Lord Dyer said So in the principall Case and therefore the later Use was utterly void and shall not be raised by intendment But otherwise it had been if it had been by devise Pasch 23. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 10. IT was holden by all the Justices of the Common Pleas That the Queen might be put out of her Possession of an Advowson by two Usurpations And she shall be put to her Writ of Right of Advowson as a common person shall be because it is a transitory thing and that the Grant of that Advowson made by the Queen after the two Usurpations should be void and that was so adjudged upon a demurrer in the point And so it is holden in 47 E. 3. 4. b. Psch 23. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 11. AN Indenture of Covenant was made betwixt I. S. and I. D. in which I. S. did Covenant to Enfeoffe I. D. of his Manor of D. In consideration of which I. D. by the same Indenture did Covenant with the said I. S. to pay him 100 li. The Question is If I. S. will not make the Feoffment whether I. D. be bound to pay the money It was holden by the Lord Dyer Chief Justice and Justice Mead That he is not because the money is Covenanted to be paid Executory to have the Feoffment made and therefore if he will not make the Feoffment he shall not have the money As if I Covenant with one That I will marry his Daughter and he Covenants with me That for the same cause he will make an Estate to me and his Daughter and to the Heirs of our two bodies begotten of his Manor of D he shall not make it untill we are married But if I Covenant with a man That I will marry his Daughter and he Covenants with me To make an Estate to me and his Daughter if I marry another woman or if the Daughter marryeth another man yet I shall have an Action of Covenant to compell him to make the Estate because in this later Case the Covenant was made for another Cause And this difference was so taken by the whole Court 15 H. 7. 10. So if A. grant to B. all the ancient Pale and for that B. grants That he will make a new Pale it is holden in 15. E. 4. 4. by Catesby and affirmed by Littleton That if B. cannot have the ancient Pale that he shall be excused from making the new Pale But if two things are given by two Persons one for the other there if one of them detain the one the other cannot detain the other as is 9 E. 4. 20. and 15 E. 4. 2. It is holden That if one grant Tithes in Fee by one Deed and by the same Deed for the same Grant the Grantee grant to the same Person an Annuity of 20 li That if the Grantor of the Tithes enter into the Tithes yet the Grantee cannot detaine the Annuity because the grant of the Tithes is executed in him and he may have an Action for them if the other enter upon them But in the principall Case The Covenant was but Executory for the other and then if one be not performed the other shall never be performed Windham and Periam Justices conceived the contrary and therefore the case was adjourned and a demurrer in law upon it Pasch 23 Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 12. TEnant in taile the Remainder in Fee the Tenant in taile makes a Lease for life according to the Statute of 32 H. 8. and afterwards dieth without issue and before any entrie he in the remainder grants his Remainder by Fine Whether the Conusee of the Fine may enter upon the Tenant for life and avoid his Lease was the question Fenner Serjeant Hee cannot because when a Free-hold is given by Livery it cannot be defeated without Entrie As If a Parson make a Lease for life rendring rent and dieth and his successor accept the rent the lease is affirmed as it is holden in 11. E. 3. and 18. E. 4. The Case was That a man made a Lease for life the remainder in Fee Tenant for life granted over his estate and then a Formedon was brought against the Grantee and then the first Tenant for life died And by all the Justices except Littleton and divers Serjeants the Writ shall not abate if he in the Remainder hath not entred So in the principall case When he had made a Lease for life and afterwards died without issue living the Tenant for life his estate is not defeated before entrie of him in the Remainder And then when before entrie he in the Remainder grants his Remainder the Grantee shall have it but as a Remainder for so is his grant and so the estate of Tenant for life which was but voidable is made good And so was it holden by Windham and Periam Justices but Meade and Dyer Chief Justice did conceive that by the death of Tenant in taile without issue his Lease made to him for life was void and not voidable because by the death of Tenant in tail his estate out of which the estate of the Tenant for life was derived is determined and therefore the estate for life is determined also Et cessante causâ cessat effectus And Meade compared it to the Case of 21. H. 7. 12 where it was holden That if a man do make a Lease for life upon condition that if he pay unto the Lessee ten pounds at such a day that his estate shall cease Now by the performance of the Condition the estate is determined without entrie Mich. 24. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 13. POLES Case THomas Pole one of the Clerks of the Chancery married a woman who was Executrix to her Husband and in an Action of Debt brought against them in the Common Pleas the said Pole brought a writ of Priviledg to have removed the said Action into the Chancery And by all the Justices the Writ was disallowed and the defendants ruled to answer there because the Wife was joyned in the Action with the Husband and she could not have the priviledg and therefore not the Husband And so it is adjudged by the whole Court 34. H. 6. 29. and 35. H. 6. 3. But see 27. H. 8. 20. where the case was That a man brought an Action in the Common Pleas against Husband and at the pluries returned he and his Wife were arrested into an inferiour Court veniendo to Westminster and because the Husband hath priviledg therefore his Wife shall be in the same condition But Dyer said That the reason there was because the Wife came in aid of her Husband to follow his suit And therefore it is not like the principall Case at the Bar. Mich. 24. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 14. IN Debt upon a Bond of Forty pound for the Payment of Twenty pound at a Day and Place certain The Defendant pleaded That he had paid the said Twenty pound according to the Condition upon which they are at Issue and at
in Ward For Cook Chief Justice said that all Offices which are found to deceive the Crown of such an ancient flower of the Crown as Wardship should be void as to that purpose and most beneficial for the King And he cited the Case in 36. H. 8. Where the Kings Tenant made a Feoffment and took back an estate unto himself for life the Remainder to his Grand-child for 80. years and died that in that Case the Heir was in Ward and they said that in the case at Barre the Heir had power of the Inheritance upon payment of five Shillings and if the Lease for years be found and proved by witnesses yet it carrieth with it the badges of fraud And Tanfeild Chief Baron said that if a Lease for 100. years shall be accounted Mortmain à fortiori this Lease for 1000. years shall be taken to be made by fraud and collusion And Cook said that the Lord Chancellour of England would not relieve such a Lessee in Court of Equity because the begining and ground of it is apparant fraud Note the lands did lye in Springfield in Essex Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 274 MEADES Case AN Action of Debt was brought upon a Bond against Meade who pleaded that the Bond was upon condition that if he paid ten pound to him whom the Obligee should name by his last will that then c. and said that the Obligee made his Will and made Executors thereof but did not thereby name any person certain to take the ten pound Sherley Serjeant moved that the Executors should have the ten pound because they are Assignees in Law as it is holden in 27. H. 8. 2. But the whole Court was of opinion that the Executors were not named in the Will for such a purpose viz. to take the ten pound For they said It is requisite that there be an express naming who shall take the ten pound otherwise the Bond is saved and not forfeited And Cook put this Case If I be bounden to pay ten pound to the Assignee of the Obligee and his Assignee makes an Executor and dieth the Executor shall not have the ten pound But if I be bounden to pay ten pound to the Obligee or his Assignees there the Executor shall have it because it was a duty in the Obligee himself the same Law if I be bound to enfeoffe your Assignees c. Wherefore it it was adjudged for the Defendant Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 275 GREENWAY and BAKER's Case IT was moved and afterwards resolved in the Case of a Prohibition prayed to the Court of Admiralty That if a Pirat taketh goods upon the Sea and selleth them that the property of them is changed no more then if a theife upon the Land steales them and selleth them And in this Case it appeared by the Libell That bona piratica fuerint infra Portam Argier super altum mare And for that cause a Prohibition was denied because Argier being a forrain Port the Court could not take notice whether there were such a place of the Sea called the Port or whether it were within the Land or not Afterwards upon the mediation of the Justices the parties agreed to try the cause in the Guild-hall in London before the Lord Chiefe Justice Cook Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 276. Sir FRANCIS FORTESCUE and COAKE's Case UPon an Evidence in an Ejectione firme betwixt the Plaintiffe and Defendant The Court would not suffer Depositions of witnesses taken in the Court of Chancery or Exchequer to be given in Evidence unlesse affidavit be made that the witnesses who deposed were dead And Cook Chiefe Justice said nullo contradicente That it is a principall Challenge to a Jurour That he was an Arbitrator before in the same case because it is intended that he will incline to that partie to which he inclined before but contrary is it of a Commissioner because he is elected indifferent And it was also said in this Case That one who had been Solicitor in the Cause is not a fit person to be a Commissioner in the same Cause Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 277 BArker Serjeant in Arrest of Judgement moved That the Venire facias did vary from the Roll in the Plaintiffs name for the Roll was Peter Percy and the Venire facias John Percy and the postea was according to the Roll which was his true name The Court doubted whether it might be amended or whether it should be accounted as if no Venire facias had issued because it is betwixt other parties But it was holden That in case no Venire facias issueth the same is holpen by the Statute of Jeofailes and in this case it is in effect as if no Venire facias had issued forth and so it was adjudged And Cook Chiefe Justice said that if there be no Venire facias nor habeas Corpora yet if the Sheriffe do return a Jury the same is helped by the Statute of Jeofailes Warburton Justice contrary vide C. 5. part Bishops case And Harris Serjeant vouched Trinit 7. Jacobi Rot. 787. in the Exchequer Herenden and Taylors case to be adjudged as this Case is Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 278 BROWN's Case IT was holden by the whole Court in this case That if a man hath a Modus Decimandi for Hay in Black-acre and he soweth the said acre seven years together with corn that the same doth not destroy the Modus Decimandi but the same shall continue when it is again made into hay And when it is sowed with corn the Parson shall have tithe in kind and when the same is hay the Vicar shall have the tithe hay if he be endowed of hay Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 279 JAMES and RATCLIFF's Case IN Debt upon a Bond to perform such an agreement The Defendant pleaded Quod nulla fuit conclusio-sive agreeamentum The Plaintiff said Quod fuit talis conclusio agreeamentum de hoc ponit se super patriam The Court held the same was no good issue because a Negative and an Affirmative Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 280 WETHERELL and GREEN's Case IT was said by the Pronothories That if a Nihil dicit be entred in Trinity Term and a Writ of Enquiry of Damages issueth the same Term that there needs not any continuance but if it be in another Term it is otherwise The Court said If it were not the course of the Court they would not allow of it but they would not alter the course of the Court the words of continuance were Quia vicecomos non misit brev Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 281 PARROT and KEBLE's Case A Man levied a Fine unto the use of himself for life the remainder in tail c. with power reserved to the Conusor to make Leases for eighty years in Possession or Reversion if A. B. and C. did so long live reserving the ancient rent
it is not known whether he be guilty or not and in Cuddingtons Case it was a general Pardon and that was the cause that the Action did lie for that it is not known whether he committed the Felony or not But they conceived that if it had been a particular Pardon that then in that case the Action would not have been maintainable For the procuring of a special Pardon doth presuppose and it is a strong presumption that the party is guilty of the offence Note it did not appear in the Case of Fines the principal Case whether the Pardon by which Dr. Spicer was pardoned were a general Pardon or whether it were a particular and special Pardon Pasch 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 415. DAVER's Case IN Davers Case who was arraigned for the death of William Dutton Ley Chief Justice delivered it for Law That if two men voluntarily fight together and the one killeth the other if it be upon a sudden quarrel that the same is but Man-slaughter And if two men fight together and the one flieth as far as he can and he which flieth killeth him who doth pursue him the same is Se defendendo Also if one man assaulteth another upon the High-way and he who is assaulted killeth the other he shall forfeit neither life nor lands nor goods if he that killed the other fled so far as he could Quod nota Pasch 21 Jacobi â—n the Court of Wards 416. Sir EDWARD COKE's Case THis Case being of great consequence and concernment The Master of the Court of Wards was assisted by four of the Judges in the hearing and debating of it and after many Arguments at the Barr the said four Judges argued the same in Court viz. Dodderidge one of the Justices of the Kings Bench Tanfield Lord chief Baron of the Exchequer Hobart Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas and Ley Lord Chief Justice of his Majesties Court of Kings Bench The Case in effect was this Queen Elizabeth by her Letters Patents did grant to Sir Christopher Hatton the Office of Remembrancer and Collector of the first Fruits for his life Habendum to him after the death or surrender of one Godfrey who held the said Office then in possession Sir Christopher Hatton being thus estated in the said Office in Reversion and being seised in Fee-simple of diverse Mannors Lands and Tenements did Covenant to stand seised of his said lands c. unto the use of himself for life and afterwards to the use of J. Hatton his son in tail and so to his other sons intail with the Remainder to the right heirs of J. Hatton in Fee with Proviso of Revocation at his pleasure during his life Godfrey the Officer in possession died and Sir Christopher Hatton became Officer and was possessed of the Office and afterwards he became indebted to the Queen by reason of his said Office And the Question in this great Case was Whether the Mannors and Lands which were so conveyed and setled by Sir Christopher Hatton might be extended for the said Debt due to the Queen by reason of the Proviso and Revocation in the said Conveyance of Assurance of the said Mannors and Lands the debt due to the Queen was assign'd over and the Lands extended and the Extent came to Sir Edward Coke and the heir of John Hatton sued in the Court of Wards to make void the Extent And it was agreed by the said four Justices and so it was afterwards decreed by Cranfield Master of the Court of Wards and the whole Court That the said Mannors and Lands were liable to the said Extent And Dodderidge Justice who argued first said that the Kings Majestie had sundry prerogatives for the Recovery of Debts and other Duties owing unto him First he had this prerogative ab origine legis That he might have the Lands the Goods and the Body of the Person his Debtor in Execution for his Debt But at the Common Law a common person a common person could not have taken the body of his debtor in execution for his debt but the same priviledg was given unto him by the Statute of 25. E. 3. cap. 17. At the Common Law he said that a common person Debtee might have had a Levari facias for the Recovery of his Debt by which Writ the Sheriffe was commanded Quod de terris Catallis ipsius the Debtor c. Levari faciat c. but in such Case the Debtee did not meddle with the Land but the Sheriffe did collect the Debt and pay the same over to the Debtor But by the Statute of West 2. cap 20. The Debtee might have an Elegit and so have the moyetie of the Lands of his Debtor in Execution for his Debt as it appeareth in C. 3. part 12. in Sir William Harberts Case Secondly He said That the King had another prerogative and that was to have his Debt paid before the Debt of any Subject as it appeareth 41. E. 3. Execution 38. and Pasc 3. Elizabeth Dyer 197. in the Lord Dacres and Lassels Case and in M. 3. E. 6. Dyer 67 Stringfellows Case For there the Sheriffe was amerced because the King ought to have his Debt first paid and ought to be preferred before a Subject vid. 328 Dyer There the words of the Writ of Priviledg shew that the King is to be preferred before other Creditors By the Statute of 33. H. 8. cap. 39. The Execution of the Subject shall be first served if his Judgment be before any Processe be awarded for the Kings debt In the Statute of 25. E. 3. Cap. 19. I find that by the Common Law the King might grant a Protection to his Debtor that no other might sue him before that the King was satisfied his debt See the Writ of Protection Register â— 81. B. the words of which are Et quia nolumus solutionem debitorum nostrorum caeteris omnibus prout ratione Perogativae nostrae totis temporibus retroactis usitatae c. But that grew such a Grievance to the Subject that the Statute of 25. E. 3. Cap. 19. was made And now by that Statute a common person may lawfully sue to Judgment but he cannot proceed to Execution and so the Kings Prerogative is saved unless the Plaintiffe who sueth will give security to pay first the Kings Debt For otherwise if the Paty doth take forth Execution upon his Judgment and doth levy the money the same money may be seized upon to satisfie the Kings Debt as appeareth in 45. E. 3. title Decies tantum 13. The third Prerogative which the King hath is That the King shall have the Debt of the Debtor to the Kings Debtor paid unto him v. 21 H. 7. 12. The Abbot of Ramseys Case The Prior of Ramsey was indebted to the King and another Prior was indebted to the Prior of Ramsey and then it was pleaded in Barr that he had paid the same Debt to the King and the Plea holden for a good Plea
E. 3 17 a. Persay Executors cannot make a Feoffment but they ought to make a Sale and the Vendee viz. the Bargainee is in without Livery and Seisin But if they do make a Feoffment by the Livery all their right is given away But if an Attorney giveth Livery in the name of his Master nothing of his own right to the same Land is given away by the Livery and Seisin but if he maketh Livery in his own name then he giveth away his own right and the Statute of 1 R. 3. cap. 1. maketh the Feoffment good which is made by Cestuy que use against him and his heirs C. 1. pt 111. By Livery and Seisin his whole right is given away Com. 352. The Feoffees of Cestuy que use are disseised the Disseisor enfeoffeth Cestuy que use who enfeoffs a stranger And the Question was If by this Feoffment made by Cestuy que use the right of the first Feoffees were determined and extinct Fitzherbert held that the right was gone and in that case the Uses were raised after 1 R. 3. and before 27 H. 8. cap. 10. Although Yelverton held that it was meant of a Feoffment before the Statute of 1 R. 3. Jus recuperandi was in Francis Bigot Then the question is Whether this Right were given away by the Statutes of 26 31 H. 8. The Statute of 26 H. 8. 31 H. 8. are several and distinct Statutes The words of the Statute of 26 H. 8. are That the party offending shall forfeit all his Possession and Vse but there is no word of Right in the Statute and that Statute doth not extend to give any land but that which was in possession or use And the cause was because before that Statute of 26 H. 8. Uses were not given unto the King for Attaindor for Treason they being but a Trust and Confidence C. 11. part 36 b. The Statute sayes By any wayes title or means But observe when this Statute was made It is a penal Statute and therefore shall be taken strictly Stamford 129 b. C. 11. part 36 b. The Statute of 5 6 E. 6. takes away Clergy but if a stranger be in the house by licence of the Owner the party shall have his Clergy because out of the words and being a penal Law it shall be taken strictly The Statute of 33 H. 8. cap. 20. forfeits for Treason Right to the Land viz. right of Entry but the Statute of 26 H 8. giveth not any Right Before the Statute of 33 H. 8. a right of Entry was not given to the King for Treason à fortiori a right of Action was not forfeited to the King It is the Statute of 31 H. 8. the private Act which hurteth us which expresly gave Rights But this Right in our Case is not forfeited by this Statute which giveth Rights which a man hath But in our Case Francis Bigot had not the Right but the Right was in abeyance Statutes in points of Forfeiture forfeit no more then a man hath But yet a Statute may give to the King that which a man hath not C. 11. part 13. The statute of Monasteries gave that to the King which was not viz. Monasteries in reputation saving to none but strangers no not to the Donors Hussies Case Tenant in tail doth bargain and sell to the King and a statute gave it to the King saving to strangers but neither the Donor nor his issue were within the saving Old Entries 423. b c d. It was enacted That the Duke of Suffolk should forfeit for Treason all his Lands Rights and Tenements and all such Rights and Titles of Entry which he had But thereby rights of Action were not given to the King but only rights of Entries The statutes of 31 33 H. 8. are alike in words If Tenant in tail the Remainder over forfeit c. the Remainder is saved without words of saving But if the statute giveth the land by name unto the King then the Remainder is not saved but is destroyed If a Right of Action be given unto the King the statutes of Limitation and Fines are destroyed for he is not bound by them C. 485 486. in point of forfeiture Stamf. 187 188. There is a difference betwixt real and personal Rights given to the King C. 3. part 3. A right of Action concerning Inheritances are not forfeited by Attaindor c. But Obligations Statutes c. are forfeited by Attaindor C. 7. part 9. A right of Action is not given to the King by general words of an Act because it lieth in privity And it would be a vexation to the subject if they should be given C. 4. pt 124. Although that a Non compos mentis cannot commit Felony yet he may commit Treason for the King is Caput salus reipublicae If Non compos mentis maketh a Feoffment and then committeth Treason the King shall not have an Action to recover the Land of the Non compos mentis as the party himself may have But if Non compos mentis be disseised and then be attainted of Treason then the King may enter into the Lands because the party himself had a right of Entry which is given to the King It was objected That a right of Action clothed with a possession might be given to the King Tenant in tail discontinues and takes back an estate and is attainted of Treason This right of Action shall not be forfeited to the King for his right of Action was to the estate tail In our Case the right of Action was to Katherine for she was Tenant for life The Attaindor was 29 H 8. and the Act which forfeited the Right was made 31 H. 8. and then the right and possession were divided 30 H. 6. Grants 91. The King may grant the Temporalties of a Bishop before they happen to be void And so he may grant a Ward But the King cannot grant the Lands of J. S. when he shall be attainted of Treason for the Law doth not presume that J. S. will commit Treason The Devise of a Term the Remainder over is good But if the Devise be of a Term to one in tail the Remainder over the Remainder is void because the Law doth presume that an estate in tail may continue for ever C. 8. part 165 166. The Law did not presume that Digby at the time of the Conveyance intended to commit Treason It was objected That whatsoever may be granted may be forfeited I deny that C. 3. part 10. by Lumley's Case If the issue in tail in the life of his Father be attainted of high Treason and dyeth it is no forfeiture of the estate tail But if the issue in tail levieth a Fine in the life of his Father it is a bar to his issues C. 3. part 50. Sir George Brown's Case 10 E. 4. 1. there Executors may give away the goods of the Testator but they cannot forfeit the goods of their Testator Com. 293. Osborns Case Guardian in
certain Farme Lands called Estons and that a Fine was levied of Lands in Eslington Eston and Chilford whereas Eston lay in another Parish appell D. Calthrope argued That the Land in Eston did passe by the Fine although the Parish was not named for that the Writ of Covenant is a personall Action and will lie of Lands in a Hamlet or lieu conus 8. E. 4 6. Vide 4. E. 3. 15. 17. Ass 30. 18. E. 3. 36. 47. E. 3. 6. 19. E. 3. Brev. 767. 2. He said That it was good for that the Plea went only to the Writ in abatement but when a Concord is upon it which admits it good it shall not be avoided afterwards 3. He said That a Fine being a common assurance and made by assent of the parties will passe the Lands well enough 7 E. 4. 25. 38. E. 3. 19. And he vouched Pasch 17. Jacobi in the Kings Bench Rot. 140. Monk and Butlers Case Where it was adjudged that a Fine being but an arbitrary assurance would passe Lands in a Lieu conus and so he said it would do in a common recovery And Richardson said That if a Scire facias be brought to execute such a recovery Nul tiel ville ou Hamlet is no plea and the Fine or recovery stands good Vide 44. E. 3. 21. 21 E. 3. 14 Stone And the opinion of the Court was That the Lands did well passe by the Fine Mich. 8. Caroli in the Kings Bench 509 CAWDRY aud TETLEY's Case CAwdry being a Doctor of Physick the Defendant Praemissorum non ignorans to discredit the plaintiff with his Patients as appeared by the Evidence spake these words to the plaintiffe viz. Thou art a drunken Fool and an Asse Thou wert never a Scholer nor ever able to speak like a Scholer The opinions of Jones and Crook Justices were that the words were actionable because they did discredit him in his Profession and hee hath particular losse when by reason of those words others do not come to him And Palmers Case was vouched Where one said of a Lawyer Thou hast no more Law then a Jackanapes that an Action did lie for the words Contrary if he had said No more Wit And William Waldrons Case was also vouched where one said I am a true Subject thy Master is none that the words were actionable Mich. 4. Caroli in the Kings Bench. 510 The King and BAXTER SIMMON's Case THE Case was this Tenant in tail the Remainder in taile the Remainder in Fee to Tenant in tail in possession Tenant in tail in Remainder by Deed enrolled reciting that he had an estate tail in Remainder Granted his Remainder and all his estate and right unto the King and his Heirs Proviso that if he pay ten shillings at the Receipt of the Exchequer that then the Grant shall be void Tenant in tail in possession suffers a common Recovery and afterwards deviseth the Lands to I. S. and dieth without Issue 18. Jacobi Afterwards 21. Jac. he in the Remainder in tail dieth without issue but no seisure is made nor Offence found that the lands were in the Kings hands Noy who argued for the King The first Point is When Tenant in taile recites his estate and grants all his estate and right to the King and his Heirs what estate the King hath And if by the death of Tenant in tail without issue the estate of the King be so absolutly determined that the Kings possession needs not to be removed by Amoveas manum And he argued That when the Lands are once in the King that they cannot be out of him again but by matter of Record 8. E. 3. 12. Com. 558. And a bare entry upon the King doth not put the King out of possession of that which was once in him And so was it adjudged 34. Eliz. in the Lord Paget's Case as Walter chief Baron said And Noy took this difference 8. H. 5. Traverse 47. and 8. E. 2. Traverse 48. If a particular estate doth determine before that the King seise there the King cannot afterwards seise the Lands But if the King hath once the Lands in his hands or possession there they cannot be devested out of him but by matter of Record So F. Nat. Br. 254. If a man be seised of Lands in the right of his Wife and be outlawed for Felonie for which the Lands come into the Kings hands and afterwards hee who is outlawed dieth there a Writ of Diem clausit extremum shall issue forth which proveth That by the death of the Husband the Lands are not immediately out of the King and setled in the Wife againe 22. E. 4. Fitz. Petition 9. Tenant in taile is attainted of Treason and the Lands seised into the Kings hands and afterwards Tenant in taile dieth without Issue he in the Remainder is put to his Petition which proveth that the Lands are not presently after the death of Tenant in taile without issue out of the King But he agreed the Cases If Tenant in taile acknowledgeth a Statute or granteth a Rent charge and dieth that the Rent is gone and determined by his death as it is agreed in 14. Assisarum The second point argued by Noy was That although that there was not any seizure or Offence found which entituled the King Yet the Deed enrolled in the Chancery which is returned in this Court did make sufficient title for the King as 8. E. 3. p. 3. is The Judges of Courts ought to Judge upon the Records of the same Courts In 8. H. 7. 11. a Bayliff shewed That a Lease was made to T. his Master for life the Remainder to the King in Fee and prayed in Ayd of the King And the Plaintiff in Chancery prayed a Procedendo And it was ruled That a Procedendo should not be granted without examination of the Kings title Thirdly he said That in this case he who will have the Lands out of the possession of the King ought to shew forth his title and in the principall case it doth not appear that the Defendant had any title Vide 10. H. 7. 13. Athowe Serjeant argued for the Defendant he said That in this case the King had an estate but for the life of Tenant in tail And therefore he said That If Tenant in tail grant totum statum suum that an estate but for his own life passeth as Litt. is 145. and 13. H. 7. 10. acc So If Tenant for life the remainder in taile bee and he in the Remainder releaseth to Tenant for life in possession nothing passeth but for the life of Tenant in tail 19. H. 6. 60. If Tenant in tail be attainted of Treason or Felonie and Offence is found and the King seiseth the lands he hath an estate but for the life of Tenant in tail And he cited 35. Eliz. C. 2 part 52. Blithmans case Where Tenant in tail Covenanted to stand seized to the use of himself for his own life and after his death to the use
of his eldest son in tail and afterwards he married a wife and died that the wife should not be endowed for when he had limited the use to himself for his life he could not limit arâ— Remainder over And Edwards Case adjudged in the Court of Wards which was That there was Tenant for life the Remainder in tail he in the Remainder granted his Remainder to I. S. and his heirs and afterwards Tenant for life dyed and then the grantee dyed his heirs within age it was adjudged that the heir of the garntee should not be in ward because the Tenant in tail could not by his Grant grant a greater estate then for his own life But he said That in the principall Case it appeareth That the Tenant in tail in Remainder hath particularly recited his estate And where it appeareth in the Conveyance it self that he hath but an estate in tail a greater estate shall not passe As if Tenant for life granteth a Rent to one and his heirs the same at the first sight seems to be a good Rent in Fee but when it appeareth in the Conveyance that the grantor was but Tenant for life there upon the Construction of the Deed it self it cannot be intended that he granted a Fee but that an estate for life passed only in the Rent Secondly he argued That although the estate in tail in the principall case was an abeyance Yet a Common Recovery would barr such estate tail in abeyance And therewith agreeth C. 2. part Sr Hugh Cholmleys Case 3. He said That the estate was out of the King and vested in the party without any Offence found as 49. E. 3. Isabell Goodcheaps case A man devised houses in London holden of the King in tail and if the Donee dyed without Issue that the Lands should be sold by his Executors The devisee died without Issue The bargain and sale of the Lands by the Executor doth divert the estate out of the King without Petition or Monstrans de Droit So If there be Tenant in tail the Remainder in tail and Tenant in tail â—n Remainder levieth a fine of his Remainder to the King and afterwards dyeth without Issue the Kings estate is determined and there needs no Petition or Monstrans de Droit 4. He said That in the principall case nothing was in the King because it doth not appeare that there was any seisure or Offence found to entitle the King And the Tenant in tail in the Remainder died in the life of King James and then if the Kings estate were then determined as before by the death of the Tenant in taile the King which now is never had any title And hee said that he needed not to shew a greater title then he had And hee took a difference when Tenant in taile doth onely defend or make defence and when he makes title to Lands in the one Case he ought for to shew That the Tenant in taile died without issue and in the other Case not And therefore in the principall case he demanded Judgment for the Defendant The Case was adjourned to another day Mich. 4. Caroli in the Star-Chamber 511 TAILOR and TOWLIN's Case A Bill was preferred against the Defendant for a Conspiracy to Indict the plaintiff of a Rape And the Plaintiff aleadged in his Bill That an Indictment was preferred by the Defendant against the Plaintiff before the Justices of Assise and Nisi prius in the County of Suffolk And did not lay it in his Bill that the Indictment was preferred before the Justices of Oyer and Terminer and Gaole delivery and the same was holden by the Court to be a good Exception to the Bill for that the Justices of Assise and Nisi prius have not power to take Indictments But afterwards upon veiw of the Bill because the Conspiracy was the principall thing tryable and examinable in this Court and that was well layd in the Bill the Bill was retayned and the Court proceded to Sentence And in this Case Richardson Justice said That in Conspiracy the matter must bee layed to be falsè et malitiosè and if it be layed for a Rape It must be layd that there was recens persecutio of it otherwise it will argue a Consent And therefore because the Defendant did not preferre an Indictment of Rape in convenient time after the Rape supposed to be done but concealed the same for half a years time and then would have preferred a Bill of Indictment against the plaintiff for the same Rape he held that the Indictment was false and malitious And Hyde Chief Justice said That upon probable proof a man might accuse another before any Justice of Peace of an Offence and although his accusation be false yet the Accuser shall not be punished for it But where the Accusation is malitious and false it is otherwise and for such Accusation he shall be punished in this Court Trinit 8. Caroli in the King Bench. 513 JONES and BALLARD's Case AN Action upon the Case was brought for these words viz These Jones are proper Witnesses they will sweare any thing They care not what they say They have already forsworn themselves in the Chancery and the Lord keeper Committed them for it Jermyn took Exceptions because it was not said to be in the Court of Chancery nor that it was in any Deposition there taken upon Oath But it was adjudged per Curiam That the Action would lie and Jones Justice said that the Addition in the Chauncery was as much as if he had said he was perjured there And Hâ—msies case was vouâ—hed by him Where one said of a Witness presently after a Tryall at the Guild Hall in London You have now forsworn your self That it was adjudged that the words were actionable Trinit 8. Caroli in the Kings Bench. 513. SYMME's and SMITH's Case A Woman being entituled to copyhold Lands of the Manor of D did covenant upon reasonable request to be made unto her to surrender the Copy-hold Land according to the Custome of the Manor And it was found That the Custome of the Manor is That a surrender may be made either in person or by Letter of Atturney and that the plaintiff did request the woman to make the surrender by a Letter of Atturney which shee refused to do And whether shee ought to surrender presently or might first advise with her Councell was the Question It was argued for the plaintiff that shee ought to do it presently And Munser's Case C. 2. part and 16. Eliz. Dyer 337. Sir Anthonie Cooks Case were vouched that she was to do it at her perill And the Election in this Case was given to the Covenantee and hee might require it to be done either in Court in person or by Letter of Atturney And C. 2. part Sir Rowland Heywards Case and C. 5. part Hallings Case was vouched to that purpose Rolls contrary for the Defendant And he said That the woman was to have convenient time to do it and
afterward the Husband suffers the wood to grow five and twenty yeers and afterwards hee dieth The question was Whether the Wife being Tenant for life might cut that Underwood And it was moved What shall be said seasonable Underwood that a Termor or Tenant for life might cut Dyer Chief Justice and all the other Justices held That a Termor or Tenant for life might cut all Underwood which had been usually cut within twenty yeers In 11. H. 6. 1. Issue was taken If they were of the age of twenty yeers or no. But in the Wood-Countries they may fell seasonable wood which is called Sylva caedua at six and twenty eight and twenty thirty years by the custome of the Country And so the Usage makes the Law in severall Countries And so it is holden in the books of 11. H. 6. and 4. E. 6. But they agreed That the cutting of Oakes of the age of eight yeers or ten years is Waste But by Meade Justice the cutting of Hornbeams Hasels Willows or Sallows of the age of forty yeares is no Waste because at no time they will be Timber Another question which was moved was That at the time of the Feoffment it was seasonable Wood and but of the growth of fourteen or fifteen yeers If this suffering of the Husband of it to grow to 25 years during the Coverture should bind the Wife so as she cannot cut the Woods Gaudy Serjeant said That it should not bind the Wife For if a Warranty descend upon a Feme Covert it shall not bind her So if a man seized of Land in the Right of his Wife be disseised and a Descent be cast during the Coverture it shall not bind the Wife but that she may enter after the death of the Husband But by Dyer Chief Justice and all the other Justices This Permission of the Husband shall bind the Wife notwithstanding the Coverture for that the time is limited by the Law which cannot be altered if it be not the custome of the Country As in the case of 17. E. 3. Where a man makes a Lease for years and grants that the Lessee shall have as great commoditie of the Land as hee might have Notwithstanding these words he cannot dig the land for a Mine of Cole or Stone because that the Law forbids him to dig the land So in the principall Case The Wife cannot fell the Wood notwithstanding that at the time of her estate she might and afterwards by the permission of the Husband during the coverture the time is incurred so as she cannot fell it because the Law doth appoint a time which if it be not felled before such time that it shall not be felled by a Termor or a Tenant for life but it shall be Waste Hill 23. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 7. A Man makes a Lease of a Garden containing three Roodes of Land and the Lessee is ousted and he brings an Ejectione firme and declares that he was ejected of three Roods of Land Rodes Serjeant moved That by this Declaration it shall be intended that he was ejected of the Garden of which the Lease was made and so the Ejectione firme would lie And it was holden by the Lord Chief Justice Dyer That a Garden is a thing which ought to be demanded by the same name in all Precipes as the Register and Fitz. N. Brevium is And this Action is greater then an Action of Trespasse because by Recovery in this Action he shall be put into Possession But Meade and Windham Justices contrary And they agreed that in all reall Actions a Garden shall be demanded by the name Gardinum otherwise not But this Action of Ejectione firme is in the nature of Trespasse and it is in the Election of the Party to declare as here he doth or for to declare of the Ejectment of a Garden for a Garden may be used at one time for a Garden and at another time be ploughed and sowed with Corn. But they conceived that the better order of pleading had been if he had declared that he was ejected of a Garden containing three Roodes of Land as in the Lease it is specified Hill 23. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 8. SErgeant Fenner moved this case That Land is given to the Wife in tail for her Joynture according to the Statute of 11. H. 7. The Husband dieth the Wife accepts a fine Sur conusans de droit come ceo c. of a Stranger And by the same fine grants and renders the Land to him for an Hundred years whether this acceptance of a Fine and Render by the Wife were a forfeiture of her estate so as he in the Reversion or Remainder might enter by the Statute Mead and Dyer Justices it is a forfeiture and Mead resembled it to the Case in 1 H. 7. 12. where it is holden That if Tenant for life do accept of a Fine Sur conusans de droit come ceo c. that it is a forfeiture and the Lessor may enter But Fenner asked their opinions what they thought of the principall case But haesitavernut because they said it was a dangerous case and is done to defraud the Statute of 11. H. 7. Pasch 23. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 9. A Man made a Feoffment in Fee to two to the use of himself and his wife for the term of their lives without impeachment of waste during the life of the Husband the remainder after their decease to the use of I. his son for the term of his life And further by the same Deed Vult concedit that after their three lives viz. of the Husband Wife and Son that I. S. and I. D. two other Feoffees shall be seized of the same Land to them and their heirs to the use of the right Heirs of the body of the Son begotten It was moved That by this deed the two later Feoffees should be seized to the use of the right Heirs of the body of the Son begotten after the death of the Husband Wife and the Son But it was holden by all the Justices That the second Feoffees had not the Fee because by the first part of the Deed the Fee-Simple was given to the first Feoffees and one Fee-Simple cannot depend upon another Fee-Simple Notwithstanding that after the determination of the former uses for life the Fee-Simple should be vested again in the Heires of the Feoffer and that the words That the second Feoffees should be seized should be void But Dyer Chief Justice and the other Justices were against that because there wanted apt words to raise the later use As if a man bargain and sell his Reversion of Tenant for Life by words of Bargain and Sale only and the Deed is not Enrolled within the six months but afterwards the Tenant for Life doth attorne yet notwithstanding that the Reversion shall not passe because Bargain and Sell are not apt words to make a Grant And that Case was so adjudged in the Common Pleas as the
