that he agreed if one say of another that he was foresworn in a Court which is not a Court of record that none action will lye because the party is not punishable for that in perjury but in our case the commission issued out of the high Commission Court which Court to the examination of witnesses is in nature of a temporal Court and had been confirmed by act of Parliment and Serjeant Harvey argued to the contrary that the first words are not actionable and then the subsequent words are uncertain and yet if one say of another that he was foresworn at the Common Pleas barre the words are actionable for it shall be intended that this was upon examination in the execution of Iustice Hobert if a man is foresworn in a Court Baron before the Steward this is perjury but in our case the words are altogether uncertain for it doth not appear what authority the Commissioners had nor yet in what manner he was forsworn and Iustice Hutton said if one man say of another he was foresworn before the Bishope of S. this is not actionable but if one say of another that he was forsworn before the Bishop of S. upon examination by him by vertue of a Commission issuing out of the Chancery this is actionable and Hutton agreed to the case of the Court Baron the same Law by him if that be in a Court Leete but in the principal case Iudgement was arrested Wase against Pretty Ent. Hill 16. Jac. Rot. 1716. WAse against Pretty Ent. Hill 16. Iac. Rot. 1716. in an ejectione firme the case was that one joynt Coppiholder did release to his companion and the question was whether this is good without surrender and admittance for it was objected if this shall be good then a Coppihold shall pass without the assent of the Lord but it was resolved by Hobert Warberton and Winch Hutton being absent that the release is good and Warberton said that by Littleton if 3. Ioyntenants are and one of them release to another he to whom the release is made is in by the releasor but if there are but two then he is in by the Lord or from the first conveyance Winch if two Ioyntenants are in capite and one release to the other the King shall not have a fine for this Alienation but Hobert said that the practice is otherwise at this day but he said that when one joynt Tenant releases to another he is in by the first conveyance and in the case in question the release shall be good without surrender and admittance for the first admittance is of them and of every of them and the ability to release was from the first conveyance and admittance it seems if a Tenant in Capite alien upon condition and afterwards he enters for the condition broken he shall not pay a fine for such an alienation Hitcham Serjeant said that if land be given to two upon condition that they shall not alien and one releaseth to the other this is no breach of the condition Hobert if the King grant you his demeasnes you shall not have his Copihold Winch said that it was adjudged in this Court that where one erected a house so high in Finsbury fields by the wind mills that the wind was stopped from them that it was adjudged in this case that the house shall be broken down Goddard against Gilbert GOddard brought an action upon the case against Gilbert for these words thou art a thiefe and hast stolen 20 loads of my furzes and upon not guilty pleaded it was found for the Plantiff and it was moved in arrest of judgement by Hitcham that these words are not actionable for though the first words of themselves had been actionable yet when those words are coupled with other words which do extenuate them it is then otherwayes for if a man say thou art a thiefe and hast stollen my apples or my wood it shall be intended that the apples and the wood were growing and he said there is no difference to say in this case you are a thiefe and have stollen 20 loads of my furzes but it was said by Iustice Warberton that the furzes shall be intended to be cut for that is the most natural and proper signification of the words and Hobert chiefe Iustice said that it is true that it is the most proper signification of the words but yet they are furzes when they are growing as well as when they are cut down and Hobert chief Iustice said if a man say of another thou art a thief and hast stollen my corn in this case the words shall be taken in the better sence and judgement in the principal case ought to be arrested and it was the opinion of him and of Winch that there is no difference where a man said thou art a thief and hast c. and thou art a thief for c. ut supra but it was adjourned Winch Iustice said I was of counsel in the Kings Bench in a case where a man had a window in the backside of his house and another man erected a wall within a yard and half of that in his own ground and adjudged in an action upon the case that the wall shall be broken down Warberton certainly this was an antient house but Winch said that made no difference It was ruled that after imparlance in debt upon an obligation the Defendant shall be received to plead that he was alwayes ready to pay notwithstanding it was strongly urged 13. Eliz. Dyer 306. is to the contrary Gilbert Lewings against Nicholas March. GIlbert Lewings brought an action of covenant against Nicholas March and deâ—lared that Charles Cornwallis had granted the next avoydance to the Church of D. to Thomas March and that Nicholas March was his Executor and that Nicholas March assigned this to Gilbert Lewings his executors and assignes to present to the same Church when that shall become void and covenanted that the same person who shall be so presented by him shall have and enjoy that without the let or disturbance of the said Charles Cornwallis or Nicholas March or any of them or any by their procurement and after Gilbert Lewings presents I. S. and after I. W. presented an other claiming the first and next avoydance by the procurement of Charles Cornwallis and ruled that the declaration was not good for it ought to say that Charles Cornwallis granted to I. w. the next avoydance and procured him to disturbe and that by his procurement he was disturbed Athow It seems to me to be but little difference to say he disseised me by the procurement of I. S. and he commanded I. S. to disseise me and he did that accordingly at his command Sir Edward Sackvil against Earnsby VPon a motion made by Sir Randal Crew in the behalf of Sir Edward Sackvil against Earnsby the case was that two brothers were seised of land to the eldest for life the remainder to the youngest in tail and they
had said that he took money for ingrossing of Feodaries which is desceit without question that had been actionable but there may not be Couzning without desceit And he cited Boxes case where one said of an Attorney that he was a maintainer of suits and a Champerter action lies for it shall be taken to be a scandal to him in his profession for though an Attorney may maintain suites yet he ought not to be a Champerter and he further said that he who will maintain an action for words ought to be scandalized in his publick profession and he cited a case which was in the Kings Bench Brad against Hay and the Plantiff declared that he was Bailiff to such a one and that he had the buying and the selling of his Corn and that the Defendant said of him that he sold by false measures and adjudged that no action lies for it is not a scandal to him in his publick profession and so 36. Eliz. one said of a Merchant that he kept a false debt book and because he may be a Merchant without a debt book it was ruled that an action doth not lie but if he had said of him that he deceived men by buying and selling these words had been actionable and he said that two things are required to every publick profession science and fidelity and when a man who hath a publick profession is scandalized in either of those an action of the case lies and cited Palmers case of Lincolns Inne he being a Lawyer 't was said to him by one that he had as much Law as a Iackan-apes and adjudged to be actionable for it is a scandal to him in his profession and so Sir Miles Fleetwoods case where he who is Plantiff in this action was Defendant in that he being receiver of the Court of Wards one said to him Mr. deceiver hath Couzned the King and hath dealt falsly with him and adjudged that an action upon the case lies and yet he did not shew wherein he had Couzned him or dealt deceitfully with him but yet because it appears to the Court that he might deal deceitfully and Couzen the King therefore actionable and he cited Birchleys case you have dealt corruptly an action lies and yet he did not shew wherein he had dealt corruptly and here he had said he was a Couzner by the receipt of money which is an express scandal to him in his office Winch accordingly to every office of trust is a condition in Law annexed that he deal honestly and justly and he cited Wingates case in the Kings Bench one said to another is Wingate your Attorney and the other said that he was and the other replied take heed and follow him well for else he will make you throw your purse over your bosome and it was adjudged that an action lies for it is a scandal to him in his profession and it shall be taken as much as if he had said he will make you spend all the money in your purse if you look not the better to him and so applied this to the principal case and in this case judgement was commanded to be entered for the Plantiff in the action if no other cause be shewed before such a day An action upon the case was brought for these words the Plantiff did load a ship of my Fathers with Barley and did steal and Couzned 7. quarters thereof in measure and upon not guilty pleaded it was found for the Plantiff and now it was moved in arrest of judgement that the word Cozned being joyned with the word stole had taken away the force of that and made it but Cozning but Hutton contrary and that it shall be understood that he stole 7. quarters in measure and quantity and Winch seemed to agree and it was adjourned and an other day awarded that an action lies Godfrey Wade Alias Mack-Williams case GOdfrey Wade and others in an ejectione firme and the case upon a special verdict was to this effect Henry Mack-Williams the father was seised of land and being so seised he conveyed that to the use of himself for life the remainder to his wife for life the remainder to the heires of their two bodies engendred the remainder to the heires of the bodie of Mack-Williams the Feoffor and the remainder to his right heirs in fee and he had a son by his wife named Henry and 5. daughters and he died and afterwards the son in the life of his Mother by deed indented leased to White-Head for 31. years rendring rent and afterwards he leavies a fine to the use of himself and his heirs in fee and died and after whose death the Mother suffered a recovery within six moneths in which 4. of their husbands were vouched and the recovery was to the use of the feme for life the remainder to every one of the daughters in fee and the sole doubt was whether the lease made by Henry the son is defeated by this recovery and it was argued by Harvey Serjeant that the lease shall stand good notwithstanding this recovery suffered by the Mother for he said that Henry Mark-Williams being issue in tail and also being heire to the remainder in fee who made this lease by indenture in this case this lease issues as well out of the estate taile as out of the reversion in fee and the fine leavied in the life of his Mother binds and bars the estate taile at the time of the fine and then the lease being drawn out of the reversion in fee which discended to the daughters after the death of their brother this reversion shall be charged with the lease and the recovery had not destroyed that and this case will differ from Capels case for it is agreed if tenant in tail bee the remainder in fee and he in remainder in fee granted a rent charge and after Tenant in tail suffer a recovery by this the rent is destroyed for there he who suffered the recovery was Tenant in tail in possession but in our case when the son had leavied a fine in the life of his Mother by this fine the tail is destroyed and the Mother is become Tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct which is only an estate for life in quantity and then though she suffers a recovery yet this doth not destroy the lease made by Tenant in tail when there was also a fine leavied to confirm that Secondly he argued that when the issue in tail in the life of his Mother made a lease for yeares by indenture and then leavied a fine and died and then the Mother being Tenant in tail and joyntress within the Statute of 11. H. 7. as in our case she is and she suffers a recovery and vouches the daughters in reversion and lessee for years enters after the death of the feme by force of 11. H. 7. for lessee for years is a person who may enter within the express words of that Statute which gives entrie to any person
that all such recoveryes shall be void and shall be taken for fained recoveries and this may not be imagined a fained recovery where he in remainder in tail is vouched by him who is Tenant for life Jennings case Coo. 10. and such recovery as is there resolved is out of the Statute of the 14. Eliz. and is good by the Common Law and so in our case but admitting this to be within the Statute of the 11. of H. 7. yet the proviso of the same Statute had made that good for there is an express proviso that a recovery with the assent of the heir inheritable if this appear upon Record this shall not be within the Statute and in our case this is with the assent of the heir inheritable and also this appears to be of record and so the recovery is out of the danger of the Statute of the 11. H. 7. See Doctor and Student a book which was written but a litle time after the making of this Statute and Dyer 89. Vernons case and he said that the intent of the same Statute and of the proviso of the same Statute was to have issues and heirs and not termors who had only a future interest to falsifie recoveries and so he concluded that the recovery is out of the same Statute and that the proviso of the same Statute had made that good by the assent of the heir but admitting this should be against him that this recovery shall be within the Statute yet the lessee in our case shall not falsifie nor take advantage of the forfeiture by force of the same Statute but it hath been objected by Harvy that the wife in this case had only an estate for life or Tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct and he answered that the resolution in Beamounts case Coo. 119. is contrary for it is there expresly agreed that she was Tenant in tail after the fine leavied by the issue and so was it also resolved in Pophams case 9. Eliz. but there it was doubted whether she was Tenant in tail within the 32. H. 8. who might make a lease but all agreed that she was Tenant in tail who may suffer a recovery and binde the remainder and then when the feme suffers such a recovery as in our case that recovery shall take away a term for years which was made by the issue in tail Mich. 20. Jac. C. P. in the life of his mother notwithstanding she was a joynteress within the 11. H. 7. also he said that this lease for years being made by Henry Mark-Williams the son who was heir to the estate in tail and also to the reversion in fee being made by deed indented rendring rent this shall be a lease which issued out of the estate in fee simple and not out of the estate tail and this shall be out of the estate tail by estoppel being by deed indented for an estate shall not enure partly by way of interest and this lease to begin after the death of the feme he may not take advantage of the forfeiture for though the words of the Statute are that all such recoveries shall be void yet this shall not be void without entry and he who will have benefit by this ought to be mabled to enter presently so soon as the recovery is suffered for as there ought to be a person in esse who shall take benefit of the same Statute as appears by Coo. 3. Lincoln Colledge case so there ought to be a present estate in esse at the time of the recovery for the words of the Statute are to whom the interest shall appertain but in our case the interest doth not appertain to the lessee who had only a future term and therefore he shall not take the benefit by any forfeiture within the Statute of 11. H. 7. and the rather in our case because there is a rent reserved also all this matter is found by special verdict what estate the son haâ— when he made the lease by indenture Dyer 244. Coo. 155. and Bredons case in Treports case lessee for life and he in reversion by indenture let for years this is no estoppel and it shall be said to be the lease of one and the confirmation of the other and here the lease shall be said to issue out of the reversion in fee and not out of the estate tail and he vouched a case adjudged 10. Jac. when Flemming was chief Iustice of the Kings Bench between Errington and Errington and the case was that a man conveyed land to the use of himself and his wife in tail the remainder to his right heirs and had issue a son and a daughter and he died and the son let for years to begin after the death of his Mother and he died without issue and the daughter leavied a fine and the wife who was Tenant in tail died and the question was whether this lease for years issued out of the estate tail by way of estoppel for then the Conusee shall not avoid this but it was adjudged this lease was drawn out of the reversion in fee and the Conusee of the daughter shall avoid that which is all one with our case but admit that this lease is good by estoppel out of the estate taile yet he shall not take benefit of the forfeiture within 11. H. 7. and this differs from Sir George Browns case for there the Conuser entered by vertue of a remainder and not by the estate tail which passed to him by estoppel and upon that he concluded that if this is an estate meerly by estoppel he shall not have benefit by that Pope and Reynolds before NOw the case between Pope and Reynolds which see before was moved again by Ashley for the Plantiff in the prohibition and the case was that he was owner of a Park and the Park had been time beyond memory replenished with deer till the 10th of Eliz. at which time that was disparked and that the owners had used before the disparking to pay a Buck in Summer and a Doe in winter in full satisfaction of all Tithes due to the Vicar and the Parson had libelled in the Ecclesiastical Court for Tithes in kinde and also traversed the prescription and it was found for the Plantiff in the prohibition and it had been moved in arrest of judgement that notwithstanding this prescription is found for the Plantiff yet he shall not have judgement for two causes First because gross Tithes belong to the Parson and not to the Vicar for the Vicaridge is derived out of the Parsonage to this he answered that for the most part every Vicaridge is derived out of the Parsonage but it is a meer non sequitur that this doth for the Vicarage and the Parsonage may have several patrons Fitzh 45. also a Vicarage may be time beyond memory as in our case 40. E. 3. 2. 7. and Fitz. juris utrum a Vicar may have a juris utrum and
that then his two sons shall pay them and if it happen that either of them die before his debts and legacies paid or before either of them do enter into his part that thou the other shall have all the land in fee and after the devisor died and in the life of the mother the eldest son released to the youngest all his right title Claim and demand to the land which was devised to him by his father and after the wife died and two points came in question in this case First whether this limitation is good Secondly whether the release is good and it was argued by Richardson Serjeant that this limitation of the Statute by way of devisee is good and he vouched Dyer 330. Clarks case and 4. Eliz. Goldley and Buckleys case a man devised to his son and his heirs provided that if his personal estate did not suffice to pay his debts and legacies that then his lands shall be to another and he vouched Brown and Pells case which was adjudged in Banco Regis the case was that a man had two sons William the eldest and Thomas the youngest and he devised his lands to Thomas his son and his heirs provided that if Thomas died without issue living that then William shall have the land and it was resolved that this was good to William by way of executory devise and in that case doubt was moved whether if Thomas suffer a recovery whether this shall take away the estate of William and it was holden by all the Court except Doderidg that it shall not but all agreed that this devise upon the future contingency is good and so he concluded that if the youngest son die in the life of the Mother and before the legacies are paid the land shall remain to the Plantiff according to the intent of the devisor but the other doubt is when the Plantiff did release all his right and claim to the other whether this release will extinguish this future possibility and he held that it will not and he said that he had seen the case of Lampet Coo. 10. and there the release of a possibility is penned as in our case and if any word discharge this possibility it is this word right but if the resolution of that book had not been against him he would have argued that this right was not sufficient to extinguish this future possibility but that there ought to be a more apt and proper word but he said he would not argue against books but he said that which he would insist upon was the distinguishing of possibilities for there are two manner of possibilities the one is Common and ordinary the other is more remote and forreigne And first there is a possibility which is Common and necessary and this depends upon an ordinary casualty as a lease for life the remainder to the right heirs of I. S. for it is apparant that the right heirs of I. S. may take by this and such a possibility may be released and a possibility which is remote and forreigne is as if a lease be made for life the remainder to another during the life of the lessee for life or a lease for life the remainder to the Corporation of B. those remainders are void but yet by possibility they may be good for in the first case the Tenant for life may enter into religion and in the latter case the King may make Corporations and yet because such possibilities are not usual the remainders are void see Coo. 2. Chamleys case where such a remote possibility may not be released if a man give land to one which is married and to another woman which is married and to the heirs of their two bodies ingendred this is a good estate tail for there is a common possibility that they may intermarry but if the gift be to a man and to two women who are married and to the heirs of their bodies ingendred they shall not have an estate tail executed for it is a remote and forreigne possibility and an imbrodery of estates which the law will not allow nor respect see the Rector of Chedingtons case that such a possibility as in our case may not be released for first here the mother ought to be dead before the Plantiff shall have land Secondly legacies ought to be paid Thirdly Thomas ought to be dead and till all these possibilities hap the Plantiff shall have nothing in the land and for that it is a remote possibility which is not gone by the release for as it is said when a possibility shall be gone by a release there ought to be a good foundation upon which the release may operate secondly the possibility which is released ought to be necessary and Common but in our case it is not necessary that the son shall enjoy it in the life of his mother and also the mother may in a short time pay the legacies and then neither of the sons shall have the land by which circumstances it is apparant that this is not a Common or an ordinary possibility but is a remote and forraigne expectancy which shall not be gone by this release and this differs from Lampets case for there was a possibility of a Chattel which as it may easily be created so it may easily be destroyed but in our case it is a franktenement which as that requires a greater ceremony in the creation and for that it will require a greater matter to destroy and to extinguish that and it is said in Woods case cited in Shelleys case Coo. 1. that if a man covenant with A. that if I. S. infeoffed him of the Mannor of D. that then he will stand seised to the use of him and his heirs of the Mannor of B. and the Covenantee died and the said I. S. infeoffed the Covenantor in such case the heir shall be inward and yet it is only a possibility which descends which possibility of an use may not be discharged or released and yet in that case there was a possibility which is more Common and ordinary then in our case for there was a possibility that I. S. should make the feofment and so say a good foundation upon which the release may operate and he put the case that I. shall let for so many years as I. S. shall name if I. S. name it is good and yet he held if I. S. release before the nomination that this release is meerly void because he had only a possibility and as to Digs case Coo. 1. there a power of Revocation may be released and good reason for the Covenantor who released had the bird in his own hand and for that it was no remote possibility but there it is said that if the power be limited to an estranger there the stranger may not release and he also agreed Albanies case for there the power to release was upon the death of a man only but in our case it is upon death and other
