did it
five years pass Whether the Lessor should have five years after the Term expired was the question and after the hearing of Arguments the Court resolved that he should as well as when Lessee for Life levies a Fine which differs not in reason from this Case for there the Lessor may have his Writ de consimili casu presently as here he may bring his Assize And though in 9 Co. Podgers Case 'T is said that where Lessee for years is ousted by a Disseisor who levies a Fine if five years pass without claim the Lessor is barred that is not the same with this Case for the Disseissor comes in without the consent of the Lessee and of his own wrong and if he can defend his Possession five years he shall hold it but here all is done with the privity and by the means of the Lessee who is trusted with the Possession and it would be of most mischievous import to Mens Inheritances if they should not have five years after the Lease ended and it being put of a Disseisin in Podger's Case seems to imply the contrary in other Cases and tho' there were many notorious Circumstances of fraud in Fermours Case which Co. in his report of it lays much weight upon yet it does not thence follow that the Law is not the same where there are not such evidences of fraud In other Books where that case is reported the resolution does not seem to go so much upon the particularities of the Fraud 'T is Fraud apparent in the Lessee Wilston versus Pilkney IN Debt for Rent the Plaintiff declared that the Dean and Chapter of c. demised to the Defendant for Life by force of which he entred and demised the Land to the Plaintiff for years by virtue of which he was possessed and afterward granted to the Defendant reserving a Rent for which he brings his Action To this Declaration the Defendant Demurrs First Because he doth not say of the Deans Demise hic in Curia prolat ' which Demise must be by Deed. Secondly He says that the Defendant entred by force thereof which is impertinent to be alledged upon a Lease for Life because Livery implies it Thirdly As to the matter that the Reservation was void it being upon a surrender by Parol A Rent cannot be reserved upon a Feoffment by Parol so where Lessee for life or years assigns over his whole interest 12 H. 4. 14. 9 H. 6. 43. 12 H. 4. 17. also no Rent can be reserved upon a Conveyance that works an Extinguishment unless by Deed where it is good upon the contract Peto's Case 3 Cro. 101. is that a Surrender drowns the interest to all intents and purposes between the Parties Dier 251. The Tenant for Life agreed with him in Reversion that he should have his Land for the Annual Rent of 20 s 't is doubted there whether this amounts to a Surrender there being no Deed or Livery But in 2 Rolls 497. 't is said if it had been a Surrender the reservation had béen void Hale I do most doubt of the first exception because the Deed was not produced And for the second it were better pleading to have said by force of which he was seized but that 's not of necessity And as to the matter the Court resolved for the Plaintiff For 1. The Reservation was good by the contract tho' without Deed. And so it was adjudged in this Court in Manly's Case that Tenant for years might assign his whole Term by Parol rendring Rent so in the Case of Purcas and Owen 23 Car. But it was doubted whether an Action would lye until the last day were past 'T is all one where the Grant is made to him in Reversion which is not actually but consequentially a Surrender by operation of Law before which the contract is perfected upon which the Rent arises 7 E. 4. is that the Lessee may Surrender upon Condition and there is no reason why a Rent cannot be created upon it as well as a Condition If it were in the case of Tenant for Life a Deed were requisite as well for a Rent as a Condition in respect of the Freehold but that is not so in case of Tenant for years Vide Postea Cartwright and Pinkney Termino Sanctae Trinitatis Anno 25 Car. II. In Banco Regis Hanslap versus Cater IN Error upon a Judgment in the Court of Coventry where the Plaintiff Cater declared That the Defendant being indebted to him infra Jurisdictionem Curiae pro diversis Bonis Mercimoniis ante tunc venditis deliberatis did then and there assume c. Vpon Non Assumpsit pleaded and a Verdict and Judgment for the Plaintiff the Error assigned was That the Goods were not alledged to be sold within the Jurisdiction of the Court. Hale and Wild seemed to be of Opinion that it was well enough the being indebted and the promise being laid to be within the Jurisdiction Twisden Contra and said he had known many Judgments reversed for the same Cause It being moved again this Term Hale consented that it should be reversed according as the latter Presidents have been for he said it was his Rule Stare decisis Parsons and Muden Pasch 22. Car. 2. Rot. out of Barnstaple Court John Brown's Case HE was indicted upon the Statute of 3 H. 7. cap. 2. for the forcible taking away and marrying of one Lucy Ramsy of the Age of fourteen years having to her Portion 5000 l He was tried at the Bar and the fact appeared upon the Evidence to be thus She was inveigled into Hide Park by one Mrs. P. confederate with Brown who had prepared a Coach for that purpose to take the Air in an Evening about the latter end of May last and being in the Park the Coachman drove away from the rest of the company which gave opportunity to Brown who came to the Coach side in a Vizar-mask and addressing himself first to Mrs. P. soon perswaded her out of the Coach and then pulls out a Maid servant there attending Mrs. Ramsy and then gets himself into the Coach and there detains her until the Coachman carried them to his Lodgings in the Strand where the next Morning he prevails upon her having first threatned to carry her beyond Sea if she refused to Marry him but was the same day apprehended in the same House It was a first doubted whether the Evidence of Lucy Ramsy was to be admitted because she was his Wife de facto tho' not de jure But the Court seriatim delivered their Opinions that she was to be admitted a Witness First For that there was one continuing force upon her from the beginning till the Marriage wherefore whatsoever was done while she was under that violence was not to be respected Secondly As such Cases are generally contrived so hainous a Crime would go unpuished unless the Testimony of the Woman should be received Thirdly In Fulwoods Case reported in 1 Cro. which was read in the
own Wrong as to enforce the Lessee to pay any thing for the residue Otherwise of a Rightful Entry into part as in the Case at Bar. 'T is true in Ascough's Case in the 9 Co. 't is said a Rent cannot be suspended in part and in esse for part And so in the 4 Co. Rawlin's Case it is held That the whole Rent is suspended where part is Redemised to the Lessor But the Court observed that the Resolution of that Point was not necessary to the Judgment given in that Case which was upon the Extinguishment of the Condition which is entire and not to be apportioned But as to the Rent no Book was found to warrant such an Opinion but Brook tit Extinguishment 48. where 't is said If there be Lord and Tenant by three Acres and the Tenant lets one to the Lord for years the whole Rent is suspended This Case is not found in the Book at large An in 7 Ed. 3. 56 57. where a Formedon was brought of a Rent-Service issuing out of three Acres and as to one Acre it was pleaded that the Demandant himself was Sole seised and concluded Judgment of the Writ But it was Ruled to be a Plea to the Action for so much and to the rest the Tenant must answer which is a full Authority that in such case the Rent is to be apportioned And the Case of Dorrell and Andrews Rolls tit Extinguishment 938. is full in the Point That where Lessee for years let ts at Will which Lessee Licenses the Lessor to enter that the Entry of the Lessor thereupon shall not suspend his Rent For Hale said Tho' it might be Objected that in regard the Lessee at Will cannot lett the Entry of the Lessor thereupon might be a Disseisin but that is ever at the Election of the Lessor And if that were now the Question perhaps the Lessor cannot take such an Entry for a Desseisin It is the Common Experience that where it comes to be tryed upon Nil debet if it be shewn that the Lessor entred into part to Answer this by proving it was the Lease of the Lessee and if the Law should not go upon this difference it would shake abundance of Rents it being a frequent thing for a Lessor to Hire a Room or other part of the thing demised for his Conveniency Hale said That a Case of a Lease for years was stronger than a Lease for Life where the remedy is by Assize and the Tenants of the Land out of which the Rent issues are to be named And for a Condition that must be extinct where part of the thing Demised comes to the Lessor because 't is annexed to such a Rent in quantity For if the Rent be diminished the Condition must fail Holland versus Ellis IN Trespass Quare clausum fregit herbas conculc ' diversas carectat ' tritici ibid ' asportavit After Verdict it was moved in Arrest of Judgment that the Declaration did not mention whose the Loads of Wheat were for it was not ibid. crescent ' Adjornatur Resolved per Cur ' That an Inquisition before the Coroner taken super visum corporis that finds that the Person was Felo de se non compos mentis may be traversed But the fugam fecit in an Inquisition before the Coroner cannot be traversed Termino Sancti Hillarij Anno 27 28 Car. II. In Banco Regis The Earl of Leicesters Case IN an Ejectment upon a Special Verdict the Case was to this effect Robert Earl of Leicester in the .. of Eliz. levied a Fine of the Lands in question to the use of the Earl of Pembrook and his Heirs for payment of his Debts reserving a Power to himself to Revoke by any Writing Indented or by his last Will subscribed with his Hand and sealed with his Seal And sometime after he Covenants by a Writing Sealed and Subscribed as aforesaid to Levy a Fine to other uses and after the Covenant a Fine was levied accordingly And whether this should be taken as a Revocation and so an execution of the Power and the extinguishment of it was the Question It was Argued by Jones Attorney General that this should not be taken as a Revocation In Powers of Revocation there is to be considered the Substance and the Circumstance and that which Revokes must be defective in neither The Deed alone in this Case cannot revoke for tho' it has the Circumstance limited viz. Indenting Writing Sealing Subscribing yet it wants Substance for it doth nothing in praesenti but refers to a future Act viz. the Fine If a man has made his Will a Covenant after that he will levy a Fine or a Charter of Feoffment made will not be a Revocation of the Will 1 Roll. 615. yet there appeared an intention to Revoke and less matter will Revoke a Will than a Deed. Again the Fine alone cannot Revoke because it is defective in the Circumstances contained in the Power but then to consider them both together how can it be conceived that the Fine should communicate Substance to the Deed or the Deed give Circumstances to the Fine But 't is Objected That they make but one Conveyance I Answer If so then the words of the Power here are to Revoke by Deed and not by Deed and Fine Again This Construction is repugnant to the words of the Power which are That it shall be lawful for him to Revoke by his Deed And yet it is agreed here that the Deed of it self is not sufficient to revoke but only in respect of another Act done which as it must be observed is executed at another time The Books agree that a Condition or Power c. may be annexed to an Estate by a distinct Deed from that which conveys the Estate but not unless both are Sealed and Delivered at the same time and so they are but as one Deed But in the present Case the Deed was made in one year and the Fine levied in another Suppose the Power to be with such Circumstances as in our Case and a Deed is made which contains some of them at one time and another Deed comprehending the rest of another time Should both these make a Revocation is one Deed Surely not Again Suppose the Fine had been Levied first and then afterwards such Deed had declared the Uses surely the Power had been extinguished by the Fine tho' there the Fine and Deed might be taken as one Conveyance as well as here Again the different natures of these Instruments makes that they cannot be taken as one entire Act within the Power for the Covenant is the Act of the party and the Fine the Act or Iudgment of the Court. But it has been Objected That this ought to have a favourable Construction I Answer But not so as to dispence with that Form the Execution of the Power is limited to be done by In the 6 Co. 33. Powers that are to divest an Estate out of another person are