the Justices did agree that the assignement was good but that the two assignees could not work severally but together with one stock or such workmen as belonged to them both And Cook who reported the opinions of the Justices was of Counsel with the Lord Mountjoy And note in that case it was said That Proviso being coupled with other words of covenant and grant doth not create a Condition but shall be of the same nature as the other words with which it is coupled Pasch 25. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 25. WEBBE and POTTER'S Case In an Ejectione firme the Case was this JOhn Harris gave Land in Frankmarriage to one White And the words of the Deed were Dedi concessi I. W. in liberum maritagium Joannae filiae suae Habendum eidem J. W. haeredibus suis in perpetuum tenendum de Capitalibus Dominis fâ—odi c. with warranty to the Husband and his heirs Periam Justice although the usuall words of gift in Frankmarriage are not observed yet the Frankmarriage shall not be destroyed for the usuall words are In liberum maritagium cum Joanna filia mea in the ablative case And it was holden by all the Justices that notwithstanding that the Frankmarriage was good Also a gift in Frankmarriage after the espousals is good as it was holden by all the Justices And see Fitz. Tit. Taile 4. E. 3. and 2. H. 3. Dower 199. And he said That a gift in Frankmarriage before the Stat. of Donis c. was a Feesimple but now it is but a special tail and if it should not be in law a gift in Frankmarriage then the Husband and Wife have an estate but for their lives for they cannot have an estate taile for that there are not words of limitation of such estate in the gift And hee cited 4. E. 3. and 45. E. 3. 20. to prove his opinion and hee much relyed upon the intent of the Donor which ought to be observed in construction of such Gifts according to the Statute And because the Habendum is repugnant to the premisses and would destroy the Frank-marriage it is void and the premisses shall stand good and to prove that he cited 9. E. 3. 13. E. 1. 32. E. 1. Tit. Taile 25. 3. H. 4. by Hill And he took this difference Where a Remainder is limited upon a Gift in Frankmarriage to a stranger and where it is limited to one of the Donees for in the first case the Remainder is good for the benefit of the stranger but in the second case it is void And he said that if a Rent be reserved upon such a Gift that it should be void during the four degrees but afterwards the Reservation should be good And if the Donor grant the Reversion over and the Donee in Frank-marriage attourn now he shall pay rent to the Grantee for by Littleton he hath lost the Priviledg of Frankmarriage viz. the Aquitall and no privitie is betwixt the Grantee and the Donees 10. Ass 26. 4. H. 6. That it is not any taile if it be not Frankmarriage Windham Justice Although it be no estate in Frankmarriage yet is it an estate taile and he cited 8. E. 3. although there want the word Heirs Also if a man give lands to another semini suo it is good 45. E. 3 Statham taile If it be not Frankmarriage yet it is a good estate in taile 19. Ass Land was given to Husband and Wife in Frank-marriage infra annos nubiles and afterwards they are divorced the Wife hath an estate in taile Meade Justice did agree with Windham and said That although there be not any Tenure nor any Aquitall yet it may be a good Frankmarriage as if a Rent Common or Reversion be given in Frankmarriage it is good and yet there is not any Tenure nor aquitall Dyer Chief Justice conceived That it is not Frankmarriage because that the usuall words in such Gifts are not observed for he said that the gift ought to be in liberum Maritagium and not Joannae filiae suae for that is not the usuall form of the words And he said That if the word Liberum be omitted that it is not Frankmarriage for that he said is as it were a Maxime and therefore the usuall words ought to be observed And by the same reason such a Gift cannot be with a man but ought to be with a woman also such a Gift ought to be with one of the blood of the Donor who by possibilitie might be his Heir Also there ought to be a Tenure betwixt the Donor and Donee and also an Aquitall And if these grounds and ceremonies be not observed it is not Frankmarriage Also if it once take effect as a Frankmarriage and afterwards the Donor granteth the Reversion over or if the Reversion doth descend to the Donees yet it shall not be utterly destroyed but shall remaine as an estate taile and not as an estate for life because it once took effect in the Donees and their issues as a Frankmarriage 31. E. 1. taile 116. If a man give lands in Frankmarriage the remainder to the Donees and the heirs of their bodies yet it is a good Frankmarriage And if a man give Lands in Frankmarriage the Remainder to another in taile it shall not destroy the Frankmarriage because that the Donor hath the Reversion in Fee in himself and the Donees shall hold of him and not of him in the Remainder in taile but if the Remainder had been limited to another in Fee simple then it had been otherwise Also if the Donor grant the Services of the Donees in Frankmarriage reserving the Reversion to himself it is no good Grant although that the Donees attourne for that the Services are incident to the Reversion but if he grant the Reversion then they do passe And he concluded That the Husband had the whole and that the Wife had nothing for she was no purchaser of the premisses because that the Gift did not take effect as a gift in Frankmariage And he said that he doth not construe it so by the intent of the Gift for here is an expresse limitation of the Fee to the Husband and his heirs which shall not be contradicted by any intendment for an Intendment ought to give way to an expresse Limitation as a consideration implyed ought to give place to a consideration expressed And afterwards this yeer it was adjudged that it was not a Frankmarriage nor a Gift in taile but that it was a Fee simple And the Justices said that although the old books are That where it takes not effect as a Frankmarriage that yet it shall take effect as an estate taile those Books are against Law But they agreed That where once the Gift doth take effect as a Frankmarriage that by matter ex post facto it might be turned to an estate in taile Pasch 26. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 26. MEade and Windham the other Justices being absent were of opinion That a
of the Term with the Remainder over And the Devisee of the Occupation of a Term hath one speciall Property and the Remainder another Property As if a Lease be extended upon a Statute the Conusee during the Extent hath one Property and he who is to have it afterwards another Property and the reason of the difference is apparent when the Occupation is devised and when the terme is devised for in the first Case he puts but only a confidence in the Devisee as it appears in Welkdens Case But in the other Case all the Property goes and there is no confidence reposed in the Devisee And there is a Case in the very Point with which I was of Councell and was decreed in the Court of Chancery it was one Edolf's Case Where the Devise was of a terme the Remainder to another and he made the Devisee his Executor and he entred Virtute donationis as in this Case and it was decreed That the Executor might alien the Terme and that the Remainder could not be good And to this purpose Vid. 33. H. 8. 2 E. 6. 37 H. 6. 30. But if there might be a Remainder yet Incertae Personae nulla donation for if all the Children be preferred then the Remainder is void and then the Property of the Lease is in the Wife and she might preferre her at any time during her life and the generall property cannot be in another but in the Executor for the Legatee cannot enter although that 27 H. 6. seemeth to be contrary And if the whole Property be in the Wife her Husband might alien it and therefore it may be extended for his Debt as 7. H. 6. 1. is But it may bee objected That the Cases before put are of a devise of a Term and this is of a Lease That makes no difference for in Wroâ—â—slâ—y's Case Lease there is said to contain not only a terme but also the years to come in the terme Then the Question is If by the sale of the Sheriff upon the Fieri facias if the term be so gone that the Wife shall not have it by the Reversall of the Judgment by Error for the Judgement is that the Party shall be restored to all that which he hath lost It is very cleer that it shall never return for if it should be so then no sale made by the Sheriffe might be good unlesse the Judgement be without Error which would be a very great damage to the Common Wealth And also by reason and by the Judgment in the Writ of Error it should not be so restored for the Judgment is That he shall be restored to all that which he hath lost ratione judicii and here the Defendant hath not lost any thing by force of the Judgment but by force of the Execution For the Judgment was to have Execution of 200 li and of the 200 li. he shall be restored again and not of the Lease And therefore in 7. H. 7. If a Manor be recovered and the Villains of the Manor purchase Lands and afterwards the Judgment is reversed by Error the Recover or shall have the Perquisite and the other shall not be restored to it And 7. H 7. A Statute was delivered in Owell maine and a recovery was by the Conusee upon Garnishment of the Conusor and the Conusee had Execution and afterwards the Judgement is reversed by Error yet the Conusor shall not be restored to the Land taken in Execution but only the Statute shall be redelivered back where it was before And in this Case if the party should be restored to the term it should be great inconvenience Also if I give one an Authority upon Condition and the Party doth execute the Authority and after the Condition is broken the Act is lawfull by him who had Authority upon Condition And so was the Lord of Arundels Case where the Feoffee upon Condition of a Manor granted Coppies it was holden That the Grants made by him were good notwithstanding the Condition was afterwards broken And in 13 E. 3. Barr 253. That a Recovery was Erroneous and the Party being in Execution the Gaoler suffered him to escape and after the Recovery was reversed for Error yet the Action lay against the Gaoler Also by him the Jury have given an imperfect Verdict so as we cannot tell whether the Party were preferred or not for the Will was unpreferred generally and the Jury find that she viz. A. the daughter was not preferred by her father in his life time so as the Preferment by the taile is limited generally so as if any other prefer her she shall not have the Remainder And the Jury have found that she was not preferred by one certain viz. by her Father nor in a certain time in his life time which is as much as to say That she was preferred by the Uncle Aunt or Mother and if it were so then the Remainder is not good to her Also they find no preferment in the life of the father and it may be that the Father hath given her preferment by Will and that was no preferment in his life but is consummate only by his death and so she might be preferred by him by Implication by his Will So as upon the whole Matter I conceive That the Judgement ought to be reversed Note that this Case was afterwards adjudged at Hertford Terme and the Judgement was That the Issue of the Wife had Judgement for her Terme and that the Judgement upon which the Execution was was Erroneous and reversed by the Writ of Error and that the opinion of the Justices was That the Term was not to be restored but so much for which it was sold upon the Execution And the Daughter of Perepoynt brought an Action for it and had Judgement 27 Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 37. ONE had certain Minerall Lands Leased to him for years with liberty to dig and make his Profit of the Mine The Lessee afterwards digged for Mine and sold the Gravell which came of it And by the Opinion of the whole Court This sale was no Waste for no Sale is Waste if the first act be not Waste As the Sale of Trees by Tenant for life or Years is not waste if the Cutting and Felling down of them was not Waste before for the Vendition is but a secondary Act and but subsequent to the Act precedent which Act if it were lawfull the Sale also is lawfull for the Sale alone is not waste But they said That if the Lessee fell or cut Timber Trees and sell them it is waste Non quia vendebat sed quia scindebat For if he suffer them to be upon the ground without doing any thing with them yet it is waste but he may use them for the Reparation of his house and then it is no waste And yet when he fels them with an intent for Reparations and afterwards sells them it is waste Non propter Venditionem only but for the felling
any remedy in this Court. Also he saith That he hath paid but doth not shew where and the other may say nâ—n solvit and so an issue shall be and no place from whence the Visne shall come Godfrey contrary If one be a lay man and the other a spirituall man then the tryall shall be at the common Law as it is holden 31. H 6. and 2. E. 4. And the defendant here is a lay man who makes prescription of a Modus decimandi for the discharge of Tithes in kind As to that which Cook said That he prescribes that he hath used to pay to the Parson and doth not say That it was due to the Parson and if he pay the Vicars Tithes to the Parson he doth wrong to the Vicar He saith That he hath paid and used to pay 4d. to the Parson in full satisfaction c. and reddâ—ndo singula singâ—lis it is good enough As to the doublenesse or repugnancy of the Prescription he said That the prescription is set forth according to the truth of the matter As to the place for that no issue can be taken upon it he answered That he conceived the issue will bee upon the Custome or Modus decimandi And Gawdy Justice agreed to that Suit Justice There is no Modus decimandi alledged for when he saith That he hath paid to the Parson that which the Vicar demands that is no answer Gaudâ— Justice The prescription is repugnant as Cook said and he said That the herbage is for all Kine as well for those which have Calves as those which have not No Prohibition granted Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 64. WINDSMORE and HULBORD's Case THe Case was this A man gave lands to J. S. Habendum to him and to three other for their lives â—t eorum diutius viventi successivè The question was What estate J. S. had and if after his life there were any occupancy in the Case Cooke That J. S. had an estate but for his life onely because he cannot have an estate for his life and for the life of another where the interest commenceth both in praesenti but he may have an estate for his own life in present interest and the remainder thereof for anothers life But this Habendum by no means can create a Remainder And he said that as a Lease to one for life Habendum to him primogâ—nito filio suo was no Remainder primogenito filio although some held to the contrary So a Lease for years Habendum to him and to another was no Remainder to the other Also the word successivè doth not make a Remainder as 30. H. 8. Br. Joynâ—ts 53. where a Lease for life to three or for yeers to three Habendum successivè yet they have a joynt estate and successivè is void for he said It is uncertain who shall have it first and who secondly Also one cannot have an estate for his own life and for the life of another at the same time in present interest for the greater will drown the lesser But if the greater be in praesenti and the lesse in futuro as a lease for his own life the Remainder to him for another mans life it is otherwise As a lease for his own life the Remainder for yeers is good But if I make a lease to you for your own life and 100 years both to begin at the same time the Lease for yeers is drowned and an estate for his own life is greater then an estate for anothers life and shall drown the estate for anothers life Vide 19. E. 3. Surr. 8. where Tenant for life of a Manor did surrender to Tenant for life in Reversion And 12. H. 7. 11. and Perkins 113. That if there be a Lease for life to one the Remainder to another for life and the Lessee for life doth surrender to him in the Remainder it is good So Dyers Reports A lease is made to one for the term of another mans life without impeachment of Waste the Remainder to him for his own life he is now punishable for waste for the first estate is surrendred Gaudy Justice If a lease be made to one for his life and so long as another man shall live quaere what estate he hath 2. If there can be any Occupancy in the Case for if the estate be void the limitation upon the estate is void therefore if the estate for the other mans life be drowned in the estate for his own life that can be no Occupancy Also the Occupancy is pleaded That such a one entred and doth not say claiming as occupant For if one come hawking upon the land he shall not by such entry be an Occupant and in the book of Entries it is pleaded that he entred clayming as Occupant Clenche Justice Every Occupancy ought to be in possession for otherwise the Law casts the interest of it upon him in the Reversion But Gaudy and Suit Justices were utterly against him in that for then they said there should be no occupancy if the party were not in by Lease or such like means Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 65. DIKE and DUNSTON'S Case IN an Action of Trespasse brought the defendant did justifie as Lessee to the Lord Mountagu and said that the Lord Mountagu for him and his Farmors had used to have a way over the land in which the trespass is supposed to be done And that by rooting of a cart wheel the way was so digged and drowned that he could not so wel use his way as before and that therefore he did fill up the cart roots and digged a trench to let out the water upon which the plaintiffe did demur in law For 15. H. 7. is that a Commoner cannot meddle with the soil so is 12. 13. H. 8. So he who hath Warren in the land of another man cannot meddle with the soile and as to that that he could not use his way so well as before it is not good for he ought to have said That he could not use his way at all otherwise the plea is not good As 6. E. 4. One is to lop his tree and he cannot do it unless it fall upon the Land of another there he may well justifie the felling of it upon the others Land because otherwise he could not lop it at all So if I give to one all the fish in my Pond he cannot dig a Trench to draw out the water unlesse he cannot otherwise take the fish as with Nets c. Also he justifies by reason that the Lord Mountagu for him and his Farmors c. And he was a Lessee and paid no rent therefore no Farmor Cowper contrary He shall not have an Action of Trespass for it is no losse or hinderance unto him but it is for his profit for the Land is the worse being drowned with water If a man do disseise me and fells trees upon the Land and doth repair the houses in an
haeredes de corpore and we are not to devise a new form in such case but it is sufficient to shew the speciall matter to the Court. Also the words of the Writ are true for they are Heirs to Sir Roger Lewknor and the count is sufficient pursuant and agreeing to their Writ for they are Heirs although they are not speciall Heirs of the body and so the Court was of opinion that the Writ was good notwithstanding that Exception And Anderson and Periam Justices said That the case is not to be compared to the case in F. Nat. Br. 57. c. for there he cannot shew by whose Demise the Tenant holdeth if he doth not shew the speciall conveyance viz. that the land was given to the Husband and Wife and the Heirs of the body of the Wife Nor is it like unto the case of 26. H. â— 6. for the same cause for alwayes the demise of the Tenant ought to be especially shewed and certainly which it cannot be in these two cases but by the disclosing of the Title also to the Reversion Another Exception was taken because that the Writ doth suppose quod tenuerunt which as they conceived is to be meant that tenuerunt joyntly whereas in truth they were Tenants in common Walmesley contrary because there is not any other form of Writ for there is not any Writ which doth contain two Tenuerunts And the words of the Writ are true quod tenuerunt although tenuerunt in Common But although they were not true yet because there is no other form of Writ it is good enough As Littleton If a lease be made for half a year and the Lessee doth waste yet the Writ shall suppose quod tenet ad terminum annorum and the count shall be speciall 40. Ed. 3. 41. E. 3. 18. If the Lessee doth commit waste and granteth over his term the Writ shall be brought against the Grantor and shall suppose quod tenet and yet in truth he doth not hold the Land 44. Ed. 3. and Fitz. If one make divers leases of divers lands and the Lessee doth waste in them all the Lessor shall have one Writ of waste supposing quod tenet and the Writ shall not contain two Tenets And such was also the opinion of the Court The third Exception was because that the Writ was brought by the two coparceners and the Heir of the third coparcener without naming of the Tenant by the Courtesie And thereupon Snagg cited the Case of 4. Ed. 3. That where a Lease is made for life the Remainder for life and the tenant for life doth waste he in the Reversion cannot have an Action of waste during the life of him in the Remainder So in this case the Heir of the third coparcener cannot have waste because the mean estate for life is in the Tenant by the courtesie And to prove that the Tenant by the courtesie ought to joyn he cited 3. E. 3. which he had seen in the Book it self at large where the Reversion of a tenant in Dower was granted to the Husband and to the Heirs of the Husband and the tenant in Dower did waste and they did joyn in an Action of waste and not good And so is 17. E. 3. 37. F. N. B. 59. f. and 22. H. 6. 25. a. Walmesley contrary for here in our case there is nothing to be recovered by the tenant by the courtesie for he cannot recover damages because the disinheresin is not to him and the term is expired and therefore no place wasted is to be recovered and therefore it is not like unto the Books which have been cited for in all those the tenant was in possession and the place wasted was to be recovered which ought to go to both according to their estates in reversion But it is not so here for in as much as the term is expired the land is in the tenant by the courtesie and so he hath no cause to complain And such also was the opinion of the whole Court viz. that because the term was ended that the Writ was good notwithstanding the said Exception Then concerning the principall matter in Law which was Whether the Writ were well brought against the second Lessee or whether it ought to have been brought against the first Lessee It was argued by Shuttleworth that it ought to have been brought against the first Lessee for when he granted over his term excepting the trees the Exception was good Ergo c. For when the Land upon which the trees are growing is leased out to another the trees passe with the Lease as well as the Land and the property of them is in the Lessee during the term and therefore when he grants his term hee may well except the trees as well as the first Lessor might have done And that is proved by the Statute of Marlebridge Cap. 23. for before that Statute the Lessee was not punishable for cutting downe the trees and that Statute doth not alter the properties of the trees but onely that the Lessee shall render damages if he cut them down c. Also the words of the Writ of Wast proveth the same which are viz. in terris domibus c. sibi dimissis Also the Lessee might have cut them down for reparations c. and for fire-wood if there were not sufficient underwoods which he could not have done if the trees had been excepted And in 23. H 8. in Brooke It is holden that the excepting of the trees is the excepting of the Soile And so is 46. E. 3. 22. Where one made a Lease excepting the woods and afterwards the Lessee did cut them down and the Lessor brought an Action of Trespasse quare vi armis clausum fregit c. and it was good notwithstanding that Exception was taken to it And it is holden in 12. E. 4. 8. by Fairfax and Littieton That if the Lessee cut the trees that the Lessor cannot carry them away but he is put to his Action of Waste Fenner and Walmesley Serjeants contrary and they conceived that the Lessee hath but a speciall property in the trees viz. for fire-boot plough-boot house-boot c. And if he passe over the Lands unto another that he cannot reserve unto himselfe that speciall property in the trees no more then he who hath common appendant can grant the principall excepting and reserving the Common or grant the Land excepting the foldage The grand property of the trees doth remain in the Lessor and it is proved by 10. H. 7. 30. and 27. H. 8 13. c. If Tenant for life and he in the reversion joyne in a Lease and the Lessee doth wast they shall joyne in an Action of Wast and Tenant for life shall recover the Free-hold and the first Lessor the damages which proves that the property of the trees is in him As to that that he was dispunishable at the common law that was the folly of the Lessor and although it was so at the
upon Evidence to the Jury the Case appeared to be viz. That there was Lessee for years and afterwards the Lessor made a Deed of Feoffment in which were words of Confirmation and in the end of the Deed there was a special Letter of Atturney to make Livery to the Lessee for years and his heirs And it was agreed by all the Justices That the Lessee for years had Election to take the same by way of confirmation or by Feoffment and that the Law doth suspend and expect untill he hath declared his pleasure And it was further adjudged That when he hath made his Election to take it by Livery that it shall be a Feoffment ab initio and by the delivery of the Deed in the mean time nihil operatur Mich. 31. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 171 A Copy-holder did alledge the custome to be That the Lord of the Manor might grant Copies in Remainder with the assent of the Tenants and not otherwise and that Copies in remainder otherwise granted should be meerly void The question was Whether it were a good custome The Justices did not deliver any opinion in the point But Walmesley Serjeant said That it was a void custome for a Copy-hold Estate is an estate of which the Law doth not take notice and Copy-holders are meer Tenants at will by the common Law and therefore to say That he who hath not an interest should have me at his pleasure aswell as I who am interessed should have him at my pleasure is preposterous and repugnant to reason as 2. H. 4. 27. A custome that the Commoner shall not use his Common before that the Lord hath put in his Cattel is not good for the Commoner hath an interest in the Common which is not reasonable to be restrained at the pleasure of another and 19. Eliz Dyâ—r 257. A custome that a man shall not demise or lease but for six years is a void custome Shuttleworth Serjeant contrary and he said That the reason that this Copy-hold is not within Littletons Estates by Copy is no reason for by the same reason you may overthrow all Copy-hold Estates And he said That this custome might have a lawfull beginning and it seems to bee grounded upon the reason of the common Law that a remainder should not be without the assent of the particular Tenant and therefore it is a good custome And so is the custome that a Woman shall not have Dower if she do not claim it within a year and a day And a custome that a free Tenant shall not alien without a surrender in the Court of the Lord is a good custome It was adjourned 31. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 172 Sir RALPH EGERTON'S Case UPon a speciall Verdict the Case was this A man being Tenant for life in the right of his Wife he made a Deed of Feoffment Habendum to the Feoffee and his Heirs ad solum opus usum of the Feoffee and his Heirs for the life of the Wife and the Court was cleer of opinion that it was a forfeiture because the Habendum is absolute and the use is another clause and although he doth not limit the use but for life yet the Law limits the remainder of the use to the party who maketh the Feoffment Trinit 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 173 MAYE'S Case IF a man sendeth a Letter by a Carrier to a Merchant for certain Merchandizes to send them to him by the Carrier receiving certain monies and the Merchant sendeth the Goods by the Carrier without the receipt of the Money the same shall not bind the Buyer as it was holden by the Court because it was but a conditionall Bargain and it was the folly of the Merchant to trust the Carrier and therefore in that Case the Vendee was admitted to wage his Law And so if one writeth for Wares and the party sends them by the same Carrier yet if the Carrier doth not deliver them the other may wage his Law in such Case Mich. 30. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 174 HALTON'S Case THE case was That a Recognizance was acknowleged before Sir N. Read one of the Masters of the Chancery The Recognizee died before the same was enrolled And whether it might be enrolled at the Petition of the Executors of the Recognizee was the question And it was agreed by all the Justices That the same might be enrolled for it was like unto the Conusans of a Fine before a Judge which might be removed out of the hands of the Judge by a Certiorari and yet it is no record untill it be perfected And at that time it was doubted whether the Chancery might help a man who was a purchaser for valuable consideration where there wanteth the word heirs in the Deed of purchase But it was agreed by all the Justices That after a Fine is levied of Land That the Chancery may compell the Tenant to attorne Trinit 31. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. Rot. 1704. 175 BLAGROVE and WOOD'S Case IN Trespass the Question was If a Copy-hold was surrendred or not And the custome was alledged to be That a Copy-holder might surrender out of the Court to the Steward out of the Manor And the Steward was retained onely by word but had no Patent Walmesley He may be Steward by word well enough But Windham and Anderson held That he might be Steward by word onely in possession that is when he holds a Court in possession But he cannot be Steward out of Court without a Patent because he is then out of possession And therefore it was the opinion of the whole Court That the surrender out of Court to the Steward by word was not good Hill 36. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 176 THe Summons of a Copy-holder to appear at the Lords Court was at the Church and thereupon the Copy-holder did not appear And it was the opinion of the whole Court that the same was no cause of forfeiture of the Copy-hold because it was not especially shewed to be the Custome And it shall be hard to make it a Forfeiture for perhaps the Copy-holder had not notice of it And to that purpose was vouched the Lord Dacres and Harlestoâ—s case And they held that notice ought to be given to the person and the Refusall must be willfull for if a Copy-holder be demanded his rent and he saith that he hath it not the same is no forfeiture but the deniall ought to be a wilfull deniall and so it was said to have been adjudged in one Winters Case Trinit 1. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. Rot. 854. 177 SAPLAND and RIDLER'S Case AFter long Arguments on both sides It was adjudged by all the Justices in this case That where the Custome of a Copy-hold Manor was to admit for life and in remainder for life at any time when there was but one Copy-holder for life in possession and during the minority of the Heir within fourteen years the Gardian in Socage in his own name
did admit a Copy-holder in Remainder for life That the same was a good admittance according to the Custome And that he was a sufficient Dominus pro tempore as to this purpose Although it was objected by Walmesley That the Gardian is but Servus and not Dominus But because it was agreed that he had a lawfull Interest the admittance was good and so it was adjudged 33. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 178 SHIPWITH and SHEFFIELD'S Case THe Custome of a Copy-hold Manor was That a feme Covert might give Lands to her Husband And if it were a good Custome or not was the Question Fleetwood The Custom is good and vouched 12. E 3. That in York there is such a custome That the Husband might give the Land of his own purchase to his wife during the Coverture and it is a good Custome That an Infant at the age of fifteen years may make a Feoffment 29. E. 3. and the same is good at the Common Law and yet the same all began by custome But the Court was of opinion That the Custome is unreasonable because it cannot have a lawfull Commencement And Anderson Chiefe Justice said That a Custome that an Infant at the age of seven years might make a Feoffment is no good custome because he is not of age of discretion And in this case at Barre It shall be intended that the wife being sub potestate viri did it by the Coherison of her Husband The same Law is of a Custome That the wife may lease to her Husband Fleetwood urged That the custome might be good because the wife was to be examined by the Steward of the Court as the manner is upon a Fine to be examined by a Judge To which the Court said nothing 31. Eliz. in the King's Bench 179 AN Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit was brought And the Plaintiff layed his Action That such a one did promise him in respect of his labour in another Realme c. to pay him his contentment And he said That Twenty five Pound is his contentment and that he had required the same of the Defendant Cook moved in arrest of Judgement it being found for the Plaintiffe upon Non Assumpsit pleaded that no place was alledged where the contentment was shewed And the opinion of the Court was against him for Gawdy and Wray were of opinion that he might shew his contentment in any Action and so it is where it is to have so much as he can prove he might prove it in the same Action Cook said That it had been moved in stay of Judgement in this Court upon an Assumpsit because the request was not certain And that case was agreed by the Justices because the request is parcell of the Assumpsit and the entire Assumpsit together in such case is the cause of the Action but in this case that he should content him is not the cause of the Assumpsit but only a circumstance of the matter and it was resembled to the Case of 39. H. 6. where a Writ of Annuity was brought for Arrerages against an Abbot pro consilio c. And the Plaintiffe declared that the Councel was ad proficuum Domus and was not alledged in certain and it was holden that the same was not materiall although it were uncertain because it was but an induction and necessary circumstance to the Action And so the Plaintiffe recovered and had Judgement Mich. 29 Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 180 THE Statute of 23. Eliz. cap. 25. is Quod non licuit alicui to engrosse Barley c. and in the Statute there is a Proviso That he may so do so as he convert it into Malt. The question was If in an Information upon that Statute That the Defendant had converted it to Malt he might plead the generall Issue Not guilty and give in Evidence the speciall matter or whether he ought to plead the speciall matter Clench Justice He may plead Not guilty c. for the Proviso is parcel and within the body of the Statute as 27. H. 8. 2. where upon an Information upon the Statute of Farmors it is holden by Fitzherbert That the Vicar may plead Non habuit seu tenuit ad firmam contra formam Statuti c. and yet the Statute in the premises of it restrains every Spirituall Person to take in Farme any Lands c. and afterwards by a Proviso gives him liberty to take Lands for the maintenance of his house c. As upon the Statute of R. 2. If he do plead That he did not enter contra formam Statuti he may give in Evidence that he entred by Title as that his father was seised and died and the same is not like unto the condition of a Bond for that is a severall thing But the Proviso and the Statute is but one Act. Mich. 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 181 NOte It was said by Master Kemp Secondary of the King's Bench That there is a Court within the Tower of London but he said That it was but a Court Baron and said That he can shew a Judgement That no Writ of Error lieth of a Judgement given there And it was a question Whether Process might be awarded to the Lieutenant of the Tower for Execution upon a Judgment given in the Kings Bench because the Defendant was removed and dwelt within the Liberty of the Tower And it was said It could not but the Writ ought to be awarded to the Sheriffs of London and if they returne the Liberties of the Tower then a Non omittas shall be awarded But some Counsellors said That although a Non omittas be awarded yet the Sheriffs durst not go unto the Liberties of the Tower to serve the Process 2 Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 182 The Lady STOWELL'S Case IT was adjudged in this Case That the wife who is divorced causa adulterii shall have her Dower 3. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 183 WARNER'S Cafe LEssee for twenty years doth surrender rendring rent during the term It was adjudged a good rent for so many years as the term might have continued 3. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 184 WHITLOCK and HARTWELL'S Case TWO Joint-Tenants for life the one demised and granted the moyty unto his companion for certain years to begin after his death Adjudged void because it is but a possibility And so is it of a Covenant to stand seised to the use c. as it was adjudged in Barton and Harvey's Case 37. Eliz. 3. Jacobi In the Kings Bench. 185 PINDER'S Case A. devised lands in Fee to his son and many other lands in tail And afterwards he said I will that if my son die without issue within age that the lands in Fee shall go to such a one Item I will that the other lands in tail shall go to others and doth not say in the second Item if the son dieth without issue within age It was adjudged That the second Item should be without