the year and afterwards the money not being paid Hickman sued forth a Capias ad satisfaciendum against Sir William Fish directed to the Sheriff of Bedfordshire for 210. l. and now upon a habeas Corpus Sir William Fish was brought to the bar and Serjeant Crawley moved for a supersedeas for him because the writ emanavit improvide c. and by the Court it is a cause to discharge him of the execution for the Capias ought to have issued for 200. l. only and he ought to have sued a scire facias though this was after the year because the Proces was not continued but they said withall it was in their discretion whether they will grant a supersedeas for they may put the Defendant to his writ of error It was ruled that if an action of debt was brought and the venire facias to trie the issue is in placito debiti and so is the habeas Corpus and the Pannel but in the Iury Roll of the nisi prius at the latter end of the jurata there it is placito transgressionis and agreed in this case this is amendable or in this case it is good without amendment Wen against Moore THomas Crew Serjeant did move in arrest of judgement where one Wen brought an Action upon the case against Moore and upon non assumpsit it was found for the Plantiff and he said that the Colloquium was laid to be at Bourn in the Countie of Lincoln and the venire facias was de Vicineto de Born without the letter u. and for that reason that they are several Towns therefore error for if the entire Town is omitted the trial is insufficient but the Court held this to be very good without amendment and shall be intended to be the same Town It was moved in arrest of judgement by Serjeant Finch that where one had brought an Action upon the case against one and shewed that the Defendant in consideration of 12. d. given to him by the Plantiff he assumed and promised that if the Plantiff may prove that he cut quandam arborem upon the land of Sir Francis Vain tunc crescent that he would give to him 10. l. and this being proved by the Plantiff it was now moved in arrest of judgement that quandam arborem is an individual tree and it ought to be aliquam arborem and another cause was alledged because it was not shewed that this was upon the land of Sir Francis Vain then growing but only he had said growing and that may be for perchance he purchased the land afterwards and before the Action brought and so it might be growing though not tunc crescent at the time of the promise but the Court c. Winch Hutton and Harvey seemed that the declaration was good for they said there is no question if quandam had been out this had been good for it is the singular number and he that certain or be that incertain yet by the verdict it is made certain that this is a tree and also those words tunc crescent do refer to the time when the tree was feld and not to the promise Holman against Sir Thomas Pope and Elizabeth his wife SErjeant Hendon moved in a case where an Action was brought by one Holman against Sir Thomas Pope and Elizabeth his wife as daughter and heir to Sir Thomas Watson and pending the writ Pope died and he moved that the writ ought not to abate because it is brought against her as daughter and heir where the land is assets in which the husband had nothing like to the case of an Executrix who brings her action in her own name and the name of her husband and pending the writ the husband dies the writ shall not abate but Justice Harvey said this case of Executors was adjudged against him and Hobert chief Justice was of opinion that the writ shall not abate but day was given over in that case Sir Thomas Holbeach against Sambeach IN the case between Sir Thomas Holbeach and Sambeach in a replevin where a demurrer was joyned the case was this one being Tenant for life and he in remainder in tail joyned in a grant of a rent in fee out of that and then they joyned in the levying of a fine to a stranger and his heirs and in this case it was said that the estate of the grantee of the rent which before was determinable is now made absolute and a judgement was also cited to be in that case lately adjudged to which the Court seemed to agree and they said if this be the point they will give judgement presently Crompton against Philpot. HEndon Serjeant moved in arrest of judgement in a case for Philpot a crier of this Court where one Crompton had recovered 40. l. damages against him in an action upon the case for words spoken against Crompton c. he innuendo the Plantiff stole a ring and had been hanged for that but for me and it was said in the first place that it doth not expresly appear that the words were spoken of the Plantiff himself neither is this introduced by any precedent Colloquium as it ought for otherwise the innuendo will not aide it but in veritie the declaration was that the words were spoken de eodem Richardo innuendo c. and also he said that the words are not actionable because that no value is exprest but it was ruled if that were but petie Larcenie the action lies but the Court gave no absolute opinion in the case for they were willing to compound for the poor man The residue of Michaelmas Term in the two and twentieth year of King James Brown and Ware against Barker BRown and Ware brought an action agaist Barker and they declared that whereas there was a suit depending between the Plantiffs and other Coppiholders of such a mannor in the Chancery against Brook their Lord and that one Woolsey was there Clark and that he for his fees and for the procuring of a decree had disbursed 14. l. and that there being a Communication between the Plantiff and the Defendant concerning the same he being a Coppiholder of the same Mannor that in consideration that they would pay to Woolsey 14. l. he would pay to the Plantiffs 40. s. upon request and the Plantiff shewed that they had paid the 14. l. and that the Defendant had not paid the 40. s. Licet postea saepius requisitus fuisset and upon non assumpsit pleaded it was found for the Plantiffs and now it was moved in arrest of judgement by Crook Serjeant First because he is a stranger to the suit for he had not alledged that the Defendant was a partie and then it is no consideration but this was over-ruled because they paid the 14. l. upon his request the second exception was that this postea saepius requisitus was not sufficient in this case because that he ought to express the certaintie when and the place where the request was made
son and his wife and upon a demurrer the question was whether this Covenant did raise a present use to the Son and to his wife or whether this only rests in Covenant and Harris Serjeant argued that no present use will arise by this Covenant for first all other Covenants in the indenture are in the future for the words are that the lands shall remain and come c. and therefore till the death of the Covenantor the fee simple is in him and no use will arise for it shall be in the election of the Covenantor what estate he will make to his Son for he himself shall interpret his intent and the difference in our books is when the words are in the present tense and when in the future and for this he cited 22. H. 7. by Iustice Rede if a man Covenant that land shall discend remain or revert he said this did not give any present interest because the wors are in the future and it is in the election of the Covenantor how and in what manner the land shall pass and there he put the case that if I give my horse or my Cow to I. S. there the Donee had election to take at his pleasure the one or the other because the words are in the present tense but if the words are that I will give a horse or a Cow there the Donor had election which he shall have because the words are in the future the Lord Borroughs Covenanted 34. H. 8. Dyer 55. with another in frank marriage with his son that immediately after his death his son shall enjoy the use of his land of inheritance according to the course as then they stood and the question was whether the see simple was presently out of the Covenantor and the opinion was that it was not because it was but a Covenant and did not change the fee simple and so is Dyer 96. Sir Thomas Seymor promised and Covenanted by indenture in consideration that the Covenantee had granted land to him that he would leavy a fine to Wimbish and Pennoy of other lands which fine should be to Sir Thomas Seymor for life the remainder to the Covenantee in taile and no fine was levied and the question was whether any use was raised by this Covenant to the Covenantee and the opinion of the book is that not because it is in the future and he cited the 20. H. 7. 10. the Duke of Buckingham in consideration that the Lord Henry his brother was to marry the Lady Wiltshire he Covenanted with Bray and with others that the Mannors of D. and of S. shall be to the Lady and to her heirs of her body begotten by the said Lord and after the Duke granted to the Lord Henry and his wife for their lives and it was argued whether this second grant is good or no for if it is then the first Covenant will not work to raise an use to the feme and the book left that as a quere and if it be then he argued that in the principal case no present use is raised but that this rests meerly in Covenant and so he prayed judgement for the Plantiff Serjeant Hendon to the contrary for he thought this will raise a present use and that this was the intent of the parties that this should raise a present use for the intent was to advance them first during their lives with the rent and after the death of the Covenantor and his wife with the land it self and therefore of necessity this will raise a present use for a bare action of Covenant may not be any advancement at all and the rather here because they who take benefit of this are strangers to the Covenant and not Preston himself for as it appears by 3. H. 7. a stranger shall not take benefit by a Covenant and therefore he said the intentions of the parties was to raise an use for otherwise there shall be no advancement at all And further the words in the indenture are Covenant and grant and if no use is raised then this word grant is idle and every word shall be so expounded that they may take effect and the word Covenant is insufficient of it self to pass an estate in land or to have any estate in signification other then to a meer Covenant and to be obligatory as is put Co. 2. Cromwels case Tirrels case there vouched a lease for years provided and it is Covenanâ—ed and agreed there the Covenant is a condition and also a Covenant and 8. Ass 1. 12. it is agreed that if I Covenant that an other shall have my land for 7. years this a good lease of the land it self and it was adjudged here Tr. 2. Jac. Rot. 1696. accordingly and in our case this word Covenant and grant is also sufficient to raise an use and to give an interest in the land it self and yet he agreed that if there was an other act to be made by the Covenantor or the Covenantee that then no use will arise but it shall rest only in Covenant Dyer 162. there are Covenants between the Lady Vere and Sir Anthony Wingfield her son that the said Lady would convey to her son by a recovery and that after 6. moneths the said Sir Anthony shall make an estate to his Mother for life and there it is doubted whether the use is changed within the 6. moneths and it was holden that it was not Mich. 20. Jac. C.P. for then it is impossible that the Covenants should be performed and in that case it is in the power of the Covenantor to make an act that the Covenants shall not be performed and therefore Covenants will not raise an use but in our case no act of the Covenantor may hinder that this use shall arise and therefore good and for that the difference is Dyer 296. which is entered 11. Eliz. the Roll of which I have seen the father upon the marriage of his son promised to the friends of his wife that after his death his son shall have his land to him and his heirs and the book is ruled that this did not change the use and the reason was this Covenant was by words and not in writing but it was not doubted if this Covenant had been by writing but that the Covenant will raise an use which is all one with our case and so was Callard and Callards case 37. Eliz. stand forth Eustace reserving to my wife and my self I give to thee and thy heires and there it was doubted whether any use will arise to the son and ruled that not because this was by words only but it was also agreed that if these words had been by writing they had been sufficient to raise an use to the son and he cited Dyer 232. before the Statute of the 27. H. 8. A Covenanted and agreed with B. that upon the marriage of his son with the daughter of the other that he would retain his land for life and that
who hath an interest and see for that Coo. 3. Lincoln Colledge case and Dyer 148. Thirdly he held that though it should be so that lessee for years may not enter by force of the Statute of the 11. H. 7. yet he may falsifie a recovery by the Statute of the 21. H. 8. which enables lessee for years to falsifie as well as lessee for life and it appears by the verdict that the sole intent of this recovery was to defeat the lease for years for this was suffered within 6. moneths after the death of Henry Mark-Williams the son and also the recovery was to the very same uses which they were before and therefore the lessee may falsifie the recovery it is true in Capels case the lessee of him in remainder may not falsifie a recovery suffered by Tenant in tail though it was suffered of purpose to defeat the lease for years but in our case the lease for years doth not enure by vertue of the estate tail for that is bound by the fine but this issues out of the reversion in fee and for that reason the lessee shall falsifie this recovery in an ejectione firme or in an avowry and he cited Kings case Hill 37. Eliz. B. R. Rot. 293. Tenant in tail infeoffed his son and after he disseâ—sed him and afterward leavied a fine of that with Proclamations the son entered upon the Conusee and made a feofment and the Proclamations passed and the feoffee of the son let for years and then the father and the son died and the issue in tail brought a formedon and recovered and it was agreed that lessee for years may falsifie this recovery and he said that he had seen a Note in Iustice Manwoods Study that it was agreed in his Circuit that lessee for years to begin at a day to come may falsifie a recovery and so be concluded his argument Hendon Serjeant to the contrary and he divided the case in three points First when Tenant in tail had issue a son and a daughter or two sons and the eldest son in the life of his father who is Tenant in tail levies a fine and dies without issue whether this shall binde the youngest son and he thought that it should not and yet he agreed that an estate tail may be barred by a fine though he who leauied the fine was not seised at the time of the estate tail and this by the very words of the Statute of the 32. H. 8. see the case of fines Coo. 3 and Grants case vouched Lampets case and so is the case of Hunt and King 37. Eliz. cited by my brother Harvey and so he agreed cleerly if the son who leavies the fine survives the father who was Tenant in tail that then in this case this binds the estate tail for ever and the reason is upon the very words of the Statute of 32. H. 8. or any was intailed to the Ancestor of the issue in tail and in this case when the issue doth survive the Ancestor and dies this shall binde the issue because it was intailed to him who leavied the fine who was his Ancestor for he may not make any Conveyance to the estate tail except he make mention of him who leavied the fine because that he survived the father who was Tenant in tail but when he who leavies the fine dies in the life of his father viz. the eldest son then the youngest son may convey an estate taile to him without making mention of his eldest brother and this appears by the 46. E. 3. 9. 4. H. 6. 10. 11. H. 7. 6. see the case of Buckner Coo. 8. from which cases he inferred that if the youngest brother may have an action at the Common Law without making mention of his eldest brother then such a construction shall be made of this word Ancestor in the Statute of 32. H. 8. that it shall be taken for such an Ancestor by whom the issue in tail claimes and for no other Ancestor and for this he put the case if land be given to a man and to his heirs females begotten of his body and he had issue a son and a daughter and the son leavied a fine and died this shall barre the estate tail for the cause aforesaid and for authorities in this kinde he cited the reports of Dallison of Eliz. printed at the end of Ashles Tables in Stamfords case in the end of the same case where the very difference is agreed Mich. 29. Jac. C. P. where the eldest son dies in the life of the father and where not and Hobert demanded of him by what warrant those reports of Dallison came in print And then Hendon cited the opinion of some of the judges in the case of Zouch and Banfield and see Coo. 3. the case of fines according to this difference and he said that Sir George Browns case will warrant that in the very letter of it for there it is said that no issue inheritable by force of the tail may enter after the fine by which he inferred that if he is such an issue that is not inheritable he is out of the Statute and so he concluded the first point that the fine being leavied by the eldest son in the life of his Mother that shall not barre the estate tail Secondly he argued that as this case is the feme is not within the Statute of the 11 H. 7. because that at the time when she suffered a recovery she was seised of an estate in general tail by force of the remainder which was limitted to her and her husband and to the heirs of their two bodies ingendred which took effect in the feme at the time of the death of the husband and this being an estate in tail of the purchase of the huband which took effect in remainder this may not be a joynture within the Statute of of the 27. H. 8. and then if she be not a joynteress within that Statute though this estate was of the purchase and of the acquisition of her husband yet this is out of the danger of the Statute of the 11. H. 7. for the words are any woman who had any estate in dower or in tail joynt with her husband of the purchase and of the acquisition of the husband which words of the purchase of the husband had relation to Tenant in dower or to a woman who was a joyntress and was not the intent of the Statute to make such a remainder to be within the danger of the Statute when the husband himself in his life may dock this by a recovery and therefore it is not within the Statute And as to the Third point he argued that admitting that she was a joyntress within the Statute of the 27. H. 8. yet when the feme suffers a recovery with the assent of him in remainder in fee this recovery is out of the body of the Statute of 11. H. 7. any which shall discontinue or release with warranty and
the lessee of the Mannor or to the Bishop was the question and it was argued by Serjeant Hendon that this appertaines to the Plantiff and not to Wood and as to that the single point is a Bishop is seised of a Mannor in the right of his Bishoprick and lets parcel of that for life whether the reversion of this parcel be alwayes parcel of the Mannor notwithstanding this lease and he argued that it was not and yet he agreed that if another let as aforesaid the reversion continues alwayes parcel of a thing in possession and that in the case of the King himself as appears by Dyer 230. if the King lets parcel of a Mannor for life the reversion of this parcel passeth to the King for the reversion had all times continuance in the same capacity and no alteration is made of this by force of the lease but where the lease for life is a discontinuance there he gaines a new reversion and this shall not be parcel of the Mannor and for that if a man is seised of a Mannor in the right of his wife and he lets parcel for life this is a discontinuance and he had gained the reversion in his own right and for that reason the reversion may not be parcel of the Mannor as appears by 18. Assises and also he held if Tenant in taile lets parcel of a Mannor for life that were the reversion of this parcel is not parcel of the Mannor for the cause aforesaid and so in our case when the Bishop granted parcel which is not grantable by the Statute now he had discontinued the reversion and had gained a new fee simple which may not be parcel of the Mannor so long as this new fee simple had a continuance and this was his first reason And secondly he argued from the intent of the parties because the intent was that the lease to Wood shall be good and if the reversion of the 20. acres pass to Wood this will make all the lease void for no rent may be reserved out of the reversion but out of the land it self 3. Assise Placito ultimo a Bishop let land and a hundred rendring rent the rent issues out of the land and not out of the hundred and so here it issues out of the land and not out of the reversion which made the lease all void and so he concluded the first point that the reversion of the 20. acres did not pass to Wood the lessee of the Mannors Secondly when the Bishop lets 20. acres of ground rendring rent and this is not confirmed by the Dean and Chapter as it ought and after he lets the Mannor and the successor accepts the rent of the Mannor this acceptance shall not make the lease of the 20. acres to be good admitting that the reversion do pass and when the Bishop had made a lease for 3. lives he may not contract for the reversion and when a lease is meerly void in the creation there no acceptance afterwards may make that good but admitting this to be against him yet the lessee shall not have the Herriot for they are not appendant to the reversion but due only by way of Covenant and the words are yielding c. and this being a Collateral thing it shall not go with the reversion and the Herriot here may not be had without it be delivered by the lessee for life Secondly it is paid only in the name of a Herriot and this is not Herriot service Thirdly it is to be paid upon the death of a stranger and not upon the death of the lessee and all this proves this Herriot to be collateral and he cited Rawlins case a lease for years paying for a fine 20. l. this is a summe in gross and shall not pass with the reversion and so he prayed judgement for the Plantiff Attoe contrary and yet he agreed the case of the husband and wife and of the Tenant in tail for here the lessor gaines a new fee simple but in our case when the Bishop lets for life this is not any wrong for the successor may enter and he shall have this lease not in his natural capacity but alwayes in his politique capacity and for that there is an apparent difference between the cases and for that reason he held that the reversion was parcel of the Mannor and so passed to the lessee and as to that which had been said that the intent of the parties was only that the Mannor in possession and not the parcel in reversion should pass to the lessee for that is most beneficial to the lessor to this he answered that by express words this is granted and no construction shall be made contrary to the very express words of the grant and here though the Defendant had not any title at all to the Herriot yet the Plantiff shall not have a trover and conversion for this because that he himself had not right to this and for that reason judgement shall be given for the Defendant and he also argued that the lease of the reversion is not meerly void but voidable and then the acceptance extends to this see 37. H. 6. the lease of a Priâ—r 2. E. 6. Bâ— Abbots case Vpon which authorities he said cleerly by the Common Law this lease of the reversion is not meerly void but voidable and for that the confirmation of the Dean and Chapter after the Statute of the first of Eliz. had not altered that and for that a lease after the Statute shall not be meerly void and see Lincolns Colledge case Coo. 3. and in our case there is a possibility that the lessee of the Mannor may survive the cestui que vies of the 20. acres and that possibility is sufficient to make this good out of the reversion for then the lessor may distrain for his rent but where no possibility of a distress is there no rent may be reserved as in Iewels case the lease was void for there was no possibility that the lessor shall ever distrain but in our case the lease for years is good for the lessor is not without his remedy for he may have an action of debt upon this reservation 1. H. 4. 2. there a measnalty in gross was let rendring rent and good for by possibility the Tenant may die without heires and yet this is a remote possibility 12. E. 3. execution 112. a reversion granted by fine in tail rendring rent is good and Coo. 5. Elmers case that a reversion being let for life rendring rent is a good reservation at the Common Law and he held without question that where a Bishop is seised of a Mannor which consists part of freeholders and part of Copiholders that a lease of the Mannor rendring rent is good and in our case the reservation of the rent is intire and shall bind the successor and as to that which had been said that the Herriot is Collateral and shall not go with the reversion to this he
the very Common Law see Ouleys case 19. Eliz. in Dyer but Hutton doubted whether this bond is void by the Common Law because the Statute of the 23. H. 6. inflicts so great specialty upon the Sheriffs for extortion and after judgement was Commanded to be entred for the Defendant in the action if no other matter be shewed to the contrary before such a day In trespas quare vi et armis one such being his servant cepit et adduxit at D. in Essex the Defendant pleaded that he was a vagrant in the same Countie and he not having notice that he was servant to another he retained him and it was moved by Finch if I retain the servant of another man in the same Countie where I and his Mr. inhabit this is not justifiable though in veritie I had not notice of that and this according to the express book of the 19. Ed. 3. 47. Hobert the book may not be law for it is a hard matter to make me take notice of every servant which is retained in the same Countie and yet perchance if this retainer be upon the Statute of labourers at the Sessions this is notorious and I ought to take notice of that at my peril but it is otherwise of a private retainer for though it is within the same Countie yet being a private matter in fact the Law will not compel me to take notice of that at my peril otherwise if this be matter of record 2. H. 4. 64. and Hobert and Winch seemed to agree and then Finch moved that the Plantiff had charged the Defendant with his servant by cepit et adduxit and the Defendant excused himself and never traversed cepit et adduxit see 11. H. 4. Hutton and Hobert the receiving and the entertaining of a servant may not be said to be vi et armis Mr. Spencers case HArvy Serjeant came to the barre and demanded this question of the Court in the behalf of Mr. Spencer a man was seised of land in fee and sowed the land and devised that to I. S. and before severance he died and whether the devisee shall have the Corn or the executor of the devisor was the question and by Hobert Winch and Hutton the devisee shall have that and not the executor of the devisor and Harris said 18. Elizabeth Allens case that it was adjudged that where a man devised land which was sowed for life the remainder in fee and the devisor died and the devisee for life also died before the severance and it was adjudged that the executor of the Tenant for life shall not have that but he in remainder and Winch Iustice said that it had been adjudged that if a man devise land and after sowe that and after he dies that in this case the devisee shall have the Corn and not the executor of the devisor nota bene Dodderidge against Anthony Entred Mich. 19. Jac. Rot. 1791. ENt. Mich. 19. Jac. Rot. 1791. Peter Dodderidge brought an action of accompt against one Anthony and he declared that he deâ—ivered to the Defendant so many pieces of cloath called Bridge-water red to be sold at Bilbo in Spain and the Defendant said that he sold the same cloath at Bilbo in Spain for 40. l. 18. s. English to be paid in May next insuing the sale which was in November before and over he alledged the Custome of Merchants to be that if any Merchant had goods in the same Kingdome to be sold to another Merchant and he sell the goods to be paid at a day to come and this is done before a publick Notary and thereby a Bill signed and acknowledged to him in his name who sold the goods and that if the Merchant who so sold the goods delivered the Merchant who was owner of the goods this Bill so taken in his name this shall be a discharge to him of the goods and he averred that he sold them to a Spanish Merchant and that he took a Bill accordingly and at London offered that Bill to the Plantiff who refused that and upon this plea the Plantiff demurred Attoe argued that the plea is not good because he had not alledged that the partie who takes such a Bill may plead that and the Custome is also alledged with an if if the party sell and if he take the Bill and not with positive averment that he may so sell and may so take the Bill which being delivered to the owner of the goods shall be a discharge to the factor who sold the goods and here this custome is not good by the Common Law for if I deliver goods to another to sell and he sell them to be paid the money at a day to come this is not good for he ought by his sale to make a compleat contract and if I sell my horse for 10. l. I may retain the horse till the money is paid for till then the contract is not compleat and so in this case and here the Plantiff shall have an action of accompt upon this delivery and if he sell them otherwise or do not sell them for ready money he had gone beyond his Commission and this Custome is unreasonable that the Bill shall be taken in his name who sold the goods but perchance if the custome had been alleadged to take the Bill in the name of the owner of the goods this had been good but in our case the owner of the goods may not sue nor have any remedy for his goods except the factor will go into Spain and sue the said Bill and it is unreasonable to leave this to the pleasure of my factor whether I shall have any remedy for my goods sold and it is very unreasonable that I shall be paid with a Bill which may not be sued and here the Plantiff is a stranger to the Custome of Spain and shall not be bound by that Serjeant Harris to the contrary the Custome which is alledged is good among Merchants though it is not good according to our Common Law and so if two Merchants trade joyntly and one of them dies before severance of the goods yet his executor shall have his part and not the Survivor and so by the law of Merchants a man cannot wage his law in debt upon a simple contract by which it is apparant that the laws of Merchants differ from our laws and indeed the laws of Merchants are National laws and that this is the Custome in Spain is confessed by the demurrer and then we may not examine that by the reason of our laws and the laws of Merchants ought to be favoured for trading sake which is the life of every Kingdome and by the law of Merchants a Bill without seal is good and yet by our law it is but an escrowl and so I pray judgement for the Defendant Hobert chief Iustice when the Merchant had delivered goods to the factor to sell he had made the factor negotiator gestorum and for that