taken strictly and here upon the first Fine the Earl of Leicester had no Estate left in him Mich. 6 Car. 1. in Communi Banco the Case of Ingram and Parker which tho' it may not be a clear Authority for me yet I am sure it does not make against me The Case was Catesby levied a Fine to the use of himself in Tail with Remainders over reserving a Power to himself and his Son to Revoke by Deed c. as in our Case and his Son after his decease by Deed intended to be Enrolled conveyed to one and his Heirs and after levied a Fine and it was held no Revocation First Because he having an Estate Tail in him the Deed might operate upon his Interest Secondly Because it was but an inchoation of a Conveyance and not perfected and they held it no Revocation and that the Fine levied after tho' intended to be to the Vses of the Deed yet should extinguish the Power Hale Chief Justice Vpon the close and nice putting of the Case this may seem to be no Revocation for 't is clear that neither the Deed nor Fine by it self can revoke but quae non valent singula juncta prosunt The Case of Kibbett and Lee in Hob. 312. treads close upon this Case where the Power was to Revoke by Writing under his Hand and Seal and delivered in the presence of three Witnesses and that then and from thenceforth the Uses should cease It was there Resolved that a Devise of the Lands by Will with all the Circumstances limited in the Power should Revoke yet the Delivery was one of the Circumstances and the Uses were to cease then and from thenceforth Whereas a Will which could have not effect while his Death did strongly import that the meaning was to do it by Deed and yet there the Will alone could be no Revocation for clearly he might have made another Will after and so required other Matter viz. his Death to compleat it And in that Case there is another put That if a Deed of Revocation had been made and the party had declared it should not take place until 100 l paid there the operation of it would have been in suspence until the 100 l paid and then it would have been sufficient yet there it had been done by several Acts and of several Natures the Intention in things of this nature mainly governs the Construction In Terries Case it was Ruled That if A. makes a Lease for years to B. and then Levies a Fine to him to the end that he might be Tenant to the Praecipe for the suffering of a Recovery that after the Recovery suffered his Lease should revive 'T is true in the Case at Bar if the Fine had been levied first and then the Deed of Uses made afterwards the Power had been extinguished by the Fine and so no Revocation of that which had no being could have been by the Deed. Twisden What if before the Fine levied the Intent had been declared to that purpose Hale I doubt whether that would have helped it I cannot submit to the Opinion in Parker and Ingrams Case cited viz. That the Deed not being Enrolled should make no Revocation For in case of a Power to make Leases for life it has been always held by the best Advice that the better way is to do it by Deed without Livery tho' Livery by the Common Law is incident to a Lease for life and so Adjudged in Rogers's Case for Lands in Blandford forum in Moor's Rep. where Tenant for life hath power to make Leases for life and makes a Lease by Livery 't is there held a Forfeiture tho' I conceived not because by the Deed the Lease takes effect and so the Livery comes too late Therefore the omission of Enrolling the Deed in that case does not seem to be material but if that Opinion be to be maintained it is because the party had such an Interest upon which the Deed might enure without Execution of his Power and so rather construed to work upon his Interest But that Reason does not satisfie because such an Estate as was intended to be conveyed could not be derived out of his Interest therefore it should take effect by his Power according to Clere's Case in the 6 Co. So by the whole Court here the Deed and Fine taken together were Resolved to be a good Execution of the Power and Judgment given accordingly Richardson versus Disborow A Prohibition was prayed to the Ecclesiastical Court where the Suit was for a Legacy and the Defendant pleaded That there was nothing remaining in his hands to pay it and that he had fully Administred And producing but one Witness to prove it Sentence was given against him and after he Appealed and because their Court gave no regard to a single Testimony he prays a Prohibition But it was urged on the other Side That it being a Matter within their Cognizance they might follow the Course of their own Law And tho' there are diversities of Opinions in the Books about this Matter yet since 8 Car. 1. Prohibitions have been been denied upon such a Surmize Hale Where the Matter to be proved which falls in incidently in a Cause before them is Temporal they ought not to deny such Proof as our Law allows and it would be a great Mischief to Executors if they should be forced to take two Witnesses for the payment of every petit Sum And if they should after their Death there would be the same Inconvenience In Yelv. 92. a Prohibition was granted upon the not admitting of One Witness to prove the Revocation of a Will Which is a stronger Case because that entirely is of Ecclesiastical Cognizance Wherefore let there go a Prohibition and let the party if he please Demur upon the Declaration upon the Attachment Hob. 188. 1 Cro. 88. Popham 59. Latch 117. Pigot versus Bridge IN Debt upon a Bond Conditioned for performance of Covenants and the Breach assigned was in the not quietly enjoying the Land demised unto him The Defendant pleads that the Lease was made to hold from Michaelmas 1661 to Michaelmas 1668 and that paying so much Rent Half yearly he was to Enjoy quietly and shews that he did not pay the last half years Rent ending at Michaelmas 1668. To which the Plaintiff Demurred supposing that the words being to Michaelmas 1668. there was not an entire Half year the Day being to be excluded and that it was so held in the Case of Umble and Fisher in the 1 Cro. 702. Cur ' contra 'T is true in pleading usque tale Festum will exclude that Day but in case of a Reservation the Construction is to be governed by the Intent Anonymus NOte per Hale Debt doth not lye against the Executor of an Executor upon a Surmize of a Devastavit by the first Executor For First 'T is a Personal Tort for which his Executor cannot be charged Secondly 'T is such an Action of Debt as would
Ejectment the Case upon a Special Verdict was to this effect Sir John Danvers being seized of the Lands c. in Tail with the Fee expectant Anno 1646 and in 1647 levied a Fine to the same uses as he was before seized save that a power was reserved to make Leases for any number of years and without reserving any Rent Sir John Danvers did after become Guilty of Treason in Murdring of King Charles the first in 1648 and died in 1655. In 13 Car. 2. cap. 15. the Statute commonly called the Statute of Pains and Penalties Enacts That sundry of the Offenders in that execrable Treason of which Sir J. D. was one should amongst other Penalties there inflicted forfeit all their Lands Tenements and Hereditaments Leases for years Chattels real and interest of what nature or quality soever See the Act of 14 of this King The Lands were by Patent granted to the Duke of York who let them to the Defendant And John Danvers Heir of Sir John Danvers entred and made the Lease to the Plaintiff It had been several times argued at the Bar and this Term Iudgment was given by the Court for the Defendant And Rainsford Chief Justice delivered the Opinion of the Court and the Reasons for himself Twisden Wild and Jones as followeth The question being Whether an Estate Tail were forfeited by the words of the Act of 13 Car. 2. It was observed that all Estates were Fee simple at the Common Law and forfeitable W. the 2. de donis was the first Statute that protected Estates Tail from Alienations and from all Forfeitures of all kinds and so continued until the 12 E. 4. Taltarums Case from which time common Recoveries have been held not to be restrained by the Statute de donis and by the way it must be considered that Perpetuities were never favoured Then came the Statute of 4. H. 7. of Fines which with the explanation of the 32 H. 8. have been always resolved to bar the Issues in Tail so as to Alienations Estates Tail were set free but were not forfeitable no not for Treason until the 26 H. 8. by which they became subjected to Forfeitures in case of Treason and so by 5 E. 6. But 't is true these Statutes extend only to Attainders and 33 H. 8. Vests the Lands c. in the Kings possession without Office Thus having considered the History and Progress of Estates Tail the reasons why such an Estate should be construed to be forfeited upon this Act of 13 Car. 2. are these First The Crime mentioned is of the same nature and with the same aggravations as in 12 Car. 2. by which the Offenders are attainted of Treason c. for they are called Perpetrators of that execrable Treason with many Expressions to the like effect which was looked upon as an offence of that hainous nature that the same Parliament Enacted An Anniversary Humiliation throughout the whole Kingdom to be perpetually observed upon the account of it as if not only they that acted it but the whole Kingdom and their Posterity like to another Original sin were involved in the Guilt of it Nati natorum qui nascuntur ab illis And therefore the Punishment shall not be mitigated in any other manner than is expresly provided by that Act. Secondly It is proved by the generally and comprehensions of the words which are made use of viz. Possessions Rights Hereditaments of what nature soever Interests which does as well signifie the Estate in the ting as that wherein the Estate is which can have no effect if not extended to Estates Tail We must observe also that at the making of this Act entailed Lands were not protected from Forfeitures and tho' 26 H. 8. extends only to Cases where the Offender is attainted yet 't is of good direction to the Judges in Cases of like nature and 't is plain that by this Act of 13 Car. 2. the Offenders were looked upon in pari gradu with these attainted for when the Proviso comes to save the Estates of Strangers c. in trust for whom the Offenders were seized It is said notwithstanding any of the Convictions or Attainders aforesaid Thirdly It is to be observed that the Act takes notice that divers of the Offenders included in this Act were dead now in regard most Lands are known to be entailed if the Act had not intended such Estates to be forfeited it would signifie nothing indeed if the Offenders had been alive it might have been somewhat satisfied with the Forfeiture during their Lives But as the case was it should be of no effect at all after making a great noise of Forfeitures and Confiscations the Act would have been but a Gun charged only with Powder or as in the Fable Parturiunt Montes c. Fourthly It is manifest that the Parliament did not intend that the Children or Heirs of the Persons within the Penalties of the Act should have any benefit of their Estates for in the saving which is made for Purchasers upon valuable Considerations the Wives Children and Heirs of the Offenders are excepted then surely if they would bar them of the benefit of their Purchases à fortiori from inheriting to an Estate Tail especially of a voluntary Entail that seems to be made with a prospect of this Treason which was perpetrated a year after and such an Entail as scarce the like was ever seen before that a power should be reserved to make Leases for any number of years and without Reservation of any Rent By which it is manifest that Sir John Danvers that committed the Treason was fully Master of the Estate Again all Conveyances are avoided by the Act unless such as were upon valuable Consideration which this Fine was not The great case which has been insisted upon by way of objection is Trudgeons Case Co. Litt. 130. Estates Tail were not forfeited upon the Statute of Praemunire but during the Offenders Life For answer to that it must be observed that that Forfeiture is upon the Statute of 16 R. 2. at which times Estates Tail were under thè protection of the Statute de donis but since that time the Judges have not been so strict in expounding Statutes concerning Estates Tail as appears by Adams and Lamberts Case 4 Co. That an Estate Tail given for a superstitious use was within the Statute of 1 E. 6. cap. 4. where the words are generally and not so large as in our case nor so much to demonstrate the intent as is in our Act to extend to Estates Tail wherefore Iudgment was given for the Defendant Note They that argued for the Defendant endeavoured to maintain that if it should be admitted that Entails were not forfeited by the Act yet the Estate of Sir John Danvers in those Lands would be forfeited in regard he levied a Fine in 1647 and the Act of 13 Car. 2. extends to all Lands c. whereof the Persons therein mentioned were seized c. since 1646 and he being
