and moreover proves their Rationality from their Self-Consciousness So that we see here of what Virtue this Self-Consciousness is that it can extend even to Beasts themselves and make them Rational For having said That a Beast is Self-Conscious p. 46. l. 21. he adds That wheresoever there is a Conscious Life there is some degree of Reason And is not this think we a blessed Assertion both in Philosophy and Divinity For according to what he has here asserted a Beast may be properly defined Animal Rationale And which is more a Beast is not a different Species from a Man for Rationality is the Specifick difference of a Man And if a Beast has Reason to a certain degree as he affirms it has then the difference between a Man and a Beast the grinning race it self not excepted is only Gradual and consequently neither is nor can be Specifical I shall say no more upon this subject but leave the whole World to consider what this Man is and what fit Propositions these are to be Licensed by Authority However I would have the Reader observe that this poor Creature who explodes Parts in Personality which his Adversary in a strict and proper Sence never did nor does assert yet admits and holds Degrees in Personality p. 46. l. 22. For says he wheresoever there is a Conscious Life there must be some Degree of Reason and that entitles them viz. Beasts to as much share in Personality as they have in Reason But let me tell this utter stranger to all Philosophy That as there is no such Thing as a magis and minus in substance so neither is there in substantial modes of which Personality is one and the Principal one too But he goes on and tells us That no Man will pretend that an humanâ— Body though united to a Reasonable Soul has any Reason or Sence either p. 46. l. 27. And yet this very Man says Vind. p. 269. l. 18 19. That the Body is conscious to all the Commands of the Will Which how it can be without any thing of Sence belonging to it I must profess surpasses all the Sence that I am Master of to conceive and I cannot but declare withal That if a Thing may be Conscious and yet have no sence at all in it I shall have a worse and a meaner opinion of Self-Consciousness than ever I had before But these and the like wonderful Things I suppose our Author will tell us that he speaks only by way of Allusion which next to his meaning is the surest refuge he has when he is baffled to fly to And so from hence he comes to this Hypothetical Decision of the Point viz. That if Personality belongs only to a Reasonable Nature it is certain that the Soul makes or constitutes the Person p. 46. l. 31. Which is an Extraordinary Consequence indeed nevertheless I deny it as utterly false For in Men neither is the Soul all that is contained in a Reasonable Nature nor a Reasonable Nature all that is contained in a Person And therefore as the Soul cannot adequately constitute a Reasonable Nature so much less can it adequately constitute a Person A Reasonable or rather an Intelligent Nature may be either simple as the Divine and Angelical or Compound as the humane Nature is which essentially consists of Soul and Body as the whole World agrees and since it does so I deny that the Soul can adequately make or constitute either a Reasonable Nature or Person which includes in it the Nature and something besides any more than one Essential Part of the said Nature or Person can do the joint office of Two And whereas he adds That the Soul as he may so speak is the Centre of Personality I must tell him that I own the Soul to be the Principal constituent Part of the Person but as for the other Notion I know no more of the Centre of Personality than I do of the Continuity of Sensation Which word as it is perfectly new and not used before so it is very absurdly applied here for I demand of him how that can be called the Centre of Personality which diffuses it self through the whole Person even to the utmost extremity of its subsistence and consequently reaches as far as the Personality of the said Person does or can Nay and to use his own Cant as far as the conscious life extends For certainly it must needs be a pleasant thing to imagine a Centre reaching as far as That which must be drawn to such a considerable distance from it one way as well as terminate in it Another But if after all this our Author means by these words the Centre of Non-sence I assure him his Writings are of a Compass large enough to pass for the Circumference But let us see some more of his Monstrous Assertions The Body says he is part of the Man and so part of the Person but it does not make the Person but is taken into the Person by a Vital Vnion p. 47. l. 7. To this I answer That for the Body to be actually a part of the Person and yet while it is so not to go to the making of the Person as a Part to the making of the whole is a direct Contradiction And whereas he talks of its being taken into the Person by a Vital Vnion Let me tell him That there is no such Thing as a Vital Vnion in Created Beings which is not also a Composition that is to say A Concurrence of Parts to the Constitution of the whole And let him shew me in Created Natures one Instance of such an Union as is not also a Composition if he can So that all Composition as such is an Union of Parts and all Vital Union of Parts a Composition and the Body is as essential though not so noble a Part of the Person as the Soul it self For the Person of a Man supposes and includes in it the whole humane Nature and the humane Nature includes in it the Essential parts of humane Nature which are Soul and Body But he tells us further That since all Life Reason and Sensation are only in the Soul the whole Personality must be in the Soul also though the Soul when Vnited to the Body is not the whole Person p. 47. l. 22. To which I answer That the whole Person and the whole Personality adequately connote one Another and belong to one and the same suppositum and that otherwise there would be no Commensuration between the Abstract and the Concrete but there would be an essential part of the Concrete to which the Abstract could not extend or belong which would be a gross absurdity But besides I deny the Thing supposed by him viz. That all Life Reason and Sensation are only in the Soul For though they may be in the Soul as the Subjectum proximum Principium Quo that is as immediately proceeding from it and subjected in it yet they are properly in the whole