contingencies by which these remote possibilities shall not be released Hoes case Coo. 5. there a release of all actions and demands to the Bailee made this void and in the case of Brown and Pell which was remembred before it was the opinion of all the Court against Judge Doderidge that where the devise was to the son in fee and if he died without issue living that then his eldest brother shall have that if in this case the second son suffer a recovery yet this had not destroyed the possibility which the eldest brother had to have the land and if a common recovery which is matter of record and the common assurance of the realm will not take away this possibility a fortiori a release which is but matter of fact and so he concluded and prayed judgement for the Plantiff Bawtry to the contrary and he said that if this remainder shall be good then the inconvenience which the judges had alwayes endeavoured to take way shall be on foot again as in the case of Chamley and Corbets of springing uses for if it shall be lawful for a man to limit a fee upon a Collateral condition or limitation then there shall be a perpetuitie and for this if any litteral construction shall be made upon such conveyances this will introduce dangerous events to inheritances and for that he held that limitation to the Plantiff to be meerly void for when the land is devised in fee this devisee by this had an absolute estate in fee and it shall be strange to give this to another though this be by way of devise for though the will of every man shall be supplied by the intent of the devisor yet his intent ought to stand with the rules of the law and otherwise his intent shall revert and for that he cited 29. H. 8. a man made two executors provided that one of them shall not administer here the intent did plainly appear and yet because the intent is contrary to the power which the law gives to every executor therefore it is void and it is put for a bare rule in Corbets case that such a conveyance which a man may not make in his life time by act executed he may not make by his Will but a man may not make such a conveyance by act executed in his life time for as it is said in Colthirsts case if a man let for life the remainder for life upon condition that if the first lessee do such a thing that then the land shall remain over to a stranger this remainder is void for when the land is given before this second limitation is meerly void and also the case is put that if a man give lands in fee upon condition the remainder over this remainder is void for the other had an estate in fee before by which it is apparant that when an estate is one time lawfully vested in any certain person there no limitation may give that to a stranger by any act executed in his life at the common law and then it shall not be good by way of devise 28. H. 8. Dyer a term was devised for years the remainder over and it was adjudged by Baldwin and by Shelley that the remainder in that case is void for when the devisor had given his term he may not limit this remainder over though this be by way of devise and this may be good law notwithstanding Lampets case for there the lease was devised and not the land and for that reason may be a difference and he vouched the case which was remembred by Richardson 29. H. 8. 33. and then as to the second point he held that the release was good admitting the first point to be against him for if the eldest son had any right by this release then this word right in the release will destroy and extinguish that and this possibility is not remote and forraigne for the condition or limitation is annexed to the estate and is not a subsequent condition which creates an estate and this depends upon an ordinary casualty which is common to all men and the payment of debts and of legacies is incident and common to every executor and as for Albanies case Coo. 1. the case was that a man had a power to revoke uses upon the death of a stranger without issue and resolved that this power may be released and yet his power depended upon two contingencies death and death without issue and the case is also there put if A. infeoffe B. upon condition that if B. Survive C. and then if A. and his heirs pay to B. 10. l. that then he shall enter in this case there are many contingencies involved in one conveyance and yet it is there said that these contingencies may be released and in Lampets case Coo. 10. there are six reasons wherefore such a contingencie may be released and our case is within all the reasons which are there mentioned for the words in the release as have been remembred by my brother Richardson are all one with our case and the first reason is because this is a Chattel which as it may be easily created so it may be easily destroyed to this he gave answer that this remainder of a Term was an interest to him who released and so in our it is an interest of a remainder to the Plantiff and for that the release is good Secondly it is a maxime in Law that every land may be charged one wayes or another and we are within this reason also for if this estate be in the Plantiff then this may be released Thirdly the foundation of every act ought to be regarded for Grants case there vouched destroyes the possibility with a fine by reason of the original act the fourth reason there remembred is because that if the devisee had been dead his Executor shall have the interest the same reason in our case if the Plantiff had been dead before the remainder or the contingencie hap yet his heir shall have that See Shelleys case the fifth reason is the legacie was in present though this was to take effect in futuro and so in our case the Will is in present though the state is to take effect in futuro and sixthly it shall be against reason to establish such a perpetuity of a Chattel and so in our case it shall be against reason to establish a perpetuity of a franktenement and the release is very well penued for it is of all his title right and claim to the reversion and remainder which the father devised to the Plantiff and so the release is not general but this is a particular and special release of that which was devised to him by his father and Hoes case Coo. 5. is not like to our case for first there the duty was altogether incertain and secondly the condition there did precede the duty but in our case the condition is annexed to the estate and so he concluded and
in capite and others in Soccage and he made a devise of all his fee simple lands and left only his lands in tail to descend to the heir which doth not amount to a full third part this is a good devise of all the fee simple lands and this case was also admitted that where the Lord Norrice gave land to Sir Edward Norrice his youngest son and to the heirs of the bodie of the father and then the Lord Norrice died and after Sir Edward died without issue that the son of the eldest Brother who was then dead shall take that as heir in tail and that he in this case had that by a descent from Sir Edward Norrice his Vncle which also doth clearly prove that in this Sir Edward Norrice son of the Lord Norrice was in this case Tenant in tail The residue of Easter Term in the two and twenty year of King James Stephens and Randal IN replevin between Stephens and Randal who made Conusance as Bailiff to the Earl of Bath and he shewed that such land was parcel of such a Chantrey which came to King Edward 6. by the Statute of 1. Edward 6. and also he pleaded the saving of the said Statute by which the right of others was saved and pleaded all incertain and shewed that so much rent was behinde upon which he made Conusance as c. to which the Plantiff replied that the land is out of the fee and signiorie of the Earl of Bath c. and this was ruled to be no plea for he confessed so much in his avoury and this avoury is not for rent service for the signiorie is extinct by act of Parliament but this is for rent reserved by the saving of the act of Parliament and this is a rent seek and yet is destrainable for the priviledge which was before but he may traverse the tenure that at the time of the making of the Statute nor never after this was holden of the said Earl of Bath Priest and King Priest and King in an action of which was entered between them Trin. 21 Iac. Rot. 3595. and this was debated between the Iudges and the Prothonotaries and the case was that two were bound for the appearance of an other and judgement was given against the debtor now if upon the capias he come and offer his bodie and the Plantiff refuse that yet that discharges the sureties but the Prothonotaries said that notwithstanding this refusal he may take a Capias against him within the year because that at the first he might have had a fierie facias or an elegit quere of that but Winch thought that in this case he ought to have a fierie facias but if he had come upon the Capias and had no suerâ—tes and he refuse to take him and this is so entred now quere if he had not discharged him Hendon moved the Court for a prohibition to the spiritual Court and suggested that one had libeld in the spiritual Court for a legacie and the Executor shewed that he had not assets to discharge the debts of the Testator and that Court would not allow this allegation and upon this he prayed to have a prohibition and it was the opinion of the Court that no prohibition shall be granted for the legacie is a thing meerly which is determinable in the spiritual Court and no other Court may have Conusance of that and this is also a thing which doth consist meerly in the discretion of the Court and resolved that in a thing which meerly doth rest in discretion of the Court in this case no prohibition shall be granted Henry Good against Thomas Good IT was agreed in the case by the Court between Henry Good and Thomas Good that if the devisee of 500. l. sue in the Marches of Wales for this legacie that a prohibition is grantable for though the Court of the Common pleas had no power to hold plea of that yet because that the thing is only triable in the Ecclesiastical Court a prohibition may be granted to reduce that to its proper Court and though the instruction of the Court of the Marches be to hold plea of all such things wheresoever there is no remedie at the Common Law yet this is to be understood of matters of equitie and not to take the jurisdiction from the spiritual Court for in verity the King may not do that by his Letters pattents but yet the Court agreed that if the Executor do suffer a decree against him in the Court of the Marches and not come to them at the first to be releived it is now meerly in the descretion of the Court whether they will grant that or no for that is a means to lengthen suits and to make the more delay before he do recover his legacie If a Capias ut legatum issueth to the Sheriff to take the partie and to enquire what lands and Tenements he had and the Sheriff findes by inquisition that he is seised of many lands and continues possession in them and the Sheriff do out me I shall have an action of trespass John Marriots case SErjeant Crawley moved this case in arrest of judgement in the case of Iohn Marriot and he declared upon a contract to table with the Plantiff at Ashton in Northamptonshire ad tunc ibidem superse assumpsit to pay 4. s. by the week for his diet and Crawley moved that this ought to have bin tried in Northamptonshire for these words ad tunc et ibident refer to Northamptonshire which was next before and not to London Hutton said that it ought to refer to London otherwise it was idle and it is to be intended of the time and the place where the promise was made but it was said if the issue had been whether he was tabled or no this shall be tried there Giles Bray against Sir Paul Tracie GIles Bray brought an action of waste against Sir Paul Tracie and in his declaration he conveyed a good tearm to the Defendant and a reversion to himself and upon a general issue a special verdict was found to this effect that Sir Edmund Bray was seised of this land in his demeasne as of fee and he being so seised 16. Eliz. made this lease for divers years to I. S. and he being so seised of the reversion conveyed that to the use of himself for life without impeachment of waste and then to the use of Edward Bray his eldest son and to Dorothie his wife and to the heirs males of the said Edward upon the said Dorothie to be ingendred and then Edward died having issue in tail the Plantiff and then this lease was assigned to Tracie and then Dorothie died and then the waste was committed and then Edmund the Grandfather died and the question was whether in this case an action of waste will lie or no. The argument of Serjeant Harris HArris argued that the waste doth lie for the priviledge or despensation which was annexed to the
reversion for life of the Grandfather is no dispensation to the estate of the lessee for though the action was suspended during his life yet now it is on foot again and in many cases an estate may be dispunishable of waste and yet by matter ex post facto this shall be punishable viz. where the first privitie of the estate was determined as in case a lease for years be without impeachment of waste and then the lessor releases to the lessee c. the first privity is gone and he is now punishable in an action of waste and here in our case there was no absolute dispensation but only for the time and yet perchance though the estate is subject to waste in the creation yet if the lessor will afterwards by his deed grant that this shall be dispunishable this may priviledge him but here is no such matter in the case at the bar and of this opinion was the Court and Winch said that there was no difference where the Franke tenement is intercedent for if this be not punishable yet the particular estate shall not participate of that priviledge of him in the remainder and Iones Iustice said if the particular estate had been extracted and drawn out of that estate for life in that case that had been dispunishable but it was agreed by Hendon Serjeant that the Plantiff in his declaration had declared of a waste after the estate for life was determined and they found that this was made in the time of him in reversion for life and so differed but the Court was of opinion that this was nothing to the purpose for it is only a variance from the time and not from the matter for it is not material whether this was before his death or after his death because in both cases this is punishable but day was given over to shew other causes Portington and Beamount IT was argued clearly in the case between Portington and Beamount that if the Court of the Councel of York which is a Court of equitie do decree against a maxime in law as against a joynt Tenant who had that by Survivorship that the heir of his companion shall have the Moietie that in this case a prohibition shall be granted except that during the lives of the parties it was agreed that there shall not be any Survivorship and then they hold plea upon that equitie and then good In Dower it was agreed clearly that if the Tenant shew that before the husband any thing had in the land A. was seised of the same land in fee and leâ— that for years rendring rent and granted the reversion to the husband of the Plantiff who died seised of the said reversion and so demanded judgement if the demandant shall have Dower c. this is no plea in bar of Dower but proves she had title of Dower but this saves the lease for years and she shall have judgement only of the reversion and of the rent and also she doth save to the Tenant damages and the demandant shall be indowed of the reversion Summers against Dugs SUmmers brought an action upon the case upon a promise against Dugs and he shewed in his declaration that the Defendant was rector of the Rectorie of D. and that he and all his predecessors had used to have all manner of Tithes and said that he the Plantiff occupied 100. acres of land in the same parish and shewed that the Defendant promised to the Plantiff that in consideration that he would plant his lands with Hops and so make the Tithes to be the better the Defendant promised to the Plantiff to allow him towards every acre which he shall so plant 40. s. towards the charge in planting them and he shewed that he planted an acre at the request of the Defendant and so upon the promise brought the action and now it was moved whether this was a good consideration to ground an action because the Tithes are not bettered by the planting of that with Hops but by the growing of them and the increase of them and he had not averred that the Tithes were of better value then they were before and it was also moved that he may not have an action for the Rood c. but this afterwards was referred to Arbitrement but the Court said if the Plantiff had shewed in his declaration that he might have made more benefit of that by other means then that by the planting of it with Hops the Tithes also being bettered then it had been more cleare Philip Holman against Tuke PHillip Holman was executor of George Holman and he brought an action of debt against George Tuke and declared upon a lease made by himself by the name of Philip Holman executor of the Testament of George Holman deceased of such land and the said land was delivered to him in execution of a Statute by extent which Statute was made to this Testator and this lease was for years if the Plantiff should so long continue seised by force of the Statute and it was rendring 100. l. per annum and for 3. years rent behinde he brought his action in the debet and in the detinet and also in the declaration he averred that he did continue seised so long by vertue of the extent and Serjeant Bing demurred in law because he said the action ought to be brought in the detinet only because he had brought the action as executor but Hendon and the Court c. Iones and Hutton to the contrary because the lease was made by himself and Hutton said in the case there is difference between a personal contract and real and it was said that an executor shall never be forced to bring his action in the detinet only where he need not name himself to be an executor which note well It was agreed in a case by Hobert that where a man brought an action de parco facto and declared upon the breach of a pound and also of the taking out of beasts and the Defendant as to the taking out of the beasts pleaded not guilty and as to the breaking of the pound he said that he was Lord of the Soil upon which the pound stood and thaâ— he brake of the Lock and put a lock of his own and Hobert said in this case that he ought to plead the general issue for in verity this is not any broach of the pound except the beast come out of it and Iones Iustice was of an opinion that if he put out the beasts he may not have this action because the freehold was in him but he ought to have a special action upon the case Entred in Easter Term in the 19th year of King James Rot. 1672. Ellen Goldingham against Sir John Saunds ELlen Goldingham brought an action of Dower against Sir Iohn Saunds to be indowed of the third part of the Mannor of Goldingham and he vouched the son to warranty as son and heir to Christopher Goldingham husband of
to be good for though that shall be void for the interest yet it shall be good for the residue and then the non payment is a breach of the condition for where an award is made for a thing against the law and for another which doth stand with the law this is good for one and void for the others so here Secondly this award is not for interest but rather for the damage for the forbearance of the money but admit that this were for direct usury yet that is not void my brother Bridgman had cited a case where an assumpsit for usury was void I know well what the judgement was for I was of Councel in the case and much was said in that against usury and Glanvil was cited Lib. 9. cap. 14. which said that an usurer did forfeit his goods but that is to be intended of such who live by the common oppression of the people and there was not any precedent found where a contract for usury was void Noy the 26. Ed. 3. 24. debt is brought for money given for usury and admitted and the Statute of the 13. Eliz. and 37. H. 8. which were made against usury shall be frivolous if such contract shall be meerly void for they made only such contracts to be void as were made for above 10. in the 100. and so I pray judgement for the Plantiff An action upon the case was brought for calling one thief and the other did justifie the words and said that he was possessed of a Heifer which was privately taken from him and that upon search he found that in the possession of the Plantiff with his ears cut off and marked with the Mark of the Plantiff and it was ruled that this was not a good justification for the matter is not sufficient but he ought to have expresly averred that the Heifer was stole from him and accordingly it was adjudged Hill 22. Jac. C. P. Hillary Term in the two and twentieth year of King James in the Common Pleas. THe residue of the case between Cooper and Edgar and now this Term Serjeant Crook argued the case for the Plantiff and after a recital of the case he said that the general question is whether the Lady Cesar had any estate by this fine or whether the old estate for life remains for if she had the one or the other then it shall be against the Plantiff and he said the points which I will insist upon are four First whether these words do make a precedent or a subsequent condition for if the uses do not arise till there be a failing of the payment then it is on my side but if the uses do arise before then indeed it is against me and I hold that no use will arise till there is a default in payment in which I will observe that the words are all in one period and one sentence and till the first of September the use wil remain in Robert Foyne for here the same is voluntarie and it is without any consideration and then what doth the Law say till the condition was performed the use was in him and his heirs the grand doubt is whether si here made a precedent or a subsequent condition and I hold that si is alwayes a note of a precedent condition if it may stand with the law and with the intentions of the parties but if it doth cross either of those then that is a subsequent condition and yet I agree if si is annexed to an estate which passeth by liverie then this is a subsequent condition and the same if it be annexed to a grant which is executed but if it is annexed to a grant which is executory then that is a note of a precedent condition and so is Bracton lib. 2. fol. 190. where there is an example and the placing that first or last is not material and in the case of an use which is executory as this is there till the if is performed nothing will pass Plowden 172. nay the case of 14. H. 8. by Brooks and by Brundwel if I covenant that another shall have my land when he marries my daughter no use will arise till he marrie her and the case of Colthirst proves my difference both the wayes for the lease was made to Henry and his wife for life the remainder to William si ipse inhabitaret c. and if he die in the life of Henry or his wife that then it shall remain to Peter there the first si is a precedent condition for if he do not die in the life of them then Peter shall take nothing by that and to this purpose there is a notable case 13. H. 6. 7. where a man made two his executors and if they did refuse to administer then he made two others within 3. moneths after his death and ruled that in the mean time they are not executors and yet si was placed in the subsequent place there and there was a case H. 33. Eliz. between Iennings and Cawman where a man made his will and devised his lands to his son for 3. years and afterwards appointed that if his wife whom he made Executrix did not suffer him to injoy that for 3. years that the son shall be executor and the question was whether the feme was executor in the mean time and there Anderson said that this was a precedent condition but the other Iustices were against him because it was a thing of continuance and there they agreed the case of Colthirst that the word si ipse inhabitaret are a subsequent condition because it is a thing of continuance which may be infringed and broken every year and there was a case in this Court 29. Eliz. Rot. 854. between Iohnson and Castle where a man devised his term to his youngest son if he lived to the age of 25. years and did pay to his eldest brother so much money and agreed no estate passeth till the age of 25. years and payment of the money and the reason was that a devise executory may depend upon a precedent condition and so here the use is executory and nothing passeth till there is a failing of the payment like to the case of the 15. H. 7. where a grant is made upon condition that if the Grantee perform such a thing he shall have such an Annuitie there nothing doth pass presently and so 21. Ed. 3. 29. where a man was bound in an obligation not to infeoff when he came to the house of Ancestor c. vide the case and here in our case because the condition is that if he do not pay that then she shall have it to her and her heirs therefore it is a precedent condition and if the use had been limited to him if he marrie his daughter such a day in the mean time no use will arise because the limitation is to him upon a thing not executed and this being all in one sentence no use will arise in the
