for septuagent and Pary and Dayes case quinquegent for quinquagint and these held no materiall variances Latch on the other side said the word in the Bond is uncertain and the condition hath nothing in it to reduce it to a certain signification and if it make any certainty in it it must make it signifie 400 l. and then the Plaintiff hath failed in his Declarasion and Hobarts case differs from this and as for Osborns case it is variously reported and so not to be relyed on Roll chief Iustice What say you to sessanta But the question here is what shall be meant by the word whether 40. or 400. And in Fiâ—zâ—â— berts case Iudgement was given upon a demurrer Variance that gent for gint was a material variance and our case is all one with that If the doubt be whether it should be 40. or 400. how shall we know the intent of the partyes and if it be certain it must he understood 400. and the Action is brought but for 40. l. 44 Eliz. Mich. rot 1301. Gray and Davis case Sexgint was adjudged to be a Bond of 60 l. and not of 600 l. And it is the gent. and gint in all the cases that makes the difference And the case of sessanta comes not to our case and so concluded Iudgement to be against the Plaintiff Ierman Nicholas and Ask Iustices of the same opinion Nicholas Iustice said that false Latin in a Bond doth not make it naught but he held this Bond was for 400 l. and not 40 l. and it is not incertain for the grammar rule ginta notat decem sed genta numero centum doth hold here Antea Gay against Gay Pasc 1651. Banc. sup Trin. 1650. rot 1350. VPon a speciall verdict found in a replevin Whether an estate tail or fee conditionall The case was this A man seised of a Copyhold Borough English devised it to H. his grandchild and to his Heirs and if he dye during the life of his mother the remainder to H. his younger brother and to his heirs The question here was whether here be an Estate tail in H. or a Fee simple executory If it be an Estate tail then the devise was said not good because it is of a Copyhold but if it be a Fersimple Limitation then it is a good devise Roll chief Iustice said that a limitation of an inheritance after an absolute Fee simple is not a good limitation for this would be to make a perpetuity which the Law will not admit Perpetuity but if it be upon a contingent Fee simple it is otherwise Adjournatur Postea Heale against Greene. Pasc 1651. Banc. sup Hill 649 rot 370. IN an Action of Trespass and ejectment Case upon a special verdict in trespass and ejectment upon a speciall verdict sound the case proved to be this A man seised of a manor that had divers Tenants that held for lives by old rents deviseth it to his wife during her life with power to let and set and make estates out of them in as ample maner as the Testator might if he were living The questions were made by Latch 1. Whether this power given her to set and set c. doth not alter her Estate for life in the Lands devised to her 2ly Whether this power given her by the Will adds any power to her estate for life to make estates and he held for the first that the power given her did not alter her Estate And 2ly that it ads no power unto her Estate because the clause in the Will is one entire clause and not double and accumulative and so she can make no greater Estates than her estate for life will bear And for the obiection that is made That then the words that limit the power to her are void and idle He answered that it is not necessary that all the words in a Will should give something but some words may be explanatory of other words and so are these words here and yet the words here may add something to her Estate viz. to enable her to make Estates without impeachment of waste And the words shall not be intended of the time of Execution of the Estates made by the Feme for then they are idle Hill 1 Car. Banc. Reg. Danyel and Vplins case One may dispose an estate by Will for life with power to make Estates to continue after the death of the party that made them But here the estate is made only out of the interest of the wife which cannot endure after her life Pasc 44. Eliz. Bible and Dringhouse and so prayes Iudgement for the Plaintiff Hales for the Defendant made these questions 1. What power was given by the Will 2ly Whether it were well executed and he held the feme being executrix hath but an Estate for life But she hath a power to make estates as she hath done There is no question but such a power may be added The question only is if this power be added here in our case and he said it was added by the express words of the will for else those words are frivolous and operate nothing In Danyel and Vplins case cited which was entred 20 Iac. Hill 720. there is no express Estate given to the party but a meer power only and it was not by reason of the words added for they are only conjunctive words And Iustice Whitlock held there that the first words gave the power Though Iustice Iones differed in opinion and that case is the very same with ours The reason in our case That the words give power to the feme may appear by the comparing this part of the Will with the other parts of it In other parts of the Will where things are devised to his wife these words here used are not added and that argues that the Testator intended the Feme more power than in other things devised to her and the words themselves being a devise of a manor proves by the nature of the thing that the Testator intended to give power to the Feme to make Estates out of the manor And it cannot be intended that the words In as ample maner c do only give the feme power to assign over her term Vaughan and Longs case 24 C. the words were adjudged to be words to enlarge the power of the Legatée and so are they here And the subsequent clause during the term of her life restrains not the power for these words may be either referred to the Estates to be made or to the time of making them and here they are referred to the execution of the power and this is more suitable to the intention of the party in ordinary reason and they are added to expound the intent viz. that the remainder limited over shall not hinder the feme for he hath not barred her out and hath imposed this trust in her as Executrix and as Legatee And for the 2d point here is a good Execution of
parts it will be naught in all Hill 1649. Banc. sup THe Case of the Vills of Newton and Tyd concerning the presentments made to the Comissioners of Sewers for the Hundred of Wisbitch For quashing presentments and Orders of Commissioners of Sewers and their order made thereupon was again spoken to Twisden against the presentment said That it is not a presentment by Iury as it ought to be by the Statute for the Iury have only power to enquire of things within the Hundred of Wisbitch and it doth not appear that Newton and Tyd are within that Hundred 2ly The substance of the presentment is not good for the Commissioners cannot order that Newton and Tyd which have no benefit by the repairing of the bank shall contribute to the reparations 18 E. 3. f. 22. 3ly They cannot order to make a new wall notwithstanding Callice his opinion in his reading upon the Statute of Seâ—â—ers 4ly The Tax is not well laid for it is not laid upon all the Lands within Newton and Tyd as it ought to be charged if any ought to be Holhead answered to this last exception that it does not appear there are more Lands in Tyd or Newton than are charged And Roll chief Iustice said that is well enough To the third exception Holhead said it is not wholly a new work and therefore they may order to make it To which Roll chief Iustice assented and said it was so notwithstanding the Case of the I le of Ely for that was for the making of a new work totally To the 2d Exception he read the words of the presentment by which it appears that because the adventurers had no Lands to be charged and it is found necessary to be repaired that therefore it is to be repaired by Newton and Tyd for the present necessity Maynard answered that they are not bound to repair for the Act of a Stranger Taxes Roll chief Iustice answered Newton Tyd may take there remedyes against the strange adventurers and it seems there was a present necessity to repair it for publique safety If one be bound by prescription to repair a wall yet to prevent the present and publique danger the Commissioners may tax others to do it and the Law is just that is here made by the Commissioners But the 1. Exception is not answered and so the Commissioners have exceeded their authority Therefore let their be a new Law made by consent and quash the presentments except better matter be shewed But we cannot order you to have your monyes again But for that take your remedy at Law Garret against Blisard Hil. 1649. Banc. sup Hill 24 Car. rot 983. VPon a special verdict found in an ejectione firmae The Case was this Grandmother Tenant for life Arguments upon a case upon a special verdict in an ejectione firmae the remainder to the Father for life the remainder to the Son for life the Son levyes a fine come ceo c. of the Land the question was whether it be a forfeiture of his estate or not Hales argued that it was a forfeiture but I could not here him well He cited these books 41 Ed. 3.10 24 E. 3. f. 70. Pasc 11. Car. Banc. Reg. Huttens reports Trin. 7 Car. Banc. Reg. and adjudged 11 Car. in King and Edwards case Dyer 339. And he said that a fine sur conisance de droit come ceo c. as it is in our case is a Feoffment upon Record and doth imply a Livery And said that a remainder may be forfeited by levying such a fine and concluded it was a forfeiture Wadham Windham on the other side argued that it was no forfeiture Forfeiture And cited Mich. 24 E. 3. and Dyer 139. and laid this for a ground that where a Feoffment in Fee made by a Tenant for lise doth displace any remainder that such a Feoffment is a forfeiture but it is not so in this Case and therefore it can be no forfeiture If Tenant for life of a rent or of an Advowson levy a fine it is a forfeiture although that no remainder be displaced this is the great objection 15 E. 4. f. 15 by Littleton and the fine fur conisance de droit implyes a Fee simple 40 Ed. 3. But there a Fee simple really passed with the estate for life But here it passes by way of interest and not by way of estopel and the Conusee may confesse and avoid and therefore here is no estopel and so it differs from the Cases objected 6 Rich. 2 Estopel 211. But it is objected that he hath taken upon him to passe all the estate which is more than he hath to passe and this makes it a forfeiture 43 E. 3. f. 22. It is good for the reversion in Fee and not for the other estate 37 H. 6. f. 5. 41 E. 3 f 14. by Thorpe It was answered that he hath not taken upon him to passe all the estate but only his own estate It is objected that the fine joyns all the estates together and purports the passing of them whole and entire It was answered that the fine doth not purport the entire estate 44 E. 3. f. 10. so much shall passe by the fine as may rightfully passe and no more and so the estate passes by fraction Cooks Instit 345. The Law construes the effect of the fine according to the intent of the parties and that wrong shall not be intended so is it here And if there be Tenant for life the remainder in fail the remainder in Fee to Tenant for life if Tenant for life levie a fine it is no forfeiture 10 H. 4. f. 2. Tenant for life may pray in ayd of all in the remainder and he said that in this case is no forfeiture nor estopel nor hath he passed more than he hath there is no wrong by the fine but it shall only passe what may be passed and he said a fine is a Feoffment when the thing to passe by it lyes in Livery otherwise it is but a grant and devests no estate as a Feoffment doth And in Baker and Hackers Case in this Court Bredons Case was denyed for Law by Bramston Iones and Barkley Hob. 388 389. It is no discontinuance and such estate shall first passe by which no wrong shall be done The Iudges ought to be Aâ—tuti to invent reasons to support estates and to defend from injuries and where the Conusee of the fine hath an interest to passe by it to satisfie the operation of it such a fine is good and doth no wrong as it is in our Case It is objected that there is a Fée simple here but it is of no value for it is after an estate tayl and shall not be assets in the Heir It was answered It is but of little value but it hath more than a right in it and so he prayed judgement for the Defendant Forfeiture Roll chief Iustice held it was a forfeiture although there be no