And Warburton held that the heir should have the Rent as a Freehold descended and for that he cited 26. H. 6. Statham Recognizance But Foster said that he should not have the Rent at all Warburton and Walmesley doubted whether the Rent were devisable by the Statute and they said that although the heir should have it by descent yet it should not be in the nature of a descent of Inheritance for he should not have his Age. Cook and Daniel were absent Pasch 8. Iacobi in the Common Pleas. 239 HEYDON and SMITH's Case IN an Action of Trespass the Plaintiff declared of breaking of his Close and cutting down of a Tree viz. an Oak The Defendant pleaded that it was his Free-hold The plaintiff in his Replication shewed that he held of the Defendant by Coppy of Court Roll a Tenement whereof the place in question is parcell And that the Custome of the Manor is That all the Copy-holders within the Manor have used to take wood for house-bote hay-bote c. et pro ligno combustibili in dicto tenemento And said that he had alwayes preserved the wood and trees growing upon the said Tenement And that he had nourished and fostered the said Oake And that sufficient wood was not left upon the said Tenement for house-bote c. upon which the Defendant did demurre in Law Foster Justice Judgment ought to bee given for the plaintiff I hold that a Copy-holder of common right without any Custome shall have wood for Reparations and for fire-bote and so is 9. H. 4. Fitz. Wast 59. the opinion of Hall And I hold that the plaintiff hath an Interest in the Trees according to Palmers Case C. 5. part And 2. H. 4. 12. is That a Coppy-holder may bring An Action of Trespass for the Trees And I hold That without a Custome the Lord cannot fell the trees growing upon the Copy-hold no more then upon a Lease for years But in this Case by Implication of Custome the Lord may take the Trees if he leave sufficient for Reparations c. For the Custome is That a Copy-holder shall have sufficient for Reparations by which is implyed that he shall not have more and then the Rest the Lord shall have And I am of opinion that in this Case and in case where the trees are excepted upon a Lease that the Lord and the Lessor may enter and take the Trees although there be not any clause of ingresse or regresse But in the principall Case because there are not more Trees then are sufficient for Reparation the Lord cannot take them but Trespasse lieth against him Warburton Justice The matter of prescription is not materiall in this case for of common right a Copyholder ought to have Trees for Reparations and to that purpose he hath a speciall propertie But the onely question in this Case as I conceive is If one who hath a speciall property may bring an Action of Trespasse against him who hath the generall propertie And I conceive that he may well enough As if I lend my horse for a week and within the week I take him again Trespasse lieth Walmesley Justice For the substance I am of opinion for the Plaintiff but I doubt For I would not that Copyholders have so great libertie and he hath prescribed to take all trees and to take them ad libitum is too great a liberty And I hold that a Copyholder hath no greater property then one who ought to have Estovers And in this case hee ought to have said quando opus fuerit and he ought to have shewed that the houses were in decay for want of Reparations for which cause opus fuerat c. And so for the pleading I hold that it is not sufficient Cook chief Justice The Plaintiff ought to have Judgment For I hold cleerly That the Lord cannot take trees without leaving sufficient for Reparations no more then he can pull down or overthrow the house of the Copyholder For of common right without Custome or prescription the Trees do belong unto the Copyholder for Reparations and for that purpose hee may take them without any Custome and the Lord cannot take the Trees without leaving sufficient for the Copyholder if there be not a speciall Custome so to do But I hold that without any custome the Lord may take the Trees if he leave sufficient to the Copyholder for the Reparations Mich. 25. 26. Eliz Doylies Case A Copyholder who hath used to take Timber for Reparations brought an action of Trespasse Trinit 26. Eliz. An action of Trespasse was brought by a Copyholder against the Lord. Pasch 37. Eliz. the Case of Mutford Wood. Trinit 40. Eliz. Stebbings Case but there the action was an action upon the Case To the Exceptions taken by Justice Walmesley that the Plaintiff ought to have shewed that the houses wanted Reparations I hold as hee said That if the action had been brought against him and hee justifie the cutting hee ought to have shewed that the houses wanted Reparations But in our Case he brings the Action against another which lyeth although that the houses were not then in decay And for the signification of the word House-boot c. Bote is an ancient Saxon word which signifies in some case Recompence and in some case Reparatio For the manner of prescription That all the Tenants may take wood pro ligno combustibili in dicto Tenemento the same is no good prescription That all shall take to burn in that Tenement But for the reasons beforesaid Judgment was given for the Plaintiffe Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 240 NEWTON and RICHARD's Case IT was ruled by the whole Court in an Action of Trespasse Quare clausum fregit cuniculos suos vel ipsius A. c. cepit c. was good Pasch 8. Jacobi In the Common Pleas. 241 MEERES and KIDOUT's Case UPon an Evidence to a Jury in this Case it was Ruled by the whole Court That if there be Copyholder for life and the Lord leaseth for years and the Copy-holder commit a forfeiture that the Lessee may enter for the forfeiture And Cooke Cheife Justice said That if there be Tenant for life the Remainder for life If the Tenant for life committeth a forfeiture he in the Remainder for life may enter and that the Case 29. Ass 64. is not Law For the particular estate in possession is determined by the forfeiture And if hee in the Remainder could not enter then it should be at the will of the Lessor whether hee should ever have it The same Law is if the Remainder be for yeers Foster Justice The reason that is given for an Entrie for a forfeiture is because that the Reversion or Remainder is devested by the Feoffment But in this Case because it is but interesse termini nothing is devested For notwithstanding the Feoffment the Interesse termini may be granted to which Cook agreed But Foster said that hee did agree in opinion with Cook
the possession is bound by the Judgment of Attaindor and the Act of Parliament 5 H. 7. 31. 7 H. 7. 15. 16 H. 7. 8. A discent of land shall not make a title against the King or any other who hath the land by an Act of Parliament But then in our Case If there should be a Remitter yet the same is overreached by the Office 〈◊〉 part 10. before the Statute of 33 H. 8. cap. 20. there ought to have been an Office found in the Case of Attaindor of Treason Br. Cases 103. Brook Office Devant c. 17. I do not mean an Office of intitling but an Office declaratory of a conspicuous title C. 5. part 52. There are two manner of Offices One which vesteth the estate and possession of the land c. in the King Another which is an Office of Instruction and that is when the estate of the land is lawfully in the King but the particularity thereof doth not appear upon record And the Office of Instruction shall relate to the time of the Attaindor not to make Queen Elizabeth in our Case in by discent but to avoid all meâ—ne Incombrances And is not this Remitter an Incombrance And for that purpose the Office shall relate For in things of Continuance Nullum tempus occurrit Regi C. 7. part 28. For so the rule of Nullum tempus c. is to be understood of a thing of Continuance and not a thing unica vice v. Fitz. Entre Congeable 53. Trav. 40. where it is said Where the King hath cause to seise for the forfeiture of Tenant for life if the Tenant for life dyeth the Reversion may enter for in that case Tempus occurrit Regi and the King cannot seize after the death of the Tenant for life 35 H. 6. 57. There is no discent against the King and if there be no discent then there is no Remitter The consequence of all this is That the Office doth relate to the Right And that the Monstrans de Droit doth not lie And the want of Office found for all this time was the fault of the Kings Officers and shall not prejudice the King But if the Office should not relate then the Monstrans de Droit would lie because then the King was in but by one single matter of Record We shew in the Office 33 Eliz. That there issued forth a Commission directed to certain of the Privy-Councel to enquire of the Treason and if Francis Bigot upon the Treason were Indicted And in our Case we shew immediately another Commission was directed to the Lord Chancellor and the two Chief Justices c. to arraign Francis Bigot And all that is confessed by Ratcliffe himself viz. modo forma And therefore the Objection which Glanvile made was frivolous viz. That it did not appear that Francis Bigot was attainted by Verdict by Confession or by Outlawry And so he concluded That for these causes the Judgment given in the Court of Common-Pleas ought to be reversed George Crook argued for Ratcliffe and he prayed that the Judgment might be affirmed I will argue only these points following 1. That Francis Bigot had not so much as a right of Action at the time of his Attaindor for he had not any right at all 2. Admit that he had a right of Action If this right of Action be given to the King by the said Statutes of 26 31 H. 8. It was objected That the right being clothed with a possession that the same is given to the King But I will prove the contrary 3. When Francis Bigot being Tenant in tail and being attainted and executed for Treason and then Katherine his wife dyeth being one of the Donees in tail 21 H. 8. and the lands discend to Ratcliff If the Office afterwards found shall relate to take away the Remitter I say it doth not but that his Remitter doth remain to maintain his Monstrans de Droit and he is not put to his Petition The chief point is What right Francis Bigot had at the time of his Attaindor 1. When Ralph Bigot being Tenant in tail 6 H. 8. made a Feoffment in Fee what right remained in Francis his Son The right is in abeyance viz. in nubibus that is in custodia Legis And then Francis Bigot had no right of that entail 21 H. 8. when he made the Feoffment Com. 487. There Jus is divided viz. Jus recuperandi Jus in randi Jus habendi Jus retinendi Jus percipiendi Jus possedendi but here Francis Bigot had not any of these rights Com. 374. if the Discontinuee of Tenant in tail levieth a Fine with proclamations and five years passe and Tenant in tail dyeth the issue in tail shall have other five years because he is the first to the right 19 H. 8. 7. C. 7. part 81. If Donee in tail maketh a Feoffment in Fee in rei veritate the Donee hath not jus in re neque ad rem C. 3. part 29. Litt. 649. There it appeareth that the right to an estate tail may be in abeyance Com. 552. Walsinghams Case There the King gave land in tail to Wyat who made a Feoffment unto Walsingham Afterwards Wyat was attainted of Treason and there the estate tail of Wyat was forfeited but the cause there was because that the reversion was in the Crown and so no discontinuance by his Feoffment because that the reversion was in the Crown In our Case no right of the estate tail was in Francis Bigot after the Feoffment unto his own use but the right is in abeyance It was objected That the Writ of Formedon is Discendit jus and the Monstrans de Droit was so I answer It is so in point of form in the Writ but not in substance C. 7. part 14. Tenant in tail makes a Lease for life and Tenant for life dyeth Now he hath an ancient right and the Donor may avow upon the Tenant in tail notwithstanding his Feoffment but that is by reason of privity and not by reason of any right he hath Jus recuperandi did discend to the issue in tail viz. Francis Bigot 21 H. 8. He who hath a right of Action giveth the same away by his Livery and Feoffment as appeareth by the Cases put in C. 1. part 111. It was objected That Cestuy que use was an Attorney or Servant therefore he doth not passe his own right for he cannot make an Attorney to make Livery and 9 H. 7. 26. was cited to be adjudged so But it is adjudged to the contrary M. 25 H. 8. in the Kings Bench rot 71. betwixt the Bishop of London and Kellet as it appeareth in Dyer 283. and Bendloe's Reports and C. 9. part 75. For there it is expresse that Cestuy que use may make a Letter of Attorney to make Livery which proves that he makes not the Feoffment as a Servant but as Owner of the Land It was objected That Cuesty que use was as an Executor but that I deny 49
Soccage may grant the Ward but he cannot forfeit him C. 3. part 3. Right of Actions reals because they are in privity by general words of a Statute are not given to the King v. Dyer 67. String fellow's Case That which is in custodia Legis cannot be taken as a Distress in a Pound overt cannot be taken out of the Pound upon another Distress The third Point is If he were remitted And I conceive that he was remitted When Tenant in tail is attainted of Treason the issue at the Common Law should inherit as if he had not been attainted Lit. 747. C. 1. part 103. for as to the Estate tail there was no corruption of blood C. 10. part 10. If Tenant in tail before the Statute of 26. H. 8. commit Treason the land shall discend to his issue for the issue doth not claim by the Father but per formam doni◠C. 8. part 166. such a discent shall take away entrie But in our Case Ratcliff had both possession and right and therefore is remitted the speciall Verdict finds that he was remitted and the Judgment given in the Court of Pleas in the Exchequer was that he was remitted It was objected that the Remitter was destroyed by the relation of the Office but the same is not so for the Office relates only to avoid Incombrances viz. acts done by himself but to devest the Freehold and to settle the same in the King the Office shall not relate And if it should relate then the King should lose many Lands which he now hath Com. Nichols Case Tenant for life upon condition to have Fee c. If the Office shall relate then the same takes away the Freehold out of the person attainted à principio and then the Fee cannot accrue and so by that means the King should lose the lands A Remitter is no incombrance for it is an ancient right and the Act of the King cannot do wrong C. 1. part 44. b. 27 Ass 30. There Tenant for life with clause of re-entrie is attainted the reversioner entreth the Office shall not relate to take the Freehold out of the reversioner C. 3. part 38. Relatio est fictio juris and shall never prejudice a third person and the Office found in the life of Katherine shal not prejudice him C. 9. part Beamounts Case the husband and wife are Tenants in tail the husband is attainted of Treason and dyeth yet the wife is tenant in tail when it is not to the damage or prejudice of the King there tempus occurrit Regi C. 7. part 28. Baskervile's Case From 29 H. 8. untill 33 H. 8. Katherine and afterwards Ratcliff had the possession and then the Law was taken to be that Ratcliff had a lawfull possession For these reasons he concluded that the Judgment ought to be affirmed In Trinity Term following viz. Trin. 21. Jacobi Regis the Case was argued again and then Coventry the Kings Attorney general argued for the Lord Sheffield That the Judgment given in the Court of Pleas in the Exchequer ought to be reversed He said I will insist only upon the right of the Case Whether upon the right of the Case Ratcliff may maintain a Monstrans de Droit First If by the Attainder the right of the old Estate tail as well as of the new Estate tail be forfeited Secondly Admitting that the old right of entail be not forfeited then if the Office do overreach the Remitter for then a Monstrans de Droit doth not lie but a Petition for the reason of the discontinuance First it is evident that when Ralph Bigot Tenant in tail in possession 6 H. 8. made a Feoffment that that was a discontinuance and it is as clear that the right of the old Estate tail vested in Francis Bigot The Feoffment made by Francis Bigot 21 H. 8. did not devest the right of the old tail First for the weaknesse of the Feoffment Secondly for the inseparableness of the Estate tail which is incommunicable and not to be displaced by weak assurance That Feoffment was made according to the Statute of 1 R. 3. and not by the Common Law but only by force of the said Statute The Feoffment is without Deed and so nothing passeth but only by way of Livery or else nothing at all Also at the time of the Feoffment in 21 H. 8. the Feoffees were in seisin of the Lands and Ratcliff shews in his Monstrans de Droit that Francis Bigot did disseise the Feoffees and so the Feoffment had no force as a Feoffment at the Common Law but only by the Statute of 1 R. 3. For at the Common-Law if Cestuy que use had entred upon the Feoffees and made a Feoffment nothing had passed There is a difference betwixt a Feoffment at the Common Law and a Feoffment according to the Statute of 1 R. 3. which operates sub modo Feoffments are the ancient Conveyances of Lands but Feoffments according to the Statute of 1 R. 3. are upstarts and have not had continuance above 150 years In case of Feoffments at the Common Law the Feoffor ought to be seised of the lands at the time of the Feoffment but if a Feoffment be according to the Statute of 1 R. 3. in such Case the Feoffor needeth not be in possession Feoffments at the Common Law give away both Estates and Rights but Feoffments by the Statute of R. 3 give the Estates but not the Rights In case of Feoffment at the Common Law the Feoffee is in the Per viz. by the Feoffor but in case of Feoffments by the Statute of R. 3. the Feoffees are in in the Post viz by the first Feoffees 14 H. 8 10. Brudnel says that a Feoffment by Cestuy que use by the Statute of 1 R. 3 is like to fire out of a flint so as all the fire which cometh out of the flint will not fasten upon any thing but tinder or gunpowder So a Feoffment by Cestuy que use by force of the Statute of 1 R. 3 will not fasten upon any thing but what the Statute requires 5 H. 7. 5. 21 H. 7. 25. 8 H. 7 8. 27 H. 8. 13. 23. by these books it appeareth that if Cestuy que use maketh a Leafe for life during the Lease he gaines nothing and after the Lease he gains no reversion for the Lessee shall hold of the Feoffees and of them he shall have aid and unless it be by deed Indented in such a Case a Reservation of Rent is void and the Lessor in such a Case cannot punish the Lessee for waste for he makes the Lease meerly by the power which the Statute gives him 8. H. 7. 9. Cestuy que use makes the Feoffment as servant to the Feoffees and if not as servant to the Feoffees yet at least as servant to the Statute of 1 R. 3. If a man entreth upon another and maketh a Lease for life he gains a reversion to himself and shall maintain an Action of Waste but
Cestuy que use when he entreth and maketh a Lease he hath no reversion nor shall punish waste And as it is in the Creation so is it in the Continuance 4 H. 7. 18. If Cestuy que use for life or in tail maketh a Lease for life it is warranted during his own life by the Statute of 1 R. 3. but if Tenant for life at the Common Law maketh a Feoffment or a lease for life there the first Lessor ought to avoid this forfeiture by entrie and it is not void by the death of the second Lessor viz. the Tenant for life 27 H. 8. 23. A Feme Covers is Cestuy que use the husband maketh a Feoffment and dieth the Feoffment is void by his death Br. Feoffments to Uses 48. If Cestuy que use for life levieth a fine it is no forfeiture but good by the Statute of 1 R. 3. during his own life And if in such case Proclamations pass there needeth no claim nor entrie within five years but the Law is contrarie of Tenant for life by the Common Law for if Tenant for life at the Common Law levieth a fine it is a forfeiture Dyer 57. Cestuy que use for life or in tail maketh a Lease for life the Lease is determined by the death of Cestuy que use and the Lessee is become Tenant at sufferance but a Lease for life by Tenant for life at the Common Law is not determined by the death of Lessee for life who was Lessor and his Tenant is tenant for life and not at sufferance as in the Case before and the first Lessor ought to avoid it by entrie Br. Feoffments to Uses 48. A Recovery by Cestuy que use in tail or in fee is ended by his death By these Cases appears a main difference betwixt the validitie of a Feoffment by Cestuy que use and the Feoffment at the Common Law The Statute of 27 H. 8. of Uses doth not execute Uses which are in abeyance C. 1. part Chudleigh's Case 9 H. 6. by the Common Law the Devise to an Enfant in ventre samier is good but by the Statutes of 32 and 34 H. 8. of Wills such a Devise is not good for the Statute Law doth not provide for the putting of lands in abeyance By the Statute of 1 R. 3. All Feoffments and Releases c. shall be good and effectual to those to whom they are made to their uses And this Feoffment in our Case was not made to a man in Nubibus Cestuy que use by this Statute of 1 R. 3. makes a lease for years the remainder over to the right heirs of I. S. the remainder is not good for the Statute doth not put it in abeyance for the remainder ought to be limited to one in esse 21 H. 8. cap. 4. giveth power to Executors to sell that Executor who proveth the Will shall sell and when he selleth if he have any right to the land the right of the said Executor is not gone by that Statute So if Commissioners upon the Statute of Bankrupts sell the Lands of the Bankrupt and one of the Commissioners hath right to the land so sold his right is not extinct And so in this Case the Statute limits what shall pass Upon the Statute of â—3 Eliz. cap. 4. which makes the lands of Receivers liable for their debts if the King selleth the right of the Accomptant passeth but not the Kings right 17 E. 3. 60. An Abbot having occasion to go beyond the Seas made another Abbot his Procurator to present to such Benefices which became void in his absence That Abbot presents in the name of him who made him Procurator to one of his own Advowsons the right of his own Advowson doth not pass but yet it is an usurpation of the Abbot which went beyond sea to that Church What is the nature of this right All rights are not giâ—en away by Feoffments at the Common Law Lit. 672. Land is given unto husband and wife in tail the husband maketh a Feoffment and takes back an Estate to him and his wife both of them are remitted Which Case proveth that the husband hath left in himself a right notwithstanding the Feoffment 41 E. 3. 17. 41 Ass 1. John at Lee's Case So at the Common Law a Feoffment doth not give away all the right This right doth stick so fast in the issue as the Statute of West 2. cap. 1. can back it unto him 2 E. 3. 23. 22 E. 3. 18. At the Common Law if Tenant in tail had offered to levie a fine the Judges ought not to receive it but ought to have refused it if it had appeared unto them that the Conusor was Tenant in tail the same was before the Statute of 4 H. 7. which gave power to Tenant in tail to levie a fine for the Statute of West 2. Cap. 1. saies Quod finis sit nullus 2. E. 2. age 77. 2 E. 3. 33. 3 E. 3. 1. 24 E 3. 25. If Donee in tail levieâ—h a Fine yet there is no remedie against his Tenant for he shall not be compelled to attorn for that the right is in the Donor â— E. 2. Avowry 181. 48 E. 3. 8. Avowry was made upon the Donee in tail notwithstanding that he made a Feoffment and Avowry is in the realtie and right 4 E. 3. 4. 4 H. 6. 28. 10 H. 7. 14. In a Replevin ancient Demesne is a good plea because the Avowry is in the realtie The Donor shall know for homage upon the Donee after that the Donee hath made a Feoffment 7 E. 4. 28. the Donee shall do homage And Litt. 90. saith That none shall do homage but such as is seised in his own right or in the right of another 2 E. 2. Avowry 85. 7 E 54. 28. 15 E. 4. 15 Gard. 116. the issue shall be in Ward notwithstanding a Feoffment by Tenant in tail Com. 561. Tenant in tail maketh a Feoffment yet the right of the tail doth remain in the Tenant in tail 21 H. 7. 40. Tenant in tail of a Rent grants the same in Fee if an Ancestor collateral releaseth with Warranty the same bindeth the Tenant in tail There is a common Rule That a Warranty doth not bind when a man hath not a right The Cases cited in C. 1. part Albonies Case where Feoffments give Rights I agree Barton and Ewers Case A man made a Feoffment of Land of which he had cause to have a Writ of Error he gave away his Writ of Error by the Feoffment I agree all those Cases for that is in Cases of Feoffments at the Common Law but in our Case the Feoffment is by the Statute of 1 R. 3. In our Case there is Jus habendi possedendi recuperandi It is like unto a plant in Winter which seemeth to be dead yet there is in it anima vegitativa which in due time brings forth fruit So the right in our Case is not given away nor is it in abeyance
24. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 19. IN an Action upon the Case upon a Promise The consideration was Where I. S. had granted a Term to I. D. That afterwards upon the request of I. S. I. D. did make to W. an Estate for four years upon which W. brought his Action And after Verdict it was moved in stay of Judgement that there was no good consideration and a difference taken where the Promise was upon the Grant and where afterwards If it were before then the Condition was good but if it were afterwards it was not good And it was adjudged That the Plaintiffe Nihil capiat per billam Pasch 24. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 20. AN Action upon the Case upon a Promise was The Consideration was That in consideration that the Plaintiffe Daret diâ—m solutionis the Defendant Super se assumpsit and because he doth not say in facto that he had given day It was adjudged that no sufficient Consideration was alledged But if the Consideration were Quod cum indebitatus c. the same had been a good Consideration without any more for that implies a Consideration in it self Pasch 24. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 21. IT was said by Cooke That the Chancellor or any Judge of any of the Courts of Record at Westminster may bring a Record one to another without a Writ of Certiorare because one Judge is sufficiently known one to the other as 5. H. 7. 31. where a Certificate was by the Chancellor alone and to this purpose is 11. H. 4. But that other Judges of base Courts cannot do nor Justices of the Peace as 3. H. 6. where the certificate by Suitors was held void Pasch 25. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 22. SKIPWITH'S Case IT was found upon a speciall verdict in an Action of Trespass that the place where c. was Copy-hold land And that the Custome is That quaelibet foemina viro cooperta poterit devise lands whereof she is seised in Fee according to the custome of the Manor to her Husband and surrender it in the presence of the Reeve and six other persons And that I. S. was seised of the land where c. and had issue two Daughters and died and that they married husbands and that one of them devised her part to her husband by Will in writing in the presence of the Reeve and six other persons and afterwards at another day shee surrendred to the Husband and he was admitted and she died and her Husband continued the possession And the Husband of the other Daughter brought an Action of Trespasse Rodes Serjeant The Custome is not good neither for the Surrender nor for the Will for two causes One for the uncertainty of what estate shee might make a Devise and because it is against reason that the Wife should surrender to the Husband Where the Custome shall not be good if it be uncertain he vouched 13. E. 3. Fitz. Dum fuit infra aetatem 3. The Tenant saith that the lands are in Dorset where the Custome is that an Enfant may make a Grant or Feoffment when he can number twelve pence And it was holden that because it is uncertain when he can so do the Custome is not good 19. E. 2. in a Ravishment of Ward the defendant pleaded that the custome is that when the Enfant can measure an ell of cloth or tell twelve pence as before that he should be out of Ward and it is holden no good custom for the cause aforesaid 22. H. 6. 51. a. there a man prescribed That the Lord of D. had used to have Common for him and all his Tenants And because it is not shewed what Lord whether the Lord mediate or immediate it is adjudged no good custome And as to the Surrender it is against reason that the Wife should give to the Husband for a Wife hath not any Will but the Will of her Husband For if the Husband seised in the right of his Wife make a Feoffment in Fee and the Wife being upon the land doth disagree unto it saying that shee will never depart with it during her life yet the Feoffment is good and shall binde during the life of the Husband as it is holden in 21. E. 3. And therefore it is holden in 3. E. 3. Tit. Devise Br. 43. That a Feme covert cannot devise to her Husband for that should be the Act of the Husband to convey the land to himself And in the old Natura Brevium in the Additions of Ex gravi quaerela it is holden so accordingly And the Case in 29. E. 3. differs much from this Case For there a woman seised of lands devisable took an Husband and had issue and devised the lands to the Husband for his life and died and a Writ of Waste was brought against him as Tenant by the Courtesie and it was holden that it did lie and that he is not in by the Devise for the reason there is because he was in before by the Courtesie But as I conceive that Case will disprove the Surrender for in as much as he had it in the Right of his wife he could not take it in his own Right Also he took another Exception in the principal Case because that the wife was not examined upon the Surrender but none of the Justices spake to that Exception but when the Record was viewed it appeared that it was so pleaded Further He said That the devise was void by the Statute of 34. H. 8. Cap. 5. where it is said It is enacted That Wills and Testaments made of any Lands Tenements c. by women Coverts or c. shall not be taken to be good or effectual in Law And he said That this Statute doth extend to customary Lands And as to that all the Justices did agree That it is not within the Statute And as to the Statute of Limitations Andâ—rson chief Justice said That if a Lease for years which perhaps will not indure sixty years shall be taken strong this shall Anderson moved That if the Lord Lease Copyhold land by Word Whether the Lessee might maintain an Ejectione firme and he conceived not for in an Ejectione firmâ— there ought to be a Right in Fact And although it be by conclusion it is not sufficient for that the Jury or Judge are not estopped or concluded And he conceived That if Tenant at Will make a Lease for years that it is no good lease betwixt him and the Lessor but that he may well plead that he had nothing in the land Meade contrary but they both agreed That the Book of 14. E. 4. which saith That if Tenant at Will make a lease for years that he shall be a Disseisor is not Law Anderson said That the prescription in the principal Case was not good for it is Quod quaelibet foemina viro cooperta poterit c. and it ought to be that feme Coverts possunt and by the Custome have used to devise to the
husband and therefore the prescription is not good that Potest ponere retes upon the land of another upon the Custome of the Sea for prescription must be in a thing done also by him the devise is not good according to the Custome for that is that she may devise and surrender and that ought to be all at one time and that in the presence of the Reeve and six other persons as well as the Surrenderer and the words of a Custome shall be so far performed as they may be Meade contrary And that these Witnesses shall be referred to the surrender onely for a devise may be without Witnesses And he said that sometimes the latter clause shall not refer to all the precedent matter but unto the latter onely as 7. H. 7. is Where a Praecipe was brought of lands in A. B. and C. in Insula de Ely the Clause in Insula de Ely is referred onely to C. And it was said That if in the principal Case the Will were good that then the husbands are Tenants in common and then the Action of Trespass is not maintainable Pasch 25. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 23. THis Case was moved by Serjant Gawdy Thomas Heigham had an hundred Acres of lands called Jacks usually occupied with a house and he leased the house and forty Acres parcel of the said hundred Acres to I. S. for life and reserved the other to himself and made his Will by which he doth devise the house and all his lands called Jacks now in the occupation of I. S. to his wife for life and that after her decease the remainder of that and all his other lands pertaining to Jacks to R. who was his second son Whether the wife shall have that of which her husband died seised for her life or whether the eldest son should have it and what estate he shall have in it Meade The wife shall not have it for because that he hath expressed his Will that the wife shall have part it shall not be taken by implication that she shall have the whole or the other part for then he would have devised the same to her And therefore it hath been adjudged in this Court betwixt Glover and Tracy That if Lands be devised to one and his heirs males and if he die without heirs of his body that then the land shall remain over that he had no greater estate then to him and his special heirs viz. heirs Males and the reason was because the Will took effect by the first words Anderson Chief Justice It was holden in the time of Brown That if lands were devised to one after the death of his wife that the wife should have for life but if a man seised of two Acres deviseth one unto his wife and that I. S. shall have the other after the death of the wife she takes nothing in that Acre for the Cause aforesaid For the second matter If the Reversion shall pass after the death of the wife to the second son we are to consider what shall be said land usually occupied with the other and that is the land leased with it But this land is not now leased with it and therefore it cannot pass Windham The second son shall have the Reversion for although it doth not pass by these words Usualy Occupied as Anderson held yet because the devise cannot take other effect and it appeareth that his intent was to pass the land the yonger son shall have it Anderson Jacks is the intire name of the house and lands And that word when it hath reference unto an intire thing called Jacks and is known by the name of Jacks shall pass to the second son for words are as we shall construe them And therefore If a man hath land called Mannor of Dale and he deviseth his Mannor of Dale to one the land shall pass although it be not a Mannor And if I be known by the name of Edward Williamson where my name is Edward Anderson and lands are given unto me by the name of Edward Williamson the same is a good name of purchase And the opinion of the Court was that the Reversion of the land should pass to the second son Pasc 25. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 24. The Lord MOUNTJOY and the Earle of HUNTINGTON'S Case NOte by Anderson Chief Justice and Periam Justice If a man seised of any entrie Franchises as to have goods of Felons within such a Hundred or Mannor or goods of Outlaws Waifes Strares c. which are causual There are not Inheritances deviseable by the Statute of 32. H. 8. for they are not of any yearly value and peradventure no profit shall be to the Lord for three or four years or perhaps for a longer time And such a thing which is deviseable ought to be of annual value as appeareth by the words of the Statute And also they agreed that the said Franchises could not be divided and therefore if they descend to two coparceners no partition can be made of them And the words of the Statute of 32. H. 8. are That it shall be lawful c. to divise two parts c. and then a thing which canot be divided is not diviseable And they said That if a man had three Manors and in each of the three such Liberties and every Manor is of equal value that yet he cannot devise one Mannor and the Liberties which he hath to it Causá quâ supra but by them an Advowson is deviseable because it may be of annual value But the Lord Chancellor smiling said That the Case of the three Manors may be doubted And there also it was agreed by the said two Justices upon Conference had with the other Justices That where the Lord Mountjoy by deed Indented and Inrolled did bargaine and sell the Manor of â—amford to Brown in Fee and in the Indenture this Clause is contained Provided alwayes And the said Brown Covenants and Grants to and with the Lord Mountjoy his Heirs and Assigns that the Lord Mountjoy his Heirs and Assigns may digg for Ore within the land in Camford which was a great Waste and also to digg Turffe there to make Allome and Coperess without any contradiction of the said Brown his Heirs and Assigns They agreed That the Lord Mountjoy could not devide the said Interest viz. to grant to one to digg within a parcel of the said Waste And they also agreed That notwithstanding that Grant That Brown his Heirs and Assigns owners of the Soile might digg there also like to the Case of Common Sans number The Case went further That the Lord Mountjoy had devised this Interest to one Laicott for one and twenty years and that Laicott assigned the same over to two other men And whether this Assignment were good or not was the Question forasmuch that if the Assignement might be good to them it might be to twenty and that might be a surcharge to the Tenant of the soile And as to that
agree in the Services Walmesley He shall have the traverse for the mischief which otherwise would follow for if he should traverse the seisin thereby he should confesse the Tenure Periam concessit and said That the difference which is commonly taken in our Books is That where they agree in the Tenure there the Seisin is traversable but where they do not agree in the Tenure there the Tenure is traversable So is 26. H. 8. 6. 7. E. 4. 27. 12. E. 4. 7. 20. E. 4. 16. And he conceived here that the payment at two dayes doth alter the tenure so as now it is another tenure then before Also he said That if Wh. acre and Bl. acre be adjoyning and are holden the one of I. S. and the other of I. D. and I. S. distrein and avow for both acres that he may well traverse the tenure Meade 8. H. 7. 5. a. It is said by Brian That if avowry be made for a tenure of two acres by twenty shillings and the Plaintiffe saith that he holdeth these two and two other acres by twelve shillings without that that he holdeth the two acres by twenty shillings that that is good for that he cannot do otherwise And it is no reason that for a false avowry the Plaintiffe should be at a mischief But the Book is not ruled for Keble is contrary Vide Librum Trinit 26 Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 35 SAVELL and CORDELL's Case HEnry Savell Lessee for years of the Manor of M. grants the same Manor Habendum for so many years which should be to come after his death to Cordell Master of the Rolls if Dorothy his Wife so long should live And afterward Henry Savell and he in the Reversion levied a Fine The Case went by many Conveyances further But two points were here moved 1. If it were a good Grant for so many yeers c. Shuttleworth argued that it was But Cooke contrary And Cooke said to that which hath been said That Leases which have uncertain beginning may be by act of matter ex post facto made certain and so good As a lease for so many years as I. S. shall name if he name it is a certain lease but if the Lessor die before I. S. name and after hee name all is void as it is in the Commentaries put by Weston and granted by Dyer 273. And the reason is that it behoves that the interest passe out of the Lessor during his life and the Deed ought to have its perfection in the life of the Lessor But in our case here the Lessor or Grantor is dead before the certaintie of the beginning is known and before any perfection of interest out of him and therefore the reason in the common case 40 Ass and 16. E. 3. that there behoveth to be Attornment in the life of the Lessor proves our case for the reason of that is that it behoveth that some interest passe out of the Lessor or Grantor during his life and that perfection of his Grant be in his life or else the Grant is void Vide 31. E. 3. alb 20. and 33. E. 3. Confirmation 22. If the Chapter confirm the Grant of the Bishop after his death it is void for it ought to have perfection in the life of the Bishop otherwise it is void And upon that reason is the case put by Popham Com. 520. b. That where a man grants all his term which shall be to come after his death that it is a void Grant because no interest passeth during the life of the Grantor And to this purpose is 7. E. 6. Br. Leases 66. Temps H. 8. 339. If a man will take by Livery within the view it behoves the Feoffee to enter during the life of the Feoffor and yet that is a more strong case for by the Livery being a ceremony of the Law it is presumed that the land passed and yet there ought to be an entry to fortifie the Grant otherwise it is void The second point was If by the Fine levyed the possibilitie aswell as the right of possession of the term did passe And I conceive that it doth therefore we see in many cases a man may grant by his Deed a possibility to come As 19. H. 7. 1. where a man seised in the right of his Wife made a Feoffment in see and after they had issue and the Wife died that he should not be Tenant by the Courtesie and yet the Wife was remitted but by his own Grant he had granted from him the possibility he might have had to be Tenant by the courtesie And here If Cordell had entered and made a Feoffment in fee or levied a Fine the possibility which he had to have the term had been cleerly gone 39. H. 6. 43. If I disseise my Eather and make a Feoffment in fee and afterwards my Father dieth although that a new Right descends unto me yet I shall be barred of this possibilitie which I had at the time of the Grant But otherwise it had been if this discontinuance or grant had been defeated by entry or otherwise in my life by my Father or any other in that case I may shew the speciall matter as 15. E. 4. 5. is and so avoid my own Deed. And 44. E. 3. 4. is That tenant for years and he in the Reversion disclaim and it is holden a good Disclaimer which proves that a possibility may also pass by Disclaimer And 21. E. 3. and 35. H. 6. is That if he who hath cause to have a Writ of Error if he enter into the Land and make a Feoffment the Writ of Error is gon for ever so by these Cases it is proved and appeareth That a Possibility may passe by grant And so in the Principall Case the Possibility to have the terme is by this Fine granted and the Grant is a good Grant And it was adjourned Pasch 26. Eliz. in the Kings Beneh 36. LUDDINGTON and AMNER'S Case Intratur Mich. 25. Eliz. Rott 495. IN a Writ of Error the Case was this Perepoynt possessed of a Lease for 99 years devised the same unto his Wife for Life and that after her Decease that it should go to his Children unpreferred the Wife took Sir Thomas Fulster to her Husband and the Lease was put in Execution by Fiery facias for the Debt of Sir Thomas Fulster and afterwards Sir Thomas died and the Wife died The Administrators of Sir Thomas Fulster did reverse the Judgement upon which the Lease was taken in Execution And afterwards A. the Daughter of Perepoynt entred supposing her selfe to be the only Daughter of Perepoynt alive unpreferred by her Father in his life time And the Pleading was That the Wife of Perepoynt was his Executrix and that she entred into the Lease after the death of Perepoynt Virtute legationis donationis praedict Cook There is a difference in our Books That the Devise of the Occupation of a Term may be with the Remainder over but not a Devise
