here to forbear to Sue generally but to stay a Suit against the Defendant whom he could not Sue To which it was answered That after a Verdict it shall be intended there was cause of Suit as Hob. 216. Bidwell and Cattons Case And Attorney brought an Assumpsit upon a Promise made to him in Consideration that he would stay the Prosecution of an Attachment of Priviledge and there held that it need not appear that there was cause of Suit for the Promise argues it and it will be presumed And here 't is a strong intendment that the Bond was made in Common Form which binds the Heirs But Iudgment was given against the Plaintiff for the Court said it might be intended that there was cause of Action if the contrary did not appear which it doth in this Case for the Bond cannot be intended otherwise than the Plaintiff himself hath expressed it which shews only that the Ancestor was bound And whereas it was said by the Plaintiff's Counsel that this would attaint the Jury they finding Assumpsit upon a void Promise Hale said there was no colour for that conceit The Plaintiff having proved his Promise and Consideration as 't was laid in the Declaration which is the only thing within their charge upon Non Assumpsit modo forma Bulmer versus Charles Pawlet Lord Saint John IN an Ejectment upon a Tryal at Bar this question arose upon the Evidence Tenant for Life Remainder in Tail to J. S. joyn in a Fine J.S. dies without Issue whether the Conusee should hold the Land for the Life of the Tenant for Life Serjeant Ellis pressed to have it found Specialy tho' it is resolved in Bredons Case that the Estate of the Conusee shall have Continuance but he said it was a strange Estate that should be both a Determinable Fee and an Estate pur auter vie and he cited 3 Cro. 285. Major and Talbots Case where in Covenant the Plaintiff sets forth that a Feme Tenant for Life Remainder in Fee to her Husband made a Lease to the Defendant for years wherein the Defendant covenanted with the Lessors their Heirs and Assigns to repair and they conveyed the Reversion to the Plaintiff and for default of Reparations the Plaintiff brought his Action as Assignee to the Husband And resolved to be well brought because the Wives Estate passed as drowned in the Fee The Court said Bredons Case was full in the point but the Reason there given Hale said made against the Resolution for 't is said that the Remainder in Tail passes first which if it does the Freehold must go by way of Surrender and so down but they shall rather be construed to pass insimul uno flatu Hob. 277 In Englishes Case it was resolved it Tenant for Life Remainder in Tail to an Infant joyn in a Fine if the Infant after Reverse the Fine yet the Conusee shall hold it for the Life of the Conusor 1 Co. in Bredons Case and he resembled it to the Case in 1 Inst a Man seized in the right of his Wife and entituled to be Tenant by the curtesie joyns in a Feoffment with his Wife the Heir of his Wife shall not avoid this during the Husbands Life Nevertheless he told Ellis That he would never deny a Special Verdict at the request of a Learned Man but it appearing that he Plaintiff had a good Title after the Life should fall the Defendant bought it of him and the Jury were discharged Sacheverel versus Frogate PAs 23 Car. 2. Rot. 590. In Covenant the Plaintiff declared That Jacinth Sacheverel seized in Fee demised to the Defendant certain Land for years reserving 120 l Rent And therein was a Covenant that the Defendant should yearly and every year during the said Term pay unto the Lessor his Executors Administrators and Assigns the said Rent and sets forth how that the Lessor devised the Reversion to the Plaintiff an for 120 l Rent since his decease he brought the Action The Defendant demanded Oyer of the Indenture wherein the Reservation of the Rent was yearly during the Term to the Lessor his Executors Administrators and Assigns and after a Covenant prout the Plaintiff declared and to this the Defendant demurred It was twice argued at the Bar and was now set down for the Resolution of the Court which Hale delivered with the Reasons He said they were all of Opinion for the Plaintiff For what interest a Man hath he hath it in a double capacity either as a Chattel and so transmissible to the Executors and Administrators or as an Inheritance and so in capacity of transmitting it to his Heir Then if Tenant in Fee makes a Lease and reserves the Rent to him and his Executors the Rent cannot go to them for there is no Testamentary Estate On the other side if Lessee for a 100 years should make a Lease for 40 years reserving Rent to him and his Heirs that would be void to the Heir Now a Reservation is but a Return of somewhat back in Retribution of what passes and therefore must be carried over to the Party which should have succeeded in the Estate if no Lease had béen made and that has béen always held where the Reservation is general So tho' it doth not properly create a Fee yet 't is a descendible Estate because it comes in lieu of what would have descended therefore Constructions of Reservations have been ever according to the Reason and Equity of the thing If two Joynt-teants make a Lease and reserve the Rent to one of them this is a good to both unless the Lease be by Indenture because of the Estoppel which is not in our Case for the Executors are Strangers to the Deed. 'T is true if A. and B. joyn in a Lease of Land wherein A. hath nothing reserving the Rent to A. by Indenture this is good by Estoppel to A. But in the Earl of Clare's Case it was resolved That where he and his Wife made a Lease reserving a Rent to himself and his Wife and his Heirs that he might bring Debt for the Rent and declare as of a Lease made by himself alone and the Reservation to himself for being in the Case of a Feme Covert there could be no Estoppel altho' she signed and sealed the Lease There was an Indenture of Demise from two Joynt tenants reserving 20 l Rent to them both one only sealed and delivered the Deed and he brought Debt for the Rent and declared of a Demise of the Moiety and a Reservation of 10 l Rent to him And resolved that he might Between Bond and Cartwright which see before and in the Common Pleas Pas 40. Eliz. Tenant in Tail made a Lease reserving a Rent to him and his Heirs It was resolved a good Lease to bind the Entail for the Rent shall go to the Heir in Tail along with the Reversion tho' the Reservation were to the Heirs generally For the Law uses all industry imaginable to conform
the Reservation to the Estate Whitlocks Case 8 Co. is very full to this where Tenant for Life the Remainder over so setled by Limitation of uses with power to the Tenant for Life to make Leases who made a Lease reserving Rent to him his Heirs and Assigns Resolved That he in the Remainder might have the Rent upon this Reservation So put the Case That Lessee for a 100 years should let for 50 reserving a Rent to him and his Heirs during the Term I conceive this would go to the Executor 'T is true if the Lessor reserves the Rent to himself 't is held it will neither go to the Heir or Executor But in 27 H. 8. 19. where the Reservation is to him and his Assigns It is said that it will go to the Heir And in the Case at Bar the words Executors and Administrators are void then t is as much as if reserved to him and his Assigns during the Term which are express words declaring the intent and must govern any implied construction which is the true and particular Reason in this Case The Old Books that have been cited have not the words during the Term. Vid. Lane 256. Richmond and Butchers Case indeed is judged contrary in point 3 Cro. 217. but that went upon a mistaken ground which was the Manuscript Report 12 E. 2. Whereas I suppose the Book intended was 12 E. 3. Fitz. Assize 86. for I have appointed the Manuscript of E. 2. which is in Lincolns Inn Library to be searched 6 Co. 62. and there is no such Case in that year of E. 2. The Case in the 12 E. 3. is A Man seized of two Acres let one reserving Rent to him and let the other reserving Rent to him and his Heirs and resolved that the first Reservation should determin with his Life for the Antithesis in the Reservation makes a strong Implication that he intended so In Wotton and Edwins Case 5 Jac. the words of Reservation were Yeilding and Paying to the Lessor and his Assigns And resolved that the Rent determined upon his Death In that case there wanted the effectual and operative Clause during the Term. The Case of Sury and Brown is the same with ours in the words of Reservation and the Assignee of the Reversion brought Debt Lane 255. and did not aver the Life of the Lessor And the Opinion of Jones Croke and Doderidge was for the Plaintiff Latches Rep. 99. The Law will not suffer and Construction to take away the energy of these words during the Term. If a Man reserves a Rent to him or his Heirs 't is void to the Heir 1 Inst 214. a. But in Mallorys Case 5 Co. where an Abbot reserved a Rent during the Term to him or his Successors it was resolved good to the Successor It is said in Brudnels Case 5 Co. that if a Lease be made for years if A. and B. so long live if one of them dies the Lease Determines because not said if either of them so long lives So it is in point of Grant But it is not so in point of Reservation for Pas 4 Jac. in the Common Pleas between Hill and Hill The Case was a Copyholder in Fee where the Custom was for a Widows Estate made a Lease by Licence reserving Rent to him and his Wife during their lives and did not say or either of them and to his Heirs It was resolved First That the Wife might have this Rent tho' not party to the Lease Secondly That tho' the Rent were reserved during their lives yet it should continue for the life of either of them for the Reversion if possible will attract the Rent to it as it were by a kind of Magnetism Hoskins versus Robbins A Replevin for six Sheep The Defendant makes Conusance c. for Damage Fesant The Plaintiff replied That the place where was a great Wast parcel of such a Mannor within which there were time out of mind Copyhold Tenants and that there was a Custom in the Mannor that the said Tenants should have the sole and several Pasture of the Wast as belonging to their Tenements and shews that the Tenants licenced him to put in his Beasts The Defendant Traverses the Custom and found for the Plaintiff The exceptions moved in Arrest of Judgment were now spoken to again First That the Custom to have the sole Pasture and thereby to exclude the Lord is not allowable It hath béen ever held That such a Prescription for Common is not good and why should the same thing in effect be gained by the change of the name That Prescription for Pasture and Prescription for Common is the same thing Vid. 3 Cro. Daniel v. Count de Hertford 542. and Rolls tit Prescription 267. It is held a Man may claim Common for half a year excluding the Lord and that one cannot prescribe to have it always so is not because of the Contradiction of the Term for if the sole Feeding be but for half a year 't is as improper to call it Common but the true reason seems to be because it should in a manner take away the whole profit of the Soil from the Lord and he should by such usage lose his greatest Evidence to prove his Title for it would appear that the Land was always fed by the Beasts of others and it would be very mischievous to Lords who live remote from their Wasts or that seldom put their Beasts there as many times they do not so that by the Tenants solely using to feed it they should lose their Improvements provided for the Lords by the Statute and so come at last for want of Evidence to lose the Soil it self Secondly This Custom is laid To have the sole Feeding belonging to their Tenements and 't is not said for Beasts levant and couchant or averred that the Beasts taken were so 15 E. 4. 32. and Rolls tit Common 398. Fitz. tit Prescription 51. A Man cannot prescribe to take Estovers as belonging to his House unless he Avers them to be spent in his House Noy 145. So 2 Cro. 256. tho' the Prescription was there to take omnes Spinas for it is necessary to apply it to something which agrees in nature to the thing Brownlow 35. Thirdly Here the Plaintiff justifies the putting in his Beasts by a Licence and doth not say it was by Deed whereas it could not be without Deed and so is the 2 Cro. 575. Fourthly Those defects are not aided by the Verdict for they are in the right and of substance But the Court were all of Opinion for the Plaintiff First They held the Prescription to be good and being laid as a Custom in the Mannor it was not needful to express the Copy-hold Estates it doth not take away all the profit of the Land from the Lord for his interest in the Trees Mines Bushes c. continues Co. Inst 122. a. is express that a Prescription may be for sola separalis pastura ' and if
makes a Lease for the Life of the Lessee not warranted by the Statute and dies leaving B. in Remainder his Heir B. let ts for 99 years to commence after the death of the Tenant for Life reserving Rent and then the Tenant for Life surrenders to B. upon Condition and dies B. suffers a Recovery with single Voucher and dies the Lessee for years enters the Heir of B. distrains for the Rent and the Lessee brings a Replevin and upon an Avowry and Pleadings thereupon this Case was disclosed to the Court of Common Bench and Judgment given there for the Avowant and Error thereupon brought in this Court For the Plaintiff in the Error it was Argued That the Lease being derived out of a Reversion in Fee which was Created in A. upon the Discontinuance for Life and the New Fee vanishing by the Surrender of the Tenant for Life for it was urged he was in his Remitter altho' the taking of the Surrender was his own Act that the Lease for years by consequence was become void Again It was Objected against the Common Recovery that the Tenant in Tail and a Stranger which had nothing in the Estate were made Tenants to the Praecipe and therefore no good Recovery Again In case B. were not remitted after acceptance of the Surrender then he was Seised by force of the Tail and so no good Recovery being with single Voucher On the other side it was Argued to be no Remitter because the acceptance of the Surrender was his own Act and the Entry was taken away But admitting it were a Remitter because by the Surrender the Estate for Life which was the Discontinuance was gone and it was no more than a Discontinuance for Life For if Tenant in Tail letts for Life and after grants the Reversion in Fee if the Lessee for Life dies after the Death of the Tenant in Tail so that the Estate was not executed in the Grantee during the Life of the Tenant in Tail the Heir shall immediately Enter upon the Grantee of the Reversion Co. Litt. It seems also to be stronger against the Remitter in this case because 't is not Absolute but only Conditional However the Lease may be good by Estoppel for it appears to have been by Indenture and if the Lessor cannot avoid the Lease the Lessee shall without question be subject to the Rent But it was Objected against the Estoppel that here an Interest passes and the Lease was good for a time As if the Lessee for Ten years makes a Lease for Twenty years and afterwards purchaseth the Reversion it shall bind him for no more than Ten. To which Pemberton Chief Justice said The difference is where the party that makes the Estate has a legal Estate and where a Defeasible Estate only for in the latter a Lease may work by Estoppel tho' an Interest passed so long as the Estate out of which the Lease was derived remained undefeated As to the Recovery it was held clearly good altho' a Stranger that had nothing in the Land was made Tenant to the Praecipe with the Tenant in Tail for the Recompence in Value shall go to him that lost the Estate and being a Common Assurance 't is to be favourably Expounded Et Adjornatur Termino Sancti Hillarij Anno 33 34 Car. II. In Banco Regis Anonymus IN Error upon a Judgment in Ejectione Firmae in the Common Pleas where the Case was That the Bishop of London was seized injure Episcopatus of a Mannor of which the Lands in question were held and time out of mind were demised and demisable by Copy of Court Roll for Life in Possession and Reversion and J.S. being Copyholder for Life in Reversion after an Estate for Life in Ann Pitt and J.N. being seized of the Mannor by Disseisin J.S. at a Court holden for the Mannor in the name of J. N. surrendred into the Hands of the said J.N. the Disseisor Lord to the used of the said Lord. Afterwards the Bishop of London entred and avoided the Disseisin Ann Pitt died and an Ejectment was brought by J. S. And it was adjudged in the Common Bench that he had a good Title and now upon a Writ of Error in this Court the Matter in Law was insisted upon by Pollexfen for the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error That this Surrender to the Disseisor Lord to the Lords own use was good for all the Books agree a Copyholder may Surrender to a Disseisor of the Mannor to the use of a Stranger and why not to the Lords own use As if Lessee for years be ousted and he in Reversion disseised and the Lessee Releases to the Disseisor this extinguishes his Term. Here is a compleat Disseisin of the Mannor by Attornment of the Freeholders without which the Services cannot be gained and the Copyholders comeing to the Disseisors Court and by making Surrenders c. owning him for their Lords tantamounts Serjeant Maynard contra And he insisted that this Surrender was not good for the Disseisor had no Estate in this Land capable of a Surrender for the Copyholder for Life continuing in Possession and never having been ousted there could be no Disssesin of that And he endeavoured to distinguish it from a Surrender to a Disseisor Lord to the use of another for in such Surrenders the Lord is only an Instrument and does but as it were assent and until admittance the Estate is in the Surrenderer And he resembled it to the Attornment of a Tenant when è converso a Seigniory is granted and he put Cases upon Surrenders of Leases that they must be to one that hath the immediate Reversion as an under Lessee for part of the Term cannot Surrender to the first Lessor and he cited a Case of Lessee for years Remainder for Life Remainder in Fee to a Stranger he that had the Fee enfeoffed the Tenant for years by Deed and made Livery and the Conveyance held void for it could not work by Livery to the Tenant for years who was in Possession before and a Surrender it could not be because of the intermediate Estate for Life and it could not work as a Grant for want of Attornment He said it had been commonly received that a Common Recovery cannot be suffered where the Tail is expectant upon an Estate for Life not made Tenant to the Praecipe which he said was true in a Writ of Entry in the Post which are commonly used And the true reason is because such Writ supposes a Disseisin which cannot be when there is a Tenant for Life in Possession But as he said a Common Recovery in such case in a Writ of Right would be good Pemberton Chief Justice said his reason of Desseisin would overthrow Surrenders to the use of a Stranger for if the Possession of the Copyholder would preserve it from a Disseisin then was it pro tempore lopped off or severed from the Mannor and then no Surrender could be at all Et Adjornatur Berry
principium inde One of the Lessees died before the Lease for Life determined whereupon the Lessor brings Covenant for the 3 l and sets forth this Matter in the Declaration To which the Defendant Demurred supposing that the 3 l was not to be paid unless the Death had hapned after the Term had commenced And the Court having heard it spoken to divers times by Counsel on both sides by the Opinion of Twisden Rainsford and Moreton Iudgment was given for the Defendant For all the other Reservations but this were expresly post principium termini and Clauses in Companies are to expound one another as it is said in the Earl of Clanrickard's Case in Hobart It is in the nature of a Rent and Reservation which it is not necessary that it should be Annual And in Randall and Scories Case 1 Cro. such a Duty was distrained for and it shall attend the Reversion Rolls 457. And he that hath but an interesse termini is not to pay the Rent reserved for there is no Term nor no Reversion until it commences If A. lets to B. for 10 years and B. redemises to A. for 6 years to commence in futuro in the mean time this works no suspension of either Rent or Condition The Intention of the Parties is to be taken That it should not be paid until then However Reservations are to be taken most strongly against the Reserver As Palmer and Prowses Case cited in Suffeild's Case 10 Co. is The Reversion of a Lease for years was granted for Life reserving certain Rent cum reversio acciderit a Distress was made for the Rent arrear ever since the Grant Resolved that it was good for no more than was incurred since it fell into possession Keeling Chief Justice held strongly to the contrary For he said the words were so express in this Case that they have left no place for Construction which other Clauses or the Intention of the Parties may direct when the Expression is doubtful He took it for a Sum in gross for Distrained for it could not be being reserved upon the Death of the Lessees or either of them which was also the limitation of their Lease And that Interpretations were not to be made against the plain sense of words He relied upon Edriches Case 5 Co. where the Judges said They would not make any Construction against the express Letter of the Statute yet there was much Equity in that Case to incline them to it And he said As well as a Fine is paid upon the taking of such Lease before it begins why may not something be paid also when their Interest determines And in some Countries they call such Payments A fair Leave Miller versus Ward TRespass for breaking of his Close on the 1st of August and putting in his Cattel The Defendant Iustifies for Common which he prescribes for in this manner viz. That two years together he used to have Common there after the Corn reaped and carried away until it was sown again and the Third year to have Common for the whole year and that that Year the Plaintiff declares for the Trespass was one of the years the Field was own quod post grana messa c. he put in his Cattle absque hoc that he put them in aliter vel alio modo The Plaintiff Demurs which it was Ruled he might for the Defendant doth not answer to the Time wherein the Trespass was alledged and the Traverse will not help it for aliter vel alio modo doth not refer to the time Anonymus AN Administrator brings Debt upon an Obligation The Defendant pleads payment to himself Vpon which it was found for the Defendant Coleman prayed that he might have Costs As where an Executor brings an Action sur Trover and Conversion in his own time and found against him it was Ruled in Atkyes Case 1 Cro. that he should pay Costs and hereof his own knowledge he had no cause of Action the Money being paid to himself But the Court Resolved That there ought to be no Costs in this Case for the Action of Trover in his own time might have been brought in his own Name so it was needless to name himself Executor or Administrator but the Action here is meerly in right of the Intestate Harvey versus James AFter Verdict at the Assizes the Clerk delivered the Postea to the Attorney by whose negligent keeping it came to be eaten with Rats But the Court Examining the Clerk of Assize it appeared that he had Entred the Jurors Names Verdict and Tales in his Book and according to that the Court suffered the Verdict to be entred on Record Anonymus IN an Action of Battery against Baron and Feme the Jury find the Feme only Guilty and not the Baron It was moved in Arrest of Judgment That this Verdict was against the Plaintiff for he ought in this Case to have joyned the Baron only for conformity and he declaring of a Battery by both the Baron being acquitted he hath failed of his Action and so is Yelverton 106. in Drury and Dennys Case But here the Court gave Iudgment for the Plaintiff and said that that in Yelvetron was a strange Opinion Anonymus A Certiorari was prayed to remove an Indictment of Manslaughter out of Wales which the Court at first doubted whether they might grant in regard it could not be tryed in an English Country But an Indictment might have béen found thereof in an English County and that might be tryed by 26 H. 8. cap. 6. vid. 1 Cro. Soutley and Prices Case and Chedleys Case But it was made appear to the Court That there was a great cause to suspect Partiality if the Tryal proceeded in Wales for the Party was Bailed already by the Justices of Peace there which Twisden said it was doubtful whether they had power to do for Manslaughter They awarded a Certiorari and took Order that the Prosecutor should be bound by Recognizance to prefer an Indictment in the next English Country Collect versus Padwell IN Debt upon a Bond to perform an Award which was That one should make a Lease to another before the 21 of October which was 2 or 3 Months after the Award and that the other upon the making of the Lease should pay him 50 l The Question was Whether notice in this Case ought to be given when he would make the Lease for otherwise it was said the other must have 50 l always about him or be in danger to break the Award And it was resolved by the Court That no notice was necessary Noell versus Nelson MIch 21. Car. 2. Rot. 745. Error to Reverse a Judgment given in the Common Pleas where the case was thus Nelson brings Debt against Noel as Executor of Sir Martyn Noel who pleads plene administravit The Plaintiff confesseth the Plea and prayeth Iudgment de bonis Testatoris quae in futoro ad manus Defendentis devenirint and upon a Suggestion of Assets afterwards he
But since H. 8. time it had béen for the most part administred by the Dean and Chapter and the Verdict was here for the Dean and Chapter King versus Melling IN an Ejectment upon a Special Verdict the case was this R. Melling seized in Fee having Issue four Sons William Robert Bernard and John devised the Land in question in this manner I give my Land to my Son Bernard for his natural Life and after his decease I give the same to the Issue of his Body lawfully begotten on a second Wife and for want of such Issue to John Melling and his Heirs for ever Provided that Bernard may make a Joynture of all the Premisses to such second Wife which she may enjoy during her Life R.M. dies Bernard in the life of his first Wife suffered a Recovery to the use of himself in Fee and after her decease Marries a second Wife and then by Indenture covenants to stand seized to the use of himself for Life and after to the use of his Wife for her Life for her Joynture and dies J.M. Enters and makes a Lease to the Plaintiff And this Term after Arguments at the Bar the Court gave their Opinions Rainsford for the Plaintiff First I hold in this Case that B. M. takes but an Estate for Life with a Contingent Remainder to the Issue by his second Wife for the Devise is by express words for Life as in Archers Case 1 Co. a Devise to R. A. for Life and after to the next Heir Male of R. and the Heirs Males of that Heir Male Resolved to create but an Estate for Life to R. A. I rely mainly upon Wilds Case 6 Co. which was brought before all the Judges of England where the Devise was to a Man and his Wife and after their decease to the Children and resolved to be but an Estate for Life 't is true there were Children at the time of the Devise but in the end of the Case 't is said that in such Case if there were no Children the Children born after might take by remainder and the first Estate to be but for Life Clerk v. Day 1 Cro. 313. the Devise was to Rose his Daughter for Life and that if she married after his Death and had Heir of her Body then that the Heir after his Daughter's Death should have the Land and to the Heirs of their Body begotten and if his Daughter died without Issue then to a Stranger It was held by Gawdy and Fenner that Rose had but an Estate for Life in this Case 1 Rolls 837. Devise to his eldest Son for Life and after his decease to the Sons of his Body lawfully begotten the Son resolved to have but an Estate for Life The Second point Whether the power to make a Joynture be destroyed by the Common Recovery these powers to make Estates are of two sorts either Collateral as when Executors have power by a Will to sell Land and such a power cannot be destroyed as appears in Diggs's Case 1 Co. or powers appendant to Estates as to make Leases which shall continue after the Estates to which the power is annexed determins and the power in the Case at Bar to make a Joynture are of this second sort and are destroyed by the alteration of the Estate to which it is annexed in privity as 1 Co. Albany's Case is so that the Common Recovery being a Forfeiture of the Estate for Life by consequence 't is an extinguishment of the power Thirdly But admitting the power continues whether it be well executed and I hold that it is not for being seized in Fee at the time of the Covenant to stand seized to the use of his Wife for her Joynture and this without any reference to his power the use shall arise out of his Interest and not be executed by vertue of his power according to the resolution in Sir Ed. Cleeres Case 6 Co. Twisden of the same Opinion As to the first Point it must be agreed that these words Issue of the Body ex vi termini make not an Entail if they were in a Conveyance by Act executed no more than Children as the words were in Wilds Case 'T is true in a VVill a Devise of Land to a Man and his Issue creates an Entail if the Devisee had no Issue at that time for otherwise those words would be void for in regard they are limited to take presently the Issue born after cannot take as by Remainder there being none to take in praesenti they must be intended to be words of Limitation as a Devise to a Man and his Heirs Males makes an Entail or otherwise the word Males must be rejected then seeing the words in themselves are not proper to make an Entail the next thing to be considered is the intention which is to be known by the expressions in the VVill and not any averment dehors the words are J will give my Land to my Son for Life and after his decease I will give the same to the Issue c. so that the Land is given to him expresly for Life Devise of Land in perpetuum makes Fee but if Land be given by Deèd in perpetuum there an Estate only for Life will pass 15 H. 7. A Devise to one paying 10 l this is a Fee 6 Co. Coliers Case But a Devise to one for Life paying 10 l makes but an Estate for Life the Case of Furse and VVinter was Mich. or Trin. 13 Regis Caroli Rot. 1339. A Devise to his two Daughters equally to be divided between them and to the Survivor of them and to the Heirs of the Body of the Survivor This was so expresly to the Surviror that it was resolved to be a Joynt Estate and not in Common The words here are after the decease of Bernard I give the same to the Issue of the Body c. implying that the Issue should take by Purchase as a Gift and not by Descent Again The power given to Bernard to make a Joynture shews that he could not do it by Virtue of his Estate and therefore needed a power to be annexed And tho' such powers are usually affixed to Estates Tail yet when the construction is doubtful what Estate shall pass the giving such a power is an argument that 't is such an Estate that cannot make a Joynture or the like by any other means The words go further and for want of such Issue then to J.M. 'T is true if Land be devised to a Man and if he dies without Issue then to remain over the Devisee shall have an Entail Owen 29. But it shall not be so in this Case because that Clause is crowded in with other Clauses directly to the contrary I rely mainly upon VVilds Case 6 Co. and the Case quoted out of Bendlowes in the end of that Case A Devise to Baron and Feme and to the Men Children of their Bodies begotten because it did not appear that there were any more Children at