determined and Hanbury and Cookrells case is not adjudged but if it be it is on my side and Mich. 37 38. C. B. rot 1149. It was adjudged upon solemn argument at the Bar and on the Bench contrary to the Iudgement in Pell and Browns case if lands be devised to one and his Heirs and if he dye without issue that the land shall be to another and his Heirs this is no Estate tail for it cannot stand with the rules of Law to devise â—uth an Estate for it is but a possibility and if it should be more it must be a Fee upon a Fee and so a perpetuity and it cannot be known within what bounds it shall end either in case of years or life or other contingencies and the comparison of Lampets case is not like to this case for that was or a Term but this is of a freehold and a contingent devise of a freehold is not good since the Statute of 32 H. 8. and Brook tit devise 2 Dyer 28 H. 8. f. 3â— is not an opinion against this And though there could be such a devise of other lands yet Copyhold lands cannot be so devised as the case is here for there cannot be so much as a possibility of reverter for there is no custom to warrant it Hill 5. Car. King and Leyden in this Court and Dyer 264. and though there might be a reverter yet he cannot devise it by will and if he could yet here the conbeyance is made up by surrender admittance and devise and the party is here in by the surrender and not by the devise and so is a Copyholder in by Act executed and not upon the contingency and the will is but to direct and though all this be otherwise yet the Plaintiff cannot have Iudgement for it appears not that the surrender is presented at any Court at all and here is nothing but a recitall found Ierman Iustice said by the Common Law there ought to be a presentment at the next Court Roll chief Iustice and Nicholas Iustice There is no certain time for the presentment but it is according to the Custom of the Manor so that it be within the life of the Tenant Roll chief Iustice said it is an inconvenience to devise such a contingent Estate Nicholas doubted for he said it would shake many wills if it might not be and so said Hales The Court would advise Hales confessed the verdict was imperfect but prayed it might be amended But Latch answered it is good enough for us the Defendants for we have primer possession The Court answered it would be good to have it amended and not to have a venire de novo Venire for that will be chargeable but if the verdict be imperfect to bring the matter in Law into question we can grant a new venire although it hath been heretofore doubted Therefore be advised so that it may be argued Antea Heal against Green Trin. 1651. Banc. sup Hill 1649. rot 370. THe case between Heal and Green upon a special verdict formerly argued by Latch was again spoken to and argued by Twisden Argument upon a special verdict upon construction of words of a Will and he held that the Feme had power by the Will to make the lease notwithstanding that she hath but an Estate for life and cited 11 Car. B. R. Hill rot 810. Iob and Whites case and 21 Iac. Danyel and Vgnel and he said that the remainder limited to the daughter doth not hurt for it may very well stand with the will and the intent of the Testator appears upon the whole to be to give such a power to his wife to make this lease and cited 8 Car. Perd and Bensams case And there is a clause in the will that shews that the Testator did intend to advance his wife by this devise And the Feme shall be in by the power which shall make the estate of the lease good and it is not necessary to recite the power as it is held in Rogers case Maynard on the other side said he would not dispute the power but here is no such power given to the wife as it appears by the expresse words of the Will which doth only describe that she shall only make Estates but for her life otherwise she might make Estates in Tail or in Fee and if this should be the last part of the Will which doth limit the remainder would be destroyed and generals in a Will shall not revoke an express devise but they ought so to be construed that all the Will may stand together as Bonhams case is 8. rep Roll chief Iustice It is a difficult thing to shew the meaning of the Testator here but the general must not destroy the particular devise to which Nicholas Iustice assented and Roll enclyned that the Feme had power by the Will to make this Estate otherwise the words of the Will must be idle and void and it may be the Baron intended to give his wife such a power that she might destroy the remainders and otherwise there cannot be any construction made of the Will Ask Iustice differed in opinion and said it was unreasonable the remainder should be destroyed which is expresly limited by the Will and a Will doth differ from a conveyance Nicholas Iustice said that the words shall be expounded to shew his bounty to his wife but not to give her power to destroy the remainder Ierman Iustice There are expresse words for the Feme and the daughter and the Feme hath a power but not to destroy the Estate of the daughter Curia advisare vult Antea Booth against Lambert Trin. 1651. Banc. sup Hill 1649. rot 201. VPon a speciall verdict upon these words Argument and judgement upon special verdict the question whether dower well assiâ—gâ—ed or not viz. I do endow you of a third part of all the lands my Cosen I. S. your husband dyed seised of The question was whether the feme were well endowed by these words because he doth not say that he endows her by metes and bounds Chase held she was not well endowed and cited 8 Ed. 2.15 and said that here is incertainty which begets dissention which ought not to be and the thing is not here entire but may be devided And this is an assignment of dower which differs from a demand of dower for a demand may be general as in the cases of Thyn and Thyn in this Court and of Fairefax and Fairefax and so the book of 8 E. 2. entry congeable S 5. which seems to prove the contrary that is not to our case for it differs from it Merifield of Councell on the other side held the feme was well endowed and agreed the cases put by Chase That of Common right a feme ought to be endowed by metes and bounds yet sometimes it is otherwise as 3 Eliz. Dyer 27. a feme endowed in Common And the feme that is to be endowed and the
really a Copyholder and cited Shellyes case and prayed Iudgement for the Defendant Roll chief Iustice said This Case differs from surrendring into the hands of Tenants for it is into the hands of the Steward out of Court Surrend Admission which is good and the Lords acceptance of his rent is an admission But Bacon doubted and therefore the rule was for the Case to be argued again the next Term and then by reason of sicknesse I was absent But that Term held not by reason of the Kings death Dunch against Smith Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. DUnch brought an Action of Debt as Executor for arrerages of a rent charge due to the Testator against Dunch Arrest of Iudgement in Debt brought by an Executor an occupyer of the land out of which the rent was issuing and hath a verdict The Defendant moved in arrest of Iudgement and for Cause shewed that the Plaintiff doth not shew any title that the Defendant hath in the Land but only sayes generally that he entred into the Lands and so it appears not that he is to pay the rent To this the Councel on the other side answered that the Plaintiff being but an Executor cannot know the title and therefore is not bound to shew it Roll chief Iustice said there can be no Iudgement for the Declaration is too generall But Bacon Iustice held the Declaration good enough Antea Brown against Poyns Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Case was this a man made his last Will and made two Executors For a prohibition to repeal an administration Prohibition Appeal the Executors dye in the life of the Testator the Testator dyes having two Sisters the eldest Sister procures Administration the younger Sister moves for a Prohibition to repeal the Administration because she being in equal degree of king ought to have equall share of the Administration But the Court answered that a prohibition lies not for you may appeal if the Administration be not rightly granted Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. A Processe issued out of this Court for a Cart and Horses that were cause of a mans death as a deodand 12. Iac. To stay processe for a deodand and it was moved that there hath been a generall pardon by Parliament since that time by which deodands were pardoned and therefore it was prayed the processe might be stayed General pardon The Court asked whether there be not an exception of deodands or the Almoners interest in the pardon The Councell answered there is not The Court demanded by what words in the pardon are deodands pardoned The Councel answered by the generall words The Court ordered thereupon it should be stayed till the Almoner be heard what he can say Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved for a habeas Corpus for one that was taken in Execution by the Sheriff and was afterwards set at liberty For a habeas corpus for one taken upon one Execution Audita querela and after that retaken upon the same Execution The Court answered take it but you are in the wrong way for you ought to bring your audita querela The King against Bray Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved to quash an Endictment of forcible entry made upon a Lessee for years upon the Statute of 21 Iac. To quash an Endictment of forcible entry The exceptions taken to it were 1. It doth not appear by the Endictment that the Lessee had any title to the Land at the time of the force committed for the force is supposed to be done before the lease commenced 2ly The lease is supposed to be a lease for so many years if I. S. shall so long live and it is not averred that I. S. was alive at the time of the forcible entry made Averment Roll chief Iustice cited the Lady Morlyes case that there ought to be a direct allegation of the life Therefore let it be quashed Mich. 24. Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved to quash an Endictment of Assault and Battery of an overseer of the poor villae de A. in executing of his office The exceptions taken to it were To quash an Endictment for assaulting a Collector for the poor 1. That there is no such officer as an overseer of the poor villae but it ought to be parochiae but the Court said it was well enough as it was though it had been more proper the other way 2ly The Endictment is for the Assaulting and beating a Collector for the poor in executing his office whereas there is no such office appointed for any one particular man by the Law for the Statute is that there shall be two Collectors for the poor in every Parish and so the office is joynt and not several But the Court over-ruled this exception also 3ly It wants vi et Armis Vpon this exception the Court bid the Councel move it again Gill against Crosse Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Plaintiff brought an Action of Debt against two as Administrators upon fully administred pleaded issue was ioyned Speciall verdict in Debt against Executors and a speciall verdict was found to this effect viz. that one of the Administrators had fully administred and that the other Administrator had assets It was urged against the Verdict that the issue that was found is impertinent and impossible Verdict Iudgement and so there can be no judgement given upon it But the Court answered that the verdict is good yet if Iudgement should be given upon it the Iudgement would be ill and Nevills and Greenwoods case Hill 7. Car. in the Exchequer rot 1189. was cited and it was said that Iudgement may be against that Executor who hath assets and nil capiat per billam against the other that hath fully administred But take Iudgement at your peril Preston against Holmes Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Trin. or Mich. 24 Car. rot 2052. VPon a special verdict found the Case in effect was this Arguments upon a special verdict upon a Will one in see having one Son by one venter and another Son by a second venter did by his last Will devise all his Lands to his wise for life and after her death to I. his eldest Son and to his Heirs and the question was whether the Son shall take these Lands by the devise or as Heir at Law and so the devise to be of no effect to make him come to the Lands by purchase Christopher Turner held that the devise is void because it sayes no more than the Law says for if there had been no such devise Iohn his Heirs should have had the Land and he cited Paramour and Yardlves Case in the Comentaries and Hob. rep Counden and Clarks case But it is objected that in this case the Law speaks one thing and the devise another thing and so the devise says not the same thing To this I answer there is no difference concerning the alteration of the Estate
