made a Feoffment to the use of himself for life the remainder in tail to I. S. He in the remainder Levied a Fine And the Counsel of the Marches upon a surmise That the Tenant for life died seised according to their Instructions would settle the possession upon the heir of Tenant for life against the Conusee For their Instructions were made That where a man had the possession by the space of three years that the same should be settled upon him until trial at Law were had But the whole Court was against it because it doth appear that he had but an estate for life and so the possession appertained to him in the remainder And here it was said by Justice Barckley that their Opinion hath been That the possession of Tenant for life should be the possession of him in the Remainder as to this purpose Note that the Principal case here was although the Case before put was also agreed for Law thus Tenant in Tail levied a Fine to the use of himself for Life the remainder in Fee to I. S. and died In that Case the Council in the Marches would settle the possession upon the heir of Tenant in tail against the Purchaser who held in by the Fine which had bar'd the estate tail by which the Issue claimed and the whole Court was against it for which cause a Prohibition was granted 80. Habeas corpora was directed to the Porter of Ludlore to bring the bodies of Iohn Shielde and William Shielde into the Kings Bench the case shortly as appears upon the retorn was this Powell the Father brought a Bill in the nature of an Information against the said Iohn and William Shield before the Council of the Marches in Wales for an unlawful Practice Combination and Procurement of a clandestine Marriage in the night betwixt Mary Shield a Maid-servant and the Son of Powell who was a Gentleman of good credit and worth the Parson also being Drunk as he himself sware and the same also being without Banes or Licence for which offence they were severally Fined to the King and an hundred Marks damages given to the Plaintiff and farther ordered by the Council that they should be imprisoned till they paid their several fines to the King and damages to the Party and found Sureties to be bound in Recognisance for their good behaviour for one year and till they knew the farther Order of the Council and these were the causes which were retorned And upon this retorn Glynn who was of Counsel with the Prisoners moved many things and many of them as was conceived by the Court altogether impertinent But the Objections which were pertinent were these First That the Councel of the Marches as this case is have no Jurisdiction because the clandestine Marriage is a thing meerly Spiritual and therefore not within their instructions The second was That they have exceeded their Instructions in that they have given damages to the party above fifty pounds For by their Instructions they ought not to hold Plea where the Principal or Damages exceed fifty pounds But as to the first he said there may be this Objection That they did not punish them for the clandeâ—â—inâ— Marriagâ— which in truth is a thing meerly Spiritual but for the unlawful Practise and Combination and for the execution of it To which he answered That they have not Juristiction of the Principal and therefore not of the Accessory here note that it was afterwards said by Bramston Chief Justice That the unlawful Practise and Combination was the Principal and the clandestine Marriage but the Accessory which was not contradicted by any Farther it was objected by Glynn That they were Imprisoned for the damages of the Plaintiff and it doth not appear whether it was at the Prayer of the Party as he ought by the Law Bankes the Kings Atturny-General contrary And as to the first Their Instructions give them power to hold Plea of unlawful Practises and Assemblies And this is an unlawful Practise and Assembly and therefore within their Instructions And although that Heresie and clandestine Marriage and such offences per se are not within their Instructions yet being clad with such unlawful circumstances and practises they are punishable by them As to the second he said The Instruction which restraineth them that they do not hold Plea above fifty pounds is only in civil Actions at the several suit of the party But there is another Instruction which gives them power where the cause is criminal to assess damages according to the quality of the Offence and at their discretions As to the third Objection he said That the Retorn being that they were in execution for the damages it ought to be meant at the Prayer of the Party otherwise it could not be For which causes he prayed thâ—â— the Prisoners might be remanded And the whole Court Crooke being absent were clear upon this Retorn That they should be remanded because it appeareth that their Fines to the King were not payed And therefore although that the other matters had been adjudged for them yet they ought to be remanded for that one And as to the Objections which were made the Court agreed with Mr. Attorney except in the point of Damages and for the same reasons given by him But as to the point of the Damages whether they have gone beyond their Instructions and so exceeded their power in giving above fifty pounds damages or not It seemed to the Court they had and as it seemed to them if the Retorn had been That the Kings Fines were paid it would have been hard to maintain that the assessing above fifty pounds damages was not out of their Instructions but because the Kings Fines were not paid they were Remanded without respect had thereunto for the reasons given before 81. It was said by the Court That when Judgment is given in this Court against another and Execution upon it and the Sheriff levieth the mony the Lord Keeper cannot order that the mony shall stay in the Sheriffs hands or order that the Plaintiff shall not call for it for notwithstanding such Order he may call for it And it was farther said by the Court That an Attachment shall not be granted against the High Sheriff for the contempt of his Bayliffs And a Writ of Error is a Supersedeas to an Execution but then there ought to be notice given to the Sheriff otherwise if he notwithstanding serve the Execution he shall not run in contempt for which an Attachment shall be granted 82. Serjeant Callis came into Court and moved this case Chapman against Chapman in Trespass done in Lands within the Dutchy of Cornwal which were Borough-English where the custome was that if there were an estate in Fee in those Lands that they should go to the younger Son according tthe custome but if in Tail the should descend to the Heir at Common Law And it was moved by him that the custom was not good because it cannot