that time this made an Estate Tail But if it had béen and after their decease to their Children then the Children should take by Purchase tho' born after 'T is true that case is variously reported in the Books but I adhere to my Lord Coke presuming that being brought before all the Judges in the Argument of VVilds Case it was a true Report As for the second Point 't is plain that the power is extinguished for by the Recovery the Estate for Life to which it was annexed in privity is gone and forfeited so that 't is not necessary to dispute the third Point whether well executed or no But upon the whole I agree with my Brother Rainsford that the Plaintiff ought to have Judgment Hale I differ from my two Brothers and tho' I was of their Opinion at the finding of the Special Verdict yet upon very great Consideration of the Case I am of Opinion for the Defendant I shall proceed in a different method from my Brothers and begin with that Point which they made last and I agree with them admitting that Bernard had but an Estate for Life that the power was destroyed also here the Recovery does not only bar the Estate but all powers annexed to it for the recompence in value is of such strong Consideration that it serves as well for Rents Possibilities c. going out of and depending upon the Land as for the Land it self So Fines and Feoffments do ransack the whole Estate and pass or extinguish c. all Rights Conditions Powers c. belonging to the Land as well as the Land it self Secondly I agree with my Brother Rainsford that if Bernard had but an Estate for Life by the Devise the power was not well executed Where Tenant for Life has a power to make Leases 't is not always necessary to recite his power when he makes a Lease but if he makes a Lease which will not have an effectual continuance if it be directed out of his interest there it shall be as made by virtue of his power and so it was resolved in one Roger's Case in which I was Counsel Again Tho' it be here by Covenant to stand seized an improper way to execute his power yet it might be construed an Execution of it Mich. 51. In this Court Stapleton's Case where a Devise was to A. for Life Remainder to B. for Life Remainder to C. in Fee with power to B. to make his Wife a Joynture B. covenanted to stand seized for the Joynture of his Wife reciting his power tho' this could not make a legal Joynture yet it was resolved to enure by virtue of his power quando non valet quod ago ut ago valeat quantum valere potest But in this Case Bernard has got a new Fee which tho' it be defeasible by him in Remainder yet the Covenant to stand seized shall enure thereupon and the use shall arise out of the Fee Thirdly I was at the first opening of the Case of Opinion that Bernard had but an Estate for Life but upon deep Examination of the Will and of the Authority and Considerations of the Consequences of the Case I hold it to be an Estate Tail And first to ease that Point of all difficulties if cannot be denied but a Devise to a Man and the Heirs of his Body by a second Wife makes an Estate Tail executed tho' the Devisee had a Wife at the time As the Case often cited Land given to a Married Man and a Married Woman and the Heirs of their Bodies We are here in case of the Creation of an Estate-Tail where intention has some influence voluntas Donatoris c. and may help words which are not exactly according to legal form 39 Ass 20. Land given to a Man and his Wife haeredi de corpore uni haeredi tantum this judged an Entail Again we are in case of an Estate Tail to be created by a Will and the intention of the Testator is the Law to expound the Testament therefore a Devise to a Man and his Heirs Males or a Devise to a Man and if he dies without Issue c. are always construed to make an Entail It must be admitted that if the Devise were to B. and the Issue of his Body having no Issue at that time it would be an Estate Tail for the Law will carry over the word Issue not only to his immediate Issue but to all that shall descend from him I agree it would be otherwise if there were Issue at the time Tayler and Sayer 41 Eliz. rot 541. a Devise to his Wife for Life 1 Cro. 742. Remainder to his Issue having two Children it was held the Remainder was void being to the Issue in the singular number for incertainy which should take But that was a little too rank for Issue is nomen collectivum Again I agree if a Devise be made to a man and after his death to his Issue or Children having Issue at that time they take by way of Remainder And that was the only Point adjudged in Wild's Case and there also against the Opinion of Popham and Gawdy This way being made I come to the Case it self and shall briefly give my Reasons why I hold Bernard has an Estate Tail First Because the word Issue is nomen collectivum and takes in the whole Generation ex vi termini and so the Case is stronger than if it were Children And where 't is said to the Issue that he shall have of the Body of the second Wife that is all that shall come of the second Wife For so 't is understood in common Parlance Secondly In all Acts of Parliament Exitus is as comprehensive as Heirs of the Body In Westm 2. de donis Issue is made a term of equivalence to Heirs of the Body for where it speaks of the Alienation of the Donee 't is said quo minus ad exitum discenderet So in 34 H. 8. of Entails setled by the Crown 'T is true in Conveyances c. the wisdom of the Law has appropriated the word Heirs as a Term of Art In Clerke's Case A Lease was made to commence after the death of his Son without Issue the Son had a Son and died and then that Son died without Issue It was Resolved both in the Kings Bench and the Exchequer that the Lease should commence for Issue being nomen collectivum whenever the Issue of the Son failed the term of Commencement did happen But now to see the difference Tyler's Case Mich. 34 Eliz. B.R. He had Issue A. B. C. and D. and Devised to his Wife for Life and after her death to B. his Son in Tail and if he dies without Issue then to his Children A. had Issue a Son and died and B. died without Issue Resolved that the Son of A. should not take as one of the Children of the Testator Which Case I cite to shew the odds between the word Issue and the
Court the Woman was a Witness tho' married as here and Rainsford cited my Lord Castlehavens Case where the Countess gave Evidence that he assisted the committing a Rape upon her But Hale said he was not governed by that case because there was a Wife de jure the Evidence being clear as to all the Points of the Statute viz. First That the taking was by force Secondly That the Woman had substance according to the Statute Thirdly That Marriage ensued tho' it did not appear she was deflowred the Jury found him guilty Whereupon Judgment was given and he was hanged Note 39 Eliz. cap. 9. takes away Clergy from this Offence Bayly versus Murin IN an Ejectment upon a Special Verdict the Case was to this effect One Cooper Vicar of Granbrook in Kent being seized of an House and Lands thereunto appertaining parcel of the Endowment of his Vicaridge situate in a Market Town in the year 1672 lets it for three years and one year of the said Lease being expired the 11 of Sept. 1673. lets it for 21 years to begin from Michaelmas following reserving the Rent during the Term payable at the usual Feasts or within ten days after this Lease was confirmed by the Archbishop Patron of the Vicarage and Dean and Chapter of Canterbury Some years after Cooper dies and the Question was Whether Buck the succeeding Vicar could avoid this Lease The first Point was Whether the Lease became void within 80 Days after the death of Cooper by the Statute of Non-residence 13 Eliz. 20. And as to that all the Justices were of Opinion that Death would not make such a Non-residence as should avoid the Lease for the Intention of the Statute was to oblige the Incumbents to Residence First By imposing of the Forfeiture of a years Value of their Benefice if they did not Reside Secondly By making their Leases void which tho' prima facie seemed to be to their advantage yet was not so in the consequence for none would be induced to Farm their Lands because it was in their power to defeat their Leases by Non residence Again 'T is plain the Statute meant a Wilful Absence because it says The party so offending the Statute of the 13th of Eliz. that allows Leases of Houses c. in Market Towns for 40 years would be of no effect if Death should be interpreted a Non-residence and the Confirmation of Patron and Ordinary would be to no purpose Butler and Goodale's Case in the 6 Co. 21. b. is that where the Incumbent is absent upon an Inhibition or for the sake of his Health he is not within the Penalty of that Law There is only one single Authority against this viz. Mott and Hale's Case in the 1 Cro. 123. which Twisden doubted whether it were so adjudged because my Lord Coke mentions it no where supposing so Notable a Point would not have escaped his Observation especially in a Case wherein he was Counsel But Hale said It was Adjudged by the Opinion of three Judges tho' in Moor 't is said the Court was Divided but it was a hard Opinion And in the 38th of Eliz. B.R. Moor 609. the very Point was adjudged contrary The second Point Whether it were void because the Rent was reserved at the usual Feasts or within Ten days after For it was urged that the Term ending at Michaelmas would be expired before the last Payment And for the other payments 't is for the Successor's advantage because the Predecessor may dye within the Ten days But the Court were clear of Opinion in regard the Reservation was during the Term that there should be no Ten days given to the Lessee for the last payment according to Barwicke and Foster's Case in the 2 Cro. 227 233. The third point Whether this were a Lease in Reversion and so not warranted by the Statute of the 14 of Elizabeth And all the Court held that it was This Statute repeats that of the 13th of Eliz. as to Houses in Market Towns which Liberty was given as Twisden said to render those places more populous but excepts Leases in Reversion which this is being to commence at a Day to come where a Power is annexed to an Estate for Life to make Leases in possession A man cannot make a Lease to commence in futuro In the 6 Co. Fitz William's Case 4 E. 3. tit Waste 18. the Lessor made a Lease to commence after the death of the Tenant for Life and notwithstanding maintained an Action of Waste And Co. Lit. citing that Case distinguishes between a Grant of the Reversion and a Lease in Reversion as that Case was In Plowden's Commentaries Tracy's Case A Lease made to commence at a Day to come is given as a most proper Instance of a Lease in Reversion In the 1 Cro. 546. Hunt and Singleton's Case a Lease of an House for 40 years there being 10 years unexpired of a former Lease by the Dean and Chapter of St. Pauls was held not warranted by the 14th of Eliz. The like was Resolved in C. B. 14 Car. 2. in the Case of Wyn and Wild of a Lease of the Dean and Chapter of Westminster and there the Court denied the Opinion in Tomson and Trafford's Case Poph. 9. And two of the Judges seemed to be of Opinion and Twisden strongly that if the Lease in the Case at Bar had been made to commence presently it yet would have been void there being another Lease in being so that for so many years as were to come of the former Lease it would be a Lease in Reversion And that the 18th of Eliz. that permits a concurrent Lease so that there be not above three years in being shall not in their Opinion make any alteration of the 14th of Eliz. but it only extends to the 13th of Eliz. because it recites that but not the former And so is the Opinion of Hobart in the Case of Crane and Taylour 269. and it hath been often held that it does not extend to the Statute of 1 Eliz. concerning Bishops But of this Hale doubted and rather conceived the contrary viz. That the Lease had been good if it had been made to commence presently there being less than three years to come of the former Lease And that of the 18 of Eliz. did give a qualification to Leases made upon the 14th as well as the 13th First Because the 14 of Eliz. is a kind of an Appendix to the 13th of Eliz. and does not repeat it but sub modo a little enlarging it as to Houses in Market Towns Wherefore the 18th of Eliz. reciting the 13th does by consequence recite the 14th also Secondly There is such a Connexion betwixt all the Statutes concerning Leases of Ecclesiastical persons that they have been taken into the Construction of one another The Statute of the 32d of H. 8. is not recited neither in the 1st or the 13th of Eliz. yet a Lease is not warranted upon those Statutes unless it hath the Qualifications
taken strictly and here upon the first Fine the Earl of Leicester had no Estate left in him Mich. 6 Car. 1. in Communi Banco the Case of Ingram and Parker which tho' it may not be a clear Authority for me yet I am sure it does not make against me The Case was Catesby levied a Fine to the use of himself in Tail with Remainders over reserving a Power to himself and his Son to Revoke by Deed c. as in our Case and his Son after his decease by Deed intended to be Enrolled conveyed to one and his Heirs and after levied a Fine and it was held no Revocation First Because he having an Estate Tail in him the Deed might operate upon his Interest Secondly Because it was but an inchoation of a Conveyance and not perfected and they held it no Revocation and that the Fine levied after tho' intended to be to the Vses of the Deed yet should extinguish the Power Hale Chief Justice Vpon the close and nice putting of the Case this may seem to be no Revocation for 't is clear that neither the Deed nor Fine by it self can revoke but quae non valent singula juncta prosunt The Case of Kibbett and Lee in Hob. 312. treads close upon this Case where the Power was to Revoke by Writing under his Hand and Seal and delivered in the presence of three Witnesses and that then and from thenceforth the Uses should cease It was there Resolved that a Devise of the Lands by Will with all the Circumstances limited in the Power should Revoke yet the Delivery was one of the Circumstances and the Uses were to cease then and from thenceforth Whereas a Will which could have not effect while his Death did strongly import that the meaning was to do it by Deed and yet there the Will alone could be no Revocation for clearly he might have made another Will after and so required other Matter viz. his Death to compleat it And in that Case there is another put That if a Deed of Revocation had been made and the party had declared it should not take place until 100 l paid there the operation of it would have been in suspence until the 100 l paid and then it would have been sufficient yet there it had been done by several Acts and of several Natures the Intention in things of this nature mainly governs the Construction In Terries Case it was Ruled That if A. makes a Lease for years to B. and then Levies a Fine to him to the end that he might be Tenant to the Praecipe for the suffering of a Recovery that after the Recovery suffered his Lease should revive 'T is true in the Case at Bar if the Fine had been levied first and then the Deed of Uses made afterwards the Power had been extinguished by the Fine and so no Revocation of that which had no being could have been by the Deed. Twisden What if before the Fine levied the Intent had been declared to that purpose Hale I doubt whether that would have helped it I cannot submit to the Opinion in Parker and Ingrams Case cited viz. That the Deed not being Enrolled should make no Revocation For in case of a Power to make Leases for life it has been always held by the best Advice that the better way is to do it by Deed without Livery tho' Livery by the Common Law is incident to a Lease for life and so Adjudged in Rogers's Case for Lands in Blandford forum in Moor's Rep. where Tenant for life hath power to make Leases for life and makes a Lease by Livery 't is there held a Forfeiture tho' I conceived not because by the Deed the Lease takes effect and so the Livery comes too late Therefore the omission of Enrolling the Deed in that case does not seem to be material but if that Opinion be to be maintained it is because the party had such an Interest upon which the Deed might enure without Execution of his Power and so rather construed to work upon his Interest But that Reason does not satisfie because such an Estate as was intended to be conveyed could not be derived out of his Interest therefore it should take effect by his Power according to Clere's Case in the 6 Co. So by the whole Court here the Deed and Fine taken together were Resolved to be a good Execution of the Power and Judgment given accordingly Richardson versus Disborow A Prohibition was prayed to the Ecclesiastical Court where the Suit was for a Legacy and the Defendant pleaded That there was nothing remaining in his hands to pay it and that he had fully Administred And producing but one Witness to prove it Sentence was given against him and after he Appealed and because their Court gave no regard to a single Testimony he prays a Prohibition But it was urged on the other Side That it being a Matter within their Cognizance they might follow the Course of their own Law And tho' there are diversities of Opinions in the Books about this Matter yet since 8 Car. 1. Prohibitions have been been denied upon such a Surmize Hale Where the Matter to be proved which falls in incidently in a Cause before them is Temporal they ought not to deny such Proof as our Law allows and it would be a great Mischief to Executors if they should be forced to take two Witnesses for the payment of every petit Sum And if they should after their Death there would be the same Inconvenience In Yelv. 92. a Prohibition was granted upon the not admitting of One Witness to prove the Revocation of a Will Which is a stronger Case because that entirely is of Ecclesiastical Cognizance Wherefore let there go a Prohibition and let the party if he please Demur upon the Declaration upon the Attachment Hob. 188. 1 Cro. 88. Popham 59. Latch 117. Pigot versus Bridge IN Debt upon a Bond Conditioned for performance of Covenants and the Breach assigned was in the not quietly enjoying the Land demised unto him The Defendant pleads that the Lease was made to hold from Michaelmas 1661 to Michaelmas 1668 and that paying so much Rent Half yearly he was to Enjoy quietly and shews that he did not pay the last half years Rent ending at Michaelmas 1668. To which the Plaintiff Demurred supposing that the words being to Michaelmas 1668. there was not an entire Half year the Day being to be excluded and that it was so held in the Case of Umble and Fisher in the 1 Cro. 702. Cur ' contra 'T is true in pleading usque tale Festum will exclude that Day but in case of a Reservation the Construction is to be governed by the Intent Anonymus NOte per Hale Debt doth not lye against the Executor of an Executor upon a Surmize of a Devastavit by the first Executor For First 'T is a Personal Tort for which his Executor cannot be charged Secondly 'T is such an Action of Debt as would
meant by the name of Son As to Beckford's Case the Words are full to carry all and therefore it had been impertinent to have wrote over the Will again So where a man has two Sons named John it may be well averred that he meant the younger Son for nothing in the Will is inconsistent with such meaning The Court took time to deliver their Opinions And afterwards the Chief Justice delivered the Opinion of the Court That neither the Republication nor Parol Declaration could operate as a Devise to R. c. the Grandson Pepis's Case A Mandamus to restore him to his Place of Recorder of the Town of Cambridge The Return was That they were Incorporated by the Name of Mayor Aldermen c. with a Power to chuse a Recorder Habend ' pro termino vitae aut ad voluntat ' eligentium That Mr. Pepis was Chosen Recorder ad voluntat ' eligentium and that afterwards by the Votes of the greater number of the Electors he was removed and the Lord Allington constituted a Recorder under their Common Seal c. Vpon this Return it was moved for Mr. Pepis that altho' they had alledged a Power to Chuse a Recorder at Will yet they should have shewn Cause for his Removal being a Judicial Office which the Court takes notice of and that none had such a Power but the King to remove Judges ad libitum Again A Corporation aggregate cannot determine their Will but under their Common Seal and that is not shewn here Curia Where a Recorder is at Will they may remove him at pleasure as it is in Blagrave's Case and several other Cases As to the other Point it does not appear that he was Constituted under their Common Seal perhaps then they must have determined their Will under their Common Seal but now 't is well enough my Lord Allington is Constituted under their Common Seal which Act removes the other so it was adjudged against Mr. Pepis Termino Sancti Michaelis Anno 31 Car. II. In Banco Regis A Prohibition was prayed to the Court of Admiralty upon a Suggestion that the Suit was there upon a Contract made upon the Land The Case was thus A Bargain was made upon the Land with severl Seamen to bring up a Ship from a Port in England to London for a certain Sum to them to be paid And for the Prohibiton 't was alledged that this being upon the Land and a Contract with divers joyntly for a Sum in Gross it could not be within the ordinary Rule of Mariners Wages which is permitted to be Sued for in the Court of Admiralty in favour of the Mariners because they may all joyn in that Court and not be put to the inconvenience of Suing severally as they must at Law but as this Contract is they are to sue joyntly at Common Law But the Prohibition was denied for this must be taken as Mariners Wages And therefore tho' the Contract were upon the Land yet they have Jurisdiction Besides the Party comes after Sentence and therefore in the Courts discretion whether they will then grant a Prohibition Note A Rump Act was made to enable Mariners to Sue for Wages in the Admiralty but yet the Law was taken to be so before Vid. 3 Cro. Anonymus A Prohibition was prayed to the Ecclesiastical Court where the Libel was for these words You are a Whore and Ply in Moorfields And the Suggestion was that the words were spoken in London where an Action lies for such words and for that Cause a Prohibition was granted otherwise Suits might have been in the Court Christian for such words tho' not singly for the word Whore being a common word of brabling otherwise where joyned with words which shew the intent to Defame in that kind Anonymus AN Indebitat ' Assumpsit was brought for Goods sold and delivered The Action was laid in London and a Motion was made to change the Venue upon an Affidavit that the Sale was in Kent But on the other side it was said the delivery was in London and that were the Matter consists of two parts in several Counties the Plaintiff shall have his Election to which the Court agreed Anonymus A Man Covenants with his intended Wife to give her leave to dispose of so much by her Will and then they Intermarry the Husband having given Bond to a third person for the performance of these Covenants after the death of the Wife the Husband is Sued upon the Bond for not permitting her Will to be performed And upon Oyer of the Condition it was insisted on for the Defendant that these Covenants were discharged by the Marriage and so the Bond likewise loseth its force Vid. Hob. 216. Et Adjornatur Anonymus A Motion was made to quash an Inquisition of forcible Entry it was Inquisitio capta per Juratores super Sacramentum suum coram T. S. J. N. Justiciariis c. qui dicunt super Sacramentum praed ' And it was objected That qui dicunt c. referring to the last antecedent it was that the Justices say Sed non allocatur for super Sacramentum praedict ' makes it certain Note The Caption of an Indictment may be amended the same Term it comes into Court Anonymus AN Indictment for not taking upon him and executing the Office of a Constable to which he was chosen by the Leer The question was Whether a Tenant in antient Demesne were obliged to that Office And the Court held that he was Termino Sancti Hillarij Anno 31 32 Car. II. In Banco Regis Anonymus IN Ejectment upon a Special Verdict the case was thus A Lease was made A. and B. for their Lives Remainder to the first Son of A. c. Remainder to the Heirs of A. B. conveys his part to A. The question was Whether the Contingent Remainder to the first Son were destroyed Holt argued that it was For a Contingent Remainder must have some particular Estate of Freehold to support it and by the Release of B. his Estate was gone and there became an intire Fee in A. For by whotsoever means a Joynt tenant for Life conveys his Moiety to his Companion it does not enure by Grant of the Estate but by Release as Eustace and Scawens Case 2 Cro. 696. A. and B. Joynt tenants for Life A. Levy's a Fine to B. B. dies there shall be no Occupancy of the Moiety of A. during the Life of A. Jones 55. and the Case of Lewis Bowels 11 Co. is not to be objected where an Estate for Life was made to B. and F. the Remainder to their first Son that they should have in Tail Remainder to B. and F. in Tail here tho' an Estate in Tail is executed in B. and F. until a Son Born yet after upon the Birth of the Son the Contingent Remainder shall vest and split and divide the former Estate 2 Co. 60.61 but here the Fee becomes executed by several Conveyances but there the Estate
to be done where there has been only a right of Action as in Sawle and Clerke's Case in Jones 211. and Cro. Car. where the Case as to this Point is to this effect A Remainder upon an Estate Tail was divested by the Fine of Tenant in Tail who had made an Estate for Life warranted by the Statute and died without Issue He in the Remainder was barred from bringing a Formedon in the life of the Tenant for Life within Five years after the Fine and had not a new Five years after the death of Tenant for Life tho' he could not Enter in the life of the Tenant for Life And the Reason given in Crook's Reports is because he had no other Right after the Death of the Tenant for Life than he had before and this plainly distinguisheth that and the Case at the Bar from the Cases that have been cited of June and Smye's Case in the 1 Cro. 219. and Laund and Tucker 254. for there the Fine was Levied by the particular Tenant which was a Forfeiture which he in Reversion might choose whether he would take advantage of and as the case might be it would be to his prejudice to take advantage of it where the particular Tenant has charged the Land and therefore if he would he should have Five years after the Estate determined to claim as of his Reversion which is another distinct Right from that of the Forfeiture And this was the standing difference that made the distinction where there should be a new Five years given to him in Reversion after the particular Estate determined and where not as we see in Margaret Podgers Case in the 9 Co. 106. If the Tenant for years were ousted and a Fine levied by the Disseisor he in the Reversion was bound by the first Five years Non-claim because tho' he could not enter as if the Estate for years had been determined or as in the Cases before of the Forfeiture yet he might have immediately brought an Assize with which Sawl and Clarke's Case exactly agrees and goes upon the same Reason As for Freeman's Case the Resolution goes wholly upon the Circumstances of Fraud appearing in the Case the principal of which was That the Lessee continued in possession and paid the Rent I confess they have gone a little further of late and now it is taken That he in Reversion shall have Five years after the Term is ended by effluction of Time tho' there were no Forfeiture incurred at the Levying of the Fine Nor no such plain Circumstances of Fraud as appears in Fermer's Case and the Case put before and cited out of Margaret Podgers Case is not held to be Law The contrary whereof is taken to have been Resolved in Folley and Tancred's Case in the 24 Car. 2. and I do not intend to shake the Authority of that Case but admit it to be good in Law yet I crave leave to observe That it is a Resolution carried beyond the words of the Statute for the Right is not pursued within Five years next after it first came For it is agreed in Fermer's Case fo 79. that there the Construction was against the Letter of the Statute and I must say it is a Construction by Equity which is a little extraordinary to weaken the force of a Statute which was made for the quieting of mens Possessions and to add force to Fines which were of so great regard in Law and especially to make a Construction by Equity contrary to the Reason of the Common Law which took no care of a future Right at all for he in the Reversion in case of a Fine Levied at the Common Law depended wholly upon the Entry or Claim of the particular Tenant and in default of that lost his Estate as in the 1 Inst 262. b. and in Plowden's Commentaries in Stowell's Case I say again I do not design by this to oppose any Case that hath been setled But I confess I should not have gone so far if I had not been led by Authority and am not willing to go a step further And now I shall endeavor to shew that this Case goes a great deal further and would be a greater strain upon the Statute than yet has been And First I Observe that upon all or most of the Cases of a Fine where there has been an Estate for Life or Years in being at the time of the Fine that the Possession has held still in the particular Tenant so that he in Reversion had no reason to suspect any Fine or other thing done upon the Estate there being no alteration of the Possession And this agrees somewhat with the Reason of the Common Law in case of a Fine Executory he that had Right was not bound to claim till there were an Execution of the Fine and Transmutation of the Possession thereupon as in Plowden's Commentaries 257. b. in Stowell's Case But here it is found that the Conusor and not the Conusees or the Tenants by Extent or either of them were in possession so that the Land being in the possession of a Wrong-doer they which had Right ought to have watched and might well suspect that Fines should be Levied to the prejudice of their respective Rights It is said in Fermer's Case If a meer Wrong-doer having got the Possession levieth a Fine on purpose to bind the Right this shall bind notwithstanding his unjust Design But the Differences that I chiefly rely upon to distinguish the Case before us from the Cases of Reversions upon Estates for Life and Years or the like particular Estates are these 1. That in those Estates there is either by an express Limitation of the Parties or an operation of Law a certain and particular Term or End of the Estate which until it happens it has not its proper determination which an Estate by Extent has not I know it is has been much insisted on that the natural and proper determination of an Extent is satisfaction by a perception of Profits according to the extended Value whereas I cannot see but a release of the Debt or satisfaction by a sudden Accident is as properly a determination of the Extent as if it were run out by perception of Profits according to the extended Value For when the first Extent is out of the way the second is immediately to take place or why this acknowledging Satisfactoin on Record should be the natural and proper determination of the Extent more than a Release of the Debt by the Conusee or destroying of it by a Fine which is an higher Record than the Statute or the Entry of Satisfaction acknowledged thereupon 2. To let him that has the Reversion upon an Estate by Extent have Five years to claim after the first Extent run out by perception of Profits or Satisfaction acknowledged is to let in a Claim after an Estate that no man can see to the end of For when it shall be satisfied by the Profits no man can tell and can