for cause shews 1. That the breach of this promise was in the Testators life time and therefore the Action should have béen brought against him and is not now to be brought against the Executor 2ly The Testator did not promise that his Executors should deliver the goods but that he would deliver them upon request Request and there appears no request to be made to the Testator as there ought to have been 15 Iac. Hob. rep f. 300. Bodwells Case But Roll chief Iustice answered Executor That an Executor may be charged upon a collateral promise if there were a breach of it in the Testators life time and here is a good request and goes to all Therefore let the Plaintif take his judgement except better matter be shewed to the contrary and Osborne Mich. 1649. 1 Reipub. Ang. Banc. super THe Plaintif brought an Action upon the Case upon two several promises the Defendant pleaded non assumpsit Arrest of Iudgement in an Action upon the case Issue and upon this an issue was joyned and a verdict found for the Plaintif The Defendant moved in arrest of iudgement and for cause shews that there is no issue joyned as to the second promise alleged for he doth not conclude with petit quod inquitatur per patriam and yet there is a verdict found upon both the promises The Iudgement was arrested till the other should move Mich. 1649. Banc. super VPon a special Verdict the case was this A Case upon a special verdict argued Tenant for life the remainder for life the remainder in tayl the remainder to the right heirs of him in the remainder for life the remainder man in tayl levies a fine in the life of tenant for life And the question was whether by the levying of this fine the estate tayl were discontinued or no. To prove that the estate tayl was discontinued these Books were cited 1 H 7.22 Lit. Cap. Discents Sect. 34.14 Ed 3. Fitz. Avâ—wry 117.3 Ed 3. Fitz. grants 60.15 Ed. 4 9.2 Rep. Butlers case 5. Cooks Lit. f. 25. Pasch 13 Car. Hungates Case Banc. Reg. Dyer 339. Twisden to the contrary argued that the estate is not altered neither to the right nor by way of Estople 46 Edward 3. f. 23. Estople An Estople supposeth a thing to be done and therefore if the thing be impossible which is alleged by way of estople it can be no estople And one shall not be construed to doe wrong by an Act which may be interpreted so that by it he may doe no wrong Brooks Abridgement Grants 49. Roll chief Iustice The matter here is not how the estates shall pass and how to make them good but the Question is upon the forfeiture Forfeiture for he levies the fine as of an estate in possession and not of a reversion in fée and this is not upon the rule in Bredons case 13 Car. Sir Julius Caesars case an Acceptance of an estate or an Attornment by Tenant for life to a stranger is a forfeiture Jerman Iustice held there was no forfeiture But the Court said the Verdict was ill sound and therefore ordered it should be amended that the whole matter in Law might come in question Amendment Gray against Walye Mich. 1649. Banc. sup VVAlye brought an Action upon the Case against Gray Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the case for speaking these words of him viz. Iack Walye was questioned for stealing of a gray Mare with a snip in her ear and hue and cry went out after him and he durst not shew his face hereabouts The Plaintif had a Verdict and the Defendant moved in Arrest of Iudgement that the words were not actionable because they were general and uncertain words and it doth not appear the party was damnified by them nor how long ago they were spoken Roll chief Iustice said that the party was defamed by speaking of them and he hath laid it that he lost his Credit thereby Therefore let the Plaintif have his Iudgement except better matter be shewn But Nicholas Iustice doubted whether they were actionable or no. And Ask Instice nihil dixit Mich. 1649. Banc. sup AN Attorney of this Court that was within age Error against at Attorney in Court for appearing propria persona being within age Error in fact appeared to an Action propria persona and pleaded to issue and had a verdict and a judgment for him and upon this a writ of Error was brought here it being an error in fact because that being within age did not appear per guardianum nor by his Attorney and it was said that it is not helped by the Statute of Ieofails though it be after verdict And thereupon the Court stayed the Execution Mercer against Rule Mich. 1649. Banc. sup THe Court was moved For a Supersedeas attachment for taking out execution after a writ of Error brought and allowed Supersedeas Attachment Execution That a writ of Error was brought to reverse a Iudgement and that it was received and allowed and notwithstanding the Plaintif that had the Iudgement had taken out execution and thereupon it was prayed for a supersedeas to supersede the execution and for an Attachment against the party for his contempt to the Court. And it was urged by the Councel that moved That after a writ of Error is received and allowed the hands of the Court that gave the Iudgement are foreclosed from granting out execution and that the writ of Error is in it self a Supersedeas and cited Dyer 283. and therefore concluded that the execution is not well issued forth Twisden of Councel on the other side said that the writ of Error was not duly pursued because the roll was not marked and therefore the party might well take out execution But Roll chief Iustice answered that the writ was well pursued though the roll were not marked Yet if neither the roll be marked Notice nor notice given to the Attorney on the other side of the bringing the writ of Error if the party procéed to take out execution it is no contempt to the Court otherwise it is a contempt Contempt Supersedeas And it is the duty of the Clerk of the Errors to mark the roll and not the Attorneys and therefore take a Supersedeas quia improvide emanavit to stop execution Pym against Morgan alias Bambery and Baselye Mich. 1649. Banc. sup Hill 24 Car. rot 1062. IN an Ejectione firmae brought for the Mannor of Caledown Argument upon a special verdict in an Ejectione firmae The Defendant pleads Not guilty and upon this the Iury find a special verdict to this effect That Sir Thomas Morgan was seised in fée amongst other lands of the lands in question and that in 13 Car. he made a settlement of these lands to himself for life the remainder to his daughter Mary for life the remainder to the heirs of the first Tenant for life with a power of revocation
to alter all or any part of the settlement made at any time during his life The verdict finds further that there was an Ordinance of Parliament made in the year of our Lord 1645. that Sir Thomas Morgan should forfeit all his lands and estate which he was then seised or possessed of or had been seised or possessed of from the year 1641. and that by the same Ordinance the lands in question were given to Mr. Pym that by virtue of the said Ordinance he encred was seised pro ut that Mr. Pym died so seised after whose death the Plaintifs lessor as his heir entred made a lease to the Plaintif after that Sir Tho Morgan died Mary the Defendant claiming as tenant in remainder for life after the death of Sir Thomas her father by vertue of the settlement made 13 Carol. entred into the lands in question and the Plaintif as lessée of Pym brings the action Vpon this special verdict the Question was Whether by the Ordinance of Parliament made not till the year 1645. yet looking back to the year 1641. the remainder of the lands in question which was setled 13 Car. being before the making of the Ordinance and also before the time to which the Ordinance looks back be forfeited by the Ordinance or not Forfeiture Latch of Councel with the Defendant argued That it was not forfeited 1. Because that the Ordinance is penal and retrospective or looking back and therefore it is odious in Law and shall not be largely interpreted but as strictly as may be 2ly The preamble of the Ordinance sets forth 2. things as the reasons why the Ordinance was made 1. Mr. Pyms deserts to whom the lands were given 2ly Morgans offences for which he was thus punished and both these grounds for making the Ordinance can extend no further than to the year 1641. and so not to the time of the settlement made 13 Car. by Sir Thomas Morgan for then neither of these causes alleged were in being 2ly The purview of the Ordinance is double 1. punitive 2ly remunerative 1. the punitive part which concerns the punishing of Sir Thomas Morgan 2ly the remunerative part concerning the rewarding of Mr. Pym and the punitiue part made in the year 1645. cannot reach the estate setled upon Mary his daughter so long before viz. 13 Car. for it can reach no further back than to the year 1641. at the most to which time and no further the Ordinance is retrospective and in the Statute of 23 H. 8. general words of an Act are restrained Besides there is a demonstration in the Ordinance that shews the Ordinance doth not extend to the estate of the Defendant as may appear by the provisoes conteined in it for although the children of Morgan are to be punished within the Ordinance by the second proviso of it yet this extends not to so long time as to 13 Car. when the estate was setled but only to the estate as it was in the year 1641. And therefore prayed Iudgement for the Defendant Wadham Windham on the other side argued that the estate of Morgan though it was said to be setled 13 Car. was forseited by the Ordinance Because the estate was not absolutely setled at that time for there was a proviso in the conveyance to revoke the settlement so that at the time of the Ordinance made the estate was in Sir Thomas Morgan absolutely to dispose off as he pleased and by the words of the Ordinance all Morgans estate is passed without any saving and the provisoes of the Ordinance do prove that the Children of Sir Thomas Morgan were excepted out of the savings made to preserve the estates of others Also Boons and Favours bestowed use to be amply expounded and this being a Boon bestowed by the Parliament shall receive as large a construction as is possible Besides Morgan was a Papist therfore it may well be supposed that he intended not this for any real settlement but only by way of subtility for some private reasons for we know that Papists do use to make such settlements as this was to preserve them from penalties of the Law And the words of the Ordinance are accumulative to convey all Morgans estate and there are no restrictive words