choose their Church-wardens and they chose two the Parson chose a third The Official of the Bishop gave Oath to one of them chosen by the Parish but refused to swear the other and would have sworn the party chosen by the Parson but the Parish was against it upon which the Parson Libelled in the Ecclesiastical Court And a Mandat was here praid That the Official swear the other who was chosen by the Parish and a Prohibition to stay the Suit in the Ecclesiastical Court. Upon the Mandat the Justices doubted and desired that Presidents and Records might be searched and at length upon many Motions Presidents and Records shewed a Mandat was granted But there being Suit in the Ecclesiastical Court bâ— the other whom the Parson chose a Prohibition was granted without any difficulty But at first the Counsel prayed a Prohibition for not swearing the other which the Court refused to grant because there was no proceeding in the Ecclesiastical Court and a Prohibition cannot be granted where there is no proceeding by way of Suit Vaughan against Vaughan in Action upon the Case upon Assumpsit 51. THe Defendant did promise that he would make such a Conveyance of certain Lands and pleaded That he had made it but did not shew the place where it was made And the Court was clear of Opinion that he need not for it shall be intended upon the Land And so in case of performance of Covenants it is not needful to shew the place where c. Norrice and Norrices Case 52. COpy-holder for life where the custome is That if the Tenant die seised that he shall pay a Heriot The Lord granted the Seigniory for 99 years if the Tenant should so long live And after that he made a Lease for 4000 years Tenant for Life is disseised or more properly ousted and died Here were two Questions 1. Whether there were any Heriot to be paid and admitting there were yet who should have it whether the Grantee for 99 years or he who had the 4000 years And the Court was clear of Opinion in both points without any argument 1. That a Heriot was to be paid not withstanding that the Tenant did not die seised because he had the estate in right and might have entred although he had not the possession And Justice Barckley compared it to the Case in C. 3. Rep. 35. a. in Butler and Bakers Case where a man hath one acre of Land holden in Capite and a hundred acres of Socage Land and afterwards he is disseised of the Capite Land and afterwards makes his will of all his Socage Land in that case he is a person having of Capite Land as the Statute speaks And yet that right of Capite Land shall make the devise void for the third part for notwithstanding the disseisin yet he is Tenant in Law And as to the second point the Court was clear of Opinion also That he in remainder or he that had the Estate for 4000 years for note the Action was brought by him in the Remainder for the Heriot should not have it And their reason was because the Tenant for life was not the Tenant of him who had the future interest of 4000 years but of him who had the interest for 99 years But they were not clear of opinion that the Grantee for 99 years should have the Heriot Justice Barckley was that the Grantee for 99 years should have it But Justice Iones there being then none in Court but they haesitavit And the reason of the doubt was because that eo instante that the Tenant died eodem instante the estate of the Grantee for 99 years determineth Justice Iones put this Case A Seigniory is granted for the life of the Tenant the remainder over in fee the Tenant dieth Who shall have the Ward Justice Barckley said he who is Grantee of the particular estate but Iones seemed to doubt it Vide 44 E. 3. 13. Lewes against Jones in a Writ of Error 53. JUdgment was given for Iones against Lewes in an Action brought in the Common Pleas And Lewes here brought a Writ of Error and assigned for Error That he was an infant at the time of the Action brought against him And that he appeared by Attorney whereas he ought to appear by Guardian or procheine amy The defendant pleaded in avoidance of this Writ of Error That there was no Warrant of Attorney The Plaintiff allegando shewed the Error before And the Defendant pleaded in nullo erratum est And the Judgment was reversed But the Opinion of the Court was That the better way had been for the Plaintiff to have demurred in Law for there being no warrant of Attorney there was no appearance at all and so are the Books 38 E. 3. and 14 E. 4. 54. In Vtburt and Parhams Case it was agreed That a man may be Non-suit without leave of the Court but he cannot discontinue his Suit without consent of the Court. Davis and Bellamies Case in Attaint 55. THe Defendant brought Attaint and the Verdict was affirmed and Costs prayed upon this Rule that where the Plaintiff shall have costs there the Defendant shall have costs But they were denied by the Court for that ought to be taken in the original Action and not in case of Attaint But upon the restituatur there costs shall be given but that is in the original Action 56. If two joynt-tenants be of a Rectory and one sueth for Tithes by himself only it is nâ— cause of Prohibition So if a Feme Covert sue solely upon a desamation a Prohibition shall not be granted 57. The Sheriff of a County made a Warrant Balâ—ivis suis to arrest the body of such a man and the Bayliffs of the Liberâ—y return a Rescous And Exception was taken to it because that the Warrant was Ballivis suis and the Return was made by those who were not his Bayliffs and it was adjudged for the Liberty might be within his Bayliwick and so are all the Presidents And there was another Exception because the place of the Rescous was not shewed and for that the Book of 10 E. 4. was cited for there the Rescous was adtunc ibidem and did not shew the place To that it was answered by the Court and agreed that adtunc ibidem is altogether incertain if the place be not shewed but in the principal Case the place was shewed at the first and always after that tunc ibidem only without naming of the place and adjudgâ—d good For that tunc ibidem throughout the Declaration hath reference to the place first shewed and it was adjudged good 58. Outlawry was reversed for this Error because that the Exigent was Secund exactus ad Com' meum ibidem c. 59. A Hundred may prescribe in Non decimando and it is good for it is the custome of the County which is the best Law which ever was But a Parish or a particular Town cannot prescribe in Non decimando And