which implyes an Affirmative which yet seems to be repugnant to a Negative as in 21. H. 6. 19. In a Writ of Entrie the Defendant pleaded the deed of the Demandant after the darrein Continuance The Demandant said It was not his deed after the darrein Continuance And that was holden a Negative pregnans wherefore he was compelled to plead and say he made it by dures before the darrein Continuance such a day absque hoc that he made it after the darrein continuance and then Issue was taken upon it The same Case is in 5. H 7. 7. But there it is said That in Debt upon a Bond to perform an Arbitrement Non fecerunt Arbitrementum per diem is no Negative pregnans The same Law that non deliberavit arbitrium in Script 38. H 6. in Formedon Ne dona pas in taile is a Negative pregnans Vide 39 H. 6. The Case of the Dean and Chapter The second Exception was That he hath pleaded neque such nor such nor such had disturbed him by any indirect means but onely by due course of Law And that cannot be tryed neither by Jury nor by the Judges Not by the Jury because it is not to be put to them whether they had disturbed him by indirect means or by due course of Law for they shall not take upon them the construction What is an indirect means and what is the due course of Law for it appertaineth to the Justices to adjudg that Not by the Judges because hee hath not put it certain that it was a due course of Law by which he disturbed him As 22. E. 4. 40. In Debt upon a Bond the Defendant saith that it is upon condition That if the Defendant or any for him came to Bristow such a day and there shewed to the Plaintiff or his Councell a sufficient Discharge of an Annuity of forty shillings per annum which the Plaintiff claims out of two Messuages of the Defendant in D that then c. The Defendant said that A. and B. by the assignement of the Defendant came the same day to Bristow and tendered to shew to N and W. of the Plaintiffs Councell a sufficient Discharge of the Annuity and that they did refuse to see it and demanded judgment of the Action The Plaintiff did demur upon the Plea And after a long argument it was adjudged by all the Justices to be no Plea c. because it lay in the judgment of the Court to judg of it and he did not shew in certain what discharge he tendered as a Release Unitie of possession c. If a man be bound to plead a sufficient plea before such a day in Debt upon such a Bond it is no plea to say That he hath pleaded a sufficient plea before the day but hee ought to shew what plea he hath pleaded For the Court cannot tell whether it be a sufficient plea or not if it do not appear what manner of plea it is 35 H. 6. 19. The Condition of a Bond was That where the Plaintiff was indebted to J. S. in one hundred pounds If the Defendant acquit and discharge the Plaintiffe that then c. The Defendant pleaded That hee had discharged him c. and the Plaintiffe did demurre upon the plea because hee did not shew how and it was holden no good plea. So 38. H. 8. Br. Condition 16. per curiam in the Kings Bench where a man pleaded That he had saved him harmlesse it was no Plea without shewing how because he pleaded in the Affirmative contrary if he had pleaded in the Negative as Non damnificatus est Suit and Clenche Justices said That if he had pleaded That he was not disturbed by any indirect means it had been good enough Gaudy If he had said That he was not disturbed contra formam conditionis praedict ' it had been good as upon a pleading of a Statute Ne entra pas contra formam Statuti Clench If I be bound to suffer I. S. to have my house but not I. D. I ought to answer That I have suffered the one and not the other to have it Suit Justice They are both severall issues and one shall not be repugnant to the other Mich. 28 29 Eliz. In the Kings Bench. 75 STURGIE'S Case A Case was moved upon the Statute of 5. Eliz. Cap. 14. The Case as I conceive was thus Grandfather Father and Daughter Land descended from the Grandfather to the Father who made a Lease for one hundred years the Father died and the Daughter forged a Will of the Grandfather by which he gave the Land to the Father for life the Remainder to the Daughter in Fee and the same was forged to have avoided an Execution of a Statute Staple the Lease being defeated and if it were within the Statute of 5. Eliz. was the question Solicitor That it was within the statute and within the first Branch viz. If any shall forge any deed c. to the intent that the Estate of Free-hold or Inheritance of any person c. in or to any Lands Tenements or Hereditaments Freehold or Copyhold or the right Title or Interest of any c. of in or to the same or any of them shall or may be molested c. Lessee for years hath a Title hath an Interest hath a right therefore within the words of the Statute and those words shall be referred to the words Lands Tenements c. But Cook said They shall be referred to the words precedent viz. Estate of Freehold or Inheritance and then a Lease for years is not within them Also by the Solicitor A Testament in writing is within the words of the Statute and therefore he recited a clause in the end of the Statute viz. and if any person plead publish or shew forth c. to the intent to have or claime thereby any Estate of Inheritance Freehold or Lease for years And also he said a Statute Staple is an estate for years although it be not a Lease for years because it is not certain Cook If she should be within both branches then she should be twice punished which Law will not suffer And the Statute is whereby any Estate for years shall be claimed and she would not claim but defeat an Estate for years and a Statute Staple is not a Lease for years and the Statute is not to be taken by Equity because it is a Penall Law Solicitor When the Statute is extended then it is an Estate for years although it be uncertain If a man forge a Lease for years it is directly within the Statute But if a man have a Lease and another is forged to defeat it it is a question whether it be within the Statute And all the doubt of this Case is upon the reference of these words Right Title Interest And it was adjourned Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 76 THE Vicar of Pancras Case was argued again by Godfrey And he said That no Plea shall be
allowed in the Ecclesiasticall Court which tends in discharge of Tithes And to prove that he cited 8. E. 4. 14. Br. Tithes 11. And a Case in 6. 7. E. 6. Dier 79. d. But admit the Plea should be allowed in the Ecclesiasticall Court as many of the Doctors have certified the Justices yet because the Modus decimandi is a thing pertaining to the common Law the Prohibition will lie By Fitz. Herb. and the Register If a Parson grant to one of his Parishoners That he shall be discharged of Tithes he may peradventure plead the same in the Spirituall Court yet there is good cause that a Prohibition do lie So 22. E. 4. 20. Br. Prohibition 14. The Abbot of Saint Albans kept the wife of I. S. in his house two houres against her will to have made her his Harlot and the Husband spake of it for which cause the Abbot sued him for slander in the Spirituall Court and because the husband for that act might have a false imprisonment therefore a Prohibition was granted So if I swear to pay I. S. 10â— and he sues for it in the Spirituall Court a Prohibition lieth for hee may have an Action of Debt in the common Law for it for where the common Law may have Jurisdiction there the Spirituall Court shall not intermeddle with the matter So if an Abbot rob I. S. and he speaks of it and the Abbot sues him in the Spirituall Court a Prohibtion will lie He said further That the Case was betwixt the Vicar and a Parishoner and therefore one of them a Temporall person If the Suit be betwixt the Farmer of the Parson and another a Prohibition shall be granted Also he said The right of the Tithes doth not come in question but only the Modus dicimandi Câ—â—k The Modus decimandi doth not come in question there therfore it cannot be traversed for if it be due to the Parson that is the question as in 40. E. 3 4. In a Replevin the Defendant saith That the place where c. is Ancient Demesne and pleads to the Jurisdiction Char l' that is a Trespasse and Personall Action and therefore it is no plea and yet it was agreed by the Court to be a good plea for by the Avowry the realty might come in debate in the Replevin Atkins If there be contention de Jure Decimarum Originum habens de jurâ— Patronatus tunc spectat ac Legem Civilem And in this case it was said That de mero jure The Parson is to have all the tythes if there be not any Endowment of the Vicarage Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 77. MEGOD'S Case THe Case was That a Feoffment was made unto another man ad eam intentionem that he should convey the same to such a one to whom he sold it and he sold the same to another and did refuse to convey it and therefore the other brought an Action upon the Case And Gaudy Justice held that the Action would lie But Suit Justice held the contrary Wray Chiefe Justice did agree with Gaudy for he said It was a Trust that he should assure it to another And it is a good consideration in the Chancery the conveyance of a Trust and thereupon an Action upon the Case will lie Mich. 28 29 Eliz. In the Kings Bench. 78. ALtham of Grays-Inne took many Exceptions to an Indictment of Murder The first was because the Indictment said Quod capta fuit inquisitio coram Coronatore in Comitatu c. and doth not say de Comitatu And a Crowner in a County is a Crowner in every County in England as it is holden 9. H. 5. 24. b. Also de and in do much differ as in 15. E. 4. 15. Where a Scire facias was brought against the Master and Scholers Beatae Mariae Sancti Nicholai in Cantabrigia where the foundation was de Cantabrigia and not in Cantabriâ—gia And the Writ was abated For there is a difference betwixt in and de For a thing may be in and not of as Saint Sepulchres is in London but not of London A second Exception was because it said Inquisitio capta per Sacramentum c. and did not say Jurati and therefore the partie is not charged upon it and by 13. E. 4. If Jury be charged upon one and they find another felon it is void because they were not charged upon him And 1. R. 3. 4. by Hassey If in Assize the Record be such viz. Quod jurati exacti comperuerunt quorum 12. supra Sacramentum suum dicunt And give their verdict If it doth not say Quorum 12. Electi jurati it is errour For it doth not say in facto that they were sworn and yet it is implyed by the words Sacramentum suum that they were sworn The third Exception was That it doth not say That he was in pace Dei dict' Dominae Reginae for it might be that the partie was a Traitour and that he was flying and in such case he might justifie the killing of him and perhaps also it was se defendendo therefore those words are very necessary An other Exception was because the Indictment is percussiâ— and it is not said ex malitia praecogitata for so an Indictment of Murder ought to be as in 2. E. 4. The Indictment was quod Cepit abduxit felâ—nicè where it ought to have said Felonicè cepit abduxit and therefore it did abate A fifth Exception was because it saith â—t dedit ei plagam mortalem and doth not say cum gladio pâ—aedicto And in the Statute de Coronatore there is a charge given him That hee finde what weapon it was which gave the stroke See the Statute of 4. E. 1. Rastall Coroners 2. The sixth Exception was That the Indictment was That the pan of the knee was cut out and it doth not shew the length depth and breadth of the wound he granted that if one single member be cut off it is not necessary to shew the breadth c. but here was no amputation of any member nor a cutting off but the cutting of the pan of the knee Saâ—g to the same purpose and he finds there is a great difference betwixt cut off and cut out And he said That as to that which the Solicitour hath answered unto to the difference of in and de viz. that it is all one as if I grant a thing percipiena ' de Manâ—rio or in Maneriâ— that is all one To that he answered that that cannot be and in Wâ—mbishâ—s case in Plo. Coâ— 75. the same Exception was taken in a Writ But in our Case he said It is an Indictment which is favoured because the life is in question And he took another Exception because that the Indictment saies Tempore feloniae murdredi praedict ' and there is no such word murdredum To that the Sollicitour said That it was in equall degree murdum and murdredum for none of them are
if he had said à Possessione firmae and the Declaration was ruled to be good notwithstanding the Exceptions Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 86 A Man was indicted upon the Statute of 5. Elizab. of Perjury in a Court Leet and the Indictment was That hee at the Court Leet of the Earle oâ— Bathe Super Sacramentum suum coram Senescallo c. And Exception was taken because it said At the Leet of the Earle of Bathe Whereas every Leet is the King's Court although that another hath the profit and commodity of it And it was said That the Steward of a Leet was an Officer of Record And also his Oath was if he had made any Rescous or not with which he was charged Drew It is not within the Statute of 5. Eliz. for then it ought to be before a Jury in giving of Evidence or upon some Articles But the Court was clear of Opinion against him Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 87 The Earle of KENT's Case THE Case was this Three severall persons did occupie three severall houses in Brackley to which another man had right and he who had right went to one of the houses and entred and afterwards went away leaving him who occupied the said house upon the land and then he entred into another of the houses and then went from that leaving him who occupied the same before upon the land and then he entred into the third house and there sealed a Lease for years unto another man of that house and naming the two other houses and the Lessee brought an Ejectione firme for the two houses in which the Lease was not delivered and the Opinion of the Court was against him that he was barred in the Action for the entrie or continuance of him who occupied the same before did defeat the entrie of the Plaintiffe or Lessor and the Plaintiffe was forced to be Non-suit Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 88 SMITH and SMITH's Case ONE I. S. did assume and promise That whereas I. N. was indebted to J. D in Forty Pounds by Bond That if J. D. ne implacitaret the said J. N. that if the money be not paid such a day that J. S would pay it to J. D. The money was not paid and after the day J. D. brought an Action upon the Case upon the promise and shewed Quod ipse non implecitavit c. Kingsmill He cannot have his Action upon the Case till J. N. be dead for during his life there is a time in which he might implead him As if I promise unto another That if he will be Nonsuit in his Action which he hath against a third person that if he doth not pay the money before such a day that then he will pay the money there if the day of payment be before the time that he can be Non-suit as before the Terme beginneth yet he cannot presently have his Action before that he is Non-suit And therefore in the principall Case he ought to shew That he hath discharged the other of the Bond and then the Action lieth for then he cannot implead him but as this Case is pleaded though he hath not yet impleaded pleaded him yet in posterum he may implead him Clench Justice That is implied that he will never implead him and then he ought to shew the Bond discharged Suit That is not so for if hereafter he sue him against his promise then the other to whom the promise was made shall have his Action upon the Case and shall recover to the value of the sum in the Bond. Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 89 BILFORD and DODDINGTON's Case A Writ of Error was brought by Richard Bilford against Robert Doddington to reverse a common recovery in the City of Worcester upon a Writ of Right Patent And for Error it was assigned 1. That no Warrant of Atturney was entred but that such a one posuit loco suo W. H. and did not write the name at length but in the Plea Roll it was at length The second Error was That the Writ was De tribus messuagiis sive tenementis and that doth containe no certainty for sive is a word uncertaine The third Error It was in the time Philippi Mariae and petit processum Domini Regis Reginae and it was â—orundum Regis and that was in the default of Voucher that the Recovery was had but if it were in the Recovery in which he did appear and plead it was otherwise The Counsell of the other side as to the first said That all the Records of the City are of the same form viz. That such a one Poâ—uit loco suo W. H. c. and if it were not good they should be all overthrown and avoided and if it should be otherwise it should be contrary to the ancient custome of the City As to the second Quod petit processum corundum Regis the same is the misrecitall of the Clark for the Writ upon which it is grounded is well and as to the Process the party did appear gratis As to the word sive the same is good for tenementum is but Surplusage As in an Action of Waste if the party do expresse some things which are not waste and some things which are those which are not waste are but Surplusage Also he said That the Writ of Error by which the Record is removed is insufficient for the Writ is That there is Error manefestus and doth not say ut dicitur and therefore it is not good for otherwise the King should forejudge us And also in the Writ it doth not say Errorem siquis fuerit and it ought not precisely to say That there is Error Also the Writ of Error is to certifie a Record de tribus messuagiis tenementis and the Record is De tribus messuagiis sive tenementis and therefore the Record is not well removed for it is not such Record As 12. Ass 2. in Attaint Exception was taken that the Writ of Attaint did not agree with the first originall but because it did agree with the Record it was good although it did not agree with the first Originall for the first Originall was of the Manor of Ansti and the Attaint was of Anesti and so was the whole Record But if the Attaint had disagreed with the Record it had been Error Also the Writ was good although tenementis were out of the Writ for it is but surplusage And also Tenementum is not a thing demandable as 11. H. 7. 25. it is said That Tenementum is not a name to demand a Messuage by but in Trespass of Nusance to it there Tenementum is sufficient Suit Justice The Record is now before us and therefore the Writ of Error is not materiall For if my Lord Anderson bring before us a Record although no Writ of Error be awarded yet wee may proceed to examine Whether there be Error in it or not
not have an Action without cause and if he were convicted then there is no cause of Action and he hath not shewed whether he was convicted or acquitted And he said that there was no difference betwixt an Action on the Case and a Conspiracie in such case but onely this That a Conspiracy ought to be by two at the least and an Action upon the Case may lie against one and he said that in both he ought to shew that he was legitimo modo acquietatus See 11. H. 7. 25. An Action of Conspiracy founded upon the Statute of 8. H 6. Cap. 10. where it is grounded upon a Writ of Trespasse brought against one onely But such a Conspiracy which is grounded upon an Indictment of Felony must be against two at the least for the same is an Action founded upon the Common Law Mich. 28 29. Eliz. In the Kings Bench. 92. BONEFANT against Sir RIC. GREINFIELD BOnefant brought an Action of Trespasse against Sir Richard Greinfield The Case was this A man made his Will and made A. E. I. O. his Executors and devised his Lands to A. E. I. and O. by their speciall names and to their heirs and further willed that his Devisees should sell the Land to I. D. if he would give for the same before such a day an hundred pound and if not that then they should sell to any other to the performance of his Will scil the payment of his debts I. D. would not give the hundred pound One of the Devisees refused to entermeddle and the other three sold the Land and if the Sale were good or not was the question Cooke The Sale is not good 1. Let us see what the Common Law is At the Common Law it is a plain case that the Sale is not good because it is a speciall trust and a joynt trust and shall never survive for perhaps the Devisor who is dead reposed more confidence in him who refused then in the others Vide 2 Eliz. the Case of the Lord Bray who covenanted That if his son marry with the consent of four whom he especially named viz. A. B. C. and D. that then he would stand seised to the use of his son and his wife and to the heirs of their two bodies begotten One of the four was attainted and executed The other did consent that he should marry such a one he married her yet no estate passed because the fourth did not consent and it was a joynt trust 38. H. 8. Br. Devises 31. A man willeth that his Lands deviseable shall be sold by his Executors and makes four Executors all of them ought to sell for the trust which is put upon them is a joynt Trust But Brook conceiveth that if one of them dieth that the others may sell the Lands The Case betwixt Vincent and Lee was this A man devised That if such a one dieth without issue of his body that then his Sons in law should sell such Lands and there were five sons in law when the Testatour died and when the other man died without issue there were but three sons in law and they sold the Lands and it was holden that the Sale was good because the Land was not presently to be sold Also he said that in the principall Case here they have an Interest in the Lands and each of them hath a part therefore the one cannot sell without the other But if the devise were that four should sell they have not an Interest but onely an Authority As to the Statute of 21. H. 8. Cap. 4. he said that that left our Case to the Common Law For that Statute as it appeareth by the preamble speaks onely of such Devises by which the Land is devised to be sold by the Executors and not devised to the Executors to sell And goes further and saith Any such Testament c. of any such person c. therefore it is meant of such a devise made unto the Executors and then no Interest passeth but onely an Authority or a bare Trust But in our Case they have an Interest for he who refused had a fourth part Then when the other sell the whole the same is a disseisin to him of his part If a Feoffment be made to four upon condition that they make a Feoffment over and two of them make the Feoffment it is not good Also the words of the Will prove that they have an Interest for it is that his Devisees shall sell c. Laiton contrary And he said That although the Devise be to them by their proper names and not by the name Executors yet the intent appeareth that they were to sell as Executors because it was to the performance of his last Will and that may be performed as well by the three although that the other doth refuse and the Sale of the Land doth referre to the performance of his Will in which there are divers Debts and Legacies appointed to be paid 2. H. 4. and 3. H. 6. A man devised his Lands to be sold for the payment of his debts and doth not name who shall sell the same the Lands shall be sold by his Executors 39. Ass A Devise is of Lands unto Executors to sell for the performance of his Will the profits of the Lands before the Sale shall be assets in the Executors hands 15. H. 7. 12. is That if a man devise that his Lands shall be sold they shall be sold by his Executors Also if I devise that my Executors shall sell my Lands and they sell it is an Administration and afterwards they cannot plead that they never were Executors nor never administred as Executors And although there are divers Authorities to be executed yet it is but one Trust 39. Ass 17. is our very Case A man seised of Lands deviseable devised them to his Executors to sell and died having two Executors and one of them died and the other entred and sold the Land and the Sale was good 49. E. 3. 15. Isabell Goodcheapes Case Where a man devised that after an Estate in taile determined that his Executors should sell the Lands and made three Executors and one died and another refused the third after the taile determined sold the Land and the Sale was holden good and that it should not escheate to the Lord for the Land was bound with a Devise as with a Condition as to the Statute of 21. H. 8. Cap. 4. the preamble of the Statute is as it hath been recited and although for exmaple the Lands in use are only put yet the Statute is not tied only to that As in the Statute of Collusion of Malbridge Examples are put only of Feoffments and Leases for years yet there is no doubt but that a Lease for life or a gift in taile to defraud the Lord is within the Statute So the Statute of Donis Conditionalibus puts onely three manner of estate tailes But Littleton saith That there are many other estate tailes which are
the Land unto another Shuttleworth moved it to the Court Whether the Patentee ought to shew the Letters Patents and he conceived He need not because he hath not any interest in them but the same do belong only to the Earle As if a Rent be granted to one in Fee and he taketh a wife and dieth and the Wife bringeth a Writ of Dower she is not bound to shew the first Deed by which the Rent was granted to her Husband because the Deed doth not belong unto her So hee who sues for a Legacie is not tied to shew the Will because the same belongs to the Executor and not him Periam Justice The Cases are not alike for they are Strangers and not Privies but the Lessee in the principall Case deriveth his interest from the Letters Patents and therefore he ought to shew them Rodes Justice remembred Throgmorton's Case Com. 148. a. where a Lease was made by an Abbot to J. S. and afterwards the same Abbot made a Lease unto another to begin after the determination of the first Lease made to J. S. and exception was taken That he ought to have shewed the Deed of the first Lease and the Exception was disallowed by the Court Periam That case is not like this case and he said That as he conceived the Lessee in this case ought to shew forth the letters Patents and if any Books were against his Opinion it was marvellous Mich. 28 29 Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 134 ONE intruded after the death of Tenant for life and died seised and the land descended to his Heire and a Writ of Intrusion was brought in the Per against the Heir and Gawdy Serjeant prayed a Writ of Estrepment against the Tenant And first the Court was in doubt what to do but afterwards when they had considered of the Statute of Gloucester Cap. 1. in the end of it Anderson said If the Writ be in the Per take the Writ of Estrepment but if the Writ be not in the Per we doubt whether a Writ of Estrepment will lie or not Mich. 28 29 Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 135 WOOD against ASH and FOSTER CErtain Lands with a Stock of Sheep was leased by Indenture and the Lessee did covenant by the same Indenture to restore unto the Lessor at the end of the Terme so many Sheep in number as he took in Lease and that they should be betwixt the age of two and four years Afterwards the Lessee granted the same Stock unto a Stranger viz. to Elizabeth Winsor who was the wife of Ashe whereas in truth all the ancient Stock was spent And it was holden by all the Justices upon an Evidence given unto a Jury at the Bar That when such a Stock of Sheep is leased for years the principall Property doth remain in the Lessor as long as those Sheep which were in esse at the time of the Lease should live but if any of them do die and other come in their roomes then the property of those new Sheep doth belong to the Lessee and therefore they held that the second Lessee should have so many of the Sheep as were left and did remaine at the end of the Lease and no other And yet it was objected by Walmesley That the Stock was entire and that as soon as any other came in the room of the ancient Sheep which were dead that they were accounted part of the same stock and although they be all dead and so changed successively two or three times yet he said it shall be said the same stock And he resembled the same to the case of a Corporation which although all the Corporation die and other new men come in their places it shall be said the same Corporation But notwithstanding his Opinion all the Justices were of opinion as before Walmesley said That agreeing with his opinion was the opinion of all the civill Lawyers but the Court was angry and rebuked him that he did in such manner crosse their opinions and that he cited the opinion of Civilians in our Law and they resolved the contrary and they said there is a difference betwixt the Lease of other Goods and a lease of live Cattel for in the first Case if any thing be added for mending repairing or otherwise by the Lessee at the end the Lessor shall have the additions for of them he hath alwayes the property and they are annexed to the principall but Lambs Calves c. are severed from the principall and are the Profits arising of the Principall which the Lessee ought to have else he should pay his Rent for nothing And as to the issue upon the Cepit by Foster it was shewed That he did but stay the Sheep in his Manor where he had Fellons Goods Waifes and Strayes and that the Sheep were stayed upon a Huy and Cry and that he had taken Bond of one to whom he had delivered the Sheep to render them to him who had the right of them And that stay was holden by the Court to be out of the point of the Issue For that he who doth stay doth not take Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 136. The Heirs of Sir ROGER LEWKNOR and FORD's Case Intratur Pasch 28. El. Rot. 826. SIR Roger Lewknor seised of Wallingford Park made a lease thereof unto Ford for years and died the Lessee granted over his term to another excepting the Wood the term expired and now an action of Waste was brought against the second lessee by the two Coparceners and the Heir of the third Coparcener her Husband being tenant by the courtesie And Shuttleworth and Snag Serjeants did argue that the action would not lie in the form as it was brought And the first Exception which was taken by them was because the action was generall viz. Quod fecit Vastum in terris quas Sir Roger Lewknor pater praedict ' the plaintiffs cujus haeredes ipsae sunt praefat ' defend ' demisit c. and the Count was that the Reversion was entailed by Parliament unto the Heirs of the body of Sir Roger Lewknor and so they conceived that the Writ ought to have been speciall viz. cujus haeredes de corpore ipsae sunt For they said that although there is not any such form in the Register yet in novo casu novum remedium est apponendum And therefore they compared this case to the case in Fitz. Nat. Brevium 57. c. viz. If land be given to Husband and Wife and to the Heirs of the body of the Wife and the Wife hath issue and dieth and the Husband committeth Waste the Writ in that case and the like shall be speciall and shall make speciall recitall of the estate And so is the case 26. H. 8. 6. where Cestuy que use makes a lease and the lessee commits Waste the action was brought by the Feoffees containing the speciall matter and it was good although there were not any such Writ in the Register cujus
it is not shewed that he used any other rite or Ceremony c. for there ought to be some Positive thing 3. He doth not shew the Place or Parish where he persisted in it and that is materiall and issuable The fourth Exception was Because it was Inquisitio câ—pta coram Johanne Peter Waltero Mildmay and so named four of them by vertue of a Commission directed to them and to others and doth not shew what others nec quod illi fuerunt praesentes and then if the Commission were to them all jointly and two only were present then it was coram non judice and so void 5. The Statute saies That if any Parson or Vicar but doth not say being Minister Dei. The sixth was That it was at another Church c. Wray Chief Justice If this Evasion should be allowed the Statute were not to the purpose The seventh was That it doth not shew where the persisting was for that is a speciall thing and materiall and issuable Wray Chief Justice conceived That that only was a materiall Exception and that the other Exceptions were but frivolous and were not good Hill 29. Eliz. In the Kings Bench. 138 WARREN's Case ONE Warren demanded by a Writ of Debt in the Common Pleas Forty Pound and upon his Declaration did confess himselfe satisfied of Twenty Pound and thereupon Error was brought in the King's Bench And the Judgement reversed because by his Declaration he had abated his Writ and he ought to have Judgement according to his Writ and not according to his Declaration The Error assigned was in the Outlawry and it was holden by all the Justices That if the principall Record be reversed for Error that the Outlawry which is grounded upon it shall be reversed also Hill 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 139 ROOTE 's Case THE Case was in a Prohibition touching Tithes and the libell in the Spirituall Court was for Corn and Hay and other things and the Tenant of the land did prescribe to pay in one part of the land the third part of the tenth and in another part the moity of the tenth of Corn for all manner of Tithes And the Court did incline that the same was a good prescription And a Prohibition was granted to the Ecclesiasticall Court Hill 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 140 A Man was possessed for the terme of six years of a Tavern in London and leased the same unto another for three years and it was convenanted betwixt them that during the three years quolibet mense monthly the lessee should give an Account to the lessor of the Wine which he sold and should pay unto him for every Tun sold so much money And afterwards the lessor granted the three years which were remaining of the six years to another and he did request the lessee to account and he would not whereupon he brought an Action of Covenant and the Defendant pleaded That he had accounted to the Assignee of the three years and upon that there was a Demurrer joyned And the better opinion of the Court was that it was no Plea because it was not a Covenant which did go with the land or the Reversion but was a collaterall thing and did not pass by the assignment of the three years Hill 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 141 IT was adjudged That the bringing of a Writ of Error to reverse a Fine by an Infant during his nonage is not sufficient but the Fine by Judgement in the Writ of Error must be reversed during his Nonage Hill 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 142 WIDALL and Sr. JOHN ASHTON's Case A Writ of Error was brought by Widall against Sr. John Ashston because in the other action being an action of Wast The Plaintiff there did declare that he was seised and so seised demisit pro termino annorum c. and did not shew of what estate he was seised And yet he did suppose that it was ad exhaeredationem ejus c. And the same by Beamount was taken for an exception as 7. H. 6. A man pleaded a Feoffment to two haeredibus and doth not say suis it is uncertain And in the principal Case it shall be supposed that he hath but an estate for life for it shall not be intended that he hath an estate of Inheritance without expressing of words to carry an Inheritance As 7. Ass If I grant a Rent to I. S. and do not name what estate he shall have in it he shall have but an estate for life But he said that the Presidents are that if the word seised had been left out it had been good enough For by the Book of Entries a man may say demisit without saying that he was seised demisit But if a man will plead a thing which is not necessary to be pleaded and mistake it it shall make his Plea naught as in Patridges Case Where a suite was upon the Statute of Maintenance It is sufficent to say contra formam Statuti But if he will plead specially the day and place of the Statute and mis-plead it it makes all naught Suit Justice I conceive that that is a fault incurable But upon the other side it was argued that in 21. H. 7. It is holden that he might plead quod demisit without that that he was seised and demisit as there in an Action of Debt And therefore it is but surplusage in the principal Case Vide 15. E. 4. A good Case where surplusage shall not hurt because it is not traversable And he urged that by the Statute of 18. El. the Declaration doth not abate for matter of form And he said that Counts and Declarations shall be taken by Intendment and it shall be intended that if bringeth Wast that he hath such an estate that he may maintain such Action In Adams Case in the Commentaries One shewed that such an Abbot was seised and that the Land came unto the King by Dissolution and that the King being seised did grant the same and did not shew of what estate the King was seised and yet it was holden good See a good Case to this purpose 18. E. 3. Formedon 58. And he said that the Defendant had pleaded Nul wast fait and therefore he had by his Plea affirmed the Declaration to be good Beamount He ought to have said reversione inde sibi haeredibus c. Clenche Justice I conceive that the Statute of 18. El. helps that Suit Justice No truly It was adjourned Hill 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 143 AN Action of Covenant was brought by a Man against another who had been his Apprentize The Defendant pleaded that he was within age The plaintiff did maintain his Action by the Custome of London Where one by Covenant may binde himself within age And Exception was taken to it That that was a Departure Daniel It is no Departure for by 18. R. 2. an Infant brought an Action against Gardian in Socage and the
Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 146 LONDON doth prescribe to have a Custom That after Verdict given in any of the Sheriffs Courts or such like Court there that the Maior may remove any such Suit before himself and as Chancellor secundùm bonam sanam conscientiam moderate it and it was moved whether it were a reasonable custom or not because that after tryal by ordinary course at Law he should thereby stay judgment Gaudy Justice It ought to be before judgment otherwise it cannot be for the Statute of 4. H. 4. is that judgment given in any Court shall not be reversed but by Error or Attaint Vide Rastal Tit. Judgment Mich. 28. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. Rot. 2619. 147 GREENE and HARRIS Case IN an Ejectione firme upon a special Verdict it was found that one John Brenne was seised of a Manor where there were Copyholders for life and by Indenture leased a copyhold called Harris Tenure parcel of the Land in question to Peter and John Blackborow for eight years to begin after the death of Brenne his Wife and by the same Indenture leased all the Manor to them as before The Copyholder did surrender and Brenne granted a copy to hold according to the custom of the Manor Brenne and his Wife died So as the lease of Blackborow was to begin Peter entred and granted all his Interest unto a stranger and died John entred into the whole as Survivor and made a lease thereof to the Plaintiff and the Copyholder entred and he brought the action Shuttleworth for the plaintiff The question is whether the plaintiff shall have Harris Tenure as in gross or as parcel of the Manor and he conceived that because it is named by it self that it shall pass as in gross for so their intent appeareth to be In 33. H. 8. Dyer 48. A Feoffment was made of a Manor to which a Villein was Regardant by these words viz. Dedi unam acram c. And further Dedi concessi Villanum meum and there it was holden that the Villein should pass as in gross and that they were several gifts although there was but one Deed. The same Law shall be of an Advowson appendant 14. and 15. El. Dyers Husband and Wife were joint-tenants in Fee of a Manor out of which the Queen had a Rent of twenty pound per annum and she by her Letters patents in Consideration of Money paid by the Husband did give grant release and remise unto the Husband and his heirs the said twenty pound Rent habendum percipiendum to him and his heirs The Husband did devise the Rent unto another and his heirs and dyed There it is debated whether the Wife should pay the Rent or not and it was holden that she should pay it for the deed having words of grant and release it shall be referred to the Election of the Husband and for his best avail how he will take it and there is no necessity that the Rent be extinguished in his possession for it is a maxime in Law that every grant shall be taken beneficially for the grantee so is it if it contain words of two intents he may take that which makes best for him 21. and 22. H. 6. A deed comprehending Dedi concessi was pleaded as a Feoffment In 5. E. 3. A Rent issuing out of Lands in Fee was granted to Tenant by the courtesie to have and to hold to him and his heirs It shall not be taken as extinct but the Rent shall go to his heires although he himself could not have it Then in our Case because it is more beneficial for the Termor he shall have it in gross And so he shall avoid the Estate of the Copyholder afterwards and here is an Election made by Peter so to have it by the grant of his Interest over Our Case is not like unto the Case of 48. E. 3. 14. Where a Cessavit was brought supposing that the House was holden of the Plaintiff by five Shillings and the Defendant pleaded that the Ancestor of the Plaintiff by his deed which he shewed forth gave the house to him and a shop which are holden by one intire service and demanded judgment c. And there it was holden that that deed did not prove but that the shop might be parcel of the house and not a shop in gross by it self And there Finchdon saith That if a man grant the Manor of F. to which an Advowson is appendant and the Advowson of the Church of F. so as it is named in gross yet it shall pass as appendant I yeild to that for there it is not more beneficial for him the one way or the other as it is in our Case It may be perhaps objected That the Plaintiff here shall not recover at all for the cause alleadged in Plo. Comm. 424. in Bracebridges Case because that the action is brought for a certain number of Acres as one hundred Acres and it is found that the Plaintiff hath right but to a moyty of them But it hath been ruled against that viz. that he shall recover Walmesley Sergeant contrary Notwithstanding that this Copy-hold be twice named yet it shall pass as parcel of the Manor and not as a thing in gross and there is but one Rent one Tenure and one reversion of both 45. E. 3. A Fine was levyed of a Manor unto which an Advowson was appendant wherein a third part was rendred back to one for life with divers Remainders over And so of the other two parts with the advowson of every third part as abovesaid and there it is debated who shall have the first avoidance And it is holden notwithstanding the Division as aforesaid and the naming of one before the other that they are all Tenants in common of it So as if they cannot agree to present that Lapse shall incurre to the Bishop and there no Prerogative is given to him who is first named nor any prejudice to the last named for being by one Deed it shall passe uno flatu 14. H. 8. 10. A Lease was made for a year Et sic de anno in annum c. And there it was debated whether it were a severall Lease for every year and it was ruled That an Action might be brought supposing that he held for one and twenty years if in truth by force of the same Demise the Lessee occupy the Land so long And if I by my Deed grant unto A. and B. the services of I. D. and by the same Deed the services of I. S. are also granted unto them they are Joyn-tenants of the Services or Seignories So if I lease a Manor reciting every parcell of the Land of the Manor for the whole consists in severall parcels In 33. H. 8. before remembred It is said That the Advowson shall be appendant if the whole Manor be granted c. But if it be admitted that there be severall Leases and that it passeth as a thing in grosse
the Court was That it is a good grant of an Annuity by these words annualem redditum But whether the Husband shall have a Writ of Annuity after the death of the wife for an Annuity during the Coverture they were in some doubt because it is but a thing in Action as is an Obligation Otherwise were it of a Rent which she had for life Note in pleading for a Rent he shall plead That he was seised c. Mich. 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 152 WINKFEILD'S Case Winkfeild devised Land in Norfolk to one Winkfeild of London Goldsmith and to his heirs in Fee And afterwards he made a Deed of Feoffment thereof to divers persons unto the use of himselfe for life without impeachment of waste the Remainder unto the Devisee in fee. But before he sealed the Deed of Feoffment he asked one if it would be any prejudice to his Will who answered No. And the Devisor asked again if it would be any prejudice because he conceived that he should not live untill Livery was made And it was answered No. Then he said that he would seale it for his intent was that his Will should stand And afterwards Livery was executed upon part of the Land and the Devisor died Rodes and Periam Justices The Feoffment is no Countermand of the Will because it was to one person but perhaps it had been otherwise if it had been to the use of a stranger although it were not executed Anderson Chiefe Justice and others the Will is revoked in that part where the Livery is executed And he said It would have been a question if he had said nothing And all the Justices agreed That a man may revoke his Will in part and in other part not And he may revoke it by word and that a Will in writing may he revoked by word Periam said It is no revocation by the party himselfe but the Law doth revoke it to which Windham agreed But he said That if the party had said nothing when he sealed the Feoffment it had been a revocation of the party and not of the Law Periam If the Witnesses dye so as he cannot prove the words spoken at the sealing of the Feoffment the Feoffment will destroy the Will and so he spake to Anderson who did not deny it All this was delivered by the Justices upon an Evidence given to a Jury at the Barre Mich. 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 153 NOte That it was said by Anderson Chiefe Justice That if one intrude upon the possession of the King and another man entreth upon him that he shall not have an Action of Trespasse for he who is to have trespasse ought to have a possession and in this case he had not for that every Intruder shall answer the King for his time and therefore he shal not answer to the other party To which Walmesley and Fenner Serjeants agreed Periam doubted of it for he conceived That he had a possession against every stranger Snagg Serjeant conceived That he might maintain an Action of Trespasse but Windham and Rodes Justices were of opinion that he could not maintain Trespass Walmesley he cannot say in the Writ Quare clausam frâ—git c. Rodes vouched 19. E. 4. to maintain his opinion Mich. 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 154 NORRIS and SALISBURIE'S Case IN an Action of Debt upon a Bond the Case was this Norris was possessed of wools for which there was a contention betwixt the Defendant and one A. And Norris promised A. in consideration that the goods were his and also that he should serve processe upon Salisbury out of the Admiral Court that he would deliver the goods to A. And afterwards he delivered the goods to Salisbury the Defendant who gave him Bond with Condition to keep him harmlesse from all losses charges and hinderances concerning and touching the said wools Afterwards A. served processe upon him and he did not deliver to him the goods for which A. brought his Action upon the Case against Norris who pleaded That he made no such promise which was found against him And afterwards Norris brought an Action of Debt upon the Bond against Salisbury because he did not save him harmlesse in that Action upon the Case And the opinion of the whole Court was That the Action of Debt would not lie because that the Action upon the Case did not concern the wools directly for the Action is not brought but for breach of the promise And that is a thing of which the Defendant had not notice and it was a secret thing not concerning the wools but by circumstances and so out of the Condition Anderson Chiefe Justice said That if A. promise B. in Consideration that B. is owner of goods and hath them to deliver them to C. the same may be a good consideration yet he somewhat doubted of it But Walmesley did affirme it to be a good Consideration Mich. 29 Eliz in the Common Pleas. 155 IT was holden by the whole Court That in an Action of Trespasse It is a good plea in barre That the Plaintiffe was barred in an Assize brought by him against the Defendant and issue joyned upon the Title But otherwise if it were upon the generall issue viz. Nul tort nul disseisin For then it might be that the Plaintiffe was never ousted nor disseised and so no cause to recover In which case it was no reason to put him from his Writ of Right Mich. 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. Intratur Mich. 27. Rot. 1627. 156 BRAGG'S Case A Woman having cause to be endowed of a Manor in which are Copy-holders doth demand her Dower by the name of certain Messuages certain Acres of land and certain Rents and not by the name of the third part of the Manor and she doth recover and keeps Courts and grants Copy-holds It was holden by the whole Court that in such Case that the Grants were void for she hath not a Manor because she hath made her demand as of a thing in grosse Otherwise if the demand had been of the third part of the Manor for then she had a Manor and might have kept Courts and granted Copies And the pleading in that Case was That she did recover the third part of the Manor per nomen of certain Messuages and Acres and Rents which was holden to be no recovery of the third part of the Manor Hill 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 157 NOte it was holden for Law That the Justices may increase but not decrease damages because the party may have an Attaint and so is not without remedy But note contrary by Anderson and Periam Justices Hill 39. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 158 SErjeant Fenner moved this Case That the Lord of a Manor doth prescribe That if the Tenant do a Rescous or drive his Cattel off from the Land when the Lord comes to distrain that the Tenant shall be amerced by the Homage and that the Lord may distrain for the same Anderson
therefore the Commoner shal be excluded But it will be objected that the Statute is that the Owners of the Ground may enclose But Sir Francis Barrington is not Owner for the Lord Rich is the Owner of the Ground I say that Sir Francis Barrington is the Owner for he hath the Herbage and the Trees so as he hath all the profit and he who hath the profit shall be said to have the Land it self and he vouched Paramour and Yardleys Case in Plow Com. Dyer 285. and 37. H. 6. 35. and 17. E. 4. 16. Also the Statute is in the disjunctive viz. the Owner or the Vendee and although he be not Owner of the soil yet he is Vendee of the Trees Secondly It will be objected that the same is not a general Law of which the Judges are to take notice and therefore he ought to plead it I hold it to be general enough of which you are to take knowledge although it be not pleaded he cited Hollands Case Thirdly It will be objected that by such general Law the particular interest of a private man shall not be destroyed To that I say that such general Statutes will include such particular interests and therefore the Case betwixt Sir Foulke Grevill and Stapleton was adjudged that where Willoughby Lord Brookes had Lands to him by Act of Parliament with authority to make Leases for one life and no more By the Statute of 32. H. 8. of Leases that authority is enlarged and he might make Leases for three lives Haughton Serjeant Although he be Owner of the profits he is not Owner of the soil and there is a difference betwixt the same and the soil And the Statute speaks of Trees growing in his own soil Foster Justice The Arbitrament the Assurance and the especial Act of Parliament is nothing to the purpose in this Case and to plead them was more then was needfull For by the Arbitrament and the Assurance the Commoner being a third person cannot be bounden in which he was not a party And by the special Act of Parliament he shall not be bound because the Act is against the Lord Rich and his Heirs so as a stranger shall not be bound by the Act And therefore upon the Statute of 18. Eliz. cap. 2. of Patents the Case was That the Queen made a Lease for years which was void for not reciting of a former Lease and afterwards she granted the Inheritance unto another And then came the Statute of 18. Eliz. which confirmed all Patents against her her Heirs and Successors by that Statute the Grantee in Fee was not bounden but he might avoid the Lease for years for the Statute is against the Queen and her successors and that case was adjudged But our case is without doubt as to that point for the right and interest of estrangers is saved by the Act then all rests upon the Statute of 22. E. 4. and I conceive that the same is a speciall Act and ought to be pleaded for it is not generally of all Woods but only of Woods in Forrests and Chases But admitting it to be a generall Act yet I conceive That it was not the meaning of it to exclude a Commoner and that appears fully by the later words of the Statute viz Without licence of c. which excludes only the Owners of the Forrest and it was not the meaning that he might inclose without the leave of the Commoner One thing hath troubled me in the Statute because it is said that before that time he could not inclose more then for 3. years so as before that statute he might enclose for 3 years as it seems without Licence and now by the Statute for 7 years Also for another cause I conceive that the Defendant shall not take advantage of the Statute as he hath pleaded for he hath pleaded that he did enclose and cut whereas the statute saies that he shall enclose after the Cutting so as I hold cleerely that he hath not pursued the authority of the Stat. for upon the St. of 35. H. 8. which is penned contrary to this Stat. scil that the Owner of the wood shall make enclosure and division for the Cōmoner and then he is to cut I hold cleerly that after the felling he cannot make any enclosure Also admitting that by the Stat. the Cōmoner shall be excluded I hold that by the Stat. of 35. H. 8. that that Stat. is repealed in that point for the Stat. of 35. H. 8. is That no man shall fell woods wherein Commoners have Interest by Prescription until he hath divided the fourth part so that the Authority if any were is restrained by that Stat. if he be a Cōmoner by Prescription as he is in our Case But if it had been a Common by grant it had not been within the Clause of Restraint And Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant especially the Stat. being in the Negative as it is here For by a Negative Statute the Cōmon Law shall be restrained otherwise if the Stat. were in the affirmative for these reasons I conclude That the plaintiff ought to have Judgment Warburton Justice contrary All the matter rests upon the Statute of 22. E. 4. First I hold that the same is a general act although it be particular in some things So you may say of all statutes which are particular in some one point or other I hold also That the Stat. of 22. E. 4. is not repealed in this point by the Stat. of 35 H. 8. because they were made to several purposes The one was for Forrests and Chases the other onely for other particular Woods And I hold that the Cōmoner shall be excluded for otherwise the Stat. should be void and contrary viz. to give power to one to enclose and exclude all beasts and yet to permit another to put in his cattel And by the words of the Statute which exclude all beasts and cattell the Deer shall not be excluded or intended for they shall not be said beasts or cattel As in 30. E. 3. One who chaseth a cow in a Park shall be said within the Statute de Malefactoribus in Parcis And then if the authority of enclosure be not to exclude the Deer it shall be to exclude the cattell of the Commoner and other the like estrangers or otherwise it should be to no purpose As to that which hath been said That there is not a person who may inclose by the Statute the Statute is that the Owner shall inclose or he to whom the Wood shall be sold so that although that hee be not Owner yet he is to have the Trees and the profits and the Statute doth intend that he may inclose who ought to have the profit and although the sale be not for monie yet such a person may be said Vendee well enough Wherefore I conclude that Judgment ought to be for the Defendant Walmesley Justice I hold that he hath not authoritie by the
parcel of it for in the one Case the Visne shall be of the Manor in the other not Vide 9. Eliz. Dyer ar But it was said That in this Case the Modus did extend only to things in Stangrave and therefore the Visne should be of Stangrave only Nichols Justice said That although the Parish be a Town and of one name yet the Visne shall be from the Parish to which the Court agreed And in the principall Case the Pleading was That the Manor was in Parochia and the Modus alledged to be in Parochia and the Prohibition de Parochia and therefore the Venire facias ought to be de Parochia and not de Manerio or de Villâ—â— Cook cited 4. E. 4. and 23. E. 4. that in Trespass de Parochia is a good addition for it shall not be intended that there are two Towns in one Parish And it was said by the Court in this Case That before the Statute of 2. E. 6. all Prohibitions to the Spirituall Court were quia secutus est de Laico feodo for when a man had a Modus dicimandi the Corn and other things were lay things Then it was moved by a Serjeant at Bar That at the Assizes where the tryall of the Modus decimandi was one of the principal Panel did appear only upon the Venire facias and the question was If in such Case a tales might be awarded de circumstantibus And it was holden by the Court that such tales might be well awarded and 10. Eliz. Dyer vouched to prove the same It was also said by the Court That at the common Law if not in appeal the tales might be of odd number as quinque tales or novem tales but now since the Statute of 35. H. 8. the tales may be even or odd as pleaseth the party But it was adjudged in this Case That in no Case where a triall is at the Bar shall any Tales de circumstantibus be awarded And so are all the Presidents Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 292 LEIGHTON against GREEN and GARRET THomas Leighton an Administrator durante minori 〈◊〉 of J. S. did libell in the Court of Admiralty against the Defendants and shewed in the Libel That there were Covenants made betwixt them by a Charter party they being Owners of the Ship called the Mary and John of Lynn that the Defendants should victuall the said Ship for a Voyage into Denmark and that the Ship should be staunch and without leak And shewed in his Libel that the Ship being upon the Seas did spring a leak by reason of which the Plaintiff did lose a great part of the Freight of the said Ship consisting in divers Commodities viz. Coney skins The Defendant pleaded That the Covenants were made infra Portum de Lynn And further pleaded That the Plaintiffe had before that time brought an Action of Covenants against the same Defendant upon the same Deed in which Action the Plaintiffe was Non-suit and it was adjudged That it was a good Plea in Bar and thereupon a Prohibition was awarded to the Court of Admiralty Cook Chief Justice in this Case said That charter party est charta partita and is all one in the Civil Law as an Indenture is in the Common Law And in this Case it was adjudged That the Triall should be there where the contract was made and so was it adjudged in Constantine and Gynns Case Where the Originall Act was in England and the subsequent matter upon the Sea the Tryall shall be where the Originall Act is done And so it was agreed in this Case that the Tryal should be Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Star-Chamber 293 MILLER against REIGNOLDS and BASSET SIr Henry Mountagu the Kings Serjeant did informe the Lords in the Star-Chamber How that the Defendants had conspired and practised Malitiosè to draw the Plaintiffs life in question being a man of One thousand Pounds per annum and otherwise very rich The Case was shortly thus Basset the Defendant was Tenant unto the Plaintiffe of a house in R. in Kent rendring a Rent the rent was behind and the Plaintiff demanded his Rent of him the Defendant told him That he was not able to satisfie him the Rent but he promised to give unto the Plaintiffe all his Goods in satisfaction of the Rent or so many of them as should countervaile the Rent and it was agreed betwixt the Plaintiff and the Defendant Basset that the Goods should be apprised by two men which was done accordingly and the Plaintiff came to the Defendants house at the time the said Goods were apprised but it was deposed and proved did not go out of the room where the apprisement was made at the time he was in the said house which was the 10 of May 7. Jacobi ar Afterwards the Defendants Reignolds being an Atturny at Law and Basset did conspire to accuse the Plaintiffe because that when he came to the Defendant Bassets house at the time of the apprising of the said Goods that the Plaintiffe went up into an upper Chamber in the said house and broke up a Chest and out of the same took a Gold Ring 10. s. in Money and the Defendant Bassets Lease of his house and thereupon brought the Plaintiff before divers Justices of the Peace who upon Examination of the matter found no ground of suspicion against the Plaintiff and therefore they did not bind him over to the Sessions to answer the same Accusation After this the Defendants made severall motions to the Plaintiff that he would give unto them 300l. and so he should be acquitted and there should be no proceeding against him and because the Plaintiffe refused so to do they told him that divers Courtiers had begged his Estate of the King and that the same was granted unto them when as in truth there was not any thing moved to any Courtier of any such matter but all this was said in a shew only to the end they might get great sums ef mony from him And in that matter they layed the scandall upon S. Rob. Car then Viscount Rochester that he was made privy to it who then was the Kings Maj. great Favorite And when all this could not prevail to gain any Composition from the Plaintiff the Defendants did prefer a Bill of Indictment at the Assizes in Kent against the Plaintiff and there upon Evidence given unto the Grand Jury they found an Ignoramus upon the Bill and divers other plots and divises were contrived by the Defendants all to the end the Plaintiff might lose his life his estate And this matter came to Sentence before the Lords and the Bill proved in every point and circumstance as well by the confession of the Defendants themselves as by divers writings depositions of witnesses and letters read and shewed in open Court and it was said by the whole Court of Lords in this case that this was a very great offence and an offence in Capite and that if such
Tenures of such men viz. A. B. C. 3. All his lands which he had by Purchase c. And the words All my Lands are to be intended all those my Lands which are within the restrictions And he said that the word Et being in the copulative was not material for all was but one sentence and it did not make several sentences and the word Et is but the conclusion of the sentence 3. They resolved That general words in a Grant may be overthrown by words restrictive as is 2 E. 4. and Plow Com. Hill Granges Case And therefore if a man giveth all his lands in D. which he hath by Discent from his Father if he have no lands by Discent from his Father nothing passeth 4. They agreed That a Restriction may be in a special Grant as in C. 4. par Ognels Case but they said that if the Restriction doth not concur and meet with the Grant that then the Restriction is void Note the principal Case was adjudged according to these Resolutions Mich. 11. Iacobi in the Common-Pleas 293. COOPER and ANDREWS Case TO have a Prohibition to the Spiritual Court suggestion was made That the Lord De la Ware was seised of 140 Acres of lands in the County of Sussex which were parcel of a Park And a Modus Decimandi by Prescription was said to be That the Tenants of the said 140 Acres for the time being had used to pay for the tythes of the said 140 Acres two shillings in mony and a shoulder of every third Deer which was killed in the same Park in consideration of all tythes of the said Park And it was shewed how that the Lord De la Ware had enfeoffed one Cumber of the said 140 acres of land who bargained and sold the said 140 acres of land to the Plaintiffe who prayed the Prohibition The Defendant said that the said Park is disparked and that the same is now converted into arable lands and pasture-grounds and so demanded tythes in kind upon which the Plaintiffe in the Prohibition did demur Hutton Serjeant By the disparking of the Park the Prescription is not gone nor extinct because the Prescription is said to be to 140 acres of lands and not to the Park and although the shoulder of the Deer being but casual and at the pleasure of the party be gone yet the same shall not make void the Prescription 2. He said that the act of the party shall not destroy the Prescription and although it be not a Park now in form and reputation yet in Law the same still remains a Park And he compared the Case unto Lutterels Case C. 4. par 48. where a Prescription was to Fulling-Mils and afterwards the Mils were converted to Corn-Mils yet the Prescription remained 3. He said Admit it is not now a Park yet there is a possibility that it may be a Park again and that Deer may be killed there again For the Disparking in the principal Case is only alleadged to be that the Pale is thrown down which may be amended For although that all the Park-pale or parcel of it be cast down yet the same doth still remain in Law a Park and a Park is but a Liberty and the not using of a Liberty doth not determine it nor any Prescription which goes with it And if a man have Estovers in a Wood by Prescription if the Lord felleth down all the Wood yet the right of Estovers doth remain and the Owner shall have an Assise for the Estovers or an Action upon the Case Vid. C. 5. par 78. in Grayes Case the Case vouched by Popham Further he said That in the beginning a Modus Decimandi did commence by Temporal act and Spiritual and the mony is now the tythe for which the Parson may sue in the Spiritual Court And a Case Mich. 5. Jacobi was vouched where a Prescription to pay a Buck or a Doe in consideration of all Tythes was adjudged to be a good Prescription And the Case Mich. 6. Jacobi of Skipton-Park was remembred where the difference was taken when the Prescription runs to Land and when to a Park In the one case although the Park be disparked the Prescription doth remain in the other not And 6 E. 6. Dyer 71. was vouched That although the Park be disparked yet the Fee doth remain And so in the Case at Bar although the casual profit be gone yet the certain profit which is the two shillings doth remain Harris Serjeant contrary And he said that the Conveyance was executory and the Agreement executory and not like unto a Conveyance or Agreement executed And said that Tythes are due jure divino and that the party should not take advantage of his own wrong but that now the Parson should have the tythes in kind And upon the difference of Executory and Executed he vouched many Authorities viz. 16 Eliz. Dyer 335. Calthrops Case 15 E. 4. 3. 5 E. 4. 7. 32 E. 3. Anuitie 245. And in this case he said that the Parson hath no remedy for the shoulder of the Deer and therefore he prayed a Consultation Hobart Chief Justice said That the Pleading was too short and it was not sufficiently pleaded For it is not pleaded That the Park is so disparked that all the benefit thereof is lost But he agreed it That if a man doth pull down his Park-pale that the same is a disparking without any seisure of the Liberty into the Kings hands by a Quo Warranto But yet all the Court agreed That it doth yet remain a Park in habit And they were all also of opinion That the disparking the Park of the Deer was not any disparking of the Park as to take away the Prescription The Case was adjourned till another day Mich. 11. Iacobi in the Common-Pleas 330. PIGGOT and PIGGOT's Case IN a Writ of Right the Donee in tail did joyn the Mise upon the meer Right and final Judgment was given against the Donee in which case the Gift in tail was given in Evidence Afterwards the Donee in tail brought a Formedon in the Discender and it was adjudged by the whole Court that the Writ would not lie For when final Judgment is given against the Donee in tail upon issue joyned upon the meer Right it is as strong against him as a Fine with Proclamations and the Court did agree That after a year and day where final Judgment is given the party is barred and also that such final Judgment should bar the Issue in tail Mich. 11 Iacobi in the Exchequer-Chamber 331 AN action upon the Case was brought for speaking these words Thou doest lead a life in manner of a Rogue I doubt not but to see thee hanged for striking Mr. Sydenhams man who was murdered And it was resolved by all the Justices in the Exchequer-Chamber That the words were not actionable At the same day in the same Court a Judgment was reversed in the Exchequer-Chamber because the words were not actionable The words
the time of King Henry the 8. said That if the King should arrest him of High-Treason that he would stab him with his dagger and it was adjudged a present Treason So was it also adjudged in the Lord Stanley's Case in the time of King Henry the 7. who seeing a Young-man said That if he knew him to be one of the Sons of E. 4. that he would aid him against the King In the like manner a woman in the time of Hen. 8. said That if Henry the 8. would not take again his wife Queen Katherine that he should not live a year but should die like a dog So if discontented persons with Inclosures say That they will petition unto the King about them and if he will not redress the same that then they will assemble together in such a place and rebell In these Cases it is a present Treason and he said That in point of Allegiance none must serve the King with Ifs and Ands. Further Cook Chief Justice said That Faux the Gunpowder Traitor being brought before King James the King said to him Wherefore would you have killed me Faux answered him viz. Because you are excommunicated by the Pope How said the King He answered Every Maunday-Thursday the Pope doth excommunicate all Herâ—tiques who are not of the Faith of the Church of Rome and you are within the same Excommunication And afterwards Owen was found guilty and Judgment of Treason was given against him Mich. 13 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 364. SIMPSON'S Case RIchard Simpson a Copy-holder in Fee jacens in extremis made a Surrender of his Copyhold habendum to an Enfant in ventrefamier and his heirs and if such Enfant die before his full age or marriage then to John Simpson his brother and his heirs The Enfant is born and dieth within two moneths Upon which John was admitted and a Woman as Heir-general to the Devisor and to the Enfant is also admitted and entreth into the Land against whom John Simpson brought an Action of Trespasse and it was adjudged against the Plaintiffe And two points were resolved in this Case 1. That a Surrender cannot begin at a day to come no more then a Livery as it was adjudged 23 Eliz in this Court in Clarks Case 2. That the Remaindor to John Simpson cannot be good because it was to commence upon a Condition precedent which was never performed And therefore the Surrender into the hands of the Lord was void for the Lord doth not take but as an Instrument to convey the same to another And it was therefore said That if a Copy-holder in Fee doth surrender unto the use of himself and his heirs because that the Limitation of the use is void to him who had it before the Surrender to the Lord is void Trin. 13 Jacobi in the Chancery 365. The Lord GERARD'S Case IT was holden in the Chancery in the Lord Gerards Case against his Copyholds of Aâ—dley in the County of Stafford That where by antient Rolls of Court it appeareth that the Fines of the Copyholds had been uncertain from the time of King Hen. the 3 to the 19 of H. the 6. and from thence to this day had been certain Except twenty or thirty That these few antient Rolls did destroy the Custome for certainty of Fine But if from 19 H. 6. all are certain except a few and so incertain Rolls before the few shall be intended to have escaped and should not destroy the Custome for certain Fines Hill 13 Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 366. BAGNAL and HARVEY'S Case IN a Writ of Partition it was found for the Plaintiffe And a Writ was awarded to the Sheriffe that he should make the partition And the Sheriffe did thereupon allot part of the Lands in severalty and for other part of the Lands the Jurors would not assist him to make the partition All which appeared upon the Retorn of the Sheriffe And an Attachment was prayed against the Jurors who refused to make the Partition and a new Writ was prayed unto the Sheriffe And the Court doubted what to do in the Case whether to grant an Attachment or not and whether a new Writ to the Sheriffe might be awarded And took time to advise upon it and to see Presidents in the Case Hill 13 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 367. BLANFORD'S Case A Man seised of Lands in Fee devised them unto his Wife for life and afterwards to his two Sons if they had not issue males for their lives and if they had issue males then to their issue males and if they had not issue males then if any of them had issue male to the said issue male The wife died the sons entred into the lands and then the eldest son had issue male who afterwards entred and the younger son entred upon the issue and did trespasse and the issue brought an Action of Trespasse And it was adjudged by the whole Court that the Action was maintainable because by the birth of the issue male the lands were devised out of the two sons and vested in the issue male of the eldest Crook Justice was against the three other Justices Hill 13 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 368. BROOK and GREGORY'S Case IN a Replevin the Defendant did avow the taking of the Cattle damage feasants And upon issue joyned it was found for the Plaintiffe in the Court at Winsor being a Three-weeks Court And the Defendant brought a Writ of Error and assigned for Error That the Entry of the Plaint in the said Court was the 7. day of May and the Plaintiffe afterwards did Declare there of a taking of the Cattel the 25. day of May. And whether the same was Error being in a Three-weeks Court was the Question and 21 E. 4. 66. was alleadged by Harris that it was no Error But the Court held the same to be Error because no Plaint can be entred but at a Court and this Entry of the Plaint was mesne betwixt the Court dayes and so the Declaration is not warranted no â—ustome being alleadged to maintain such an Entry 2. It was holden by the Court in this Case That 〈…〉 est erratum is pleaded the Defendant cannot alleadge Dimâ—â—â—tion because there is a perfect issue before 3. It was holden That a 〈◊〉 cannot alleadge Diminution of any thing which appeareth in the Râ—â—â—d to be 〈◊〉 And because the Defendant â—id alleadge Diminution 〈◊〉 Case of the Record and by the Record it was certified that the 〈◊〉 was entred the 25 day of May the same was not good after issue joyned and after Judgment is given upon the â—â—â— Record upon the first Dâ—â—â—aration and Pleading in the said Court of Winsor And therefore the Judgment was reversed by the opinion of all the Justices Hill 13 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 369. BISSE and TYLER'S Case IN an Action of Trover and Conversion of goods the Defendant said That J. S. was possessed of the said goods and sold them unto him in open market
â—uaere whether it be a good Plea because it doth amount to the general issue of Not guilty Curia avisare vult And v. Tompsons Case 4 Jac. in the Kings Bench It was adjudged that it was no good Plea Hill 6 Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 370. PAGINTON and HUET'S Case IN an Ejectione Firme the Case was this That the Custome of a Manor in Worcestershire was That if any Copyholder do commit Felony and the same be presented by twelve Homagers That the Tenant should forfeit his â—opyhold And it was presented in the Court of the Mannor by the Homage That Hâ—â—t the Defendant had committed Felony But afterwards at the Asâ—ises he was acquitted And afterwards the Lord seised the Copyhold And it was adjudged by the Court that it was no good Custom because in Judgment of Law before Attaindor it is not Felony The second point was Whether the special Verdict agreeing with the Presentment of the Homage That the party had committed Felony did entitle the Lord to the Copyhold notwithstanding his Acquital Quaere For it was not resolved Mich. 7 Iacobi in the Common Pleas. 371. THe Custom of a Mannor was That the Heirs which claimed Copy-hold by Discent ought to come at the first second or third Court upon Proclamations made and take up their Estates or else that they should forfeit them And a Tenant of the Mannor having Issue inheritable beyond the Seas dyed The Proclamations passed and the Issue did not return in twenty years But at his coming over he required the Lord to admit him to the Copyhold and proffered to pay the Lord his Fine And the Lord who had seised the Copyhold for a Forfeiture refused to admit him And it was adjudged by the whole Court That it was no Forfeiture because that the Heir was beyond the Seas at the time of the Proclamations and also because the Lord was at no prejudice because he received the profits of the Lands in the mean time Mich. 14 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 372. A Copyholder in Fee did surrender his Copyhold unto the use of another and his heirs which surrender was into the hands of two Tenants according to the custome of the Mannor to be presented at the next Court. And no Court was holden for the Mannor by the space of thirty years within which time the Surrenderor Surrenderee and the two Tenants all dyed The heir of the Surrenderor entred and made a Lease for years of the Copyhold according to the Custome of the Mannor And it was adjudged per Curiaâ—â— That the Lease was good Mich. 14 Iacobi in the Common-Pleas 373. FROSWEL and WEICHES Case IT was adjudged That where a Copyholder doth surrender into the hands of Copy-Tenants That before Presentment the Heir of the Surrenderor may take the profits of the Lands against the Surrenderee For no person can have a Copyhold but by admittance of the Lord. As if a man maketh Livery within the view although it cannot be countermanded yet the Feoffee takes nothing before his entry But it was agreed That if the Lord doth take knowledge of the Surrender and doth accept of the customary Rent as Rent due from the Tenant being admitted that the same shall amount unto an Admittance but otherwise if he accept of it as a duty generally Mich. 5 Iacobi in the Exchequer 374. IT was adjudged in the Exchequer That where the King was Lord of a Mannor and a Copyholder within the said Mannor made a Lease for three lives and made Livery and afterwards the Survivor of the three continued in possession forty years And in that case because that no Livery did appear to be made upon the Endorsment of the Deed although in truth there was Livery made that the same was no forfeiture of which the King should take any advantage And in that case it was cited to be adjudged in Londons case That if a Copy-Tenant doth bargain and sell his Copy-Tenement by Deed indented and enrolled that the same is no forfeiture of the Copyhold of which the Lord can take any advantage And so was it holden in this Case Pasch 14 Iacobi in the Kings Bench 375. FRANKLIN'S Case LAnds were given unto one and to the heirs of his body Habendum unto the Donee unto the use of him his heirs and assignes for ever In this â—ase two points were resolved 1. That the Limitation in the Habendum did not increase or alter the Estate contained in the premisses of the Deed. 2. That Tenant in Tail might stand seised to an use expressed but such use cannot be averred Hill 13 Iacobi in the Chancery 376 WINSCOMB and DUNCHES Case VVInscomb having issue two sons conveyed a Mannor unto his eldest son and to the daughter of Dunch for life for the joynture of the wife the Remainder to the 〈…〉 The son having no issue his Father-in-law Dunch procured him by Deed indented to bargain and sell to him the Manner The Bargâ—ynor being sick who died before enrolment of the Deed within the 〈…〉 Deed â—ot being acknowledged And 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 coming to be enrolled the Clark who enrolled the same did proâ—â—â—e Waâ—â—â—nt from the Master of the Rolls who under-â—â—â— upon the Deâ—◠〈◊〉 the Deed be enrolled upon Affidavit made of the delivery of the Deed by one of the Witnesses to the same And afterwards the Deed was eâ—â—â—â—d within the six moneths And the opinion of the Court wasâ— That 〈◊〉 Conveyance was a good Conveyance in Law And therefore the younger brother exhibited his Bill in Chanchery pretending the Conveyance to be made by practice without any Consideration Mich. 15 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 377 LUDLOW and STACIâ—S Case A Man bargained and sold Land by Deed indented bearing date 11 Junii 1 Jacobi Afterwards 12 Junii The same year Common was granted â—nto the Bargainee for all manner of Cattell commonable upon the Land 15 Junii theâ— Deed of Bargain and Sale was enrolled And it was adjudged a good grant of the Common And the Enrolment shall have Relation as to that although for collaterall things it shall not have relation Hill 15 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 378. NOte that it was held by Dodderidge Justice and Mountagu Chief Justice against the opinion of Haughton Justice That if Lessee for years covenanteth to repair and sustein the houses in as good plight as they were at the time of the Lease made and afterwards the Lessee assigneth over his Term and the Lessor his Reversion That the Assignee of the Reversion shall maintain an Action of Covenant for the breach of the Covenants against the first Lessee Hill 15 Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 379. SMITH and STAFFORD'S Case A Man promised a Woman That if she would marry with him that if he dyed and she did survive him that he would leave unto her 100â— They entermarried and then the husband dyed not performing his promise The wife sued the Executor of her husband upon the said promise And whether the