and if there were they should be void here for the Manor of Callidown being the Lands in question are expresly given by the Ordinance and as to these Lands the rights of all men are bound and therefore if there were a saving it would be void as it is Cook rep Alton Woods Case And an act of Parliament sometimes is as a conveyance sometime as a judgment and both waies a saving in it is void and srivolous 1 Rep. 4. A conditional estate or a right may be saved by Iudgment or fine but not an entire estate or interest Saving and therefore the estate of Mary in the Manor of Callidown cannot be saved by any proviso and he cited Alton Woods Case for authority in the principal Case f. 51. But admitting a general saving had been good to save Maries estate yet as the words of the Ordinance were penned her estate is not saved by it for the words were put in the Ordinance for the advantage of Pym and not to provide for Mary for she claims from Thomas Morgan and so prayed Iudgement for the Plaintif Roll chief Iustice said that the provisoes in the Ordinance are not void to all persons as Windham argued for Strangers are clearly provided for by them But let the Case be argued again Saturday fortnight Postea Hatwood against Payte Mich. 1649 Banc. sup Entred Hill 24 Car. rot 78. THe question insisted upon in this Case was Whether Tithes be extendible upon an Elegit whether upon a recovery in an Action of Debt against a Parson the Tithes be extendible by Elegit Hales of Councel with the Plaintif held that they are because that Tithes may be said to be Tenements and the Parson hath a Free-hold in them although he hold them jure Ecclesiae But Roll chief Iustice said Elegit that a Parsonage cannot be extended but that the Debt may be levyed out of the profits of it by the Sherif as it was wont to be done Extent for now there being no Bishops the profits cannot be sequestred by the Bishop of the Dioces Sequestration as they used to be But Ierman and Nicholas Iustices doubted Clergy Ask Iustice agreed with Roll and said that by the Common-law the Clergy are no more privileged from paying their debts than Lay men are Roll chief Iustice said it hath been heretofore questioned whether a Clergy-man be subject to watch and ward or to contribute to satisfie for a robbery done within the Hundred but now it is no question but they are subject and shall contribute Adjourned till Saturday to be argued again Postea Tyndal and others against Harington Mich. 1649. Banc. sup TYndal brought an Action of Debt
to the Sheriff for his appearance and therefore it was prayed that the party arrested might be discharged and that the bond given to the Sherif might be delivered up Roll the chief Iustice answered Endict the Bailies that made the Arrest or bring your Action against them if you please Discharge for we will not discharge the party arrested Bois against Cranfield Mich. 1650. Banc. sup rot Q. BOis as Executor to another brought an Action of Debt upon divers Obligations made to his Testator Debt upon divers Obligations by an Execution The Defendant pleaded that he did pay a lesser sum than is expressed in the Obligations to the Testator during his life and that he did accept there of in full satisfaction of the said Obligations To this plea the Plaintif demurred Roll Chief Iustice upon opening the matter said that the question here is whether the payment or the acceptance of the money paid in satisfaction be to be traversed And he held it was indifferent to traverse either of them Traverse but he said it was more proper to joyn issue upon the payment but the Court would advise It was then also said that if one pay money in satisfaction of an Obligation and the party to whom it is paid saith that he will receive it for another cause Satisfaction payment yet if he receive it it shall be judged to be paid in satisfaction of the Obligation for he must receive it upon such terms as the other will pay it Brian against Stone Mich. 1650. Banc. sup STone moves the Court for an Attachment against Brian and others For an Attachment for that he was arrested by a Latitat out of this Court in the County of Wilts and thence carried into the Town of Malborow and there arrested by a Serjeant of that Town by a writ out of that Corporation and the Plaintif procéeds there against him upon that writ and not upon the latitat by which he was first arrested which is a contempt to this Court. Attachment Habeas Corpus cum causa The Court ruled the party should have an Attachment nisi c. and also should have a Habeas Corpus cum causa Mich. 1650. Banc. sup THe Recorder of London moved for the Inhabitants of Bishopsgate against one Withringes For the setting a moderate fine upon one that submitted to a fine who for refusing to serve upon the Ward mote Enquest was indicted for his refusal in London and convicted and fined 20 l. the Defendant being committed for not paying his fine removed himself hither by a Habeas Corpus but now hath submitted himself to a fine it was therefore prayed he may be moderately fined here The Court thereupon fined him 20 l. Beal against VVyman Mich. 1650. Banc. sup Trin. 1649. rot 849. VPon these words of a will Question upon words of a Will viz. I give and bequeath one half of my lands to my wife after her death I give all my lands to the heirs males of any of my Sons or next of Kin Latch made these questions in the Case 1. Whether there were a good estate created by these words of the will 2ly Whether the estate were destroyed by the fine levied of the lands For the 1. he held that the heirs males of any of his Sons are words certain enough to create an estate for it is all one as if he had said to the heirs males of all his sons if they have heirs males or to those who have heirs males and the words or to the next of Kin are also certain enough being joyned with the precedent words and shall be meant to the next of Kin and their heirs males if his sons have no heirs males For in a Win if there be words to express the meaning of the Testator it is sufficient enough though the words be not apt And he cited 21 Rich. 2. Devise 27. and 8 Rep. 46 and said that the case in 30 Ass pl. 47. is the same with this in terminis And here is no contingent remainder but only a contingent devise there is no necessity for a particular estate to support it for it ariseth out of the estate of the Devisor yet if there were néed of a particular estate here to support the remainder here is a particular estate in the wife who by implication of the will doth take all the land during her life as it is 13 H. 7.29 H. 8. Br. Devise 48. Trin. 3 Ed. 6. Bendloes Plow Com. 521. Whelpdales case Pasch 25 Eliz Com. Ban. To the 2 point he spake not holding it not material Hales of Councel on the other side held that the wife had not an estate for life in all the land by implication of the will but only an estate for life in a moyety of the land and so there is no particular estate to support the contingent remainder which he held was in this case that it is not a contingent Devise as Latch urged for the remainder here depends by way of remainder and not as a contingent Devise And he held the Devise it self to be void admitting all the precedent matter alleged to be true 1. Because the devise is uncertain for the intent of the deviser doth not appear for it appears not what heir male shall have the land whether the heir male of his son or the heir male of his next of Kin for the words are disjunctive 41 42 Eliz. Com. Banc. in the Case of Tayler Sawyer land devised to a Mans Issue was adjudged a void devise for the incertainty of it And he held that the intent was that the heir male of his son should inherit before the heir male of the next of Kin otherwise the further off of Kin should have the land before the nearer of Kin. And he said that Hill 2. Car. Rot. 1288. Com. Banc. in Hunt and Fishers case the case at the Bar was adjudged in point Roll chief Iustice said That the intention of the Testator here is coeca sicca Intention and senceless and cannot be known Will. and we ought not to frame a sence upon the words of a Will where we cannot find out the Testators meaning Ierman Iustice held that the devise was not void but that the words are to be interpreted as they may stand with Law and as the words will bear Nicholas Iustice prima facie that the devise is void but yet it is questionable Ask Justice to the same intent Roll chief Iustice said that there is too much way usually given to ambiguous devises But let it be argued again the next Term. Parker against Cook Mich. 1650. Banc. sup Hill 23 Car. rot 660. THe Action was an Action of Trespass quare Clausum fregit Upon a Demurrer the question was whether a Copyhold were forfeited or not The Defendant pleaded a special plea of justification viz. That the Plaintif was a Copyholder to his Manor and that for
to his heir in the singular number And he argued that the word heir includes heirs because it is Nomen Collectivum Next Whether the devising the land to Richard for his natural life and after to his heir for ever makes any difference in the Case and he held it did not and said that Archers case that is objected by the other side differs much from this for there the words are restrained for it is Proximo Haeredi and not Haeredi generally as it is in our Case and there the words next heir are not words of limitation but of purchase and to decipher the person but not to limit the estate and in our case if there should not be a limitation Richard should only take for life which is not the intent of the Will as may appear by the passages and clauses of it And Thomas and Kemishes case in 5 Car. in this Court makes an end of our Case Neither doth the adding of the word in perpetuum make a difference in the Case for if the words had béen omitted the same estate had passed to the Tenant Richard and his Estate is not enlarged by them 2ly The words in perpetuum relate to all the Estate and not to any particular Estate and so the surrender made by R. Hunt is good Next of all supposing that it be a limited Estate and a contingent remainder the question will then be whether this contingent remainder be destroyed or no and I conceive it is because the particular Copyhold estate which must support this contingent remainder is destroyed and the Law is the same in that point in Copyhold cases as it is in other cases at the Common Law for Copyholds are directed by the rules of the Common Law 13 Iac. Banc. Reg. It is also held that there is the same rule to support a contingent remainder of a Copyhold as there is of Land at the Common Law Next it is to be considered whether the particular Copyhold estate be extinguished or not And it is cléer that it is for the customary Estate is in the Lord who hath the Fée simple which cannot both stand together and so there is no estate to support the contingent remainder Copyhold and consequently all objections are by this answered 1. That the surrender shall not do wrong 2ly That the surrender destroys not the Custom Turner on the other side argued that only an estate passeth to Richard for life and that the word Heir is not a word of limitation to make the Ancestor take a Fée simple neither shall the word Heir be taken Collective here but singulariter and so according to the common sence number and matter ought it to be construed And Nowns Collective in the singular number do not signifie the same thing that they do in the plurall number as may be proved by other examples and there is no proper name to signifie one particular Heir in Law if the word Heir in the singular number shall not do it Shellyes case 1. Rep. f. 101. â—ooks institut f. 8.1 Rep. Archers case And there are two Iudgements in the Common pleas in the very point as I am informed by the Attorney on our side In a Will the word Heir shall not be taken Coliective out in the natural grammaticall sence and not as a word of art but it is otherwise taken perchance in conveyances which are made by men of Art and learned in the Laws