ought to maintain the award but to shew the breach for it shall be otherwise if it be found against him and then Hendon answered to the other exception that this is not for direct usury but is rather for the damage which he sustained by the forbearance of the money and yet if it were for interest it is good and then as to that which now had been agreed by my brother Bridgman that contracts and obligations for usury are good I say then by the same reason an award for that is good for whatsoever a man may contract for the same thing may be awarded if the contract will bear that and usury is not malum in se but only malum prohibitum and is good by our law and here in this case though the Arbitrator was deceived in the summe yet after the award made it is altogether certain and an implied recompence is sufficient in this case but the Court said that the casting up of the accompts did not make an award for it is not a good Calculation but the ending of the controversies that doth make the award but yet the opinion of the Court in this case was that the award was good for an Arbitrement shall not be taken absolutely upon the bare words and the Court did command the parties to come before them upon the morrow in the Treasury and as it seems this was for mediation to make an agreement for the opinion seemed to be for the Plantiff The case of Hilliard and Sanders argued by the Court. IUstice Harvey this Term did argue the case of Hilliard and Sanders which see before and after a brief recital of the case he said that his opinion was that the avowant shall not have return because that by the fine of the lands the rent is extract and I am induced to be of this opinion by two things the first is the agreement and tâ—e other is the favourable exposition of the Statute of fines to settle repose and quiet and I will first shew the efficacie of fines at the common law 21. Ed. 4. the Pryor of Binghams case it is laid for a ground and rule in law if a thing be contained in a fine either expresly or implicitly this is very good and so is 44. Ed. 3. 22. 37. H. 6. 5. for a fine is no more then an agreement and therefore it is called in latin Concordia and then see if by any words you may pass this rent by the fine and though the word rent is not there yet if it be so infolded in the lands that is good with that it is very good and for that 3. H. 7. 16. 17. 21. H. 7. proves that by a feofment of the land the rent doth pass and wherefore not by fine then and this shall be within the Statute of 4. H. 7. and 32. H. 8. and a case may be out of the Statute of 32. H. 8. and yet be within the Statute of the 4. H. 7. as the 2. Ed. 3. in Dyer though the feme after the death of the husband she may enter upon the discontinues of the husband yet if she do not within 5 years she shall be barred and now you see that the construction of these Statutes was alwayes to settle repose and quietness for if such a construction should be made according to the opinion of Chornton in Smith and Stapletons case then it will be mischievous and for his opinion it was only in the way of arguing and yet I conceive he had the good opinion of the Reporter and without all question it is a case of as hard a construction as that is of Archers case where the heir who nothing had in the land in the life of his father did levie a fine this is a bar for ever and the reason is because it is of a thing which is intailed and he cited a case in Bendloes Reports where a discontinuee was disseised by Tenant in tail who levied a fine and the discontinuee entred and then proclamations passed that in this case the issue was barred truly I do agree the case of 36. H. 8. that that a fine levied of land did not bar him who had title of Common or a way the reason is because there is no privitie but in our case there is a privitie and by Margaret Podgers case a Coppiholder is within this Statute and in our case the rent passeth especially in regard of the agreement as in the Lord Cromwels case and he cited a case primo Jacobi between Gage and Selby in an ejectione firme where Gage was Tenant in tail and he levied a fine to I. S. in fee and after he levied another fine to the use of himself for life the remainder over and his brother brought a writ of error to reverse the first fine and ruled that he may not for the second fine had barred him of any writ of error and so I conclude the fine had extinguished the rent The argument of Justice Hutton to the contrary HUtton contrary the fine had not barred the rent in which I will consider the nature of fines at the Common Law and they were of mightie and great esteem and force as appears by the great solemnitie which is used in them as is prescribed in the Statute of fines 18. Ed. 1. de modo Levandi fines and he agreed that such a fine by Tenant in fee simple will pass that inclusively for by the release of all his right in the land a Signiorie is gone I agree also that a fine is but an agreement but yet it must work according to the nature of the thing as upon a writ of Measne or of right of advowson a fine may be levied and yet it is not levied of the lands but of the advowson or Signiorie and so if the writ of covenant be one thing and the agreement of another thing then it is not good and first I will prove that at the Common law fines have been rejected when the writ of covenant did not contain the thing of which the fine is to be be levied and if at the Common law a fine was levied of rent there ought to be a writ of covenant of that 18. Ed. 2. fines 123. and there the rule is given that it is against reason to hold covenant of that which never was and the rent there never was before but ought to begin then and yet it is clear a man may create a rent by fine but he shall not have a writ of covenant of that when it was not in esse before and because the concord may not varie from that therefore it was not received 38. Ed. 3. 17. Knevet put the rule that a fine may not be of more then is in the writ of covenant and when a fine is properly levied of that it is by way of release Fitz. fine 100. and so I conceive here the rent doth not pass Secondly here no man may plead that any fine is levied of
pleads no award the Plantiff maintaines the award and the breach the Defendant rejoyned that before the time of the award they discharged the Arbitrators 75 Debt by a servant for wages in the debet and detinet and for 2 shirts in the detinet only good without shewing that it was according to the Statue and by several precipes in one writ 75 In Dower the Tenant pleads never seized to have Dower the husband having an estate but by disseizing which was avoided by entrie no Dower 77 In Debt two were bound for the appearance of annother and judgement against the debtor who upon the capias offers his body the Plantiff refuses the suerties are discharged but the Plantiff may take a Capias within the year but if he had come on the capias and had not Suerties and he refused him Quer. if he be not discharged 77 78 Dower of a reversion after a lease for years she shall have the rent and the Defendant pay no damages 80 Dower what judgement shall be given where the vouchee dieth whether absolute or conditional 81 88 Dower where the trial ought to be by witnesses and in what manner 82 Dower the Tenant pleads that the demandant had entred and disseized since the last continuance 90 Where the Demandant shall have judgement and where only a petit Cape 90 Dower against an Infant who pleads a devise to the demandant in satisfaction of Dower and entrie 100 E ERror lieth not for a judgement given in the Stanneries in Cornwal 8 If an Executor be nonsuit he shall pay no costs 10 Executor where he bringeth an action he ought to shew the Will otherwise if the issue be joyned 19 If the Debtor makes the Debtee Executor he may retain and plead fully administred 19 Execution what fees are due to the Sheriff where the debt exceeds 100. l. 21 22 Essoign in a Formedon after the Vouchee appeared 34 Escape against the Warden of the Fleet retaking upon fresh suit good after an action but not after issue joyned 35 Escheat where lands are given to a Monasterie and all the Monks die who shall have it the founders or the Lord of whom it is holden 38 Executor where he or a devisee shall have the Corn 51 If an Executor waste the goods of a Testator and dies intestate his Administrator shall be liable and by the Court 31 Ed. 3. Coo. 11. gives no remedy but against an immediate administrator 65 Estray whether the partie may fetter him or no 67 68 124 An Executor where compellable to plead a general issue and give the special matter in evidence 70 Executor may bring an action in the debet and detinet upon his own contract 80 Executor an action brought against him by Journeys accompts where good 82 Execution where the partie shall be discharged by supersedeas at the Courts discretion 100 101 Execution see purchase 112 F TEnant for life and he in remainder in tail Covenant to levie a fine Tenant for life dies if he in the remainder ought to do it 4 In a Formedon the Tenant pleads that at the day of the writ the Plantiff was seised of the moitie thereof not good 23 Fees where an action of the case lieth for them by a Sollicitor 53 54 G GEneral issue where it ought to be pleaded and where not 70 H HErriot whether it be due to the Lessee of part of the Mannor or to the lessee of the whole Mannor 46 47 57 I INformation for ingrossing a 100. Quarters of Corn and upon inquiry he is found guiltie of a 100. it is good for so much 5 In an idempnitate nominis the Plantiff prayed a superdeas to stay Execution Curia Advisari vult 6 Information for entertaining his apprentice without a Testimonial contrary to 5 Eliz. 25 Joynture the father makes a feofment to the use of himself for life the reversion to his son and his wife intail this is no Joynture though the father die in the life of the son so if it had been for years 33 Infant and Apprentice unto what Covenants lyable 63 64 Issue in a quare impedit is joyned the wife one of the Plantiffs dieth before the venire facias the writ doth not abate because it was a Chattle vested in her husband 73 Infant where he may declare uses upon a fine and what acts are by him void or voidable 104 Infant in a judgement against him where he shall be relieved by audita querela or error and whether against the Attorney who suffered it 114 K VVHere the King may seise without office and where not 9 Where an usurpation gaineth an advowson from the King 14 King where he hath title to present the incumbent being created a Bishop in Ireland and what act is a dispensation thereof and where a Commendam is well granted and the several kindes thereof 94 95 96 97 98 L A Lease of a rectorie excepting the Gleab void otherwise if parcel of the Gleab 23 A Lease for a year and so from year to year this is a Lease for 3. years and if the Lessee hold over Quer. what remedy for the rent 32 A Lease for years by him in remainder in tail if destroyed by a recoverie 41 42 43 In a lease to trie a title of several parcels he ought to enter into them all severally 50 M A Miss-trial is not aided by any Statute of Jeoffales 69 N NUsance by stopping the winde abated 3 Nusance for stopping a light abated 4 Notice to give bond where necessarie and where not 26 27 New Assignment if it be more large then the declaration it is good in Trespass but otherwise in an ejectione firme 65 Notice where ought to be taken and by whom 108 120 O ORdinary what power he hath to dispose after debts and legacies paid 11 An Obligation where good upon the Statute 23. H. 6. 20 21 50 51 P A Prescription to pay the Vicar a Buck in Summer and a Doa in Winter for a Park which becometh Disparked 144 Prescription to have land it self void 6 Prescription See Replevin A Prohibition to the Admiraltie lieth not after judgement given there 8 Protestation where good and where not 13 14 Prohibition where it lies to the Court of Audience for saying thou art a common and base Quean 14 15 Promise by a Lessee or a stranger to pay rent if an action he thereupon 15 A Presentation by the Lord Chancellor where it belongeth to the King is only voidable 19 Prohibition where it lies for a seat in the Church a difference between the Lord of the Mannor and another Person 19 A Protection from a Peer not good in a Capias utlagatum 24 A Prohibition where the parties agree in the modus but varie in the place of payment lieth not 33 A Prohibition awarded against one who sued in the Court of Audience Administrators for a Legacie as Executors 64 65 In a prohibition the Tenants of a Dean and Chapter alledge prescription for non-payment
of Tithes and good because they are a spiritual bodie 65 In a Prohibition upon a suit for a Legacie the Executor shewed he had not assets to pay the debts and the spiritual Court would not allow that allegation yet no Prohibition 78 Prohibition to the Marches of wales because a Legatee sued there for 500. l. good before a decree but not after 78 Prohibition see Court of equitie c. 79 Prohibition to the Marches of Wales for requiring an accompt of an Administrator 103 Proces against two Obligors by several precipes and thereupon several Executions whether the writs are well awarded 112 A parco fracto where it lies against the Lord of the Soil and where not except the Cattle come out 80 81 Prohibition to the delegates a pardon not allowed of there 125 Q IN a Quare impedit adjudged that nothing ought to be questioned after induction the spiritual Court there 63 R TEnant in tail sells to I. S. in fee who sells to the heir of Tenant in tail being of full age the father dies if the son be demitted 5 A replevin c. the Defendant saith that all those c. had used to have pasturage in c. when it was not sowed the Prescription is good 7 In a return of Rescous there needeth no addition 10 Replevin for rent issuing out of six acres the avowant must prove that the grantor was seised of 6. acres or more 15 Replevin in the Plantiff claimeth propertie without that the propertie was in the Defendant the Traverse not good yet judgement for the Plantiff because after verdict 26 In Return of an extent by the Sheriff surplusage hurteth not 27 Replevin the Defendant avowed for homage and shewed not how it was due if good 31 Replication although evil where the Plantiff shall have judgement if the Defendants plea be vitious 37 A Riotous quarrel about an arrest between the Sheriffs Bailiffs and the Bailiffs of the Marches of Wales 72 Release an avowrie not good without pleading it by deed 72 A Rent-charge granted and a Covenant if it happen to be behinde then the land to be alwayes open to distress whether this be a distinct covenant or not 74 87 Replevin for rent the Defendants say that the land was parcel of a Chaunterie which came to the King by the Statute wherein the right of others was saved the Plantiff replies that the land is out of the fee of the Defendant no good plea but he might have Traversed the Tenure that at the making of the Statute the land was not holden of him 77 A Record amended where the bargain and sale and deed of uses were by the right name but the writ of entrie was of another name 99 100 Rent granted in fee by Tenant for life and him in remainder in tail levied a fine a good grant 102 Rent-charge whether it be extinct by a fine of the land to the Ter-tenant and a release unto him 109 110 111 121 122 S SCire facias the Defendant pleads a feofment the Plantiff traverses and the jury found a feofment to other uses whether this shall be intended the same feofment which was pleaded 32 Scire facias by an Executor upon a judgement for the Testator the Defendant cannot plead the Testators death between the verdict and judgement but he must bring a writ of error 48 Simonie a grant of a next avoidance for monie the Parson being readie to die is Simonie 63 A Sheriff by force of a Capias utlagatum to inquire what lands c. cannot put the partie out of possession 78 Statute-Merchant if good in regard no day of payment is limited largely and learnedly argued by the Court 82 83 c. Servant taken away See Trespas T TIthes See Prescription Trespass the Defendant saith that I. S. was seised in right of his wife and that she died seised and that he as heir c. the Plantiff replied that she died not seised he ought to have said that she died not sole seised 7 Trespass in Yorkshire Justification in Durham without that that guiltie in Yorkshire good because it is local 7 A Traverse to a presentation where good and where not 13 14 Tenure where it is Traversable and where the seisin 18 Tithes not due of Cattle for the diarie 33. Trespass for Beasts taken in London Justification upon a lease of land in Kent Replied that the Defendant sold them in London no good plea to bring the trial out of Kent 48 Trespass for taking ones servant lieth not upon a private retainer otherwise if it were at the Sessions 51 Tithe giuen by the Pope to the Vicar and the Copie of the Bull only was shewed in evidence not good 70 Tithes cannot be appurtenant to a Grange except the Grange be the Gleab 72 73 Traverse where good and where not 113 U VEnire facias omitting part of the venue if good 34 Variance between the writ and Declaration where good 35 A feofment to the use of A. for life and after to the use of his daughter till B. pay her 100. l. here the daughter hath no remedie for this 100. l. without a promise 71 A Ventre inspiciendo awarded and returned but the Court would not agree that she should be detained from her second husband but attended by divers women till her deliverie 71 Variance between the venire facias and the Sheriffs return no judgement in that case 73 W IN Waste judgement by nihil dicit and upon an inquirie the jury found 8. s. damages what judgement shall be given 5 Wager of Law upon a Bill of Exchange 24 Writs a difference wherein there is an error in the original and where in the judicial writ that is amendable 73 Waste although for a time it is punishable yet after the action may revive 79 86 Writ against husband and wife as an Inheritrix the husband dies if the writ abate 102 Errata PAge 1. line 2. 27. for do read Doa p. 2. l. 4. r. lieu p. 4. l. 2. 22. r. 300. pa. 8. l. 36. r. Hendon and so throughout p. 12. in the Title r. Duncombe against the Vniversitie of Oxford p. 12. l. 14. r. 38. H. 8. cap. 39. p. 14. in the Title r. Sir George Savile against Thornton p. 15. l. 21. r. communication p. 16. l. 12. r. 7. Jac. cap. 5. p. 17. l. 47. r. Maines and l. 17. r. sic and also p. 17. 18. in the Margent r. Trin. p. 21 l. 51. r. 39. Eliz. p. 23. l. 9. r. till p. 26 l. 28 for writ r. Action and for Action r. writ p. 27. l. 12. for he r. they p. 28. l. 34. r. may not p. 29. in the Margent r. Easter p. 29. l. 33. for S. r. N. p. 33. l. ultim r. Moore p. 36. l. 43. r. Titterels p. 45. l. 20. r. demandable p. 50. l. 35. r. Bar p. 51. l. 22. r. a penalty p. 53. l. 16. r. may not p. 54. l. 44. r. Estate p. 57. l. 19. r. in our case p. 58. l 50 r. 16. E. 4. p. 68. l. 5. r. estray p. 71. l. 26. r. 12. Note in p. 72. l. 7. Wolseys case ought to have been printed by it self p. 77. l. 4. r. avoided p. 88. l. 4. r. Finch p. 90. l. 15. r. continuance p. 100. l. 21. for preservation r. perswasion and l. 34. for entire r. entrie p. 109. in the Margent for Trin. r. Mich. p. 112. l. 25. r. thought p. 114. l. 18. for interested r. interest
it is that if the Lord had seisin of more then the very services in this case it may not be avoyded in avowry and no fall tenure shall be avoyded c. but when he joyns another falsity and that is in the quantity of land now the false quantity of the rent had made the tenure traversable and the judgement was commanded to be entred accordingly Trin. 19. Jac. Thomas Bull Executor c. against Fankester THomas Bull Executor of William Bull brought an action against Fankester and declared that the Defendant enfeoffed his Testator in certaine land and that he covenanted for him and his heirs that he was seised of a good estate in fee and he alleadged the breach upon which they were at issue and now Attoe moved in arrest of judgement first because the Plantiff sueing as Executor had not shewed the Will for it hath been adjudged here that if a man bring an action as executor and do not shew the Will that the Defendant may demurre upon that because it is matter of substance but Hobert said it is very good because the Defendant had admitted him to be responsible but it is true he might have demurred upon the declaration as we often times adjudged here secondly Attoe said that the covenant being made with the heire the executor shall not have an action of covenant for it is annexed to the land which was granted by Hobert and Winch being only present in the Court. Note that it was said at the barre and agreed by Hobert that if the debtor make the dettee his executor he may now retain in debt against him and safely plead plene administravit if he had no other goods and shall not be driven to his special plea and so it had been agreed often times in this Court Parson and Morlees case PArson and Morlees case it was said that the Lord Chancellour presented to a venefice which belonged to the King which was above the yearly value of 20. l. per annum and this was referred to Hobert chief Iustice and to Tanfield chief Barron to certifie whether this was meerly void it remained good till it was avoyded Harris against Wiseman HArris had procured a prohibition against Wiseman who had libelled in the spiritual Court against the Plantiff for a frat in the Church which did belong to his house and it was said by Hobert and Winch only present that a man or a Lord of a mannor who had any Isle or a seat in the Church c. and he is sued for that in the spiritual Court he shall have a prohibition but not every common parishioner for every common seat and upon the first motion at the barre in this case day was given over to the Defendant to shew cause wherefore that a prohibition shall not be granted and the Defendant not having notice of that after the day the Plantiff had a prohibition and now after the day he shewed a good cause and upon that a supersedeas was granted to stay the prohibition in that case Aylesworth against Harrison AYlesworth against Harrison in debt against an executor the question was whether he may plead plene Administravit and give in evidence a debt in which the Testator was indebted to him or whether he may plead the special matter that plea amounting but to the general issue and it was argued by Harris Serjeant the Defendant may plead the special matter and shall not be bound to the general issue to leave that to the lay people who may suppose such a retainer to be an administration and he vouched the 15. E. 4. 18. if a man illiterate seale a deed which is read to him in another manner c. and he delivers that as an escrow to be delivered over as his deed upon conditions performed and this is delivered over before the conditions performed he may in this case plead the special matter and conclude so not his deed or if he will he may plead the general issue of non est factum and so is 39. H. 6. in dower the Tenant said that before marriage the husband infeoffed him and that after the Tenant let to him at Will and that the husband continued possession during his life absque hoc that he was seised of such an estate of which she might have dower and exception was taken there because that this only amounts to the general issue and yet ruled to be good for the lay people may conceive such a continuance of possession during the life of the lessee to be such an estate of which the wife may have dower if this were put upon the general issue and in our case because he had liberty to plead specially or generally he prayed that the Defendant may be admitted to plead specially and that he may not be bound to the general issue Serjeant Hendon to the contrary if one plead a plea which amounts to the general issue see Layfields case Coo. 10. and though in Woodwards case commentaries there was such a plea pleaded yet this doth not prove the contrary for in the same case no exception was taken by the Plantiff and presidents do prove that the Defendants in this kind have been compelled to plead the general issue Hobert if no special matter may be alleadged to the contrary the Defendant shall be compelled to plead the general issue and this is good discretion in the Court to take away the perplexity of pleading because one plea is as good as the other to which Winch being only present agreed and it was ordered that the Defendant here plead accordingly In debt against the heire upon the obligation of his father and in the declaration the Plantiff omitted these words obligo me et hered es meos c. and after error brought the Plantiff prayed that this might be amended because it was the misprision of the Clark only Hobert and Winch said that this shall not be amended for it is a matter of substance but because the clark who made this misprision was a good clark day was given over c. Widdow Archers case IN debt against the Widdow of Archer being executrix of her husband and the Plantiff declared that neither the Testator in his life nor the executrix after his death had paid that omitting those words licet saepius requisitus c. and evil but this omission was amended Sir Edward Grubham against Sir Edward Cooke SIr Edward Grubham brought an audita querela against Sir Edward Cooke upon a recognizance of 4000. l. and this was acknowledged to the use of his Mother and shewed that the conusor had infeoffed him and another in the land and that the conusee had sued execution only against him and it was found for the Plantiff and it was so moved in arrest of judgement by Ashley Serjeant first because he had not shewed in this audita querela when the Statute was certified nor yet the Teste nor yet the return of the writ of extent