therefore iâ— the King be deceived either in point of profit or in point of Title his Grant is void 9 H. 6. Where he is not deceived in point of profit he shall not avoid the Grant 26 H. 8. The second reason That a Deed ought to be construed Vt res magis valeat quam pereat 34 H. 6. A man having a Reversion deviseth his land in Manibus thereby the Reversion passeth 9 E 4. 42. Release of all Actions against Prior and Covent shall be construed and intended all Actions against the Prior only for an Action cannot be brought against the Covent Farther by this construction you would avoid this deed and by the Rule of Law the deed and words of every man shall be taken very strong against himself ut res magis valeat as is said before And it is against reason to conceive that it was the meaning of the parties that nothing should pass A third reason was because the grant was a distinct clause of it self And the words which were objected at the Bar to be restrictive were in another distinct clause and therefore shall not restrain that which was before for words restrictive ought to be continued in one and the same sentence Wherefore they having granted all their Tithes in Chesterton by one clause the false recital afterwards in another clause shall not make the grant void See 3 4 Eliz. Dyer in Wast 31 Eliz. the Lord Wenworths Case in the Exchequer upon this Rule of distinct clauses And Atkins and Longs case in the Common Pleas upon which cases Justice Iones did rely The fourth reason was That construction ought to be made upon the whole Deed And it appeareth by the context of the Deed That it was the meaning of the parties to grant the Tithes by the Deed. Further the Exception of the four things sheweth That it was the meaning of the parties to grant all things not excepted as the Tithes in this Case For exceptio firmat Regulam And to what purpose should the Exception be if they did not intend to pass all other things not excepted See 4 Car. Hâ—skins and Trâ—ncars Case Sir Robert Napwiths Case 21 Iac. cited by the chief Jâ—â—tice to that purpose Wherefore it was agreed by the whole Court that Judgment should be given for the Defendant And the Opinion of the Court was clear also That although some of the Tithes had been in the Tenure of Margaret Petâ—e that yet the grant was good And that was after Argument upon the Demurrer to avoid all scruples to be after made by Counsel because it was conceived That some of the Tithes were in her Tenure Crisp against Prat in Ejectione firme 67. THe Case upon the four Statutes of Bankrupts viz. 34 H. 8. 13 Eliz. 1 Iac. and 21 Iac. was thus Ralph Brisco 9 Iac. purchased Copyhold to him and his Son for their lives the Remainder to the Wife in Fee 11 Iac. he became an Inholder and about twelve years after a Commission of Bankrupt is obtained against him And thereupon the Copyhold-land is sold by the Commissioners to the Defendant Ralph Brisco dieth and his Son Iohn Brisco entred and made the Lease to the Plaintiff The Defendant entred upon him and he brought an Ejectione firme And Judgment was given upon solemn argument by the Justices for the Plaintiff The first point was Whether an Inholder be a Bankrupt within these Statutes And it was resolved by all the Justices viz. Iones Crook Barckley and Bramstone chief Justice that an Inholder quatenus an Inholder is not within these Statutes Justice Barckley and Justice Iones one grounded upon the special Verdict the other upon the Statutes did conceive That an Inholder in some cases might be within these Statutes Justice Barckley did conceive upon this special Verdict that this Inholder was within them because it is â—ound That he got his living by buying and selling and using the Trade of an Inholder And he conceived upon these words Buying and selling in the verdict and getting his living thereby although that the Jury have also found him an Inholder that the same is within the Law And he agreed That he who liveth by buying or selling and not by both is not within the Law but in our case the Jury have found both And it hath been adjudged That he who buys and sells cattle and stocks his ground with them that he may be a Bankrupt within those Statutes I agree that a Scrivener was not within 13 Eliz. for he doth not live by buying and selling but by making use of the monies of other men but now he is within 21 Iac. But in our case the Inholder buys his grass hay and grains and provision also for his Guests and by selling of them he lives But he agreed That if the Jury had found that he was an Inholder only and not that he did get his living by buying and selling that in that case he was out of the Law And for these reasons he did conceive That this Inholder as by the special Verdict is found was within the Statutes of 13 Eliz. and 21 Iacobi Justice Iones An Inholder may be or not be within these Laws upon this difference That Inholder who gets his living meerly by buying and selling as many of the Inholders here in London do they are within these Statutes But those who have Lands of their own and have hay and grain and all their provisions of their own as many have in the Country those are not within the Statutes Farther he said That buying and selling doth not make men within these Statutes for then all men should be within the Statutes but they ought to be meant of them who gain the greatest part of their living thereby and live chiefly or absolutely thereby But Bramston chief Justice and Justice Crook were clear of Opinion that an Inholder could not be a Bankrupt neither by the Statutes nor according as it is found by the special Verdict And their reason was because that an Inholder doth not live by buying and selling for he doth not sell any thing but utter it He which sells any thing doth it by way of contract but an Inholder doth not contract with his Guests but provides for them and cannot take unreasonable rates as he who sells may and if he doth he may be Indicted of Extortion which the seller cannot Wherefore they concluded that an Inholder is not within the Statute of 13 Eliz. 1 Iac. Justice Crook remembred these Cases Webb an Inholder of Vxbridge brewed in his house and sold his Beer to his Guests And it was adjudged in the Exchequer that it was not within the Statute of Brewers And Bedells Case who being a Farmer bought and sold cattle and adjudged that he was not a Bankrupt within these Statutes And he put thâ—se cases upon this reason That where the Statutes said Get their living by buying and selling that it ought to bâ—â—or the greater part that they gain