cannot tender an Oath to the party sued nisi in causis Matrimonialibus Testamentariis But the Court after hearing divers Arguments denied the Prohibition for they said It was no more than the Chancery did to make Defendants answer upon Oath in such like Cases Termino Sanctae Trinitatis Anno 31 Car. II. In Banco Regis How versus Whitfield ante in ult ' Term. IN Repl the Plaintiff declares of the taking of his Cattle in a Close containing five Acres The Defendant avows and sets forth a Fine to the use of A. in Tail which discended to him Virtute cujus he was seised in Dominico ut de feodo talliato c. The Plaintiff Replies that the Fine was first to the use of J. S. for Life the Remainder to his Executors Administrators and Assigns for 80 years with Power to him and his Assigns to lett the five Acres in Possession or Reversion for 21 years determinable upon three Lives reserving the ancient Rent and that J. S. Devised this Term to J. N. and died his Executors assented and after it came to the Executors of J. N. who assigned it and that the Assignee made a Lease of the said five Acres inter alia reserving proinde the Rent of 6 s per annum and avers that the ancient Rent was 6 s per annum The Avowant Rejoyns setting forth his former Title And the Plaintiff Demurrs It was Objected First That the Plaintiff ought to have traversed the Seisin in Tail alledged by the Avowant seeing in his Replication he sets forth and intitles himself under an Estate inconsistent with it To this it was Answered and the Court agreed that there ought to be no Traverse for the Avowant doth not say it was his Freehold or that he was Seised in Tail but only under a Virtute cujus c. And the Plaintiff in his Replication sets forth a Title consistent with all that the Avowant alledges and so confesses and avoids and all depends upon the execution of the Power And for that Secondly It was Objected That he which made this Lease was not Assignee of J. S. for Executors were not within the Power and consequently not their Assignee This is a Power collateral to the Estate and shall not run with the Land for then Assignees of Commissioners of Bankrupcy the Vendee of the Term by the Sheriff upon an Execution c. should execute this Power It is like Covenants annexed to Leases which the Assignee could not take advantage of till 32 H. 8. Again Here appears to be no good Reservation for the Lease is of the five Acres inter al' reserving proinde so that the Rent issues out of other Lands as well as the five Acres and therefore cannot be said to be the ancient Rent reserved upon that The Court were all of Opinion that the Assignee in this case might execute the Power and conceived that Assignees might include Assignees in Law Vid. Mo. 855. as well as Fact but however the Tenant for Life devising this Term the Devisee was an Assignee and the Power in the greatest strictness of acceptation was in him and consequently must go to his Executors and by the same Reason to their Assignee As to the Reserving the Rent proinde the Court said it might be intended that the inter al' might comprehend nothing but such things out of which a Rent could not be reserved and then the six Shillings was reserved only for the five Acres However the proinde might reasonably be referred only to the five Acres and not to the inter al and that a distinct Reservation of Six shillings might be for five Acres And so Judgment was given for the Plaintiff Ante. Steed versus Berrier ERror upon a Judgment given in the Court of Common Pleas upon a Special Verdict the Case was to this effect J.S. made his Will in Writing and devised Lands to his Son J.S. and his Heirs and in the same Will gave a Legacy of 100 l to his Grandson The Son died afterwards in his Life time after whose decease J. S. the Grandfather made a Codicil wherein he gave away part of the Lands devised as aforesaid to a Stranger and afterwards declared by Parol that his Intention was that his Grandson J. S. should have the Lands which his Son J. S. should have had The Question upon this Special Verdict was Whether this were sufficient to carry the Lands to the Grandson And Judgment was given in the Common Pleas by three Judges against one that it was Whereupon a Writ of Error was brought in this Court Finch Solicitor Argued that this Will was sufficient to carry it to the Grandson He agreed Brett and Ridgen's Case in Pl. Com. that a Devise to a man and his Heirs who dies in the Life of the Devisor a new Publication will not be enough to make the Heir take by the Will because named in the Will by way of Limitation of the Estate and not Designation of the Person that should take But in Fuller's Case in the 1 Cro. 423. and in Mo. 2. where the Devise was to his Son Richard and the Heirs of his Body which Richard afterwards died in his Life time and then the Devisor said My Will is That the Sons of Richard my Son deceased shall have the Land devised to their Father as they should have had if their Father had lived and died after me There Popham and Fenner held that this new Publication would carry the Land to Richard's Son Gawdy and Clench contra But our Case is much stronger for there Heirs of the Body were used only for Limitation but in the Will here where the words are I Devise to my Son J. with this new Publication the Grandson J. may take because a Grandson is a Son and when a Will is new Published it is all one as if it were wrote at the time of such Publication Beckford and Parncot's Case in the 1 Cro. 493. Mo. 404. Devise of all his Lands and after the Will the Devisor purchaseth other Lands and then publishes it again it will carry the new purchased Lands Dyer 149. Trevanian's Case Cestuy que use before the 27th of H. 8. Devised the Lands a new Publication will pass the Lands executed in him by the Statute The Opinion of the Court inclined to Reverse the Judgment they held it to be the same with Fuller's Case in the 1 Cro. that no Parol averment can carry Lands to one person when the words of the Will plainly intended them to another They agreed If a man having no Son but a Grandson deviseth his Lands to his Son the Grandson may take But here is an opposition contained in the new Publication viz. Those Lands which my Son J. should have had my meaning is my Grandson J. shall have And in the Will it self there is a Legacy devised to the Grandson by that Name so where they are so distinguished 't is impossible to take the Grandson to be
for if a Man Covenants to stand seized to a Contingent Use and afterwards is attainted of Treason before the Contingency happen the Contingency shall never rise for the King has the Estate discharged and the Use is to rise out of the Estate of the Covenantor so is Moor Sir Tho Palmers Case 815 In Moors Rep. of my Lord Pagets Case 194. It s said that W. Paget had an Amoveas manus for the Estate of the Queen leased by the Death of my Lord Paget In Sir Francis Englefeilds Case Popham 18. n. 7. It s resolved that no Use rises because t is that it shall Discend Remain or Come which is uncertain but if he had Covenanted that after his Death he and his Heirs would have stood seized to the Use of John an Use would have resulted to Sir Francis Second Point I conceive if it be impossible for Ralph to take by Discent this would be a Contingent Use in him by Purchase The great Objection against this is that the Limitation is to an Heir and an Heir which ought to take by Purchase ought not to be only Heir of the Body c. but Heir general Of this I am not well satisfied I conceive the Remainder being limited to the Heirs of the Body of Jane begotten by Michael such a Limitation will make a special Heir to serve the turn and t is not to be resembled to Shelley's Case My Reasons are First Because at the Common Law before the Statute de Donis notice was taken that this was a special Heir and therefore 't is no wrong done to make him here a qualified Heir In the Statute de Donis 't is said When Lands are given to Man and his Wife and the Heirs of their two Bodies begotten Secondly Vpon the special penning of the Deed it is apparent that Michael took notice that he had an Heir at Common Law therefore it can't be intended that he meant here such an Heir that should be Heir general to him this would be Contradictio in Adjecto Litt. Sect. 352. puts this Case If a Feoffment be made upon Condition that the Feoffee shall give the Land to the Feoffor and his Wife and the Heirs of their two Bodies begotten In this Case if the Husband dye living his Wife before the Estate Tail is granted to them the Feoffee ought to make the Estate as near the Condition and as near the intent of the Condition as may be viz. To let the Land to the Wife for her Life without impeachment of Wast the Remainder to the Heirs of the Body of the Husband on her begotten If the Husband and Wife dye before the Gift made then the Feoffee ought to make it to the Issue and to the Heirs of the Body of his Father and Mother begotten Suppose that this had been to a second Wife and there had been Issue by a former the Book of 12 H. 4. 3. says that there it shall be in another manner but Litt. says it shall be as near vid. Litt. Sect. 22. Morevils Case Fitzh Tail 23. 2 Ed. 3. 1. 4. Ed. 3. 50. by all these Cases it appears that no regard is had whether the Son be Heir of the Husband if he be Heir of their two Bodies Therefore it seems that by this Limitation Ralph shall take by way of Contingent Remainder For Heirs of the Body of the second Wife is a good name of Purchase I have not read any Case against this Hill 16. or 26 Eliz. there was this Case A Man taking notice in his Will that his Brother who was dead had a Son and that he himself had three Daughters who were his right and immediate Heirs he gave them 2000 l and gave his Land to the Son of his Brother by the name of his Heir Male. Provided If his Daughters troubled his Heir then the Devise of the 2000 l to them should be void And it was resolved that the Devisor taking notice that others were his Heirs the Limitation to his Brothers Son by the name of Heir Male was a good name of Purchase and this agrees with Cownden and Clarks Case in Hob. Wild Justice said he was of the same Opinion with Hale in this last Point And Iudgment was given for the Defendant Three Learned ARGUMENTS One in the Court of Kings-Bench BY Sir FRANCIS NORTH Attorny General And Two in the Court of Exchequer BY Sir MATTHEW HALE Chief Baron there The Argument of Sir Francis North. In Banco Regis Potter and Sir Henry North. IN a Replevin for taking of an Horse in a certain place called the Fenn at Milden-Hall in the County of Suffolk the Defendant makes Cognizance as Bayliff to Sir Henry North and saith That the place Where c. containeth Ten thousand Acres of Pasture in Milden-Hall whereof a certain place called Delfe is parcel and that it is Sir Henry North's Freehold and the Horse was Damage feasant there c. The Plaintiff Replies Confessing the Soyl to be the Freehold of Sir Henry Norths but says That time whereof c. the place Where hath been parcel of the Fenn and parcel of the Mannor of Milden-Hall of which Sir Henry North is seised in Fee and that the Plaintiff was at the time c. seised of an Ancient Messuage one of the Freeholds holden of the Mannor by Rents and Services and parcel of the said Mannor and that Time out of Mind there were divers ancient Freehold Messuages holden of the said Mannor by Rents and Services and divers Copyhold Messuages parcel of the said Mannor by Custom of the said Mannor demised and demisable by Copy of Court Rolls of the said Mannor And the several Tenants of the said Freehold Tenements being seised in their Demesn as of Fee and they whose Estate they have in the same Time out of mind have had together with the Customary Tenants of the said Customary Tenements the sole and several Feeding of 100 Acres of Pasture for all Beasts except Hogs Sheep and Northern Steers levant and couchant upon their several Freeholds every year at all times of the year as to their several Freeholds belonging And that within the said Mannor there is and Temps d'ont c. hath been such a Custom that the several Tenants of the Customary Messuages together with the Freeholders aforesaid have used and accustomed to have the sole and several Feeding of the said 100 Acres of Pasture for all their Beasts except Sheep Hogs and Northern Steers levant and couchant upon their several Copy-holds every year at all times in the year tanquam ad seperal ' Tenementa customar ' spectant ' pertinent ' and the Plaintiff being seised put in his Horse c. and so Iustifies Vpon this the Defendant demurs generally This Prescription is naught in substance and Judgment ought to be given for the Defendant upon these Four Exceptions First That several Freeholders cannot joyn or be joyned in a Prescription to claim an entire Interest in another mans Soyl as
Plaintiffs and assign a Breach on the Defendants part Defendant pleads quod Testator nihil habuit in Tenementis The Plaintiffs demur to the Plea 98 4. By an Assignee of an Assignee against an Executor 117 The Declaration sets forth the Demise and that the Defendants Testator Covenanted to pull down three old Houses and build three new ones in their room and to keep the same in good repair and so deliver them up at the end of his Term 119 Sets forth the Plaintiffs Title to the Reversion by Assignment from the Lessor 119 120 And that the Tenant for years Attorned 121 That the Tenant in possession died and left the Defendant his Executor c. The the Plaintiff hath performed all and singular the Covenants on the part of the Lessor and his Assigns Protestando that the Defendant hath not performed those on the part of his Testator 122 He assigns a Breach in facto for permitting once of the new erected Houses to fall down before the end of the Term and other defaults in not Repairing Et sic the Defendant Convenconem non tenuit 123 The Defendant pleads performance specially to each Breach assigned and says that his Testator pull'd down the three Houses and built other three Houses in their room which he kept in Repairs and so delivered at the end of his Term 124 The Plaintiff demurs to the Plea as not being sufficient as to the leaving one House totally prostrate and ruined as the Plaintiff declared The Defendant joyned in Demurrer 125 5. Against the Assignee of an Executrix 228 The Declaration sets forth That the Plaintiff was possest of a Term for years yet in being by Indenture demised to the Testator for 21 years at the yearly Rent of c. 229 With a Clause of Re-entry and Covenants 230 That the Lessee entred made his Will made the Assignor his Exetrix and died That she proved the Will entred and assigned to the Defendant who entred and is still possest The Breach assigned was in the Non payment of Rent 231 The Defendant pleads That he assigned over before any Rent due 232 Demurrer to part of the Plea Joynder in Demurrer Judgment for the other part 233 Cesset executio Brevis de Inquirendo de dampnis quousque the Demurrer be determined 234 6. In Covenant the Plaintiff declares upon an Indenture of Demise from the Defendant 272 Profert in Curia The Demise