Perkins IN Debt upon a Bond entred into Eliz. Perkins who was the Plaintiffs Wife and he as her Administrator brings this Action The Defendant pleads That he delivered the Bond to one Eliz. Perkins his Sister quae obiit sola innupta absque hoe that he delivered it to Elizabeth Perkins the Plaintiffs Wife And to that the Plaintiff Demurres Specially For if it be taken that there are two of the name the Defendant should have pleaded non est factum for it amounts to no more Or at least he ought to have induced his Plea that there were two Elizabeth Perkins But this Traverse is designed to bring the Marriage in question which is not to be tried now Wherefore the Court gave Iudgment for the Plaintiff Twisden said If the Issue be Whether the Wife of such a Man or no This is to be tried per Pais For if she be a Wife de facto it serves upon the Issue But Loyalty of Matrimony is to be tried by the Certificate of the Bishop only 2 Cro. 102. Dightons Case A Mandamus was prayed to the Corporation of Stratford super Avon to restore Dighton the Town Clerk They returned their Letters Patents of Incorporation whereby they had Authority to Grant the Office of Town Clerk Durante bene placito and that he was amoved from his Office by the Mayor and Burgesses It was said that here appeared no Cause of amoval upon the Return which was manifestly needless having Authority to turn them out at their Pleasure But Twisden said It hath béen held that where any such like Power is to chuse one into a Iudicial Office as an Alderman whose place concerns Judicature that they cannot amove him without Cause But this was in a Misterial Office It was further moved That it did not appear that they had discharged him by any matter in Writing under Seal and it could not be by Parol Sed non allocatur for it is returned to be done by the Mayor and Burgesses and a Corporation cannot do any thing by Parol Post An Executor obtained Judgment in Debt in this Court and was afterwards upon an Information here convicted of Forging the Will It was also made void by Sentence in the Ecclesiastical Court Whereupon the Court was moved to vacate the Judgment which they ordered accordingly and the Cause of Vacuteing thereof to be entred upon the Record Vide Ante in Paris's Case King versus Atkins IN Debt upon a Bond the Condition recited That whereas the Plaintiff was bound with the Defendant being an Excise-Man that he should render a true Account in the Exchequer that the Defendant should save him harmless at all times c. The Defendant pleaded non fuit damnificatus The Plaintiff replied That a Scire facias issued out against him c. To which the Defendant demurred because he did not alledge that he gave notice This being spoken to divers times the Court thought notice not requisite in this Case no more than upon a Promise to pay so much at the others Marriage or return into England vid. Hob. 112 113. 1 Bulst 12 and 13. Where it is held upon a Promise notice is not necessary otherwise upon a Bond because of the penalty Ante Chester versus Wilson TRin. 21 Car. 2. Rot. 498. The Case was two Ioyn-tenants the one Grants Bargains and Sells all his Estate and Interest to the other It was held clearly by all the Court That this amounted to a Release but it must be pleaded quod relaxavit for one Ioyn-tenant cannot grant to another Wilson versus Armorer IN Debt against the Heir upon the Bond of his Ancestor who pleaded riens per discent the Jury find a Special Verdict to this effect That the Father was seised of a Mannor in Fee and made a Feoffment of it excepting two Closes for the life of the Feoffor only and refered it to the Iudgment of the Court whether these Closes descended to the Defendant or not So that the Question was Whether the Closes were well excepted or passed by the Feoffment And it was argued by Levins for the Plaintiff That by these words the two Closes were Totally excepted and that the Law should reject the latter words because they cannot take effect according to the Parties intention to reserve to the Feoffor a particular Estate If one surrendred a Copyhold to the use of J. S. and his Heirs which Estate to begin after his death adjudged in 2 Rolls 261. a present Fee simple passed 3 Cro. 344. A Man said to his Son being upon his Land Stand forth Eustace my Son reserving and Estate for mine and my Wifes Life I do give you this Land to you and your Heirs Resolved there that this is a good Feofment Moor 950. Popham 49. A Man possessed of a Term in an House in the right of his Wife granted it excepting the Cellar pro usu suo proprio and held that by these words it was altogether excepted out of the grant 1 Anderson 129. Serjeant Turner è contra For that it is but one Sentence and cited 38 H. 6. 38. An Addowson was granted saving the Presentation to the Grantor during his life and held void and Pl. Com. 156. where it is said if a Termour granted his Term after his Death it is void But if in two Sentences as to grant his Term Habendum after his Death there the Habendum is only void Er Adjurnatur Postea Love versus Wyndham AN Action upon the Case upon an Issue directed out of Chancery upon a Special Verdict the Case was George Searl being seised of the Mannor of N. Demised the same to Nich. Love for 99 years if 3 Lives should so long live N. Love devised it to Dulcibell his Wife the remainder to Nich. his Son for life and if he the said N. the Son should dye without Issue then to Barnaby Love the Plaintiff The Executor assented and whether the Devise to Barnaby were good was the Question Jones for the Plaintiff this is a good possibility I shall make two points First If a Termor Devise first to one and then to another whether he may Devise it over Secondly Whether the Limitation here after the Death without Issue be a good Limitation over First He may make a third Limitation which is a Possibility upon a Possibility at least he may make 2 or 3 such Limitations over I can't certainly say where it will end It can't be denied but that a Termour may Devise first to one for life and after to another 8 Co. 95. But I say he may go further and that will appear by Reason and Authority First By Reason The Reason given why the Executory Devise in the first case is good is because 't is in Construction of Law as much as if he had Devised it to the last first if the first Man should dye within the Term and then had Devised that the first should hold during life and without such a transposition it cannot
there be not an Entry immediately a Livery within the View is not good and in this case by the Marriage he becomes seised in the Right of his Wife and cannot by his own Act divest himself of that Estate or work a prejudice to his Wife by putting the Estate out of her Which makes it differ from the Case of the 38 E. 3. 11. b. Where a man made Livery of the within View to a Woman and before she Entred married her and claimed the Estate in Right of his Wife there held to be a good Feoffment For in that case there is no Alteration of the Estate consequent upon the Intermarriage Neither is it like the Case of 2. R. 2. quoted in Forse and Hemling's Case in the 4 Co. Where a Woman grants a Reversion to a Man and they Intermarry before Attornment For there the Grant is to be perfected by the Act of a Stranger which in reason should be more available to a man than his own Act. But it was Resolved by all the Court that this Livery was well Executed after the Marriage For an Interest passeth by the Livery in View which cannot be countermanded The effectual part of it viz. Go Enter and take possession was before the Marriage tho' the Estate is not in the Feme while Entry She hath done all on her part to be done and hath put it meerly in the Foffor's power and when he Enters it hath a strong retrospect to the Livery and shall be pleaded as a Feoffment when she was sole If two Women Exchange Lands and one marries before Entry this shall not defeat the Exchange The Cases of 2 R. 2. and 38 Ed. 3. are as strong Emerson versus Emerson TRin. ult Rot. 1389. Error of a Judgment in the Common Pleas in an Action of Trespass by the Plaintiff as Executor upon the Statute of 4 E. 3. De bonis asportatis in vita Testatoris The Plaintiff declared that the Defendant blada crescentia upon the Freehold of the Testator messuit defalcavit cepit asportavit Vpon Not Guilty pleaded a Verdict and Judgment was for the Plaintiff and assigned for Error That no Action lay for Cutting of the Corn for that is a Trespass done to the Freehold of the Testator for which the Statute gives the Executor no Action and while the Corn stands 't is to many purposes parcel of the Freehold So that if a man cuts Corn and carries it away presently tho' with a Felonious intent 't is no Felony Otherwise if he let it lye after 't is Cut and at another time comes and steals it So that it appears for parcel of the Trespass no Action lyes then entire Damages being given as well for the Cutting as Carrying away the Corn the Judgment is Erroneous But all the Court were of another Opinion 9 Co. 78. for 't is but one entire Trespass the Declaration only describes the manner of Taking it away Indeed if it had been quare clausum fregit blada asportavit it had been naught or if he had Cut the Corn and let it lye no Action would have lain for the Executor So if the Grass of the Testator be Cut and carryed away at the same time because the Grass is part of the Freehold but Corn growing is a Chattel The Statute of 4 Ed. 3. hath been always Expounded largely Mr. Amhurst's Case of Grays-Inn SErjeant Maynard moved for a Mandatory Writ to the Mayor and Court of Aldermen of London upon the Statute of 13 Car. 2. c. 11. to give Judgment according to the late Act of 22 nunc Regis The Case was That the Act appoints a Market to be on certain Ground set out in Newgate-Market and in all such cases for the satisfaction of the Owners of the Ground if the City cannot agree with them for it it Impowers the Mayor and Aldermen to Empannel a Jury who shall Assess and Adjudge what satisfaction and recompence shall be given to the Owners and says That the Verdict of such Jury on that behalf to be taken and the Judgment of the said Mayor and Court of Aldermen thereupon and the Payment of the Money so awarded or adjudged c. shall be binding and conclusive to and against the Owners c. Now there was Fifteen thousand Foot of Amhurst's Ground taken away for this purpose and a Jury had been Empannelled and had assessed and awarded him Two shillings a Foot but the Mayor and Court of Aldermen refused to give Sentence or Judgment thereupon This says he is a Ministerial thing and this Court will interpose when any Officers will not do Iustice or will out-go their Authority For there is the same Reason to command to do Justice as to prohibit Injustice A Bishop of Exon had Fallen-out with a Town in Cornwal and denyed them Chrisme and a Mandamus went hence to command him to give it them Mr. Noy brought in a Copy of it Sir William Jones This somewhat resembles a Procedendo ad Judicium this is stronger than the Case of commanding a Bishop to grant Administration there this Court commands them to observe a Statute tho' it be in a Matter this Court has no Cognizance of We can't have an Action on the Case Hale If they don't make you Satisfaction your Interest is not bound Maynard But that is taken away by the same Act Pag. 143. 4. We are Lessee to â—he Dean and Chapter of St. Pauls Hale 'T is not Enacted That they shall give Judgment but that is implyed I never knew a Writ commanding to grant Administration tho' the Opinion has been so Sir William Jones That was done in Sir G. Sandy's Case after great Debate Then a Rule was made to shew Cause why a Writ should not go Afterwards the Court granted a Writ but willed them to consider well of the Form and to whom to direct it Loyd versus Brooking TRin. ult 1046. The Case was Tenant for Life Remainder to his first Son in Tail Remainder to J. S. for Life Remainder to his first Son in Tail c. Tenant for Life after the Birth of his first Son accepts a Fine from J. S. to certain uses and then makes a Feoffment after which the Son of J. S. is Born and whether his Contingent Remainder were destroyed or should vest in him was the Question And it was Resolved by the whole Court upon the first Opening that the Contingent Remainder was not destroyed the acceptance of the Fine displaced nothing the Feoffment divested all the Estates but the Right left in the first Son in Remainder supported the Contingent Remainders My Lord Coke's Case 2 Rolls 796 797 is stronger He Covenanted to stand seised to the use of himself for Life Remainder to his Wife for life Remainder to his Daughter for Life when born Remainder to her first Son in Tail And minding to disturb the arising of the Contingent Estates attempted it by these two Means First He grants the Reversion and in the
the Earl of Warwick and the Earl of Manchester or the major part of them And in case she Marries without such Consent or happen to dye without Issue then I give and bequeath it to George Porter viz. the Lessor of the Plaintiff The Earl of Newport dies and the Lady Anne Knolles being of the Age of 14 years marries with Fry without the Consent of her Grandmother or either of the Earls and it was found that she had no Notice of the Will until after the Marriage and that George Porter at that time was of the Age of 8 years and that after the Death of the Countess she Entred and George Porter Entred upon her and made the Lease to the Plaintiff This Case having been twice Argued at the Bar viz. in Michaelmas Term by Sir William Jones for the Plaintiff and Winnington for the Defendant And in Hillary Term last by Finch Attorney General for the Plaintiff and Sir Francis North Solicitor General for the Defendant It was this Term Resolved by the Court viz. Hale Twisden and Rainsford Moreton being absent for the Plaintiff upon these Reasons Rainsford Here have been three Questions made First Whether the words in the Will whereby the marriage of the Defendant is restrained make a Condition or Limitation If a Condition then none but the Heir can Enter for the Breach But 't is clear that they must be taken as a Limitation to support the intent of the Devisor and to let in the Remainder which he limits over 1 Rolls 411. Secondly Whether the Infancy of the Defendant shall excuse her in this Breach and clearly it cannot For a Condition in Deed obliges Infants as much as others 8 Co. 42. Whittingham's Case the difference between Conditions in Fact and Conditions in Law Especially in this Case the nature of the Condition shewing it to be therefore imposed upon her because she was an Infant Thirdly and the main Point of the Case Whether the want of Notice shall save the Forfeiture of the Estate As to that Let the Rules of Law concerning Notice be considered First I take a difference where the Devisee who is to perform the Condition is Heir at Law and where a Stranger The Heir must have Notice because he having a Title by Discent need not take notice of any Will unless it be signified to him And so is Fraunce's Case 8 Co. Where the Heir was Devisee for 60 years upon Condition not to disturb the Executor in removing the Goods and Resolved that he should not lose his Estate upon a Disturbance before he had Notice of the Will But where the Devisee is not Heir as in this Case he must inform himself of the Estate devised to him and upon what terms Another Rule is When one of the Parties is more privy than the other Notice must be given but where the Privity is equal Notice must be taken by the party concerned A Bargainee shall not Enter for a Condition broken before Notice for the Bargain and Sale lies in his Cognizance and not the Lessees So if a Lease be made to commence after the end of the former if the first be surrendred the Lessor shall not Enter for a Condition broken for Non payment of Rent until Notice given of the Surrender 3 Leon. 95. And therefore there shall be no Lapse to the Ordinary upon a Resignation without Notice If a man makes a Feoffment upon Condition to Enter upon payment of such a Sum at a place certain he must give Notice to the Feoffee when he will tender the Money Co. Lir. 211. a. Dyer 354. And upon this Reason is Molineux's Case 2 Cro. 144. where a Devise was that his Heir should pay such Rents and if he made default then his Executors should have the Lands paying the said Rents and if they failed of Payment then he devised the Land to his younger Children to whom the Rents were to be paid It was Resolved Non-payment by the Executors should be no Breach until they had Notice that the Heir had failed which was a thing that the younger Children must be privy to But in 22 E. 4. 27 28. Tenant for Life Lets for years and dies the Lessee must remove in convenient time to be reckoned from the death of the Tenant whether he had Notice of it or no For he in Reversion is presumed to be no more privy to it than himself So Gymlett and Sands's Case 3 Cro. 391. and 1 Rolls 856. where Baron and Feme were Tenants for Life Remainder to the Son in tail Remainder to the right Heirs of the Baron the Baron makes a Feoffment with Warranty and dies then the Feme and Son joyn in a Feoffment this is a Forfeiture of the Estate of F. tho' she had no Notice of the Feoffment or Warranty whereby the Right of the Son was bound So Spring and Caesar's Case 1 Rolls 469. A. and B. joyn in a Fine to the use of A. in Fee if B. doth not pay 10 l to A. before Michaelmas and if he doth then to the use of A. for Life Remainder to B. B. dies before Michaelmas the Heir of B. is bound to pay the 10 l without any Notice given by A. The Reason given which comes home to our Case is For that none is bound to give Notice and then it must be taken tho' indeed a second be added For that B. from whom his Heir derives had Notice The Mayor and Comminalty of London aganst Atford 1 Cro. where a Devise was to six Persons to pay certain Sums for the Maintenance of an Almshouse c. and if through Obliviousness or other Cause the Trusts were not performed then to J. S. upon the same Condition and if he failed by two Months then to the Mayor and Comminalty of London upon the same Trusts The six did not perform the Trusts J.S. enters J. N. enters upon him and a Fine with Proclamations was levied and Five years passed and the better Opinion was that the Mayor and Comminalty of London were bound to pay the Money appointed by the Will altho' they had no Notice that the six persons or J. S. had failed tho' indeed the Case is adjudged against them as being barred by the Fine and Non-claim Sir Andrew Corbet's Case 4 Co. is very strong to this purpose where a Devise is to J. S. until he shall or may raise such a Sum out of the Profits of the Land If a Stranger Enters after the death of the Devisor tho' the Devisee had no Notice of the Will yet the time shall run on as much as if he had the Land in his own possession These Rules being applied to the present Case it will appear no Notice is to be given First The Defendant is as privy to the Will as any one else viz. as George Porter who is found also to be an Infant It is not found whether there were any Executors if it had they were not concerned to give Notice nor did it
Respondeas Ouster But because the Plaintiff said he would be content with the latter that was not Resolved Anonymus IN Trespass Quare clausum fregit 't is a Plea in Abatement to say That the Plaintiff is Tenant in Common with another But cannot be given in Evidence upon Not Guilty as it may where one Tenant in Common brings Trespass against the other Peters versus Opie THe Case was moved again and Hale held clearly that the Promise being pro labore tho' there was also a Counter-Promise did carry in it a Condition precedent viz. That the work should be done first And he said that in Cases tried before him where the Declaration was upon Reciprocal Promises if it appeared upon the Evidence that the Intention was that the Plaintiffs part was to be performed before the Defendants he directed against the Plaintiff and would not have the Defendant driven to his Cross Action Twisden strongly to the contrary Pro labore says he is no more than would have been implied if those Words had been omitted then 't is within the Case of Reciprocal Promises The Case cited in Ughtred's Case 7 Co. A. Covenants to B. to serve him in the Wars B. Covenants to pay him so much for it an Action lies for the Money without averment of the Service done because of the mutual Remedy Hale was now of Opinion that the Plaintiffs saying parat ' fuit obtulit to do the Work tho' he did not say and the other refused yet it was a sufficeint Averment after a Verdict The Case of Vivian and Shipping 3 Cro. 384. in an Assumpsit upon a Promise to perform an Award the Plaintiff said licet He had performed all on his part c. which tho' no good Averment in Form yet held it aided by the Verdict Wherefore tho' they could not agree in the other matter yet Judgment was given for the Plaintiff Ante. King versus Melling IN an Ejectment the Case was thus found in a Special Verdict John Melling was seised in Fee and had Issue Barnard and John and by his Will in Writing devised to Barnard for and during his Natural life and after his decease to such Issue as he should have of the Body of his second Wife his first then being alive and if no such Issue hapned then to John Melling provided that Barnard might make a Joynture to his Wife which she should enjoy for her Life The Devisor dies Barnard suffers a Recovery to the use of himself in Fee and after Covenanted to stand seised to the use of his Wife for her Joynture for Life and died without Issue by any second Wife The Question was Whether the Wife had a good Estate or that J. Melling in Remainder had the Right It was Argued for John Melling First That Barnard Melling had only an Estate for Life by this Devise Indeed if it had been to him and his Issue which he should have by the second Wife that would have been an Entail but here 't is expresly given to him for his Life The Case of Wiat Wield 8 Co. 78. b. is full to this A Devise to a man and his Children is an Estate Tail if he hath none at the time But if the Devise were to a man for his Life and after his Decease to his Children there whether he had Children or no at the time they take by way of Remainder either contingent or vested So Archer's Case 1 Co. 1 Rolls 837. A Devise to his Son for Life the Remainder to the Sons of his Body lawfully begotten the Son takes only an Estate for Life because so expresly limited Then the Recovery destroys this Contingent Remainder and so also the power of appointing a Joynture to his Wife For 't is not a bare Collateral Power but annexed to his Estate and therefore extinguishes in the Conveyance of it But admitting it were still in him yet he did not well execute it which should have been in such manner as it might have taken effect by the Will and not to arise upon a Covenant to stand seised On the other side it was Argued that it was an Estate Tail in Barnard Melling and no Remainder contingent to the Issue For there a Remainder is said to be contingent where the first Estate may fail before 't is ascertained whether the Contingent will happen or no here if it be an Entail Barnard Melling hath it for his Life and the Issue had nothing until after his decease So 't is but an Expressio eorum quae tacite insunt Again The Power remains notwithstanding the Recovery for 't is collateral to the Estate If Executors have Authority to make a Feoffment for the payment of the Testator's Debts if they should first make a Feoffment to another purpose this would not determine their Power but they might afterwards execute it in performance of the Will 1 Co. in Albany's Case Hale It seems very strong upon Weild's Case that Barnard Melling hath but an Estate for Life if it were devised to him and after his decease to his Issue I should think that to be an Estate Tail but here the express Words are for his Life A Devise to one for his Life and after his decease to his Heir that hath been held a Fee for Heir is nomen Collectivum But Archer's Case 1 Co. is a Devise to A. for his Life and after to his Heir and the Heirs of that Heir there because the words of limitation were put to the Heir therefore Heirs was taken to be but designatio personae and Resolved he should take by Purchase Vid. Anderson 110. Construction must be according to the express words of the Will A Devise to Two equally to be divided between them and to the Survivor of them makes a Joyntenancy upon the express import of the last Words Twisden A Devise to one for Life in perpetuity makes but an Estate for Life only 15 H. 7. Hale 'T is considerable also that he adds a Power to make a Joynture which would have been useless if he had intended him in an Estate Tail And this Power is in the nature of an Emolument annexed to his Estate which seems to be destroyed by the Recovery neither hath he well executed his Power for after the Recovery he became seised in Fee so the Covenant to stand seised may work upon that Estate and so shall not be taken in pursuance of his Authority which possibly it might have been if he had but an Estate for Life for without reference to that it would have been ineffectual quando non valet quod ago ut ago valeat quantum valere potest And this is agreeable to the Learning in Sir Edward Clere's Case in the 6 Co. The Court seemed pretty clear in these Points but because it was upon the first Argument they gave leave to the parties to speak to it again if they thought fit Et Adjornatur Post Goffe's Case A Trial at Bar was had upon an Indictment
word Children My second Reason is from the manner of the Limitation which is to his Issue and of his Body lawfully begotten upon the second Wife Phrases agreeable to an Estate Tail and the meaning of a Testator is to be spelled out by little Hints It is admitted in Wild's Case in the 6 Co. 17. that if the Devise had been to the Children of their Bodies it would have been an Entail Thirdly It appears by the Devise that the Testator knew there could be no Children at that time and shall not be supposed to intend a contingent Remainder Fourthly It appears that the Testator did not intend to prefer the Children of the first Wife of Bernard but did the Children of the second and therefore cannot be thought to mean that John the younger Brother of Bernard should take before failure of the Issue which Bernard should have by his second Wife And to this purpose is Spalding's Case 3 Cro. 185. A Devise to his eldest Son and the Heirs of his Body after the death of his Wife and if he died living the Wife then to his Son N. And devised other Lands to another Son and the Heirs of his Body and if he died without Issue then to remain c. The first Son died living the Wife It was strongly urged that his Estate should cease for being said If he died living the Wife this was a Corrective of what went before But 't was Ruled by all the Court that it was an absolute Estate Tail in the first Son as if the words had been If he died without Issue living the Wife for he could not be thought to intend to prefer a younger Son before the Issue of his eldest Fifthly The words are further and for want of such Issue then to John which words in a Will do often make an Estate Tail by Implication As 4 Jac. Robinson's Case A Devise to A. for Life and if he died without Issue then to remain A. took an Entail So Burley's Case 43 Eliz. A Devise to A. for Life Remainder to the next Heir Male and for default of such Heir Male then to remain Adjudged an Estate Tail 'T is true Dyer 171. is where Lands were Devised to a man and the Heirs Males of his Body and if he died without Issue c. these last words did not make a Tail General to the Devisee For an Implication of an Estate of Inheritance shall never ride over an express limitation of an Inheritance before being 't is said here for want of such Issue the Land should remain 't is plainly meant that it should not before the Issue failed and then the Issue must have it so long for none else can and so 't is an Estate Tail I come now to Authorities 6 Eliz. Anderson num 86. Moor pl. 397. A Devise to his Son for Life and after his decease to the Men Children of his Body said to be an Estate Tail and so cited by Coke in that Book and so contrary to his Report of it in Wild's Case Bendloes num 124. But that Case is not so strong as this for Children is not so operative a word as Issue Rolls 839. A Devise to his eldest Son for Life non aliter for so were the words tho' not printed in the Book and after his decease to the Sons of his Body it was but an Estate for Life by reason of the words Non aliter Hill 13 Car. 2. Rot. 121. Wedgward's Case A Devise to his Son Thomas for Life and after his decease if he died without Issue living at his death then to the Daughter c. it was held to be an Estate for Life But were it an Estate Tail or no it was not necessary to be Resolved the Case depending upon the destruction or continuance of a Contingent Remainder which would have been gone had the Devise made an Estate Tail again there being an express Devise for Life they would not raise a larger Estate by Implication Again Wild's Case where Lands were Devised to A. for Life Remainder to B. and the Heirs of his Body Remainder to Wild and his Wife and after their decease to their Children And the Court of Kings-Bench were at first divided Indeed it was afterwards adjudged an Estate for Life to Wild and his Wife First Because having limited a Remainder in Tail to B. by express and the usual words if he had meant the same Estate in the second Remainder 't is like he would have used the same words Secondly It was not after their decease to the Children of their Bodies for then there would be an Eye of an Estate Tail Thirdly The main Reason was because there were Children at the time of the Devise and that was the only Reason the Resolution went upon in the Exchequer Chamber And tho' it be said in the latter end of the Case That if there were no Children at that time every Child born after might take by Remainder 't is not said positively that they should take And it seems to be in opposition to their taking presently but however that be it comes not to this Case For tho' the word Children may be made nomen collectivum the word Issue is nomen collectivum of it self Hill 42. and 43 Eliz. Bifield's Case A Devise to A. and if he dies not having a Son then to remain to the Heirs of the Testator Son was there taken to be used as nomen collectivum and held an Entail I come now to answer Objections First 'T is objected that in this Case the Limitation is expresly for Life and in that respect stronger than Wild's Case And this is the great difficulty But I Answer That tho' these words do weigh the Intention that way yet they are ballanced by an apparent Intention that weighs as much on the other side which is That as long as Bernard should have Children that the Land should never go over to John for there was as much reason to provide for the Issue of the Issue as the first Issue Again A Tenant in Tail has to many purposes but an Estate for Life Again 'T is possible that he did intend him but an Estate for Life and 't is by consequence and operation of Law only that it becomes an Estate Tail 1651. Hansy and Lowther The Case was A Copyholder surrendred to the use of his Will and Devised to his first Son for Life and after his decease to the Heir Male of his Body c. This was Ruled to be an Estate Tail and this differs from Archer's Case in the 1st of Co. for that the Devise there was for Life and after to the Heir Male and the Heirs of the Body of that Heir Male There the words of Limitation being grafted upon the word Heir it shews that the word Heir was used as Designatio personae and not for Limitation of the Estate So is the Case of Clerk and Day 1 Cro. 313. Another Objection was That there being a Power appointed