whereas wills are made commonly by lay gents and unskilfull in the Law And the rule is that words shall be interpreted to make all the parts of a déed in which they are to stand together and to bear sence and to be in esse and effectual which cannot be here if the word heir shall be taken Collective but may be if it be taken singulariter Hob. rep Stukely and Butlers case Next if the word heir should be taken Collective then the Estate for life would merge 30 El. C. B. Hill 3 Iac. C. B. Hiller and Lewis his case 3ly Rich. hath only an Estate for life if it were otherwise the Testator would have otherwise expressed it and he hath well expressed an estate for life and no other Estate in him If one grant 4. parts of his mannor it shall passe 4. parts of 5. and not all For the other poynt the contingent remainder is not here destroyed by the destruction of the Copyhold Estate for Copyhold Estates do not depend one upon another as Estates of the Common Law do and here is one in esse to take the Estate Another question he spoke to viz. whether a Lessee at will being ousted by a stranger can reenter and he held he cannot for he hath but a meer right 38 H. 6. f. 27. Fortescue and Yelverton 3. Iac. Banc. Reg. rot 501. Carpenter and Collins But to this Roll chief Iustice Entry and Nicholas Iustice answered that he may enter notwithstanding it hath been heretofore controverted and the reason is because he hath the primer posseâ—sion Roll chief Iustice enclined that the contingent remainder is not destroyed because it doth not here depend upon the particular Estate but it ought to expect till the remainder happen and he conceived that the word heir and heirs were all one here by the intent of the partyes and the frame of the conveyance Ask Iustice said that it is a good Estate of Fee simple conditionall executed in Richard Ierman Iustice The intent in a Will if it be not contrary to Law ought to be taken and there must be words to make the intent appear and these words must stand together and shall not be made void and he conceived the contingent remainder not destroyed Adjourned till the next Term. Postea Port against Midleton Hill 1650. Banc. sup A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Iudgement given in an Action of debt upon an obligation Error to reverse a judgment in debt and the Error insisted upon was in the entring of the Iudgement which was quod recuperet Debitum suum and doth not say praedictum Roll chief Iustice answered Delivery Escrow that the debt is confessed by the party and the question is whether the deed was delivered as an escrow or not but it was delivered to the party himself and therefore could not be delivered as an escrow Ierman Iustice said that debitum suum without praedictum is not good for the word praedictum is verbum operativum Ask Iustice as Roll and there is but one debt Implication and the word ideo in the record implyes it to be the same debt Nicholas to the same effect The rule was affirmetur nisi causa die Iunae sequenti Hill 1650. Banc. sup AN administrator had a Iudgement against one to recover a debt due to the Intestate and then the Administrator dyed Intestate For a scire facias to revive a judgement denyed Scire facias and another took out new letters of administration de bonis non
purpose to dispence with the want of Investiture if it were necessary and the reason of the making the new Patent of the Lord Barkeley was not for the want of the Clause of Investiture for the Investiture is a ceremony of the Heraulds and not essential to the Honour And although there be no certain place of denomination of the place of the Earldom yet is the Patent good for it may be out of England and yet she may be an English Countess notwithstanding Although I agree that forein honours may be granted by the Broad Seal of England but here be sufficient words to express her to be an English Countess the most proper that can be viz. the Patent Creations of such honours have been frequent she hath also a sufficient estate to support her dignity I confess that it is true that no person can be privileged from Arrest by grant but here the privilege ensues the Patent of her Counteship by Custom and Law as incident to it The King cannot grant a privilege to imprison but if he grant a Court the power to imprison follows necessarily upon it And the privilege which the Law gives to the person of a Countess is that which exempts her from Arrest as it appears in the Case of a Countess by Mariage and a Countess by Creation is more honourable than a Countess by Mariage and therefore ought to have as high privileges as the other and the Statute made concerning Countesses the wives of Earls and Barons do appertain to a Countess created for those Statutes were but an affirmance of the Common Law and did introduce no new Law This privilege is not taken away for it arose by Custom and by the Common Law and not from Foreiners as Latch conceives and so the reason of that cannot be as he urgeth but by the privilege of the person which indures as well when there is no Parliament as when there is and this privilege is during life and not like to a privilege granted by reason of employment For a Countess Dowager hath no more reason to be privileged in relation to military employment than a Countess by Creation and by the late Act no employment is taken away And for the Clergy they were privileged from Arrests not because of employment but by reason of the eminency of their persons There may be an Earl or a Baron by writ or by prescription and there it ought to be certified by writ but here the honour being by Creation the Patent may be pleaded to certifie it as well as if it were certified by writ and to plead it thus is the more proper way A Baron ought not to be stiled Dominus in a writ but by his Christian name and addition of Knight if he be one if he have no special name of Barony in his Creation Roll chief Iustice demanded if one be made a Baron and be not called to the Parliament by writ or comes thither by virtue of some clause in his Patent shall he be exempted from Arrest quasi diceret non And if one heretofore had had twenty Knights fees Privilege could he have come to the Parliament by reason of them And held that the privilege is not allowable for she never had reference to the Parliament or to do any other publique service Ierman Nicholas and Ask Justices agreed with Roll in all Roll said If the King grant a Town to be a Burrough the grant gives it not privilege to send a Burgess to the Parliament except there be special words in the Patent to warrant it but if he make a County it is otherwise by Statute Adjourned Hayward against VVilliams Hill 1650. Banc. sup Hill 1649. rot 824. THe Case was this Whether a Writ of Error well brought A Feme was sued as a Feme sole but by the surname of her Husband she being Covert Baron and Iudgement was given against her and the Baron brought a writ of Error The question was whether the writ of Error was well brought by the Baron It was then said That if a Feme Covert levy a fine as a Feme sole if her Baron die she shall not defeat it but the Baron may defeat it during her life 18 E. 4 40.7 Roll chief Iustice to the case at the Bar said how can the Baron bring a writ of Error here who is no party to the Record neither is chargeable by the judgement But let us see books for the case is considerable Postea Needler and Guest Hill 1650. Banc. sup Trin. 1649. rot Q. A Writ of Error was brought in the Chequer Chamber to reverse a judgement given in this Court Whether Execution may be notwithstanding a Writ of Error brought in the Chequer Chamber Execution The question was whether now since the late Act that a Writ of Error shall be no supersedeas of Execution this Court may grant execution Roll chief Iustice said it may for otherwise the Act is to no purpose Latch said the Record is not now in this Court and therefore there can be no Execution granted here Roll chief Iustice answered you have confessed by your pleading namely by your Demurrer that the Record is here so far as to grant Execution Therefore let there be Execution except cause be shewed to the contrary the day the next term But afterwards the Court said they would not grant it but said the party might take execution at his peril and Alleyn Hill 1650. Banc. sup A Certiorari was directed to the County Palatine of Chester to remove a cause into this Court. They make a special retorn Whether a Return good out of the County Palatine of Chester viz. that they have jurisdiction of the cause and that therefore they are not to certifie it Serjeant Glyn argued that this retorn was not good for this Court hath jurisdiction over all the Courts in England in writs mandatory 34 Ass 7.19 H. 6.12 And an Act of Plarliament doth not take away the power of this Court if it run not in the negative but in writs remedial it is not so general as it is in this case the cause may be well enough tryed here notwithstanding it be concerning a matter which ariseth in the County Palatine as the Statute 9 Ed. 3. C. â— is 2ly It appears that the Maior and Citizens of Chester are parties and so they will try their own cause and this appears by the Record and this they ought not to do 21 H. 7. f. 33. lib. Ass 332. 37 E. 3. f. 7.6 Iac. C. Banc. and Smith and Hancocks case 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Roll chief Iustice answered If the cause were come to tryal this were good cause to remove it but it is not so here and it appears not by the retorn that the matter of the sute did arise within the jurisdiction of the City what say you to that Iurisdiction for they have not shewn any cause why they should have jurisdiction
the power for it ariseth partly out of her interest and partly out of her Authority and both may well stand together and the Estate made out of both is a good Estate or if not the Estate may be intended to arise out of the power given her to make such an Estate and not out of her interest and the joyning of her daughter is not materiall though no good estate be derived from her and so he prayed Iudgement for the Defendant Roll chief Iustice It is usual in the West of England to make Estates for lives upon the old rent but it is not here expressed of what nature this manor is or whether it used to be let and here is no limitation to let for lives But here either the laster words are idle or else the Feme hath such a power that she may destroy the remainder And itsh all not be intended that he trusted his Executrix with more than he gave her and the words of the Will do not express that and the question is how it shall be interpreted The words may be interpreted Cumulative Interpretation otherwise the feme hath power to destroy the remainder which would be a hard construction To which Nicholas assented Roll chief Iustie The intention of the Testator is not cleer to give this power to the Feme but if it did appear to be his meaning it might be otherwise and here it is in a Will And the Verdict is not well drawn up for the Case might have been made better for all the land may be in Demesite for ought appears by the Verdict Adjourned to be argued again Postea VVebb against Wilmer Pasch 1651. Banc. sup Hill 1650. rot 309. VVEbb brought an Action of Debt for rent reserved by him upon a lease for years made to Wilmer Arrest of Iudgement in Debt for rent reserved upon a Lease for years and obtains a Verdict The Defendant moved in Arrest of Iudgement and alleged for cause that the Plaintif had abated his writ The case was this Webb leaseth certain lands to Wilmer for years reserving a rent with a clause of re-entry for not payment the rent being behind the Lessor brings an Action of Debt for the rent and pending the sute re-enters into the land and after the Lessee re-enters The question here was whether the writ once abated by the Plaintifs entry Reviver Abatement pending the writ were revived by the Defendants re-entry Roll chief Iustice held it was not Twisden argued that the writ is not