ought to be pleaded 3. That if a man in his pleading is to set forth the jurisdiction of the Court of Justices in Eyre if he say Curia tent c. he need not set forth all the Formalities of it And Mountagu Chief Justice in this Case said That if a man do justifie for divers causes and some of the causes are not good the same doth not make the whole Justification to be void but it is void for that only and good for the residue Hill 16 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 393 CULLIFORDS Case CVlliford and his Wife brought an Action upon the Case against Knight for words And declared upon these words viz. Thou art Luscombs Hackney a pockey Whore and a theevish Whore and I will prove thee to be so which was found for the Plaintiffe And in arrest of Judgment it was moved that the words were not Actionable which was agreed by the whole Court quia verba accipienda sunt in mitiori sensâ—â—â— And Judgment was staied accordingly Hill 16. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 371. IN an Action upon the Case for Words The Plaintiffe did relate that he was brought up in the Studie of a Mathematition and a Measurer of Land And that he was a Surveyor and that the Defendant spake these words of him viz. Thou art a Cosener and a cheating Knave and that I can prove And the opinion of the Court was That the words were actionable And Montague Chief Justice said that it was ruled accordingly in 36 Eliz. Rot. 249. betwixt Kirby and Walter And a Surveyor is an Officer of whom the Statute of 5. E. 6. takes notice And he said that Verba de persona intelligenda sunt de Conditione personae And he said that the words are Actionable in regard it is a faculty to be a Measuror of Lands But Dodderidg Justice put it with a difference viz. Betwixt a Measurer of Land by the Pole and one who useth the Art of Geometrie or any of the Mathematicks for he said that in the first Case it is no scandal for that his Credit is not impeached thereby but it is contrary in the other Case because to be a Geometritian or Mathematitian is an Art or faculty which every man doth not attain unto And he put this Case If a man be Bailiffe of my Mannor there no such words can discredit him and by consequence he shall not have an Action for the words because the words do not found in discredit of his Office because the same is not an Office of Skill but an Office of Labour quod nota Hill 16 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 395. BISHOP and TURNERS Case IN a Prohibition it was holden by the whole Court That for such things as a Church-Warden doth ratione officii no Action will lie by his successor against him in the Spiritual Court and a Churchwarden is not an Officer but a Minister to the Spiritual Court But it was holden that a Churchwarden by the Common Law may maintain an Action upon the Case for defacing of a Monument in the Church Trin. 16 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 396. BLACKSTON and HEAP'S Case IN an Action of Debt for Rent the Case was this A man possessed of a Tearm for 20 years in the right of his Wife made a Lease for 10 years rendring Rent to him his Executors and assignes and died The Question was whether the Executors or the Wife should have the Rent Haughton and Crook Justices against Montague Chief Justice Doddridg being absent that the Rent was gon But it was agreed by them all that the Executors of the Husband should not have it But Montague held that the Wife should have it But it was agreed that if Lessee for 20 years maketh a Lease for 10 years and afterwards surrendreth his Tearm that the Rent is gon And yet the Tearm for 10 years continues And in the principal Case If the Husband after the Lease made had granted over the Reversion his grantee should not have the Rent But Montague said that in that Case the Wife in Chancery might be Releived for the Rent Mich. 16 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 397. WAIT and the Inhabitants of STOKE'S Case WAyte a Clothier of Nubery was robbed in the Hundred of Stoke of 50l upon the Saboth day in the time of Divine Service The Question was whether the Hundred were chargeable or not for not making out Hue and Cry And 3 of the Justices were against Montague Chief Justice that they were chargeable For they said that the apprehending of Theeves was a good work and fit for the Saboth day and also fit for the Commonwealth Montague Chief Justice agreed that it was bonum opus and that it might be lawfully done But he said that no man might be compelled upon any penalty to do it upon that day For he said That if he hath a Judgment against I. S. and he comes to the Parish-Church where I. S. is with the Sheriffe and shews unto the Sheriffe I. S. upon the Saboth day and commandeth the Sheriffe to do his Office If the Sheriffe do arrest I. S. in Execution upon that day it is good but if he doth not arrest him it is no escape in the Sheriffe And he took a difference betwixt Ministerial Acts and Judicial Acts for the first might be done upon the Saboth day but Judicial Acts might not But the case was adjudged according to the opinion of the three other Justices Pasch 17 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 398. SPICER and SPICE'S Case UPon a special Verdict the Case was this A man seised of Gavil-kind Land devised the same to his Wife for life paying out of it 3l per annum to his eldest son and also devised the Land to his second Son paying 3l per annum to his third Son and 20s to such a one his Daughter and whether the second Son had the Land for his life or in Fee was the Question And it was adjudged that he had a Fee-simple in it by reason of the payment of the Collateral Sums of 3l and 20s to his brother and sister which charge to the brother might continue af-after the death of the Devisee and if he should have but an estate for life his charge should continue longer then his own estate And so it was adjudged Mich. 17 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 399. IN a Habeas Corpora which was to remove two men who were imprisoned in Norwich The Case was this That within Norwich there was a Custom that two men of the said place should be chosen yearly to make a Feast for the Bailiffs and upon refusal for to do it that they should be Fined and imprisoned which two men brought to the Barr by the Habeas Corpra were imprisoned for the same cause It was urged and much stood upon That the Custom was no good Custom for the causes and reasons which are delivered in Baggs Case in C. 11. part But yet at the last the Court did remand
them and held that the Custom might be good Mich. 17 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 400. IN an Evidence in an Ejectione firme for Land in the Countie of Hartford the Case was this A man was married unto a woman and died The wife after 40 weeks and 10 days was delivered with child of a daughter and whether the said daughter should be heir to her Father or should be bastard was the Question and Sir William Padde Knight and Dr Montford Physitians were commanded by the Court to attend and to deliver their opinions in the Case who being upon their Oaths delivered their opinions That such a child might be a lawfull daughter and heir to her Father For as wellas an Antenatus might be heir viz. a child born at the end of 7 months so they said might a Postnatus viz. child born after the 40 weeks although that 40 weeks be the ordinary time And if it be objected that our Saviour Christ was born at 9 months and five days end who had the perfection of Nature To that it may be answered That that was miraeulum amplias And they held that by many Authorities and by their own Experiences a child might be Legitimate although it be born the last day of the 10â—h Month after the conception of it accounting the Months per Menses solares non Lunares Hill 17 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 401. WEBB and PATERNOSTERS Case A Man gave Licence unto another to set a Cock of Hay upon his Medow and to remove the same in reasonable time and afterwards he who gave the Licence made a Lease of the Medow to the Defendant who put his Cattel into the Medow which did eat the Hay And for that the Paintiffe brought his Action of Trespass And upon Demurrer joyned the Court was of opinion against the Plaintiffe For upon the whole matter it appeared That the said Hay had stood upon the said ground or Medow for 2 years which the Court held to be an unreasonable time Mich. 18 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 402. BROWN and PELL's Case IN an Ejectione firme upon a special Verdict found the Case was this Browne had issue two Sons and devised his Lands to his youngest Son and his Heirs And if it shall happen his said youngest Son to die without issue living his eldest Son That then his eldest Son should have the Lands to him and his Heirs in as ample manner as the youngest Son had them The youngest Son suffered a Common Recovery and died without issue living the eldest Son The Question was whether the eldest Son or the Recoverer should have the â—ands Montague Haughton and Chamberlain Justices The same is a Fee-simple Conditional and no Estate Tail in the youngest Son Doddridge Justice contrarie Mich. 18. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 403. POLLYES Case IN an Action of Trespass It was agreed by the Court If 2 Tenants in Common be of Lands upon which Trees are growing and one of them felleth the Trees and layeth them upon his Freehold If the other entreth into the â—and and carrieth them away an Action of Trespasse Quaere clausum fregit lyeth against him because the taking away of the Trees by the first was not wrongfull but that which he might well do by Law And yet the other Tenant in Common might have seized them before they were carried off from the Land But if a man do wrongfully take my Goods as a Horse c. and putteth the same upon his Land I may enter into his Land and seize my Horse again But if he put the Goods into his House in such Case I cannot enter into his House and retake my Goods because every mans House is his Castle into which another man may not enter without special Liâ—ence Hill 19 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 404. THe Case was That two Tenants in Common of Lands made a Lease thereof for years rendring Rent and then one of them died And the Question was who should have the Rent And if the Executor of him who died and the other might joyn in an Action for the Rent And as this Case was The opinion of the whole Court was That the Executor and the other might joyn in one Action for the Rent or sever in Action at their pleasures But if the Lease had been made for life rendring Rent The Court was cleer of opinion that they ought to sever in Actions Trin. 20 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 405. A Man was bounden in a Bond by the name of Edmond and his true name was Edward And an Action of Debt was brought against the Executors of Edmond upon the said Bond who demanded Oyer of the Bond and then pleaded that it was not the Deed of their Testator and issue being thereupon joyned It was found by Inquest in London to be his Deed viz. the Deed of Edmond And it was moved in Arrest of Judgment Quod querens nihil caperet per Billam and so it was resolved and adjudged by the Court Doddridge only being absent And a Case was vouched by Henage Finch Recorder of London to prove this case That it was so adjudged in a Case of Writ of ErError brought in the Exchequer-Chamber in which Case the party himself upon such a Misnosmer and after a Verdict and Judgment given in the same Case did reverse the Judgment for this Error Mich. 14 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 406. VESEY's Case VVIlliam Vesey was indicted for erecting of a Dove-house And Serjeant Harvey moved That the Indictment was insufficient the words were That the Defendant erexit Columbare vi armis ad commune nocumentum c. and that he was not Dominus Manerii nes Rector Ecclesiae And the Indictment was quashed because it was not contained in the Indictment that there were Doves in the Dove-cote For the meer erecting of a Dove-cote if there be no Doves kept in it it is no Nusans as it was holden by the Justices Mich. 15 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 407 Sir WILLIAM BRONKER's Case SIR William Bronker brought an Action upon the Case for slanderous words And he shewed in his Declaration how that he was a Knight and one of the Gentlemen of His Majesties Privy-Chamber And that the Defendant spake of him these scandalous words viz. Sir William Bronker is a Cosening Knave and lives by Cosenage Which was found for the Plaintiffe In arrest of Judgment it was moved that the words were not actionable And so it was adjudged per Curiam Pasch 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 408. YATE and ALEXANDER's Case YAte brought an action upon the Case against Alexander Attorney of the Kings Bench and declared That the Plaintiffe in an action of Debt brought against Alexander the Defendant who was Executor to his Father had Judgment to recover against him as Executor and that he sued forth a Fieri facias to the Sheriffe to have Execution and that before the Sheriffe could come to levy the debt and serve the
Execution of Justice is no wrong when it is for the King The King hath the precedency for the payment of his Debts to him as it appeareth in Stringfellows Case cited before by Justice Dodderidge And when Lands are once lyable to the payment of the Kings debts let the Lands come to whom you will yet the Land is lyable â—o his debt as it appeareth in Cavendishes Case Dyer 224 225. which was entred Pasc â— Eliz. Rot. 111. in the Exchequer 50. Ass 5. A man bindeth himself and his heirs and dieth and the heir alieneth the Land the Land is discharged of the Debt as to the Debtee But in the Kings Case if at any time the Land and Debt meet together you cannot sever them without payment of the Kings debt Vid. Littleton Executors and soe Administrators are chargeable in an Account to the King and the Saying of Mr Littleton are adjudged for Law and are Judgments A sale in Market over nor a Fine and Nonclaim shall not bind the King and so it is of things bought of the Kings Villeyn because Nullum tempus occurrit Regi A common person in London by Custom may attach a Debt in anothers hands As he may come into Court and shew that his debtor hath not any thing in his hand to satisfie his debt but only that debt which is in the hands of another man and that Custom is allowable and reasonable And if it shall be reasonable for a Subject so to attach a Debt will you have it unreasonable for the King Before the Statute of 25. E. 3. cap. 19. The King might protect his Debtor as it appeareth by the Register 281. and Fitz. 28. 6. But the Statute of 25. E. 3. gave the Partie a liberty to proceed to Judgement but doth barr him from taking forth of Execution upon the Judgment untill the King be satisfied his Debt In Dyer 296 297. a man condemned in the Exchequer for a Debt due to the Queen was committed to the Fleet and being in Execution he was also condemned in the Kings Bench at the Suit of a Subject upon a Bill of Debt in Custodia Mariscalli Marisâ—alciae Afterwards upon prayer of the Partie a Habeas Corpus cum causa was awarded out of the Kings Bench to the Warden of the Fleet who retorned the Cause ut supra and he was remanded to the Fleet in Execution for the Debt Afterwards a Command was given by the Lord Treasurer upon the Queens behalf to suffer the Prisoner to go into the Countrie to collect and levie monie the sooner to pay the Queen her Debt In that Case the Subject brought an Action of Debt against the Warden of the Fleet upon the Escape who justified the Escape by the said Commandment It was holden in that case That although the Partie was in Execution for both the Debts yet before the Queen was satisfied the Execution for the Subject did not begin For the King cannot have equall to have interest in the Body of the Prisoner Simul cum illo But if the Case were as Lassels case 3. Eliz Dyer then he might be in Execution for the King and for the Subject Lassels was taken in Execution at the Suit of a Subject and before the Writ was retorned a Writ for the Queen came to the Sheriffe and Lassels was kept in Execution for the Queen In that case Lassels was in Execution for them both viz. the Queen and the Subject So there is a difference where the Partie is first taken for the King and where he is first taken for the Subject Now I will consider of the Case at Barr Whether the Land might be extended notwithstanding the Conveyance made The Kings Debt is to be taken largely and so Goods in such case are to be taken largely and so is it likewise of Lands viz. any Land be it Land in Use upon Trust by Revocation By the Law Debts are first to be paid then Legacies then childrens preferments There is a difference where the Land was never in the man and where it was once in him C. 8. Part. 163. Mights Case Might Purchased lands to him and to his heir It was resolved that this original Purchase could not be averred to be by Collusion to take away the Wardship which might accrue after the death of Might for they were Joynts and the survivor shall have the whole Note that there was no fraud for that it was never in him but if it had once been the Lands only of Might and then Might had made the conveyance to him and his heir then it would have been fraud to have deceived the King of the Wardship In the Case at Barr Hatton hath not aliened the land For an Alienation is alienum facere and here he hath not made it the land of another having a power of Revocation Sir John Packington Mortgaged his lands for 100l The Mortgagee enfeoffed W. and within the time of Redemtion Packington and he to whom the money was to be paid agreed that Packington should pay him 30l of the said 100l and no more and yet in appearance for the better performance of the Condition it was agreed that the whole 100l should be paid and that the residue above 30l should be repaid back to Packington which was done accordingly It was resolved in that Case that the same was no performance of the Condition because it was not a payment animo solvendi And so in this Case there was not any allienation animo 〈◊〉 For Sir Christopher Hatton gave the Lands but yet he kept the possession and received the profits of them And if Sir Christopher Hatton had given the land with power of Revocation or reserving as in this Case he did an Estate for his own life it had been all one If a man deviseth the profits of such lands the lands themselves do pass And a Conveyance of lands upon Condition not to take the profits is a void condition in Law Lit. 462 463. A Feoffment is made upon confidence and the Feoffor doth occupie the land at the will of the Feoffees and the Feoffees do release unto the Feoffor all their right Litt. 464. there it was said that such a Feoffor shall be sworn upon an Inquest if the lands be of the value of 40s per annum and that by the Common Law Therefore it seemeth that the Law doth intend That when a man hath Feoffees in Trust that the lands are his own and then if in such case the Commonwealth shall be served shall not the King who is Pater reipublicae be served so as he may be satisfied his debts If the Case of Walter de Chirton had never been yet I should now have the same opinion of the Law in such Case as the Judges then had The King is not bound by Estopels nor Recoveris had betwixt strangers nor by the fundamental Jurisdiction of Courts as appeareth 38. Ass 20. where a Suit was for Tythes in the Exchequer being a meer spiritual
thing and shall he be bound by a Conveyance Anno. 16. H. 6. then in the time of Civil War Uses began and of Lands in use the Lord Chief Baron Tanfield in his Argument hath cited diverse cases where the lands in use were subject and lyable to the debt of Cestuy que use in the Kings Case and so was it untill the Statute of 27. H. 8. of Uses was made Babbington an Officer in the Exchequer had lands in the hands of Feoffees upon Trust and a Writ issued out and the lands were extended for the Debt of Babbington in the hands of his Feoffees Sir Robert Dudley having lands in other mens hands upon Trusts the lands were seized into the Kings hands for a contempt and not for debt or damages to the King And in this Case although that the â—nquisition do find the Conveyance but have not found it to be with power of Revocation yet the Land being extended it is well extended untill the contrary doth appear and untill the extent be avoided by matter of Record viz. by Plea as the Lord Chief Baron hath said before Ley Chief Justice of the Kings Bench argued the same day and his Argument in effect did agree with the other Justices in all things and therefore I have forborne to report the same at length And it was adjudged That the Extent was good and the Land well decreed accordingly Pasch 21 Jacobi in the Exchequer Chamber 417. The Lord SHEFFIELD and RATCLIFF'S Case IN a Writ of Error brought to reverse a Judgment given in a Monstrans de Droit in the Court of Pleas The Case was put by Glanvile who argued for Ratcliffe the Defendant to be this 2 E. 2. Malew being seised of the Mannor of Mulgrave in Fee gave the same to A. Bigot in tail which by divers discents came to Sir Ralph Bigot in tail Who 10 Jannarii 6 H. 8. made a Feoffment unto the use of â—is last Will and thereby after his Debts paid declared the use unto his right heirs in Fee and 9. H. 8. dyed The Will was performed Francis Bigot entred being Tenant in tail and 21 H. 8. made a Feoffment unto the use of himself and Katherine his wife and to the use of the heirs of their two bodies Then came the Statute of 26 H. 8. cap. 13. by which Tenant in tail for Treason is to forfeit the Land which he hath in tail Then the Statute of 27 H. 8. of Uses is made Then 28 H. 8. Francis Bigot did commit Treason And 29 H. 8. he was attainted and executed for the same Anno 31 H. 8. a private Act of Parliament was made which did confirm the Attaindor of Francis Bigot and that he should forfeit unto the King word for word as the Statute of 26 H. 8. is saving to all strangers except the Offendor and his heirs c. 3 E. 6. The heir of Francis Bigot is restored in blood Katherine entred into the Mannor and dyed seised 8 Eliz. their Issue entred and married with Francis Ratcliffe and had Issue Roger Ratcliffe who is heri in tail unto Ralph Bigot And they continue possession untill 33. Eliz. And then all is found by Office and the Land seised upon for the Queen who granted the same unto the Lord Sheffield Francis Bigot and Dorothy die And Roger Ratcliffe sued a Monstrans de Droit to remove the Kings hands from off the lands and a Scire facias issued forth against the Lord Sheffield as one of the Terre-Tenants who pleaded all this special matter and Judgment was thereupon given in the Court of Pleas for Roger Ratcliffe And then the Lord Sheffield brought a Writ of Error in the Exchequer-Chamber to reverse the said Judgment And Finch Serjeant argued for the Lord Sheffield that the Judgment ought to be reversed And now this Term Glanvile argued for Roger Ratcliffe that the Judgment given in the Court of Pleas ought to be affirmed There are two points The first If there were a Right remaining in Francis Bigot and if the same were given unto the King by the Attaindor and the Statute of 31 H. 8. Second If a Monstrans de Droit be a proper Action upon this matter which depends upon a Remitter for if it be a Remitter then is the Action a proper Action The Feoffment by Ralph Bigot 6 H. 8. was a Discontinuance and he had a new use in himself to the use of his Will and then to the use of his Heirs Then 9 H. 8. Ralph Bigot dyed And then Francis Bigot had a right to bring a Formedon in the Discendor to recover his estate tail 21 H 8. then the point ariseth Francis Bigot having a right of Formedon and an use by force of the Statute of 1 R. 3. cap. 1. before the Statute of 27 H. 8. by the Feoffment he had so setled it that he could not commit a forfeiture of the estate tail When a man maketh a Feoffment every Right Action c. is given away in the Livery and Seisin because every one who giveth Livery giveth all Circumstances which belongs to it For a Livery is of that force that it excludes the Feoffor not only of all present Rights but of all future Rights and Tytles v. C. 1. par 111. and there good Cases put to this purpose 9 H. 7. 1. By Livery the Husband who was in hope to be Tenant by Courtesie is as if he were never sised 39 H. 6. 43. The Son disseiseth his Father and makes a Feoffment of the lands the Father dyeth the hope of the heir is given away by the Livery It was objected by Serjeant Finch 1. Where a man hath a right of action to recover land in Fee or an estate for life which may be conveyed to another there a Livery doth give away such a Right and shall there bind him But an estate in tail cannot be transferred to another by any manner of Conveyance and therefore cannot be bound by such a Livery given I answer It is no good Rule That that which doth not passe by Livery doth remain in the person which giveth the Livery 19 H. 6. Tenant in tail is attainted Office is found The estate tail is not in the King is not in the person attainted but is in abeyance So it is no good Rule which hath been put When Tenant in tail maketh a Feoffment Non habet jus in re neque ad rem If he have a Right then it is a Right of Entre or Action but he cannot enter nor have any action against his own Feoffment 19 H. 8. 7. Dyer If Discontinuee of Tenant in tail levieth a Fine with proclamations and the five years passe and afterward Tenant in tail dyeth his issue shall have other five years and shall be helped by the Statute for he is the first to whom the right doth accrue after the Fine levied for Tenant in tail himself after his Fine with Proclamations hath not any right But if Tenant in tail be
Judgement was affirmed for by intendment the Judgment was given upon the first Original which bore date before the Iudgment Another Error was assigned because the Plea was That such a one was seised of the Castle and Mannor of Mulgrave predictis in the plural number I answer that there is not any colour for that Error for the word predictis doth shew that the Mannor and Castle are not one and the same thing So upon the whole matter I pray that the Iudgment given in the Court of Pleas may be affirmed Sir Henry Yelverton argued for the Lord Sheffield that the Iudgment might be reversed There are three things considerable in the Case First If any right of the ancient estate tail was in Francis Bigot who was attainted at the time of his Attainder Secondly admit that there was an ancient right if it might be forfeited being a right coupled with a Possession and not a right in gross Thirdly Whether such a Possession discend to Francis Bigot that he shall be remitted and if this Remitter be not overreached by the Office First If by the Feoffment of Francis Bigot 21. H. 8. when he was Cestuy que use and by the Livery the right of the ancient entail be destroyed And I conceive it is not but that the same continues and is not gone by the Livery and Seisin made There is a difference when Cestuy que use makes a Feoffment before the Statute of 1 R 3. and when Cestuy que use makes a Feoffment after the said statute of 1 R 3 For before the statute hee gives away all Com 352. but after the statute of R. 3. Cestuy que use by his Feoffment gives away no Right In 3 H. 7 13. is our very case almost For there the Tenant in Tail made a Feoffment unto the use of his Will so in our Case and thereby did declare that it should be for the payment of his debts and afterwards to the use of himself and the heirs of his body and died the heir entred before the debts paid but in our Case he entred after the debts paid there it is said that the Feoffment is made as by Cestuy que use at the Common Law for his entrie was not lawfull before the debts paid But when Francis Bigot made a Feoffment 21 H. 8. he was Cestuy que use in Fee and then is the Right of the Estate tail saved by the Statute of 1. R. 3. And by the Statute of 1. R. 3. he gives the Land as Servant and not as Owner of the Land and so gives nothing but a possession and no Right 5 H. 7. 5. Cestuy que use since the Statute of 1 R. 3. is but as a Servant or as an Executor to make a Feoffment And if an Executor maketh a Feoffment by force of the Will of the Testator he passeth nothing of his own Right but only as an Executor or Servant 9 H. 7. 26. proves that Cestuy que use since the Statute of 1 R. 3 hath but only an Authority to make a Feoffment For Cestuy que use cannot make a Letter of Attorney to make Livery for him for he hath but a bare Authority which cannot be transferred to another Cestuy que use hath a Rent out of Land and by force of the Statute of 1 R. 3. he maketh a Feoffment of the Land yet the Rent doth remain to him for he giveth but a bare possession So in our Case the right of the Estate Tail doth remain in Francis Bigot notwithstanding his Feoffment as Cestuy que use by the Statute of 1 R. 3. If Cestuy que use by force of the Statute of 1 R. 3. maketh a Feoffment without Warranty the Vouchee shall not Vouch by force of that Warranty For as Fitzherbert saith Cestuy que use had no possession before the Statute of 27. H. 8. Cap. 10. 27 H. 8. 23. If Feoffees to Use make a Letter of Attorney to Cestuy que use to make a Feoffment he giveth nothing but as a Servant The Consequent of this Point is That the right of the old Estate Tail was in Francis Bigot at the time of his Attainder and was not gone by the Feoffment made 21 H. 8. The second Point is Whether a right mixt with a possession of Francis Bigot might be forfeited by the Statutes of 26. H. 8. and the private Act of 31. H. 8. The Statute of 31. H. 8. doth not save this Right no more then the Statute of 26. H. 8. For they are all one in words I say that he hath such a right as may be lost and forfeited by the words of the Statute of 26. H. 8. Cap. 13. For that Statute giveth three things First It gives the Forfeiture of Lands and not of Estates Secondly How long doth that Statute give the lands to the King For ever viz. to the King his Heirs and Successors Thirdly It gives the lands of any Estate of Inheritance in Use or Possession by any Right Title or means This Estate Tail is an Estate of Inheritance which he hath by the Right by the Title and by the means of coming to the Right it is forfeited These two Statutes were made for the punishment of the Child For the Common Law was strict enough against the Father viz. he who committed the Treason And shall the same Law which was made to punish the Child be undermined to help the Child The ancient Right shall be displaced from the Land rather then it shall be taken from the Crown which is to remain to the Crown for ever And this Statute of 26 H. 8. was made pro bonoâ— publico and it was the best Law that ever was to preserve the King and his Successors from Treason for it is as it were a hedg about the King For before this Statute Tenant in Tail had no regard to commit Treason For he forfeited his Lands but during his own life and then the Lands went to the issue in Tail But this Statute doth punish the Child for the Fathers offence and so maketh men more careful not to offend least their posterity may beg I take two grounds which are frequent in our Law First That the King is favoured in the Exposition of any Statute Com. 239 240. The second That upon the construction of any Statute nothing shall be taken by equity against the King Com. 233 234. Here in this Case although the Right were not in possession yet it was mixed with the possession from Anno 13. E. 1. untill 26. H. 8. Tenant in Tail feared not to commit Treason For the Statute of West 2. did preserve the Estate Tail so as the Father could not prejudice his issue per factum suum And therefore the Commonwealth considering that a wicked man did not care what became of himself so as his issue might be safe provided this Statute of 26. H. 8. Cap. 13. although the Statute of 16. R. 2. Cap. 5. which giveth the Premunire doth Enact that all Lands and
Tenements of one attainted in a Premunire shall be forfeited to the King Yet Tenant in Tail in such Case did not forfeit his Lands C. 11. part 63. b. as the Statute of West 2. Cap. 1. saith in particular words That Tenant in Tail shall not prejudice his issue Therefore the Statute of 26. H. 8. in particular words saith That Tenant in Tail shall forfeit his Lands for Treason The Right of Francis Bigot is not a right in gross but a Right mixed with a possession The Statute of West 2. Cap. 1. brought with it many mischiefs For by that Statute the Ancestor being Tenant in Tail could not redeem himself out of prison nor help his wife nor his younger children and that mischief continued untill 12. E. 4. Taltaram's Case and then the Judges found a means to avoid those mischiefs by a common Recovery and this Invention of a common Recovery was a great help to the Subject Then came the Statute of 32. H. 8. Cap. 36. which Enacted That Fines levied by Tenant in Tail should be a good barr to the issue of any Estate any way entailed If the Son issue in tail levieth a Fine in the life of his Father who is Tenant in tail it shall be a barr to him who levieth the Fine and to his issues And both these viz. the Common Recovery and the said Statute did help the Purchaser And shall not this Statute of 26. H. 8. help the King The Statute of 26. H. 8. Cap. 13. hath not any strength against the Ancestor but against the Child For the Construction of Statutes I take three Rules First When a Case hapneth which is not within the Letter then it is within the intent and equity of the Statute Com. 366. 464. Secondly All things which may be taken within the mischief of the Statute shall be taken within the Equity of the Statute 4. H. 6. 26. per Martin Thirdly When any thing is provided for by a Statute every thing within the same mischief is within the same Statute 14. H. 7. 13. The Estate tail of Francisâ— Bigot and Katharine his wife is forfeited by the Statute of 26 H. 8. There is a difference when the Statute doth fix the forfeiture upon the person As where it is enacted that J. S. shall forfeit his lands which he had at the time of his Attaindor The Judges ought expound that Statute only to J. S. But the Statute of 26 H. 8. doth not fix the forfeiture upon the person but upon the land it self And Exposition of Statutes ought to extend to all the mischiefs 8 Eliz. Sir Ralph Sadler's Case in B. R. where an Act of Parliament did enact That all the lands of Sadler should be forfeited to the King of whomsoever they were holden Sadler held some lands of the King in that case the King had that land by Escheat by the Common-Law and not by the said Statute Com. 563 The Law shall say that all the rights of the tail are joyned together to strengthen the estate of the King Tenant in tail before the Statute of 1 E. 6. cap. 14. of Chauntries gave lands to superstitious uses which were enjoyed five years before the said Statute of 1 E. 6. made Yet it was adjudged that the right of the issue was not saved but that the land was given to the Crown for the issue is excluded by the saving in the said Statute If Tenant in tail give the lands to charitable uses the issue is barred For the saving of the Statute of 39 Eliz. cap. 5. excludes him And he is bound by the Statute of Donis So the Statute of 26 H. 8. cap. 13. and the private Act of 31 H. 8. do save to all but the heirs of the Offenders The third Objection was That Ratcliffe was not excluded by the saving for it was said That the same doth not extend but to that which is forfeited by his Ancestors body And here Ratcliffe had but a Right and that was saved And the Statute doth not give Rights I answer first The Statute of 26 H. 8. is not to be expounded by the letter for then nothing should be forfeited but that only which he had in possession and use Tenant in tail is disseised and attainted for treason By the words of the said Statute of 26 H. 8. he forfeits nothing yet the issue in tail shall forfeit the lands for the issue in tail hath a right of Entrie which may be forfeited 6 H. 7. 9. A right of Entrie may escheat and then it may be forfeited Secondly The Statute is not to be construed to the possession but if he hath a mixt right with the possession it is forfeited but a right in grosse is not forfeited Tenant in tail of a Rent or Seignorie purchaseth the Tenancie or the Land out of which the Rent is issuing and is attainted He shall forfeit the Seignorie and Rent or the Land for the King shall have the Land for ever And then the Seignorie or Rent shall be discharged for otherwise the King should not have the Land for ever For the King cannot hold of any Lord a Seignorie 11 H. 7. 12. The heir of Tenant in tail shall be in Ward for a Meanaltie descended unto him the Meanaltie not being in esse and yet it shall be said to be in esse because of the King C. 3 part 30. Cars Case Although the Rent was extinguished yet as to the King it shall be in esse The difference is betwixt a Right clothed with a possession and a right in grosse viz. where the Right is severed from the possession there it is in grosse For there the Right lieth only in Action and therefore neither by the Statute of 26 H. 8. nor by the private Act of 31 H. 8. such a Right is not forfeited C. 3. part 2. C. 10. part 47 48. Right of Action by the Common-Law nor by Statute-Law shall escheat and therefore it is not forfeited For no Right of Action is forfeitable because the right is in one and the possession in another Perkins 19. A Right per se cannot be charged 27 H. 8. 20. by Mountague A man cannot give a Right by a Fine unless it be to him who hath the possession C. 10. part Lampits Case Sever the possibility from the right and it doth not lie in grant or forfeiture but unite them as they are in our Case and then the Right may be granted or forfeited for that Right clothed with a possession may be forfeited A Right clothed with the possession 1. It tastes of the possession 2. It waits upon the possession 3. It changes the possession The Bishop of Durham hath all Forfeitures for Treason by the Common-Law within his Diocess viz. the Bishoprick of Durham And if Tenant in tail within the Bishoprick commits Treason and dyeth the Issue in tail shall enjoy the land against the Bishop Dyer 289 a. pl. 57. For the Bishop hath not the land for ever but the Issue