Habendum Reddendum The Covenants on the Plaintiffs part 273 Covenants on the Defendants part for himself and Assigns to permit to make a Drain The Plaintiff entred and was possest and avers performance of all Covenants on his part The Breach assigned Eo quod the Defendant being possest of certain Tenements adjoyning for a Term of years did demise part of the Term to J. S. who entred 274 And died possest And Administration granted to his Widow who entred and was possest and took Husband The Husband and Wife entred and were possest and refuse to suffer the Defendant to make the Drain Et sic inde producit sectam 275 The Defendant pleads That he permitted the Plaintiff to make a Drain according to Covenant but the Plaintiff refused it The Plaintiff demurs The Defendant joyns in Demurrer 276 D Debt 1. IN Debt upon a Bond the Defendant craves Oyer of the Condition and pleads the Statute of Vsury 80 He sets forth the Usurious Contract the Money lent and the Bond in question given for it and that the Money for Forbearance exceeds the rate of 6 l per Cent. 81 The Plaintiff Replies That the Bond was made by a Scrivener in his absence who mistook the Condition and Traverses the Corrupt Agreement The Defendant demurs to the Replication The Plaintiff joyns 82 2. Debt upon a Bond to perform an Award 110 The Defendant craves Oyer of the Condition and pleads that the Arbitrators made no Award but that they named an Umpire who made no Award by Writing or Word of Mouth 111 The Plaintiff replies That true it is that the Arbitrators nor the Umpire by them first Chosen made any Award but refused whereupon the Arbitrators chose another Umpire who mad an Award within the time limitted 112 The Defendant demurs specially and assigns for Cause That it does not appear by the Replication that the Defendant had Notice that the Arbitrators had named the second Umpire or that he had any Authority to make any Umpirage The Plaintiff joyns in Demurrer 113 3. For Rent against an Executrix upon a Lease parol 176 The Declaration sets forth the Demise to the Defendants Testator of the 4th part of two Corn Mills and of one Mault-Mill under the same Roof to hold for one year sic de Anno in annum as long as both parties shall please paying Monthly for the same the Sum of 60 s 4 d ob so long as the said Testator should hold the Premisses and shews that he entred and held it for so long and that the Rent is due and unpaid for so many Months per quod actio accrevit 176 He also sets forth another Demise from year to year so long as both parties shall please at the yearly Rent of 20 l to be paid Quarterly by equal Portions the Tenants Entry the Rent arrear per quod actio accrevit Another Demise at Will laid Entry Rent arrear Actio accrevit 177 Another Demise at Will laid of the 4th part of another Mill Entry Rent arrear Actio accrevit the The Testator in his Life time nor the Executrix post mortem have not paid 178 The Defendant pleads in Abatement That the Tenant died Intestate and that Administration was granted to her and therefore ought to be sued as Administratrix and not as Executrix 178 The Plaintiff replies That the Defendant administred as Executrix before the granting the Administration to her The Defendant demurs to the Replication The Plaintiff joyns 179 4. Debt upon Bond. The Defendant craves Oyer of the Condition which is to perform an Award 219 Pleads That the Arbitrators made no Award The Plaintiff replies and sets forth the Award made in Writing and assigns a Breach in not paying a certain Sum of Money awarded 220 The Defendant demurs The Plaintiff joyns 221 5. Debt upon a Sheriffs Bond 234 The Defendant prays Oyer of the Condition which was to appear in Chancery to answer a Contempt Pleads the Statute of 23 H. 6. That an Attachment issued out of Chancery delivered to the Plaintiff being Sheriff who caused the Defendant to be arrested and after took the said Bond for his Appearance 236 Contra formam Statuti praedicti sic scriptum Obligatorium illud c. vacuum in lege existit The Plaintiff demurs to the Plea The Defendant joyns 237 6. Debt upon Bond Condition'd to perform an Award 239 The Defendant pleads that the Arbitrators made no award The Plaintiff replies and sets forth an Award made ore tenus 240 Notice of the Award and request for the Performance of it
redd ' unius anni mediet ' redd ' unius anni per quem talia terrae vel tenementa sic alienat ' tent ' fuer ' in Manerio praed ' nomine finis pro alienatione and lays a Custom to distrain for the said Alienation Fine and then sets forth an alienation of the said Messuage and Premisses by the said Sir John Sabin to one Walter Tyndall in fee and shews that the said Walter Tyndall made another alienation in fee to one Christopher Yates and so sets forth that there were two Fines due upon the said alienations after the rate aforesaid amounting to 18 l 7 s and 7 d ob and that he as Bayliff of the said Dean and Chapter captionem praed ' bene cognoscit in praed ' loco in quo ut in parcell ' tenement ' praed ' To this the Plaintiff demurred and it was spoken to at the Bar the last Term and likewise this Term The main thing was that the Custom as it was laid was not good for the Alienation Fine is set forth to be due upon the Alienation of any parcel of Lands or Tenements held of the said Mannor to have a year and halfs Rent by which the Lands or Tenements so aliened were held so that if the 20th part of an Acre be aliened a Fine is to be paid and that of the whole Rent for every parcel is held at the time of the alienation by the whole Rent and no apportioning thereof can be but subsequent to the Alienation and this the whole Court held an unreasonable Custom and it is set forth it could not be otherwise understood than that a Fine should be due viz. a year and halfs Rent upon the Alienation of any part of the Lands held by such Rent The Court doubted also whether the Custom was good as to the claiming an Alienation Fine upon an Alienation for Life because by that the tenure of the Lands aliened is not altered for the Reversion is still held as before by the same Tenant Judicium pro Quer ' Colley versus Helyar IN an Action of Debt for 34 l the Plaintiff declared against the Defendant an Attorney of this Court praesente hic in Cur. in propria persona sua upon a Bond of 34 l The Defendant pleads in Bar quoad quinque libras sex solid tres denar of the aforesaid 34 l that the Plaintiff post confectionem Scripti Obligat ' praedict ' scilicet vicesimo c. anno c. ê‘ quoddam Scriptum suum acquietantiae cognovisset se accepisse habuisse de praed Defendente 5 l 6 s and 3 d in part solutionis majoris summae and pleaded a frivolous Plea as to the rest of the Mony to which the Plaintiff demurred And it was argued that the Acquittance under the Plaintiffs Hand and Seal for 5 l 6 s and 3 d part of the Mony due might have been pleaded in bar of the whole and that if the Defendant here had relied upon it it would have barred the Plaintiff of the whole Vide for that matter Hollingwoth and Whetston Sty 212. Allen 65. Beaton and Forrest Note there the payment was since the Action brought and pleaded in abatement where it was said that it could not be so pleaded without an Acquittance Vide Kelw. 20. 162. 3 H. 7. 3 B. receipt of parcel pending the Writ 7 Ed. 4. 15. a. But it seems clear by the Book of Edw. 4. 207. Mo. 886. Speak versus Richards That if part be received and an Acquittance given before the Action it is a Bar only of so much but it seems the Action must be brought for the whole Dickman versus Allen. Cantabr ' ss Case brought against the Defendant for not folding his Sheep upon the Plaintiffs Land according to Custom The Colledge of St. Mary and St. Nicholas seized in Fee jâ—re Collegii ABRAHAMUS ALLEN nuê‘ de Grancester in Com' praedicto Yeom ' attach ' fuit ad respondend ' Roberto Dickman Gen ' de placito transgr ' suê‘ Casum c. Et unde idem Robertus per Robertum Drake Attorn ' suum queritur quare cum Praepositus Scholares Collegii Regalis Beatae Mariae Sancti Nicholai in Cantabr ' in Com' praed ' seisit ' fuissent de uno Capitali Messuagio cum pertinen ' in Grancester in Com' praedicto ac de centum sexaginta acris terrae arrabil ' jacen ' in Communibus Campis de Grancester praedicta cum pertinen ' in dominico suo ut de feodo in jure Collegii sui praedicti iidemque Praepositus Scholares omnes ill quorum statum ipsi habuer ' de in tenementis praed ' cum pertinen ' a tempore cujus contrarii memoria hominum non existit habuer ' habere consuever ' ê“ se Firmariis Tenentibus suis eorundem A Custom for all the Tenants to sold their Landlords Land Tenementorum cum pertinen ' libertatem Faldagii Anglicê Foldage omnium Ovium Ovibus suis ê“priis Ovibus tenen ' occupatorum ê“ tempore existen ' quorundam Messuagiorum Terrarum in Villa de Coton in Com' praed ' qui a tempore cujus contrarii memoria hominum non existit respective usi fuer ' Common of Vicinage intercÌ„oiare causa vicinagii in quibusdam Communibus Campis de Grancester praed ' cum Ovibus suis in super praed ' Messuagiis terris suis in Coton praed ' Levant and Couchant levan ' cuban ' except ' suor ' depascen ' infra Communes Campos territoria de Grancester praedicta a vicesimo quinto die Martii usque primum diem Novembris quolibet anno suê‘ praedictas centum sexaginta acras terras arabil percipiend ' From such a day to such a day faldand ' tanquam ad tenementa praedicta cum pertinenciis pertinen ' praedictisque Praeposito Scholaribus Collegii praed ' de Tenementis praedictis cum pertinen ' The Principal and Scholars demise to the Plaintiff by Indenture in forma praedicta seisit ' existen ' Praepositus Scholares postea scilicet decimo nono die Octobris Anno Domini millesimo sexcentesimo octogesimo primo apud Grancester praedictam quodam Johanne Coppleston Sacrae Theologiae Professor ' adtunc Praeposito Collegii praedicti existen ' ê‘ quandam Indenturam inter ipsos Praepositum Scholares ex una parte quendam Johannem Wittewronge Mil Barronet ' ex altera parte factam cujus alteram partem Sigillo cÌ„oi ipsorum Praepositi Scholarium signat ' idem Robertus Dickman hic in Cur ' profert cujus dat' est eisdem die anno dimiser ' ad firmam tradider ' eidem Johanni Wittewronge Tenementa praedicta cum pertinen ' Habendum habend ' occupand ' praefat ' Johanni Assign ' suis a tempore confectionis Indenturae illius usque plenum finem terminum viginti
c. Quibus lectis auditis idem Querens dicit quod cognitio praed ' in forma praed ' fact ' materia in eadem content ' ac factum indentat ' praed ' in forma praed ' fact ' minus sufficien ' in lege existunt c. and the Defendant joyned in Demurrer It was argued for the Plaintiff that there is no sufficient Grant by this Indenture for it is said to be made between Nicholas of the one part and Elizabeth and Nicholas Cossen junior of the other part and then recited the Surrender of a former Grant after which came the words hath Given and Granted and by these Presents doth Give and Grant c. and no Grantor names but if it should be taken for a Grant from Nicholas Cossen 't is a Grant to Elizabeth an her Heirs and the habend ' cannot alter the Premisses in the limitation of the Estate in the Grant of a Rent and the Defendants in their Plea set forth that the said Elizabeth was seised of the said Rent for her Life ut de libero Tenemento so there is a material variance between the Indenture and the Plea The Court were of Opinion as to the first matter that it was a good Grant the Indenture being between Nicholas Cossen of the one part and Elizabeth of the other part and then after a recital saith hath Given and Granted to Elizabeth c. That must be taken that Nicholas Cossen hath Given and Granted and that the Conisans setting her forth to be seised for Life whereas there passed an Estate in Fee was a material variance The Cheif Justice Pollexfen seemed to incline that it was a Rent-charge for Life for the power of Distress was given to her only for Life and a Rent-seck in Fee and that it was as a Grant of two several Rents and then the Pleading was good But the other Justices held it was one entire Rent and that she had it with a Priviledge of Distress during her Life only but leave was given to amend the Conisans upon payment of Costs Dod versus Dawson SCire Facias upon a Recognizance of Bail in this Court upon condition That if Iudgement should be had against the Principal in an Action of Debt for 2000 l in this Court that he should pay the Debt and Damages recovered or render his Body in Execution to the Prison of the Fleet and sets forth that he recovered the said Debt of 2000 l and 12 l pro damnis Termino Pschae 4 Jacobi Secundi nuper Regis and that the Defendant did not pay the said Mony nor render himself in Execution c. The Defendants plead to this Scire fac ' that the Mony praetextu cognitionis praed ' in praed ' brevi de Scire fac ' mentionat ' de Terris Catallis c. praed ' Defendentis fieri ad usum praed ' Timothei Dod levari non debet quia dicunt quod Narratio super qua Judicium praed ' in praed ' Brevi de Scire fac ' mentionat ' obtent ' fuit versus ipsum Willielmum Dawson seu aliqua alia narratio in placito debiti non fuit exhibit ' in Curia hic in Termino Paschae Anno Regni dicti nuper Regis primo quo Termino recognitio praed ' facta fuit nec ad aliquod tempus infra duos terminos post praed ' Terminum Paschae proxime sequen ' unde pro defectu Narr ' per praefatum Timotheum Dod versus praefat ' Willielmum Dawson in eadem Cur ' ante finem praed ' duorum terminorum praed ' summa duarum mille librarum per cursum legis de Terris Catallis praed ' Defend ' vel eorum alicujus fieri levari non debent hoc parat ' sunt verificare unde pet ' Judicium c. To this the Plaintiff demurs and Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff for altho' by course of the Court if the Defendant lie in Prison two whole Terms without any Declaration put in he may get a Rule to be discharged yet if a Declaration be afterwards delivered and Iudgment thereupon 't is a good Iudgment and the Bail will be liable in such case Rogers versus Bradly IN a Replevin for taking of a Cow apud Liscard in Cornwall in a certain place there called the Underway The Defendant made Conusans as Bayliff to William Trewman and Thomas Coll and sets forth that Joseph Mark diu ante c. was seised in Fee of a Close called Underway parcel of the Mannor of Liscard of which the place where was and is parcel according to the Custom of the said Mannor and being so seised the 9th day of January Anno Domini 1663. demised to Sampson Rogers the Premisses for 99 years from the Date of the Indenture if A. B. c. should so long live tendring 10 l yearly Rent by virtue whereof the said Rogers entred and the said Joseph Mark being seised of the Revertion in Fee secundum consuetudinem Manerii praed ' upon the first day of February Anno 1663. supradict ' at a Court of the said Mannor then held did surrender in Manus Domini Caroli Secundi nuper Regis Angliae c. adtunc Domini Manerii praed ' secundum consuetudinem Manerii praedict ' the aforesaid Revertion and Rent to the use of the said Trewman and Coll and their Heirs to which said T. and C. at the Court praed ' Dominus Rex per quendam Thomam Moulton adtunc Seneschal ' suum Manerii praed ' did grant the said Revertion and Rent to hold to them and their Heirs according to the Custom of the said Mannor and by virtue thereof the said T. and C. became seised of the said Revertion and Rent in their Demesn as of Fee according to the Custom of the said Mannor and for five years Rent ending at Michaelmass c. bene cognoscunt captionem c. To this the Plaintiff replied and the matter in the Replication was frivolous and Demurrer thereupon But the Court gave Iudgment for the Plaintiff because the Conusans was insufficient for the Lands whereupon the Distress was taken being Freehold for so they must be taken to be tho' it is shewn that Mark was seised according to the Mannor because it is not said at the Will of the Lord could not be conveyed by Surrender in Court and an admittance without an Especial Custom to pass them in that Form and 't is not enough to say that he surrendred them secundum consuetudinem Manerii but the Custom should have been fully set forth viz. quod infra Manerium praed ' de tempore c. talis habebatur consuetudo c. but here the Custom is by Implication 1 Cro. 185 Vaughan 253. 2 Leon. 29. Lade versus Baker and Marsh Kanc ' ss THOMAS BAKER Nicholaus Marsh sum̄ fuer ' ad respondend ' Philippo Lade Gen ' de placito quare ceper ' averia
the putting them to Sue severally as they must do at Law But here there is but part of them that Sue and then they appear to be Officers in the Ship that Sue and so not to have this Priviledge of the Common Seamen to Sue for it was alledged that this practice had been obtained but of late and in favour to them and here it appears that the Contract for the Wages was joynt with the Owners and they have sued but two of them and so they shall be charged with the whole But the Court denied the Prohibition for they have been ever alowed to proceed for Marriners Wages and tho' the Plaintiffs have an employment in the Ship as Purfer Boatswain or the like they are Marriners as well as others and may sue in the Admiral Court for their Wages and they having Iurisdiction shall proceed in their own way tho' different from our Law as to the joyning of all the Plaintiffs or Defendants and if the Proceeding be not according to their Law the Remedy lies there Note It was said by one of the Admiralty that tho' the Suit be against some of the Owners the course there is not to charge them with the whole but according to their proportionable parts Adams versus Cross IN a Replevin against Cross and two others for taking of divers Goods at Ware in quodam loco vocat ' a Messuage there The Defendants made Conusance as Bayliffs of Jane Cross and they say that before the Caption she was seised in her Demesn as a Fee at the Will of the Lord of the Mannor according to the Custom of the Mannor of and in the aforesaid Messuage which said Messuage is and time out of mind hath been parcel of the said Mannor and demised and demisable by Copy of Court Roll c. and being so seised 24 June 1687. she demised the said Messuage to the said Adams from thenceforth at Will reserving for so long time as the said Adams should hold it the yearly Rent of 8 l by equal Quarterly payments By virtue of which Demise the said Adams entred and was and yet is possessed and for 14 l being a Year and three Quarters Rent ending at the Feast of the Nativity of St. John Baptist last past they as Bayliffs to the said Jane distrained the said Goods being in the House c. To this Avowry the Plaintiff pleaded an insufficient and frivolous Bar and now took Exceptions to the Avowry for that the said Jane Cross is therein set forth to have been seised in Fee of the said Messuage at the Will of the Lord according to the Custom of the Mannor and sheweth no admission from the Lord whereas a Copyholder cannot plead his Estate without setting forth an Admission or Grant from the Lord 4 Co. 22. b. But the Court resolved in this Case there need not be shewn any Admittance for the Title did not come in question If one pleads a particular Estate for life or years generally the commencement of it is to be shewn but if a Lessee for years Let for a lesser Term reserving a Rent in an Action of Debt for the Rent he may set forth that at the time of the Lease he was possessed of the Land ê“ termino diversorum annorum adtunc adhuc ventur ' and being so possessed demised to the Defendant c. without shewing the beginning of his Term and how derived for 't is but an inducement to the Action And Judgment was given for the Avowant Clarke versus Tucket IN an Action of Trespass for entring of his House and taking of four Pewter Dishes of the Plaintiffs The Defendant pleaded the Letters Patents of Edward the 4th whereby the Company of Taylors in the City of Exeter were Incorporated and by the said Letters Patents they were to keep a Feast every year upon the Feast-day of St. John the Baptist in some place of the City belonging to them and there to make Orders and By-Laws c. And that the said Corporation at a Meeting held the 20th of March in the 21st year of the Reign of the late King Charles the Second did make an Ordinance or By-Law That if any person being Master or one of the Chief Wardens of the Corporation aforesaid at any of their Assemblies should reproach or revile the Master or any of his Brethren or any of the Common Council of the Corporation he should forfeit 6 s and 8 d And if any other person or persons of the said Bodies should revile or use any unhandsom Speech of the Master Wardens or any of the said Council he should forfeit 3 s and 4 d the said Fines to be levied by Distress upon a Warrant under the Corporation Seal and by sale of the Offenders Goods after Four days Notice given to the Fine so set forth and an Allowance of the By-Law by the Justices of Assize according to the Statute of Henry the 7th And further saith That the Plaintiff being a Member of the said Corporation and having Notice of the said By-Law did at an Assembly of the said Master and Wardens in the Common Hall say of the said Master and Wardens in the said Corporation these words viz. The Masters ipsos Magistrum Custod ' innuendo are all a Company of Pickpocket Rogues and divers other very scurrilous and reproachful Words were set forth to have been there spoken of the said Master and Wardens by the Plaintiff whereby the Plaintiff forfeited 3 s and 4 d by the said By-Law which was demanded of him and by him neglected to be paid by the space of six Days Whereupon the said Master made his Warrant directed to the Defendant commanding him to Levy the said 3 s and 4 d by distress and sale of the Goods of the Plaintiff And the Defendant by virtue of the said Warrant did enter into the Plaintiffs House being then open and took the Goods in the Declaration mentioned Nomine districtionis prout ei bene licuit And to this Plea the Plaintiff demurred and Judgment was given for the Plaintiff For a Corporation cannot make a By-Law to have a Forfeiture levied by the sale of Goods 8 Co. 127. nor for Forfeiture of Goods And here tho' the Defendant only Distrained neither is the Defendant charged with selling the Goods in the Declaration yet the By-Law being void as to the selling is void in toto and no Justification can be upon it It was also said at the Bar That the Distress was excessive to distrain so many Dishes for 3 s and 4 d Indeed a man cannot sever a Distress and therefore in some cases a Distress of great value as a Cart and Horses may be taken for a small matter because not severable but here he might have taken some of the Dishes But the Court did not regard that Exception because it did not appear of what value the Dishes were Again it was said That they ought to have made the By-Law upon St. John Baptists Day To
Body of such first Son and in like manner to the second third Son c. and for want of Issue of the said Simon Leach the remainder to Sir Simon Leach and the Heirs Males of his Body and for default of such Issue to the right Heirs of Nicholas the Testator for ever and that the said Nicholas died seised of the Premisses and after his decease the said Simon Leach entred and became seised for Life with Remainders over as aforesaid and being so seised made a Deed hearing date the 23th of August in the 25th year of the Reign of the said King Charles sealed and delivered to the use of the said Sir Simon Leach but he was not present which Deed the Verdict sets forth in haec verba and by if he granted and surrendred to the said Sir Simon Leach his Heirs and Assigns the said Mannor and Premisses the Reversion and Reversions Remainder and Remainders of the same To have and to hold the same to the said Sir Simon Leach and his Heirs to the use of him and his Heirs and they find that the said Charles Leach Lessor of the Plaintiff the first Son of the said Sir Simon Leach was born the first of November in the 25th year of the Reign of the said King Charles and not before and that Simon Leach from the time of his Sealing the Deed to the 25th of May in the 30th year of the said King Charles continued possessed of the Premisses and that then and not before Sir Simon Leach accepted and agreed to the said Surrender and entred into the Premisses and that afterwards the said Simon Leach Brother of the said Nicholas the Testator died and the said Charles Leach his Son after his decease entred into the Premisses and demised them to the Plaintiff who by virtue thereof entred and became possessed and so continued till the said Simon Leach and the other Defendants by his Command ejected him But whether upon the whole Matter the said Simon Leach did surrender the said Mannor and Premisses to the said Sir Simon Leach before the said Charles Leach was born and if he did not surrender before the birth of the said Charles Leach then they find the Defendants Guilty and if he did surrender them before the birth then they find for the Defendants And Pollexfen Chief Justice Powell and Rokeby were of Opinion that here was no Surrender till such time as Sir Simon Leach had notice of the Deed of Surrender and agreed to it and so the Remainder was vested in Charles the Son and it was not defeated by the Agreement of Sir Simon after his birth to the Surrender But Ventris differed and his Argument was as followeth Whom this Record the Case is no more than this Simon Leach Tenant for Life Remainder to his first Son Remainder in Call to Sir Simon Leach Simon Leach before the birth of that Son by Deed sealed and delivered to the use of Sir Simon but in his Absence and without his Notice surrenders his Estate to Sir Simon and continues the possession until after the birth of his Son and then Sir Simon Leach agrees to the Surrender Whether this Surrender shall be taken as a good and effectual Surrender before the Son born There are two Points which have been spoken to in this Case at the Bar. First Whether by the Sealing of the Deed of Surrender the Estate immediately passed to Sir Simon Leach for then the Contingent Remainder could not best in the after-born Son there being no Estate left in Simon Leach his Father to support it Secondly Whether after the assent of Sir Simon Leach tho' it where given after the birth of the Son doth not so relate as to make it a Surrender from the Sealing of the Deed and thereby defeat the Remainder which before such Assent was vested in the Son I think these Points include all that is material in the Case and I shall speak to the Second Point because I would rid it out of the Case For as to that Point I conceive that if it be admitted that the Estate for Life continued in Simon Leach till the Assent of Sir Simon that the Remainder being vested in Charles the second Son before such Assent there can be no Relation that shall divest it I do not go upon the General Rule That Relations shall not do wrong to Strangers 'T is true Relations are fictions in Law which are always accompanied with Equity But 't is as true that there is sometimes loss and damage to Third Persons consequent upon them but then 't is what the Law calls Damnum absque injuria which is a known and stated difference in the Law as my Brother Pemberton urged it But I think there