the greater part of their living thereby And he said that if a Gentleman buy and sell Land he is not within the Statutes for it ought to be taken those who buy and sell personal things The second point It was agreed by all that Copyhold is within the Statute of 13 Eliz. 1 Iac. First because it is no prejudice to the Lord because there ought to be composition with the Lord and the Vendee And although the sale ought to be by Indenture yet the Vendee ought to be admitted by the Lord. And the difference in Heydons case in 3 Rep. was agreed Secondly It is expresly within 13 Eliz. and therefore within 1 Iac. also by way of recital although the Statute of 1 Iac. hath new provisions And by the Statute of 21 Iac. it was said That these Statutes shall be construed most beneficial for the Creditors because their ground is suum cuique tribuere 5 Eliz. Dyer Vmpton and Hides Case The Acts of Explanation shall be taken most beneficial and liberally And the Statute of 13 Eliz. says expresly That the Commissioners shall dispose of Lands as well Copy as Free But although a Copyhold be not within the later part of 13 Eliz. expresly yet by connexion it is And the Statute of 13 Eliz. guides the Statutes 1 21 Iacobi Justice Iones did agree That the Copyhold is within 13 Eliz. but not the person of the Copyholder although the person be within 1 Iac. And the chief Justice said That his Opinion was that upon the Statute of 21 Iac. which is That these Statutes shall he taken liberally that Copyholds although they had not been named had been within these Statutes It was said by Justice Barckley who argued for the Defendant That the verdict hath not found within 13 Eliz. because the verdict hath not found fraud expresly but badges only thereof See Meriel Littletons Case in the Chancellor of Oxfords Case That the Fraud ought to be expresly found but so it is not here for here it is found that the Son was an Infant at the time of the purchase and also that the purchase was with the mony oâ— the Father which are only inducements of Fraud But he argued it was within 1 Iac. because the Father hath caused oâ— procured this conveyance to his child as the Statute speaks And here is Fraud apparent Et quod constat clarè non debâ—verificari And therefore if a man enfeoff his Son it is Fraâ—â— apparent ought not to be found particularly But it was resolved by all the other Justices That here was not fraud apparent and therefore it ought to be found by the Jury The third and chief point in this Case was He being no Inholder at the time of the purchase and afterwards becoming an Inholder whether he were within the Statute of 13 Eliz. And it was resolved he was not But here Justice Barckley who argued for the Defendant was against it And he argued that if a man purchase and sell and afterwards become a Tradesman and Bankrupt that that was not within the Statute but if he keepeth the Land in his hands there he conceived him within the Statute as it was in this case And he was against the Book of the Chancellor of Oxfords Case of relation to devest the Advowson and he said It is not like to the Case in 6 7 Eliz. there cited Iâ— Eriches Case in the 5 Rep. there is a Rule taken that A verbis legis non est recedendum and in our Case it is within the express words of the Statute which are That if any person which hereafter shall become a Bankrupt c. And here he after became a Bankrupt But it was resolved by the others with whom Justice Barckley did concur after that it was not within the Statute Justice Crook argued That it is not within the words of the Statute which are If the offender purchase and that the sale shall be good against the offender and here he was not offender at the time of the purchase and using no Trade shall he be punished for that after Besides here the soâ— should be punished for the offence of the Father which the Law of God will not suffer Smith and Cullamers Case 2 Rep. he ought to be endebted at the time otherwise he is no offender And he might give away his goods before he was in Debt And the mischief here will be That Lands purchased 40 years before should thereby be defeated And I hold that it a man ba a Tradesman and afterwards leaves his Trade and thâ—n purchaseth and afterwards becomes a Tradesman again and a Bankrupt that he is not within the Statute But Justice Iones was of opinion that iâ— he be a Tradesman at the time although not an offender yet he is within the Statute But the chief Justice did argue that he ought to be an offender and the thing which makes him to be an offender is his intent to defraud his creditors Iones It shall be hard in this Case to cause the estate to be reached by this Statute for perhaps it was for the marriage of the son and perhaps the son might sell it and after the father become Bankrupt it would be hard to void the sale The Chancellor of Oxfords case was a stronger case for there the party was Indicted And if a man be Accomptant to the King and afterwards sell yet the sale shall be avoided by the King But if he be not accomptant and â—ellâ—th and afterwards becomes Accomptant the sale shall not be defeated And here he became Inholder after the purchase and being a clear man at the time of the purchase he shall not now be within the Statute Chief Justice If that should be permitted all things which the party did should be defeated and therefore he agreed That although he be a Tradesman yet if he be not in debt if he purchase for another or give unto another if no fraud be found it is not within the Statutes And Judgment accordingly was given for the Plaintiff Young against Fowler 68. YOung brought an Action upon the Case against Fowler for disturbing of him to execute the Office of Register to the Bishop of Rochester and upon Not guilty pleaded the Jury gave a special verdict They found that the Office was granted by one Bishop to one for life which was confirmed by the Dean Chapter which Bishop died and afterwards Iohn Young was created Bishop And then they found that the Office was grantable in Reversion time out of mind c. And that Iohn Young Bishop did grant the said Office of Register to Iohn Young his son now Plaintiff in Reversion And that the Office was to be executed by the said Iohn Young or his Deputy which Iohn Young the son was but of the age of 11 years at the time of the Grant but they found that he was of full age before the Tenant for life died And then they found that Iohn Young