abated but only abatable by plea and so this matter is not to be offered to stay the Iudgement 5 H. 7. f. 47. and he hath pleaded nothing in abatement but to the Action only and he said that it now being after a verdict it is helped by the Statute Hales on the other side said that it doth here appear that the Plaintif hath no cause of Action for he was in possession when he brought the Ejectment Roll answered If one declare having no cause of Action Declaration Departure if there be cause afterward it is well enough But here is a departure and the 1. Ejectment is not revived for it is purged by the re entry The rule was nil capiat per billam nisi The Custodes Libertatis c. against Hall Pasch 1651. Banc. sup HAll was endicted for forestalling of Butter Error to reverse a judgment upon an Endictment for forestalling and pleaded and had judgement given against him whereupon he brought his writ of Error and took these exceptions 1. That it doth not appear that the Endictment was at the Quarter Sessions as it ought to be by the Statute of 5 Ed. 6. for it is only said to be ad generalem Sessionem Roll chief Iustice answered if it be ad generalem Sessionem it may be intended the Quarter Sessions Intendment 2ly It was objected that there is no Capiatur awarded in the judgement as there ought to be The Court answered they would advise VVillis against Bond. Pasch 1651. Banc. sup Mich. 1650. rot 86. BOnd an Administrator brought an Action of Debt in Bristow against Willis upon an indebitatus assumpsit Error to reverse a judgement in debt and had a judgement The Defendant brought a writ of Error and took these Exceptions 1. That the Plaintif declares for a thing the conusance whereof lyes out of the jurisdiction of the Court Iurisdiction for it is for wages to be paid upon the performance of a Voyage to be made in locis transmarinis Roll chief lustice said this was a good Exception for they cannot enquire at Bristow whether the party hath performed his Voyage or not The 2d Exception was that the Plaintif declares that the Defendant was indebted to him in such a sum of money to render him an accompt The Court answered this is not good Accompt Debt for in such case an Action of accompt lies and not an indebitatus assumpsit And for these causes the Iudgement was reversed nisi and pronounced by Ierman Iustice at the prayer of the Plaintifs Counsel in English being the first that was pronounced so in this Court according to the late Act for proceedings in Law to be in English Quod nota Gowr against Pasch 1651. Banc. sup IN Arrest of Iudgement upon a Verdict found for the Plaintif Arrest of Iudgement in a Trover and Conversion Demand Trover in a Trover and Conversion brought by Baron and Feme for goods of the Feme dum ipsa sola suit The Exception was that it is not expressed that the goods were demanded by the Feme Roll chief Iustice said the Demand of the Feme is good to found the Action and it was then also said that a Trover and Conversion lies for goods found and converted although they come afterwards to the hands of the party that lost them The Rule was judicium nisi Pasch 1651. Banc. sup MEmorandum The first rule of this Court made in English was between White and Keblewhite Pasch 1651. Pease against Shrimpton Pasc 1651. Banc. sup Hill 24 Car. rot 191. THe Court was informed by Councel that the Habeas Corpus and Bail-piece were lost and therefore it was prayed that there might be a new Habeas Corpus and that the old Bail put in may be allowed by the rule of Court Roll chief Iustice answered make a new Habeas Corpus Habeas Corpus Bail and a new Bail-piece but first let Tutt the Attorney that was Clark of the Bails attend here to be examined whether the Habeas Corpus Bail-piece be lost as is suggested Ritch against Sanders Pasch 1651. Banc. sup Hill 1649. rot 758. RItch brought an Action of Trespass against Sanders for taking away his Corn set forth for tithes Special verdict in Trespass for tithes upon the words of a Will upon issue joyned a special Verdict was found whereupon the case fell out to be upon the construction of the
for another man he had unwillingly committed a Trespass against the Plaintif in taking away 2 or 3 wheele-barroughs of Earth of the Plaintifs soil and therefore it was prayed that the matter might be referred to the Secondary to tax the damages and Costs for the Trespass which he was ready to pay that the proceedings might be stayed But Roll chief Iustice answered It cannot be but you may confess the Action Reference He le against Green Hill 1651. Banc. sup IN an Ejectione firmae a special Verdict was found upon which the Case fell out to be this A man being Lessee of a Manor for 199 years Special Verdict in an Ejectione firmae deviseth the Term to his wife for life with power to make such estates in as ample manner as he himself might have done during her life and the remainder in Tall to his Daughter and dies the Feme proves the Will and accepts of the Legacy and after makes a Lease for 99 years and dies and the daughter brings an Ejectione firmae against the Lessee of the Feme The question was whether this Lease made by the Feme were a good Lease or not Merifield argued that the Lease was not good after the death of the Feme because she having but an estate for life Lease and the Lease for 99 years being derived out of it when the estate for life ends the estate derived out of it must end also And 2ly If the Feme had any power to dispose of any part of the Term longer than for her life by the same reason she might have disposed of all of it which cannot be intended for the Testator did not mean that she should have power to destroy the Entayl made upon his Daughter And as to the Objection that she hath dissposed of but part of the Term and therefore hath not destroyed the Entayl I answer It matters not what she hath done but what she might have done for by the same reason that she disposed of part she might have disposed of the whole The rest of the Argument I could not hear Henage Finch on the other side argued That the Lease made by the Feme continues after her death because the Feme had a power given her to make such a Lease and by vertue of that power the Lease continues for the power given unto her relates to the Estates to be made by her and not to the continuance of her life And here the intent of the Testator is to be considered which was that his wife should have the power to dispose of all the Term if she would for he trusted her with it because she was his Wife and Mother of his Daughter to whom the Entayl was made and the very subject matter shews his intent to be so and because there is no other power expressed against this in any other part of the Will and the words that give her this power would be idle and trifling if they should receive any other Construction 2 Car. Banc. Reg. Danyel and Ogleys case and Gibs and Whites case 1 Car. nor does the assent of the Feme to the Legacy to have the Term for life destroy her power to make estates 2ly She hath well executed this power for the Iury have found that it is the Lease of the Feme 9 Iac. Suckham and Hawkins case a power given to an Executor may be executed by parts Roll chief Iustice held Lease the Lease was good for a Will ought to be so interpreted that all the parts of it may stand together and if the Feme here have not power to make this Lease the Clause of giving her this Lease is idle and the meaning is so without doubt the Feme hath the sole estate in Law in her and the power given here is but a restoring to her of that which she had before by the Law and her consenting to the Legacy doth not take away her power to make Estates And this limited power and the remainder to his daughter may stand together for it might be that the wife would not make such a lease and then the daughter should have had the land in tayl but if she dispose of it the daughter shall not have it Ierman as Roll. Nicholas Iustice held that the Feme could only dispose of the land during her life and that the Testators intent by the words was that the Feme should not be tyed to occupy the lands her self during her life but might dispose of them Ask as Nicholas that she can dispose of the lands only during her life for the power is only given during her life and this interpetation will make all parts of the Will stand together better than the other interpretation Adjourned Antea Dekins against Latham Hill 1651. Banc. sup Entred Hill 22 Car. rot 946. IN an ejectione firmae a special verdict was found Special verdict in an ejectione firmae upon which the Case fell out to be this One seised of lands covenanted to levy a fine to the use of himself and his wife for life and after he leased the lands for 21 years for 3 l. rent per annum by equal portions and after the death of I.S. to pay a gross sum of 125 l. by way of fine payable by 5 l. a year quarterly with a proviso in the Indenture that for default of payment of the rent or fine or for want of reparations it should be lawfull for the Lessor to re-enter After the Lessor levyes a fine and assigneth over his interest in the reversion The question here was whether the condition of entry be transferred over to the Assignee by the transferring over of the reversion Hales of councell with the Plaintiff held that the lease proceeds from the Husband only and not from the Baron and Feme and the condition is transferred over for the condition runs joyntly as well to the fine reserved as to the rent and is as it were a several condition in Law although it be comprised but in one clause and not several clauses and the condition as to the rent is transferred though not as to the fine In 19 E 4. f. 7. The law makes a several distribution of one praecipe and so may it do here of one condition and Rawlins case in the â— rep cited against this comes not to this case for there the question was of the suspension of a condition but here it is of the transferring over of a condition 2ly If it be but one condition yet it is well transferred by the Statute of 32 H. 8. C. â—4 an extinguishment in part is not extinguishment of all although a suspension of part be a suspension of all and the Grantee of the reversion shall have advantage of the condition because 1. He is within the words of the condition as to the condition 2ly The clause of re-entry is within the words of the Statute and Knights case objected comes not to this case for there