needs nothing of that to be considerrd in this Point But the Reason which I go upon is That the Relation here let it be never so strong cannot hurt or disturb the Remainder in Charles Leach in this Case for that the Remainder is in him by a Title antecedent and paramount to the Deed of Surrender to which the Assent of Sir Simon Leach relates so that it plainly over-reaches the Relation If an Estate in Remainder or otherwise ariseth to one upon a Contingency or a Power reserved upon a Fine or Feoffment to Vses when the Estate is once raised or vested it relates to the Fine or Feoffment as if it were immediately limited thereupon 1 Co. 133 156. So this Remainder when vested in Charles he is in immediately by the Will and out of danger of his Remainder being divested by any act done since as the Surrender is I will put one Case I think full to this Matter and so dismiss this Point It cannot be denied but that there is as strong a Relation upon a disagreement to an Estate as upon an agreement where the Estate was Conveyed without the Notice of him that afterwards agrees of disagrees if the Husband discontinues the Wives Estate and then the Discontinuee conveys the Estate back to the Wife in the absence of the Husband who as soon as he knows of it disagrees to the Estate this shall not take away the Remitter which the Law wrought upon the first taking the Estate from the Discontinuee And so is Litt. cap. Remitter Jones 78. Co. 11 Inst 356. b. The true Reason is because she is in of a Title paramount to the Conveyance to which the Disagreement relates tho' that indeed was the foundation of the Remitter which by the Disagreement might seem to be avoided This therefore I take to be a stronger Case than that at the Bar So that if there were no Surrender before the birth of Charles the Son there can be none after by any Construction of Law for that would be in avoidance of an Estate settled by a Title antecedent to such Surrender whereas Relations are to avoid Mesn Acts and I believe there can be no Case put upon Relations that go any further and it would be
part yet notwithstanding the Estate should continue in him The words of my Lord Coke 1 Inst 217. a are That it cannot stand with any Reason that a Freehold should remain in a man against his own Livery when there is a person able to take it There needs only a Capacity to take his Will to take is intended Why should it not seem as unreasonable that the Estate should remain in Simon Leach against his own Deed of Surrender For in case of a Surrender a Deed and sometimes Words without a Deed are as effectual as a Livery in case of a Feoffment Thirdly The third and principal Reason as I take it why the Law will not suffer the Operation of a Conveyance to be in suspence and to expect the Agreement of the party to whom 't was made is to prevent the Vncertainty of the Freehold This I take to be the great Reason why a Freehold cannot be granted in futuro because that it would be very hard and inconvenient that a man should be driven to bring his Praecipe or Real Action first against the Grantor and after he had proceeded in it a considerable time it should abate by the transferring the Freehold to a Stranger by reason of his Agrement to some Conveyance made before the Writ brought for otherwise there is nothing in the nature of the thing against Conveying a Freehold in futuro for a Rent de novo may be so granted because that being newly Created there can be no precedent Right to bring any Real Action for it Palmer 29 30. Now in this Case suppose a Praecipe had been brought against Simon Leach this should have proceeded and he could not have pleaded in Abatement till Sir Simon Leach ha assented and after a long progress in the Suit he might have pleaded that Sir Simon Leach assented puis darrein continuance and defeated all So that the same Inconvenience as to the bringing of Real Actions holds in Surrenders as in other Conveyances And to shew that it is not a slight matter but what the Law much considers and is very careful to have the Freehold fixed and will never suffer it to be in abeyance or under such uncertainty as a Stranger that demands Right should not know where to fix his Action A multitude of Cases might be cited but I will cite only a Case put 1 H. 6. 2. a. because it seems something of a singular nature Lord and Villain Mortgagor and Mortgagee may be both made Tenants But it will be said here that if a Praecipe had been brought against Sir Simon Leach might not he have pleaded his Disagreement and so abated the Writ of Nontenure 'T is true but that Inconvenience had been no more than in all other Cases a Plea of Nontenure and it must have abated immediately for he could not have abated it by any dissent after he had answered to the Writ Whereas I have shewn it in the other Case it may be after a long progress in the Suit Again It 's very improbable that he should dissent whereas on the other side an Assent is the likeliest thing in the world so the mischief to the Demandant is not near so great nor the hundredth part so probable Now I come to consider those Inconveniences that have been urged that would ensue if a Surrender should work immediately It has been said That a Tenant for Life might make such Deed of Surrender and continue in possession and suffer a Recovery and this might destroy a great many Recoveries and overthrow Marriage Settlements and defeat Charges and Securities upon his Estate after such Deed of Surrender These and a great many more such like Mischiefs may be instanced in Surrenders but they hold no less in any other Conveyance whereby a man may as has been shewed before divest himself of the Estate and yet continue the Possession and in this Case the Assent of the Surrendree tho' he doth not enter would as it is agreed of all hands vest the Estate in him Hutton 95. Br. tit Surrender 50. tho' he cannot have Trespass before Entry and that Assent might be kept as private and let in all the Mischiefs before mentioned as if no such Assent were necessary And this I think sufficient to Answer to the Inconveniences objected on that side Now let us see what Inconveniences and odd Consequences would follow in case a Surrender could not operate till the express Assent of the Surrendree then no Surrender could be to an Infant at least when under the age of Discretion for if it be a necessary Circumstance it cannot be dispensed with no more than Livery or Attornment So tho' an Infant of a year Old is capable to take an Estate because for his benefit he could not take a particular Estate upon which he had a Reversion immediately expectant because it must enure by Surrender If there be Joyntenants in Reversion a Surrender to one of them enures to both 1 Inst 192 214. a. so there as to one Moiety it operates without Assent or Notice Suppose Tenant for Life should make Livery upon a Grant of his Estate to him in Reversion and two others and the Livery is made to the other two in the absence and without the Notice of him in Reversion should the Livery not work immediately for a Third part of the Estate And if it doth it must enure as a Surrender for a Third part So is Bro. tit Surrender and 3 Co. 76. If Tenant for Life should by Lease and Release convey the Lands held by him for Life together with other Lands to him in Reversion who knows nothing of the Sealing of the Deed should this pass the other Lands presently and the Lands held for Life not till after an express Assent because as to those Lands it must work as a Surrender Plainly an express Assent is not necessary For if the Grantee enters this is sufficient I come in the last place to Answer those Arguments that have been made from the manner of putting the Case of Surrenders in the Book and the Form of pleading Surrenders Co. 1 Inst 337. b. First A Surrender is a yielding up of the Estate which drowns by mutual Agreement between them Tenant for Life by Agreement of him in Reversion surrenders to him he hath a Freehold before he enters And so Perkins in putting the Case of a Surrender mentions an Agreement and divers other Books have been cited to the same purpose To all which I Answer No doubt but an Agreement is necessary But the Question is Whether an Agreement is not intended where a Deed of Surrender is made in the absence of him in the Reversion whether the Law shall not suppose an Assent till a Disagreement appears Indeed if he were present ' he must agree or disagree immediately and so 't is in all other Conveyances The Cases put in Perkins Sect. 607 608 609. are all of Surrenders made to the Lessor in person for thus he puts
of the Crown so 11. and so it was held in the Case of the Earl of Essex in Queen Elizabeths Time and in the Lord Cobham's Case in the Reign of King James the First And the Chief Justice cited the Statute made 29 H. 6. cap. 1. upon the Rebellion of Jack Cade which Act sets forth that John Cade naming himself John Mortimer falsly and traiterously imagined the Death of the King and the destruction and subversion of this Realm in gathering together and levying of a great Number of the King's People and exciting them to Rise against the King c. against the Royal Crown and Dignity of the King was an Overt act of imagining the Death of the King and made and levied War falsly and trayterously against the King and his Highness c. So that it appears by that Act that it was the Iudgment of the Parliament That gathering Men together and exciting them to Rise against the King was an Overt Act of Imagining the Death of the King Vide Stamford's Pleas of the Crown fo 180. And according to this Opinion Judgment was given against Harding in the following Sessions and he was Executed thereupon NOta At an Adjourned Sessions held the 19th of May 2 Willielmi Mariae it appeared that one of the Kings Witnesses which was to be produced in an Indictment for Treason had been the day before Challenged to Fight by a Gentleman that it was said was a Member of the House of Commons he was by the Court bound in a Recognizance of 500 l to keep the Peace And because it appeared the Witness had accepted the Challenge he was bound in the like Sum. NOta Vpon an Appeal to the House of Lords Anno 2 Willielmi Mariae the sole Question was Whether upon the Statute of Distributions 22 23 Car. 2. the half Blood should have an equal share with the whole Blood of the Personal Estate And by the Advice of the two Chief Justices and some other of the Judges the Decree of the Lords was That the Half Blood should have an Equal share Samon versus Jones IN an Ejectment brought in the Court of Exchequer in the year of the Reign of the late King James the Second The Case upon a Special Verdict was to this effect William Lewis seised of a Reversion in Fee expectant upon an Estate for Life did by Deed Poll in Consideration of Natural love and affection which he had to his Wife and Robert Lewis his Son and Heir apparent begotten on the Body of his said Wife and to Ellen his Daughter give grant and confirm unto the said Robert Lewis the Son all those Lands c. the Reversion and Reversions Remainder and Remainders thereof To have and to hold to his Son and his Heirs to the Vses following viz. to the use of himself for Life and then mentioned several other Vses not necessary to be here mentioned as not material to the Point in question and then to the use of the Wife for Life and after to the use of Robert and the Heirs of his Body and for want of such Issue to the use of Ellen the Daughter and the Heirs of her Body c. William Lewis and his Wife died Robert the Son devised the Estate to the Lessor of the Plaintiff and died without Issue Ellen was in possession and claimed the Lands by this Deed in which thâ—re was a Warranty but no Execution of the said Deed further than the Sealing and Delivery was had either by Enrolment Attornment or otherwise So that the sole Question was Whether this Deed should operate as a Covenant to stand seised or be void And it was Adjudged to amount to a Covenant to stand seised in the Court of the Exchequer And upon a Writ of Error brought upon the Statute of Ed. 3. before the Commissioners of the Great Seal and others empowered by that Act to sit upon Writs of Error of Judgments given in the Court of Exchequer the said Judgment was Reversed by the Opinion of Holt Chief Justice of the Kings Bench and Pollexfen Chief Justice of the Common-Pleas And upon a Writ of Error before the Lords in Parliament brought upon the said last Judgment it was Argued for the Plaintiff in the VVrit of Error That this should enure as a Covenant to stand seised to the use of the Wife Son c. It appears by Bedell's Case in the 7 Co. and Foxe's Case in the 8 Co. that the words proper to a Conveyance are not necessary but ut res magis valeat a Conveyance may work as a Bargain and Sale tho' the words be not used so as a Covenant to stand seised tho' the word Covenant is not in the Deed and and Poplewell's Case were cited in 2 Roll. Abr. 786 787. A Feme in Consideration of a Marriage intended to be had between her and J. S. did give grant and confirm Lands to J.S. and his Heirs with a Clause of VVarranty in the Deed which was also Enrolled but no Livery was made It was Resolved to operate as a Covenant to stand seised Vide Osborn and Churchman's Case in the 2 Cro. 127. which seems contrary to that Case but the chiefest Case relied upon was that of Crossing and Scudamore Mod. Rep. 175. where a man by Indenture bargained sold enfeoffed and confirmed certain Lands to his Daughter and her Heirs and no Consideration of Natural Love or Money exprest This was Resolved 22 Car. 2. in B.R. to operate as a Covenant to stand seised and upon a Writ of Error in the Exchequer Chamber the Judgment was affirmed It was said on the other side for the Defendant That the Case at Bar differed from the Cases cited for here the Intention of the Deed is to transfer the Estate to the Son and that the Vses should arise out of such Estate so transferred In the Cases cited no Vses are limited upon the Estate purported or intended to be Conveyed but only an Intention appearing to convey an Estate to the Daughter in Crossing's Case and to the intended Husband in Poplewell's Case and seeing for want of due Execution in those Cases the Estate could not pass at Law it shall pass by raising of an Vse But the Case at Bar is much the same with the Case of Hore and Dix in Siderfin the 1st Part. 25. where one by Indenture between him and his Son of the one part and two Strangers of the other part in Consideration of Natural love did give grant and enfeoff the two Strangers to the use of himself for Life Remainder to the Son in Tail c. and no other Execution was three than the Sealing and Delivery of the Deed this was Resolved not to raise an Vse for the Vse was limited to rise out of the Seisin of the Strangers who took no Estate Vide Pitfield and Pierce's Case 15 Car. 1. Marche's Rep. 50. One gave granted and confirmed Lands to his Son after his Death this Deed had been