see more after Vpon an elegit the Sheriff returned that to be executed and the extent of the Church of St. Andrews Al 's St. Edes and Attoe prayed the Sheriff may amend this and make that Andrews only for that is the true name Hobert and the Court if this be the true name the alias dictus is surplusage and will not hurt the return of the writ Hill 19. Jac. C. P. Allen against Brach Ent. Hill 19. Jac. ALlen against Brach upon the reading of a record in a replevin the case was Tennat of a Coppihold for life in which the custome was that the wife shall have her widowes estate and the husband was attaint of fellony and executed and whether the wife in this case shall have the widowes estate was the question upon the demurrer Winch being only present seemed that not without a special custome In an action upon the case the Plantiff shewed that he was possessed of a Wind mill sufficiently repaired and that he at the instance and request of the Defendant let that to I. S. and in consideration thereof the Defendant promised to pay the rent and that the Mill should be left in sufficient repair except the Sayles and he averred that he had let that to I. S. accordingly and that he had not paid the rent nor left that sufficiently repaired and Serjeant Hendon said that the declaration is not good first because that the Plantiff had shewed that he was possessed of a Winde Mill and had not shewed of what estate and it may be this was only at will and then the lease is void Hutton Iustice it is good notwithstanding this exception for the shewing that he was possessed was surplusage and if he had shewed that he let for years and never shewed that he was possessed yet this is good and if the lessee never enter yet the assumpsit lyâ—â— secondly Hendon moved that the promise was to pay the rent and to leave the Mill sufficienty repaired except the sailes and the Plantiff averred that he had not repaired and never made mention of excepting the Sailes and here the jury found the Defendant guilty of all and had given entire damages and it appears by the Plantiffs own shewing that he shall no have any action at all for the sails for they are excepted and therefore though the promise is good for the rent yet it is not for the not reparation and the damages are intire Winch and Hutton Iustices only present held this good after verdict and judgement was given according Wright against Black and Black VVRight against Black and Black in an action upon the case and the Plantiff declared that he was of good fame and that the Defendants such a day and yeare at the Sessions of Norwich preferred a Bill of indictment containing that the Plantiff felloniously stole two bundles of vetches and also they maliciously incited one I. S. to give in evidence to the grand Iury that this was Billa vera and upon not guilty pleaded it was found for the Plantiff and now it was moved in arrest of judgement by Serjeant Richardson first because the Plantiff had not averred in his declaration that the Bill was found but only that he preferred a Bill of indictment against him containing such a thing and this is not good as 21. E. 4. 41. one pleaded a pattent of exemption and this was pleaded quod inter alia continetur and ruled no expresse grant was pleaded and so evil and so Browning and Beestons case Com. 173. there a condition was pleaded that in such an indenture it was contained that if such a thing was not made then the lease shall be void and evill because he had not expresly averred what the condition was and so in our case to say the Defendants preferred a Bill of indictment containing that the Plantiff stole 2. bundles of Vetches this is only in nature of a recital and no direct affirmation that there was such an indictment and this declaration doth not agree with the precedents and therefore it is evil secondly admit this to be good yet as this case is the Plantiff may not have an action upon the case but an action of conspiracy against both Thirdly the declaration is not good because it sets forth that the Defendants incited I. S. to give in evidence to the grand jury that this was Billa vera and had not averred that he was sworn and then though an action may lye for the other yet because the action is brought for all and damages are entire all shall be void and the Plantiff shall not have judgement for any and lastly he said the action it self in this case will not lye because the indictment was not found but only an evidence and an acquital before the grand jury and this is lawfull being in an ordinary course of justice and prayed that the Plantiff may have judgement in the case Attoe contrary First the Plantiff here may not have a writ of conspiracy for the indictment was not found but yet if we should admit that he may have a writ of conspiracy yet he may as this case is have an action upon the case at his election which was granted by Justice Winch as to this point and yet he said that this action upon the case is in the nature of a writ of conspiracy and for that reason there ought to be some act made or else an action of conspiracy will not lye upon a bare attempt Attoe an action upon the case will lye upon this attempt for by this the Plantiff is defamed as much as if the Defendants had said that he had stole 2. bundles of Vetches and this is more then a defamation by word and though the indictment was not found yet an action upon the case lyes as 10. Jaco B. R. Whorwoods case against S. and R. declared that the Defendant preferred a Bill of indictment containing such a thing without any eo quod c. and the Bill not found and yet an action upon the case lyes very well upon this attempt without an express averment of an eo quod because that the indictment was not found but otherwise it is where the indictment is found there it is not good containing such a thing as my brother Richardson had said without an eo quod and the same case of Whorwood was adjudged accordingly and it was also affirmed in the exchequer chamber upon a writ of error brought there and he also cited a case 14. Iac. in B. R. Rot. 236. Demey against Ridg where was a Bill of indictment for the stealing of a horse and the Bill was not found and yet adjudged that an action upon the case will lye for that Richardson said that the indictment is not found here and therefore it was no slander and so was adjudged in a case in the 44. of Eliz. in the Kings Bench which was one Jeroms case Justice Hutton said that it seemed to him that the action
of the obligation and so had disabled himself afterwards and the obligor is bound that a fine shall be leavied this is to be understood of a good and a lawfull fine and not a fine in name only and he put the case that I let for years and after Covenant to make a feofment to I. S. this lease for years is a breach of the Condition though at the time of the Covenant made the lease for years was made Iustice Winch thought the contrary for this disability is by the act of a stranger and for that the obligor may not take any certain notice of that and therefore if I am obliged to you that I. S. shall enfeoffe you of his Mannor and at the time I. S. had made a feoffement of two or three acres of the same Mannor yet if he enfeoffe you of that which he was seised at the time of the obligation this is a good performance of the Condition though that 2. or 3. acres were disjoyned from that before and so in this case the obligor being a stranger to the estate of I. S. if I. S. make such an estate as he had at the time of the obligation made this is sufficient upon which he concluded that the Plantiff shall not have judgement but afterward judgement was commanded to be entered for the Plantiff according to the opinion of Hobert and Hutton Hoels case HOels case upon a special verdict was to this effect a man was seised of 2. acres of land in fee and had 2. sones and he devised both the acres to his wife for life the remainder of one acre to his eldest son in fee the remainder of the other acre to his youngest son in fee upon this condition in manner and form following if either of my sonnes die before my depts and legacies are paid or before either of my sonnes enter into their part that then the longest liver shall have both parts to him and to his heires in fee and the devisor died and Hoel the Plantiff being the eldest sonne in the life of his mother released all his interest and his demand in this to his younger brother and the doubt was whether this condition was gone by this release and Attoe argued that it was gone for Littleton saith that every land may be charged one way or other see Anne Mayowes case Release Coo. 1. Albaines case power of revocation released see more of this afterwards Trin. 20. Jac. C. P. Whitgift aganist Sir Francis Barrington IN Replevin the Defendant avowed as Baliff to Sir Francis Barrington and that Whitgift the Plantiff held certaine land of Sir Francis Barrington by escuage et quendam reditum and that the said Sir Francis was seised by the hands of Whitgift his very Tenant and for homage he avowed and upon this the Plaintiff demurred first because he had avowed for homage and had not shewed how nor in what manner the homage is due whether in respect that the tenancy come to him by discent or by purchase and for that this general allegation is naught for by Hendon Serjeant all the presidents in such avowryes made mention of the title to the homage as 4. E. 4. in avowry for homage the tenure is shewed and a discent alleadged or a purchase of the land and in no book or in any president that he ever yet saw did he see such a general allegation in avowry for homage but he agreeth the book of the 44. E. 3. 42. if the avowry is upon tenant by the curtesie this general allegation is good but otherwise of a tenant in fee simple and for that he alledged the second E. 3. avowry in a replevin the Bishop avowed for homage due by the Plantiff and exception was taken because it was not shewed in whose time the death of the ancestor was whether in his own time or the time of his predecessor and ruled to be evill for his avowry being his title he ought to shew that in certaine and so in our case Hobert this case doth not prove our case for in our case prima facie it is certain to all intents and purposes and I cannot see how an avowry may be better made and Finch at the barre vouched a president in the book of entries title horse de son fee secondly where such a avowry as in our case is made and then Hendon moved that the avowrie is not good for he had shewed the tenure by homage and by escuage and rent de quo quidem redditu he was seised c. and this is also repugnant for when he said that he was seised of the rent by the hands of the Plaintiff this is a seisin of the homage as Bevils case is and then by his own shewing because the seisin of the rent is a seisin of the homage he shall not have the homage of the Plantiff Thirdly admitting this point against him and that the seisin of the rent is not seisin of the homage yet the pleading is not good for when he expresly alleadged seisin of the rent in this manner de quo quidem redditu he was seised this excluded the seisin of any other services but only of the rent which is expresly alleadged and therefore in our case he ought to have alleadged generally de quibus serviciis he was seised and to leave this to the construction of the Law and he vouched 13. H. 7. 31. Serjeant Harvy to the same intent for though perchance no good reason may be given wherefore the pleading shall be such and that the seisin of the homage ought to be expressed yet because all the presidents are so the course of pleading shall not be altered and all the presidents shew a seisin of the homage see the book of entries 597. and 598. Serjeant â—owse to the contrary the book of the 19. E. 2. Recovery 224. is that the alleadging of the seisin or escuage as in our case of tent is a sufficient avowry for homage and 29. H. 3. such an allegation of the seisin of rent was made in avowry for fealty and good Hutton if the book of the 19. E. 12. be as Towse had alleadged it is all one with our case Hobert seems the avoury is good notwithstanding this last exception for perchance he was not actually seised of the homage by the hands of the Tenant himself and then by his own shewing his avowry shall abate and he demanded of Brownlow if there were any such president of an avowry who answered no. Hobert if the continual pleading be as my brother Harvy had alleadged we will not alter the course of pleading but in my opinion in reason none may plead in better manner or form and Hutton being only present agreed and then Hobert commanded the presidents to be searched concerning that matter and Finch at the barre being of Councel with the avowant said that till the resolution in Bevils case it was a great question whether the seisin of the rent was the
seisin of the homage and therefore perchance it will be hard to finde my antient president they adjourned and at another day Hutton and Winch being only present judgement was given for the avowant against Whitgift and Hutton said that he had spoke with the other Iustices and they agreed Vpon a motion made by Towse the case was this a man made a lease for one year and so from year to year during the Will of the lessor and lessee rendring rent and the lessee died and the rent was behinde and by Winch being only present if the rent is behinde in the time of the lessee and he dies an action of debt is maintainable against his Executor in the detinâ—t only and so I conceive if that was behinde after his death he may have an action in the debt and the detinet or in the detinet only to which Brownlow agreed Secondly Winch said that when a man made a lease for a year and so from year to year at the pleasure of the parties that this is a lease for 3. years and not for two Thirdly he doubted if the lessee hold over his term so that he is tenant at sufferance what remedy the lessor had for his rent Vpon the reading of a record the case was that a Scire facias issued against the land Tenant to have execution of a judgement given against Ferdinando Earl of Darby in the 15. Eliz. and the Defendant pleaded that a long time before the said Ferdinando any thing had in the land one Edward Earl of Darby was seised of the land and being so seised 3. Mar. infeoffed I. S. to the use of the Lord Strange and his wife in tail the remainder over to the said Ferdinando and made the said Ferdinando heire to the estate taâ—le and pretended that by this meanes the land should not be liable to this judgement because it was intailed to Ferdinando and of such estate he died seised the Plantiff traversed the feofment made by Edw. Earl of Darby and the jury found that the feofment was made by Edward Earl of Darby to the same persons as the Defendant had pleaded but this was to the use of the feoffor for life the remainder over to the Lord Strange and his wife the remainder as before and whether this shall be intended the same Feofment which the Defendant had pleaded was the question because the estate for life was omitted and upon the special verdict that was the question and Attoe said that if the jury had found this feofment made to other feoffees though the estate had agreed this should be found against the Defendant and Winch Iustice said that there was such estate found as had taken away the execution or extent and the estate for life is not material but it was adjourned till another day A man Covenanted to make such assurance as shall be devised by the counsel of the Plantiff so the same assurance be made within the county of Norff. or the Citty of Norwich and the Plantiff assigned the breach and shewed that in this case his Councel devised that a fine should be leavied of the same land which was not done and it was moved by Serjeant Attoe that in this case the breach was not well laid because he had not shewed where his councel devised that the fine should be leavied In the case of a prohibition in case of a libel in the Ecclesiastical Court for the tithes of Cattles the Plantiff alleadged that those Cattle of which Tithes were demanded are for his Dairy and for the plough and Winch being only present said that the parson shall not have Tithes of such Cattle but if he bred up Cattle to sell it is otherwise secondly the Plantiff in the prohibition alleadged that time beyond memory the parishoners had paid a half peny for the Tithe of a Calf and a penny for a Cow and that upon a day limitted they use to bring this to the Church and to pay this to the Vicar and now the Vicar had libelled in the spiritual Court against them to compel them to bring it home to his house and Winch said that this is no occasion of a prohibition for they agree in the modus but vary in the place of payment and this is not matter of substance and for that reason no prohibition will lie Vpon the reading of a record the case was that the father made a feofment to the use of himself for life the remainder to his son and his wife and to the heires of the body of the son and this was for a joynture for his wife and the father died and the son also died and whether this was a good joynture was the question for all this matter was pleaded in barre of dower brought by the wife and it was ruled to be no good joynture for the feme notwithstanding that the father died in the life of his son and Hutton said if a man made a feofment to the use of himself for life the remainder to his Executors for years the remainder to his wife for a joynture this will be no good joynture within the Statute of joyntures though the feme here had the immediate franktenement In an action of debt against an Administrator who pleads outlawry in the Testator and it was moved that this was no plea for he had taken the Administration upon him Winch a man who is outlawed may not make an executor for if he meet with his goods he shall answer for them to the King and for that reason it seems to be a good plea 3. H. 6. 32. and Brownlow chief Prothonotary said that he could shew a president 27. Eliz. where this is adjudged to be no plea and Iustice Winch said to him shew that president if any such be and upon Tuesday after he shewed that and then Winch agreed Auditor Curle for words AUditor Curle brought an action upon the case and in his declaration he set forth the Statute of 32. H. 8. for the erection of the Court of Wards and that the same Statute appointed the Auditor of the same Court and shewed that the Plantiff was an Auditor of the same Court and that the Defendant such a day and at such a place said of him you have taken money for ingrossing of feodaries innuendo accompts and tunc et ibidem you are a Cozner and live by Cozning and I will prove that to be Coznage and upon not guilty pleaded it was found for the Plantiff and now it was moved in arrest of judgement by Finch Serjeant of the King that the Plantiff shall not have judgement upon this verdict for the first words are not actionable for the taking of money for the ingrossing of feodaries are insensible and then the inuendo will not help nor aid that also the words in the second place are not actionable because he had not said that he was a Cozning officer and so he had not expresly applied that to his office and
Winch seemed to agree and Hobert said that the writ of contra formam donationis was given to the Founder or Donor by the Statute and not by the Common Law but in the principal case the judges said they would advise of that and gave day over to argue that again Auditor Curles case before ANd now at this day the case of Auditor Curle was moved again in arrest of judgement by Hendon and he said Auditor Curle brought an action upon the case against Tuck and he shewed in his declaration the erection of the Court of Wards by the Statute of 32. H. 8. and that it was ordained by the same Statute that those persons which shall be ordained Auditors of the same Court shall be sworn and take an oath and that such a time the Plantiff was sworn an Auditor and that to the office was 2. s. due to be paid for the ingrossing of Feodaries and that the said Plantiff exercised the said office honestly and justly and with the fees and the profits of the same he maintained his family and that the Defendant such a day and at such a place having Communication with the Plantiff concerning his behaviour in his office said to him you have received money for the engrossing of Feodaries and I will prove that to be Cousenage and tunc et ibidem said you are a Couzner and live by Couzning and Hendon after verdict for the Plantiff moved in arrest of judgement first he said the office appertains to 2. Auditors as appears by the Statute of 32. H. 8. and by Auditor Curles case and if that appertain to 2. then this doth not appertain to the Plantiff alone and secondly the Plantiff had expresly laid in his declaration what fees are due to the office for the engrossing of Feodaries and then when it appears by his own shewing that the fees were due and that the Defendant said of him that he took money for the engrossing of Feodaries this may not be any scandall to him and he cited Suaggs case Coo. 4. where the Plantiff shewed that his wife was living and that the Defendant said of him that he had killed his wife here in this wise no action lies for it appears by his own shewing that the wife was alive and so no scandal and so in our case when he had shewed that such fees were due for the engrossing of Feodaries it was no scandal to him for the Defendant to say that he took money for the ingrossing of them and thereby the words are general of Couznage and they may have other interpretation as the Couzning at the Cock pits or the like and then those general words shall not be applied to his office and not left to such an exposition as is equivocal and he vouched Serjeant Heales case Mr. Heales Warrants have undone many a man and adjudged that an actition lies because it had relation to his profession but he said that this was afterwards reversed in the Exchequer chamber because the word Warrants is general and may be applied to other things but Winch interrupted him and said that it was not reversed for error then Hendon alleadged Yardleyes case 11. Jac. in C. B. where one said to another is Yardly your Attoâ—ney your Attorney is a briving knave and took 20. l. of you to Cozen me and the opinion was that an action will not lie and Winch interrupted him again and said it was adjudged the contrary and after Hendon alleadged Eliots case against Brown Hill 17. Jac. B. R. thou hast made false writings between I. S. and his brother and adjudged that an action lies and he cited Mallard against Wise for these words 10. Jac. Mallard is a knave and forged my husbands Will against his minde and ruled that no action lies and so 13. Jac. Harvey against Boking and he applied all those cases that the words ought to scandalize him in his office and profession for if words by any intendment may have relation to any thing else they shall not be interpreted to have relation to his office and therefore here the words are too general also he shewed that when the Plantiff had said that the Defendant such a day having communication concerning him in his office said you have received money for the engrossing of Feodaries which is Coznage and tunc et ibidem said you are a Cozner and live by Cozning these words tunc et ibidem shall not have relation to all but only to the last words and cited 5. H. 7. 8. to that purpose and so he concluded against the Plantiff Attoe Serjeant to the same purpose but his only argument was because the Plantiff had alleadged that the fees were due to him and so no scandal according to Snags case But it was resolved by Hobert and Winch being only present for Hutton was in the Chancery and Iones was not yet returned from Ireland that the Plantiff shall have judgement and first it was agreed by them and by Hutton the day before that tunc et ibidem shall have relation to the same time that the first words were spoken and secondly by Hobert and Winch though the office appertaines to 2. yet this is a scandal to him for the scandal is to the person and not to the office and the persons are distinct and several though the office is joynt and they may not joyn in an action for of the other no words are spoken and so they agreed that this objection is of no force and as to the other objection which was made by Hendon and by Attoe Hobert said that true it is as had been cited but he said for his part he never was nor yet is satisfied in the Law of that case for be she in life or not yet the scandal is the same to the standers by who perchance did not know that she was living and so the scandal never the less but admitting the case to be good Law yet our case differs from the reason of that for in our case he had shewed that 2. s. fees were due to him for the ingrossing of Feodaries and the Defendant said that he took money for the ingrossing of Feodaries which is Couzning and so shall be intended that he took more then was due and this is extortion and as to Eliots and Browns case he agreed that to say he had made false writings no action will lie for it is no scandal to him in his profession for it doth not appertaine to an Attorney to make writings no more then it appertaines to an Appothecary to give Physick and so it is no scandal to him in his profession and he agreed the case of Mallard against Wise he forged my husbands Will no action will lie for the words are repugnant and contrary for if it be forged it is not the Will of her husband but in our case the words had a plaine sence to common understanding and shall be intended to refer to his office for if he
also he said that in some parts the Vicar shall have Tithe Corn and hay and not the Parson and so he concluded this to be a good prescription by the Common Law and then for the second point he argued that though the Park is disparked yet the modus decimandi continued and he vouched Beddingfields and Fields case P. 38. Eliz. B. R. prescribed to pay 10. s. for a Park this modus had a continuance notwithstanding the disparking and 18. Iac. upon a motion a prohibition was granted in such a case Hendon to the contrary and yet for the first point he agreed that a prescription to pay Tithes to the Vicar was good for here it appeares that the Vicarage is as antient as the Parsonage both being time beyond memory and it was the opinion of all this Court when the case was first opened and so he said he would not insist upon that but agree the Law to be against him but then for the second point he held the modus to be gone by the disparking for the prescription is annexed to the Park and not to the land for the prescription is to pay a Buck and a Doe for all manner of Tiths of that Park and then the prescription is in some sort annexed to that meerly as land but quatenus a Park and for this he held if a man will prescribe to pay 10. s. for the Tithes of such land and it is given in evidence to be a Park this will not maintain the issue for a Park is deceivable one way or other and so are of several natures and so Coo. 4. Lutterels case a tenure to cover the hall of the Lord if the hall is thrown down the tenure is gone and here when the Park is destroyed the modus is also destroyed but it hath been objected here that the prescription is general and therefore though the Park was disparked yet the modus had continued to this he answered that this prescription shall have such construction as a grant shall have and though it is general yet it is sub modo subject to this limitation that this alwayes continue and remain a Park and it was resolved 43. Eliz. that the Commoner may not grant over his Common except he grant over his Tenement for they may not be severed and so indeed is Nevils case in the Commentaries a man prescribed to have estovers to burn in his house if the owner destroy the house the estovers are gone for the prescription is annexed to the house and so in our case the prescription is annexed to the Park and not to the land for 18. H. 6. 21. a Park may not be without the grant of the King and the Common Law saith if a man prescribe to have Tithes in a Vineyard if the Vineyard be converted to another use the Tithes are gone for it is said tantum est prescriptio quantum est possessio and vouched Coneys case 14. Caro. who prescribed to be discharged of paying Tithes for a meadow and afterwards this was converted to arrable and the opinion of the Court was that the prescription is gone and the rather in our case because it is by the act of the party himself that the Park is destroyed yet he agreed the principal case in Lutterels case Coo. 4. for there a new will is only a translation of the old and no destruction of the thing which was before but in our case the Park it self is destroyed by the act of the party himself and therefore the prescription which was annexed to this is gone forever Also this prescription is against Common right and therefore shall be taken strictly as Teringhams case Coo. 4. a man had Common appurtenant in another mans land and he purchased parcel of the same land the Common is gone because this Common is against Common right but otherwise of a Common appendant and he cited Wilds case Coo. 8. according to our case that a prescription to pay a Buck and a Doe for the Tithes of a Park is against Common right for though Tithes are not due Iure divino yet they are due jure humano Communi and therefore the prescription is not founded in Law and it shall not be intended to the Park when that is destroyed and converted to arrable as if a man made a feofment of land with warranty and afterwards the land is improved and made of greater value then that was at the time of the feofment if in this case the feoffee is evicted and lease that and recovery in value upon the warranty he shall recover in this case only the value that this was at the time of the feofment made and not according to the value that the land is of at this day by the improvement 32. E. 3. Entry 81. and in our case it shall be intended that by composition at the first this prescription had beginning and the composition only extended to the Park and not to a new thing and for that reason the prescription is gone in this case and he cited a case in this Court M. 10. Iac. Rot. 1223. in a prohibition between Roux C. D. the Plantiff suggested that such land was parcel of a Park as in our case and that the owner had used to pay the shoulder of every Doe which was killed and 2. s. annually for all Tithes the Defendant pleaded that this was disparked and the first opinion of the Court was that the Defendant ought to plead in certain how that was disparked secondly this was doubted whether the modus as to the 2. s. was gone in regard that the shoulder of the Doe is gone by the disparking out of which he collected that the modus is annexed to the Park and not to the land and so he concluded and prayed a consultation Winch said to him the prescription is found against you and therefore you ought to have demurred Hendon if the prescription is gone the Plantiff shall not have a prohibition and at another day judgement was commanded to be entered for the Plantiff judgement if no other matter is shewed by such a day Hobert and Winch being only present The Bishop of Glocester against Wood. IN a Trover and conversion brought by the Bishop of Glocester against Wood upon a special verdict the case in effect was that the predecessor of the now Bishop was seised of the Mannor of D. and he let 20. acres of that to A. and B. during the lives of 3. of their Children rendring 27. s. renâ— per annum and also paying and delivering to the Bishop and to his successors two of the best beasts upon the death of every one of the Cestuy que vies and over the jury found that after the lease of the 20. acres the same predecessor let all the Mannor rendring the antient rent to Wood the Defendant and after one of the Cestui que vies died and he seised two of the Cattle for a herriot and whether this appertained to Wood