his guardian and therefore let the Iudgement be reversed nisi Fortune against Johnson Hill 1651. Banc. sup THe Court was moved for an attachment against Iohnson upon an affidavit For an attachment for putting one out of possession that he had ejected one out of possession that was put in by a habere facias possessionem and that in a very riotous manner and had imprisoned the party so put out of possession and others Windham on the other side by way of answer said that the party came into the land by virtue of an eign Iudgement and an extent upon it Roll chief Iustice answered here is title against title therefore take your course in law for we will make no rule in it Crosthwayt and the Hundred of Lowdon Hill 1651. Banc. sup CRosthwayt brought an Action upon the Statute of Winchester of robberyes Arrest of Iudgement in an Action upon the Statute of Winchester for robbery against the Hundred of Lowdon for being robbed of 160 l. and had a verdict against the Hundred It was moved in arrest of Iudgement that the Action upon the Statute did not lye for the party that brought it for it appears that he was not robbed but that the mony was taken out of a portmantle which was carryed by the postboy and that only the Plaintiffs hand was upon one end of the portmantle so that the post-boy was robbed and not the Plaintiff But Roll chief Iustice answered Robbery Possession there is no question but that this was a robbery of the Plaintiff and it is all one as where my Servant is robbed in my presence and there the goods shall be said to be in my possession and so is it here and therefore let Iudgement be entred nisi Tayler and Web. Hill 1651 Banc. sup THis case formerly argued at the Bar and broken on the Bench Special Verdict upon the words of a will and some opinion delivered in it was again moved by Maynard and argued by him And he said that by the Will no land passeth because lands are not mentioned in it neither is there any necessary implication that the Testator intended to devise his lands for the making one his Heir and enjoyning him to pay an annuity doth not convey the lands to him and the Will doth not say that he makes him his Heir of his lands but generally his Heir which by the civill Law may be of goods and for the enjoyning him to pay the annuity this may be out of other lands in consideration of the personal estate given unto him In Danyel and Vblies case a gift made by a Feme coparcener of her purparty of land did not convey the lands in Fée In Marshes case the Father gave his lands to his two Sons to be equally divided it was adjudged there that only an Estate for life passed and here is nothing at all expresly given In Gilbert and Withers case Mich. 20 Iac. It was adjudged that there ought not to be made such a construction of a Will as is not agreable to Law And this is only a logical Will by way of argument and not a grammatical Construction or Interpretation and positive Will Roll chief Iustice answered to make a construction of a Will where the intent of the Testator cannot be known is intentio caeca sicca but here although the words of the Will be not proper yet we may collect the Testators meaning to be by making of the party his Heir that he should have his lands and it is all one as if he had said Heir of his lands and here he not only makes him his Heir but his Executor also Will. and therefore if he shall not have his lands the word Heir is meerly nugatory and to no purpose for by being Executor only he shall have the goods and as it hath been observed he is in this case haeres factus though not natus Ierman Iustice to the same effect and said that the word Heir implyes two things 1. That he shall have the lands 2ly That he shall have them in Fee simple Nicholas and Ask Iustices concurred and so it was ruled that Iudgement should be given for Sir Iohn Bridges the Devisee nisi Lockoe against Palfriman Hill 1651 Banc. sup Hill 1651 rot 1002. VPon a special verdict found in an ejectione firmae Special verdict in an ejectione firmae the case fell out to be this Tenant for life the remainder to Baron and Feme and their Heirs Baron and Feme suffer a recovery The question was whether the Heirs of the Feme were bound by this recovery because the Feme being covert it was conceived she was not Tenant to the praecipe because it appears not she was examined and so nothing was recovered from her It was argued that this recovery did bind the Feme 1. because if a precipe be brought against one who hath nothing in the land the writ only is abatable Fitz. Tit. Droyt 29. Next an Estople with recompence excludes not only parties and privies but also strangers as it is in Shellyes case and 3 Iac. C. B. in Duke and Smiths case 15 E. 4 f. 28 In 43 Ed. 3. f. â—8 was the first mention of examination of a Feme upon a Recovery and she shall be intended to be examined here if it be requisite for it is not found she was not examined and in Br. Abridg. recovery in value 27 23 H. 8. It is held that a Feme Covert is barred by a Common recovery and this hath been the continual practice since that time and whereas it is objected that a colourable recovery doth not bind a Feme Covert it is answered that this is not a colourable recovery but a judicial matter of Record and is brought upon an original and there is an intended recompence to the Feme and to urge that there is no Tenant to the praecipe is an objection which reaches to the common practice of assurances and therefore not to be admitted and in time they might have counterpleaded the voucher but now they cannot avert this matter against the Record 19 E. 3. estople 9. and though the Feme be not examined yet she shall be bound by this recovery though in a fine it is otherwise where there is no recompence in value as here there is and in a fine the Iudge ex officio is bound to examine the Feme but not in a recovery nor is there any practice of it in Law 13 Ed. 3 Iudgement 29. A partition made by writ shall bind a Feme Covert because she hath a recompence so is it upon a partition made upon Record in Chancery And by the Barons surviving the Feme here the recompence both not survive to the Baron but shall go to the Heirs of the Feme Br. recovery in value 27 2 Iac. C. B. here is a reall Estate in the Baron and Feme Hales on the other side made the question to be whether by a recovery
one as if the party had appeared for if he had appeared the Case would have béen otherwise So Iudgement was given for the Plaintif nisi c. Pasch 1652. Banc. sup MEmorandum One brought by Habeas Corpus from the Fleet remaâ—â—ed One was brought into the Court by the Mareschall of the Fléet by vertue of a habeas Corpus directed to him out of this Court and because it did appear upon Record that the party was charged with divers debts when he was turned over to the Fleet he was not suffered to put in Bail here but was remanded Gossage against Tayler Pasch 1652. Banc. sup Hill 1650. rot 117. IN an Ejectione firmae upon a Lease for years of a Messuage Special verdict in Trespass and Ejectrueâ—â— and certain lands in Hatfield Broad-Oak in the County of Essex upon a special verdict found the case fell out to be this Rich. Frank seised amongst other lands and Tenements of the Messuage and lands in question upon the mariage of his Son Leventhorp Frank with Susan Cotele levies a fine of the lands to the use of himself during his own life and the life of Leventhorp his Son and after during the life of Susanna Cotele the wife of Leventhorp the remainder to the use of the heirs to be begotten upon the body of Susanna by Leventhorp her Husband The question here was whether the word heirs shall be intended the heirs of Leventhorp and Susanna his wife or whether the estate shall be intended to be limited to the heirs of Susanna only and that Leventhorp shall have barely an estate for life in the lands Serjeant Glyn of Councel with the Plaintif held That Susanna Cotele hath an estate tayl executed in the lands and that the word heirs shall relate only to the heirs of Susanna and not to the heirs of Leventhorp 1. Because that here is an estate limited for life unto Susanna by an express limitation and her heirs shall take immediately after the estate for life ended and they shall not come in as purchasors By express Terms the word heirs is not limited to any person but it is left to the construction of the Law and that doth apply it to Susanna as to a person to whom Richard that setled the lands hath expressed most affection as appears by the Deed Lit. f. 6. Sect. 28. There is an expression of the party to whom the word heirs shall relate but so is not here and therefore the cases differ In 3 Ed. 3. f. 31 32. It is ruled that both parties have an estate tayl because the estate is limited to both but so it is not in our case so those books are not against me In our case it doth not appear that Richard did intend to advance the Husband of Susanna and therefore it is not reason that the word heirs should relate to him but to Susanna his wife only for in case of limitation of estates the intention of the party is to be considered and doth direct the matter and the preceding limiting of the estate to Susanna and not to Leventhorp doth shew that the party did mean to promote the heirs of Susanna Lit. Sect. 27. Dyer 27. A second reason is drawn from the penning of the déed which in the limitation of it doth encline more that the word heirs should be applyed to Susanna than to Leventhorp for the words upon her is as much as to say of her and then it is the same case with Littletons case 3ly The Intention of the Donor appears to be such by the circumstances of the entire limitations which do shew that he did intend that Leventhorp should not have such an estate whereby it should be in his power to deprive his issue and therefore the word heirs are to be applyed to Susanna and not to Leventhorp for if it should be applyed to both then Leventhorp might destroy the estate of the issue contrary to the Donors intent And whereas Dyer 99 is objected against me I answer that case is not against me for there the word heirs is expresly limited to a certain person viz. to the heirs of the body of both of them but so it is not in our case and whereas Hill 13 Iac. Lane and Panels case in this Court is also objected against me I answer that that case is in effect the same case with Dyer and the question in our case came not in dispute And the will of the Donor in deeds is to be ohserved Lit. 22. C. Tayl. 1. rep Shelleys case 103. 〈◊〉 Notwithstanding in gifts in tayl this rule holds not so that a gift in tayl may be limsted contrary to the rule of the Common Law And I know not of any authority in print or writing against me but in 13 Ed. 3. Fitz. tit variance 81 there is an expresse authority for me and 4 H. 4. Fitz. br 448. in my experience I have known many estates limited as this is in the Southern parts held good estates tayl if it should be otherwise many estates would be shaken Roll chief Iustice We have delivered our opinions before against you viz. that it was not the meaning of the donour to apply the word Heirs to the body of Susanna only for this construction would offer violence unto the words as appears by Littleton who interprets that they are to be applyed to the Heirs of both the partyes and your reason is founded upon a wrong ground and expresly against Litletons case and for your second reason it is of no waight for the words are all one as if he had said to the Heirs of the Husband and wife begotten upon the wife 3ly We are not to frame a meaning against plain words which shew the Donors intent to be against you And the Baron cannot Bar the Estate tayl as you suppose Tayl. for the Feme hath an Estate for life and if she survive she may revive the remaining Estate and we must not consider of inconveniences which possibly may happen against the expresse words of the deed and the multitude of conveyances made in this manner are of no force to alter the Law Ierman Iustice as Roll. That the word Heirs shall be applyed to the Heirs of both partyes because voluntas donatoris secundum formam chartae expressa est observanda Nicholas and Ask Iustices of the same opinion Garland against Yarrow Pasc 1652. Banc. sup THis case being in arrest of Iudgement formerly spoken unto in an Action upon the case for these words Arrest of Iudgement in an Act on for words you are a knave and keep a Bawdy house was again moved by Christ Turner who held that the words are not actionable 1. Because they are of spiritual cognisance 2ly It is not said that he kept a common Bawdy house 3ly here is no special damage laid 10 Car. These words he is a pimp adjudged not actionable in Lewis and Whittons case 4ly It is not alleged that he