in tail may have a Formedon against the Bishop But in our Case it is otherwise Tenant in tail maketh a Feoffment and takes back an estate unto himself in tail the remainder in Fee to his right heirs The Bishop in such case shall not have the land forfeited for Treason because that the Bishop cannot have the estate tail but in such case the King shall have the Land by the Statute of 26 H. 8. cap. 13. And the Bishop in such case shall not have the Fee because it is one estate and the King shall not wait upon the Subject viz the Bishop The Right waits upon the possession For 11 H. 7. 12. If the son and a stranger disseiseth the father and the father dyeth this right infuseth it self into the possession and changeth the possession And it is a Release in fact by the father to the son 9 H. 7. 25. Br ' Droit 57. A Disseisor dyeth seised and his heir enters and is disseised by A. The first Disseisee doth release unto A. all his right All the right is now in the second Disseisor viz. A. because the right and the possession meet together in A. 40 E. 3. 18. b. Tenant in tail makes a Lease for life with warranty If Tenant for life be impleaded by the heir to whom the warranty doth discend he shall rebut the right in tail being annexed with the possession for that is in case of a saving of the land by that right But where one demands land there all the Right ought to be shewed 11 H. 4 37. If a man be to bring an Action to recover then he ought to make a good title by his best right if he hath many rights But if a man be in possession and an Action be brought against him then he may defend himself by any of his rights or by all his rights 11 H. 7. 21. Tenant in tail maketh a Feoffment to his use upon Condition and afterwards upon his Recognisance the land is extended and afterwards the Condition is performed yet the interest of the Conusee shall not be avoided For although the Extent come upon the Fee and not upon the Tail yet when the Extent was it was extracted out of all the rights C. 7. part 41. A Tenant in tail makes a Lease for life now he hath gained a new Fee by wrong and afterwards he makes a Lease for years and Tenant for life dyeth He shall not avoid his Lease for years although he be in of another estate because he had a defeicible title and an ancient right the which if they were in several hands shall be good as the Lease of the one and the Confirmation of the other And being in one hand it shall be as much in Law as a saving of the Right In our Case the Right and Possession both were in Francis Bigot And Ratcliffe is entitled to the old estate tail and to the new also There is a difference betwixt him who claims the land so forfeited to the King and the heir of the body of the person attainted Littâ—719 Land is given to A and the issue males of his body the remainder to the heirs females of his body If the Father commit Treason both heir male and female are barred for they both claim by the Father but if the heir male after the death of his Father be attainted of Treason the King shall have the lands as long as he hath issue male of his body and then the heir female shall have the lands for she shall not forfeit them because she claimeth not by the brother but by the father Com. in Manxels case A man hath three several rights of estate tails and comes in as Vouchee If the Recovery pass it shall bar all his Rights for one Recompence and they shall be all bound by one possession There is a difference where the Kings title is by Conveyance of the party and where for forfeiture for Treason by this Statute of 26 H. 8. cap. 13. v. the Abbot of Colchesters Case The Abbot seised in the right of his house did commit Treason and made a Lease for years and then surrendred his house to the King after the Statute of 26 H. 8. The question was whether the King should avoid the Lease It was adjudged That the King was in by the surrender and should not avoid the Lease and not by the Statute of 26 H. 8. But if the King had had it by force of the Statute then the King should have avoided the Lease Com. 560. Tenant in tail the reversion to the King Tenant in tail maketh a Lease for years and is attainted of Treason The King shall avoid the Lease upon the construction of the Statute of 26 H. 8. which gives the lands unto the King for ever The third point is upon the Remitter This point had been argued by way of Admittance For as I have argued The ancient right is given away unto the King and then there is no ancient right and so no Remitter There is a difference where the issue in tail is forced to make a Title and where not In point of defence he is not so precisely forced to make his Title as he is in case of demand Whereas the Defendant demands the lands from the King the Discent will not help him because the Attaindor of the Ancestor of Ratcliffe hinders him in point of title to make a demand Dyer 332 b. In this case he ought to make himself heir of the body of Francis Bigot and Katharine C. 8. part 72. C. 9. part 139 140. There Cook couples the Case of Fine levied and the Case of Attaindor together C. 8. part 72. Land is given to husband and wife and to the heirs of their two bodies The husband alone levies a Fine with proclamations Or is attainted of Treason and dyeth The wife before Entry dyeth The issue is barred and the Conusee or King hath right unto the land because the issue cannot claim as heir to them both viz. father and mother for by the father he is barred 5 H. 7. 32 33. C. 9. part 140. Husband and wife Tenants in tail If one of them be attainted of Treason as it was in our Case the lands shall not discend to the issue because he cannot make title And there Cook puts the Case That if lands be given to an Alien and his wife they have a good estate tail and yet it is not discendable to the issue The Consequence then of all this is That if Ratcliffe cannot take advantage of the discent by reason of the disability by Attaindor à fortiori he shall not be remitted And yet I confess that in some Cases one may be remitted against the King Com. 488 489 553. But that is where the King is in by matter of Law by Conveyance but in this Case the King is in by an Act of Parliament and there shall be no Remitter against a matter of Record Another reason is because that
be quashed and exonerated and discharged in the possession of the King For it is out of the Rule which is in C. 10 part 48 for the cause of quieting and repose of the Terre-Tenants otherwise it would be a cause of Suits But all Rights Tythes Actions c. might for the same reasons viz. for the quiet of the Terre-Tenants and the avoidance of Suits and Controversies be released to the Terre-Tennants By the same reason here the right of Action of Francis Bigot shall be discharged and exonerated by this forfeiture viz. for the quiet and repose of the Terre-Tenants for the Law delights in the quiet and repose of the Terre-Tenants If Francis Bigot had granted a Rent the ancient right of the tail had been charged C. 7. part 14. Where Tenant in tail makes a lease for life and grants a Rent charge and Tenant for life dieth he shall not avoid his charge although he be in of another Estate because he had a defeisible possession and an ancient right the which c. so as they could not be severed by way of conveyance and charge and no lawfull act Then I admire how he will sever this from himself by his unlawfull act viz. the Feoffment the discontinuance Lit. 169. If a man commit Treason he shall forfeit the Dower of his wife yet he doth not give the dower of his wife but it goes by way of discharge in those Lands 13 H. 7. 17. Tenant by the Curtesie in the life of his wife cannot grant his Estate of Tenant by the Curtesie to another but yet he for Felony or Treason may forfeit it viz. by way of discharge A Keeper of a Park commits Treason there the King shall not have the Office of Keeper for a forfeiture because it is an Office of trust but if he had been Keeper of the Kings Park and had been attainted there he should forfeit his Office by way of discharge and exoneration This Statute of 26 H. 8. hath been adjudged to make Land to revert and not strictly to forfeit Austin's Case cited in Walsingham's Case Tenant in tail the reversion in the King the Tenant makes a Lease for years and dies the issue accepts of the Rent and commits Treason the Lease is avoided for the King is not in by forfeiture by the Statute of 26 H. 8. but by way of Reveter by the Statute of 26 H. 8. It was objected that if Tenant in tail maketh a Feoffment and takes back an Estate for life and is attainted of Treason that he shall not forfeit his old right I agree that Case For indeed it is out of the Statute of 26 H. 8. which speaks of Inheritance and in that Case the Tenant hath but a Freehold The Statute of 26 H 8. saith that it shall be forfeited to the King his heirs and Successors And if in our Case the old right should remain then it should be a forfeiture but during the life of the Testator When the Common Law or Statute Law giveth Lands it gives the means to keep them as the Evidences So here the King is to have by force of this Statute of 26 H. 8. the Evidences The forfeiture of right is expresly within the Statute of 26 H. 8. as the forfeiture of Estate as by any right title or means for the old Estate tail is the means of Estates since 6 H. 8. And if you will take away the Foundation the Building will fall For all the Estates are drawn out of the old Estate tail The Statute of 26 H. 8. is not an Act of Attaindor for none in particular is attainted by the Act but the Act of 31 H. 8. doth attaint Francis Bigoâ— in particular It was objected that here in this case there needed not to be any express Saving I answer that there are divers Statutes of Forfeitures yet the Statutes have Savings in them so as it seems a saving in such Acts were not superfluous but necessary The Act of 33 H. 8. for the attainder of Queen Katharine there is a saving in the Act and yet an Act of Forfeiture Dyer 100. there the land vested in him in the Remainder by force of a saving in the Act so the saving is not void but operative C. 3. part Dowlies Case vid. the Earl of Arundels Case there the saving did help the wife so it appears savings are in Acts of Parliaments of Forfeiture and Acts of Attaindor Dyer 288 289. The Bishop of Durham had Jura Regalia within his Diocese and then the Statute of 26 H. 8. came now whether the Forfeiture for Treason should be taken away from the Bishop by reason of that Statute and given to the King was the doubt It was holden that of new Treasons the Bishop should not have the Forfeitures for those were not at the Common Law as the Forfeitures of Tenant in tail but that he should have the Forfeitures of Lands in Fee within his Diocese and that he had by force of the saving in the Statute so that a Saving is necessary and operative Com. Nichols's Case there Harpers opinion that there needs no saving to strangers but yet a saving is necessary for the Partie and the Issue if they have any thing as well as strangers vid. C. 3. part Lincoln Colledg Case It is the Office of a good Interpreter to make all the parts of a Statute to stand together Com. 559. By these general words Lose and Forfeit and by excluding of the heir in the saving the heir is bound So the Judges have made use of a Saving for it is operative 2 Ma. Austin's Case cited in Walsinghams Case Tenant in tail the Reversion in the Crown Tenant in tail made a Lease for years and levied a Fine to the King the King shall not avoid the Lease for the King came in in the Reverter but in such Case if he be attainted of Treason then the King shall avoid the Lease So a Statute of Forfeiture is stronger then a Statute of Conveyance By this Statute of 26 H. 8. Church Land was forfeited for so I find in the Statute of Monasteries which excepts such Church Lands to be forfeited for Treason Dyer Cardinal Poole being attained did forfeit his Deanary and yet he was not seised thereof in jure suo proprio for it was jus Ecclesiae 27 E. 3. 89. A writ of Right of Advowson by a Dean and he counteth that it is Jus Ecclesiae and exception that it is not Jus suae Ecclesiae But the Exception was disallowed for the Jus is not in his natural capacitie but in his politique capacitie and yet by this Statute of 26 H. 8. such Church Land was forfeited for Treason this is a stronger Case then our Case Vide C. 9. part Beaumont's Case Land is given to husband and wife in tail and the husband is attainted of Treason the wife is then Tenant in tail yet the Land is forfeited against the issue although it be but a possibility for the whole estate
is in the wife but the cause thereof is because it was once coupled with a possession C. 7. part Nevils Case There was a question whether an Earldom might be entailed and forfeited for Treason which is a thing which he hath not in possession nor use but is inherent in the blood And there resolved that the same cannot be forfeited as to be transferred to the King but it is forfeited by way of discharge and exoneration 12 Eliz. Dyer the Bishop of Durhams Case There if it had not been for the saving the Regal Jurisdiction of the Bishop had been given to the King by the Statute of 26 H. 8. This Statute of 26 H. 8. was made for the dread of the Traitor For the times past saw how dangerous Traitors were who did not regard their lives so as their lands might discend to their issue It was then desperate for the King Prince and Subject For the time to come it was worse The Law doth not presume that a man would commit so horrid an act as Treason so it was cited by Mr. Crook who cited the case That the King cannot grant the goods and lands of one when he shall be attainted of Treason because the Law doth not presume that he will commit Treason If the Law will not presume it wherefore then were the Statutes made against it If the Land be forfeited by the Statute of 26 H. 8. much stronger is it by the Statute of 31 H. 8. But then admit there were a Remitter in the Case yet by the Office found the same is defeated Without Office the Right is in the King Com. 486. c. 5. part 52 where it is said There are two manner of Offices the one which vests the estate and possession of the Land c. in the King where he had but a Right as in the case of Attaindor the Right is in the King by the Act of Parliament and relates by the Office Com. 488. That an Office doth relate 38 E. 3. 31. The King shall have the mean profits The Office found was found in 33 Eliz. and the same is to put the King in by the force of the Attaindor which was 29 H. 8. and so the same devests the Remitter Tenant in tail levieth a Fine and disseiseth the Conusee and dyeth the issue is remitted then proclamations pass now the Fine doth devest the Remitter C. 1. part 47 Tenant in tail suffereth a common Recovery and dyeth before Execution the issue entreth and then Execution is sued the Estate tail is devested by the Execution and so here in our Case it is by the Office C. 7. part 8. Tenant in tail maketh a Lease and dyeth his wife priviment ensient without issue the Donor entreth the Lease is avoided afterwards a Son is born the Lease is revived Com. 488. Tenant in capite makes a Lease for life rendring rent and for non-payment a re-entry and dyeth the rent is behind the heir entreth for non-payment of the rent and afterwards Office is found of the dying seised and that the land is hoâ—den in capite and that the heir was within age In the case the Entry for the Condition broken was revived and the Estate for life revived 3 E. 4. 25. A Disseisor is attainted of Felony the Land is holden of the Crown the Disseisee entreth into the Land and afterwards Office is found that the Disseisor was seised the Remitter is taken out of the Disseisee which is a stronger case then our Case for there was a right of Entire and in our Case it is but a right of Action which is not so strong against the King And for these Causes he concluded That the Judgment given in the Court of Pleas ought to be reversed And so prayed Judgment for the Lord of Sheffield Plaintiffe in the Writ of Error This great Case came afterwards to be argued by all the Judges of England And upon the Argument of the Case the Court was divided in opinions as many having argued for the Defendant Ratcliffe as for the Plaintiffe But then one new Judge being made viz. Sir Henry Yelverton who was before the Kings Sollicitor his opinion and argument swayed the even ballance before and made the opinion the greater for his side which he argued for which was for the Plaintiffe the Lord Sheffield And thereupon Judgment was afterwards given That the Judgment given in the Court of Pleas should be reversed and was reversed accordingly And the Earl Lord Sheffield now Earl of Mulgrave holdeth the said Castle and Mannor of Mulgrave at this day according to the said Judgment Note I have not set here the Arguments of the Judges because they contained nothing almost but what was before in this Case said by the Councel who argued the Case at the Bar. Pasch 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 418. IT was the opinion of Ley Chief Justice Chamberlain and Dodderidge Justices That a Defendants Answer in an English Court is a good Evidence to be given to a Jury against the defendant himself but it is no good Evidence against other parties If an Action be brought against two and at the Assises the Plaintiffe proceeds only against one of them in that case he against whom the Plaintiffe did surcease his suit may be allowed a Witnesse in the Cause And the Judges said That if the Defendants Answer be read to the Jury it is not binding to the Jury and it may be read to them by assent of the parties And it was further said by the Court That if the party cannot find a Witnesse then he is as it were dead unto him And his Deposition in an English Court in a Cause betwixt the same parties Plaintiffe and Defendant may be allowed to be read to the Jury so as the party make oath that he did his endeavour to find his Witnesse but that he could not see him nor hear of him Pasch 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 419. THe Husband a wife seised of Lands in the right of the wife levied a Fine unto the use of themselves for their lives and afterwards to the use of the heirs of the wife Proviso that it shall and may be lawfull to and for the husband and wife at any time during their lives to make Leases for 21 years or 3 lives The wife being Covert made a Lease for 21 years And it was adjudged a good Lease against the husband although it was made when she was a Feme Covert and although it was made by her alone by reason of the Proviso Pasch 21 Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 420. NOte that Hobart Chief Justice said That it was adjudged Mich. 15 Jacobi in the Common-Pleas That in an Action of Debt brought upon a Contract the Defendant cannot wage his Law for part and confesse the Action for the other part And it was also said That so it was adjudged in Tart's Case upon a Shop-book And vide 24 H. 8. Br. Contract 35. A Contract cannot be divided
then the tender is good But if he be not there but at another place the notice is sufficient Dodderidge The Law requires certainty in a Declaration and the matter cannot be taken by intendment so we ought to have a certainty set forth otherwise no certain Judgment can be given It was adjourned for Dodderidge and Haughton Justices were against Ley Chief Justice But as I have heard the Case was afterwards adjudged for the Plaintiffe There quaere the Record of the Judgment Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 425. A Man made a Lease for life and covenanted for him and his heirs That he would save the Lessee harmless from any claiming by from or under him The Lessor dyed and his wife brought a Writ of Dower against the Lessee and recovered and the Lessee brought an Action of Covenant against the heir And it was adjudged against the heir because the wife claimed under her husband who was the Lessor But if the woman had been mother of the Lessor who demanded Dower the Action would not have layen against the heir because she did not claim by from or under the Lessor And so it was adjudged v. 11. H. 7. 7. b. Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 426. SNELL And BENNET'S Case A Parson did contract with A. his Executors and Assigns That for ten shillings paid to him every year by A. his Executors and Assigns that he his Executors or Assigns should be quit from the payment of Tythes for such Lands during his life viz. the life of the Parson A. paid unto the Parson ten shillings which the Parson accepted of And made B. an Enfant his Executor and dyed The mother of the Enfant took Letters of Administration durante minori aetate of the Enfant and made a Lease at Will of the Lands The Parson libelled in the Ecclesiastical Court for Tythes of the same Lands against the Tenant at Will who thereupon moved for a Prohibition Dodderidge During the life of the Parson the Contract is a foot but the Assignee cannot sue the Parson upon this Contract yet he may have a Prohibition to stay the suit in the Ecclesiastical Court and put the Parson to his right remedy and that is to sue here This agreement is not by Deed and so no Lease of the Tythes The Parson shall have his remedy against the Executor for the ten shillings but not against the Tenant at Will and the Executor hath his remedy against the Tenant at Will Crook 21 H. 6. A Lease of Tythes without Deed is good for one but not for more years v. 16 H. 7. And afterwards a Prohibition was granted Trin. 16 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 427. PHILPOT and FEILDER'S Case THe Parties are at issue in the Chancery and a Venire facias is awarded out of the Chancery to try the issue and the Venire facias was Quod venire facias coram c. duodecim liberos legales homines de vicineto de c. quorum quilibet habeat quatuor lib. terrae tenementorum vel reddituum per annum ad minus per quos rei veritas melius sciri poterit c. And it was moved in arrest of Judgment That the Venire facias is not well awarded for it ought to be Quorum quilibet habeat quadraginta solidos terrae tentorum vel reddit per an ad minus according to the Statute of 35 H. 8. cap. 6. which appoints that every one of the Jurors ought by Law to expend forty shillings per annum of Freehold and it ought not to be quatuor libras terrae c. according to the Statute of 27 Eliz cap. 6. which Statute of Elizabeth doth not speak of the Chancery but only of the Kings Bench Common-Pleas and the Exchequer or before Justices of Assise Before the Statute of 35 H. 8. no certain Land of Jurors was named in the Venire facias but since the Statute of 35 H. 8. it was quadragint solidos untill the said Statute of 27 Eliz. and now it is quatuor libras in the Kings Bench Common-Pleas and Exchequer It was adjourned At another day the Case was moved again That the Venire facias ought to be 40 solidos c. according to the Statute of 35 H. 8. cap. 6. And 10 H. 7. 9. 15 were vouched That if a Statute appoint that the King shall do an act in this form the King ought to do it in the same form and manner So if a Letter of Attorney be to make a Bill in English and the same is made in Latine it is not good although it be the same in form and matter Cook lib Entries 578. Waldrons Case is That in the Chancery the Venire facias was but 40 but that Case was between 35 H. 8. and 27 Eliz. cap 6. Dodderidge and Haughton Justices It is a plain case For the Venire facias ought to be according to 35 H. 8. cap. 6. because the Statute of 27 Eliz. cap. 6. speaks nothing of the Chancery Quod nota Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 428. HEWET and BYE'S Case IN an Ejectione Firme of a house in Winchester the Ejectment was laid to be of a house which was in australi parte vici Anglice the High-street Ley Chief Justice If it had been ex australi parte vici then the South part had been but a Boundary but here it is well laid Then it was moved That the Venire facias is Duodecim liberos legales homines de Winton and doth not say of any Parish in Winton But notwithstanding it was holden good For Dodderidge Justice said That it is not like unto Arundels Case C. 6. part 14. For there the Offence was laid to be done in paroechiae Sanctae Margaret de Westminster therefore the visne ought to be of the Parish but in this case it being laid generally in Winton it is sufficient that the visne come out of Winton Judgment was given for the Plaintiffe Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 429 WATERER and MOUNTAGUE'S Case A Man made a Lease for six years and the Lessor covenanted That if he were disposed to lease the said lands after the expiration of the said term of six years that the Lessee should have the refusal of it The Lessee within the six years made a Lease thereof to J. S. for 21 years Dodderidge Haughton and Ley Chief Justice The Covenant is not broken because it is out of the words of the Covenant But Dodderidge said Temp. E. 1. Covenant 29. The Lessee covenanted to leave the houses trees and woods at the end of the term in as good plight as he found them and afterwards the Lessee cut down a tree that in that case the Covenant was broken and the Lessor shall not stay untill the end of the term to bring his action of Covenant because it is apparant that the tree cannot grow again and be in as good plight as it was when he took the Lease Trin. 21
by prescription have used to have and dig clay there The first point is found for the Defendant and the last issue is found against the Defendant and damages are given generally All the question is upon the Declaration Coepit asportavit the clay which implies a propertie and interest in the clay to be to the Plaintiffe It is not said that the clay was carried over the land I conceive that the property of the clay is in issue and the Commoner hath nothing to do with that So damages being given to him for that which doth not belong unto him I hold the Judgment to be Erroneous and that it ought to be reversed Dodderidge The Declaration is well enough and of necessity it cannot be otherwise Here the Plaintiffe challengeth nothing but Common In an Action upon the Case there ought to be injurie and damage which is the consequent upon injurie For an Action upon the Case will not lie for an injurie without damage Here Bullen doth not complain for any thing but the loss of his Common which is the first wrong The second wrong is the digging of the pit in the which his cattel may fall and perish The third wrong is for carrying away of six loads of clay over the Common which is a great detriment to the Common to carrie it either by Carts or otherwise and for these three wrongs he concludes his damages ratione cujus he could not have his Common in as ample manner as before he was used to have it and he doth not conclude any damage for the clay Every one of these injuries doth increase the damages and so it would have been if he had left the clay to lie upon the land by the pit for thereby so much Common would have been lost Here he makes himself title only to the Common and these Acts do increase the damages only 2. E. 4. 7 E. 4. Where one was unlawfully and falsly imprisoned and being imprisoned compelled to levie a Fine or make a Feoffment or other Deed. In an Action of false Imprisonment the Jurie gave damages by reason of his restraint of his Liberty and increased them by reason of the levying of the Fine or making the Feoffment or other Deed which he then made The Jurie found that he is not to have any clay and coepit asportavit doth not alter the Case for that is a special Action of trespass And by three of the Justices against Haughton the Judgment given in the Court of Common Pleas was affirmed Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 438. CAlthrope Councellor cited this Case to have been adjudged 25 Eliz. The husband seised in the right of his wife of Copyhold Land made a Lease for years and it was holden by the Court then That by the death of the husband the forfeiture of the Copyhold was purged and that the wife should have the land again notwithstanding this forfeiture by the husband by making a Lease for years without Licence And the Court seemed to allow of the said Case to be Law And afterwards this very Term the like Case came in question in this Court betwixt Severn and Smith where in an Ejectione firme a special Verdict found That a Copyholder seised in the right of his wife made a Lease for years and it was a question whether it were a forfeiture of the inheritance of the wife Hitcham Serjeant said it was no forfeiture Dodderidg Justice took this difference Where a Feme Sole is a Copyholder and she takes a husband who makes a lease for years without licence the same is a forfeiture because it is her folly to take such a husband as will forfeit her Land But where a Copyhold is granted to a Feme Covert and the husband maketh a Lease without Licence in such case it is no forfeiture and so in the Case of a Feme Lessee for life at the Common Law against Whitinghams Case C. 8. part 44. It was adjourned Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 439. NOte It was the opinion of all the Justices and so declared That if the Plaintiffe in an Ejectione firme doth mistake his Declaration That the Defendant in such Case shall have his Costs of the Plaintiffe by reason of his unjust vexation Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 440. FOur several men were joyntly Indicted for erecting and keeping of four several Inns in Bathe It was moved that the Indictment was insufficient because the offence of the one is not the offence of the other like unto the Case in Dyer 19. Where two joyn in an Action upon the Case for words 't is not good but they ought for to sever in their Actions because the wrong to the one is no wrong to the other Dodderidge Iustice One Indictment may comprehend several offences if they be particularly laid and then it is in Law several Indictments It may be intended that the Inns were lawfull Inns for it is not laid to be ad nocumentum and therefore not punishable but if they be an anoyance and inconvenient for the Inhabitants then the same ought particularly to appear otherwise it is a thing lawfull to erect an Inn. An Action upon the Case lyeth against an Inn-keeper who denies lodging to a Travailer for his money if he hath spare lodging because he hath subjected himself to keep a common Inn. And in an Action upon the Case against an Inn-keeper he needeth not to shew that he hath a Licence to keep the Inn. If an Inn-keeper taketh down his Signe and yet keepeth an Hosterie an Action upon the Case will lie against him if he do deny lodging unto a Travailer for his money but if he taketh down his Signe and giveth over the keeping of an Inn then he is discharged from giving lodging The Indictment in the principal case is not good for want of the words ad Nocumentum Haughton and Ley Iustices argreed Ley If an Indictment be for an Offence which the Court ex Officio ought to take notice to be ad Nocumentum there the Indictment being general ad Nocumentum contra Coronam dignitatem is sufficient without shewing in what it is ad Nocumentum But for Inns it is lawfull for to erect them if it be not ad Nocumentum c. and therefore in such Indictments it ought to be expressed that the erecting of them is ad Nocumentum c. and because in this Case there wants the words ad Nocumentum the Indictment was quashed Vi. The Lord North and Prat's Case before to this purpose Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 441. BRIDGES and NICHOLS's Case THey were Indicted for the not repairing of such a Bridg and the Indictment was debent solent reparare pontem c. It was moved that the Indictment was insufficient because it is not alledged in the Indictment that the the Bridg was over a Water and no needfull that it be amended Secondly It did not appear in the Indictment that
for years rendring Rent by an Enfant and afterwards at his full age he accepts the Rent of the particular Tenant it is a good comfirmation of the estate of him in the remainder Litt. 547. If he at full age confirm it is good which could not be if the Lease were void and yet in that Case it doth not appear that there was any Rent reserved The Enfant being a Copyholder makes no difference in the Case And in Murrels Case C. 4. part It is said That if a Copyholder make a Lease not warrantable by the Custome it is a forfeiture which proves it is a good Lease otherwise it could not be a forfeiture Hill 37 Eliz. in the Kings Bench Rot. 99. East and Hardings Case A Copyholder makes a Lease for three years by word to begin at Michaelmas next ensuing it is a forfeiture of the Copyhold and a good lease betwixt the parties Hill 18 Jacobi Haddon and Arrowsmiths Case One licensed his Copyholder for life to make a Lease for 20. if he should so long live and he made a lease for 20 years and left out the words if he should so long live yet because he was a Copyholder for life and so the lease did determine by his death and so he did no more then by Law he might do it was adjudged a good Lease and no forfeiture otherwise if he had been a Copyholder in Fee All Conditions in Fact shall bind an Enfant but not Conditions in Law C. 8. part 44. Whittinghams Case An Enfant Tenant for life or years makes a Feoffment in Fee it is no forfeture For if the Lessor entreth the Enfant may enter upon him again yet it is a good Feoffment but he shall avoid it by Enfancy but if it be by matter of Record then it is otherwise For if an Enfant be Lessee for life and levieth a Fine it is a forfeiture and in that case if the Lessor enter for the forfeiture the Enfant shall not enter again The same Law if an Enfant committeth Waste which is against a Statute it is a forfeiture and if the Lessor recovereth the place wasted the Enfant shall not enter again 9 H. 7 24. A woman an Enfant who hath right to enter into lands taketh a husband and a discent is cast yet she shall avoid the discent after the death of her husband The Court said That if in the Case at Barr the Enfant had been Tenant in Fee at the Common Law and made a lease without Deed and had accepted the Rent at his full age that the same had been good for that there he had a recompence but being a Copyholder it is a question Jones Justice It was adjudged in the Common Pleas in Peters Case That if a Copyholder without licence maketh a Lease not warranted by the Custome That such Lessee should maintain an Ejectione firme The Councel against the Enfant in the Case at Barr said That the Enfant made the Lease as Tenant by the Common-Law for that he made it by Conveyance of the Common-Law And so the Lease was voidable and not void and then the acceptance of the Rent had made the Lease to be good It was adjourned to another day Hill 2. Caroli Rot. 389 in the Kings Bench. 457. GEORGE BUSHER against MURRAY Earl TILLIBARN A Scire facias was brought dated 28 Junii retornable in Mich. Term 2 Car. Regis why Execution should not be awarded against the Defendant upon a Iudgment had against him in this Court The Defendant pleaded That King Charles 7 Octob. in the second year of his Reign did take him into his protection for a year and did grant unto him that during that time he should be free from all manner of Plaints but Dower Quare Impedit and Placit coram Justiciariis Itinerantibus It was said that this Protection was not warrantable by Law for three causes 1. Because it is after the purchase of the Scire facias and before the Retorn 10 H. 6. 3. 11 H. 4. 7. A Protection depending the Suit is not allowable although it make mention that the party is to go a voyage with the Kings Son 2. Because he doth not specifie any particular cause why the Protection was granted unto him All our books do express a cause viz. Quia moratur c. quia profecturus c. Register 22 23. there three Protections are Quia incarceratus 39 H. 6. 38 39 40. per Curiam The Protection ought to express a special cause otherwise it is not good Fitz. 28. a. b. the cause is expressed 1. R. 2. cap. 16. The particular cause ought to be in the Protection A Protection being general the party hath no remedy against him to traverse it or to procure it to be repealed 3. This Court is greater then a Iustice in Eyre and he is excepted in placitis itinerantibus That Court was of opinion that there was no colour for allowing of the Protection A Safe-conduct will only keep the party safe from harm but will not protect him from Actions Mich. 2 Caroli Intratur Pasch 18. Jur. Rot. 298. in the Common Pleas. 458. ROYDEN and MOULSTER's Case IN Trespass for entring into his Close called Dipson in Suffolk upon Not guilty pleaded the Jury gave a special verdict That the said Close was parcel of the Mannor of Movedon and demisable by Copy of Court-Roll and that the same was granted to G. Starling in Fee by Copy of Court-Roll who had issue two sons John and Henry And that 35 Eliz. George Starling did surrender the same to the use of his Will and thereby demised the same to John and the heirs males of his body with divers Remainders over and dyed seised And that the Surrender was presented according to the Custom and that John was admitted to have to him his heirs And that the said John had issue 3 sons Harry George and Nicholas And that the said John 43 Eliz. did surrender to the use of his Will and thereby devised the same to Katherine his wife and dyed and that the said Surrender 9 Martii 4t Eliz. was presented and the said Katherine was admitted Harry George and Nicholas dyed without issue They further found That the Custom of the Mannor is That the youngest brother is to have the Copyhold by discent And also That no Copyholder by the Custome could make any Estate in feodo and that the said Katherine took to her husband Francis Robinson who 1 Sept 17 Iacobi leased the same to Royden the Plaintiffe for one year who entred and was thereof possessed untill Moulster the Defendant by the commandment of c. did out him c. In which case the only Question was Whether a Copyhold be within the Statute of West 2. so as an estate thereof so limited should be a Fee tail or a Fee conditional And by the opinion of the Justices of the Common-Pleas it was adjudged That a Copyhold could not be entituled within the
Statute of West 2. First they said That Copyholds are not within the letter of the Statute which speaks onely de tenementis per chartam datis c. Secondly they are not within the meaning of it 1. Because they were not untill 7 E. 4. 19. of any accompt in Law because they were but Estates at will 2. The Statute of West 2. provides against those who might makeâ— a dissen heresin by Fine or Feoffment which Copyholders could not do 3. Because if Copyholders might give lands in tail by the Statute then the Reversion should be left in themselves which cannot be 4. The Makers of the Statute did not intend any thing to be within the Statute of Donis whereof a Fine could not be levied For the Statute provides Quod sinis ipso jure sit nullus 5. Great mischiefs would follow if Copyholds should be within the Statute of West 2. because there is no means to dock the estate and no customary conveyance can extend to a Copyhold created at this day 37 Eliz Lane and Hills case adjudged in the Common-Pleas was cited by Justice Harvey where a Surrender was unto the use of one in tail with divers remainders over in tail The first Surrenderee dyed without issue And first it was agreed and adjudged That it was no discontinuance 2. If it were a discontinuance yet a Formedon in the Remainder did not lie because there ought to be a Custom to warrant the Remainder as well as the first Estate tail For when a Copyholder in Fee maketh such a gift no Reversion is left in him but only a possibility And the Lord ought to avow upon the Donee and not upon the Donor And there is a difference when he maketh or giveth an estate of inheritance and when he maketh a Lease for life or years for in the one case he hath a Reversion in the other not 2. A Recovery shall not be without a special custom as it was agreed in the Case of the Mannor of Stepney because the Warrantie cannot be knit to such an Estate without a Custom And for express authority in the principal Case he cited Pits and Hockleâ—'s ase which was Ter Pasc 35 Eliz. rot 334. in the Common-Pleas where it was resolved That Copyholds were not within the Statute of Donis for the weakness and meanness of their estates For if they were within the Statute of West 2. the Lord could not enter for Felony but the Donor and the Services should be done to the Donor and not to the Lord of the Mannor And so and for these mischiefs he conceived That neither the meaning nor the words of the said Statute did extend to Copyholds Hill 34 Eliz. Rot. 292. in the Kings Bench Stanton and Barney's Case A Surrender was made of a Copyhold within the Mannor of Stiversden unto one and the heirs of his body and after issue he surrendred unto another And it was agreed by all the Justices That the issue was barred And Popham did not deny that Case but that it was a Fee conditional at the Common-Law and that post prolem suscitatam he might alien And so it was agreed in Decrew and Higdens case Trin. 36. Eliz. rot 54â— in the Kings Bench and in Erish and Ives case 41 42 Eliz. in the Common-Pleas in an Evidence for the Mannor of Istleworth That no Estate tail might be of Copyhold without a Custom to warrant it Mich. 36 37 Eliz. in the Kings Bench it was adjudged That a Copyholder could not suffer a common Recovery and the reason was because that the Recovery in value is by reason of the Warrantie annexed to the Estate at the Common-Law which could not be annexed to a Customary estate And another reason was given because that he who recovers in value shall be in by the Recovery and the Copy of the Court-Roll only should not be his Evidence as Littleton and other books say it ought to be And Crook said That the Statute of Donis was made in restraint of the Common-Law And it should be very disadvantagious to the Lord if Copyhold should be construed to be within that Statute And therefore he conceived that the said Statute did not extend to Copyholds by any equitable construction And such difference was taken by Popham Chief Justice 42 Eliz. in the Kings Bench rot 299. in Baspool and Long 's Case For he said That a Custom which did conduce to maintain Copyholds did extend to them But a Statute or a Custom which did deprave or destroy them did not As if one surrender to the use of one for life the Remainder in Fee where the Custom is to surrender in Fee the Custom doth not extend thereunto because a Custom which goes in destruction of a Copyhold shall be taken strictly But if a man be Copyholder in Fee he may grant a Fee conditional Harvey Justice put some Cases to prove the small account the Law had of Copyholds at the time of the making of that Statute as 40 E. 3. 28. 32 H. 6. br Copyhold 24. And he said That there is not any book in the Law but only Mancels case in Plow Comment That the Statute of West 2. doth extend to Copyholds Hill 2 Caroli rot 235 in the Kings Bench. 459. LITFIELD and his Wife against MELHERSE A Writ of Error was brought upon a Judgment given in an Action upon the Case brought by Husband and Wife in the Common-Pleas for words spoken of the Plaintiffs wife And the Judgment in the Common-Pleas was That the husband and wife should recover And that was assigned for Error in this Court because the Husband only is to have the damages and the Judgment ought to be That the Husband alone should recover But notwithstanding this Error assigned the Judgment was affirmed by the opinion of the whole Court Pasch 2 Caroli rot 362. in the Kings Bench. 460 HOLMES and WINGREEVE's Case A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Judgment given in the Court at Lincoln in an Action of Trespass there brought for taking away a Box with Writings And four Errors were assigned 1. Because the Plaintiffe did not appear by Attorney or in person at the retorn of the Attachment against the Defendant so as there was a discontinuance for the Plaintiffe ought to appear de die in diem 2. Because in his Declaration there he saith That the Defendant took a Box with Writings and doth not make any title to the Box nor shews that the same was lockt nailed or sealed 2 H. 7. 6. a. The certainty of the writings ought to be shewed that a certain issue may be taken thereupon Com. 85. 22 H. 6. 16. 14 H. 6. 4. 21 E. 3. He ought to shew the certainty of the writings 18 H. 1. Charters in a Box sealed C. 9. part Bedingfields case C. 5. part Playters case The Declaration was insufficient because the Plaintiffe therein did not name the certain number of the Fishes 3. He pleaded That he made a