to Bernard to make his Wife a Joynture it shews that it was intended he should have but an Estate for Life which needed such a Power and not an Estate Tail for then he might have made a Joynture without it I Answer That Tenant in Tail cannot by virtue of such Estate make a Joynture without discontinuing or destroying his Estate Sed Judicium pro Quer ' There being Justice Twisden and Justice Rainsford against the Chief Justice Termino Sancti Hillarij Anno 24 25 Car. II. In Banco Regis Anonymus A Prohibition was prayed to the Ecclesiastical Court for that they Cited one out of the Diocess to Answer a Suit for a Legacy But it was denied because it was in the Court where the Probat of the Will was For tho' it were before Commissioners appointed for the Probat of Wills in the late Times yet now all their Proceedings in such cases are transmitted into the Prerogative Court And therefore Suits for the Legacies contained in such Wills ought to be in the Archbishop's Court for there the Executor must give account and be discharged c. Note When a man is in custodia Marescalli any man may Declare against him in a Personal Action and if he be bailed out he is still in custodia to this purpose viz. quoad Declarations brought in against him that Term For the Bail are as it were Delegated by the Court to have him in Prison Hob. Error is not well assigned That there was no Bail filed unless added That the Defendant was not in custodia Debt IN an Action of Debt upon a Sheriffs Bond the Case was this A man was Arrested upon a Latitat in placito Transgr ' ac etiam bille pro 40 l de debito And the Condition of the Bond given to the Sheriff was to appear at the Day of the Return of the Writ to answer to the Plaint in plito debito And it was urged that this made the Bond void by the Statute of 23 H. 6. for the Condition should have been to Appear at the Day to Answer in the Action upon which the Process went out and that was in this Case but an Action of Trespass and the adding the Ac etiam debiti c. is but to satisfie the late Act and for Direction to the Sheriff to what Value he shall require Bail And it was usual to Endorse the Cause of Action before the Statute upon the Latitats that the Sheriff might insist upon Bail accordingly So this is a material Variance from the Statute and not like some of these which are remembred in Beaufage's Case in the 10 Co. and Dyer 364. And to this the Court inclined And Hale Cited a Case between Button and Low adjudged Mich. 1649. An Attachment went out of Chancery to answer Coram nobis in Cancellaria ubicunque c. and the Sheriff took a Bond Conditioned to Appear Coram Rege in Cancellaria ubicunque c. apud Westmonasterium And for the addition of Westminster the Bond was held to be void Anonymus THe Court was moved for a Prohibition to the Archbishop's Court to stop their Proceedings in a Cause belonging to the Jurisdiction of Durham upon a Suggestion that the Dean and Chapter of Durham Sede vacante have Cognizance there as Guardians of the Spiritualties And the Court granted a Prohibition for the Right of Jurisdiction was tryed between the Archbishop and Dean and Chapter the last Term and found against the Archbishop and therefore he was concluded by the Verdict until the Record was reversed by Error or Attaint Thodie's Case THody and two others were Indicted for that Conspiratione inter eos habita they enticed J. S. to play and cheated him with False Dice Thody pleaded and was found Guilty the others not having pleaded It was moved that Judgment might not be Entred against him until the others came in for being laid by way of Conspiracy if the rest should chance to be acquitted no Judgment could be given against him And so is 14 H. 6. 25. Hale said If one be Acquitted in an Action of Conspiracy the other cannot be Guilty But where one is found Guilty and the other comes not in upon Process or if he dies hanging the Suit yet Judgment shall be upon the Verdict against the other And so is 18 E. 3. 1. and 24 E. 3. 34. Wild said The difference was where the Suit was upon Conspiracy wherein the Villanous Judgment was to be given and where the Conspiracy is laid only by way of Aggravation as in this Case Hale said It would be the same in an Action against two upon the Case for Conspiracy but not in such Actions where tho' there be a Charge of Conspiracy yet the Gift of the Action is upon another matter But the Court said They would give him two or three days for the bringing in of the other two and defer the Entry of the Judgment in the mean time Methyn versus the Hundred of Thistleworth THe Case was moved again by North Solicitor He urgrd for the Plaintiff That the Issue being Whether they took the Felon upon Fresh Suit It being not found that there was any actual Taking or that the Fresh Suit continued until Sir J. Ash found the Felon in the presence of Sir P. Warwick Also it was found that Sir J. Ash was a Justice of Peace and therefore it was his duty to Apprehend him To this it was Answered That the Statute of Winton upon which the Action is founded and not upon the 27 of Eliz. and therefore it is ill if it concludes contra formam Statutorum doth not say shall Take but shall Answer the Bodies of the Offenders which is Answer them to Justice And therefore if the Felon be taken upon another account and the Country finding him in Prison cause him to be Indicted this satisfies the Statute Goldsb 55. Again it was more decent for Sir John Ash being concerned as an Inhabitant of the Hundred to leave this Matter to the other Justice of the Peace for it has been known that Justices of the Peace have been Censured in the Star-Chamber for being too forward to interpose in their own business But if it were an omission of the Duty of his Office that could not be Objected to him as an Inhabitant having done enough to satisfie the Statute of Winton Wild said That the Defendant should have Demurred because the Issue is ill joyned viz. absque hoc that he took him super eadem recenti insecutione For if he were not immediately taken upon Fresh pursuit it were sufficient but the Verdict finding Fresh Suit was made it may be taken by Intendment which shall help out a Special Verdict that it was directed this way and continued until the finding of him in the presence of Sir P. Warwicke Et sic Judicium pro Def. Ante. Dacres versus Duncomb IN Trover after Imparlance the Defendant pleaded That the Plaintiff with two others brought Trover for the
five years pass Whether the Lessor should have five years after the Term expired was the question and after the hearing of Arguments the Court resolved that he should as well as when Lessee for Life levies a Fine which differs not in reason from this Case for there the Lessor may have his Writ de consimili casu presently as here he may bring his Assize And though in 9 Co. Podgers Case 'T is said that where Lessee for years is ousted by a Disseisor who levies a Fine if five years pass without claim the Lessor is barred that is not the same with this Case for the Disseissor comes in without the consent of the Lessee and of his own wrong and if he can defend his Possession five years he shall hold it but here all is done with the privity and by the means of the Lessee who is trusted with the Possession and it would be of most mischievous import to Mens Inheritances if they should not have five years after the Lease ended and it being put of a Disseisin in Podger's Case seems to imply the contrary in other Cases and tho' there were many notorious Circumstances of fraud in Fermours Case which Co. in his report of it lays much weight upon yet it does not thence follow that the Law is not the same where there are not such evidences of fraud In other Books where that case is reported the resolution does not seem to go so much upon the particularities of the Fraud 'T is Fraud apparent in the Lessee Wilston versus Pilkney IN Debt for Rent the Plaintiff declared that the Dean and Chapter of c. demised to the Defendant for Life by force of which he entred and demised the Land to the Plaintiff for years by virtue of which he was possessed and afterward granted to the Defendant reserving a Rent for which he brings his Action To this Declaration the Defendant Demurrs First Because he doth not say of the Deans Demise hic in Curia prolat ' which Demise must be by Deed. Secondly He says that the Defendant entred by force thereof which is impertinent to be alledged upon a Lease for Life because Livery implies it Thirdly As to the matter that the Reservation was void it being upon a surrender by Parol A Rent cannot be reserved upon a Feoffment by Parol so where Lessee for life or years assigns over his whole interest 12 H. 4. 14. 9 H. 6. 43. 12 H. 4. 17. also no Rent can be reserved upon a Conveyance that works an Extinguishment unless by Deed where it is good upon the contract Peto's Case 3 Cro. 101. is that a Surrender drowns the interest to all intents and purposes between the Parties Dier 251. The Tenant for Life agreed with him in Reversion that he should have his Land for the Annual Rent of 20 s 't is doubted there whether this amounts to a Surrender there being no Deed or Livery But in 2 Rolls 497. 't is said if it had been a Surrender the reservation had béen void Hale I do most doubt of the first exception because the Deed was not produced And for the second it were better pleading to have said by force of which he was seized but that 's not of necessity And as to the matter the Court resolved for the Plaintiff For 1. The Reservation was good by the contract tho' without Deed. And so it was adjudged in this Court in Manly's Case that Tenant for years might assign his whole Term by Parol rendring Rent so in the Case of Purcas and Owen 23 Car. But it was doubted whether an Action would lye until the last day were past 'T is all one where the Grant is made to him in Reversion which is not actually but consequentially a Surrender by operation of Law before which the contract is perfected upon which the Rent arises 7 E. 4. is that the Lessee may Surrender upon Condition and there is no reason why a Rent cannot be created upon it as well as a Condition If it were in the case of Tenant for Life a Deed were requisite as well for a Rent as a Condition in respect of the Freehold but that is not so in case of Tenant for years Vide Postea Cartwright and Pinkney Termino Sanctae Trinitatis Anno 25 Car. II. In Banco Regis Hanslap versus Cater IN Error upon a Judgment in the Court of Coventry where the Plaintiff Cater declared That the Defendant being indebted to him infra Jurisdictionem Curiae pro diversis Bonis Mercimoniis ante tunc venditis deliberatis did then and there assume c. Vpon Non Assumpsit pleaded and a Verdict and Judgment for the Plaintiff the Error assigned was That the Goods were not alledged to be sold within the Jurisdiction of the Court. Hale and Wild seemed to be of Opinion that it was well enough the being indebted and the promise being laid to be within the Jurisdiction Twisden Contra and said he had known many Judgments reversed for the same Cause It being moved again this Term Hale consented that it should be reversed according as the latter Presidents have been for he said it was his Rule Stare decisis Parsons and Muden Pasch 22. Car. 2. Rot. out of Barnstaple Court John Brown's Case HE was indicted upon the Statute of 3 H. 7. cap. 2. for the forcible taking away and marrying of one Lucy Ramsy of the Age of fourteen years having to her Portion 5000 l He was tried at the Bar and the fact appeared upon the Evidence to be thus She was inveigled into Hide Park by one Mrs. P. confederate with Brown who had prepared a Coach for that purpose to take the Air in an Evening about the latter end of May last and being in the Park the Coachman drove away from the rest of the company which gave opportunity to Brown who came to the Coach side in a Vizar-mask and addressing himself first to Mrs. P. soon perswaded her out of the Coach and then pulls out a Maid servant there attending Mrs. Ramsy and then gets himself into the Coach and there detains her until the Coachman carried them to his Lodgings in the Strand where the next Morning he prevails upon her having first threatned to carry her beyond Sea if she refused to Marry him but was the same day apprehended in the same House It was a first doubted whether the Evidence of Lucy Ramsy was to be admitted because she was his Wife de facto tho' not de jure But the Court seriatim delivered their Opinions that she was to be admitted a Witness First For that there was one continuing force upon her from the beginning till the Marriage wherefore whatsoever was done while she was under that violence was not to be respected Secondly As such Cases are generally contrived so hainous a Crime would go unpuished unless the Testimony of the Woman should be received Thirdly In Fulwoods Case reported in 1 Cro. which was read in the
c. be indicted for not repairing of a Way within their Precinct they cannot plead Not guilty and give in Evidence that another by Prescription or Tenure ought to repair it for they are chargeable de communi Jure and if they would discharge themselves by laying it elsewhere it must be pleaded Error ERror to Reverse a Judgment in Debt upon a Bond given in Norwich Court where by the Custom the plea of the Defendant was quod non dedicit factum sed petit quod inquiratur de debito First It was moved to be Error for that the Venire was XII Men c. in figures Sed non allocatur for being in these letters XII and not in the figures 12. it was well enough Secondly It was ad triandum exi tum whereas there was no Issue joyned wherefore it ought to have been ad inquirend ' de debito c. Sed non allocatur for the Presidents are as the Case is here Thirdly The Condition of the Bond was to pay at Alborough and that ought to have been shewn to be within the Jurisdiction of the Court Sed non allocatur for the Plea here is not payment secund ' formam Conditionis but the Jury is to inquire by the custom of all manner of payments and discharges Fourthly In the Record it was continued over to several Courts and in the Court where the Judgment is given 't is said in Curia praedicta and so incertain which but notwithstanding these matters the Iudgment was affirmed Anonymus THe Case upon Evidence at a Tryal in Ejectment was this a Dean and Chapter having a right to certain Land but being out of Possession Sealed a Lease with a Letter of Attorney to deliver it upon the Land which was done accordingly and held to be a good Lease for tho' the putting the Seal of a Corporation aggregate to a Deed carries with it a delivery yet the Letter of Attorney to deliver it upon the Land shall suspend the operation of it while then Tenant for Life being in Debt to defraud his Creditors commits a Forfeiture to the end that he in Reversion may enter who is made privy to the contrivance The Opinion of Hale was that the Creditors should avoid this as well as any fraudulent Conveyance Anonymus IN an Ejectment upon a Tryal at Bar for Lands in antient Demesne there was shewn a Recovery in the Court of antient Demesne to cut off an Entail which had been suffered a long time since and the Possession had gone accordingly But there was now objected against it First That no sufficient Evidence of it appeared because the Recovery it self nor a Copy of it was shewn for in truth it was lost But the Court did admit other proof of it to be sufficient and said if a Record be lost it may be proved to a Jury by Testimony as the Decree in H. 8. time for Tythe in London is lost yet it hath been often allowed that there was one Secondly It appeared that a part of the Land was leased for Life and the Recovery with a single Voucher was suffered by him in Reversion and so no Tenant to the Praecipe for those Lands But in regard the Possession had followed it for so long time the Court said they would presume a Surrender as in an Appropriation of great Antiquity there has been presumed a Licence tho' none appeared Thirdly It was objected That the Tenant in Tail which suffered the Recovery having first accepted of a Fine sur Conusans de droit come ceo his Estate Tail was changed for he was estopped during his Life to say that he had any other Estate than Fee then he being made Tenant to the Praecipe the Recovery was not of the Estate Tail and so should not bind But the Court held clearly that the acceptance of this Fine made no alteration of his Estate If Tenant for Life accepts such a Fine 't is a Forfeiture because he admits the Reversion to be in a Stranger but it does not change his Estate so where two joynt-Joynt-tenants in Fee accept a Fine which is to the Heirs of one of them yet they continue Joynt-tenants in Fee as they were before Fourthly The Writ of Right Close did express the Land to lie in such a Mannor and a Praecipe that demands Land ought to mention the Vill in which they lie for a Praecipe of Land in Parochia or in Manerio is not good But this exception was disallowed by the Court for Hale said the Writ of Right Close is directed Ballivis Manerij c. quod plenum rectum teneant of the Land within the Precinct of the Mannor and it is not to be resembled to another Praecipe But if a Praecipe be faulty in that Point unless exception be taken to it in Abatement it cannot be assigned for Error but if it were Erroneous the Recovery would bind until reversed Note After Judgment quod computet tho' it be not the final Judgment yet no motion is to be admitted in Arrest of Judgment and after such Judgment a Scire facias lies against the Executor of the Defendant Note In an Action of Debt against the Lessee he may plead nil debet and give the expulsion in Evidence Anonymus IN an Assumpsit the consideration appeared to be that the Defendant promised to pay a Sum of Money which he owed this is no good consideration tho' after a Verdict unless it appeared that the Debt was become remediless by the Statute of Limitations but payment of a Debt without Suit is a good consideration Anonymus A Justice of the Peace brought an Action of Slander for that the Defendant said He was not worth a Groat and that he was gone to the Dogs and upon motion in Arrest of Judgment notwithstanding that it was urged to maintain it that the Statute of H. 6. requires that a Justice of Peace should have 40 l a year And therefore in regard an Estate was necessary to his Office that the Action would lie yet the Judgment was stayed for such words will not bear an Action unless the person of whom they are spoken lives by buying and selling Anonymus IT was returned upon Elegit that the Sheriff had delivered medietatem Terrar ' Tenementorum in extent and after the Filing and Entry of it upon the Record the Plaintiff moved to quash it because it was insufficient for the Sheriff ought upon such Execution to deliver the Possession by Metes and Bounds Wild held that it being entred upon the Record there was no avoiding of it but by Writ of Error But Hale held that in regard it appeared by the Record to be void it might be quashed as if upon an Ejectment to recover Possession upon such a return it appears upon the Evidence that there was more than the half the Land delivered this shall be avoided So if a Fieri facias be not warranted by the Judgment upon which it is awarded tho' the Sheriff shall be
excused yet 't is merely void as to the Party Et Ad jornatur Norton versus Harvey THe Case was an Executor being possessed of a Term let part of it reserving a Rent and died And the Question was whether his Executor should have the Rent or the Administrator de bonis non It was argued for the Executor that this Rent is meerly due by the Contract and not incident to the Reversion and the Administrator is in Paramount it being now as if the Testator had died Intestate and therefore before the Statute of this King such Administrators could not have had a Scire facias upon a Judgment obtained by the Executor tho' in the Case of Cleve and Vere 3 Cro. 450 457. 't is held that he may have a Liberate where the Executor had proceeded in the Execution of a Statute so far as an Extent for there the thing is executed and not meerly Executory as a Judgment If a Man that hath a Term in the right of his Wife le ts part of it reserving a Rent the Wife surviving shall not not have the Rent On the other side it was said that this case differed from that because the Reservation here is by him that had the whole Right executed in him Another objection against the Action was that here in the Declaration being in Covenant for Non payment of Rent there is not any demand alledged But that was answered because the Covenant was to pay such a Sum for the Rent expresly but if the Condition of a Bond be for performance of Covenants expressed in such a Lease one of which is for payment of Rent in that case the Bond will not be forfeit without a demand and of that Opinion were the Court and that the Executor should have the Rent but when recovered Hale said it should be Assets in his Hands And accordingly Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Termino Sanctae Trinitatis Anno 26 Car. II. In Banco Regis Silly versus Silly DOwer of 300 Acres of Land 200 Acres of Pasture 100 Acres Meadow The Tenant pleaded Non Tenure The Jury found him Tenant as to 320 Acres of Land and as to the rest that he was not Tenant And the Iudgment was that the Demandant should recover the 320 Acres Error was assigned in this Court that the Verdict and Judgment were for more Acres of Land than were demanded But on the other side it was said Land was a general word and might include Meadow and Pasture Curia In a Grant Land will extend to Meadow Pasture c. but in Pleading it signifies Arable only and here in regard they are distinguished in the Count the Verdict and Judgment must be reversed for the whole Tho' Hale said antiently such Iudgment would have been reversed but for the surplusage Vid Post Batmore Vxor versus Graves TRover for a 100 Loads of Wood upon a Special Verdict the Case was this Copyhold Land was surrendred to the use of J. S. for years Remainder to the Brother of the Plaintiff's Wife who died before the Term expired and so was not admitted any otherwise than by the admission of the Tenant for years And it was resolved First That the admittance of him that had the Estate for years was an admittance for him in the Remainder 4 Co. 23. a. 3 Cro. 504. Fine sur Grant and render to A. for Life Remainder to B. Execution sued by A. serves for B. So an Attornment to Tenant for Life serves for him in Remainder and this brings no prejuduce to the Lord for a Fine is not due until after admittance and the Lord may Assess one Fine for the particular Estate and another Fine for the Remainder But Wild said he need not pay it until his Estate comes in Possession after a Surrender the Estate remains in the Surrender before admittance of the Cestuy que use yet where Borough English Land was Surrendred to the use of J. S. and his Heirs and he died before admittance It was held that the younger Son should have it Secondly It was resolved that the Possession of the Tenant for years was so the Possession of him in Remainder as to make a Possessio Fratris But then it was moved that the Conversion was laid after the Marriage and so the Feme ought not to have joyned with her Husband in the Action But the Court held that in regard the Trover was laid to be before the Marriage which was the inception of the cause of Action the Wife might be joyned as if one has the Custody of a Womans Goods and afterward Marries her she may joyn in Detinue with her Husband for in case of Bailment the Proprietor is to some purposes in Possession and to some out of Possession Hale said in this case the Husband might bring the Action alone or joyntly with his Wife And so Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Anonymus IN Debt upon a Bond the Condition was to save the Obligee harmless from another Bond. The Defendant pleaded Non damnificatus The Plaintiff replies that the Money was not paid at the day and he devenit onerabilis and could not attend his business for fear of an Arrest The Defendant rejoyns that he tendred the Money at the day absque hoc that the Plaintiff devenit onerabilis to which it was Demurred and the Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff for the Money not being paid at the day the Counter Bond is forfeited Vid. 1 Cro. 672. 5 Co. and the Traverse in this case is naught The Mayor and Commonalty of London versus Dupester IN Debt for a Duty accruing to the City for Timber imported called Scavage The Declaration was that they were and had been a Corporation time out of mind and their Customs were confirmed by Act of Parliament Temps R. 2. c. The Defendant tendred his Law and Co. Entries 118. was cited where in Debt for an Amerciament in a Court Baron tho' the imposing of it was grounded upon a Prescription yet Wager of Law was admitted But notwithstanding in this case the Court overruled the Wager of Law for here the Duty it self is by Prescription and that confirmed by Act of Parlimant Debt for a Duty growing by a By-Law if the By-Law be Authorised by Letters Patents no Wager of Law lies So in Debt for Toll granted by Letters Patents 20 H. 7. Termino Sancti Michaelis Anno 26 Car. II. In Banco Regis Silly versus Silly THe Case was moved again And the Court said that the Demandant might have taken Judgment for the 300 Acres only habito nullo respectu to the rest and released all the Damages But this was not proper for an Amendment the Mistake being in the Verdict but if it could have been amended in the Common Bench the Court might here have made such Amendment Ante. Burfoot versus Peal A Scire facias was brought against the Bail who pleaded that the Principal paid the Debt ante diem impetrationis Brevis
own Wrong as to enforce the Lessee to pay any thing for the residue Otherwise of a Rightful Entry into part as in the Case at Bar. 'T is true in Ascough's Case in the 9 Co. 't is said a Rent cannot be suspended in part and in esse for part And so in the 4 Co. Rawlin's Case it is held That the whole Rent is suspended where part is Redemised to the Lessor But the Court observed that the Resolution of that Point was not necessary to the Judgment given in that Case which was upon the Extinguishment of the Condition which is entire and not to be apportioned But as to the Rent no Book was found to warrant such an Opinion but Brook tit Extinguishment 48. where 't is said If there be Lord and Tenant by three Acres and the Tenant lets one to the Lord for years the whole Rent is suspended This Case is not found in the Book at large An in 7 Ed. 3. 56 57. where a Formedon was brought of a Rent-Service issuing out of three Acres and as to one Acre it was pleaded that the Demandant himself was Sole seised and concluded Judgment of the Writ But it was Ruled to be a Plea to the Action for so much and to the rest the Tenant must answer which is a full Authority that in such case the Rent is to be apportioned And the Case of Dorrell and Andrews Rolls tit Extinguishment 938. is full in the Point That where Lessee for years let ts at Will which Lessee Licenses the Lessor to enter that the Entry of the Lessor thereupon shall not suspend his Rent For Hale said Tho' it might be Objected that in regard the Lessee at Will cannot lett the Entry of the Lessor thereupon might be a Disseisin but that is ever at the Election of the Lessor And if that were now the Question perhaps the Lessor cannot take such an Entry for a Desseisin It is the Common Experience that where it comes to be tryed upon Nil debet if it be shewn that the Lessor entred into part to Answer this by proving it was the Lease of the Lessee and if the Law should not go upon this difference it would shake abundance of Rents it being a frequent thing for a Lessor to Hire a Room or other part of the thing demised for his Conveniency Hale said That a Case of a Lease for years was stronger than a Lease for Life where the remedy is by Assize and the Tenants of the Land out of which the Rent issues are to be named And for a Condition that must be extinct where part of the thing Demised comes to the Lessor because 't is annexed to such a Rent in quantity For if the Rent be diminished the Condition must fail Holland versus Ellis IN Trespass Quare clausum fregit herbas conculc ' diversas carectat ' tritici ibid ' asportavit After Verdict it was moved in Arrest of Judgment that the Declaration did not mention whose the Loads of Wheat were for it was not ibid. crescent ' Adjornatur Resolved per Cur ' That an Inquisition before the Coroner taken super visum corporis that finds that the Person was Felo de se non compos mentis may be traversed But the fugam fecit in an Inquisition before the Coroner cannot be traversed Termino Sancti Hillarij Anno 27 28 Car. II. In Banco Regis The Earl of Leicesters Case IN an Ejectment upon a Special Verdict the Case was to this effect Robert Earl of Leicester in the .. of Eliz. levied a Fine of the Lands in question to the use of the Earl of Pembrook and his Heirs for payment of his Debts reserving a Power to himself to Revoke by any Writing Indented or by his last Will subscribed with his Hand and sealed with his Seal And sometime after he Covenants by a Writing Sealed and Subscribed as aforesaid to Levy a Fine to other uses and after the Covenant a Fine was levied accordingly And whether this should be taken as a Revocation and so an execution of the Power and the extinguishment of it was the Question It was Argued by Jones Attorney General that this should not be taken as a Revocation In Powers of Revocation there is to be considered the Substance and the Circumstance and that which Revokes must be defective in neither The Deed alone in this Case cannot revoke for tho' it has the Circumstance limited viz. Indenting Writing Sealing Subscribing yet it wants Substance for it doth nothing in praesenti but refers to a future Act viz. the Fine If a man has made his Will a Covenant after that he will levy a Fine or a Charter of Feoffment made will not be a Revocation of the Will 1 Roll. 615. yet there appeared an intention to Revoke and less matter will Revoke a Will than a Deed. Again the Fine alone cannot Revoke because it is defective in the Circumstances contained in the Power but then to consider them both together how can it be conceived that the Fine should communicate Substance to the Deed or the Deed give Circumstances to the Fine But 't is Objected That they make but one Conveyance I Answer If so then the words of the Power here are to Revoke by Deed and not by Deed and Fine Again This Construction is repugnant to the words of the Power which are That it shall be lawful for him to Revoke by his Deed And yet it is agreed here that the Deed of it self is not sufficient to revoke but only in respect of another Act done which as it must be observed is executed at another time The Books agree that a Condition or Power c. may be annexed to an Estate by a distinct Deed from that which conveys the Estate but not unless both are Sealed and Delivered at the same time and so they are but as one Deed But in the present Case the Deed was made in one year and the Fine levied in another Suppose the Power to be with such Circumstances as in our Case and a Deed is made which contains some of them at one time and another Deed comprehending the rest of another time Should both these make a Revocation is one Deed Surely not Again Suppose the Fine had been Levied first and then afterwards such Deed had declared the Uses surely the Power had been extinguished by the Fine tho' there the Fine and Deed might be taken as one Conveyance as well as here Again the different natures of these Instruments makes that they cannot be taken as one entire Act within the Power for the Covenant is the Act of the party and the Fine the Act or Iudgment of the Court. But it has been Objected That this ought to have a favourable Construction I Answer But not so as to dispence with that Form the Execution of the Power is limited to be done by In the 6 Co. 33. Powers that are to divest an Estate out of another person are
have admitted Wager of Law and therefore lies not against the Executor It was difficultly brought in that Debt should lye against the Executor upon a Surmize of a Devastavit by himself But that Point is now setled but no Reason to extend it further And he cited a Case where Debt was brought against A. Executor of B. Executor of C. who pleaded that he had not of the Goods of C. in his hands To which the Plaintiff Replied That B. had Wasted the Goods of C. to the value of the Debt demanded Vpon which Issue was joyned and found for the Plaintiff and he had Judgment to recover de bonis B. in the hands of A. But that Judgment was Reversed Anonymus IF A. Engages that B. shall pay for certain Goods that B. buys of C. this is good to charge him upon a Collateral Promise but not upon an Indebitat ' Assumpsit for it doth not create a Debt Anonymus IN an Information for a Riot it was doubted by the Court whether it were Local being a Criminal Cause And it was observed that divers Statutes in Queen Elizabeth and King James's time provided that Prosecutions upon Penal Laws should be in their proper Counties Which was an Argument that at the Common Law they might have been elsewhere Taylor 's Case AN Information Exhibited against him in the Crown Office for uttering of divers Blasphemous Expressions horrible to hear viz. That Jesus Christ was a Bastard a Whoremaster Religion was a Cheat and that he neither feared God the Devil or Man Being upon this Trial he acknowledged the speaking of the Words except the word Bastard and for the rest he pretended to mean them in another Sense than they ordinarily hear viz. Whoremaster i. e. That Christ was Master of the Whore of Babylon and such kind of Evasions for the rest But all the Words being proved by several Witnesses he was found Guilty And Hale said That such kind of wicked Blasphemous words were not only an Offence to God and Religion but a Crime against the Laws State and Government and therefore punishable able in this Court. For to say Religion is a Cheat is to dissolve all those Obligations whereby Civil Societies are preserved and that Christianity is parcel of the Laws of England and therefore to reproach the Christian Religion is to speak in Subversion of the Law Wherefore they gave Judgment upon him viz. To stand in the Pillory in Three several places and to pay One thousand Marks Fine and to find Sureties for his Good Behaviour during Life Walker versus Wakeman THe Case was An Estate which consisted of Land a Rectory c. was conveyed to the use of one for Life c. with a Power to Lett the Premisses or any part of them so as 50 l Rent was reserved for every Acre of Land The Tenant for Life Demised the Rectory reserving a Rent which Rectory consisted of Tythes only and whether this was within the Power was the Question Serjeant Pemberton Argued That this Lease is not warranted by the Power for a Construction is to be made upon the whole Clause and the latter Words that appoint the Reservation of the Rent shall explain the former and restrain the general Word Premisses to Land only for if it shall be extended further the Settlement which was in Consideration of a Marriage Portion is of no effect for the Rectory As in case it should de Demised reserving no Rent which it might be if not restrained to the latter words and they applied only to the Land But it was Resolved by the Court that the Lease of the Rectory was good for the last Clause being Affirmative shall not restrain the Generality of the former And this Resolution was chiefly grounded upon Cumberford's Case in the 2 Rolls 263. where a Conveyance was made to Vses of divers Mannors and Lands with a Power to the Cestuy que use for Life to make Leases of the Premisses or any part of them so that such Rent or more were reserved upon every Lease which was reserved before within the space of Two years and a Lease was made of part of the Lands which had not been Demised within Two years before And Resolved it was a good Lease and that thereupon any Rent might be reserved because the Power was General To Lease all and the restrictive Clause should only be applied to such Lands as had been demised within Two years before Termino Sanctae Trinitatis Anno 28 Car. II. In Banco Regis MEmorandum The last Term Sir Richard Rainsford was made Chief Justice Hale Chief Justice quitting it for infirmity of Body and Sir Thomas Jones was made one of the Justices of the Court of Kings Bench. Anonymus IN an Action upon the Case brought against the Defendant for that he did Ride an Horse into a place called Lincolns in Fields a place much frequented by the Kings Subjects and unapt for such purposes for the breaking and taming of him and that the Horse was so unruly that he broke from the Defendant and ran over the Plaintiff and grievously hurt him to his damage c. Vpon Not guilty pleaded and a Verdict for the Plaintiff It was moved by Sympson in Arrest of Judgment that here is no cause of Action for it appears by the Declaration that the mischief which happened was against the Defendants Will and so Damnum absque injuria and then not shewn what right the Kings Subjects had to walk there and if a man diggs a Pit in a Common into which one that has no right to come there falls in no Action lies in such Case Curia contra It was the Defendants fault to bring a Wild Horse into such a place where mischief might probably be done by reason of the Concourse of People Lately in this Court an Action was brought against a Butcher who had made an Ox run from his Stall and gored the Plaintiff and this was alledged in the Declaration to be in default of penning of him Wild said if a Man hath an unruly Horse in his Stable and leaves open the Stable Door whereby the Horse goes forth and does mischief an Action lies against the Master Twisden If one hath kept a tame Fox which getts loose and grows wild he that kept him before shall not answer for the damage the Fox doth after he hath lost him and he hath resumed his wild nature Vid. Hobarts Reports 134. The Case of Weaver and Ward Anonymus IN Trespass in an inferiour Court if the Defendant plead son frank Tenement to oust the Court of Jurisdiction It was said by Wild that they may enforce the Defendant to swear his Plea as in case of Foreign Plea negat Twisden and as in this Court where a Local justification in Trespass c. is pleaded the Defendant must swear it But the Court held no Indictment will lie for Perjury in such Oath no more than upon a Wager of Law Anonymus IN Trover the Hab. corpora