the Actions brought by the other Creditors But Justice Bramston contrà That the damages were well assessed because that the Actions brought by the Creditors were added for aggravation only and the cause of the Action was the Arrest and Imprisonment like the case where a man speaks words which are in part actionable and others only put in for aggravation and damages is assessed for the whole it is good There was a third Error assigned That the Venire facias was de Warda omnium Sanctorum de Bristow without shewing in what Parish Childe against Greenhil 77. CHilde brought Trespass against Greenhill for Fishing in seperali piscaria of the Plaintiff and declared that the Defendant pisces ipsius cepit c. And Verdict found for the Plaintiff And it was moved by Saint-Iohn in Arrest of Judgement because the Plaintiff declared of taking of pisces suos whereas the Plaintiff they being ferae naturae hath not property in them Register 94 95. and F. N. B. and Book Entries 666. No count that the Defendant cepit pisces ipsiuâ— but ad valentiam c. without ipsius So Fines Case in Dyer 7 H. 6. 36. 10 H. 7. 6. 12 H. 8. 10. by Brudnell 13 E. 4. 24. 7 Rep. case of Swannes And the Book of 22 H. 6. 59. is over-ruled by the case of Swannes 34 H. 6. 24. And the same is matter of substance and therefore not helped after Verdict An Action of Trover and Conversion against husband and wife quia converterunt is not good and it is not helped after Verdict because it is matter of substance Rolls for the Defendant I agree that lepores suos or pisces suos without any more is not good But where he brings an Action of Trespass for taking them in his Soil there it is good because it is within his Soil So in our case for taking pisces suos in his several Piscary and with this difference agree 22 H. 6. 59. 43 E. 3. 24. so Regist. 93 102. 23 H. 6. tit Tresp 59. 14 H. 8. 1. and the Book of 43 E. 3. saith That in Trespass the Writ shall not say Damam suam if he do not say that it was taken in his Park or Warren or saith damam domitam or as the Book is in 22 H. 6. in my Soil or Land and by Newton he shall say there damas suis. And admit that it was not good yet I hold that it is helped after Verdict because it is not matter of Substance for whether they be pisces suos or not the Plaintiff shall recover damages Justice Barckly It is true that in a general sense they cannot be said pisces ipsius but in a particular sense they may and a man may have a special or qualified property in things which are ferae naturae three ways ratione infirmitatis ratione loci ratione privilegii and in our case the Plaintiff â—ath them by reason of Priviledge And it was agreed by the whole Court That Judgment should be affirmed upon the very difference taken by Rolls that where a man brings Trespass for taking pisces suos or lepores suos c. and the like that the Action will not lie But if he bring Trespass for fishing in his several Piscary as in our Case or for breaking of his Close and taking lepores suos c. there it will lie Pitfield against Pearce 78. IN an Ejectione firme the Case was thus Thomas Pearce the Father was seised of Lands in Fee and by Deed in consideration of Marriage did give and grant this Land to Iohn Pearce the now Defendant his second Son and to his Heirs after his death and no Livery was made Thomas Pearce died the Eldest Son entred and made a Lease to the Plaintiff who entred and upon Ejectment by the Defendant brought an Ejectione firme Twisden The only question is whether any estate passeth to the Son by the Deed and it was said there did and that by way of Covenant And it was agreed That in this Case if Livery had been made it had been void because that a Freehold cannot begin at a day to come But I may Covenant to stand seised to the use of my Son after my death So a man may surrender a Copyhold to take effect after a day to come Com. 301. So a man may bargain and sell at a day to come 1 Mar. Dyer 96. Chudleighs Case 129. 20 H. 6. 10. A use is but a trust betwixt the parties and 7 Rep. 400. There need not express words of Covenant to stand seised to an use 25 Eliz. Blithman and Blithmans case 8 Rep. 94. Besides these words dedi concessi are general words and therefore may comprehend Covenant and words shall be construed that the Deed may stand if it may be 8 Ass. 34. 7 E. 3. 9. But I agree that if the intent appeareth that it shall pass by transmutation of possession that there it shall be so taken but here his intent doth not appear to be so for if there should be Livery then the son should take nothing for the reason before given which is against his meaning Mich. 21 Iac. Rot. 2220. Buckler and Simons Case Dyer 202. Vinions case The cases cited before are in the future tense but the words are here I give c. 36 Eliz. Callard and Callards Case Stand forth Eustace reserving an estate to my self and my wife I do give thee my Land and the better Opinion was That in that case it did amount to a Livery being upon the Land for his intent is apparent Mich. 41 42 Eliz. Trelfe and Popwells Case adjudged in such case That an use shall be raised For which it was concluded that in this case there is a good estate raised to Iohn Pearce by way of Covenant Rolls I conceive that not estate is raised to Iohn Pearce by this conveyance It was objected That it shall inure by way of Covenant to raise an use I agree that if the meaning of the party may appear that he intended to pass his estate by way of raising of an use otherwise not And here is no such appearance Foxes Case in 8 Rep. is a stronger case and here it doth not appear that he meant to pass it by way of use But by the word give he intended transmutation of possession 8 Rep. Bedells case Mich. 18. Car. Rot. 2220. in the Common Pleas it was adjudged That a gift of a Remainder after the death of the grantor was void wherefore he concluded for the Plaintiff and so Judgment was given by the whole Court And Justice Iones said When a man makes a doubtful Conveyance it shall be intended a Conveyance at the Common Law And it shall not be intended that the Father would make him Tenant for life only punishable of wast Mich. 15º Car ' in the Kings Bench. 79. IT was moved for a Prohibition to the Counsel of the Marches and the Case was such A man seised of Lands in Fee