reason the factor may sell the goods without ready money and this is good reason for perchance the goods are of that nature that they will not keep without perishing by which clearly it appears that if I deliver goods to another to Merchandise and to sell he may sell them without ready money but if my factor or Bailiff will sell them to one which he knows wâ—ll prove a Bankrupt without ready money this is not good but secondly he held the custome as it is here alledged not to be good for then the partie shall have no remedy for his money except the factor will go into Spain and sue the Bill and the laws of Merchants are special laws for their benefit and not for their prejudice and this custome as it is alledged is too large but if he had alledged that such Bill taken by the factor shall be as good and effectual to the Mr. as if it had been taken in his own name this had been good besides the custome is not good for it is alledged to be that when the factor had delivered the Bill to the owner of the goods this shall be a discharge to him who was the factor and here is no time set within which this may be delivered and so for ought is shewed it may be delivered 10. years after which may be good and to that which had been said that the laws of Merchants are national laws he denied that for every Kingdome had its proper and peculiar laws and though this is the law of Spain and national to them yet this ought to be reasonable or else it shall not binde and judgement was commanded to be entered for the Plantiff Hobert and Winch being only present It was ruled that he who had land in a parish who did not inhabit there shall be chargable to the reparation of the Church but not to the buying of ornaments of the Church for that shall be levied of the goods of the parishioners and not of their lands by Sir Henry Yelverton and said to be so formerly adjudged In trespas the Defendant pleads that one such was possessed of a term for years and bring so possessed by his last will and Testament devised that to the Defendant and died after whose death the Defendant entered and was possessed by vertue of the devisee upon which plea the Plantiff demurred generally and Hutton thought this plea prima facie to be good though the Defendant had not expresly alledged that the devisee died possessed but his plea implies that for he had said that he entered by vertue of the devisee and was possessed and this only matter of form and not matter of substance and no cause of general demurrer which Winch also granted that this was also matter of form and not matter of substance Gage against Johnson for his fees GAge brought an action against Iohnson as his servant and Solicitor to the Defendant in a suit in the Kings Bench taking for every Term 3. s. 4 d. for his fees and for this he brought his action of debt and Serjeant Hitcham moved in arrest of judgement and he urged the case of Samuel Leech an Attourney of this Court in an action upon the case brought by him upon a promise to pay so much for the solliciting of a cause of the Defendant and the opinion was that the action will not lie for it is in nature of maintenance for a Solicitor may not lay out money for his Clyent and if an action upon the case will not lie then much less an action of debt and Hobert said that a Councellor may take fees of his Clyent but he may not lay out or expend money for him and the same law of an Attourney for if he did disburse money for him he doubted much what remedy he should have and he further said a servant may follow business for his Mr. and may take money for his labour for if I retain my servant generally he is not bound to follow my suits at law except at his pleasure for that is an extraordinary service and for that if I will say to my servant that if he will follow my business at Westminster I will give him so much for his pains my servant in this case is not without his remedy but if his service is coupled with Soliciting to take money for his pains his opinion was that no action will lie to which the other justices also agreed and they arose Wright against Black before NOw the case of Wright and of Black was moved again and the case was that Wright had brought an action upon the case against Black and Black for that the Defendants intending to make away his good name and to cause him to lose his goods did maliciously and without cause at Norwich in the County of Norfolk prefer a Bill of indictment at the Sessions of peace containing that the Plantiff stole two bundles of fetches and also did cause and entice one I. S. to give in evidence that the indictment was good and true by reason of which he was bound to Answer that at the next Assiles and there he was accquitted and whether the action was maintainable was the question and Attoe argued that the action is maintainable though it is not shewed that the Bill of indictment was found and he vouched a case which was Hill 10. Iac. B. R. Rot. 921. between Whorewood and Cordery and his wife Defendants which case and judgement was after affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber upon a writ of error and the case was that the Plantiff declared that the Defendants intending to take away his good name did charge him to have ravished Dorothie Coxe and maliciously exhibited a Bill of indictment containing that the Plantiff did felloniously ravish the said Dorothie their daughter and did give this in evidence to the Grand jury who found Ignoramus and yet it was adjudged that an action lies and he cited a case the 19. Iac. in B. R. Deney against Ridgy where was only an indictment preferred concerning the stealing of a horse and no more and yet an action lies Hobert chief Iustice said that if seemed to him that it is actionable for this is as great a scandal to give this in evidence to the Grand jury as to publish this upon an Alebench and as the course of Iustice ought not to be stopped so neither ought the good name of man in things which concern his life be taken away without good cause and I have heard that judgement was given another Term for the Plantiff but quere better of that Hoes case HOes seised of land in fee he devised that to his wife for life the remainder of one parcel of that to Thomas his eldest son the remainder of the other parcel to his youngest son in fee and this devised was with proviso that the feme shall pay his legacies and also his will was that in case his wife died before the payment of his debts and legacies
prayed judgement in the case for the Defendant Finis M. 20. Jac. The Bishop of Glocester against Wood before NOw the case between the Bishop of Glocester and Wood was adjudged Hobert and Winch being only present and first it was resolved by them that when the Bishop let parcel as 20. acres for life and after he lets the Mannor it self to another rendring rent in this case the rent issues out of the intire Mannor for if in debt for the rent the lessor do declare upon a demise of the Mannor omitting the reversion of this parcel the declaration is evill and upon non dimisit pleaded it shall be found against him Secondly this they held that the Herriot reserved shall go with the reversion and if this do not go with the reversion to the lessee of the Mannor yet the Plantiff shall not have the Herriot and then though the Defendant had not good title to the Herriot yet if the property of the Herriot do not appertain to the Plantiff he shall not have a trover and conversion for the Defendant had the first possession and judgement was commanded to be entred for the Defendant if no other cause was shewed before next thursday Hill 20. Jac. C. P. Bulloigne against William Gervase Administrator BUlloigne brought an action of debt upon an obligation of 12. l. against William Gervase Administrator to I. S. and the Defendant pleaded that the intestate died outlawed and that the outlawrie alwayes continued in force and upon this the Plantiff did demur generally and it was argued by Attoe for the Plantiff for the plea is not good for this is a plea only by way of argument that he shall not be charged for this debt because he had not assets and in this case this outlawrie ought to be given in evidence upon nothing in his hands being pleaded and it ought not to be pleaded in barre for by possibility the outlawrie may be reversed and then the Administrator shall be charged if he had any goods and he vouched a case in this Court Trin. 27. Eliz. Rot. 2954. Worley against Bradwel and Dame Manners his wife Administratrix to Sir Thomas Manners and the feme pleaded outlawrie in the intestate and the Plantiff demurred generally and it was adjudged to be no plea and note that the record was brought into the Court and read accordingly Hitcham Serjeant to the contrary the record in Manners case was not well pleaded for the Defendant only shewed that a Capias ad satisfaciendum issued against the Testator and did not shew any recovery or judgement against him and that was the reason of the judgement in that case and the Plantiff here ought to have demurred specially as the case of 27. of Eliz. for otherwise he shall not have advantage of this plea and the plea is only evil for the manner for it is apparant that by the outlawrie of the Testator all his goods are forfeit and this is the reason of the book of 16. E. 4. 4. it is a good plea in an action of debt to plead an outlawrie in the Plantiff and to demand judgement of the action and not judgement of the writ for the debt is forfeit to the King by the outlawrie Hobert Hutton and Winch the president shewed by Attoe is not answered for though the pleading of the outlawrie is without shewing of a recovery and judgement yet the outlawrie is good till it is reversed and Hutton said that in some cases an Executor or Administrator had goods though the Testator died outlawed as if the Testator let for life rendring rent and the rent is behinde and after the Testator is outlawed and dies this shall not be forfeit but his Executors shall have the rent and if a man make a feofment upon condition that the feoffor pay 100. l. to the feoffee and his heirs or Executors and the feoffee is outlawed and the feoffor pay the money to his Executors as he may well the Executors and not the King shall have that also if the Testator is outlawed and he devise his land to his Executors to be sold these moneys shall not be forfeit and they shall agree that the plea was not good notwithstanding the general demurrer for he who will barre another by an argumentative plea his plea ought to be infallible to all intents and purposes and so it is not here for the Executors and the Administrators may be charged by the having of goods though the Testator was outlawed and for that the plea of the Defendant is not good in substance and the general demurrer is good by Hobert and by him if we suffer this plea then the Defendant will keep the goods and not reverse the outlawrie nor yet satisfie the King also if he had not goods the Defendant may plead plene Administravit or nothing in his hands and give this outlawrie in evidence See 8. E. 4. 6. 3. H. 6. 32. 39. H. 6. 37. by the opinion of Prisot and also see the case in E. 4. 5. a case to this purpose and also note well that it was said concerning the case of Manners that a writ of error was brought of that afterwards and that the case remains till this day undetermined Buckley against Simonds Ent. 18. Jac. Rot. 2120. NOw at this day the case of Buckley and Simonds was argued by Iustice Hutton and by Winch and the case was briefly this Anne Buckley Administrator to Andrew Buckley her Husband was Plantiff in a quare Imp. against John Simonds John Prior and Robert Pierce Alias Price for disturbing her to present to the Church of D. and shewed that Andrew Buckley Grandfather of the Husband of the Plantiff was seised of the said advowson in gross and presented one I. S. and he died after whose death the advowson discended to Richard Buckley and that the Church became void and that one Richard Williams usurped upon the said Richard Buckley then being within age and that Richard Buckley also died and by his death the said advowson discended to Andrew Buckley as brother and as heir to Richard and that the Church became void and before the presentment by Andrew and within 6. moneths Andrew died and that the Administration of the goods of Andrew were committed to the Plantiff and that she presented within 6. moneths and the Defendants disturbed her and the Defendants pleaded in barre and confessed the seisin of the Grandfather as is alledged in the declaration and they said that the said Andrew Buckley 14. Eliz. by his Indenture made between the said Andrew Buckley on the one part and John Preston of the other part by which the said Andrew Buckley by the same Indenture covenanted with Preston in consideration of a marriage to be had between John Buckley and Elizabeth Preston daughter of John Preston he covenanted with him and his heirs that immediately after he death of him and of his wife the said advowson inter alia shall be to the said John Buckley
he was seised in fee and that he had power to alien that and this was to encourage the Purchasers and for the form he needs not aver that this was in the hands of Anne Parker for he had confessed that in the bar that he came lawfully to that and besides the Covenant is broken though he never was seised and so I conceive that the Plantiff shall have judgement Winch to the same intent it is true if it had been all but one Covenant then if it had been no question this had not been broken but I think they are several Covenants like to the case of Sir Robert Napper lately adjudged also the first two Covenants are in the affirmative and the other in the Negative and for that they ought to be answered with several pleas and these kinde of assurances are the Common assurances and therefore they ought to be interpreted favourably for the Purchasers and Iohn was not deceived in these Covenants for they brought down upon the deed an estate in fee and it is also agreed if the word Covenant and grant had been divers times added to the several clauses then they had been several Covenants and now it is all one word and made those to be several Covenants and words of relation never will controul that which is certainly put down before and so he concluded in this case the Plantiff shall have judgement to recover Hobert chief Iustice to the contrary every deed ought to be construed according to the intention of the parties and the intents ought to be adjudged of the several parts of the deed as a general issue out of the evidence and intent ought to be picked out of every part and not out of one Word only and here Peter joyned with his father to strengthen the assurance and Iohn had not only his own estate but the estate of Proud and it is plain he never meant to intangle himself with other Conveyances then those which he and Proud had made and I hold this to be no independent Covenant and it is all bound with one clause S. for any Act or Acts made by them c. and it is confessed if these words had been placed in the forefront that then they should relate to all and it is as clear as if they were and the first reson is that the intent appears only to undertake for himself because he should but have part of the land and for that he was to warrant his evidence and to that end he was to deliver to him his title at large in the said indenture and here he had made the Plantiff privie to every several conveyance of that to inform the Purchaser of it and will you also intangle him with a covenant you might have taken notice of his title and it appears to be the very intents of the parties that you should take notice of the title and inform your selves concerning the same Secondly this is a sentence which may be taken both wayes and I say it is agreed that if it had begun with these words notwithstanding any Act or Acts c. that then it shall be all construed by this and I never saw any difference I grant they are several Covenants in point of fact but not in point of obligation for there are not several words of binding nay I say if he had released this last he had released all but it hath been said that one is in the negative and the other is in the affirmative but I do not value that and it hath been said that this is the Common assurance of the Realm and if other construction shall be made then no man shall be sure of his own we had given him leave to say that no reversion nor remainder is in the King by any Act by him made and the King may not have any reversion and he seised in fee also this clause standing indifferent whether this shall be referred to all or not and then the question is how the Court will adjudge of that for my part I take it that this may stand with the intent of all the parties of the deed but take that as you take it that this destroyes all for if he is absolutely seised in fee what matter is where the reversion is and yet if the reversion was in the Crown and not by his Act you confess that may not charge him which is expresly against the first Covenant if this be distinct by it self but take that indifferently and all the parties will stand together Nappers case hath no affinity with this for questionless there were several Covenants for in that indenture it did not appear what estate Sir Thomas Eearsfield had and for that reason nothing might be collected out of that but he had a present estate but in our case all is contained in the bodie of the indenture and Nokes case is a strong case and stronger then the case at the bar is for thereupon construction of all the parties of the deeds the special warrantie controuls the general warranty and the reason is no man will take an express special warranty when the intent is that he shall have a general warranty there was a case lately ajudged between the Earl of Clanrickard and his wife against the Countess of Leicester where the Lady pleaded that she was Tenant in Dower where in veritie she had the revesion in fee expectant upon a Term for life and they conveyed all the estate the Lady had in Dower and then they covenanted that they would convey all their estate to the Lord of Leicester and his heirs during the life of his wife and then Covenanted that they would convey all their estate to the Earl of Leicester and his heirs for ever in the aforesaid land and it was resolved that though such Covenant will raise an use to the partie who ought to have that and so the reversion will pass if there had been no more words now it was but during the life of the Lady for that third part for the Covenant was but to strengthen an estate and not to convey it and so he concluded that the Plantiff should be hard and after it was said by the Court that this case was not of weight to be brought into the Exchequer Chamber and therefore the Court advised that the parties would agree quere for the residue in the Exchequer Chamber concerning that Entred Hill 18. Jac the case of Comendams Richard Woodley against the Bishop of Exeter and Mannering RIchard Woodley brought a quare Impedit against the Bishop of Exeter and Mannering who was Parson of the said Church and he declared that Arthur Basset was seised of an acre of land to which the said Advowson was appendant in his demeasne as of fee and that he the 13. Octobris 13. Eliz. granted the next advowson to one William Manwood who was then incumbent in the said Church who by his will 20. November made one Harcourt his executor
and died by whose death the Church became void the which was the first and the next avoydance after the grant and Harcourt presented Cardon and that the said Arthur Basset so being seised in fee 18. Octobris 17. Eliz. by his will in writing devised to Iohn Basset his son the first and next avoydance of the Church aforesaid which first and next avoydance hapned after the death of the said Arthur Basset and that the said Iohn Basset was possessed of the said next avoydance and the said Chardon being incumbent 29. of September 37. Eliz. he was elected Bishop of Down in Ireland and he being so Elect the Queen by her letters 37. of her Raign considering the smalness of the said Bishoprick that it was not able to maintain him in his episcopal dignitie ex gratia sua speciali concessit Lycensavit et potestatem dedit to the said Chardon Bishop elect that he with the said Bishoprick the rectory of Tedbome in comendum ad huc recepire et fructus de c. in usus suos convertere disponere et applicare valeat et possit habendum that in Comendam for 6. years and within the 6. years he was consecrated and after the Term of the 6. years the Church became void per legis Anglie and that the Queen by her prerogative presented one Bee who was admitted instituted and inducted and the Plantiff conveyed from Iohn Basset his title by his grant of the next avoydance and shewed that the said Church became void by the death of Gee and that the vacation by the death of Gee is the next avoydance after the death of Arthur Basset by reason whereof the Plantiff presented and was disturbed and upon his decla ration Edwards the patron demurred and the Bishop claimed nothing but as ordinary and Manering pleaded and confessed the seisin of Arthur Basset and the grant to Manwood and the presentation by Harcourt of Chardon and the devise to Iohn Basset but he shewed that after the death of Arthur Basset the Acre to which the advowson is appendant descended to Thomas Basset as c. and he being so seised the Church became void by the death of Chardon who had the next avoydance after the death of Arthur Basset and that this remained void by 2. years after his death by which the Queen presented by Lapse the said Gee who was admitted c. and Thomas Basset conveyed that to Edwards and that became void by the death of Gee and that he presented the said Mannering c. absque hoc quod praedicta vacatio Ecclesiae praedictae post Mortem de Gee was the first and next avoydance after the death of Arthur Basset as the Plantiff had alleadged and upon this bar the Plantiff demurred and it was argued by the Councel of both sides on several dayes and in Michaelmas Term ensuing it was argued by the Court but because that Harvey was newly made Iustice he did not argue the case but Iustice Hutton began The argument of Justice Hutton ANd Iustice Hutton after a recital of the case said that his opinion was that the Plantiff should be barred and in the first place it is to be considered whether the King had any title at all to present by the Creation of Chardon to be Bishop Secondly admit that he had title whether he had dispensed with that and by his dispensation he had satisfied his prerogative Thirdly admit that the King had title and that this was not satisfied with the Commendam whether the grantee had lost his turn and as to the first point it ought to be agreed that when a parson is made a Bishop that he is discharged of the Church by the Common Law and so is the 45. Edw. 3. 5. and Dyer 159. petit Broo. 116. and this is an avoydance by Cession and for any thing that I see in our books the King had not any title to present except that he himself was patâ—on but because that did not happen fully in question here I will not deliver any opinion but I will say what our antient books do lay 41. Edw. 35. adjudged that the King shall not present to a prebendary where the prebend was made Bishop and the tithe which the King had to present was by reason that the temporalities of the Bishoprick of which he was prebend was in his hands and see the 7. H. 4. 25. a good case 11. H. 4. 37. Dyer 228. and for Brooks presentation 61. that is but the report of the Chancellor who had that in presentation but our Common Law doth not warrant any such thing and then for the second point whether the King had dispenced with his prerogative and in the first place we are to know that these Commendams were at the first but to see the cure served and by the opinion of Pollard the ordinary is to see the cure served though that be charged with such rents that none would have it and for that Commendams were at the first good but now if the King had title then that began per the consecration otherwise he shall never have it and so is 41. Edw. 3. 5. if consecration doth not give that he shall never have it and hereby his grant to hold that in Commendam he had dispenced with this prerogative and if this had been granted to him for his life none will deny but that he had dispenced with his prerogative and shall never take advantage of that again afterwards and no more in this case for he is incumbent to all intents and purposes for Fitz N B. 36. he may have a Spoliation and yet in this case he is parson and Bishop and now that the King may dispence with that it is not to be doubted and I will compare that with the like cases A. 6. Eliz. Dyer 252. where the King granted the Custody of the land and heir of his Tenant if he died his heir being within age and this grant was to Cantrel and it was agreed to be good and Wardship is as Royal an antient perrogative as any appertains to the Crown and 3. H. 6. title grant 61. the King may grant the temporalities of the Bishoprick before it is void which in my opinion is Cosen German to our case out of which book I conclude the King may dispence and by the dispensation he is full parson and this is for his life for the King may not make him incumbent except it be for life like to the case of Dyer fo 52. where the patron and the ordinary made a confirmation of a lease for part of the time which was made by the parson and agreed that this shall stretch to the whole time and no better case may be put then the case of Packhurst in Dyer 22. 8. where Packhurst was incumbent of the Church of Cleave and was made Bishop of Norwich but before he was created Bishop he had a dispensation from the Arch-Bishop to retain that in Commendam for 3.