Trover inter al' de uno Instrumento ferreo Anglicè an Iron Range After Verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in Arrest of Judgment that Instrumentum ferreum was too uncertain and that a Range was the same with a Grate for which Crates was a proper Latin word Sed non allocatur For Crates is such a Grate as is before a Prison But a Fire Range was not in use in the Romans time and therefore Instrumentum ferreum is well enough with the Anglicè Twisden said Trover de septem libris has been held good without saying what they were Blackman's Case IT was assigned for Error that the Venire was to Summon probos legales homines instead of liberos and so a material Variance and alledged that many Judgments had been Reversed for it But the Court here being informed that the Presidents were generally probos instead of liberos would not allow the Exception The King versus Armstrong Harrison al' c. THey and others were Indicted for Conspiring to Charge one with the Keeping of a Bastard Child and thereby also to bring him to Disgrace After Verdict for the King it was moved in Arrest of Judgment that the bare Conspiring without Executing of it by some Overt act was not subject to Indictment according to the Poulterers Case in the 9 Co. And it doth not appear that he was actually Charged with the Keeping of a Child nay 't is alledged 't was but a pretended Child neither was he by Warrant brought before a Justice of Peace upon such an account but only that they went and affirmed it to the party himself intending to obtain Money from him that it might be no further disclosed Sed non allocatur For there was as much Overt act as the nature and design of this Conspiracy did admit in regard there was no Child really but only a Contrivance to Defame the Person and Cheat him of his Money which was a Crime of a very heinous nature Then it was alledged That this was tryed at the Old-Baily commonly called Justice-Hall in London and the Jury came de Warda de Faringdon extra London which appeared to be out of the Iurisdiction Sed non allocatur For the Name of the Ward is Faringdon extra to distinguish it from Faringdon infra but both are known to be in London Whereupon Judgment was Entred up against them and Armstrong which appeared to be the principal Offender was Fined 50 l and the other 30 l Burrough's Case HE and others were Indicted for that they being Church-wardens Overseers of the Poor and a Constable did contemptuously and voluntarily neglect to Execute diversa Praecepta Watranta directed to them by the Bayliffs of Ipswich being Justices of the Peace under their Hands and Seals c. It was moved to quash it for that the nature and tenour of the Warrants were not expressed in the Indictment For unless the parties know particularly what they are charged with they cannot tell how to make their Defence And for that Reason it was quashed by the Court. Note The Court never gives Costs for not Executing of a Writ of Enquiry of Damages tho' Notice be given Anonymus AN Indictment of Forcible Entry into certain Lands in the possession of J.S. was quashed for not shewing what Estate J.S. had and tho' the word Disseisivit were in the Court held that tho' that might be taken to imply a Freehold yet it was not sufficient Vid. Mo. 481. And another was quashed because it was said possessed pro termino But the Court held that if it had been pro termino annorum tho' not said for how many years it had been well Note A Bayliff caught one by the Hand whom he had a Warrant to Arrest as he held it out of a Window And the Court said that this was such a Taking of him that the Bayliff might justifie the breaking open of the House to Carry him away Kent versus Harpool AN Ejectment The Case came hither by a Writ of Error out of the Kings-Bench in Ireland and divers Points were in it which concerned the Act for Settlement of Lands in Ireland But the Case was as to the great Point at Common Law to this effect Father Tenant for Life Remainder to the Son for Life Remainder to first Son of that Son who was not born Remainder to the Heirs of the Body of the Father the Father died before the first Son was born and Whether the Descent of the Entail to the Son did prevent the Contingent Remainder was the Question It was Argued that it did not because the Inheritance came to the Son by Act in Law And the Opinion in Cordal's Case in the 1 Cro. 315. was cited the great Reason in Chudley's Case and other Cases wherein Contingent Remainders have been held to be destroyed was for the preventing of Perpetuities which would have been let in if Contingent Remainders had been preserved whatever Act had been done by those which had the Actual Estate But there is no such necessity of making the life Construction upon Acts in Law If Lessee for years makes the Lessor Executor the Term is not drowned But if the Executor that hath a Lease purchases the Inheritance the Term is gone because it is his own act but in the other Case the Law shall not work that which must be construed a Devastavit In Lewis Bowles's Case in the 11 Co. and Co. Litt. where there is an Estate for Life Remainder to the first Son Remainder in Fee to the Tenant for Life the Estates at first close and open again upon the Birth of the first Son which should take the Remainder And so it may be here But the Court seemed to be of Opinion that the Contingent Remainder was destroyed by the Descent of the Estate Tail And Rainsford Chief Justice relyed upon Wood and Ingersol's Case in the 2 Cro. 260. where a Devise was to the first Son for Life Remainder to the Son which should survive and there three Judges against one held that the descent of the Fee upon the first Son prevented the Contingent Remainder to the Survivor Et Adjornatur Note In Lewis Bowle's Case the Estates were united at the first upon making of the Conveyance Smith versus Tracy IN a Prohibition the Case was One died Intestate and whether his Brother of the Half-blood should come in for Distribution upon the new Statute of 22 23 Car. 2. cap. 10. was the Question It was Argued that the Half blood should have no share for the Words are The next of Kindred to the Dead person in equal Degree which the Half-blood is not The Words likewise are Those which legally represent their Stocks and that must be intended in an Act of Parliament such as the Common Law makes to be Representatives and not the Civil Law For then it would be that the Bastard eigne should come in for Distribution For their Rule is that subsequens matrimonium facit
cannot tender an Oath to the party sued nisi in causis Matrimonialibus Testamentariis But the Court after hearing divers Arguments denied the Prohibition for they said It was no more than the Chancery did to make Defendants answer upon Oath in such like Cases Termino Sanctae Trinitatis Anno 31 Car. II. In Banco Regis How versus Whitfield ante in ult ' Term. IN Repl the Plaintiff declares of the taking of his Cattle in a Close containing five Acres The Defendant avows and sets forth a Fine to the use of A. in Tail which discended to him Virtute cujus he was seised in Dominico ut de feodo talliato c. The Plaintiff Replies that the Fine was first to the use of J. S. for Life the Remainder to his Executors Administrators and Assigns for 80 years with Power to him and his Assigns to lett the five Acres in Possession or Reversion for 21 years determinable upon three Lives reserving the ancient Rent and that J. S. Devised this Term to J. N. and died his Executors assented and after it came to the Executors of J. N. who assigned it and that the Assignee made a Lease of the said five Acres inter alia reserving proinde the Rent of 6 s per annum and avers that the ancient Rent was 6 s per annum The Avowant Rejoyns setting forth his former Title And the Plaintiff Demurrs It was Objected First That the Plaintiff ought to have traversed the Seisin in Tail alledged by the Avowant seeing in his Replication he sets forth and intitles himself under an Estate inconsistent with it To this it was Answered and the Court agreed that there ought to be no Traverse for the Avowant doth not say it was his Freehold or that he was Seised in Tail but only under a Virtute cujus c. And the Plaintiff in his Replication sets forth a Title consistent with all that the Avowant alledges and so confesses and avoids and all depends upon the execution of the Power And for that Secondly It was Objected That he which made this Lease was not Assignee of J. S. for Executors were not within the Power and consequently not their Assignee This is a Power collateral to the Estate and shall not run with the Land for then Assignees of Commissioners of Bankrupcy the Vendee of the Term by the Sheriff upon an Execution c. should execute this Power It is like Covenants annexed to Leases which the Assignee could not take advantage of till 32 H. 8. Again Here appears to be no good Reservation for the Lease is of the five Acres inter al' reserving proinde so that the Rent issues out of other Lands as well as the five Acres and therefore cannot be said to be the ancient Rent reserved upon that The Court were all of Opinion that the Assignee in this case might execute the Power and conceived that Assignees might include Assignees in Law Vid. Mo. 855. as well as Fact but however the Tenant for Life devising this Term the Devisee was an Assignee and the Power in the greatest strictness of acceptation was in him and consequently must go to his Executors and by the same Reason to their Assignee As to the Reserving the Rent proinde the Court said it might be intended that the inter al' might comprehend nothing but such things out of which a Rent could not be reserved and then the six Shillings was reserved only for the five Acres However the proinde might reasonably be referred only to the five Acres and not to the inter al and that a distinct Reservation of Six shillings might be for five Acres And so Judgment was given for the Plaintiff Ante. Steed versus Berrier ERror upon a Judgment given in the Court of Common Pleas upon a Special Verdict the Case was to this effect J.S. made his Will in Writing and devised Lands to his Son J.S. and his Heirs and in the same Will gave a Legacy of 100 l to his Grandson The Son died afterwards in his Life time after whose decease J. S. the Grandfather made a Codicil wherein he gave away part of the Lands devised as aforesaid to a Stranger and afterwards declared by Parol that his Intention was that his Grandson J. S. should have the Lands which his Son J. S. should have had The Question upon this Special Verdict was Whether this were sufficient to carry the Lands to the Grandson And Judgment was given in the Common Pleas by three Judges against one that it was Whereupon a Writ of Error was brought in this Court Finch Solicitor Argued that this Will was sufficient to carry it to the Grandson He agreed Brett and Ridgen's Case in Pl. Com. that a Devise to a man and his Heirs who dies in the Life of the Devisor a new Publication will not be enough to make the Heir take by the Will because named in the Will by way of Limitation of the Estate and not Designation of the Person that should take But in Fuller's Case in the 1 Cro. 423. and in Mo. 2. where the Devise was to his Son Richard and the Heirs of his Body which Richard afterwards died in his Life time and then the Devisor said My Will is That the Sons of Richard my Son deceased shall have the Land devised to their Father as they should have had if their Father had lived and died after me There Popham and Fenner held that this new Publication would carry the Land to Richard's Son Gawdy and Clench contra But our Case is much stronger for there Heirs of the Body were used only for Limitation but in the Will here where the words are I Devise to my Son J. with this new Publication the Grandson J. may take because a Grandson is a Son and when a Will is new Published it is all one as if it were wrote at the time of such Publication Beckford and Parncot's Case in the 1 Cro. 493. Mo. 404. Devise of all his Lands and after the Will the Devisor purchaseth other Lands and then publishes it again it will carry the new purchased Lands Dyer 149. Trevanian's Case Cestuy que use before the 27th of H. 8. Devised the Lands a new Publication will pass the Lands executed in him by the Statute The Opinion of the Court inclined to Reverse the Judgment they held it to be the same with Fuller's Case in the 1 Cro. that no Parol averment can carry Lands to one person when the words of the Will plainly intended them to another They agreed If a man having no Son but a Grandson deviseth his Lands to his Son the Grandson may take But here is an opposition contained in the new Publication viz. Those Lands which my Son J. should have had my meaning is my Grandson J. shall have And in the Will it self there is a Legacy devised to the Grandson by that Name so where they are so distinguished 't is impossible to take the Grandson to be
because the Intent of the parties appears that it should be so There 's no great difference between the Construction of a Deed of Uses and a Will 13 H. 7. The Wife takes an Estate for Life by Implication where the Land is devised to the eldest Son after her decease Manning and Andrew's Case in 1 Leon. 259. The Reason of these Cases is the fulfilling of the Intention of the Parties and here this Limitation cannot be made good by way of a Future Use nor by any other way but only by creating of an Estate for Life in Michael the Father by Implication and this is according to the nature of a Covenant to stand seiz'd For the Use is not to pass out of the Covenantor till the proper time for the subsequent Estate to commence As to my Lord Paget's Case 't was his Intention to have the Use during his Life And my Lord Coke was certainly very well satisfied with the Resolution in Fenwick and Mitford's Case when he wrote his Institutes for he Argued before to the contrary as appears by the Report of that Case in Moor. Rainsford Justice to the same Intent If no Use rises immediately to Ralph yet if a Use rises by the Deed so that he has the Land any way be it by discent from his Father 't is within the Conclusion of the Verdict By the scope of the Conveyance it appears that it was intended that Robert should never have his Land till Twelve hundred Pound was paid for the provision of younger Children so that if Robert should have it it would be against the Intention of Michael There are two Reasons and Grounds in Law by which we may make this Deed agree with the Intention of the Parties First Because it is in the Case of an Estate Tail ubi voluntas donatoris observari debet Secondly It is in a Conveyance setled by way of Use and in Cases of Uses the Intention of the parties ought to be pursued And this is in Case of a Use that rises by Covenant to stand seiz'd which makes the Case the stronger And I conceive this is not a void Limitation but such an one as gives an Estate to Ralph In speaking to which I shall observe what my Lord Coke in the 1 Inst 23. says viz. That so much of the Use as the Owner of the Land does not dispose of remains in him c. and so in Cownden and Clark's Case in Hob. 30. And this is the Reason of Bingham's Case 1 Co. 91. Now here when Michael Covenanted to stand seiz'd to the Vse of his Heirs Male on the Body of his second Wife begotten I conceive he shall retain the Land as parcel of his ancient Vse during his Life for non est Haeres viventis according to Archer's Case 1 Co. And that Michael shall retain an Estate for Life is prov'd by my Lord Paget's Case 1 Co. 154. Dyer 310. N. 79. 1 Co. Chudleigh's Case 129. 2 Rolls 788. 21 H. 7. 18. From my Lord Paget's Case upon which I shall rely and the other Cases it appears that were there 's a Limitation to one after the death of another the Covenantor shall retain the Land during the Life of the other and here in our Case this Estate not taking effect till after the Death of Michael he shall retain the Estate and shall be Tenant for Life of the old Vse Now the Question is Whether Ralph shall take by Discent or Purchase And I conceive this Estate for Life with the Remainder in Tail makes but one Estate Tail in Michael and that he becomes Tenant in Tail and so Ralph shall take as Heir in Tail I shall not trouble my self whether Ralph may take here as a Purchaser because in Cownden and Clark's Case in Hob. it is Resolved that he cannot take as Heir Male of the Body by Purchase because all the words are not verified in him for he is not Heir I shall rely upon the First Point That here is an Estate Tail executed in Michael For when an Estate for Life is in the Auncestor by way of Retainer and an Estate is afterwards limited to his Heirs this is within the Rule put in Shelley's Case in 1 Co. where the Auncestor takes an Estate of Freehold and by the same Conveyance an Estate is limited to his Heirs Mediately or Immediately they are Words of Limitation and not of Purchase because the Heir is part of his Father Our Case is stronger that Fenwick and Mitfords Case It s true the same Reason for that Case is not given by Anderson and More which is given by my Lord Coke More 437. There the Reason is because the Limitation to the right Heirs is merely void here Michael hath an Estate in Tail of the ancient Use therefore 't is not necessary for the Law to create an Estate for Life Obj. That this cannot be an Estate Tail executed in Michael because the Estate for Life is not by the same Limitation but by Construction of Law But my Lord Coke says in Fenwick and Mitfords Case 1 Inst 22. b. that there is no difference where the Estate is created by Law and where by the Deed. 1 Anderson 259. and the Law retaining an Estate in Michael for Life our Case is the same as if the Estate had been limited to him with the Remainder to his Heirs Male begotten on his second Wife which would be an Estate Tail executed in Michael and would have discended to Ralph Twisden Justice for the Plaintiff I hold there 's no Use raised to Ralph by this Deed. We are here in the construction of a Deed and not of a Will It may be an Estate should be raised in such a case by a Will altho' my Lord Hobart is of a contrary Opinion I agree the Case of Hodgkinson and Wood Cro. Car. 23. but it cannot be argued from thence that it shall be so in a Deed for a Devise is not to take effect till after the Death of the Devisor and then 't is apparent that he is Heir Male of his Body It hath been agreed that Heirs Male of the Body are words of purchase It is plain that Ralph cannot take as Special Heir unless by Purchase and that he cannot do because he who shall take by virtue of such a Limitation ought to be Heir as well as Issue Male and Ralph here cannot take by vertue of the Statute de Donis Conditionalibis because none can take as Special Heir but where his Ancestor took before and therefore this Limitation is utterly void To make this Limitation good divers ways have been urged First That this Deed has an operation by way of returning of the Use and it has been compared to my Lord Pagets Case which differs from it here cannot be any part of the old Use in Michael for if he hath an Estate for Life it ought to be a new Use It cannot be a returning Use for the Limitation to the Heirs Male of the Body
Estate Tail in Michael First Because in this Case the Use returns by operation of Law and executes an Estate in Michael for Life which being conjoined to the Estate limited to the Heirs Male of his Body makes an Estate Tail This Estate for Life rising by operation of Law is as strong as if it had been limitted to him for his Life and after his decease to the Heirs Male of his Body Secondly Because that a Limitation to the Heirs Male of his Body is in Construction of Law a Limitation to himself and the Heirs Male of his Body There is a great difference when he who has the Use limits it to A. for Life the Remainder to the Heirs of the Body of B. here no Estate can rise to B. because nothing moved from him but where he who has the Estate limits it to the Heirs Male of his own Body ut res valeat he shall have it for his Life Thirdly It is plainly according to the intent of the Parties the intent perfectly appears that the Issue by the second Wife should take and that Robert the eldest Son should not take till so much Money be paid therefore if we can by any means serve the intent of the parties we ought to do it as good Expositors For as my Lord Hobart says Judges in Construction of Deeds do no harm if they are astuti in serving the intent of the Parties without violating any Law Obj. Here the Use being never out of Michael he hath the ancient Use which is the Fee simple and consequently being the ancient Use and this being a new Limitation to the Heirs Male of his Body the ancient use and the new one cannot be piec'd to make an Estate Tail executed in Michael but it shall be a Contingent Use if any which ought to rise to the Heir Male of his Body and so remains the ancient Fee simple And it hath been compared to these Cases If a Man Covenants to stand seized to the Use of J.S. or of his Son after his Marriage or after the Death of J. D. these are Contingent Limitations and there is a Fee simple determinable in the Covenantor to serve the future Uses Resp 'T is true if a Man Covenants to stand seized to such Uses as that he leaves a discendible Estate in himself As if a Man Covenants to stand seized to the Use of his Son from and after his Marriage this is purely a Contingent Use because t is possible the Marriage may never take effect and nothing is fetch'd out of the Covenantor so if he Covenants to stand seized to the Use of J. S. after 40 years there is a Fee simple determinable in the Covenantor and therefore those Cases are not to be resembled to our Case where the Estate of Michael cannot continue longer than his Life And this without any wrong done to any Rule of Law may be turned to a Use for Life and therefore such construction shall be Object 2. Here is an Estate to rise by way of Use by a Deed and not by a Will which shall not be by Implication by a Deed. Resp It s a certain truth But we are not here upon raising an Estate by Implication but qualifying an Estate that is now in the Father which by this new Deed is to be qualified to be an Estate for Life to preserve the Estate Tail so that the Cases of Implication are not to the purpose Object 3. In this Case Michael shall be in of his ancient Estate in Fee simple which is in him and not of a new Estate created by Implication of Law and it hath been compared to the Devise of Land to a Mans Heir he shall not be in by the Devise but of his ancient Estate that would have descended to him Resp True But in this Case a Man may qualifie his Estate as in Gilpins Case Cro. Ca. 161. Devise to his Heir upon Condition that he shall pay his Debts in a year the Heir is a Purchasor so here is a qualification to turn the Estate of Michael into an Estate for Life ut res valeat Object 4. Michael had not an Intention to have an Estate for Life for in the Limitation of the other Lands he has limited them expressly to himself for Life and if he had intended to have had an Estate for Life in the Lands in question he would also have so expressed it Resp The intention will not controul the operation of Law his main intent was to settle the Lands upon his younger Children this the Law serves but not his secondary intentions If a Man Covenants to stand seized to the Use of himself for Life without impeachment of Wast and afterwards to the Use of the Heirs Male of his Body the Law supervenes his intention and makes him to be Tenant in Tail And in our Case there was a necessity to limit the other Lands to himself for Life because there was another Estate to intervene the Estate for Life and the Estate Tail The Reason given by my Lord Coke in Fenwick and Mitfords Case is plain enough and it appears that he was of that Opinion afterwards by the Report of Pannel and Lanes Case 13 Jac. in Rolls Rep. 1 part 238. The Case upon which I shall rely which has not been answered is my Lord Pagets Case adjudged by all the Judges of England Tho. Lord Paget Covenants in consideration of the discharge of his Funerals Payment of his Debts and Legacies out of the profits of his Land and for the advancement of his Son Brother and others of his Blood that he and his Heirs would stand seized of divers Mannors to the Use of T.F. one of the Covenantees for the Life of my Lord Paget and after his Death to the Use of C. Paget for the term of 24 years and then to the Use of W. Paget his Son in Tail with Remainders in over and afterwards the Lord Paget was aâ—â—â—nted of Treason And it was adjudged that the Lord Paget himself had an Estate for his Life for the Remainder being limited after his Death the Estate cannot pass out of him during his Life and there in Case of a Covenant to stand seized he himself hath an Estate for Life And this is not because the Estate returns as my Brother Twisden has said but because the Estate was never out of him and cannot return either from the Heir or the Covenantee otherwise where should it be during the Life of the Lord Paget who was attainted the Book is that it was never out of him but was turn'd into an Estate for Life So that now it is all one as if he had Covenanted to stand seized to the Use of his eldest Son after his Death And the question is What Estate he has during his Life It is adjudged that he has an Estate for Life for if there had been a Contingent Fee simple in the Lord Paget his Heir could never have had an Amoveas manus
for if a Man Covenants to stand seized to a Contingent Use and afterwards is attainted of Treason before the Contingency happen the Contingency shall never rise for the King has the Estate discharged and the Use is to rise out of the Estate of the Covenantor so is Moor Sir Tho Palmers Case 815 In Moors Rep. of my Lord Pagets Case 194. It s said that W. Paget had an Amoveas manus for the Estate of the Queen leased by the Death of my Lord Paget In Sir Francis Englefeilds Case Popham 18. n. 7. It s resolved that no Use rises because t is that it shall Discend Remain or Come which is uncertain but if he had Covenanted that after his Death he and his Heirs would have stood seized to the Use of John an Use would have resulted to Sir Francis Second Point I conceive if it be impossible for Ralph to take by Discent this would be a Contingent Use in him by Purchase The great Objection against this is that the Limitation is to an Heir and an Heir which ought to take by Purchase ought not to be only Heir of the Body c. but Heir general Of this I am not well satisfied I conceive the Remainder being limited to the Heirs of the Body of Jane begotten by Michael such a Limitation will make a special Heir to serve the turn and t is not to be resembled to Shelley's Case My Reasons are First Because at the Common Law before the Statute de Donis notice was taken that this was a special Heir and therefore 't is no wrong done to make him here a qualified Heir In the Statute de Donis 't is said When Lands are given to Man and his Wife and the Heirs of their two Bodies begotten Secondly Vpon the special penning of the Deed it is apparent that Michael took notice that he had an Heir at Common Law therefore it can't be intended that he meant here such an Heir that should be Heir general to him this would be Contradictio in Adjecto Litt. Sect. 352. puts this Case If a Feoffment be made upon Condition that the Feoffee shall give the Land to the Feoffor and his Wife and the Heirs of their two Bodies begotten In this Case if the Husband dye living his Wife before the Estate Tail is granted to them the Feoffee ought to make the Estate as near the Condition and as near the intent of the Condition as may be viz. To let the Land to the Wife for her Life without impeachment of Wast the Remainder to the Heirs of the Body of the Husband on her begotten If the Husband and Wife dye before the Gift made then the Feoffee ought to make it to the Issue and to the Heirs of the Body of his Father and Mother begotten Suppose that this had been to a second Wife and there had been Issue by a former the Book of 12 H. 4. 3. says that there it shall be in another manner but Litt. says it shall be as near vid. Litt. Sect. 22. Morevils Case Fitzh Tail 23. 2 Ed. 3. 1. 4. Ed. 3. 50. by all these Cases it appears that no regard is had whether the Son be Heir of the Husband if he be Heir of their two Bodies Therefore it seems that by this Limitation Ralph shall take by way of Contingent Remainder For Heirs of the Body of the second Wife is a good name of Purchase I have not read any Case against this Hill 16. or 26 Eliz. there was this Case A Man taking notice in his Will that his Brother who was dead had a Son and that he himself had three Daughters who were his right and immediate Heirs he gave them 2000 l and gave his Land to the Son of his Brother by the name of his Heir Male. Provided If his Daughters troubled his Heir then the Devise of the 2000 l to them should be void And it was resolved that the Devisor taking notice that others were his Heirs the Limitation to his Brothers Son by the name of Heir Male was a good name of Purchase and this agrees with Cownden and Clarks Case in Hob. Wild Justice said he was of the same Opinion with Hale in this last Point And Iudgment was given for the Defendant Three Learned ARGUMENTS One in the Court of Kings-Bench BY Sir FRANCIS NORTH Attorny General And Two in the Court of Exchequer BY Sir MATTHEW HALE Chief Baron there The Argument of Sir Francis North. In Banco Regis Potter and Sir Henry North. IN a Replevin for taking of an Horse in a certain place called the Fenn at Milden-Hall in the County of Suffolk the Defendant makes Cognizance as Bayliff to Sir Henry North and saith That the place Where c. containeth Ten thousand Acres of Pasture in Milden-Hall whereof a certain place called Delfe is parcel and that it is Sir Henry North's Freehold and the Horse was Damage feasant there c. The Plaintiff Replies Confessing the Soyl to be the Freehold of Sir Henry Norths but says That time whereof c. the place Where hath been parcel of the Fenn and parcel of the Mannor of Milden-Hall of which Sir Henry North is seised in Fee and that the Plaintiff was at the time c. seised of an Ancient Messuage one of the Freeholds holden of the Mannor by Rents and Services and parcel of the said Mannor and that Time out of Mind there were divers ancient Freehold Messuages holden of the said Mannor by Rents and Services and divers Copyhold Messuages parcel of the said Mannor by Custom of the said Mannor demised and demisable by Copy of Court Rolls of the said Mannor And the several Tenants of the said Freehold Tenements being seised in their Demesn as of Fee and they whose Estate they have in the same Time out of mind have had together with the Customary Tenants of the said Customary Tenements the sole and several Feeding of 100 Acres of Pasture for all Beasts except Hogs Sheep and Northern Steers levant and couchant upon their several Freeholds every year at all times of the year as to their several Freeholds belonging And that within the said Mannor there is and Temps d'ont c. hath been such a Custom that the several Tenants of the Customary Messuages together with the Freeholders aforesaid have used and accustomed to have the sole and several Feeding of the said 100 Acres of Pasture for all their Beasts except Sheep Hogs and Northern Steers levant and couchant upon their several Copy-holds every year at all times in the year tanquam ad seperal ' Tenementa customar ' spectant ' pertinent ' and the Plaintiff being seised put in his Horse c. and so Iustifies Vpon this the Defendant demurs generally This Prescription is naught in substance and Judgment ought to be given for the Defendant upon these Four Exceptions First That several Freeholders cannot joyn or be joyned in a Prescription to claim an entire Interest in another mans Soyl as