it then a Prohibition shall be granted And note that it was said by Bankes Chief Justice that before the Statute of 1 Eliz. the Ecclesiastical Court might punish any person for not coming to Church pro reformatione morum salute animae 163. Where there are several Modus alledged there several Prohibitions shall be granted but where divers are sued joyntly and they alledge one Modus only there they shall have but one Prohibition by Reeve and Foster Justices the others being absent Pasch. 15º Car in the Kings Bench. Edwards and Rogers Case 164. THe Case was thus Tenant for life the Reversion to an Ideot an Unkle heir apparent of the Ideot levied a Fine and died Tenant for life died the Ideot died the only Question was Whether the Issue of the Unkle who levied the Fine should be barred or not Iones that it should his chief reason was because the Son must make his conveyance by the Father and as to him he is barred As in a Writ of Right he ought of necessity to name his Father and that by way of Title so here But Crooke and Barckley contrary and their reason was because that here the Issue of the Unkle doth not claim in the right line but in the collateral Secondly because the naming of the father here is not by way of Title but by way of pedigree only Note that Serjeant Rolls in the Argument of the Serjeants case which was the very point said that this case was adjudged according to the Opinions of Crooke and Barckley viz. that the fine should not bar the Issue The Serjeants Case aforesaid was Trin. 17 Car. 165. Payne the elder and Payne the younger were bound joyntly and severally in an Obligation to Dennis who afterwards brought Debt upon the Bond against both And after appearance Dennis entred into a Retraxit against Payne the younger and whether this were a discharge of the elder also was the Question And this Term it was argued by Maynard for the Defendant that it was a discharge of Payne the elder also for it doth amount to a Release and it is clear that a release to one shall discharge both Rolls contrary that it goeth only by way of Estoppel and not as a release and therefore shall not bar Barckley Justice that it amounts to a Release and therefore shall discharge both 7 E. 4. Hickmots case in the 7 Rep. the Plaintiff shall not have judgment where he hath no cause of Action And here by his Retraxit he hath confessed that he hath no cause of Action and therefore he shall not have judgment Further a Retraxit is not an Estoppel but a Bar of the Action besides here he hath altered the Deed and it is not joynt as it was before like as where he interlines it or the like there the Deed is altered by his own act and therefore the other shall take advantage of it Crook Justice contrary for it is not a Release but quasi a Release and if the Obligâ—e sueth one and covenanteth with him that he will not further sue him the same is in the nature of a Release and yet the other shall not take advantage of it So in this case 21 H. 6. there ought to be an actual Release of which the other shall take advantage and therefore in this Case because it is but in the nature of an Estoppel the other shall not take advantage of it Sprigge against Rawlenson 166. IN a Writ of Error to reverse a Judgment given in the Common Pleas in an Ejectione firme the Case was R. brought an Ejectione firme against S. and declared of an Ejectment de uno mesuagio uno repositorio And the Jury found for the Plaintiff and assessâ—d damages entire upon which a Writ of Error was brought here and the Error which was largely debated was that Rep. sitâ—rium which was here put for a Ware-house is a word uncertain and of divers significations as appeareth by the Dictionary And therefore an Ejectione firme de uno repositorio is not good and by consequence the damages which are joyntly assessed are ill assessed And in an Ejectione firme seism shall be given by the Sheriff upon a Recovery as in a Precipe quod reddat and therefore the Ejectment ought to be of a thing certain of which the Sheriff may know how to deliver seifin otherwise it is not good Barckley and Crook Justices were that the Judgment should be affirmed and that it was certain enough but Iones and Bramston Chief Justice contrary that it was utterly uncertain For that is Repositorium in which a man reposeth any thing and an Ejectione firme de uno tenemento is not good because there are several â—enements So here because there are several Repositories and the Sheriff cannot tradere possessionem and afterwards Barckley released his Opinion and judgment was given that the Judgment given in the Common Pleas should be reversed Trinit 17º Car ' in the Common Pleas. 167. A Man having a Legacie devised unto him out of a Lease for years which Indenture oâ— Lease was in the hands of a Stranger The Legatee suâ—d the Executors in the Spiritual Court to assent to the Legacie And Evars Serjeant prayed a Prohibition because they order that the Lease should be brought into Court which they ought not to have done being in the hands of a stranger But the Prohibition was denied by the whole Court for they may make an executor assent to a Legacie out of a Lease and therefore may order that although that the Lease be in the hand of a third person that it shall be brought in to execute it For the Order although it be general binds only the Defendant and it was agreed by the Court that assets or not assets is triable by them Juxon against Andrewes and others 168. IN an Ejectione firme the Defendants pleaded not guilty the Jury found them not guilty for part and guilty in tanto unius messuagii in occupatione c. quantum stat super ripam and whether this Verdict were sufficiently certain so as the Court might give judgment upon it and execution thereupon might be had was the question And by Whitfield Serjeant the Verdict is certain enough it hath been adjudged that where the Jury find the defendant guilty of one Acre parcel of a Mannor that it was good so of the moiety of a Mannor which is as uncertain as in this case And it is as certain as if they had said So many feet in length and so many in breadth for if the certainty appeareth upon the view of the Sheriff who is to deliver the possession it sufficeth and Clark Serjeant who was of the same side said that it is a Rule in Law Quod certum est quod certum reddi potest and this may be reduced to certainty upon the view of the Sheriff and therefore it is certain enough Besides it is the finding of the Jury who are lay gents M. 8. Iac. in