much less tell that Satisfaction will ever be acknowledged whereas other particular Estates have a known and determinate Limitation In the other Case it could not be computed within what compass of time a possession should be quieted and so the Statute of Fines in a great measure would be defeated of its end But 3ly and principally It should be in the power of the party that has the Extent in Reversion to protract the time as long as he pleased for till he thinks fit to bring the Scire facias ad computandum he nor no one else can say the Statute is satisfied For that must appear by an account taken in the Scire facias nor none can compel the acknowledging of Satisfaction and so it should be at the pleasure of Strangers to him that is in possession by a Fine to make his Estate liable to a future Claim as long as they pleased and sure this would render the Statute of Fines of little or no effect And this makes an Estate by Extent to differ wholly from an Estate for Life or Years or such other like particular Estate which will end of it self and cannot be protracted longer than the proper limitation of the act of any one whatsoever I will conclude with an Answer to an Objection that has been much insisted upon by those that Argued for the Defendant That an Extent begins by Record and cannot end but by Record viz. either by an account taken upon a Scire facias or Satisfaction acknowledged upon the Record of the Statute or at least he that is in Reversion is bound to take notice of any other determination of the Extent To which I Answer It begins by Record but it may end without Matter of Record for a Release by the Conusee after the Extent determines it to all intents and purposes and undoubtedly in such case he which hath a puisne Statute may enter an Extent upon an Elegit begins by Record yet when satisfied by perception of Profits he in Reversion may enter So that the Scire facias as appears by our Books is to be brought upon another Reason and not because the Extent cannot end but by Record but 't is because of the incertainty of the Expences that must be satisfied And why should not they which have had the right of Burroughs's Extent be bound to take notice of the Fines that have been levied as much as the acknowledging of Satisfaction And a Fine is much more a publick Record than the other especially since the Statute of the 4th of H. 7. has provided for the making of Proclamations upon it Some Remarkable and Curious CASES IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY Termino Sanctae Trinitatis Anno 22 Car. II. In Cancellaria Marsh versus Lee. A Bill in Chancery was brought by Marsh and an Answer put in thereto The Case was thus One English being seised of the Mannor of Wicksall and of the Mannor of Morfield in 1649. Mortgages part of the Mannor of Wicksall to Burrell for 1000 l Afterwards in 1655. he acknowledges a Statute to Burrell of 800 l for the payment of 400 l Afterwards in 1662. English Mortgages both these Mannors to Mrs. Duppa for 7000 l Afterwards in 1665. English Mortgages the Mannor of Wicksall to Lee for 2000 l Lee having no notice of the former Mortgages But afterwards Lee coming to have notice of the Mortgage to Duppa purchases in the two Incumbrances to Burrel Viz. the Mortgage of part of the Mannor of Wicksall and the Statute And now Marsh Executor of Duppa sues Lee who pleads this whole Matter My Lord Keeper assisted with Hale Chief Baron and Justice Rainsford held That Lee might make use of these Incumbrances to protect his own Mortgage For they said that he had both Law and Equity for him First He had Law for that he had a precedent Mortgage in 164â— which indeed was but upon part and also the Statute in 1655. so that while these remained in force Marsh could not come in Next He had Equity for he having a subsequent Mortgage yet it being without Notice he ought to be relieved in this Court. And therefore my Lord Chief Baron put the Case as if the first Mortgage had been of the Mannor of W. to Burrel and afterwards it had been mortgaged to Duppa and afterwards to Lee not having notice if afterwards Lee bought in Burrel's Mortgage he shall hold the Estate against Duppa until he be satisfied for both the Money which he paid Burrel and also his own Money lent upon the last Mortgage And for that he said that it had been so Adjudged in Camera Scaccarij in the Court of Equity since the King came in in one Shelley's Case Next he put the Case of the Statute which English entred in to Burrel in 1655. and was afterwards bought by Lee from Burrel He held that Duppa shall not bring Lee to any Account upon this Statute here in Equity any otherwise than he may do at Common Law Nota It was agreed that the Lands were extended upon the Statute at the third part of the true value Now at Common Law the Conusor or he that claims under him must bring a Scire facias ad computand ' as in the 4 Co. 69. b. But then the Conusee shall not account according to the true value but according to the extended value and also for the whole Statute And if the Conusee is satisfied by the extended value the Conusor shall recover or if the Conusor will pay down the rest of the Money which is behind with Damages he shall also recover But if the Conusor will sue the Conusee in a Court of Equity then he shall bring him to Account for what he hath received of the Profits above the extended value Now then our Case here is somewhat more for Lee has also Equity on his Side and therefore Duppa shall not bring him to Account for what he has received above the extended value unless he has also received enough to satisfie his own Mortgage of 2000 l as well as the Statute and therefore if Marsh will take off this Statute by a Suit in this Court he must be content that Lee doth account upon the extended value for the whole 800 l and Damages Secondly They held that whereas part of the Mannor of W. was mortgaged to Burrel but that now the whole Mannor was mortgaged to Lee that yet the first Mortgage should not extend to protect more than that part of the Mannor which was first mortgaged to Burrell And my Lord Chief Baron Hale put the Case thus If a man is seised of 60 Acres and mortgages 20 to A. and then mortgages the whole to B. and then mortgages the whole to C. and afterwards C. purchases in the first Mortgage that shall not protect more than the 20 Acres but it shall protect those 20 Acres so as B. shall never recover that until he pay C. all the Money upon the first and last Mortgage
may be sold Noell versus Robinson THe Plaintiffs Father being seised in Fee of a Foreign Plantation devised it to the Plaintiff and made the Defendant Executor The Executor let it for years reserving Rent in Trust for the Plaintiff who now Exhibited his Bill to have his Rent The Defendant Confessed the Devise of the Testator and the Lease made by himself but said That great Losses had fallen upon the Testator's Estate and that he paid and secured which is payment in Law for the Debts of the Testator to â— great value and that he hoped he should be permitted to reimburse himself by the receipt of this Rent notwithstanding the mentioning of the Trust as aforesaid The Cause came to Hearing and the Court Decreed for the Plaintiff For altho' a Legatee shall refund against Creditors if there be not Assets and against Legatees all which are to have these proportion where the Assets fall short yet the Executor himself after his Assent shall never bring the Legacy back But if he had been sued and paid it by the Decree of this Court the Legatee must have refunded as if a Debtor to a Bankrupt pays him voluntarily he must pay him over again Otherwise of payment by Compulsion of Law Note My Lord Chancellor said That if they give Sentence for a Legacy in the Ecclesiastical Court a Prohibition lies unless they take Security to Refund Note also in this Case that tho' it be an Inheritance yet being in a Foreign Country 't is looked upon as a Chattel to pay Debts and a Testamentary thing It was Objected That this could not be taken for an Assent for if so how could the Executor let it But the Court said that it did tantamount to an Assent and being a lawful Act a little matter will be taken for an Assent Anonymus A Bill was Exhibited by the Assignees of Commissioners of Bankrupts to have an Account against the Defendant of the Bankrupts Estate The Defendant pleaded that he was but Servant to the Bankrupt and had given an account of all to his Master and likewise had been Examined before the Commissioners upon the whole Matter Vpon Hearing his Plea my Lord Chancellor Over-ruled it and Ordered that he should Answer Anonymus IF a man makes a Lease or devise an Estate for Years he being seised of an Estate of an Inheritance for payment of Debts if the Profits of the Lands surmount the Debt all that remains shall go to the Heir tho' not so exprest and albeit it be in the case of an Executor Barney versus Tyson THe Case was thus The Plaintiff in the Life of his Father being about 26 years of Age and having occasion for Money prevails with the Defendant to let him have in Wares to the value of 400 l and gives him Bond for 800 l to be paid if he survived his Father at which time an Estate would befall him of 5000 l per Annum and he having survived his Father he preferred his Bill against the Defendant to compel him to take his Principal Money and Interest And it was proved in the Case that the Defendant was Informed at the time of this bargain that the Father was ill and not like to live and he did live but a year and half after and that one Stisted a man very Infamous was employed in the transaction of this Bargain And the Plaintiff obtained a Decree in the time of the Lord Chancellor Fynch And now upon a Petition to the Lord Keeper North the Defendant obtained a Re-hearing And in maintenance of the Decree it was alledged that the hazard which was run was very little and such Bargains with Heirs were much to be discountenanced The Lord Keeper affirmed the Decree but said that he would not have it used as a President for this Court to set aside mens Bargains But this Case having received a Determination and the Defendant having accepted his Principal Money and Interest thereupon and there being only a slight Omission in the Enrolment of the Decree which if it had been done had prevented a Re-hearing and the Defendant having delayed his Application to him by Petition he would not now set the Decree aside Termino Paschae Anno 35 Car. II. In Cancellaria Hodges versus Waddington THe Case was thus An Executor wasted the Testator's Estate and made his Will wherein he devised divers of his own Goods and made his Son Executor Afterwards a Suit was commenced against the Son to bring him to an Account for the Estate of the first Testator which was wasted and pending that Suit the Son after the Bill brought against him by the Legatee of his own Goods delivered them to the Legatee and assented to the Legacy After which upon the Account against the Son it appeared that the first Executor had wasted the Goods of the first Testator to such a value And then the party at whose Suit the said Account was and who was to have the benefit thereof together with the Son and Executor of the first Executor preferred a Bill against the Legatee of the Goods to make him Refund and obtained no Relief especially for that he had made the Executor Plaintiff who should not be admitted to undo his own Assent But liberty being given to bring a New Bill against the Legatee and the said Executor the Cause came to Hearing and it was Decreed That the Legatee should Refund So that one Legatee that is paid shall not only Refund against another but a Legatee shall Refund against a Creditor of the Testator that can charge an Executor only in Equity viz. Upon a wasting by the first Executor But if an Executor pays a Debt upon a Simple Contract there shall be no Refunding to a Creditor of an higher Nature Note also The Principal Case went upon the Insolvency of the Executor Anonymus A Bill was brought setting forth a Deed of Settlement of Lands in Trust and to compel the Defendant who was a Trustee therein nominated to Execute an Estate The Defendant by Answer says That he believed that there was such a Deed as in the said Bill is set forth c. And upon the Hearing they would have read a Deed for the Plaintiff tho' not proved but upon a Commission taken out only against another Defendant to the Bill supposing it to be Confessed by the Answer But the Court would not permit the Reading of it for the Confessing goes no further than what is set forth in the Bill and will not warrant the Reading of a Deed produced altho' it hath such Clauses in it Anonymus A Bill was preferred against one to discover his Title that A.B. might be let in to have Execution of a Judgment The Defendant pleaded That he was a purchaser for a valuable Consideration but did not set forth That he had no Notice of the Judgment And it was Over-ruled for 't is a fatal Fault in the Plea Bird versus Blosse THe Case was thus One wrote a Letter signifying