George because being descended from an Alien the Law takes no notice of them as to this purpose otherwise 't is if the said Nicholas had been a Denizen born and Attainted because in such a case though he could not take himself by Discent he could obstruct the Discent to the younger Brother so the Land would Escheat Thirdly That the Case of George the Son naturalized and the Case of John his Son as in reterence to John the Earl and the Discent from him will be all one if George had survived him John the Earl might have inherited so will John his Son who jure Representationis is the same with his Father Et è Converso These things being unquestionably to be admitted before I come to the Argument of the Case I shall premise certain General Observations First Touching Discents Secondly Touching the Capacities of Incapacities of an Alien Thirdly Touching Naturalizations Touching Discents I shall consider First The Rule whereby they are to be Governed Secondly The various kinds of Discents or hereditary Successions Concerning the Rule of Discents we must not govern our selves therein by the General Notions of Law or Proximity of Nature but by the Principal Laws of the Country where the Question ariseth for the various Countries have variously disposed the manner of Discents even in the same Law or Degree of Proximity For Instance The Father is certainly as near of Kin to the Son as the Son is to the Father and is nearer in Proximity than a Brother and therefore shall be preferred as next of Kin in an Administration 3 Rep. Ratcliffs Case Yet touching the Succession of the Father to the purchase of his Son the Laws of several Countries variously provide First According to the Jews for want of Issue of the Son the Father succeeds excluding the Brother and that hath been the Vse and Construction of the Jewish Doctors upon Number 27. Selden de Successionibus Hebr. Cap. 12. But the Mother was wholly excluded Secondly According to the Greeks the Provision for the Succession of the Father is left doubtful Petit Leges 1 6. fol. 6. According to the Romans or Civil Law by the Construction of the Law of the Twelve Tables the Father succeeds in the purchase of the Son for want of Issue of the Son under the Title of Proximus Agnatus and accordingly was their Vsage tho' my Lord Coke supposed the contrary Co. Lit. 5. But to settle all the Institutes of Justinian Lib. 3. Tit. 3. in an Authentick Collection 8. Tit. de Haered ' ab intestato venientibus the Son dying without Issue his Brothers and Sisters Father and Mother do succeed him in a kind of Coparcenary as well to Lands as Goods According to the Customs of Normandy which in some things have a Cognition with the Laws of England the Son dying without Issue his Brothers are preferred before the Father but the Father is preferred before the Vncles Terrien lib. 6. c. 6. la Customier de Normandie cap. Descheants 5. According to the Laws of England the Son dying without Issue or Brother or Sister the Father cannot succeed but it descends to the Vncle. And it is a Maxim of the English Law An Inheritance cannot Lineally ascend Consequently the Question being in this Case touching a Discent of Lands in England it must be Ruled and Disputed according to the Grounds and Reasons of the Laws of England Secondly Touching the Second the Division of Discents are of two kinds First Lineal as from the Father or Grandfather to the Son or Grandson Secondly Collateral or Transversal as from Brother to Brother Vncle to Nephew or è converso And both these are again of two sorts First Immediate as in Lineals from Father to Son Secondly Mediate as in Lineals from Grandfather to Grandson the Father dying in the Life of the Grandfather when the Father is the medium differens of the Discent Thirdly In Collaterals from the Vncle to the Nephew or from the Nephew to the Vncle where the Father is likewise the medium differens And I call this a Mediate Discent tho' as to many purposes it be Immediate for the Father dying in the Life of the Grandfather the Son succeeds in point of Discent of the Laws immediately to the Grandfather and in a Writ of Entry shall be supposed in the Per to the Grandfather and not in the Per and Cui But I call it a Mediate Discent because the Father is the medium through or by whom the Son derives his Title to the Grandfather Therefore if any man thinks the term of Mediate Discent not properly used he may if he please use the words of Mediate or Immediate Ancestors Words are imposed to signifie Things and therefore the Terms being explained what I mean by them I shall retain the Terms of Mediate or Immediate Discents This distinction of Discents or Relations between Ancestor and Heir and Hereditary Succession will be of use throughout this whole Debate In Immediate Discents there can be no Impediment but what arises in the parties themselves For Instance The Father seised of Lands the Impediment that hinders the Discent must be either in the Father or the Son as if the Father or the Son be Attaint or an Alien In Immediate Discents a Disability of being an Alien or Attaint in him that I call a medius Ancestor will disable a person to take by Discent tho' he himself hath no such Disability For Instance In Lineal Discents If the Father be Attaint or an Alien and hath Issue a Denizen born and dies in the life of the Grandfather the Grandfather dies seised the Son shall not take but the Land shall Escheat In Collateral Discents A. and B. Brothers A. is an Alien or Attainted and hath Issue C. a Denizen born B. purchaseth Lands and dies without Issue C. shall not inherit for A. which was the Medius Ancestor or medium differens of this Discent was incapable Dyer 274. Gray's Case And this is apparent in this very Case for by this means Patrick tho' a Denizen and the Son of an Elder Brother is disabled to inherit the Earl A. and B. Brothers A. is an Alien or person Attainted and hath Issue C. and dies and C. purchaseth Lands and dies without Issue B. his Vncle shall not inherit for the Reason before-going for A. is a Medius which was disabled This is Courtney's Case And if in our Case Patrick the Son of Nicholas altho' a Denizen born had purchased Lands and died without Issue John his Vncle should not have Inherited him by reason of the Disability of Nicholas and yet Nicholas himself had he not been an Alien could not immediately have Inherited to his Son but yet he is a Block in the way to John See the Reason 17 E. 4. cap. 1. But this must be intended of such as are absolute Impediments as Attainder or Alien not Temporary suspensions As in the Lord Delaware's Case in 10 Co. But in any Discents the Impediment of
an Ancestor that is Medius Ancestor between the persons from whom and to whom will not impede the Discent The Grandfather and Grandmother both Aliens or Attaint of Treason have Issue the Father a Denizen who hath Issue the Son a Denizen the Son shall be Heir to the Father notwithstanding the Disability of the Grandfather For they are not Medii antecessores between the Father and the Son but Paramount and yet all the Blood the Father hath he derived from his disabled Parents And this Observation states in effect the Case For if the Discent between Brothers be an Immediate discent and that the Father be not Medius antecessor between them then the Disability in Robert will not impede the Discent of George his Brother or to John his Brother's Son But if it be a Mediate discent and the Father be a Medius antecessor between them then the Disability in Robert the Father may impeach the Discent The Second Term to be explained is that disabling Term of an Alien and to consider what Disability ariseth from it The Law that is the Rule of Discents in England is also the measure of this Nonability and is the only Rule that must determine how far it extends Therefore I consider what Disability the Law doth induce in case of an Alien It doth not hinder but that an Alien is of the same Degree and Relation of Consanguinity as in the like cases of a Denizen born The Son Father and Brother tho' Aliens are yet Son Father and Brother as Natural born Subjects and so taken notice of in our Law In Cro. Car. Carroon's Case he shall be preferred in Administration as next of Kin. Secondly What the Law doth do as to Disabilities of an Alien And this is of two kinds First the Disability that is Personal or Original to the Alien himself in reference to Inheritance Tho' he may take by Purchase by his own Contract that which he cannot retain against the King yet the Law will not enable him by Act of his own to transfer by Hereditary discent the Alien dying having since a Denizen born the Land will not descend Or to take by an Act in Law for the Law quae nihil frustra will not give an Inheritance or Freehold by Act in Law for he cannot keep it And therefore the Law will not give him 1. Discent 2. Courtesy 3. Dower 4. Guardianship And in respect of this Incapacity he doth resemble a person Attaint yet with this difference the Law looks upon a person Attaint as one that it takes notice of And therefore the eldest Son Attaint over-living his Father tho' he shall not take by Discent in respect of his Disability yet he shall hinder the Discent of the younger Son But if the Eldest Son be an Alien the Law takes no notice of him and therefore as he shall not take by Discent so he shall not impede the Discent to his younger Brother 32 E. 3. Cousenage 5. A consequential Consecutive Disability that reflects to an Alien from one that must derive by or through him tho' he perchance be a Natural born Subject As in our Case tho' Patrick the Son of Nicholas be a Natural born Subject yet because Nicholas his Father was an Alien there is a Consecutive Impediment derived upon Patrick whereby he is Consequentially disabled to Inherit John his Vncle and this Consecutive Disability is parallel to that which we call Corruption of Blood which is a Consequent of Attainder If the Father be Attainted the Blood of the Grandfather is not Corrupted no nor the Blood of his Son tho' he could not inherit him but only the Blood of the Father But that Corruption of Blood in the Father draws a Consequential Impediment upon the Son to inherit the Grandfather because the Fathers Corruption of Blood obstructs the transmission of the Hereditary discent between the Grandfather and the Son And here we must take notice of a great diversity between a Disability in the Blood and a Bar. Cro. Car. 16. Edwards and Rogers's Case William Rogers was seised of a Reversion in Fee Andrew his Vncle levies a Fine with Proclamations and dies having Issue John who dies leaving Issue William then William Rogers dies without Issue Ruled that William the Grandson of Andrew shall inherit notwithstanding the Fine of his Grandfather and the Reason is because William Rogers dying after Andrew the Estate never passed through Andrew and consequently William the Grandson claiming from William is in effect a Stranger to the Fine of Andrew and may aver that Partes c. But in that Case had Andrew been an Alien or Attaint then had William his Grandson been disabled to have inherited William by the Consecutive Disability Now in the Case at Bar there is first no doubt but that John the Earl and George were Brothers tho' they continued Aliens neither is there any question that they could not have inherited one the other had they continued Aliens neither is there any question whether that Personal Disability be removed by the Naturalization But the Question is Whether any Consequential or Consecutive Disabilities do result upon them from their Father Roberts being an Alien which may disable the one Brother to Inherit tho' there Personal disability be removed I come now to the Explication of the Third Term viz. the Restoring or Enabling Term Naturalization The Means of removing Disabilities of this kind are two A temporary partial and imperfect amotion thereof Letters Patents of Denization which tho' it puts the Person Denized as to some purposes in the Condition of a Subject and enables a Transmission Hereditary to his Children born after the Denization yet it doth not wholly remove the Disease or Nonability as to the point of Discents or Hereditary Transmission and resembles a Pardon in case of an Attainder And therefore in Lineal Discents if there be Grandfather a Natural born Subject Father Alien Son Natural the Father is made Denizen he shall not inherit the Grandfather and if the Father dies in the life of the Grandfather the Grandchild tho' born after the Denization doth not remove either the Personal or the Consequential Impediment or Incapacity of the Father In Collateral Discents the Father a Natural born Subject hath Issue two Sons Aliens who are both made Denizens and one dies without Issue the other shall not inherit him This was agreed in Godfrey and Dixon's Case hereafter cited The Second is more deep viz. Naturalization According to the Laws of Normandy they may Naturalize but such Naturalization shall not divest a Discent already vested Terrien lib. 2. cap. 12. But according to our Law it can only be by Parliament and not otherwise And this cures the Defect and makes them as if they had been Born in England and no man shall be received against an Act of Parliament to say the contrary and therefore if the Father an Alien hath Issue a Son born here and then the Father is Naturalized the Son shall
Alien they might inherit their Mother and consequently they might inherit one the other It hath been endeavoured to be Answered that it is not possible the Mother could be an English Woman because the Sons are found to be Aliens But that will not be so altho' an English Man marry an Alien beyond the Seas and having there Issue the Issue will be Denizens as hath been often Resolved Yet it is without question that if an English Woman go beyond the Seas and marry an Alien and have Issue born beyond the Seas the Issue are Aliens for the Wife was sub potestate viri and yet the Issue born in England should inherit tho' the Husband be an Alien But the true Answer is That in this Case Robert the Husband being an Alien born out of the Allegiance of the Crown of England and marrying and having all his Issues born there She shall not be presumed an English Woman but shall be presumed a Native in Scotland where her Husband lived and had Issue unless the contrary had been expresly found Now touching the Point in question it is true that Sir Edw. Coke in his Littl. fo 8. is of another Opinion He says That if an Alien have two Sons born in England and one dye without Issue the other shall not inherit him But I take the Law to be the contrary First I will shew what Reasons do not move me Secondly What Reasons do convince and satisfie me It doth not move me thus to conclude because there is no defectus Parriae or Nationis or Ligeantiae of either of the Brothers for tho' there be no personal defect in either of the Extreams yet it may be possible that a consequential Impediment arising from another Ancestor may hinder the Discent and this is apparent in the Case in question for Patrick the Son of Nicholas the Elder Brother of John the Earl hath no Defectus Ligeantiae for he was naturalized yet the Land shall not Discend from John the Earl to Patrick by reason of the defect of Nicholas his Father neither doth it move me that George or John his Son do not claim the Land from Robert the Father but from John the Earl for if the Grandfather be seized the Father is an Alien The Son of Denizen born the Father dies in the Life of the Grandfather the Son shall not inherit by reason of the defect of the Father tho' he claim nothing from him but from the Grandfather But the Reasons that satisfie me are these three in order as they are propounded My first Reason is because the Discent from a Brother to a Brother tho' it be a Collateral Discent yet it is an Immediate Discent and consequently upon what hath been premised at first unless we can find a disability or impediment in them no impediment in another Ancestor will hinder the Discent between them Now to prove this Discent immediate I shall use these three ensuing Instances or Evidences First In point of Pleading one Brother shall derive himself as Heir to another without mentioning another Ancestor this hath been at large insisted on by others and therefore I shall pass it over Secondly According to the computation of Degrees according to the Laws of England Brother and Brother make one Degree and the Brother is distant from his Brother and Sister in the first degree of Consanguinity According to the Civil Law the Brother is in the second Degre from the Brother for they make one Degree from the Brother to the Father and from the Father a second Degree to the other Brother but yet they say in Collaterals Nullus est proximior Fratre ideoque in Collateralibus nullus est primus Gradus sed secundus Gradus obtinet vocem primi Inst lib. 3. Tit. B. de Gradibus Consaguinitatis According to the Cannon Law Frater Frater Soror Soror sunt in primo Gradu Decret ' gratian Laus 35. quest 5. ad sedem and therefore their Laws prohibiting Marriage in the fourth Degree take Brother and Sister to be the first Degree of the fourth The Laws of England in computation of the Degrees of Consanguinity agree with the Common Law and reckon the Brother and Brother to be the first Degree and this is apparent by Littl ' sect 20. and the Objection of Lord Coke thereupon and the Book of 31 E. 3. Hollands Case cited by Littleton And with this likewise agrees the Laws and Custome of Normandy which tho' in some things they differ from the Law of England as is before observed yet in this particular and divers other touching Discents they agree with it Vid. Glov Com. super Customeir de Normandy in Cap. de Escheat Et doir un ' Scavoir que tonque le Custome de paijs de Normandy pur compter les Degrees en Line Collateral solonque les Cannoists deux freres ont le primier Degree eont que en Degree My third Evidence that the Discent between Brothers is immediate this viz. the Discent between Brothers differs from all others Collateral Discents whatsoever for in other Discents Collateral the half Blood doth inherit but in a Discent between Brothers the half Blood doth impede the Discent which argues that the Discent is immediate The Vncle of the part of the Father hath no more of the Blood of the Mother than the Brother of the Second Venter The Brother by the second Venter hath the immediate Blood of the Father which the Vncle viz the Fathers Brother hath not but only as they meet in the Grandfather The Brother of the half Blood is nearer of Blood than the Vncle and therefore shall be preferred in the Administration And so it hath been resolved in 5 E. 6. in Browns Case and tho' the Book of 5 E. 6. B. Administration 47. mistakes the Law in preferring the Brother of the half Blood before the Mother yet it had been right in the case of a Competition between him and the Vncle. And yet the Vncle is preferred in the Discent before the Brother of the half Blood and the reason is because that is a mediate Discent mediante Patre but the Discent to the Brother must be immediate if at all and therefore the half Blood impedes it Again it is apparent that if in the Line between Brother and Brother the Law took notice of the Father as the Medium thereof the Brother by the second Venter should rather succeed the other Brother because he is Heir to his Father therefore in a Discent between Brothers the Law respects only the mediate relation of the Brothers as Brothers and not in respect of their Father tho' it is true the Bosom or Foundation of their Consanguinity is in the Father and Mother My second principal Reason is to prove that the disability of the Father doth not at all hinder the Discent between the Brothers immediate is this If the Father in case of a Discent between Brothers were such an Ancestor as the Law
that he should suffer a Recovery his Term is not drowned 195 Tenant for Life with power to make a Jointure suffers a Recovery the Power is extinguished 226 227 Good tho' a Stranger that hath nothing in the Land be made Tenant to the Praecipe for a Recovery being a Common Assurance is to be favourably expounded 358 Whether a Recovery can be suffered where the Tail is expectant upon an Estate for Life the Tenant for Life not being made Tenant to the Praecipe 360 Release See Obligation Of all Demands its effect 314 Remainder Contingent Remainder by what Act destroyed 188 306 334 345 No Cross Remanders upon Construction in a Deed tho' sometimes in a Will 224 Rent Difference between a Rent and a Sum in Gross 99 Lease by Tenant in Fee and Rent reserved to the Lessor Executors Administrators and Assigns the words Executors and Administrators void 162 A Rent may be reserved by Contract without Deed 242 Where Rent shall be suspended and where apportioned by the Lessors Entry 276 277 Reputation Lands repurted parcel of a Mannor shall pass in a Recovery under the Word Appurtenances 52 Retorn Sheriff amerced for retorning Non est inventus on the Writ brought against his Bayliff 12 24 Sheriff retorns that Goods came to the Executors hands elongavit vendidit disposuit ad proprium usum suum convertit this tantamounts to quod devastavit 20 221 Sheriff retorns upon a Fi. fa. that he had taken Goods and that they were rescued from him not good 21 Action against Sheriff for a false Retorn of Cepi Corpus 85 Revocation What shall be a good Revocation upon a Power reserved 278 infra S. Scandal See Action upon the Case for Slander Scandalum Magnatum I do not know but my Lord of P. sent G. to take my Purse Action lies 59 Difference between an Action on the Statute of Scandalum Magnatum and a Common Action of Slander the Words in one Case shall be taken in mitiori sensu and in the other in the worst sense against the Speaker that the Honour of Great Persons may be preserved 60 Sewers Commissioners of Sewers and their Proceedings subject to the Jurisdiction of the King's Bench notwithstanding the Clause in Statute 13 Eliz. cap. 9. 67 Sheriff Sheriff may bring Trover for Goods taken in Execution and after taken away by the Defendant in the first Action 52 Soldiers Every Officer and Soldier as liable to be arrested as a Tradesman or any other person whatsoever 251 A Captain and Serjeant committed to Newgate for a great Misdemeaner in rescuing a Soldier ibid. Statutes When a Statute makes an Offence the King may punish it by Indictment but an Information will not lie when a Statute doth barely prohibit a thing 63 31 Ed. 1. Statute of Winton in an Action upon this Statute what taking shall be sufficient to discharge the Hundred 118 235 4 Ed. 3. cap. 7. Action lies for Executors upon this Statute for cutting and carrying way Corn 187. This Statute hath been always expounded largely ibid. 3 H. 7. cap. 2. A Wife forcibly married contrary to this Statute shall be admitted to give Evidence against her Husband 244 5 Eliz. cap. 4. For using a Trade not being Apprentice thereto 8 51 142 326 346 364. This Statute in relation to Apprentices expounded 174 31 Eliz. cap. 7. Of Cottages no Offence against this Statute to erect a Cottage if no body inhabits therein 107 43 Eliz. cap. 2. Poor By this Statute that enables Justices of Peace to tax a Neighbouring Parish the Justices may tax any of the Inhabitants and not the whole Parish 350 21 Jac. cap. 26. Of Felony to Personate 301 12 Car. 2. Of Ministers A good Act being made by King Lords and Commons and any defects in the Circumstances of calling them together ought not to be pried into 15 This Act extends only to Benefices with Cure ibid. 14 Car. 2. cap. 10. 16 Car. 2. cap. 3. Harth-mony Smiths Forges shall pay 191 192. So empty Houses 312 14 Car. 2. cap. 33. Of Printing Seditious Books 316. 16 Car. 2. cap. 7. Of Gaming Articles for above 100 l at a Horse Race within this Statute 253 254 17 Car. 2 cap. 2. Of Non Con-Ministers explained 328 29 Car. 2. Of Frauds and Perjuries No Promise made before the 24th of June within this Act 330. What Contracts within ths Act 361 31 Car. 2. Habeas Corpus Prayer must be made by Council wiihin the first Week after the beginning of the Term 346 T. Tail THO' a Term in gross cannot be entail'd yet where man hath a Term in point of Interest and at the same time the Trust of the Inheritance here he may entail the Trust of the Term to wait upon the Inheritance 194 What Words create an Estate Tail and what in Remainder contingent or vested 215 230 231 Estates Tail how forfeitable for Treason 299 infra A Devise to a Man and the Heirs Males of his Body with a proviso if he attempts to alien the Estate to cease the Condition void 321 322 A Limitation in Tail how it operates 378 Tender Tender and refusal is as much as payment 167 Tender where not good 252 261 Teste Where the Teste of a Writ before it was taken out is notwithstanding good 362 Tythes May be paid of a Warren by Custom 5. So of Doves and Fish ibid. Whether an Executor may bring Debt upon the Statute 2 E. 6. for Tythes due to the Testator 30 31 Where and what Modus shall bar the Recovery of Tythes in specie 32 A Prescription cannot be suggested time out of mind to pay a Modus for Tythe Hops since they were not known in England till Queen Elizabeth's time 61 Tythes of VVood tho' not Fewel payable unless exprest to be burnt in a House for the maintenance of Husbandry 75 Treason In Coyning and Clipping the Judgment 254 For raising a Rebellion in Carolina 349 Trespass See Pleading Quare Clausum fregit and threw down his Fences what Plea in Justification good 221 Continuando in Trespass where good and where not 363 Trust See Tayl. A Use in former time the same with what a Trust is now 130 Where a Trust for Life Remainder over with Power of Revocation is forfeitable and where not 128 infra Whether a Trustee is compellable to produce Writings or the Key of the Box wherein they are against the Interest of the Party for whom he is Trustee 197 Tryal See Venue What shall be Cause for new Tryal what not 30 Justices of Assize may try Informations tho' commenced before the Justices of a former Assizes 85 181 V. Venue WHere a Deed is forged at S. and given in Evidence at D. from whence the Venue ought to come in an Information thereupon 17 A Breach of Covenant assigned in Barwick the Venue shall arise from the next place in Northumberland 58 Judgment by Nihil dicit reverst after a Writ of Enquiry executed because no
Plaintiffs and assign a Breach on the Defendants part Defendant pleads quod Testator nihil habuit in Tenementis The Plaintiffs demur to the Plea 98 4. By an Assignee of an Assignee against an Executor 117 The Declaration sets forth the Demise and that the Defendants Testator Covenanted to pull down three old Houses and build three new ones in their room and to keep the same in good repair and so deliver them up at the end of his Term 119 Sets forth the Plaintiffs Title to the Reversion by Assignment from the Lessor 119 120 And that the Tenant for years Attorned 121 That the Tenant in possession died and left the Defendant his Executor c. The the Plaintiff hath performed all and singular the Covenants on the part of the Lessor and his Assigns Protestando that the Defendant hath not performed those on the part of his Testator 122 He assigns a Breach in facto for permitting once of the new erected Houses to fall down before the end of the Term and other defaults in not Repairing Et sic the Defendant Convenconem non tenuit 123 The Defendant pleads performance specially to each Breach assigned and says that his Testator pull'd down the three Houses and built other three Houses in their room which he kept in Repairs and so delivered at the end of his Term 124 The Plaintiff demurs to the Plea as not being sufficient as to the leaving one House totally prostrate and ruined as the Plaintiff declared The Defendant joyned in Demurrer 125 5. Against the Assignee of an Executrix 228 The Declaration sets forth That the Plaintiff was possest of a Term for years yet in being by Indenture demised to the Testator for 21 years at the yearly Rent of c. 229 With a Clause of Re-entry and Covenants 230 That the Lessee entred made his Will made the Assignor his Exetrix and died That she proved the Will entred and assigned to the Defendant who entred and is still possest The Breach assigned was in the Non payment of Rent 231 The Defendant pleads That he assigned over before any Rent due 232 Demurrer to part of the Plea Joynder in Demurrer Judgment for the other part 233 Cesset executio Brevis de Inquirendo de dampnis quousque the Demurrer be determined 234 6. In Covenant the Plaintiff declares upon an Indenture of Demise from the Defendant 272 Profert in Curia The Demise Habendum Reddendum The Covenants on the Plaintiffs part 273 Covenants on the Defendants part for himself and Assigns to permit to make a Drain The Plaintiff entred and was possest and avers performance of all Covenants on his part The Breach assigned Eo quod the Defendant being possest of certain Tenements adjoyning for a Term of years did demise part of the Term to J. S. who entred 274 And died possest And Administration granted to his Widow who entred and was possest and took Husband The Husband and Wife entred and were possest and refuse to suffer the Defendant to make the Drain Et sic inde producit sectam 275 The Defendant pleads That he permitted the Plaintiff to make a Drain according to Covenant but the Plaintiff refused it The Plaintiff demurs The Defendant joyns in Demurrer 276 D Debt 1. IN Debt upon a Bond the Defendant craves Oyer of the Condition and pleads the Statute of Vsury 80 He sets forth the Usurious Contract the Money lent and the Bond in question given for it and that the Money for Forbearance exceeds the rate of 6 l per Cent. 81 The Plaintiff Replies That the Bond was made by a Scrivener in his absence who mistook the Condition and Traverses the Corrupt Agreement The Defendant demurs to the Replication The Plaintiff joyns 82 2. Debt upon a Bond to perform an Award 110 The Defendant craves Oyer of the Condition and pleads that the Arbitrators made no Award but that they named an Umpire who made no Award by Writing or Word of Mouth 111 The Plaintiff replies That true it is that the Arbitrators nor the Umpire by them first Chosen made any Award but refused whereupon the Arbitrators chose another Umpire who mad an Award within the time limitted 112 The Defendant demurs specially and assigns for Cause That it does not appear by the Replication that the Defendant had Notice that the Arbitrators had named the second Umpire or that he had any Authority to make any Umpirage The Plaintiff joyns in Demurrer 113 3. For Rent against an Executrix upon a Lease parol 176 The Declaration sets forth the Demise to the Defendants Testator of the 4th part of two Corn Mills and of one Mault-Mill under the same Roof to hold for one year sic de Anno in annum as long as both parties shall please paying Monthly for the same the Sum of 60 s 4 d ob so long as the said Testator should hold the Premisses and shews that he entred and held it for so long and that the Rent is due and unpaid for so many Months per quod actio accrevit 176 He also sets forth another Demise from year to year so long as both parties shall please at the yearly Rent of 20 l to be paid Quarterly by equal Portions the Tenants Entry the Rent arrear per quod actio accrevit Another Demise at Will laid Entry Rent arrear Actio accrevit 177 Another Demise at Will laid of the 4th part of another Mill Entry Rent arrear Actio accrevit the The Testator in his Life time nor the Executrix post mortem have not paid 178 The Defendant pleads in Abatement That the Tenant died Intestate and that Administration was granted to her and therefore ought to be sued as Administratrix and not as Executrix 178 The Plaintiff replies That the Defendant administred as Executrix before the granting the Administration to her The Defendant demurs to the Replication The Plaintiff joyns 179 4. Debt upon Bond. The Defendant craves Oyer of the Condition which is to perform an Award 219 Pleads That the Arbitrators made no Award The Plaintiff replies and sets forth the Award made in Writing and assigns a Breach in not paying a certain Sum of Money awarded 220 The Defendant demurs The Plaintiff joyns 221 5. Debt upon a Sheriffs Bond 234 The Defendant prays Oyer of the Condition which was to appear in Chancery to answer a Contempt Pleads the Statute of 23 H. 6. That an Attachment issued out of Chancery delivered to the Plaintiff being Sheriff who caused the Defendant to be arrested and after took the said Bond for his Appearance 236 Contra formam Statuti praedicti sic scriptum Obligatorium illud c. vacuum in lege existit The Plaintiff demurs to the Plea The Defendant joyns 237 6. Debt upon Bond Condition'd to perform an Award 239 The Defendant pleads that the Arbitrators made no award The Plaintiff replies and sets forth an Award made ore tenus 240 Notice of the Award and request for the Performance of it