it turns the Avowry into a Justification in our Case so as you shall not make us Trespassers but that we may well justifie to save our damages Crawley Justice that the Avowry is turned into a Justification and that there is sufficient substance in the Plea to answer the unjust taking the distress Justice Reeve that it is good by way of Avowry for the distress being lawfully taken at the time it shall not take away his avwry therefore he shall have Retorn for that was as a gage for the rent and therefore differs from the other Cases Justice Foster put this Case at the Common Law Distress was taken and before avowry Tenant for life died Whether he shall avow or justifie But all agreed that at the least the Avowry is turned into a Justification but it was adjourned 179. The Court demanded of the Protonotharies Whether a man might make a new assignment to a special Bar and they said no but to a common Bar only viz. that the Trespass if any were was in Bl. Acre there ought to be a new assignment by the Plaintiff but Reeve and Crawley Justices the other being absent held clearly that the Plaintiff might make a new assignment to a special Bar and further they said that the Plaintiff if he would might trise the Desendant upon his Plea but we will not suffer him to do so because that his Plea is meerly to make the Plaintiff to shew the place certain in his Replication in which the Trespass was done 180. The Disseisee levieth a Fine by Reeve and Crawley Justices it shall not give right to the Disseisor because that this Fine shall enure only by way of Estoppel and Estoppels bind only privies to them and not a stranger and therefore the Disseisor here shall not take benefit of it and therefore they did conceive the 2 Rep. 56. a. to be no Law Vid. 3 Rep. 90. a 6 Rep. 70. a. 181. Serjeant Callis prayed a Prohibition to the Court of Requests for cause of priority of Suit but by Foster and Crawley Justices the other being absent priority of Suit was nothing the Bill being exhibited there before Judgment given in this Court 182. The Case of White and Grubbe before being moved again it was said in this case by Reeve and Foster Justices that where a man is indebted unto another for divers wares and the debt is superannuated according to the Statute of 21 Iac. cap. 16. and afterwards they account together and the party found to be indebted unto the other party in so much mony for such wares in that Case although that the party were without remedy before yet now he may have debt upon accompt because that now he is not bound to shew the particulars but it is sufficient to say that the Defendant was indebted to the Plaintiff upon accompt pro diversis mercimoniis c. 183. A Prohibition was prayed unto the Council of the Marches of Wales and the Case was thus A man being posfessed of certain goods devised them by his will unto his wife for her life and after her decease to I. S. and died I. S. in the life of the wife did commence Suit in the Court of Equity there to secure his Interest in Remainder and thereupon this Prohibition was prayed And the Justices viz. Banks Chief Justice Crawley Foster Reeve being absent upon consideration of the point before them did grant a Prohibition and the reason was because the devise in the remainder of goods was void and therefore no remedy in equity for Aequitas sequitu◠legem And the Chief Justice took the difference as is in 37 H. 6. 30. Br. Devise 13. and Com. Welkden Elkingtons Case betwixt the devise of the use and occupation of goods and the devise of goods themselves For where the goods themselves are devised there can be no Remainder over otherwise where the use or occupation only is devised It is true that heir looms shall descend but that is by custome and continuance of them and also it is true that the devise of the use and occupation of Land is a devise of the land it self but not so in case of goods for one may have the occupation of the goods and another the Interest and so it is where a man pawns goods and the like For which cause the Court all agreed that a Prohibition should be awarded Trin. 17º Car. in the Kings Bench. 184. A Man was sued in London according to the custom there for calling a woman Whore upon which a Habeas corpus was brought in this Court and notwithstanding Oxfords case in the 4 Rep. 18. a. which is against it a Procedendo was granted and it was said by Serjeant Pheasant who was for the Procedendo and so agreed by Bramston Chief Justice and Justice Malle◠That of late times there have been many Procedendo's granted in the like case in this Court 185. An Orphan of London did exhibite a Bill in the Court of Requests against another for discovery of part of his estate And Serjeant Pheasant of Counsel with the Defendant came into this Court and Prayed a Prohibition upon the custom of London That Orphans ought to sue in the Court of Orphans in London but the whole Court which were then present viz. Chief Justice Bramston Heath and Mallet Justices were against it because that although the Orphan had the Priviledge to sue there yet if he conceive it more secure and better for him to sue in the Court of Requests then he may waive his priviledge of suing in the Court of Orphans and sue in the Court of Requests for quilibet potest renunciare juri pro se intraducto c. and Heath said that he always conceived the Law against the Case of Orphans 5 Rep. 73. b. But which is stronger in this Case the Court of Orphans did consent to the Suit in the Court of Requests and therefore there is no reason that the Defendant should compel the Infant to sue there wherefore they would not grant a Prohibition but gave day until Mich. Term to the Defendants Counsel to speak further to the matter if they could Trin. 17º Car. in the Common Pleas. Dewel against Mason 186. IN an Action upon the Case upon an Award the case was this The Award was that the Defendant should pay to the Plaintiff eight pound or three pound and Costs of suit in an Action of Trespass betwixt the Plaintiff and Defendant as appears by a note under the Plaintiffs Attorneys hand ad libitum defendentis c. And the Plaintiff doth not aver that a note was delivered by the Attorney of the Plaintiff to the Defendant and the Defendant pleaded Non assumpsit and it was found for the Plaintiff and it was moved in arrest of Judgment for the reason given before Rolls contrary that there needs no averment and he said it was Wilmots case adjudged in this Court Hill 15 Car. where the Case was that the Defendant should