years notwithstanding his advancement and he resigned during the 3. years and issue there taken upon the resignation and this case proves all the partes of our case first that the King may dispence and that by his dispensation he is compleat person to resign and if he do resigne during the years the King shall not have the prerogative to present again for that was satisfied with the dispensation and also when the King came to his prerogative by subjects means he ought to take that as it falls for otherwise he loses that quite vide Bastervils case Coo. 7. and another reason is if it be not satisfied then the King shall have another which is mischievous and this being a new case such president is not to have more favour then the necessitie of the Law will require and so my opinion is that it is all one as if it had for life and there is a good case 9. Ed. 3. 20. where the King had 2. presentments vide the case but it was upon another reason but the case of 21. H. 7. 8. Frowike where the grantee of the next avoydance had judgement to recover and the incumbent resigned so that it is the second presentment yet the Plantiff shall have the effect of his judgement and he had a writ to the Bishop quere the application for I did not well heare that but in our case if the prerogative of the King was not satisfied yet it ought to appear that when he presented Gee he had no title but that was an usurpation and if the King was not satisfied then the Plantiff shall not have judgement for then Gee was an usurper and upon that declaration the Plantiff shall be barred but now for the last point admit that the King was satisfied of his prerogative by his presentation of Gee whether the Plantiff had lost his course I think he had in the first place the words of the devise are the first the next avoydance which shall hap after the death of Athur Basset now it hath been objected that the King had the first by his prerogative and therefore he shall have the second I think in this case Brook presentation 52. is a strong case where a presentation was granted to one and after to another when the first is void and ruled that the second grantee shall not have the second and so Dyer 35. it ought to be taken according to the words for otherwise he shall not have any for modus et Conventio uniunt Legem and the case of quare Impedit 152. proves something to this purpose for a man had 4. advowsons and granted the next which should hap of them to I. S. and he died and the heir assigned the wife for her Dower one Mannor to which the advowson was appendant which first became void and ruled that the Grantee shall not have that against the feme and then it was moved by Thorpe that he shall have the second but Shard said certainly never which proves that if the turn of the Grantee was taken from him by the indowment of the feme he had lost that for ever the like case is the 15. H. 7. 7. 14. H. 7. 22. moved by Mordant that the Grantee of the third shall have the fourth when the wife is indowed of the third which case is brought to prove a case which without question is not law and that is that the King being Gardian of the Grantee of the next avoydance and he grant that in this case the heir shall have that at his full age which without question is now law for by the same reason his course may be the 20. but there are two rules from this which seem to cross this opinion one rule is that the words of the grantor shall be taken most strong against himself and the other that the Grantor shall not be received to avoid his own grant as it is said in Davenports case Coo. 8. but yet these rules are to be intended where the words are compleat for as the case is the 13. Ed. 3. Grant 65. that where the husband and his wife are joynt Tenants for life and he in reversion grant the lands only which the husband held in this case nothing passeth for the reversion was expectant upon a lease which the husband and wife held nay I will cite one case where a man by his own Act shall avoid his own grant in a quare Impedit Elmes against Taylor where a man was seised of the Mannor to which the advowson was appendant and he granted the third next avoydance and after against his own grant he usurped and it was adjudged that by this usurpation he had gained the advowson to be appendant to his Mannor again and that the Grantee had lost his course and so the case in Dyer 283. where the Church was void and the patron granted the next avoidance tunc vacant to another and this pro hac unica vice tantum and there resolved that the grant was not good and that it should not extend to another and so in our case it shall not extend to a second another reason is if the King had a prerogative he is bound and every derivative estate under him for he shall not be in better case then the grantee for he was bound by the law of the land and for that it is equitie and it is Iustice that the estate of the grantee should be bound and so in this case like to the case in Plowden 207. and Dyer 231. where by Act of Parliament the possessions of an Abbot were bound now if afterwards the Abbot made a lease for years or granted the next avoydance and then after they came to the King he shall avoid the grant for the interest of the Grantor was bound by Act of Parliament and see the case of the universitie of Oxford Coo. 10. where a man before he was a recusant convict he granted the next avoydance and after he became a recusant convict and then the Church became void now the grantee shall not present for his interest was bound by Act of Parliament and so he must take it and here it behoves him to take that as it is bound with the prerogative of the King and so upon all the matter he hath lost his title and he concluded that the Plantiff shall be barred The argument of Justice Winch. WInch Iustice of the same opinion but because his argument was much to the purpose of that with Hutton and the Lord Hobert therefore I will not Report that verbatim and Winch said I will speak to the last point which was moved by my brother Hutton and I hold that where he had the first granted to him now he shall have none at all for it is punctually expressed that he shall have the first and that shall not extend to the next which may be granted but I grant if two coparceners had an advowson and the eldest presented and
in Plowdon and the 5. Ed. 4. 41. and yet I grant that an Act of Parliament may make a thing void which was good but so may not a fine and so held the verdict had not aided that The residue of Michaelmas Term in the two and twentieth year of King James ANd now he argued to the third point which is the great point whether those words if Robert do not pay make a subsequent or a precedent condition and I hold that it is a precedent condition and this interpretation stands best with the intentions of the parties for before Ann had an estate for life and Robert in fee and if a present use will arise then Ann shall have all presently and leave nothing to Robert but if the uses do forbear setling till the first of September and arise according to payment and all the doubt stands upon this word if which is some time taken as a limitation as if a man gives land to another and to the heirs of his body and if he die without issue then to another there if is a limitation as it is in Bestons case but here this refers to a contingencie and therefore it is a condition and saving the opinion of Hide and of Mountague in Colthursts case I hold that if there was a condition and regularly if is a note of a precedent condition and I will first prove that by Logick for the word are an intire Hypothetical proposition S. the use shall be to An if c. and in this is a Histeron proteron invertio ordinis partium that the consequent should be before the Antecedent in this manner if Robert do not pay 10. l. to Anne the first of September then it shall be to the use of Anne and so quelibet pars in Loco proprio redigenda est and then if it is so it is no doubt but this is a precedent condition and he cited Wheelers case 14. H. 8. a man granted his Term if he could procure the good will of his Lessor and this was adjudged to be a precedent condition and so is Bracton Lib. 2. cap. 6. if the condition is in futuris then it is alwayes precedent as to do talem rem si dederis mihi 10. s. there it is said valet donatio sed suspenditur tanquam c. and if we observe quite thorough Wheelers case this is alwayes a note of a precedent condition and yet I grant that in some case it may be a note of a subsequent condition but that is quando impediatur c. as in the principal case in Colthirst si vellet inhabitare there of necessitie this ought to be a subsequent condition Now the next point is whether the condition is discharged by the the death of Robert before the first of September and I hold that it is for If distinguisheth as if the word had been that if Robert do not pay yet if he die before the day he is discharged of the payment for there was not any default in him for all Humane contracts must give way to this Statute of mortalitie Statutum est omnibus mori and there was not any default in the heir of Robert for he was not bound to pay and therefore he needs not to do that being to his prejudice but my chief reason is upon the general rule of all conveyances for our law in its institution was a Law of mercy and will indeavour to iustifie Acts made in obedience to that and to excuse defaults of disobedience and this is the reason of Master Littletons case if a feofment is made upon condition that if the feoffor pay 10. l. such a day c. now that being to reduce an estate is not taken litterally but if the heir or executor pay that this is sufficient to reduce the estate and so it may be paid at other places and to other Parsons and so if the condition is to be performed of the part of the feoffee there his feoffee may pay that The next point is whether any notice is requisite and he held that there ought to be notice because the heirs are ignorant of that and in some case where a man is bound to take notice of that yet by the Act of Law that shall be discharged as in Sir Andrew Corbets case but now for that last point Cook 4. whether the antient estate for life is gone and it is clear it was gone by the Common Law but the question is whether it is within the saving of the Statute of the 27. H. 8. and I hold it is not for this is repugnant to the estates conveyed and to the uses limited true if this had been a lease for years then it had been saved as is resolved in Lillingstons case Cook 7. and Dyer 344. but this being a freehold confounds the nature of the fine if it shall be saved for the nature of such a fine is to carry a Franktenement and this is repugnant to the uses limited for it is presently in Anne and her heirs if Robert do not pay and for that if the Franktenement is saved there is no uses limited of that which is contrary to the intent of the parties and also here the Conusee took an interest by the fine and for this it is out of the saving of the Act of Parliament and so I pray judgement for the Plantiff The argument of Serjeant Finch Recorder of London LEinuage Finch Serjeant and Recorder of London contrary and after a Recital of the case said that I think judgement ought to be given for the Defendant it is usually said finis finem imponet Litibus but here our fine had not that sence for that had been questioned in all the Courts of Westminster and now it is come to this Court where we ought to have begun for this is the proper Court to determine the right of inheritances ergo spero sumus in Loco proprio and therefore shall be at rest and the case upon this special verdict stands upon two points First whether by the indenture and fine the Lady Cesar had gained the inheritance Secondly if she had not gained the inheritance whether she had kept her first estate and for the first there are three pertinent points moved by my brother Crawley to which I will add a fourth First whether the words make a precedent or subsequent condition Secondly whether the death of Robert had discharged that and that is become impossible Thirdly admit that this is become impossible whether the use will arise to the Lady Cesar and I hold that it will arise to the Lady Cesar Fourthly whether any notice is requisite and here first by the way whether an infant may limit the uses of a fine I will not argue that for so it is resolved in Beckwiths case and so is it cited in Mary Portingtons case to be adjudged and there was one Lewes case 26. Eliz. before Wray and Anderson and the reason is apparant that
had two sons and he do Covenant in consideration of natural affection that if the eldest return from Rome by such a day that then he will stand seised to his use and if he do not return then he will stand seised to the use of the youngest son now if in this case the eldest die before the day so that it is become impossible that he should return yet that will not hinder the raising of the use to the youngest son and so in Dyer 331. the limitter may not have any estate against his own limitation of his uses for this is his own fact and so in our case it is his own default to make such a limitation and now for the fourth point whether any notice is requisite to the heirs and first I agree that in many cases a man shall not lose a thing except he had notice but there are two exceptions from this rule upon which I will put some cases and then I will applie them and first the ordinary may present by laps and he needs not to give notice for it s supposed in law that the ordinary will in 6. moneths see whether the cure is served or no nay if the patron was a Purchasor and a stranger present he had lost his inheritance and yet no notice ought to be given and the 12. H. 7. if the Tenant of the Lord do die without heir and a stranger do enter and Abates and dies seised now the Lord had lost the benefit of the escheat and yet perchance he had no notice of that and so was the opinion of Dyer and Welch 4. Eliz. that if two Copartners make partition in this case the Lord ought to take notice at his peril and secondly when one is bound to take notice at his peril as in Westby's case Cook 3. the new Sheriff ought to take notice of the Execution upon the prisoners when he takes them and so is the first of H. 7. 4. a man being bound to perform an arbitrement he ought to take notice of that at his peril but in our case here is a presumption in law that he had notice for he had the land from his ancestor and in the same degree and so the law doth intend that he had notice of the conditions and if he had not it is the default of his Ancestor that he had not left his deeds with him Secondly the heir is privie to the condition this doth descend to him and therefore he ought to take notice of that and put the case that an Action of debt is brought against the heir upon the obligation of his father and he pleads he had nothing by discent and it is found that he had a reversion expectant upon a Term for life of which he had not notice of yet that will not excuse for the law intends that he had notice and that he shall be charged as if it were his own debt and also the deed after the death of his Ancestor doth appertain to him and if the deeds are kept from him he may have an action for them and besides here no man is bound to give him notice for if it should be given it ought to be given to the heir or to the Executors for they may both save the land by the performance of the condition nay if there be 20. Coheirs there ought to be notice given to them all because they are to lose their inheritance by that and it is not like to the case which was adjudged where there are two obligors to make such an assurance as the obligee shall devise there a devise to one is sufficient because this concerns a personal thing but otherwise when this doth concern an inheritance as here but I relie upon the reason of the first forming of the deed if I am not bound to give notice at the time of the making of the deed I shall not be bound to give notice by any matter ex post facto and yet I do agree that in many cases where a thing is certain at the first and doth refer to some future agreement that in such cases there ought to be notice given to the partie as Hill 12. Iac. in this Court Rot. 109. where a promise was made upon a consideration Trin. 22. Jac. C. P. that the other will with draw his suit which he had in the Exchequer that then he will give to him so much when he came into Somersetshire and adjudged that the partie ought to give notice when he came in to Somersetshire but in our case every thing is certain at the time of the making of the deed 38. Assises 7. if a feofment is made upon condition to regrant to the feoffor and his heirs if in this case the feoffor do die he is not bound to regrant to his heirs without a request another reason is who shall give notice to the Lady that Foyn is dead she is bound to take notice of that at her peril and also if the Lady had died who shall give notice to the Executors that they may attend to receive the money for if they do not attend this is a peremptory refusal and for that reason it is equitie that if no notice is to be given of one side then there shall be none given of the other side and so I conceive that there doth not need any notice and now for the last point c. of the estate for life whether if no fee do arise whether she had lost her estate for life and first this is no Forfeiture for here he in reversion is partie but it is said that this is extinct but let us examine if this had been before the Statute of uses no more use will result then was before and for the estate for life that is saved and it was resolved Trin. 5. Iac. that if Tenant for life grant his estate by fine to another and yet he doth express no use that it shall be to the use of the partie because that the Law intends that by this it is disburthened of the danger of waste but in our case the estate of the Conusee is saved by the Statute of the 27. H. 8. for this saves all rights titles possessions c. of those who shall be seised to any use and so was it adjudged in Cheny and Oxenbridge his case that the Term for years was saved but the doubt in that case was not whether a Term was saved which he had to his own use but that which he had to the use of his wife and adjudged that this was saved and 32. Eliz. it was ruled in the Chancery between Tates and Willers that if he in reversion do infeof lessee for years and two others there it was ruled that the Term was saved and so it was adjudged Trin. 17. Iac. Rot. 246. Francis Priors case that where the lessee for years is and he in reversion levies a fine to the lessee to the intent that he suffer a
recovery here the Term is saved and yet for the time the lessee was seised to his own use but because that the fine was Preparatory to inable him to suffer the recovery now in this case after the recovery suffered that will look back to the first agreement of the parties and so the Statute hath saved the Term and for that reason if the Statute do save a Term which is of small account much more a freehold and so he prayed judgement for the defendant see more after The case of Hilliard and of Sanders entred Mich. 20. Jac. Rot. 1791. HIlliard brought a replevin against Michael Sanders for the taking of Beasts in a place called Kingsbury and the Defendant avowed and shewed that Sir Ambrose Cave was seised in his demeasne as of fee of Kingsbury where the place in which c. is parcel and 14. Feb. 16. Eliz. granted a rent charge of 42. l. 8. s. 4. d. to one Thomas Bracebridg and to the heirs of Thomas upon Alice to be ingendred the remainder to the right heirs of Thomas and Thomas had issue John and Thomas died and then Iohn his son died having issue Anne the wife of the Avowant in whose right he avowed for the rent of half a year c. 21. l. 4. s. 2. d. due at W. in Bar of which avowrie the Plantiff pleaded that true it is that Sir Ambrose Cave was seised of the Mannor c. and he made the grant according and that Sir Ambrose Cave died seised and that the said Mannor descended to Mary his daughter as daughter and heir to him who was married to one Mr. Henry Knowles and shewed that he was seised and then shewed that the 12. Iac. it was agreed between the said Sir Thomas Bracebridg and Alice his wife Mich. 22. Jac. C. P. and the said Henry Knowles and mary his wife that for the extinguishment and final determination of the said rent that Thomas and Alice should levie a fine to Henry and Mary of the said lands and Tenements aforesaid by the name of the Maniior of Kingsbury 300. Acres of land and of divers other things but no mention was made of the rent and this fine was upon Conusance of right as that which they had c. and also they released all the right which they had in the land to Henry and to Mary and then shewed that after the death of Mary this land descended to two daughters one being now married to the Lord Willoughby the other to the Lord Paget under whom the Plantiff claimed to which the avowant said by protestation that there was no such agreement and for plea that the rent was not comprised and upon that it was demurred in Law and now Serjeant Attoe this Term argued for the Plantiff and the substance of his argument was in this manner Attoe said the case was Tenant in tail of a rent charge agreed with the Tenant of the land to extinguish that and that he would levie a fine of the land to the land Tenant which is upon Conusance of right and upon release which fine is levied accordingly whether this cuts off the tail of the rent and I hold that it will and I do not finde any opinion in all the Law against this but only the opinion of Thornton in Smith and in Stapletons case in Plowden which I do not esteem to be a binding authoritie and the case is Tenant in tail of a rent disseised the land Tenant and levied a fine with proclamation of the same fine to a stranger now said Thornton this shall not bar the issue in tail of the rent because the fine was only levied of the land and he cited this to prove another case which is Tenant in tail of land accepted a fine of a stranger as that which he had c. and he rendered to him a rent and he said that his issue may avoid that rent and this case I grant because the rent was not intailed but for the other case I openly denie that and there is much difference between those two cases for a fine levied of the land may include the rent as well as the land but it is impossible that a fine of rent should include the land and our case here is pleaded to be of the land and of the rent and a fine of the land may carry the rent inclusively because it is a fine of a thing intailed yea it is not a new thing that rent should be carried inclusively by way of extinguishment in the case of a feofment and then á fortiori in a fine which is a feofment upon Record and especially when it is levied on purpose to extinguish the rent and the Statute of fines is more strong for that is of any lands Tenements and hereditaments any wayes intailed to any person c. but this rent is an hereditament intailed to the person who levied the fine and this which is carried inclusively is within the Statute nay if a man had nothing in the land yet if it was intailed to him who levied the fine this shall bar the estate tail for ever as if Tenant in tail made a feofment to G. S. and after that he did levie a fine to a stranger of the same land that in this case the issue shall never avoid this and yet neither the Conusor nor the Conusee had any thing in the land and see for Archers case Cook 3. where the issue in tail levied a fine in the life of his ancestor and a good bar and yet there he had but a possibilitie and so was the case of Mark-williams Mich. 19. Jac. Rot. 763. C. B. where all the distinctions were made for Henry Mark-williams was heir apparant to his Mother who was Tenant in tail and he levied a fine in the life of his Mother and died without issue and then his Mother died and it was ruled that this did not bar the sister heirs because she may have that and never make mention of her brother but in our case if the rent had been granted in fee it had been no question but that a meer release will extinguish that and I think a fine with proclamation is as forcible to extinguish a rent which is intailed as a release is for a rent in fee another reason is this is a fine directly of the rent though this is by the name of land and also this is upon Conusance of right c. and also in that he released and remised to the Conusees all his right in the said land but a case out of Bendloes Reports may be objected Tenant in tail accepted a fine of the land and rendred that for life ruled the issue is not barred but first I do not allow this case to be good law but if it be good law the reason is because he accepted only a fine of the land and for that it only extends to that and not to the rent as if a man is seised
mean time the second point is whether the heir of Robert Foyne may pay that or is bound to perform that then the law dispenceth with that for it is limited if Robert do not pay and so it is personall to him like to the case in Plowden when a thing is reserved to be made by the person of a man no other man may perform that neither the heir nor yet the Executor as in Dyer 66. 8. H. 4. 19. 21. Ed. 3. 29. where the heir is not named he is not charged and 10. Ed. 4 12. 11. Ed. 3. 16. and so in this case because it is personally limited to Robert Foyn and ergo if he do die there the law will not compel the heir and that is the reason of Littletons case fol. 76. for there though the father Morgaged and the son is not named in the condition yet because he had an interest in the condition he may perform that and so the case fol. 77. the feoffee of the feoffee may perform that though it is annexed to the first feoffee only and this is for the salvation and safety of his estate and in the first case being in A. Morgage the law said that the heir shall not be prejudiced but when it is a voluntarie Act and in point of discretion to the father there the son may not perform that and here the law had prevented the father in the point of election ergo it is discharged and it is like to the case of the Countess of Arundel where a thing is annexed to the person of a man no other may perform it and so here the heir may not perform that for it is discharged by the death of Robert Thirdly admit that he may perform that then the question is whether default of notice may not excuse and here the Lady was a partie to this condition in the indenture and here the ignorance of the fact may excuse and when the law doth put a man upon a necessitie there it will excuse him as 44. Ed. 3. 61. and 50. Ed. 3. 39. and so the Law will not impose a necessitie of notice upon him The residue of the case of Cooper and Edgar by Serjeant Crook BVt Crook said that he being heir is bound to take notice but for answer to that I will cite you one express case Francis case Cook 8. for there the heir was not bound to take notice of the proviso in the feofment without notice given to him of it Winch that case directly complies with our case and so Farmers case Cook 3. lessee for years in possession levies a fine that doth not bar the reversioner because he continued in possession at the same time and he had not notice of that and here if the Ancestor had not died seised there had been some colour that he might have had notice and this differs from Littletons case where the heir may pay the Morgage that in that case he ought to take notice at his peril because he did not die seised Corbets case and see 4. Coo. 8. where land is given to executors to take the profits there resolved that default of notice doth not hurt them but they shall hold against the heir now for that last point whether the estate for life is saved by the Statute of the 27. H. 8. or whether it is gone by the acceptance of the fine and I think it is gone and yet I agree if it had been lessee for years it had been within the saving of the Statute because he is but a conduit pipe to convey that but in our case when it is by limitation of the use then it will not be saved because that it is by her own provision that the use is so limited to her and so the law will not aid that and by the common Law it is an express determination of the estate 1. H. 7. also the cases of Tenant for years being within the saving of the Statute doth in no sort help this case for it may well stand with the estate but out of the freehold the uses do arise and besides the law will not provide for him who had not provided for himself as 5. H. 7. 7. if a man made a gift intaile rendring rent the Law will not raise any other tenure and it is a rule in law that a man shall not take an estate by implication where he had expresly limited an estate to himself and to that purpose there was a good case Hill 13. Eliz. between Richmond and Bowcher where a lease was made rendring rent to the lessor his executors and his assigns and there the lessor died and it was ruled in that case that the Executors nor the assignes shall not have that nor the heir for it was not reserved to him and in 16. Iac. one Farmers case where such a lessee for years took a feofment with an intent to suffer a recovery but he continued in possession two terms after before he suffered the recovery and yet it was adjudged the Term for years was saved but here he being Tenant of the freehold this may not stand with the limitation of the uses and so I pray judgement for the Plantiff The argument of Davenport Serjeant DAvenport to the contrary after a Recital of the case said that he thought this to be a subsequent condition for here are two uses limited and so there is two conditions for the first if if he do not pay this is subsequent and the estate doth proceed but the other is precedent and the estate is subsequent and the sole difference when if makes a precedent and when a subsequent condition is upon the words for in this case words make the case and if the estate is limited first and then the condition seems annexed in words to determine that in that case it is a subsequent but if the Act is first appointed to be made and then the estate is limited by express words there the estate will not begin till the tunc is performed and so is the very difference 14. H. 8. 22. and there the principal case is adjudged to be subsequent and upon that difference is 15. H. 7. and Coo. 7. where the estate is first limited and then the condition is after that and the meaning of the parties was that the Lady shall have the fee if the other will not redeem that and I desired to be tried by no other cases then those which my brother Crook had cited Mary Portingtons case si is a proper word to determine an estate and then the estate ought to be before and for the difference between things executed and things Executory under favour that is no difference but that is as the words are placed and I denie the case of Executors put by my brother Crook and so I say it is a present estate but it is defeasable after by payment but now for the second point whether it was discharged by the death of Robert or whether