1 W. M. After which Judgment for the Defendants 166 That the said Defendants shall go sine die and have their Costs 167 Averment that the said Judgment remains in full force That the Goods in the said Action of Trespass and this of Trover are the same That the Conversion in this Action and the Taking in the other is the same That the Cause of Action was the same in both And that the Plaintiffs and Defendants are the same Et hoc parati sunt verificare unde petunt Judicium si praedicti the Plaintiffs Actionem suam versus eos habere debeant c. Not guilty to the residue of the Goods The Plaintiffs demur The Defendants joyn 168 Vsury Pleaded Vid. Debt 7. Way Action for stopping it Vid. Action on the Case 5. WE all knowing the Great Learning and Judgment of the Author do for the Benefit of the Public approve of and allow the Printing and Publishing of this Book Intituled The Reports of Sir Peyton Ventris Kt. Late One of the Justices of the Court of Common-Pleas J. Som̄ers C.S. J. Holt Geo Treby Ed Nevill Joh. Powell W. Gregory N. Lechmere Tho. Rokeby G Eyre Jo Turton John Powell Sam. Eyre April the 20 th 1965. The Second Volume TERMINO SANCTI HILLARII Anno Vicesimo primo secundo Caroli Secundi IN COMMUNI BANCO Craw versus Ramsey IN an Ejectment of Lands and the Rectory of Kingston upon Thames in Surrey Vpon Not Guilty pleaded the Jury found a Special Verdict to this effect viz. That Robert Ramsey Born in Scotland before the Accession thereof to the Crown of England had Issue four Sons Robert Nicholas John and George Antenati Robert died they do not find when leaving Issue three Daughters Margaret Isabel and Jane who were also Aliens and alive 1 Octob. 14 Car. 1. Nicholas had Issue Patrick born in England 1 May 1618. They also find that at the Parliament holden 10 Car. 1. in Ireland it was Enacted That all Persons of the Scottish Nation should be reputed the Kings Natural Subjects to all intents constructions and purposes of that his Realm of Ireland as if Born there And they find the Act of Parliament at large Nicholas Ramsey was alive at the making of that Act. John the third Son afterwards Earl of Holderness was Naturalized by Act of Parliament in England 1 Jacobi and purchased the Lands and Rectory in question and being seised 22 Jac by Indenture Tripartite between him of the First part Sir William Cocke and Martha his Daughter of the Second part and Charles Lord Effingham of the Third part In Consideration of a Marriage to be had between him and Martha did Covenant to levy a Fine to the use of himself for Life and afterwards to Martha for Life the Remainder to the Heirs Males of his Body the Remainder to his own right Heirs And 29 Septemb. 22 Jac. the Marriage was had and the Michaelmas Term after a Fine was Levied accordingly The 24 of Jan. 1 Car. 1. the Earl died without Issue Martha Entred and was seised for her Life and died 17 Car. Et eodem anno it was found by Office that the Earl of Holderness died seised of the Rectory as before and without an Heir and that King Charles anno decimo granted this Rectory to one Murray George the fourth Son of Robert was Naturalized by the Parliament here 7 Jac. He had Issue John the Defendant Nicholas died Patrick his Heir in 1651. bargained and sold to the Earl of Elgin and one Sydenham virtute cujus vigore Statuti c. they were seised prout Lex postulat and in 1662. bargained and sold for years to Amabel Countess of Kent and Jane Hart and afterwards Released to them and their Heirs in 1665. They being seised bargained and sold by Lease and Release also to Pullen and Neale who Entred and bargained and sold to Sir Lionel Talmash and West the Lessors of the Plaintiff upon whom John the Defendant Entred Vpon which the Action is brought and the great Question in the Case was Whether Patrick the Son of Nicholas might claim these Lands as Heir to the Earl of Holderness by virtue of the Act of Parliament in Ireland 10 Car. or that they should descend to the Defendant the Son of George Naturalized the 7 of Jac. in England Wyld and Archer who Argued first were of Opinion That however the Point was adjudged the Plaintiff could not have Judgment upon this Verdict for they do not find that Patrick entred or was seised but that he in 1651. did bargain and sell c. Virtute cujus the Bargainees were seised prout Lex postulat and then bargained and sold in 1662 and do not so much as find their Bargainees seised prout Lex postulat But they find the Defendant Entred and so the primer Possession is in him which is a good Title against the Plaintiff for whom none is found it not being found that Patrick Entred Again If the Naturalization in Ireland will serve in England the Title appears for the Daughters the Heirs of Robert the eldest Son for 't is found that he died but not when so it might be after the Act of 10 Car. But Tyrrell and Vaughan Chief Justice differed in these two Points As to the First They said it would be intended Patrick entred for a Verdict that leaves all the Matter at large to the Iudgment of the Court will be taken sometimes by Intendment as well as where the Jury Conclude upon a Special Point 2 Cro. 64. find an Incumbent Resigned the Resignation shall be intended accepted So in 4 Co. Fullwood's Case it was found that one came before the Recorder of London and Mayor of the Staple recognovit se debere c. and did not say per scriptum suum Obligatorium nec per formam Statuti yet intended so Vid. Hob. 262. And where they find the Bargainees seised prout lex postulat that doth not leave it doubtful whether seised or no but whether by right or wrong for Seisin must be taken as found expresly Neither do they find any other in possession nor that the Defendant made any Claim in Twelve years after which enforces the Intendment as before And it is found expresly that Pullen and Neale Entred in 1665. so that the Defendant had not the primer Possession however or if he had he should not have Judgment if no other Title were found for him as is Resolved in 1 Cro. 42. Hern and Allen's Case As to the Second It shall be intended Robert died before 10 Car. For he is found an Alien and shall be presumed to have continued so during his Life unless found to the contrary then the Discent to the Daughters is obstructed by the Incapacity of their Father And tho' when the Title is found for the King the Court shall adjudge for him because the Kings Courts are intrusted with his Rights 't is not so of any other person but they shall take no
praed ' Comit ' de Clare sigillat ' idem Tho. Dowse modo Quer ' hic in Cur ' ê“fert cujus dat' est eisdem die anno ult ' supradicto pro in consideration ' cujusdam Pecuniae summae eidem Comit ' de Clare in manibus praed ' Arthur ' Stanhope Ed Rosseter Joh Wolstenholme Tho. Bristowe solut ' barganizavit verdidit praefat ' Arthuro Stanhope Ed. Rosseter Joh. Wolstenholme Tho. Bristowe in t ' al' revertion ' tenementorum praed ' cum pertin praefat ' Rich. Cale c. ut praefertur dimiss habend ' tenend ' revertion ' ill ' eisdem Arthur ' Stanhope Ed. Rosseter Joh. Wolstenholme Tho. Bristowe Executor ' Administrator ' Assign ' suis a die prox ' ante dat' ejusdem Indentur ' pro duran ' termino un ' anni integri extunc prox ' sequen ' plenar ' complend ' finiend ' reddend ' solvend ' proinde dicto Joh. Comiti de Clare Haered ' Assign ' suis reddit ' un ' grani Piperis à d Festum Sanct. Michaelis Arch ' prox ' sequen ' post dat' ejusdem Indentur ' si idem foret petit ' Virtute quarum quidem bargainae vendition ' necnon vigore cujusdam Actus in Parliament ' dom ' Henrici nuper Regis Angl ' octavi apud Westm ' By virtue whereof and of the Statute of Uses the Bargainee was possest in dicto Com' Midd ' quarto die Februar ' Anno Regni sui vicesimo septimo tent ' edit ' provis ' de usibus in possession ' transferend ' praed ' Arthur ' Stanhope Ed. Rosseter Joh. Wolstenholme Tho. Bristowe fuer ' de praed ' revertion ' tenementorum praed ' cum pertin ' possessionat ' revertion ' inde ulterius eidem Comit ' Haered suis spectan Ipsisque Arthur Stanhope Ed. Rosseter Joh. Wolstenholme Tho. Bristowe sic de praed ' revertion tenementorum praed ' cum pertin possessionat existen ac praed ' Comite de revertion inde immediate super praed ' The Lessor Releases the Inheritance termin praed ' Arthur Ed. Joh. Wolstenholme Tho. Bristowe expectan in dominico suo ut de feodo seisit existen idem Comes postea scilicet septimo die Augusti Anno Regni dict nuper Regis Caroli Secundi decimo quarto supradicto apud Paroch Sacti Clement Dacorum praed ' in Com. praed ' per quandam al. Indentur in t eundem Joh. Comit. de Clare per nomen praehonorabilis Joh. Comitis de Clare ex una parte praefat Arthur Stanhope Ed. Rosseter Joh. Wolstenholme Tho. Bristowe ê‘ nom ' praehonorabilis Arthur Stanhope Armig. secundi Filii nuper praehonorabil Philip. Comit. de Chesterfeild defunct Ed. Rosseter de Somerby in Com. Lincoln ' Mil. Joh. Wolstenholme de London Armig ' Thomae Bristowe de Beerthorpe in Com. Nottigham gen ex altera parte adtunc ibidem fact cujus un ' partem sigillo praedict ' Comit. de Clare sigillat ' Idem Thomas Dowse modo quer ' hic in Cur ' ê“fert cujus dat' est eisdem die anno ult ' supradict ' pro in cons in eadem Indentur ' mentionat ' relaxavit remisit praefat ' Arthur ' Stanhope Edwardo Rosseter Johanni Wolstenholme Thomae Bristowe inter al. praed ' revertion ' ipsius Comitis tenementorum praed ' cum pertin habend tenend eisdem Arthur ' Stanhope Edwardo Rosseter Johonni Wolstenholme Thomae Bristowe Haered ' To the use of himself for life Assign imperpetuum ad usum praed ' Johannis Comitis de Clare ê“ termino vitae suae natural ' Et post decess ipsius Comit. tunc ad usum â—â—â—rundam Arthur Stanhope Edwardi Rosseter Johannis Wolstenholm Thomae Bristowe Executor ' Administrator ' Assign ' And after his decease to the Grantees for 1000 years suorum abpro duran ' tetmino Mille annorum à dat' â—jâ—sejusdem Indentur ' computand ' plenar ' complend finiend virtute cujus quidem relaxation ' necnon vigore praedict ' Statut ' de usibus in possession ' transferend ' Seisin by virtue of the Statute of Uses Idem Johannes Comes de Clare fuit de praed ' revercon ' tenementorum praed ' cum pertin ' seisit ' in dominico suo ut de libero tenemento ê“ termino vitae suae natural ' remanere inde ut praefertur limitat ' spectan ' Et sic inde seisit ' existen ' idem Comes postea scilicet primo die Julii Anno regni dicti nuper Regis Caroli Secundi decimo octavo apud praed ' paroch ' sancti Clement ' Dacorum obiit sic de tali statu suo inde seisit ' Tenant for Life died seised post cujus mortem iidem Arthur ' Stanhope Edwardus Rosseter Johannes Wolstenholme Thomas Bristowe possessionat ' fuer ' de praed ' revercon ' tenÌ„torum praed ' cum pertin ' ê“ praed ' The Grantees possessed for the Term of 1000 years termino Mille annorum Et sic inde possessionat ' existen ' iidem Arthur ' Stanhope Edwardus Rosseter Johannes Wolstenholme Thomas Bristowe postea scilicet septimo die Julii anno regni dicti nuper Regis Caroli Secundi vicesimo apud praed ' paroch ' sancti Clement ' Dacorum per quandam Indentur ' inter Gilbertum Comit ' de Clare praefat ' Arthur ' Stanhope Edward ' And by Indenture grant to the Defendants Testator for the residue of the Term. Rosseter Johannem Wolstenholme Thomam Bristowe per nomina Praehonorabil Gilberti Comit ' de Clare Honorabil ' Arthur Stanhope Armig ' secundi filii nuper Praehonorabil ' Philippi Comit. de Chesterfield defunct domini Anglicè Sir Edwardi Rosseter de Somerby in Com' Lincoln ' Mil ' Johannis Wolstenholme de London Armig ' Thomae Bristowe de Beerthorpe in Com. Nott. gen ' ex un ' parte quendam Thomam Dowse patrem praed ' Thomae Dowse modo quer ' per nomen Thomae Dowse de Grays-Inn in Com. Midd. gen ex altera parte adtunc ibidem fact ' cujus quidem Indentur ' un ' partem sigillis praed ' Gilberti Comitis de Clare Arthur ' Stanhope Edwardi Rosseter Johannis Wolstenholme Thomae Bristowe sigillat ' Idem Thomas Dowse modo quer ' hic in Cur ' ê“fert cujus dat' est eisdem die anno ult ' supradict ' ê“ in cons ' cujusdam pecuniae summae eisdem Arthur Stanhope Edwardo Rosseter Johanni Wolstenholme Thomae Bristowe in manibus ê‘ pÌ„dict ' Thomam Dowse patrem solut ' concesser ' dicto Thomae Dowse prÌ„i Executor Administrator Assign suis inter al' praed ' revercon ' tenementor ' praed ' cum pertin ' habend tenend revercon ' praed cum pertin ' dicto Tho' Dowse prÌ„i Exec. Administr Assign ' suis ê“ duran omni reliq ' resid '
necesse non habet nec per legem terrae tenetur respondere Et hoc parat ' est verificare unde pro defectu sufficien ' placiti in hac parte idem Thomas Dowse pet ' judicum dampna sua occatione fraction ' convention ' praed ' in hac parte sibi adjudicari c. Et praed ' Johannes Cale dic ' qd ' placitum praed ' per ipsum Johannem modo forma praed ' placitat ' materiaque in eadem content ' A Joynder in Demurrer bon ' sufficien ' in lege existit ' ad Cur ' dict' Domini Dominae Regis Reginae nunc hic a cognitione placiti praedict ' habend ' praecludend ' quod quidem placitum materiaque in eadem content ' idem Johannes parat ' est verificare probare prout praed ' Cur ' c. Et quia praed ' Thomas Dowse ad placitum illud non respond ' nec ill ' hucusque aliqualit ' dedic ' idem Johannes Cale pet ' Judicium si Cur ' dictorum Dom ' Dominae Regis Reginae nunc hic placitum illud ulterius cognoscere velit Hen. Trinder Et quia Justic ' hic se advisare volunt de super praemissis unde partes praed ' superius posuer ' se in Judicium Cur ' priusquam Judicium inde reddant dies dat' est partibus praed ' hicusque in Octabis Sancti Hilarii de audiendo inde judicio suo eo qd ' iidem Justic ' hic inde nondum c. Et quoad triand ' separal ' exit ' praed ' inter partes praed ' per patriam triand superius junct Prec est Vic. qd venire fac hic ad praefat Terminum duodecim c. per quos c. Et qui nec c. ad recogn c. Quia tam c. Dowse versus Cale IN an Action of Covenant brought by Thomas Dowse as Assignee of Thomas Dowse his Father Assignee of Arthur Stanhope Edward Rosseter John Wolstenholm and Thomas Bristow Assgnees of John late Earl of Clare against John Cale Executor of Richard Cale The Plaintiff set forth a Lease by Indenture made by the said Earl of Clare the 9th of December 1647. to the said Richard Cale of three Messuages in the Parish of St. Clement Danes in Middlesex to hold from Christmas Day then next following for 41 years rendring 20 l yearly Rent and further sets forth that the said Richard Cale by the said Indenture Covenanted with the said Earl his Heirs and Assigns to pull-down the said three Houses and would in the same place build three as good and substantial Houses in all respects as the said Richard Cale had for some short time before built for himself in Fleetstreet Ac eciam That he would during the said term well and sufficiently repair all the Houses so agreed to be built ac eciam omnia singula Canal ' Angelicè Sewers Sentinas Anglicê Sinks Elicia Anglicè Drains paviamenta fact ' vel fiend ' in pro cum omnibus requisitis necessar ' reparationibus ac dicta dimissa praemissa ac domus edificia superinde fore erect ' edificat ' eorum quodlibet bene sufficienter reparat ' supportat ' manutent ' in fine vel citiori determinatione dicti termini pacifice quiete relinqueret sursum redderet dicto Com' Haered ' Assign ' suis prout per Indentur ' praed ' c. By virtue of which said Demise the said Richard Cale entred and was possessed and the said Earl being seised of the Reversion by Lease and Release dated the 6th and 7th of August 1662. conveyed the said Reversion to the said Arthur Stanhop Edward Rossiter John Wolstenholm and Thomas Bristow and their Heirs to the use of the said John Earl of Clare during his Life and after his Decease to the use of the said Stanhop Rossiter Wolstenholm and Bristow for one thousand years next after the date of the said Indenture and that after the said Earl of Clare died and the said Stanhop Rossiter Wolstenholm and Bristow became possessed of the Reversion of the Premisses for the said term of 1000 years and upon the 7th of June 1668. by an Indenture between Gilbert Earl of Clare and the said Stanhop Rossiter Wolstenholm and Bristow of the one part and Thomas Dowse Father of the Defendant of the other part they granted to the said Thomas Dowse the Reversion of the said Premisses for and during the residue of the term of 1000 years to which the said Richard Cale being then possessed of the term demised to him as aforesaid of the Premisses did attorn and the said Richard Cale being so possessed in the year 1672. died having made his last Will and the Defendant Executor thereof who after the decease of the said Richard entered into the said demised Premisses and became possessed and the said Thomas Dowse Father to the Plaintiff died possessed of the Reversion aforesaid in the year of our Lord 1686. having made his Will and thereby devised the said Reversion to the Plaintiff for his life and after his decease to Thomas Dowse Son of the Plaintiff and to the Heirs of his Body and made the Plaintiff Executor of his said Will who caused the same to be proved and did claim the Reversion of the said Premisses ratione legationis praed ' and thereupon became possessed thereof for the residue of the said term of 1000. years then to come and unexpired And the said Richard Cale being possessed by vertue of the Demise aforesaid altho' he the said Thomas Dowse performed all the Covenants to be performed as aforesaid on the part of the said John late Earl of Clare his Heirs and Assigns the said Defendant did not perform the Covenants which were to be performed on the part of the said Richard Cale his Executors and Administrators and in facto dicit the said John Cale being possessed of the Premisses after the decease of the said Thomas Dowse Father of the Plaintiff before the end of the said term of one and forty years viz. the 13th of September 1684. did permit one House of the value of 200 l erected upon the Premisses by the said Richard Cale in his life time to fall down and to be wholly ruinated and the said John Cale at the end of the said term which ended at Christmas Anno Dom. 1688. left the said House so prostrated and ruined contra formam conventionis praed ' And assigns another Breach for that he permitted the Pavement of the Yard to be broken and in decay and at the end of the term left it so in decay for want of repair and that he suffered the Tiles and one hundred yards of Walling of four Houses upon the Premisses erected by the said Richard Cale in his life-time during the term to be broken and in decay for want of Repairs and so the said John Cale left them
redd ' unius anni mediet ' redd ' unius anni per quem talia terrae vel tenementa sic alienat ' tent ' fuer ' in Manerio praed ' nomine finis pro alienatione and lays a Custom to distrain for the said Alienation Fine and then sets forth an alienation of the said Messuage and Premisses by the said Sir John Sabin to one Walter Tyndall in fee and shews that the said Walter Tyndall made another alienation in fee to one Christopher Yates and so sets forth that there were two Fines due upon the said alienations after the rate aforesaid amounting to 18 l 7 s and 7 d ob and that he as Bayliff of the said Dean and Chapter captionem praed ' bene cognoscit in praed ' loco in quo ut in parcell ' tenement ' praed ' To this the Plaintiff demurred and it was spoken to at the Bar the last Term and likewise this Term The main thing was that the Custom as it was laid was not good for the Alienation Fine is set forth to be due upon the Alienation of any parcel of Lands or Tenements held of the said Mannor to have a year and halfs Rent by which the Lands or Tenements so aliened were held so that if the 20th part of an Acre be aliened a Fine is to be paid and that of the whole Rent for every parcel is held at the time of the alienation by the whole Rent and no apportioning thereof can be but subsequent to the Alienation and this the whole Court held an unreasonable Custom and it is set forth it could not be otherwise understood than that a Fine should be due viz. a year and halfs Rent upon the Alienation of any part of the Lands held by such Rent The Court doubted also whether the Custom was good as to the claiming an Alienation Fine upon an Alienation for Life because by that the tenure of the Lands aliened is not altered for the Reversion is still held as before by the same Tenant Judicium pro Quer ' Colley versus Helyar IN an Action of Debt for 34 l the Plaintiff declared against the Defendant an Attorney of this Court praesente hic in Cur. in propria persona sua upon a Bond of 34 l The Defendant pleads in Bar quoad quinque libras sex solid tres denar of the aforesaid 34 l that the Plaintiff post confectionem Scripti Obligat ' praedict ' scilicet vicesimo c. anno c. ê‘ quoddam Scriptum suum acquietantiae cognovisset se accepisse habuisse de praed Defendente 5 l 6 s and 3 d in part solutionis majoris summae and pleaded a frivolous Plea as to the rest of the Mony to which the Plaintiff demurred And it was argued that the Acquittance under the Plaintiffs Hand and Seal for 5 l 6 s and 3 d part of the Mony due might have been pleaded in bar of the whole and that if the Defendant here had relied upon it it would have barred the Plaintiff of the whole Vide for that matter Hollingwoth and Whetston Sty 212. Allen 65. Beaton and Forrest Note there the payment was since the Action brought and pleaded in abatement where it was said that it could not be so pleaded without an Acquittance Vide Kelw. 20. 162. 3 H. 7. 3 B. receipt of parcel pending the Writ 7 Ed. 4. 15. a. But it seems clear by the Book of Edw. 4. 207. Mo. 886. Speak versus Richards That if part be received and an Acquittance given before the Action it is a Bar only of so much but it seems the Action must be brought for the whole Dickman versus Allen. Cantabr ' ss Case brought against the Defendant for not folding his Sheep upon the Plaintiffs Land according to Custom The Colledge of St. Mary and St. Nicholas seized in Fee jâ—re Collegii ABRAHAMUS ALLEN nuê‘ de Grancester in Com' praedicto Yeom ' attach ' fuit ad respondend ' Roberto Dickman Gen ' de placito transgr ' suê‘ Casum c. Et unde idem Robertus per Robertum Drake Attorn ' suum queritur quare cum Praepositus Scholares Collegii Regalis Beatae Mariae Sancti Nicholai in Cantabr ' in Com' praed ' seisit ' fuissent de uno Capitali Messuagio cum pertinen ' in Grancester in Com' praedicto ac de centum sexaginta acris terrae arrabil ' jacen ' in Communibus Campis de Grancester praedicta cum pertinen ' in dominico suo ut de feodo in jure Collegii sui praedicti iidemque Praepositus Scholares omnes ill quorum statum ipsi habuer ' de in tenementis praed ' cum pertinen ' a tempore cujus contrarii memoria hominum non existit habuer ' habere consuever ' ê“ se Firmariis Tenentibus suis eorundem A Custom for all the Tenants to sold their Landlords Land Tenementorum cum pertinen ' libertatem Faldagii Anglicê Foldage omnium Ovium Ovibus suis ê“priis Ovibus tenen ' occupatorum ê“ tempore existen ' quorundam Messuagiorum Terrarum in Villa de Coton in Com' praed ' qui a tempore cujus contrarii memoria hominum non existit respective usi fuer ' Common of Vicinage intercÌ„oiare causa vicinagii in quibusdam Communibus Campis de Grancester praed ' cum Ovibus suis in super praed ' Messuagiis terris suis in Coton praed ' Levant and Couchant levan ' cuban ' except ' suor ' depascen ' infra Communes Campos territoria de Grancester praedicta a vicesimo quinto die Martii usque primum diem Novembris quolibet anno suê‘ praedictas centum sexaginta acras terras arabil percipiend ' From such a day to such a day faldand ' tanquam ad tenementa praedicta cum pertinenciis pertinen ' praedictisque Praeposito Scholaribus Collegii praed ' de Tenementis praedictis cum pertinen ' The Principal and Scholars demise to the Plaintiff by Indenture in forma praedicta seisit ' existen ' Praepositus Scholares postea scilicet decimo nono die Octobris Anno Domini millesimo sexcentesimo octogesimo primo apud Grancester praedictam quodam Johanne Coppleston Sacrae Theologiae Professor ' adtunc Praeposito Collegii praedicti existen ' ê‘ quandam Indenturam inter ipsos Praepositum Scholares ex una parte quendam Johannem Wittewronge Mil Barronet ' ex altera parte factam cujus alteram partem Sigillo cÌ„oi ipsorum Praepositi Scholarium signat ' idem Robertus Dickman hic in Cur ' profert cujus dat' est eisdem die anno dimiser ' ad firmam tradider ' eidem Johanni Wittewronge Tenementa praedicta cum pertinen ' Habendum habend ' occupand ' praefat ' Johanni Assign ' suis a tempore confectionis Indenturae illius usque plenum finem terminum viginti
Ground tanquam ad Mesuag ' praed ' spectant ' pertinent ' de jure habere debet and that the Defendant stopped it up ad damnum c. The Defendant pleaded a frivolous Plea to which there was a Demurrer It was Objected on the Defendant's part that the Declaration was insufficient because the Plaintiff did not prescribe for the Way nor otherwise entitle himself to it than by a possession of the Messuage and that he had and ought to have a Way to the said Messuage belonging And a difference was taken between this and Dent and Oliver's Case 2 Cro. 43. where one alledged himself to be seised in Fee of a Mannor and had a Fair there and that the Defendant disturbed him to take Toll And in 2 Cro. Stackman and West there is a Prescription laid in the Dean and Chapter who had the Fee for the Way But it was Objected That a Corporation could not prescribe in a Que Estate but it was held well being but inducement to the Action And the Court here held the Declaration sufficient being but a possessory Action And a Case was said to be so Adjudged in this Court between the same parties Anno primo Jacobi secundi Vide the Case of Saint John and Moody upon the like Point Woodward al' versus Fox IN an Indebitat ' Assumpsit for 200 l for so much Money received by the Defendant for the use of the Plaintiffs The Defendant pleaded Non assumpsit and upon that a Special Verdict was found That in the Year 1681. before the Promise supposed c. John Hammond was and yet is Archdeacon of Huntington within the Diocess of Lincoln and that the Bishop of Lincoln is Patron of the Archdeaconry and that the Office of Register of the Court of Archdeaconry was time out of mind grantable by the Archdeacon for the Term of three Lives and that the said John Hammond in the said Year 1681. for 100 l sold and granted to Simon Michael and John Juce for their Lives the said Office of Register it being an Office concerning the administration of Justice and that by Colour thereof they enjoyed the Office till Juce died which was in 1687. and soon after in the same year the said Simon Michael died in the possession of the said Office and that Hammond was no ways Convicted of selling the said Office upon any prosecution at Law or otherwise And they further said That Thomas Bishop of Lincoln in the said Year 1687. after the Death of Juce and some time before the Death of Michael granted the said Office of Register to the Defendant Fox and set forth the Grant in haec verba which mentioned the said Registers Office to be void by the Statute of the 5 6 Ed. 6. against Sale of Offices and that thereupon it belonged to the said Bishop to grant the said Office by virtue of which the said Fox became seised of the said Office prout lex postulat And they find afterwards that in the same Year that Juce and Michael died Hammond being Archdeacon as aforesaid granted the said Office to the Plaintiffs Woodward Masters and Gilbert for their Lives and that they entred upon the said Office and became seised thereof ê“ut lex postulat And they find that the Bishops Grant was Afterwards Confirmed by the Dean and Chapter and they find that afterwards viz. the 22 of Octob. Anno regni Willielmi Mariae primo the said King and Queen their Letters Patents under the Great Seal reciting that the said Office appertained to Their Majesties to grant by the said Statute of Edward the 6th did grant the said Office of Register to the said Plaintiffs Woodward Masters and Gilbert for their Lives and that by virtue thereof they entred upon and exercised the said Office and received divers Fees and Profits thereunto belonging and that the Defendant having notice thereof did take divers Fees and Profits of the said Office amounting to 30 l claiming them to his own use c. and if upon the whole Matter c. Vpon this Special Verdict there were these Points moved The first Point was Whether this Office of Register could be granted for Lives This was not much insisted on by the Defendants Council it having been usually granted and so found by the Verdict 3 Cro. Young and Fowler 's Case a Grant in Reversion of the Registers Office was allowed being warranted by Usage and so in 3 Cro. Young and Stoel But unless there have been such Vsage 't is not grantable in Reversion Vide 3 Cro. Walker and Sir John Lamb. The second Point was Whether the Grant of this Office in Consideration of Money is void by the Statute of the 5th and 6th of Edward the 6th against Sale of Offices That Point was also waved it being Resolved in Dr. Trevor's Case 12 Co. 78. 2 Cro. 269. forasmuch as it concerned Administration of Justice The third Point was That the Statute of 5 Ed. 6. Enacting That the person who takes any Money for any Office shall lose and forfeit all his Right to any such Office c. Whether the King or the Bishop shall take advantage of this Forfeiture in regard the Statute doth not express who shall dispose of the Office in such case Co. Lit. 159. a. And it was said on the part of the Plaintiff That when a Statute gives a Forfeiture and not said to whom the King shall have it 11 Co. 60. a. unless there be a particular party grieved as upon the Statute of 2 Ed. 6. of Tythes and yet it was for some time before it was setled that the Parson should have the treble Value in that Case And this agrees with the Reason of the Common Law things that are nullius in bonis the King shall have them as extra Parochial Tythes 11 H. 4. 17. Vid. 5. Co. in Sir Henry Constable's Case The Soil of Navigable Rivers and derelict Lands was with this difference If the Sea leaves the Land gradatim and for but a little quantity the Owner of the Land shall have it but if in a great quantity at a time it goes to the King Davis Rep. 5. 6. Vid. Siderfin 86. Dyer 126. 'T is true at the Common Law where a person hath an Interest in that which is Forfeited he shall have the benefit of it as if a Park-keeper forfeit it shall go to the Owner of the Park And in Sir John Breon's Case Bridgm. 27. where the Earl of Lancaster gave License to make a Park in his Forest and the party forfeited his Office the Earl had the advantage of it In those cases the thing is forfeited to him from whom it was granted as a Copyholder forfeits to his Lord and Tenant for Life to him in Reversion but here the Bishop hath nothing to do with the Office of Register he cannot dispose of it in the time of Vacancy of the Archdeaconry The Verdict finds that his Office is to Register the Acts in the