debt there can be no consideration and therefore the promise void because it is but nudum pactum Rolls contrary that there is a good consideration because that although by the release to one obligor the debt of the other be discharged sub modo viz. if the other can get it in his power to plead yet it is no absolute discharge for if he cannot get it into his hand to plead it he shall never take advantage of it and then if it be no absolute discharge but only sub modo viz. if he can procure it into his hand to plead then the consideration is good for perhaps he shall never get it Justice Foster asked him if by this release the debt be not intirely discharged to which he answered No as to B. only but sub modo as I have said before but he said and with him agreed the whole Court that the Law is clearly otherwise that the debt is intirely gone and discharged and then clearly there can be no consideration in this Case Justice Reeve every promise ought to have a consideration and that ought to be either benefit to him that makes it or disadvantage to him to whom it is made and in this Case the consideration which is the ground of the Assumpsit is neither benefit to him that made it nor disadvantage to hiâ— to whom it was made because there was no debt for it was totally discharged by the release made to A. Crawley agreed to it Bankes Chief Justice was absent But because the obligation was laid to be made in London and no Ward or Parish certain put from whence the Visne should come they conceived clearly that it was not good Pasch. 18º Car. in the Kings Bench. Heamans Habeas Corpus 144. RIchard Heaman was imprisoned by the Court of Admiralty upon which he prayed a Habeas corpus and it was granted upon which was this retorn viz. First the custom of the Admiralty is set forth which is to attach goods in causa civili maritimi in the hands of a third person and that upon four defaults made the goods so attached should be delivered to the Plaintiff upon caution put to restore them if the debt or other cause of Action be disproved within the year and after four defaults made if the party in whose hands the goods were attached refused to deliver them that the custom is to imprison him until c. Then is set forth how that one Kent was indebted unto I. S. in such a sum upon agreement made Super altum mare and that Kent died and that afterwards I. S. attached certain goods of Kents in the hands of the said Heaman for the said debt and that after upon summons four defaults were made and that I. S. did tender caution for the re-delivery of the goods so attached and condemned if the debt were disproved within the year and that notwithstanding the said Heaman would not deliver the goods for which he was imprisoned by the Court of Admiralty until c. Widdrington of Counsel with the prisoner took this exception to the Retorn that it appeareth by the Retorn that Kent who was the debtor was dead before the attachment and you shall never attach the goods of any man as his goods after his death because they are not his goods but the goods of the executor in the right of the testator Besides although the attachment be upon the goods yet the Action ought to be against the person which cannot be he being dead wherefore he prayed that the prisoner might be discharged Hales that the attachment is well made notwithstanding that the party was dead at the time of attachment for it is the custom of their Court so to proceed although that the party be dead Besides he said that although that the party were dead yet the goods are bona defuncti and to prove that he cited 10 E. 4. 1. the opinion of Danby and Catesby That the grant of Omnia bona catalla sua by an executor will not pass the goods which he hath as executor because they are the goods of the dead But note that it was here said by Bramston Chief Justice that it had been adjudged divers times against the opinion aforesaid that it passeth the goods which the executor hath as executor and he said that if a man hath a judgment against an executor to recover goods the Judgment shall be that he recover bona defuncti To that the Court said that the Judgment is not quod recuperet bona defuncti but quod recuperet the goods which fuerunt bona defuncti For the objection that the plaint ought to be against the person which cannot be when he is dead to that Hales said that in the Admiralty the Action is against the goods and therefore the death of the person is not material to that Justice Heath said that it is the party who is charged the goods are only chargeable in respect of the person and you shall never charge the goods alone but there ought to be a party to answer Hales if they have Jurisdiction they may proceed according to their Law and we cannot hinder it to which Heath said take heed of that when it concerneth the liberty of the Subject as in this Case And note that Bramston Chief Justice asked the Proctor of the Admiralty then present this Question Whether by their Law the death of the party did not abate the action and he said that it did then said the Chief Justice it is clear that an attachment cannot be against the goods the party being dead wherefore by the whole Court the custom to attach goods after the death of the party is no good custom and therefore they gâ—ve Judgment that the prisoner should be discharged 245. Note that Bramston Chief Justice and Heath Justice said in evidence to a Jury that a Will without a Seal is good to pass the Land and that it is a Forgery expresly by the Statute of 5 Eliz. cap. 14. to forge a Will in writing Pasch. 18º Car ' in the Kings Bench. Fulham against Fulham in a Replevin 246. THe Case was thus Henry the 8 seised of a Mannor in which are Copyholds grants a Copy-hold for life generally and whether this be a destroying of the Copyhold or not was the Question And it was argued by Harris that the grant was utterly void because the King was deceived in his grant for he said the King had election to grant it by Copy and therefore it shall not be destroyed by a general grant without notice and cited many Cases to prove that where the King is deceived in the Law his Grant shall be void but Bramston Chief Justice and the Court said that it never recited in any of the Grants of the King what is Copyhold and they were clear of Opinion that the Grant was not void But whether it destroy the Copyhold or not so as the King hath not election to grant the