and for these causes he prayed Judgment for the Defendant Observe Reader the Argument of Calthrope he doth not speak to the point where part of the thing or Contract is upon the Sea and part upon the Land as it was urged by Andrews who argued on the other side The Case was adjourned Pasch 3 Caroli rot 362. in the Kings Bench. 475. IT was cited to be adjudged That if a man purchase the next Avoidance of a Church with an intent to present his son and afterwards he present him that it is Symony within the Statute Pasch 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 476. SUTTON the Chancellor of Gloucester's Case IN the Case of Sutton who was Chancellor of Gloucester and put out of his place for insufficiency in the Ecclesiastical court Trotman moved for a Prohibition to the Spiritual Court and said that the Bishop had power to make his Chancellor and he only hath the Examination of him and the allowance of him as it is in the Case of a Parson who is presented to the Bishop and said that if his sufficiency should be afterwards reexamined it would be very perilous Doddridg Justice If an Office of Skill be granted to one for life who hath no skill to execute the Office the grant is void and he hath no Frank-tenement in it A Prohibition is for two causes First to give to us Jurisdiction of that which doth belong unto us And secondly when a thing is done against the Law and in breach of the Law then we use to grant a Prohibition Jones Justice Brook had a grant of the Office of a Herald at Arms for life and the Earl Marshal did suspend him from the execution of his Office because he was ignorant in his profession and full of Error contrary to the Records and it was the opinion of the Justices that because he was ignorant in such his Office of Skill that he had no Freehold in the Office In the Principall Case the Prohibition was denyed And afterwards Sutton was put out of his Office by Sentence in the Spiritual Court for his insufficiency Pasch 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 477. SYMM'S Case TWo men having speech together of John Symms and William Symms one of them said The Symmses make Half-crown peeces and John Symms did carrie a Cloak-bag full of clippings And whether the Action would lie was the Question because it was incertain in the person For he did not say these Symmses but The Symmses Like unto the Case where one Farrer being slain and certain persons being Defendants in the Star-Chumber one having speech of them said These Defendants did murder Farrer and it was adjudged that the Action would not lie for two causes First because the words These was uncertain in the person And secondly it was incertain in the thing For it might be that they had Authority to do it as in Mills Case 13 Jac. in the Kings Bench Thou hast Coyned Gold and art a Coyner of Gold Thirdly a Cloakbag of clippings that is also uncertain for it might be clippings of Wooll or other things or it might be clippings of Silver from the Goldsmith For the Goldsmith that maketh Plate maketh clippings And fourthly It is not shewed any certain time when the words were spoken And for these causes it was adjudged that the Action would not lie Pasch 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 478. WHITTIE and WESTON'S Case AN Action of Debt was brought upon the Statute of 2 E. 6. and the Plaintiff declared That at the time of the Action brought he was Parson of Merrel and that Weston the Defendant did occupie such Lands and sowed them with corn Anno 21 Jac. and that he did not fet forth his Tythe-corn c. The Defendant pleaded in barr of the Action That W. W. Prior of the Hospital of St John of Jerusalem was of the Order of Hospitalers c. and that he held the said Lands free from the payment of Tythes and that the Priory came by the Statute of 32. H. 8. to the King By vertue of which Statute the King was seised thereof and that the same descended to Queen Elizabeth who granted the Lands unto Weston to hold as amply as the late Prior held and that he was seised of the Lands by vertue of that grant Et propriis manibus suis excolebat Upon this Plea the Plaintiff did demurr in Law Noy argued for the Plantiff There are three points in the Case First If these Lands the possessions of the Hospitalers of St John which they held in their own hands were discharged of Tythes Secondly If there be any thing in the Statute of 32 H. 8. by which the Purchasor of the King should be discharged Thirdly Admitting that it shall be a discharge if the Defendant hath well entitled himself to such discharge or Priviledg First it is not within the Statute of 31 H. 8 cap. 13. for that Statute did not extend to the Order of St John Secondly the Statute of 31 H. 8. cap. 13. doth not discharge any but what was then dissolved Thirdly The Statute of 32 H. 8 cap. 24. gives the possessions of the Hospitalers of St Johns to the King and not the Statute of 31 H. 8. Note that the Defendant did recite the branch of the Statute of 31 H. 8. cap 13. That as well the King his heirs and successors as all and every such person and persons their heirs and assignes which have or hereafter shall have any Monasterie c. or other Religious or Ecclesiastical houses or places shall hold c according to their Estates and Titles discharged and acquitted of the payment of Tythes as freely and in as large and ample manner as the said Abbots c. had or used Also he recited the Statute of 32 H. 8. cap. 7 which Enacts that none shall pay Tythes who by Law Statute or Priviledg ought to be discharged The Statute of 31 H. 8. recites that divers Abbies c. and other Religious and Ecclesiastical houses and places have been granted and given up to the King The Statute enaâ—ts that the King shall have in possession for ever all such late Monasteries c. and other Religious houses and places c. And also enacts that the King shal have not only the said Monasteries c. but also all other Monasteries c. and all other Religious and Ecclesiastical houses which hereafter shall happen to be dissolved suppressed renounced relinquished forfeited given up or by any other means come to the King and shall be deemed adjudged vested by Authority of this present Parliament in the very actual possession and seisin of the King for ever in the state and condition they now be Vi. The Statute And shall have all priviledges c. in as ample manner and form as the late Abbots c. had held or occupied c. The Question then is Whether the men of the Hospital of St John at Jerusalem are intended to be within the
The Case shortly is A. being seised in Fee makes a gift in tail to B. and that descends to four daughters c. And the Plaintiff replies That A. was seised in Fee and gave the Lands to B. and to his Heirs Males and the Plaintiffe claimes the entail as Heir Male and the Defendants under the generall tail absque hoc that A. was seised in Fee 27. H. 8. 4. by Englefield If in Trespass the Defendant plead the Feoffment of a stranger and the Plaintiff saith That he was seised in Fee and made a Lease for years to the said stranger who enfeoffed the Defendant he need not to traverse absque hoc that he was seised in Fee C. 6. part 24. The seisin in Fee is traversable Br. Travers 372. acc Dodderidge Justice The seisin in this Case is traverseable Ley Chief Justice Take away the Seisin and then no gift and therefore the Seisin here is Traverseable Haughton and Chamberlain Justices agreed The Court resolved That either the Seisin in Fee or the gift in tail is traverseable Dodderidge Justice If you both convey from one and the same person then you must traverse the conveyance It is a rule C. 6. part 24. there the Books are cited which warrants the traverse of either Quod nota It was adjudged for the Plaintiff Trinit 21. Jacobi In the Kings Bench. 494 Sir EDWARD FISHER and WARNER's Case THE Testator being indebted unto Fisher made Warner his Executor and Warner in consideration that Fisher would forbear suing of him upon the Assumpsit of the Testator did promise to pay him Fifty Pounds and in an Action upon the Case upon this promise Warner pleaded Non Assumpsit in the Common Pleas and it was found for the Plaintiff And a Writ of Error was brought in this Court because it was not shewed for what consideration the Testator did promise 2. Because it was not shewed That Warner the Executor had Assets in his hands It was said by the Councel of Sir Edward Fisher That they need not shew that he hath Assets because the Defendant Warner was sued upon his own promise C. 9. part 94. The Testator made a promise to pay to Fisher fifty pound and died The Executor in consideration of the forbearance of a Suit upon that promise of the Testator doth assume to pay c. The Jury find for the Plaintiff The Error is that no time is limited nor no place where the promise was made and also it is not shewed when the Testator died and so it is not shewed whether the promise were made in the life time of the Testator or not for if it were in the life time of the Testator then the promise was void Nor is the time of the forbearance shewed and so no good consideration Hill 5. Jacobi a consideration to forbear paululum tempus is no good consideration by Cook And the like case was adjudged 36. Eliz. Rot. 448. Sackbdos case We do alledge de facto that we have forborn our Suit and that the Defendant hath not paid us the money Dodderidge Justice It is alledged that the Plaintiff paid money to the Testator upon which he promised And the Action now brought is upon the promise of the Executor Part of the promise is That he paid the fifty pound to the Testator and that ought to be proved in evidence to the Jury C. 6. part Gregories case if it be not specially named how he shall prove it Haughton to forbear to sue him is for all his life time and not paululum tempus Dodderidge Justice Exception was taken that he doth not shew that the Testator was dead at the time of the promise by the Executor It was shewed That after the death of the Testator that he took upon him the Execution of the Will and then promised and that of necessity must be after the death of the Testator Trinit 21. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 495 WILLIAM's and FLOYD's Case IN an Ejectione firme The Array was challenged because it was made at the Nomination of the Plaintiffe And by consent of the parties two Atturneys of the Court did try the Array The question was Whether the Triall of the Array was good It was said by the Councel which argued for the Defendant That it was not good If one of the four Knights be challenged the three other Knights shall try that challenge and if he be found favourable he shall be drawn and if another of the Knights be challenged hee shall be tried by the other two and if one of the two be challenged then a new Writ shall issue forth to cause three Knights to appear 9. E. 4. 46. The two which quash the Array ought to try the Array of the Tales for that they are strangers to them The assent of the parties in this case is to no purpose for the consent of the parties cannot alter the Law neither can the King alter the Law but an Act of Parliament may alter the Law 29. Ass 4 19. H. 6. 9. by Newton 27. H. 8. 13. Where a triall cannot be out of the County by the assent of the parties and if it be it is errour By the Councel of the other side contrary This triall of the Array is much in the discretion of the Judges for sometimes it is tried by the Coroners and they are strangers to the Array 21. Ass 26. 20. Ass 10. there the Judges at their discretion appointed one of the Array and the Coroners to try it 27. Ass 28. there upon such a challenge it was tried by the Coroners and Shard said That the triall by any of them was sufficient and by Forriners de Circumstantibus 31. Ass 10. so as it rests much in the discretion of the Judges 29. Ass 3. there it was denied But note That that was in Oyer and Terminer and there it did not appear that the Array was made at the Nomination of one of the parties but in other challenges it may be tried by one of the Panell But in our case they were all challenged was the objection 9. E. 4. 20. Billing For if one of the parties will nominate all of the Jurours to the Sheriffe it is presumed that they are all partiall and 〈◊〉 â—his case the whole Array is challenged but in other cases he may challenge one or two of the Array and yet the others may be indifferent But admit it had been errour yet being by the assent of the parties it is no errour Baynams case in Dyer A Venire facias by assent of the parties was awarded to one of the Coroners and good Dyer 367. 43. E. 3. Office of Court 12. One of the twelve doth depart If the Justices do appoint one of the panell to supply his place it is erroneus but yet if it be with the assent of the parties it is good So in our case 21. E. 4. 59. Brian saith That he hath not seen more then two to try the Array yet by assent of the
taking be before the Action brought R. is excused We say That postea antè the purchasing of the Bill and I suppose we need not lay down any day but the postea antè makes it certain enough If the viz. be repugnant to our allegation it is surplusage 41. Eliz. in Communi Banco Bishops Case Trespass is brought for a Trespass supposed to be done 4. Maii 39. El. It is ruled in that Case That the videlicet doth not vitiate the premises because it is surplusage Trinit 34. El. in the Kings Bench Garford and Gray's Case In an Avowry it was shewed That such an Abbot surrendred 32. H. 8. and that the King was seised of the possessions of the said Abby and that postea scilicit 28. H. 8. the King did demise and that the same descended to King Ed. 6. there it was ruled that postea had been sufficient though he had not shewed the year of the demise of the King so here postea ante do expresse that he was taken before the Bill brought Dodderidge Justice If the day had been certain at the first and then he cometh and sueth that postea videlicet such a day and alledgeth another day which is wrong there the videlicet is not material but if the first day be uncertain then the videlicet ought to be at a certain day otherwise it is not good Curia If you had left out your time your videlicet it had been good for you must expresse a certain time for when the time is material it ought to be certain If you had layed down a certain day of the purchase of his Bill then the ante would have been well enough Dodderidge Justice If a thing is alledged to be done in the beginning of the Term quaere if that shall be intended the first day of the Term if you can make it appear that it must be intended of necessity of the first day of the Term then you say somewhat and then the videlicet is void and surplusage Judgement was given for the Plaintiff Pasch 3. Caroli in the Kings Bench. 498 DEAN and STEELE's Case AN Action upon the Case for words was brought for words spoken in the Court of Sudbury and it was layed That he did speak the words at Sudbury but did not say Infra jurisdictionem curiae 2. The Judgement in the Action upon the Case was capiatur And for these two Errors the Judgement was reversed Pasch 3. Caroli in the Kings Bench. 499 GOD and WINCHE's THIS Case was put by Serjeant Astley A Lease is made for life by Husband and Wife and the Covenants were That he should make such reasonable assurance as the Counsel of the Lessee should advise and the Counsel advised a Fine with warranty by the Husband and Wife with warranty against the Husband and his Heirs and the Defendant did refuse to make the assurance in an Action of Covenant brought it was moved That it was not a reasonable assurance to have a Fine with Warranty because the Warranty did trench to other Land But the Court did over-rule it and said That it is the ordinary course in every Fine to have a Warranty and the party may rebut the Warranty Pasch 3. Caroli in the Kings Bench. 500 IT was cited to be adjudged That if a man purchase the next avoidance of a Church with an intent to present his son and afterwards he doth present his son that it is Symony within the Statute of 31. Eliz. Ter. Mich. 4. Caroli in the King 's Bench. 501 HILL and FARLEY's Case IN Debt brought upon a Bond the Case was A man was bound in a Bond That he should perform observe and keep the Rule Order and finall end of the Councel of the Marches of Wales And in Debt brought upon the Bond the Defendant pleaded That the Councel of the Marches of Wales nullum fecerunt ordinem The Plaintiffe replied That Concilium fecerunt ordinem that the Defendant should pay unto the Plaintiffe an hundred pound The Defendant did demurre in Law upon the Replication And the only Question was If the Plaintiffe in his Replication ought to name those of the Councel of Wales who made the Award by their particular names Jermyn who argued for the Plaintiffe said That he ought not to name the Councellors by their proper names and therefore he said That if a man be bounden to perform the Order that the Privy Councel shall make or the Order which the Councel should make That in Debt upon the same Bond If the Defendant saith that he hath performed Consilium generally of the Councel without shewing the particular names of the Councellors it is good And he vouched 10. H. 7. 6. 10. E. 4. 15. and Com. 126. Sir Richard Buckleys case That the number of the Esliors ought not to be particularly shewed But in an Action brought upon the Statute of 23. H. 6. he may declare generally that he was chosen per majorem numerum and that is good And 10. E. 4. 15. In debt upon a Bond That the Defendant shall serve the Plaintiffe for a year in omnibus mandatis suis licitis The Defendant said That he did truely serve the Plaintiff untill such a day as he was discharged And it is there holden that he is not compellable to shew the certainty of the services Banks contrary and said That he ought to name the Councel by their particular names And therefore in this case he ought to have pleaded specially as in 9. E. 4. 24. If a man will plead a Divorce Deprivation or a Deraignment he ought to shew before what Judge the Divorce Deprivation or Deraignment was So 1. H. 7. 10. If a man will plead a Fine he must shew before what Judges the Fine was levied although they be Judges of Record And he took this difference That the Judges ought to take notice of the Jurisdiction of generall Courts which are Courts of Record and of the Customes of those Courts but of particular Courts which have but particular Jurisdictions and particular Customes the Judges are not to take notice of them nor of the Lawes and Customes of such Courts if they be not specially shewed unto them And therefore although it was alledged That it was the generall usage to plead Awards or Orders made before the Councel of the Marches of Wales as in the principall Case yet he held that the Judges were not to take notice thereof And therefore the Councellors who made the Order ought to be particularly named 2. He said that the Replication was not good because the Plaintiffe in his Replication doth not shew that the Order was made by the President and the Councel for by the Statute of 34. H. 8. it ought to be made by the President and the Councel 3. He said That the Replication was not good because the Plaintiffe doth not shew within the Record that the matter of which the Order was made was a matter which was within their
to Thomas Spence and his Wife and the Survivor the Rent of seventeen Pounds yearly and every year during the terme Proviso that if the Rent be arrere by forty daies that Thomas and his Wife or the Survivor of them should enter Thomas Spence died his Administrator did demand the Rent and being denied entred for the Condition broken Calthrope argued That the reservation to the Wife was void because she had not any interest in the Land and also never sealed the Indenture of Assignment but was as a stranger to the Deed and so he said that the Wife could not enter for the condition broken nor make any demand of the Rent The 2l l Point was Admitting that the wife could not enter nor demand the Rent Whether the Administrator of the Husband might demand it and enter for the condition broken because the words are Yeilding and paying to Thomas Spence and Jane his Wife and the Survivor of them during the term and no words of Executors or Assigns are in the Case and he conceived the Administrator could not and so he said it had been resolved in one Butcher and Richmonds Case about 6. Jacobi Banks contrary and he said It was a good Rent and well demanded and the reservation is good during the Term to the Husband and Wife and although the word Reddendo doth not create a rent to the Wife because the Husband cannot give to the Wife yet the Solvendo shall gain a good rent to the Wife during the life of the Wife and the reservation shall be a good reservation to him and his Administrators during the Survivor Vide C. 5. part Goodales Case 38. E. 3. 33. 46. E. 3. 18. and admitting that the rent shall be paid to the Wife yet the condition shall go to the Administrator 2. The word Solvendo makes the Rent good to the Wife and amounts to an agreement of the Lessee to pay the Rent to them and the Survivor of them and that which cannot be good by way of reservation yet is good by way of grant and agreement and many times words of reservation or preception shall enure by way of grant Vide 10 E. 3 500. 10. Ass 40. 8. H. 4. 19. Richard Colingbrooks Case 41. E. 3. 15. 13. E. 2 Feasts and Fasts 108. Richardson Justice The Reservation being during the term is good and shall go to the Administrator Jones Justice contrary It is good only during the life of the Lessor and so was it adjudged in Edwyn and Wottons Case 5. Jacobi Crook Justice accorded The Administrator hath no title and the Wife is no party to the Deed and therefore the Rent is gone by the death of the Husband If it had been durante termino generally perhaps it had been good but durante termino praedicto to him and his Wife it ceaseth by his death And the words durante termino couple it to him and his Wife and the Survivor and it cannot be good to the Wife who is no party nor sealed the Deed neither can it inure to the Wife by way of Grant And the words Reddendo and Solvendo are Synonima and the Administrator is no Assignee of the Survivor for she cannot assign because she hath no right in the Rent Barkley Justice The intention of the parties was That it should be a continuing Rent and Judges are to make such Exposition of Deeds as that the meaning of the parties may take effect I do agree That the Wife could not have the Rent neither by way of Reservation nor by way of Grant if she were not a party to the Indenture but here she is a party to the Deed for it is by Deed indented made by the husband and wife and the husband hath set his Seal to it And 2. The Solvendo doth work by way of Grant by the intent of the parties The Reddendo shall go and relate as to the husband and the Solvendo to the wife and he agreed the Case 33. H. 8. Br. Cases because there expressum facit cessare tacitum but in case of a Lease for years the words Reserving Rent to him shall go to the Executor who represents the person of the Testator and 27. El. it was adjudged in Constables Case and Littleton agrees with it That the Executor shall be possessed and is possessed in the right of his Testator And therefore if an alien be made an Executor in an Action brought by him the Tryal shall not be per medâ—â—tatem lâ—nguae And this Case is the stronger because the Reservation is during the Term. And C. 3. part in Malleries Case That the Law shall make such a construction Upon reservation of Rent upon a Lease as may stand with the intent and meaning of the parties and therefore in that where an Abbot and Covent made a Lease for years rendring Rent yearly during the Term to the Abbot and Covent or to his Successors it is all one as if it had been to him and his Successors and although the words be joint or in the Copulative yet by construction of Law the Rent shall be well reserved during the terme for if the reservation had been only Annually during the terme it had been sufficient and his Successors should have had the Rent Quaere the principall Case for the Judges differed much in their opinions Hill 8. Caroli in the Kings Bench. 517 The KING against HILL AN Information was by the Kings Atturney against Hill and others upon the Statute of 32. H. 8. of Maintenance Where the Point was A man was out of Possession and recovered in an Ejectione firme in May 2. Car. and Habere Possessionem was awarded and 29. Sept. 4. Car. he sold the Land And whether he might sell presently or not was the Question And it was determined That he being put in possession by a Writ of Habere facias possessionem that he might sell presently Vide Com. Crookers Case and C. Littl. acc and so was it holden in Sir John Offley's Case 7. Car. in this Court Barkley Justice If a Disseisor doth recover in an Ejectione firme if he afterwards sell the Land it is a pretended Title Jones Justice It was adjudged 36. El. in the Common Pleas in Pages Case in the Case of a Formedon That if a man be out of Possession for seven years and afterwards he recover that he may sell the Lands presently Crook Justice There is a difference where the recovery is in a reall Action and where it is in an Ejectione firme It was Master Browneloes Case in the Star-Chamber resolved by all the Judges of England That a Suit in Chancery cannot make a Title pretended nor Maintenance Barkley Justice put this Case If Husband and Wife bargaineth and selleth whereas the Wife hath nothing in the Land and afterwards a Fine is levied of the same Lands by the Husband and Wife it shall have a relation to conclude the Wife and to make the Wife to have a Title ab initio It was
Inrollment 7 270 142 Intent Intendment 130 121 381 Common 332 Interest not dividable 18 77 78 Interesse termini 2 3 175 Interruption 22 48 Joyning in action 43 283 90 116 160 345. Husband and Wife 10 Joint-charge 56. 57. Joint-tenants 129. Joinâ—ture forfeited by 11 H. 7. 6. 339. Issue lâ—giâ—tim are born after ten moneths c. 281. Issue not proved by the special matter 10. Of Issues see 23. 286. 92. 100. 108. 154. A thing in Issue not in the verdict 57. Mâ—â— joyned no issue 56. Several issues 57. Repugnant 62. Negative and affirmative 194. tried 233. Jury 334. their finding things 33. 34. 65. 274. 88. 171. 359. Examined sworn 209. Forein matter ibid. Strongly imply a thing 36. Three with Sweet-meats in their pockeâ—s 364. Returned 370. Judges sworn to procure the Kings profit 201. Judgment in a Writ of Error 27 66. in Account 258. Husband and wife 369 80. False 176. depending on another 176. staid 177. joint 448. voidable 96. entred Concessum est 399. Justification 277. 137. Jurisdiction of Courts 45. 240. 427. 163. 196. 197. shewing how 380 381. K. KIng usurped upon 7. 8. adhering to his enemies in France 34. To direct the lawes 237. his Prerogatives 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. Prerogative-law Common-law 295. Lands once in the King 441. 442. devest without Office 443. Intrusion upon the King 133. Knights of S. Johns of Jerusalem 393. Lay 394. their possessions Ecclesiastick 393. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. Templars 394. L. LAches in not entring the Kings silver 139. Laps 129. Lâ—w against the rule of the Common-law to meddle with blood 393. The Law preserves things in its custody 316. Not alterable by grant 201. Leases Term extinguished 2. 3. 5. 268. 129. on Continge â—ie rule 419. 420. Exception of timber-woods and underwoods 98 99. In certain beginning 24. 25. 166. may be avoided 323. 324. and revive 325. within 32 H. 8. 102. Joining to Lease 211. Lease for life by Copyholder 171. of an infant Copyholder 364. of a stock of sheep 113. windfals 117 118. by a Parson 302. by Tenant in tail 9. wants a beginning 419. Legacies for children security to be given 243. A verbal Legacie after the will made 246. 247. To be paid at full age 182. Suit for them 41. Liberty to cleanse a Water-course 98 Licence to erect Dove-cotes 259. 82. 93 93. Limitation by Law statute 5. Limitation of an Estate 19. 103. Of time for actions according to 21. Jac. 437. Livery 9. 25. 84. 93. 301. 158. Right extinguished by it 314. London insolency of the Common-Councel 106 107. Custome there 127. Lunatick M MAâ—hem 67 Maintenance 81 159. 450. hem Mannor 3. 135 Market 131. Marshaâ—sey Judgment there 184. Marriage 2 Is a Release 271. Master and Servants acts of and to the Servant 361 Mines 5. 28. Misnaming 35. 38. 283. Mirâ—cital 36. 170. in the Kings Grant 416 417. 420 421 422. of a Statute 178. Mistake of the day 125 126. of the date 433. Monasteries 1. 392 393. what houses within the Stat. 31 H. 8. there 394 Monstrance of Deeds c. 85. 111 112 114 115. How things are done 61. 126. Of the Place 187 188. 359. 412 413. time 391. Of Letters of Administration 34. Of a Bond must be 39. In what Ward c. 160. Of more then needs and that false 189. That the place is within the Jurisdiction c. that he ought to be priviledged c. 402. Inducement to a matter need not be showne precisely 404. Number and names to be shown 436. before whom c. 437. Monstrance of right 301. 304. Mortmain 192. Murder Manslaughter se defendendo 288 289. within the Stat. of King James 154. N NAme 17. in a Writ 40. 379. 398. Nihil dicit 135 Nisi prius 10. 328. Nomine poenae 12. 154. Non compos 302. 316. 321. Non obstante in the Kings Grants 37. Nonsuit 328. 220. Non use 235. No such Record See Record Notice 23. 162. 339 Nusance 4. 259. 58 59. 183. then when an Action upon the Case when an Assise of Nusance part of an house in Assise abated 233 O OAth putting to a mans Oath 151. Obligation the Condition against Law 13. see 152. 177. see 192. to save harmless 212. not within 13 Eliz. 29. by the High Commissioners 148. Bond to deliver Possession the Assignee of Reversion demands it 272. taken by the Sheriff 136. 212 213. to pay when out of his apprenticeship c. 153. Occupant occupancy 52 172. 220. Offices Officers 21. 47 48. Insufficient 390 391. Coroners 64 89. 105. Regarder 277. Steward of the Leet 71. Office found 312 313. 322. Rights vest without Office 325. void if in deceit of the King 192 Omission of word in a Certificate 407. Ordinarie 30. 191. Ordinances 253. 106 107. Over-sea 268 Outlawry 83. 119. Oyer of a Record not to be denied 186. P PAyment before the day 10 Parceners 3. 129 130. Parceney 3. Park-keeper for what things accountable 419 Forfeits 419. Parker forfeits not his Office by Attainder 418. Parks 237. 425. Chasing 169. beasts of it there 171. Pardon 378. Parliament Summoned at the Kings pleasure only 250. held at the Kings pleasure Writ of Error there must be the Kings Licence 247 by Petition 250 Parsons heretofore Knights 399 Parsonage 34 Partition 3 4. 265. 14 84 85 86. by word 94 Partners in Trade 244. 90. Patents 21. 37. Exposition of them 418. void 254 Perjury 88 89. 179. Perpetuity by devise 102. 350 351. Perquisite 27. Petition of Right 304. Place to be alleadged 48. 187 188 189. 382 384. Plaint entred 266. Pleas 6. 43. 91. 95 96. 145. 121. Certainty 93. in debt 359 360. Amount to a general issue 374. General where they should be specially 10. taken strictly 70. mistaken 121 not entred new Plea 176. Plwalitâ—es 23. 153. Portiâ—n of Tythes 35. Pâ—ssâ—ssion unity 4 Possibility 20. 25. may pass by a grant 26 146 325. Premunire 308 389. Praecipe 6 16. 87. 152. Preâ—ogative see King Presentation 265 179. as Precurator 319. Pâ—â—seâ—â—mentsâ—n â—n Courts c. 59. 〈◊〉 14 15 16. 262. 54 Rules of it there and 237. â—7 184. in a Court 48. one against another 183. Principal and accessory Prâ—vily 19. to sue 377. 379. Prviledg 10. 81. 286. 90 372. Priviledges not transferrable 396 397. of discharge 398. Pleaded 398. time to pray it 404. Probate of Wills Exception of the 23 H 8. 214. Proceedings of Law the form must be kept 201. Procedendo 442. Proclamation 107. Proces 73. Erronious 371. Judicial 328. A Summons for an Attachment 400. Proof 254. Profession trial of it 393. Prohibition 260. 259. 45. 51. 63. 216. 234. 243. 246. 273. 163. 164. 196. 200. 301. 446. 447. Promise 13. 32 271. 94. 134. 349. 350. 216. Property 26 27 117. 118. 193. Changed by tender 330. 331. in things 〈◊〉 naturae 123. Protection 299. 366. Proviso 18. gives power to lease 195. No proper place for it 418. Purchase by
practices should be suffered and go unpunished that no mans life was in safety but in continual jeopardy And therefore in this case it was said that pregnant presumption had been sufficient to have acquited the Plaintiff but here the case was very cleer because the matter was confessed by the parties Defendants themselves And in this case Cook Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellour said that a conspiracy ought not to be onely false but malitiose contrived otherwise it will not be a conspiracy and such malice ought to be proved For if a poor Man travelling upon the High-way be robbed by another Man and he knows not the party if afterwards he do accuse such a one of the Robbery and the party accused be found not Guilty he shall not have an Action of conspiracy against the accuser for although he was falsly accused yet he was not malitiously accused and it might be that he took him to be the Offender because he was like unto him who robbed him Secondly It was said by them that by the Law no Man may Begg the Lands or Goods of another man upon such an accusation until the party be convict of the fact and that for divers causes 1. Because before conviction the King hath not an Interest in them for the goods are not forfeit And 2. Because the party till his conviction ought to have his goods to maintain himself with them And 3. Because the goods cannot be seised upon for the Kings use before conviction although they may be put in salva custodia and therefore they said that this was a very great slander which the Defendants layed upon the Lord Viscount Rochester viz. that he had begged the Plaintiffs goods of the King before he was convicted and it was said that if such goods should be begged before conviction of the party that the same would be a main cause that the Jury will not find the Indictment against the party when they are sure his Lands goods and other estate shall be in anothers person and so by consequence should be a great cause that the King might be defrauded of the forfeiture of the goods of Fellons and further it would be a great cause of Rebellion if such Lands and goods should be seised upon and given away before conviction of the party accused And as the Lord Chancellour said the same was the cause of the great Rebellion in the time of King Henry the sixth because the goods of divers were given away to other men before the parties were convicted And Cook said that it appeareth that this was not onely a scandal of divers Gentlemen of Worship whom the Defendants had abused in this thing But even of the King himself And it was not onely scandalum Magnatum But scandalum Magistr Magnatum And he said that it appears in Britton that if a Rebel or base fellow do strike a Man of Dignity that he shall lose his right hand à fortiori in such case when they defame and scandalize them by such impudent practices that they be grievously punished And it should be a very unhappy estate to be a Rich-Man if such Offences should not severely be punished multi delicti propter inopiam The Sentence against the said Defendants was this Reignolds being an Attorney to be degraded cast over the Common Pleas Barre and both the Defendants to lose their Eares to be marked in the Face with a C. for Conspirators to stand upon the Pillory with Papers of there Offences to be Whipped and each of them fined to the King in 500. pound and according to this Sentence Reignolds the same Mich. Term was cast over the Common Pleas Barre by the Cryers of the Court and the other part of the Sentence executed on them both Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 294 COOKES Case IN a Writ Quare intrusit maritagio non satisfacto It was found for the Plaintiff but no damages were assessed by the Jury and the value of the Marriage was found to be 500. pound And now the question was whether the same might be supplied by a Writ of Enquire of Damages and the Court primâ facie seemed to doubt of the case For where the party may have an attaintment there no damages shall be assessed by the Court if the same be not found by the Jury and therefore the Court would be advised of it but afterwards in the same Term it was adjudged that no Writ of Enquire of damages should Issue But a venire facias de novo was granted to try the Issue again Vide 44. E. 3. the opinion of Thorpe acc Note this was the last Case that Cook Chief Justice did speak to in the Common Pleas for this day he was removed from that Court and made Chief Justice of the Kings Bench. Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 295 WEDLOCK and HARDING's Case THE Case was this a Man seised of a Messuage holden in Socage in Fee by his will in Writing devised the same to his Cosen by these words viz. I devise my Messuage where I dwell to my Cosen Harding and her Assignes for eight years And also my Cosen Harding shall have all my Inheritances if the Law will And it was adjudged by the whole Court without argument That this was a devise of the Messuage in Fee by these words and that all his other Inheritances passed by the said Will by those generall words Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 296 ROSSER against WELCH and KEMMIS IN an Action of Debt brought against the Defendants upon severall Praecipes one Judgement is given and the Plaintiffe takes forth a Capias against one of them and arrests his body and afterwards hee takes a Fieri facias against the others And the question was Whether the severall Executions should be allowed and the Court was of opinion they should not for that a man shall have but one satisfaction And therefore in the principall Case because that upon the Fieri facias twenty five pounds was levied if the other who is in prison upon the Execution will pay the other twenty five pound the whole Judgment being but fifty pound the Court awarded that the prisoner should be discharged and the Court was clear of opinion that the partie cannot have a Fieri facias against one and a Capias ad satisfaciendum against the other But it was agreed That he might have a Capias against them both As if a man hath one Judgement against seven persons he may take all their bodies in execution because the body is no satisfaction but onely a gage for the Debt and therewith agreeth 4. H. 7. 8. 5 E. 4. 4. and C. 5. part Bamfeild's Case Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 297 JENOAR and ALEXANDER's Case IT was moved for a Prohibition to the Court of Requests because that the Court held plea of an Attornment for the complaint there was to compel a man to attorn upon a Covenant to stand seised to uses