Body of such first Son and in like manner to the second third Son c. and for want of Issue of the said Simon Leach the remainder to Sir Simon Leach and the Heirs Males of his Body and for default of such Issue to the right Heirs of Nicholas the Testator for ever and that the said Nicholas died seised of the Premisses and after his decease the said Simon Leach entred and became seised for Life with Remainders over as aforesaid and being so seised made a Deed hearing date the 23th of August in the 25th year of the Reign of the said King Charles sealed and delivered to the use of the said Sir Simon Leach but he was not present which Deed the Verdict sets forth in haec verba and by if he granted and surrendred to the said Sir Simon Leach his Heirs and Assigns the said Mannor and Premisses the Reversion and Reversions Remainder and Remainders of the same To have and to hold the same to the said Sir Simon Leach and his Heirs to the use of him and his Heirs and they find that the said Charles Leach Lessor of the Plaintiff the first Son of the said Sir Simon Leach was born the first of November in the 25th year of the Reign of the said King Charles and not before and that Simon Leach from the time of his Sealing the Deed to the 25th of May in the 30th year of the said King Charles continued possessed of the Premisses and that then and not before Sir Simon Leach accepted and agreed to the said Surrender and entred into the Premisses and that afterwards the said Simon Leach Brother of the said Nicholas the Testator died and the said Charles Leach his Son after his decease entred into the Premisses and demised them to the Plaintiff who by virtue thereof entred and became possessed and so continued till the said Simon Leach and the other Defendants by his Command ejected him But whether upon the whole Matter the said Simon Leach did surrender the said Mannor and Premisses to the said Sir Simon Leach before the said Charles Leach was born and if he did not surrender before the birth of the said Charles Leach then they find the Defendants Guilty and if he did surrender them before the birth then they find for the Defendants And Pollexfen Chief Justice Powell and Rokeby were of Opinion that here was no Surrender till such time as Sir Simon Leach had notice of the Deed of Surrender and agreed to it and so the Remainder was vested in Charles the Son and it was not defeated by the Agreement of Sir Simon after his birth to the Surrender But Ventris differed and his Argument was as followeth Whom this Record the Case is no more than this Simon Leach Tenant for Life Remainder to his first Son Remainder in Call to Sir Simon Leach Simon Leach before the birth of that Son by Deed sealed and delivered to the use of Sir Simon but in his Absence and without his Notice surrenders his Estate to Sir Simon and continues the possession until after the birth of his Son and then Sir Simon Leach agrees to the Surrender Whether this Surrender shall be taken as a good and effectual Surrender before the Son born There are two Points which have been spoken to in this Case at the Bar. First Whether by the Sealing of the Deed of Surrender the Estate immediately passed to Sir Simon Leach for then the Contingent Remainder could not best in the after-born Son there being no Estate left in Simon Leach his Father to support it Secondly Whether after the assent of Sir Simon Leach tho' it where given after the birth of the Son doth not so relate as to make it a Surrender from the Sealing of the Deed and thereby defeat the Remainder which before such Assent was vested in the Son I think these Points include all that is material in the Case and I shall speak to the Second Point because I would rid it out of the Case For as to that Point I conceive that if it be admitted that the Estate for Life continued in Simon Leach till the Assent of Sir Simon that the Remainder being vested in Charles the second Son before such Assent there can be no Relation that shall divest it I do not go upon the General Rule That Relations shall not do wrong to Strangers 'T is true Relations are fictions in Law which are always accompanied with Equity But 't is as true that there is sometimes loss and damage to Third Persons consequent upon them but then 't is what the Law calls Damnum absque injuria which is a known and stated difference in the Law as my Brother Pemberton urged it But I think there needs nothing of that to be considerrd in this Point But the Reason which I go upon is That the Relation here let it be never so strong cannot hurt or disturb the Remainder in Charles Leach in this Case for that the Remainder is in him by a Title antecedent and paramount to the Deed of Surrender to which the Assent of Sir Simon Leach relates so that it plainly over-reaches the Relation If an Estate in Remainder or otherwise ariseth to one upon a Contingency or a Power reserved upon a Fine or Feoffment to Vses when the Estate is once raised or vested it relates to the Fine or Feoffment as if it were immediately limited thereupon 1 Co. 133 156. So this Remainder when vested in Charles he is in immediately by the Will and out of danger of his Remainder being divested by any act done since as the Surrender is I will put one Case I think full to this Matter and so dismiss this Point It cannot be denied but that there is as strong a Relation upon a disagreement to an Estate as upon an agreement where the Estate was Conveyed without the Notice of him that afterwards agrees of disagrees if the Husband discontinues the Wives Estate and then the Discontinuee conveys the Estate back to the Wife in the absence of the Husband who as soon as he knows of it disagrees to the Estate this shall not take away the Remitter which the Law wrought upon the first taking the Estate from the Discontinuee And so is Litt. cap. Remitter Jones 78. Co. 11 Inst 356. b. The true Reason is because she is in of a Title paramount to the Conveyance to which the Disagreement relates tho' that indeed was the foundation of the Remitter which by the Disagreement might seem to be avoided This therefore I take to be a stronger Case than that at the Bar So that if there were no Surrender before the birth of Charles the Son there can be none after by any Construction of Law for that would be in avoidance of an Estate settled by a Title antecedent to such Surrender whereas Relations are to avoid Mesn Acts and I believe there can be no Case put upon Relations that go any further and it would be
and it s a Devise That all his Personal Estate shall be laid out c. Curia There is nothing to be laid out until the Debts and Legacies paid the 80 l is not to the Daughter but for the Mother 'T is taken for granted that where a Sum of Money is devised to a Child at such an Age it shall have the Interest in the mean time rather than the Executor shall swallow it but clear when no Maintenance is otherwise provided for The Lord Chancellor Decreed it for the Daughter and that the Executor should account for what Interest he paid the Brother Note Tho' it be said that the Money to be laid out after all Legacies paid yet all besides what serves to pay the Legacies should be laid out presently Anonymus Trin. Anno 31 Car. II. A Devise of 100 l to J.S. at the Age of 21 years and if J.S. died under Age then J.N. and A.B. to have the 100 l or else the Survivor of them A.B. and J.N. dye both in the life of J. S. and before the Age of 21 years and then J.S. dies under the Age of 21 years The Administrator of J.N. who survived A.B. sued and obtained a Decree for the 100 l for tho' he died before the Contingency hapned yet his Administrator should have it Charles Blois al' Plaintiffs versus Dame Jane Blois and Jane Blois Infants Defendants Mich. Anno 31 Car. II. THe Case was thus Sir William Blois who had Issue the Plaintiff and two Daughters by a former Venter and Jane the Defendant by a second Venter upon his second Marriage setled Lands for the Ioynture of his Wife and after her decease in case he had Issue only a Daughter to raise 3000 l for that Daughter to be paid her at the Day of Marriage so that she married after Sixteen or otherwise at the Age of Eighteen years and if she died before either then his Heir to have the benefit Afterwards Sir William Blois by his Will devises the Reversion of his setled Lands and all his other Estate to Jane his Relict one of the Defendants and three others and says That after the Son by a convenient Match shall have raised 9000 l for his three Daughters that then they should let the Son the now Plaintiff have his Estate The Question now was That if the Daughter by the second Venter had 3000 l paid her whether she should have any further benefit by the Settlement and so take a double Portion one upon the Will and another upon the Settlement The Decree made by my Lord Fynch was That if the Heir paid 9000 l the Security by the Settlement should be discharged the Will being but Cumulative Security and so the Defendant Jane was to have but one 3000 l and be subject to the same Contingencies with the Settlement and gave the Heir two years time to pay the Money and in the mean time Jane to have a third part of the Profits of the Land devised My Lord Chancellor cited one Pyne's Case where a man had secured Portions for his Children and afterwards by his Will Devised to each of them a like Sum it was held that this would not double their Portions unless plainly proved that he intended to do so Nota If one sue in Chancery an Executor of one Obligor to discover Assets you must make all the Obligors parties that the Charge may lye equal Quaere Whether you may not sue the Principal and leave out them that are bound only as Sureties But 't is clear that if a Judgment be had at Law against one Obligor you may sue the Executor of him alone to discover Assets c. because the Bond is drowned in the Judgment Turner's Case A Mortgage was made in Fee which descended to the Heir at Law and the Money ten years since paid to him The Executor of the Mortgagee preferred his Bill and had a Decree for the Money but without Interest My Lord Chancellor went upon the Reason of the Case in Littleton That if a Feoffment be made upon Condition to re-enter upon the payment of a Sum of Money and not expressed to whom to be paid there after the Death of the Feoffee it must be paid to the Executor and not to the Heir So here tho' the Proviso was to pay to the Feoffee his Heirs or Executors yet when the Day is past 't is as much as if no person had been expressed and then Equity shall follow the Law and appoint it to the Executor Termino Paschae Anno 32 Car. II. In Cancellaria Anonymus AN Impropriator devised to one that served the Cure and to all that should serve the Cure after him all the Tythes and other Profits c. Tho' the Curate was incapable to take by this Devise in such manner for want of being Incorporate and having Succession yet my Lord Chancellor Finch Decreed That the Heir of the Devisee should be seised in Trust for the Curate for the time being Broadhurst versus Richardson al' A Man had Issue three Daughters and devised to his three Daughters 540 l equally to be divided between them that is to say 180 l apiece but if any of them died without Child her part to go to the Survivors One of the Daughters married Broadhurst and before the Portion paid she died without Issue Broadhurst Exihibits his Bill against the Executor and the two surviving Sisters and had a Decree for the 180 l For a Sum of Money cannot be Entailed Anonymus IF Lands be devised for the payment of Debts and Legacies and the residue of the Personal Estate be given to the Executors after the Debts and Legacies paid the Personal Estate shall notwithstanding as far as it will go be applied to the payment of the Debts c. and the Land charged no further than is necessary to make up the residue Termino Sancti Hillarij Anno 32 33 Car. II. In Cancellaria Sayle Freeland al' Infants THe Bill was to Redeem a Mortgage made by the Father of the Defendants or to be foreclosed The Defendants by Guardian Answered setting forth That their Grandfather was seised in Fee and made a Settlement whereby he entailed the Estate but with a power of Revocation by any Writing published under his Hand and Seal in the presence of three Witnesses And the Case was That he made his Will under his Hand and Seal wherein he recited his Power and declared that he Revoked the Settlement but the Will had but two Witnesses which subscribed their Names tho' a third present and died The Lands descended to the Father who made the Mortgage and the Defendants claimed by virtue of the Entail The Decree was that the Mortgage Money should be paid First My Lord Chancellor said that here was an Execution of the Power in strictness tho' the third Witness did not Subscribe Secondly If there had not that Equity should help it in such a little Circumstance where the Owner of
his Bill to have the Land Conveyed according to the Agreement above But for the Defendants it was much insisted upon that this being to settle the Lands in case Thomas should dye without Issue it should not be regarded in this Court for the Execution of a Trust of a Remainder or Reversion in Fee upon an Estate Tail shall not be compelled because it is subject to be destroyed by the Tenant in Tail as here Thomas might have done in case he had made a Settlement according to the import of that Writing who therefore could not have been compelled himself to have executed this Agreement But the Lord Chancellor Fynch Decreed the Land for the Plaintiff because it was proved that the Marriage with the Plaintiffs Wife was in expectation of the performance of this Agreement and he was obliged to have left the Land to the Plaintiff if he had had no Issue Termino Sanctae Trinitatis Anno 34 Car. II. In Cancellaria Collet versus Collet WIlliam Fox having three Daughters Mary Elizabeth and Martha the two latter being Married and the first a Widow by his Will devised in these Words Viz. I give unto Martha my Daughter the Sum of 400 l to be paid unto her by my Executors within one year next after my decease But I will and my desire is that Cornelius Collet the Husband of Martha upon the payment of the said 400 l shall give such Security as my Executors shall approve of that the said 400 l shall be laid out within 18 Months next after my decease and purchase an Estate of that value to be setled and assured upon her the said Martha and the Heirs of her Body lawfully begotten And in the Close of his Will were these words following Viz. I Will That after my Debts which I shall owe at the time of my Decease and my Funeral Expences and the Probat of this my Will be discharged then I do give all the rest of my Personal Estate Unbequeathed to purchase an Estate near of as good value as the same Personal Estate shall amount unto within one year next after my my decease Which said Estate so to be purchased I Will shall be setled and assured unto and upon my said three Daughters Mary Elizabeth and Martha and the Heirs of their respective Bodies lawfully begotten for ever or otherwise my said Daughter Mary and the Husbands of my said two other Daughters Elizabeth and Martha shall for such Moneys as they shall receive of my said Executors for the Overplus of my Personal Estate enter into one or more Bonds in the double Sum of Money as each part shall amount unto the same being to be divided into three parts unto my said Executors within 18 Months next after my decease to settle and assure such part or Sum of Money as each of them shall receive and have by this my Will for the Overplus of my Personal Estate unto and upon the Child and Children of my said Daughters Mary Elizabeth and Martha part and part alike Martha the Wife of Cornelius Collet died within six Months after the Testator leaving Issue only a Daughter who died within four Months after the Mother the other two Sisters surviving Cornelius Collet took out Letters of Administration both to Martha his Wife and likewise to his Daughter the Four hundred Pounds and likewise the Overplus of the Personal Estate being unpaid or disposed of Cornelius Collet preferred his Bill against the Executors and the surviving Sisters and thereby demanded the 400 l and likewise a third part of the Overplus which amounted unto 700 l And the Cause came to be heard before the Lord Chancellor upon Bill and Answer who Decreed the 400 l to the Plaintiff but as to the Surplus of the Estate the Bill was dismissed altho ' it was much insisted upon for the Plaintiff that he might have given Bond to secure the Surplus for his Child and so from the Child it would have come to him as Administrator But seeing that no Interest could vest in the Child till the Election were determined it not being material as to this Point whether the Executors or the Husband aâ— the Election the Father could not claim it as Administrator to the Child And then if the Money had been laid out in Land and the Settlement according to the direction of the Will the Husband would have had no benefit for there would have been a Ioynt Estate for Life in the Daughters with several Inheritances and no severance of the Ioynture by the Marriage and having Issue Co. Inst and so no Tenant by the Courtesie Therefore as to the Surplusage the Bill was Decreed to be dismissed Note As to the 400 l the Order of my Lord Chancellor was That Interest should be paid for it from the time of bringing the Bill Termino Sancti Michaelis Anno 34 Car. II. In Cancellaria West versus The Lord Delaware WEST Heir apparent of the Lord Delaware Exhibited his Bill against the said Lord setting forth That upon a Marriage agreed to be had between him and the Daughter of one Mr. Huddleston with whom he was to have 10000 l Portion The Lord his Father Articled to settle Lands of such yearly value for the Wives Ioynture for their maintenance and the Heirs of their Bodies c. That the Wife being now dead and without Issue and no Settlement made the Bill prayed an Execution of the Articles and a discovery of what Incumbrances there were upon the Lands to be setled To this the Lord Delaware Answered That he never intended to settle Lands but for the Wives Ioynture only and that the Plaintiff her Husband was not named in the Articles and so was Advised He need make no Settlement and upon that Reason the Plaintiff could not require him to discover Incumbrances An Exception being taken to the Answer for that it did not discover any thing touching Incumbrances it was Argued before my Lord and for the Defendant it was alledged That by the Course of the Court the time of the Discovery should be when the other Point was determined for if that be for the Defendant then no Discovery can be required but if otherwise that then the Defendant shall be put to answer Interrogatories as is usual in Cases of like nature And it cannot be Objected That the Estate may be charged with Incumbrances since the Bill because they will be of no avail On the other side it was said That this would create great delay for upon the discovery of Incumbrances other parties must be made to the Bill and therefore this Case differed from the Case of Account which concerns the Defendant himself only but the Question now is only for the making proper Parties The Court Ordered That a further Answer should be made Nota If a man deviseth that such a Sum of Money shall be paid out of the Profits of his Lands and the Profits will not amount to the Sum in such case the Land
his Assent to the Marriage of his Daughter with J.S. and that he would give her 1500 l And afterwards by another Letter upon a further Treaty concerning the Marriage he went back from the Proposals of his Letter And at some time after declared That he would agrèe to what was propounded in his first Letter This Letter was held a sufficient Promise in Writing within the Statute of 29 Car. 2. called the Statute against Frauds and Perjuries and that the last Declaration had set the Terms in the first Letter up again Anonymus WHere a man buys Land in anothers name and pays Mony it will be in Trust for him that pays the Mony tho' no Deed declaring the Trust for the Statute of 29 Car. 2. called the Statute of Frauds doth not extend to Trusts raised by Operation of the Law Anonymus AN Administrator de bonis non of the Conusee of a Statute had agreed with the Conusor to assign it in Consideration of a Sum of Mony which upon the said Agreement the Conusors had Covenanted to pay to him his Executors or Administrators and then the Administrator died The Court Decreed the Mony to be paid to the Executor of the Administrator and not to the New Administrator de bonis non altho' before the Extent it could not be assigned at Law Sed nota That there were not Debts of the first Intestate appearing Termino Sancti Hillarij Anno 35 36 Car. II. In Cancellaria NOte Suits in Chancery admitted for Distribution of Intestates Estates upon the Act of 22 Car. 2. Sir Thomas Draper Mil ' versus Dr. Crowther THe Bill sets forth a Contract under Seal with the Defendant for making of a Lease of certain Lands in Middlesex and to have an Execution of the Agreement The Defendant pleaded That he has Head of a Colledge in Oxford and sets forth the Charters of 14 R. 2. and 14 H. 8. Impowering the University to enquire and proceed in all Pleas and Quarrels in Law and Equity except concerning Freehold where a Scholar their Servants and Ministers sunt una partium c. ita quod Justiciarij de Banco Regis sive de Communi Banco vel Justiciarij ad Assisas non se intromittant c. And the Confirmation by an Act of Parliament of the 13th of Elizabeth and Concluded his Plea to the Iurisdiction of the Court. And it came to be Argued before the Lord Keeper Guildford 22 Febr. 1683. and the Plea was Over-ruled because the Charter ought properly to be extended to Matters at Common Law only or to Proceedings in Equity that might arise in such Cases and not to meer Matters of Equity which are Originally such as to Execute Agreements in specie Again Conuzance of Pleas is never to be allowed unless the Inferior Jurisdiction can give Remedy Here they can only Excommunicate or Imprison but cannot proceed to Sequestration of Lands in Middlesex If the Matter lay only in Damages it might be allowed to them because the Jurisdiction is given over all England but this is not to be intended where the Suit is for the thing it self and when 't is out of their reach A President was cited in the year 1663. before my Lord Clarendon Chancellor assisted with Hale then Chief Baron and Justice Wyndam where the Plea was Over-ruled Vide in the 3 Cro. 63. Wilcocks and Bradell's Case and Hallie's Case 87. Sir Robert Reeve's Case SIr George Reeve upon his Marriage with his Second Wife setled a Ioynture of divers of his Lands in Suffolk which he had before charged with his Daughters Portion viz. 3000 l which Daughter he had by a former Wife and by his last Will he mentioned that the said Joynture Lands were so incumbred and therefore he Devised certain Lands he had in Bickerton in Yorkshire to his Wife in lieu of such part of the Suffolk Lands as were charged with the Portion in case she would accept thereof But after his Decease it appeared that the Lands in Bickerton were not equivalent in Value to the Suffolk Lands and therefore she held to the latter and was not prejudiced by the Charge of the Portion because it appeared to be a Voluntary Settlement Nota In this Case the Lord Keeper Decreed that the Portion should be charged upon the Bickerton Lands for so much as it was defeated by the Settlement in Ioynture of the Suffolk Lands Anonymus ONe Devised his Lands to J.S. in Fee in Trust for Katharine and the Heirs of her Body and if Katharine died without Issue to Jane for life And in another Clause in the Will he devised That if Katharine died without Issue and Jane be then deceased then and not otherwise he gave the Land to J. N. and his Heirs Katharine died without Issue and Jane survived her and died A Bill was brought by J. N. against J. S. and the Heir at Law of the Testator to have this Trust executed My Lord Keeper Decreed it for J. N. altho' Jane survived Katharine because the words if Jane be then deceased seemed to be put in to express his meaning that Jane should be sure to have it for her life and that J. N. should not have it till she were dead and also to shew when J.N. should have it in possession Termino Paschae Anno 36 Car. II. In Cancellaria Wiliam Ragget and his Wife versus William Clarke THe Case was thus Nicholas Wheeler was seised of a parcel of Land for his own life and the lives of two others and prevailed with the Defendant to be bound with him for a Sum of Mony And that the Defendant might raise Mony for the discharge of the said Debt he permitted the Defendant to enter into the said Lands and to take the Profits for two years the said Lands being about 12 l yearly value and the said Land being so in the possession of the Defendant the said Wheeler died and made Isabel Wife of the now Plaintiff his Executrix And this Bill was brought by the said Husband and Wife to have an account of the Profits and that the possession of the Land should be delivered up to them The Defendant by Plea sets forth his Title as Occupant and it was allowed And the Bill was dismissed Bonham versus Newcomb ONe being seised in Fee in Consideration of 1000 l paid to him by a Person that married his Kinswoman Conveys to him and his Heirs and takes a Re-demise for 99 years if he should live so long And a Covenant therein That if he should pay 1000 l with the Interest that should be due for the same at any time during his life that the Grantee should Re-convey to him and his Heirs and that if he did not pay the Mony then that his Heirs c. should have no power to Redeem He died the Mony not being paid and his Heir preferred a Bill to Redeem it And it was urged for him That in a Conveyance which was a Security for Mony whatever
could not be digged up there might be an Indictment Exhibited to the Grand Jury who might Enquire thereupon Termino Sancti Hillarij Anno 32 33 Car. II. In Banco Regis Anonymus A Motion was made against a Judge of an Inferiour Court of Record for increasing upon a View the Damages in an Action of Trespass and Battery to so much more than was given by the Jury Curia The proper way is to Reform it by a Writ of Error for none but the Courts at Westminster can increase Damages upon View Anonymus IF a Writ of Error in Ejectment c. abates by the Act of God a second Writ will be a Supersedeas Otherwise where it abates by the Act of the Party Anonymus IN a Writ of Error to Reverse a Fine the Proclamations were pleaded in the same Fine and Five â—ears quiet possession and this in barr of a Writ of Error The Court Inclined that the Error being in the Fine Five years possession could not be pleaded Sed Adjornatur Mo. Rep. 8. Termino Paschae Anno 33 Car. II. In Banco Regis NOte This Term Sir Francis Pemberton was made Lord Chief Justice of the Kings-Bench in the room of Sir William Scroggs who was displaced Page versus Denton HIll 32 33. Car. 2. Rot. 45. In Debt upon a Bond against an Executor who pleads that the Testator was Indebted to him by an Obligation the Condition whereof was to pay Rent and that at the time of his Decease there was 300 l due for Rent and that he had not more than 60 l Assets to pay it c. The Plaintiff Replied That there was but 30 l due for Rent at the time of the Testator's death Which the Court held to be a good Replication altho' the Penalty of the Bond was forfeited at the time of the Testator's death For if a Bond due to a Stranger be forfeited and this be pleaded by an Executor and that he hath not Assets ultra 't is a good Replication to say That the Obligee would have taken part of his Money in full and it shall be a Bar for no more and here the Defendant ought to take but his due Debt And the Court said that if men would plead their Case Specially it would save many a Suit in Chancery Fitzharris's Case EDward Fitzharris was Indicted of High Treason upon which being Arâ—aigned and demanded to plead he delivered in a Paper containing a Plea to the Jurisdiction of the Court which could not be received as the Court said not being under Counsel's Hand Whereupon he prayed to have Counsel assigned and Named divers whereof the Court assigned Four And he was taken from the Bar three of four days being given him to advise with his Counsel to prepare his Plea as they would stand by him The Counsel prayed that they might have a Copy of the Indictment But the Court denied it and said that it was not permitted in Treason or any other Capital Crimes But Justice Dolben said that sometimes it had been allowed to take Notes out of the Indictment Vid. Mirror 304. Abusion est que Justices ne monstre l'Indictment à les Indictes s'ils demandront Sect. 115. Termino Sanctae Trinitatis Anno 33 Car. II. In Banco Regis Anonymus IN an Action of Debt against an Executor in the Debet and Detinet upon a Surmize of a Devastavit the Defendant was held to Special Bail And so Ruled upon Motion Anonymus IT was said by the Court That if a Corporation that hath been by Prescription accept a New Charter wherein some alteration is of their Name and likewise of the Method in the Governing part yet their Power to remove and other Franchises which they had de temps d'ont c. do continue And if the Power to Remove be at their Will and Pleasure this Will must be expressed under their Common Seal but in Return to a Mandamus debito modo amotus may suffice Note No Writ of Error lies upon an Indictment of Recusancy and Conviction by Proclamation Note In an Ejectment where there are divers Defendants which are to Confess Lease Entry and Ouster if one does not appear at the Trial the Plaintiff cannot proceed against the rest but must be Nonsuit Termino Sancti Michaelis Anno 33 Car. II. In Banco Regis Anonymus IN Covenant the Plaintiff Declared upon several Breaches one whereof was for not paying of 7 l according to the Covenant It was moved for the Defendant that he might be admitted to bring 7 l into Court to pay to the Plaintiff together with his Costs hitherto c. as is usual in Cases of Debt or Assumpsit for Money and that the Plaintiff might proceed for the rest if he thought fit But the Motion was denied because the Plaintiff had Declared of other Breaches and the Matter lay in Damages Anonymus ERror upon a Judgment in the Common Pleas where the Plaintiff Declared in an Action upon the Case that he had Common in the Defendants Lands habere debuit c. The Defendant Demurred because not set out how the Plaintiff was Intituled to the Common whether by Prescription or otherwise Notwithstanding which Judgment in the Common Bench was for the Plaintiff and now the same Matter insisted on for Error here and the Court doubted To make the Declaration good there was quoted the Case of Sands and Trefuses in the 3 Cro. in an Action for Stopping of a Watercourse to his Mill which was held good without saying an Ancient Mill or that he was Intituled to the Watercourse by Prescription or otherwise 2 Cro. 43.122 Dent and Oliver an Action for disturbing of him to take Toll and no Title set forth Sed Adjornatur Vid. Co. Entr. 9. 11. Day versus Copleston IN an Assumpsit for Money the Defendant pleaded the Statute for the Discharge of poor Prisoners and that he had been Discharged by that Act which provides that there shall be no after Prosecution by a Creditor in such case so as to subject the Body to Execution and says that he can say nothing further in Bar of the Action Vpon which the Plaintiff Demurred and the Defendant joyned in the Demurrer and Judgment was Entred up for the Plaintiff but with a Cesset executio quoad Corpus c. And the Court approved of this way of pleading the Statute for otherwise they said if the Matter had not been disclosed in pleading they doubted whether the could have given the Defendant the benefit of the Act but he would be driven to his Audita Querela Anonymus ERror of a Judgment in the King's Bench in Ireland it was suggested that the Plaintiff was in Execution upon the Judgment in Ireland And the Court seemed to be of Opinion that a Habeas Corpus might be sent thither to remove him as Writs Mandatory had been awarded to Calais and now to Jersey Guernsey c. Anonymus THe Case was A. Tenant in Tail Remainder to B. in Tail c. A.