Covenant there was therein to exclude from Redemption such Covenant would not be regarded in this Court and that the Person to whom the Conveyance was made might have had a Bill in the life time of him that Conveyed to have a time set for the payment of the Mony or otherwise to be foreclosed But my Lord Keeper dismissed the Bill For he said in a common Mortgage such Covenant to restrain Redemption should not be regarded but this was made with an Intention of a Settlement of his Estate besides the Consideration of the Mony paid And he denied that he could have been by the Decree of this Court limited to any time for payment of the Mony for this Court cannot shorten the time that is given by express Covenant and Agreement of the parties but when that time is past then the Practice is to foreclose Nota This Dismission was afterwards in the Parliament held 1 2 W. M. affirmed Nota If a man makes a Voluntary Conveyance and there be a defect in it so as it cannot operate at Law this Court will not Decree an Execution thereof But sometimes it has been Decreed where it is intended a provision for younger Children The Lord Salisbury's Case MY Lord Salisbury married the Daughter of one Bennet who had two Daughters and bequeathed by his Will to each of them 20000l provided that if they or either of them married before the Age of Sixteen or if that the Marriage were without the Consent of such persons that they should lose 10000 l of the Portion and that the 10000 l should go to his other Children The Case was thus The Lord Salisbury married with one of the Daughters under the Age of 16. but with the Consent of all the parties It was urged That it being with Consent it might be at any Age. But my Lord Keeper was of Opinion that both parts must be observed Anonymus IN a Covenant to stand seised to the use of A. for life and after to two equally to be divided and to their Heirs and Assigns for ever My Lord Keeper declared his Opinion that the Inheritance was in Common as well as the Estate for life He said that it had been held that where the words were to two equally divided that should be in Common otherwise if the words were equally to be divided but since taken to be all one Nay a Devise to two equally will be in Common Here there shall not be such a Construction as to make one kind of Estate for life and another of the Inheritance and Survivorship is not favoured in prejudice of an Heir Note That if a Bill be Exhibited for the Examining of Witnesses in perpetuam rei memoriam if the Plaintiff therein prays Relief the Bill shall be dismissed Termino Paschae Anno 1 Jac. II. In Cancellaria The Lord Pawlett's Case THe Lord Pawlett had made a Settlement of his Estate and had by the Deed charged his Lands with the payment of 4000 l apiece to be paid to his two Daughters at their respective Ages of 21 years or days of Marriage and reserved to himself a Power of otherwise ordering it by his Will And by his Will in Writing made at the same time or within a day after devised by these words viz. I give and bequeath to my two Daughters by name 4000 l apiece to be respectively paid unto them for their Portions in such manner as I have provided by the said Settlement and mentioned that he would be understood to mean only one 4000 l to each of his said Daughters and appointed to each of the Daughters 100 l per annum for Maintenance It hapned one of the Daughters died before Marriage or the Age of 21 years and my Lady Pawlett the Mother of the Daughters took out Letters of Administration to the Daughter that died and preferred a Bill against the Trustees for the 4000 l and the Heir to whom the benefit of the Lands after the Mony raised was appointed The Question solely was Whether this Mony should go to the Administratrix or the Land be discharged thereof and accrue to the benefit of the Heir It was agreed on all hands that if this had been a Legacy or a Sum of Mony bequeathed by the Will altho' the party had died before the Age of 21 or Marriage the Administrator should have had it and that is the Practice in the Ecclesiastical Court in case of Legacies The Legatee in such case is taken to have a present Interest tho' the time of payment be future My Lord Keeper mentioned the Reason to be because it Charges the Personal Estate which is in being at the time of the Testator's death and if the Legacy should by such an accident be discharged it would turn to the benefit of the Executors whereas the Testator did not probably so intend it And further it has been Ruled That altho' a Sum of Mony be devised out of Lands to be so paid at a future day the Death of the Legatee doth not lose it Tho' my Lord Keeper did not seem satisfied with the Reason of that Case but it having been so Decreed it was not good to vary to avoid Arbitrariness and Incertainties But here this Sum of Mony is appointed to be paid by the Deed and is a Trust charged upon Lands and Trusts are governed by the Intention of the party and that the Personal Estate is not Charged and this Sum of Mony doth not lye in demand by a Suit as where a Legacy is devised but only a Bill may be preferred to have the Trusts performed And tho' it was much insisted on for the Plaintiff that here the Will bequeaths this Mony yet that refers to the Deed and orders it to be paid in such manner as was thereby appointed And it was said to be the same with the Case of Bond and Richardson which was lately by my Lord Keeper thus Decreed being a Sum of Mony charged to be paid out of Land at such an Age. If a Settlement were made and Lands charged with such Sums of Mony as a Will should declare there the Will would be but Declarative and not Operative Termino Sancti Hillarij Anno 1 2 Jac. II. In Cancellaria Frances Whitmore Vid ' Plaintiff versus Weld al' Defendants THe Case as it was drawn up upon Reference thereof by my Lord Keeper to the Judges of the Common Pleas for their Opinion was thus Viz. On the 18th of January 1675. William Whitmore the Elder taking notice that he had setled the major part of his Lands by Deed and being possessed of a very great Personal Estate in Mortgages Jewels Plate Bonds and other Goods and Chattels amounting in the whole to a very great Sum by Will in Writing devised several Legacies and after Wills in this manner Viz. The surplusage of my Personal Estate my Debts Legacies and Funeral Charges being paid and satisfied I give unto the Right Honourable William Earl of Craven for
of Priviledge fitting the Parliament 154 Prohibition A second Prohibition not grantable after a Consultation 47 Q Quantum meruit See Outlawry Que Estate See Corporation R Recovery A Deed Fine and Recovery do all make but one Assurance but each hath its several effect 31 Common Recoveries are Common Assurances and are not to be overthrown by nice Constructions 32 A Common Recovery stopt what shall be good Cause to stop it 90 Relation Of Relation its force and where it shall Operate 200 Remainder What shall be accounted a Contingent Remainder and what a Remainder vested 313 Rent Rent due if the thing let hath been really enjoy'd 68 A Rent cannot be reserved out of a thing Incorporeal 69 Every Quarters Rent is a several Debt and distinct Actions may be brought for each Quarters Rent Not so for part of the Money due upon Bond or Contract unless the Plaintiff shews that the rest is satisfied 129 A Debt for Rent payable by an Executor before Bonds because it savours of the Realty and is maintain'd in regard of the Profits of the Land received 184 Request Request where necessary to be set forth and where not 75 Rescous See Return Return If a Sheriff Return a Rescous it is not now Traversable tho' formerly it was 175 Reversion A Reversion is a present Interest tho' to take effect in possession after another Estate determined 328 Revocation What shall be a good Revocation in Equity 350 S Scire facias WHere one Ter-tenant is Return'd summon'd he may plead That there are other Ter-tenants tho' in another County 104. But he must not plead this by way of Abatement but demand Judgment si ipse ad breve praed in forma praed retorn ' respondere compelli debeat 105 The Record of a Scire facias naught in the Titleing not permitted to be amended 105 Scire facias in Chancery to Repeal a Patent 344 Settlement See Conveyance Marriage Mortgage A Voluntary Settlement avoided by a following Settlement in Joynture 363 Sheriff If a Sheriff of a City be in Contempt the Attachment shall go to the Coroners and not to the Mayor but if he be out of Office then it shall go to the succeeding Sheriff 216 Simony To sell an Advowson ea intentione that J.S. shall be presented Simony 39 In case of Simony the Presentation vests in the King without Office Quaere in other Cases 213 Statutes 13 E. 1. Stat. of Winton In an Action upon this Statute not necessary to set forth more in the Declaration than is pertinent to the Action 215 4. H. 7. cap. 24. Of Fines Of Claims after the coming in of Future Interests in the second Saving in this Act 333 21 Jac. 1. cap. 16. See Limitations 22 23 Car. 2. cap. 9. No more Costs than Damage explain'd 36 What Trespass within this Statute What not 48 29 Car. 2. cap. 3. A Promise by Letter a sufficient Promise in Writing within this Statute 361. This Statute does not extend to Trusts raised by Operation of Law 361 31 Car. 2. cap. 2. Where a Man commits a Capital Crime in Ireland he may be sent thither to be Tried thereupon notwithstanding that by this Act No Subject of this Realm shall be sent Prisoner to any Foreign parts 314 1 W. M. cap. 4. That Statute which saves time of Limitation does not alter the Form of Pleading but that shall be as it was before 185 197 Statute Recognizance See Fine What shall be esteemed a regular Extending of a Statute Merchant 326 Where the Interest of a former Statute shall drown'd in that of a latter being both Extended and assigned to the same person 326 327 328 The Extent of a Statute what it is and the Effect thereof 326 338 An Extent upon a Puisne Statute where Extended after a Prior Statute is in the nature of a Reversional Interest 328 When a former Statute is determin'd whether it be by release of the Debt by purchase of part of the Lands by being barr'd by Non-Claim upon a Fine Satisfaction acknowledged or any other means this lets in the Puisne Statute 332 An Extent begins by Record but it may end without Record for a Release by the Conizee after Extent determines it and he that hath a Puisne Statute may Enter 336 Cannot be assigned before Extent in Law 362 Surrender No Surrender of an Estate without Acceptance by the Surrenderee 199 Yet quaere for the Judgment was reverst in Parliament 208 That a Surrender divesteth the Estate immediately before express Assent of the Surrenderee 203 infr T Tail A Devise to one for Life Remainder to the Heir Males of his Body for ever this is an Estate-Tail in the Devisee 313 A Sum of Money cannot be Entailed 349 Tender Plea of a Tender without setting forth a Refusal not good otherwise if a place of Payment was appointed and the Party to Receive was not there 109 Tythes Whether Notice be necessary to be given to the Parson upon setting forth of Tythes 48 Traverse See Pleading Treason Whether Listing of Men to send beyond Seas to joyn the King's Enemies be Treason within the Clause of Levying War in the Stat. 25 Ed. 3. 316 Whether the indictment should not express in particular who those Enemies are or whether the General Words be not sufficient ibid. To List c. and an Intent to Depose the King is Treason within the Clause of Compassing the Death of the King 317 Trespass See Assent Whether a Suit in an Action of Trespass be a Breach of Covenant to hold and enjoy quietly 46 61 62 Where an Action of Trover will lye for Goods tho' an Action of Trespass would not for taking them 169 170 Trust See Chancery Limitation The force of the Word Trust in the Limitation of a Use 312 Where a Man buys Land in anothers Name and pays Money it will be a Trust for him who pays the Money tho' there be no Deed declaring the Trust 361 Trust executed in Chancery according to the Parties meaning 363 364 Tryal A New Tryal directed by the Lord Chancellor where the former Verdict has been complain'd of in a Bill before him the Complainant paying the Costs of the first Tryal 351 352 V Variance See Pleading Verdict See Baron and Feme A Mistake in an Indebitatus Assumpsit where good after Verdict 36 A Declaration tho' Inartificial is notwithstanding good after Verdict 174 Vill. Vill and Parish the Diversity and where Lands in One shall pass in the Other of the same Name 31 Vmpire Arbitrators and Umpire cannot lawfully have concurrent Authorities at the same time 115 Vse Where Money is paid to A. for the Use of B. in whom the Right and Interest vests 310 Lands may be Devised to the Use of another but if no Use be limited they will lodge in the Devisee for a Devise implies a Consideration 312 Vsury No Unlawful Usury if the Agreement be not Corrupt tho' the Wording of the Condition may be otherwise by Mistake