Iustice answered Denied It appears not to us but that the Parliament was sitting at the time and peradventure it will be made appear at the tryal Therefore plead and go to tryal and then move in Arrest of judgement if you have any thing to move Page and Parr Hill 1654. Banc. sup Trin. 1654. rot 1687. PAge brought an Action of Covenant upon a Covenant conteined in an Indenture of a demise for years Covenant upon an Indenture for the not paying the rent reserved by the Indenture according to the Covenant The Defendant pleads in bar that the Plaintif entred into part of the land demised before the rent due for which the Action was brought and so had suspended his rent The Plaintif replyed the Defendant did re-enter and so was possessed as in his former estate Suspension of ren and to this replication the Defendant demurred and for cause he shewed that here was no confession and avoidance or traverse of the plea in bar Roll chief Iustice Have you shewed that he continued in possession until the rent grew due for you ought to shew that he entred and was possessed untill after the rent-day but here you have only said that he was possessed in his former right Nil capiar per Billam Therefore nil capiat per Billam nisi Hill 1654. Banc. sup VPon an Affidavit read in Court Not to plead till costs paid assessed in a former Action that 20 l. costs were taxed upon a non-sute in an Action of Trespass and Ejectment brought to the Bar and that the Plaintif had not payed them nor was to be found and yet had brought another Action for the same land The Court was moved that the Defendant might not be ruled to plead to this second Action until the Plaintif had paid the costs taxed upon the former non sute and that another Plaintif might be named or that security might be given to pay the costs if the Plaintif should be non-sute again Shew cause The rule was to shew cause why it should not be so Hill 1654. Banc. sup DArcy moved that an Endictment of Michaelmas Term last might be amended in the Caption But Roll chief Iustice answered To amend an Endictment of a former Term denied It cannot be if it be of the last Term but had it been an endictment of this Term it might have been amended Hill 1654. Banc. sup THe Court was moved to quash an Endictment for entring forcibly upon a Tenant for years against the Statute of 21 Iacobi To quash an Endictment and the Exception was that the Endictment doth not say that he entred manu forti Roll chief Iustice answered The Statute is only that if one enter by force and the words manu forti are not expressed in the Act Therefore move it again if you will Hill 1654. Banc. sup A Habeas Corpus cum causa was granted for Elizabeth Bayne To discharge a prisoner turned over to the Mareschal For a habeas corpus ad subjiciendum to the intent to charge her with an Action and upon the return thereof she was committed to the Mareschal Wild moved that she might be discharged because the return of the Habeas Corpus is erronious But Roll chief Iustice answered It could not be whereupon he moved for another Habeas Corpus for her ad subjiciendum to be directed to the Mareschal which was granted Hill 1654. Banc. sup THe Court was moved to quash an Endictment preferred against one for practising Phisick not being skilfull in the profession To quash an Endictment for practising Phisick without licence and not having a License to practice from the College of Phisicians The Exceptions were 1. That no Endictment at the Common Law lies for the offence supposed to be committed for it is not an offence against the Common Law and 2ly an Endictment upon the Statute lies not and so no Endictment lies And upon these Exceptions it was quashed The Protector and Hart. Hill 1654. Banc. sup ONe Hart committed to the Gatehouse appeared in Court upon the return of a Habeas Corpus granted for him To remand a prisoner appearing upon a Habeas Corpus and turned over Denied and upon the prayer of his Councel the return was filed upon which it was moved on his behalf that he might be remanded to the Keeper of the Gatehouse and not turned over to the Mareschal to the intent to save his fees but the Court said it could not be because upon filing of the return there ought to be entred upon it a Committitur to the Mareschal whereby he becomes his prisoner Torret and Frampton Hill 1654. Banc. sup Trin. 1653. rot 178. VPon a special Verdict the Case was this Special verdict upon a Devise A man deviseth his lands to his wife for her life the remaindar to A. B. and C. and their heirs respectively for ever The question was whether A. B. and C. were joynt tenants or tenants in common Serjeant Twisden held that they were joynt renants Whether joynt tenancy or a tenancy in common and that this case differs from Radcliffs case and cited Wilds case in the 6 Rep. that a Will must be clear and conspicuous but so it is not here and here is no enforcement by these words respectively and they do relate to the persons and not to the lands bequeathed and a Covenant made by three respectively is a joynt Covenant and not a several Covenant and the word respectively hath relation to the survivorship which may happen betwixt the parties and a devise to one and his heir is a fee-simple Latch For the Defendant held that here is a tenancy in Common and not a joynt tenancy for the Estate ought to be whole out either a tenancy in Common or whole out a joynt tenancy and this of necessity for there cannot be a joynt tenancy for life and several inheritantes in the remainder and Littletons ground proves this to be so And 2ly It is against all construction to be otherwise as the word respectively is here placed and Ratclifs case which is not so strong a case as this case proves it to be so and although the word respectively may sometimes make a distribution of heirship as hath been objected viz. of several heirships yet here the placing of the word respectively shews it cannot be so Distribution of heirship and this using of the word is not operative but idle if here should be a joynt tenancy for the law says as much though the word respectively were left out and the word would be the more idle in explicating a thing so obvious to common understanding and no ways doubtfull and therefore we cannot think but that these extraordinary words do enforce an extraordinary construction and not a common one and an idle application and this comes not within the rule objected for the certainty for this word hath a proper meaning to make a several distribution
to the surrender or otherwise the admittance is not good Thurle and Madison Mich. 1655. Banc. sup IN a Tryal at the Bar between Thurle and Madison Enrolment of a Deed. It was said by Glyn chief Iustice that if divers persons do seal a Deed and but one of them acknowledge the Déed and the Déed is thereupon enrolled this is a good enrollment within the Statute and may be given in evidence as a Deed enrolled Evidence at a Tryal It was then also said that if a deed express a consideration of money upon the purchase made by the Deed yet this is no proof upon a tryal Consideration that the monies expressed were paid but it must be proved by witnesses MEorandum Copy proved That upon the same Tryal an Act of Parliament produced in point for the selling of Delinquents estates was sworn to have been examined by the Parliament Roll and that it was a true Copy before it was read in evidence Nota. VVood and Gunston Mich. 1655. VPon a motion for a new tryal between Wood and Gunston Memorandum New tryal for miscarriage of the Iury. upon a supposition of excessive damages given by the Iury in an Action upon the case tryed at the Bar for words viz. Calling the Plaintif Traytor c. 1500 l. being the damages given It was said by Glyn chief Iustice that if the Court do believe that the Iury gave their verdict against their direction given unto them the Court may grant a new Tryal And a new Tryal was gronted in this Case after a full debate had by Councell on both sides Culliar and Iermin Mich. 1655. Banc. sup CUlliar brought an Action upon the Case upon a promise and declared Arrest of judgement upon a promise that the Testator of the Defendant in consideration that the Plaintif would mary such a Woman did promise that he would leave him half his Estate at his death and thereupon he did mary the party and yet he did not leave him half his estate at his death Vpon a verdict found for the Plaintif it was moved in arrest of judgement that the Declaration was not good for whereas the promise was that the Defendant should leave him half of all his estate which might be intended both of his real and also of his personal Estate and of any estate in reversion as well as of an estate in possession the Plaintif only says that the Testator died worth 3000 l. in possession and that he did not leave him half of that estate and it may be he left him part of his real estate or estate in reversion to the full value of half his whole estate But Glyn chief Iustice disallowed the exception and gave judgement for the Plaintif Iudgement Lance and Blackmore Mich. 1655. Banc. sup Hill 1654. rot 191. LAnce an Executor brought an Action upon the Case against Blackmore Arrest of judgement in an Action upon the Case upon a pro and declared that in consideration that the Testator would suffer the Defendant to enjoy such a Close of land the Defendant did assume and promise to pay 53 s. a year for the rent thereof for so long time as he should enjoy it and for so much rent due for it for so long time in the Testators life time and for so much rent due since his death he brings the Action Vpon non assumpsit pleaded a verdict was found for the Plaintif and entire dammages given It was moved in arrest of Iudgement That an Action of the Case doth not lie it being for the non-payment of rent which follows the nature of the land and doth sound in the realty for which a personal Action lies not 2ly Here doth not appear by the Daclaration Personal act on Consideration to the any consideration to ground the promise upon for the Declaration is that if the Testator in her life time would permit the Defendant to enjoy the Close then c. and it is not averred Averment that the Testator did in her life time suffer the Defendant to enjoy the Close Glyn chief Iustice If a promise be made to the Testator the Executor may have an Action Executor and it is a good consideration as to him for the executor is representative of the Testator And 2ly An Action upon the Case will not lie for rent upon a promise in law but upon a special promise of the party to pay it Promise in Law Special as our Case is it will lie Ingram and Fawset Mich. 1655. Banc. sup IN this Case it was said by Glyn chief Iustice Administratâ—r must shew how Administrator That if an Administrator bring an Action against an Administrator it is not necessary for the Plaintif to shew by whom the letters of Administration were granted unto the Defendant but he must shew by whom the letters of Administration were granted to himself to entitle himself to the Action for if it appear not to the Court that he is Administrator he cannot sue by that name Mich. 1635. Banc. sup IT was said by Wild and agreed by Whitwick one of the Masters of the Vpper Bench office How far special bayl is lyable for the principal that if an Attorny do appear for one in the Vpper Bench special bayl is entred for his Clyent to that Action that that Bayl is not bound to stand Bayl to all other Actions that shall be declared in against the party upon the by but the Attorny for him is bound to appear for him in all such Actions and to put in Common bayl Wagstaff and Tempest Mich. 1655. Banc. sup IT was said by Glyn chief Iustice upon evidence given in a Tryal at the Bar Dispensation with a forfeiture of an Estate bayl between VVagstaff and Tempest that if tenant for life do levy a Fine of the Lands he is so seised of whereby he should forfeit his estate yet if he in the remainder will joyn with the Tenant for life in declaring the uses this is a dispensation with the forfeiture and Le Gay Mich. 1655. Banc. sup THe Court was enformed For a time to accompt before Auditors that in an Action of Accompt brought there was a verdict that the Defendant should accompt before Auditors and that Auditors were assigned and the parties were now before the Auditors and thereupon it was moved on the Defendants part that this Court would grant him time to accompt for the reasons alleged But Wild answered that it was not proper to move here for the Auditors are now Iudges of the matter Auditors Iudges by the Statute and may give time if they see cause To which Glyn chief Iustice agreed and said the Auditors are Iudges by the Statute and therefore move before them and trouble not us with it Sergeant Bradshaw and Procter Mich. 1655. Banc. sup IN the Case of Sergeant Bradshaw and Mr. Procter of Grays Inne Challenge to an array no part of