the heir may pay that and I think that its impossible to avoid Mr. Littleton and my brothers difference of Morgage is no difference and Littleton saith that the heir may perform that because he hath an interest in the condition and the reason is not because he is charged and so the case of the feoffee may perform that and yet in both cases it is annexed as personally as it may be and Sect. 337. no mention is made of the Morgage but it s in this case if the condition had been that a stranger should pay that then this is meerly personal and so is Hill 28. Eliz. between Waltham and Ashworth if an heir is bound to perform a condition then a stranger may not perform that but any who had an interest as Gardian in Soccage or Chivalry and here by reason of the interest of the heir by the non-payment he had broken the condition for this is an hereditarie condition or limitation by which the heir had an interest now for the third point whether he is bound not having notice and I do conceive that because the notice is ancestrel and he was partie to that and so there was an original notice upon the agreement which is also hereditarie and discends to the heir and that shall force him to take notice of that at his perill but if it had been collateral to the father there I grant that will not binde the son without express notice as in Francis case for there was not any Act by which the father was bound to take notice and I desire no better case then Sir Andrew Corbets case Fourthly the estate for life is not drowned by the common law neither by the Statute for it is grounded upon the Condition and so there is not any Surrender in the case and when an agreement is that such a fine shall be levied now that shall be understood to be meant only of the reversion and he cited Sharingtons case where Tenant for life levied a fine upon conusance of right to him in reversion to the use of others there because it might not appear to be otherwise the estate of the Conusee was saved and Farmers case where a lease was made to Farmer for years rendring rent and after he bargained and sold the reversion for 41. years and then made an indenture between the lessor and the lessee and one of the bargainees that the recovery shall be suffered to the use of them and their heirs and adjudged the reversion for years was saved and so I pray judgement for the Defendant The argument of Serjeant Finch Pasch 1. Carol. ANd the following Term the case was argued by Henage Finch Serjeant of the King for the Plantiff and he said the first point is whether this made a precedent or a subsequent condition in which there had been much Logick used and it had been said that it is a rule in law that when a state is first limited and there are words of condition to devest that in that case there is a subsequent condition which ground I will not denie but I denie that here the estate is first limited for though that seems to be in words yet it is not in the intents of the parties but here first I will note an ordinary difference in our books that proviso and sub conditione are notes of a subsequent condition si of a precedent condition as appears by Mr. Littleton and the reason of this difference is because proviso and sub conditione make a full proposition and so doth not the word si and I compare that with Henry Finches case where aut and alibi never begin a sentence and so si never made an entire proposition but the proposition is that the fine shall be to the use of the Lady if Robert do not pay which is an Hypothetical proposition knit with a copulative conjunction and then the antecedent ought to be si for all doth depend upon that but it hath been objected that this is not an antecedent for it is put in the last place but I say put that where you will si will rule the sentence and will have a construction in the first place S. if Foyn do not pay 10. s. the first of September then that shall be to the use of the Lady and her heirs and there are many cases where si being so transposed will make a precedent condition 1. H. 4. 4. where the Iudges will receive the Attorney of the vouchee if his Master will consent there he is no Attorney till he do assent 3. H. 6. 71. per Martin a man made another his Executor if he will be bound to I. S. in that case before he is bound to I. S. he may not maintain an action as an Executor and so by those authorities 7. Ed. 3. 41. 14. H. 8. Whistlers case and Dyer 159. now for the second point whether by the death of Foyn the condition is discharged and I hold that it hath discharged that and I hold Littletons case where a day is limited and where not will aid me and I conceive that in many cases where Acts are not judicially annexed to the person of a man yet they may be discharged by the death of the parties if they are Colateral Acts and put the case that the use had been so limited that if I. S. do not pay so much money before c. now if I. S. do die before the day it is no question but that the condition is discharged and also if it had been limitted in this manner if Foyn do not pay this to a stranger ther by death also it is discharged and the difference I conceive is when the money is to be paid as a duty and where as a penaltie and this difference I learn of Mr. Plowden in the argument of Sir Thomas Treshams case reported by the Lord Cook and also by the Lord Dyer and by Dyer it is said that such a summe of money to be paid to the feoffes is not my duty and therefore I say this Colateral Act is meerly discharged by the death of Foyn and Littleton seems to implie so much for in all the cases of Morgages he saith that the Executor or heir may pay that but when he comes to such a feofment made to the feoffee to pay money on his part he said that if he alien the land the partie himself or the vendee may pay that but not the heirs nor Executors of the feoffees and there was a case 18th Eliz. in this Court A. levied a fine to B. and his heirs upon condition that if he pay so much to the son of A. when he comes to the age of 18. years then to the use of B. and if not to A. and his heirs and the son died before the day and the opinion was that B. shall have that now for the last point whether the estate for life is gone and I hold that it is and here he agreement of
the parties hinders the operation of the law and that law will not provide for him that provides not for himself and the Lady her self was partie to the limiting of the uses and she covenanted that she will be seised by vertue of the fine and under the condition in the indenture and so it is a plain Surrender of her former estate and so I pray judgement for the Plantiff The argument of Serjeant Hendon to the contrary HEndon contrary there are 3. points First whether this be a precedent or a subsequent condition and I conceive it is subsequent and here the indentures being but to declare the uses of the fine and not to create any use ergo it shall be guided by the intents of the parties appearing in them and so is the Earl of Rutlands case Cook 5. and Dyer 357. and Shelleys case and the meaning of the parties was not to raise any use to Robert but only a possibilitie to reduce that by the performance of the condition and first it is here said that the Conusee shall be seised to the uses hereafter expressed and under the conditions and then the use ought to preceed the condition for no man may stand seised under the condition except the condition is subsequent to the use to arise Secondly when is the use to arise to Robert surely when he payes 10. s. and then in the mean time the use is to the Lady and her heirs for tunc had here relation to when as it is said in Boles case Cook 3. and in Grants case cited in Loves case Cook 10. and 17. Ed. 3. 1. all which cases prove that tâ—en had relation to when and before this when he had nothing and this doth appear to be the agreement of the parties and now for the words themselves I take it that they make a subsequent condition and so it is here limited in intention and for that in matter also and it is said in Colthirsts case in Plowden that if the estate doth first pass reducible upon condition then it is subsequent and here it is limited to the Conusee and his heirs if the Conusor do not pay but here it hath been said is inversio verborum and the consequent is placed before the Antecedent and this hath been proved by Logick I never knew cases in law to be expounded by Logical and Grammatical learning but by the intentions of the parties and here I conceive that the estate is vâ—sted in the Conusee by the fine and so the condition is subsequent but admit it is Executory and I say concerning that there are these differences that if the state of the thing granted is executory and that the condition of the thing granted is Executory and the condition is to remain with the estate so long as the estate doth remain the condition is precedent 28. E. 3. 2 4. 3. 1. H. 6. 32. but if the condition be but one time to be executed and that not contained with the estate then it is subsequent 10. Eliz. Dyer Calthorps case but here our estate is executed for it is expresly limited to the Lady Cesar and her heirs which takes away all implied uses so that no implied use shall result in the mean time and so 75. Assises land given to a man and to his heirs if he have heirs of his body now this if is subsequent and so I conceive that it is not a condition simply but a conditional limitation for it appears by Mr. Littleton because it is no otherwise expressed and another reason is because the condition is annexed to the future time ergo that is subsequent and yet I grant there is a difference betwixt such an estate conditional annexed to an interest and where it is is annexed to an authoritie it may be precedent but for an interest it is subsequent as is the case of Bracton lib. 2. fo 3. and now for the second point whether the heir may and ought to perform that and I do conceive that he is and it is not annexed to the person because it is real and doth arise with the land Secondly yet the law doth expect who ought to have performed that but it is the performance it self which the law doth respect 4. E. 3. 2. such condition real which doth arise with the land and in such a case no notice is in that case requisite and the last point is whether the estate for life is gone and I hold that it is saved by the common law of England for the fine only is as the grant of the reversion by the explanation of the indenture and then there is no surrender in the case but when the condition is performed the estate for life doth remain and so was it resolved in Mr. Mansors case and yet I agree that a litle matter will make a surrender and Mr. Ruds case where lessee for years of an advowson was presented by the Patron that was a surrender but the Statute of the 27th of H. the Eighth at the end saved that though it is to her own use for the words of the saving are to every person and their heirs which hereafter shall be seised to any use all such former rights c. possession c. as they might have had to their own use in any lands whereof they be seised to any other use whatsoever and so upon the whole matter I do conceive that judgement ought to be given for the Defendant The residue of the case of Gibson and Ferrers NOw the case of Gibson and Ferrers which see before was argued again by Serjeant Bridgman and he said as before the award is not good for the interest and yet he now agreed that covenants bonds and contracts for usury are good in law but yet it may not be awarded 17. Ed. 4. 5. if a man do submit to Arbitrators they may not award that he and his wife shall levie a fine but if the partie himself do promise that this is good and shall binde the wife to perform that and besides he said that here is an award made only of one side and nothing is allowed to Ferrers and so not good 9. Ed. 4. 29. 29. H. 6. 22. and I pray that the Plantiff may be barred Hendon to the contrary and he argued if an award be good in any part though it be not in that which is assigned for breach yet it is good upon such plea of nullum fecerit arbitrium and the other shews an award and assignes the breach in this case the breach is not traversable for it is of the form and not of the substance of the action but to that the Court did presently answer that the cause of the action is the breach of the award and this he ought to make apparent to the Court for otherwise he shall not have any action and though the breach is not traversable yet it is of the substance of the action for upon such plea pleaded he not only
this rent for this is forced in by the name of land which is absurd and contrary and here is not any fine levied directly of the rent nor any Silver of the King paid for that but only by the judgement of consequence and now for the Statutes of fines whether it is a fine within these Statutes and I hold that it is not and I am of opinion that if the rent had been behinde before all the dayes of proclamation pass and the issue had accepted that he is remitted and the same law is if Tenant in taile of such a rent and he acknowledge such a fine with proclamations and the proclamations pass now if his issue had accepted the rent before the proclamations passed he is remitted and now for the Statute of 32. H. 8. that is not taken by equitie because it is a Statute of explanation which regularly may not be inlarged and so appears in Butler and Bakers case and now for the agreement it self that is not any thing for this is by a contrary name which may not be good like to the case of the Lord Cromwel for there was an agreement to raise a rent by fine but here is an agreement to pass a rent by another name and will any man say that if a man agree to levie a fine of rent by the name of an advowson that this will pass the rent and I think that the case of Thornton is good law and so is also the case which is put after that of the advowson and yet I agree if Tenant in tail do accept a fine with render to another for years that shall bar him because that doth not work a discontinuance but otherwise where it is for life and so in my opinion the rent remains and the avowant shall have judgement The argument of the Lord chief Justice Hobert HObert to the contrary the short question is whether the rent is extinct by the fine of the land and I hold that it is and it is agreed it is a bar against the parties themselves though not against the issue and that being granted I see no second reason wherefore the issue shall not be barred and first I am of opinion that this plea of not comprised it is not good because this fine doth work by way of release but it was said at the bar that things ought to pass litterally in a fine which I denie and also every informalitie of a fine which is cause to reject that is not a cause to frustrate that when that is levied and the words of the Statute are of any lands Tenements or hereditaments any wise intailed and if there be any word in the conveyance which will carry that it is sufficient and it shall be put upon the construction of the law and as to that that the fine shall be according to the writ of covenant but I say if there be no writ of covenant then there is no departure but it was said that the Silver of the King was not paid which I also denie for it was paid inclusively and the words of the Statute are of any thing any wise intailed and Tenant in taile had as great power to pass that by fine as Tenant in fee simple and for the case of Thornton I know he was a learned man but let it suffice that he was so esteemed but for his opinion I do utterly denie that and I do denie the case put by my brother Hutton of the Piscary for I hold if a man had a Piscary in another mans land and levies a fine of that by the name of land this will pass the Piscary clearly and so the same if a man have an office appertaining to land intailed and a fine is levied of that by the name of the land this shall bar the issue and I denie that Statutes of explanation shall alwayes be taken litterally for it is impossible that an Act of Parlâ—ament should provide for every inconvenience which happens and so the case of Godfrey and Wade adjudged that the fine of the youngest son may not bar the eldest and yet within the words the eldest was heir to him but this word heir shall be expounded as his heir and so we use to expound the Statute of 4. H. 7. which is an original Statute and bindes parties and privies and here the eldest brother is not privie for he claimes before him and so I conclude that the rent is gone and judgement was given accordingly Sir Robert Hitcham against Brooks SIr Robert Hitcham Serjeant of the King brought an action upon the case against Brooks and set forth in his declaration that he was one of his Majesties Serjeants at law and that the Defendant spoke these words of him I doubt not but to prove he innuendo Sir Robert Hitcham hath spoken treason and upon not guiltie pleaded it was found for the Plantiff and now it was moved in arrest of judgement by Hendon first because it is not a direct affirmation that he spake treason but he doubts not but to prove that like to Penticosts case which was adjudged here where one Baker said of him I will prove that Penticost was perjured and no action will lie because he did not directly affirm that he was perjured Secondly because he had not shewed when he spoke those words and perchance it was in his infancie or lunacie or before the general pardons Thirdly here is not any allegation of any conference had of the King before and the speach of Treason is not Treason but when there is an intent to commit that and words shall be taken in the best sence as the case of Stanhop Cook 4. and so in the case between the Earl of Shrewsbury and Sir Thomas Stanhop one laid to Sir Thomas Stanhop that the Earl is a subject nay said Sir Thomas that is his grief and adjudged those words are not actionable and yet the words might be taken as if he had repined to have a Soveraign but the words were taken in the best sence Finch to the contrary this is more then a bare affirmation for he said he doubted not but to prove that asmuch as if he had said I am sure of that and Mich. 16. Iac. Sidnams case where one said I think in my conscience that if Sir Iohn Sidnam might have his will he would kill the King and all his good subjects and adjudged upon a writ of error brought of that the words are actionable and so in Whorewoods case so sure as you beleeve that God rules the world and that the King rules the Kingdome so sure did Whoorwood steal such goods and adjudged to be actionable and yet perchance the partie to whom he spake did not beleeve either of them and so Woods case 18. Iac. I will call him in question for killing of a man I will pawn my shirt but I will hang him and so here and prayed judgement for the Plantiff Ashley Serjeant contray words which may be taken
his son and to Elizabeth Preston and to the heirs of John and so the Defendant claimed by vertue of a lease for 1000. years made by Iohn Buckley and the Plantiff demanded Dyer of the Indenture which was read to this effect that Andrew Buckley by the said Indenture covenanted with Preston that in consideration of a marriage between his son and the daughter of Preston that he will grant a rent charge of 6. l. 13. s. out of his land at Weymouth and at Melcombe Regis payable at 4. usual feasts and he Covenanted for him and his heirs that he would convey the land in Melcombe Regis and Wike Regis to such persons as Preston should appoint provided that the said Andrew Buckley and his wife may injoy that during their lives without impeachment of waste and covenanted that immediately after their deaths the lands shall immediately remain come and be to the said Iohn Buckley and Elizabeth his wife and that the advowson of Bradway shall remain come and be to the said Iohn Buckley and Elizabeth his wife and upon all the matter the question was whether by this last covenant an use will arise of the advowson in Bradway to Iohn Buckley for if an use is raised to him then this lease made by him is good and by consequence the title of the Defendants is good to present to this advowson and if not then the fee alwayes remained in Andrew Buckley the Grandfather and by devise discends did come to Andrew Buckley the Husband of the Plantiff and thâ—n the quare Impedit is maintainable And Hutton began his argument he argued that no use will arise to Iohn Buckley by this Indenture for when a man will raise an use by way of covenant there are 4. necessary things which ought to concur First is a sufficient consideration as of blood or marriage or other Collateral considerations as if I covenant with you that when you infeoffe me of certain land I will stand seised to the use of you and your heirs this is good but if the consideration be for money then this ought to be inrolled or otherwise no use will arise the second point is there ought to be a deed to testifie this agreement for otherwise no use will arise as was resolved 38. Eliz. in Collard and Collards case Thirdly he who covenants ought to be seised of the laâ—d at the time of the covenant as was resolved 37. Eliz. in Yelvertons case a man covenanted to stand seised to the use of his son of such lands as he should afterwards purchase and it was holden void because he was not seised at the time of the covenant and lastly the uses must agree with the rules of the Common law Cook 1. and he cited Chudleys case a man covenanted to stand seised to the use of one for years the remainder to the right heirs of I. S. this remainder is void though this is by way of covenant and use for the free-hold may not be in abeyance and so if I will at this day bargain and sell my lands in fee they shall not pass without the word heirs for it was not the intention of the said Statute to raise uses in such mannor contrary to the rules of the Common law or uses which are uncertain and in our case the intent was that no present use shall arise for out of the same land is granted a rent charge to Iohn Buckley and Eliz. his wife by which it appears plainly that it was not their intent that any present use should arise by the delivery of the indenture and if the use do not arise presently upon the delivery of the Indenture it shall never arise at all also the intent appears for it is that the land shall remain free from incumberances and this sounds only in covenant and for this reason the covenants shall be of the same nature and lastly the covenant is that the land shall remain and be and this is altogether incertaine and for this no use will arise because this failes of words as if I covenant to leave my lanâ— to my son after my death this will not raise an use to my son no more then if I covenant with the friends of my wife that after my death she shall have my goods this will not make my wife to be Executor and he vouched 21 H. 7. 17. 34. H. 8. 59. the Lord Borroughs case Dyer 355. 166. 324. and so be concluded that judgement ought to be given for the Plantiff Iustice Winch argued to the same purpose and he said the first part of the covenant contains that there shall be a marriage before such a day if the parties shall agree and the second part is a covenant that the feme shall have 6. l. 13. s. for her joynture and if this covenant executed an use of the land presently then this destroyes the joynture which was not the intention of the parties Thirdly there is another covenant to convey Coppihold land and if this covenant do raise an use then it will follow that Iohn Buckley shall have the land though the marriage do take effect and besides the covenant doth create an use presently or not at all and then when this use is to be raised by this covenant which contains in that nothing but future and Executory matter this will not create a present use and he cited the books which were vouched at the barre and by Hutton and so he concluded that this covenant will not raise an use presently to Iohn Buckley and that judgement ought to be given for the Plantiff And at another day the case was argued by Hobert chief Iustice for the Plantiff and that no use will arise by this covenant and he said if I will covenant to make assurance of my land to my son or to a stranger this covenant is meerly nugatorie and will not raise an use but on the contrary if I will covenant to stand seised to the use of my son though there is also a covenant to make further assurance yet this will raise a present use for the covenant is declaratory and not obligatory and so is Dyer 235. and there was no word to assure the land or to stand seised to uses but only that the land shall come remain and be in tail or in fee and there was no word to assure the land and this case is agreeable to the case of 21. H. 7. 18. by Rede that no use will arise and the reason is plain because the covenantor had election in which manner he shall have that whether by discent or in any other manner for if I covenant that my land shall descend to my son after my death no use will arise by this covenant and he put the case in Chudleys case that if a man covenant that after his death his son shall have his land in tall it is said that the son shall have an estate executed by the Statute of 27. H. 8. and the
covenantor shall have an estate for life and so the law makes in that case fractions of estates as the case of the Lord Seymor Dyer 96. seems to accord with this and besides those two books he said he could not finde any book which will warrant that and for that reason he held those two books to be no law for if I Covenant that my son shall have my land after my death this will not raise an estate to me by implication for life and an estate to my son and so by such means to change my estate in fee for an estate for life without more words for the word covenant in his proper and native signification is only obligatorie and yet it had been alwayes conceived sufficient to raise an use to him who is not partie to that as if I covenant with a stranger that I will stand seised of my land to the use of my son this will raise an use to my son and yet neither my son nor the covenantee may have an action of covenant but an use will very well arise to my son as if a man bargain and sell his land in consideration of 100. l. paid by I. S. though in this case the consideration ariseth from a stronger yet that will pass the use to the bargainee and in case of covenant it is not this word covenant only which creats the use but it is rather the agreement of the parties which is testified by the covenant for if sufficient agreement appears there will not need this word covenant as if I will agree and declare to stand seised to the use of my son by which it appears that the word covenant is onely declarative of the intentions of the parties and then in the principal case the covenant is not that the son shall have the land but that the land shall come remain and be to him and those words are incertain as 21. H. 7. redert come or discent and for that reason it is all one with the law of the same case and then void to raise any use for the incertainly and then when Andrew Buckley covenants that his son shall have his lands and no words to inforce his intention and for that reason the intention shall be lyable to an action of covenant and not to change his estate which he had in fee for an estate for life by this covenant but if he had expresly covenanted that in consideration of marriage of his son that he would hold his land for life and after this should be to his son this will change the estate which was in fee for an estate for life but in our case the covenant being general and left to the indifferent construction of the law the word covenant shall be taken in his proper and native signification and this is obligatorie and so he concluded that this covenant being at the first to grant a rent and was executory and the last part of that is executory for assurance and the limitation of the estate to the son being intangled between these two Covenants this shall be of the same nature and by consequence the covenant is obligatorie only and will raise no use to the son and so he concluded that judgement shall be given for the Plantiff and it was commanded to be entered accordingly Sparrow against Sowgate IN debt by Sparrow against Sowgate who declared that the Defendant became Bail for one Richard Sowgate in Banco Regis against whom the Plantiff had brought a Bill of debt of 77. l. and now the Defendant bound himself in a Recognizance of 77. l. upon which the action is now brought that in case judgement should be given against the said Richard Sowgate that he shall satisfie the said judgement or render his bodie to prison for in this case no part was impossible for after the judgement the principal may render himself in B. R. to the Marshal for the redemption of his suretie and that is the Common course there as he said but he agreed the case to be otherwise if a scire facias issue out of the Kings Bench against the Bail for there the death of the principal is a good plea for a scire facias doth not lie there till default is assigned in the principal in his not comming upon the capias ad satisfaciendum which may not be when he is dead Note that but yet before any capias it is clear he may have an action of debt Sir Robert Hitcham Serjeant of the King to the contrary and he alledged this to be the constant course in the Kings Bench that the Bail is never chargable till there is default assigned in the principal upon the recorn of the Capias ad satisfaciendum which may not be here for the principal is dead and he agreed the case of the other side that when a man is to do two things though the one is become impossible yet he ought to perform the other but when it is in the election of one to make either the one or the other then it is otherwise see Dyer 262. and so he concluded for the Defendant Hobert chief Iustice said that it is inconvenient that the Plantiff shall be forced to sue his Capias ad satisfaciendum against the partie before he have execution against the Bail for perchance he will sue a fieri facias or an elegit against him and that the Corps of the partie will not satisfie him and Browlow Prothonotary said that it had been adjudged in this Court that such plea is not good Winch the course of the Kings Bench is that default shall be assigned upon the retorn of the principal before the Bail shall be charged and though the Plantiff refuse to take his bodie after he had made his election to take his fieri facias or elegit he shall never more resort to the Bail which was granted by Hobert and Hutton as to that last point and it was holden by all the Court that if the principal render his bodie though the Plantiff refuse to take that yet that is a discharge of the Bail and also it was agreed by Hutton Hobert and by Winch that if the course of the Kings Bench be such that the Bail shall not be forfeit till there is a default assigned in the principal the same course also shall be followed here and per Curiam if the course of the Kings Bench be such that such Capias is necessary to be awarded that then a convenient time shall be allowed for the principal to render his bodie gratis and if the principal do die before such time the Bail is discharged but it was said by Winch if he die before convenient time and the Capias is awarded that such death shall not discharge the Bail note that Iones Iustice said that he thought in this case that it is necessary that the principal render himself gratis for when he is let to Bail the law supposeth him to be alwayes in custodie