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the Humane Nature together If this be not a Supernatural Effect and consequently no Natural Vnion let this Man assign me any one that ever was or can be reputed such And therefore let him take notice for the future That it is not the bare Terms or Extreams of an Vnion as that it is between Two Natures that can make it Natural But an Agent acting and joining those Natures together according to the Ordinary Course of Nature which must make it formally so and which can never be wrought by any Agent so working where one of the Natures to be united is Finite and the other Infinite But as I said before what is all this to this present Argument which has nothing to do with the Hypostatick Vnion but only with that way or kind of Union by which Created Beings are united together And will this Man argue from one sort of Union to another between which there is no Cognation at all Wherefore let the Charge not only of Boldness but Prophaneness too rest upon him who dares make the common way of Natural Unions the measure of a Supernatural and that such a one as exceeds all the Miracles that Omnipotence it self ever yet wrought in the World But now as he tells us he is for quitting the School-Terms which he never understood and for speaking so as all may understand him And here the first Oracle thus delivered by him is this viz. That the Soul may be a Compleat and Perfect Person but not a Perfect Man p. 49. l. 28. To which I answer That a perfect Man is essentially a Compound Nature or Being And that an Humane Person is essentially so too And that therefore the Soul being as essentially a simple Vncompounded Being can neither be a Perfect Man nor a Perfect Person But this is such a Proposition that I shall say no more of it but leave it wholly to the Reader 's Admiration Nevertheless to dis-encumber him from such Stuff as this Man's Ignorance is still throwing in his way I think fit here to note the Difference between a Perfect and a Compleat Being Now a Thing is said to be Perfect in respect of its Essence as wanting nothing that is Essential to it But it is called Compleat in respect of its Subsistence as subsisting so by it self as to be neither a Part nor Adjunct of another Thing Accordingly the first of these is the Perfection of a Man considered barely as a Man as an Animal Rationale compounded of Soul and Body But the other is the Perfection of a Person or of a Man considered not only as a Rational Nature but as a Rational Nature completely subsisting From whence it follows That neither does the Perfection of a Man nor the Perfection of a Person depend upon the Perfections or Operations belonging to him as being neither Essential to him as a Man or as a Person and consequently though they be never so defective yet he who has the Essence or Essentials of a Man is a Perfect Man and he who has this Essence or Nature of a Man completed with the Proper Subsistence of the same is a Perfect Person But our Author is for explaining this matter to us further by an Instance Let us says he consider a Soul vitally Vnited to a Body with Organs so indisposed for Sensation that a Man can neither see nor hear nor tast nor smell but only just lives and breaths you will not say this is a perfect Man p. 50. l. 8. Yes good Sir I both will and do say so For he who has the perfect Essence of a Man is a perfect Man whether Halt or Blind or Deaf and as defective in the Actual Exercise of his faculties as of his Limbs But you will say do not all these great defects render a Man more Imperfect than he would be otherwise Yes as to his State or Condition they do but not as to his Nature or Essence And therefore this Author may take notice That there is a twofold Perfection belonging to a Man the first Essential which we have been hitherto speaking of and properly consists in that perfection of Nature or Essence without which he could not be a Man The other is Extra-essential and in respect of the former Accidental and may as we have noted be called a perfection of State or Condition and consists properly in an Integrity of Parts and a right disposition of the Faculties enabling a Man to exert all the Operations belonging to him And I do here according to all the Principles of Philosophy and the concurrent sence of Philosophers affirm that notwithstanding an Universal failure of all those Accidental Perfections a Man is as perfectly a Man by vertue of his bare Essence and as perfectly a Person by vertue of his Compleat Subsistence as if he had them all in their highest Pitch But our Author goes on If says he a Compleat Person may not be a Compleat and perfect Man then the Formal Reason of Personality and the Natural Perfection of a Man are Two Things p. 50. l. 15. I grant they are so But utterly deny That a Compleat Person can be otherwise than a Perfect Man though there may be a Perfect Man who is not a Person For every Person includes in it a Nature Rationalis which makes a Perfect Man and besides that a Compleat Subsistence of the same which makes the Person and whereas he says That the whole Personality must be in the Soul if a Man be a perfect Man who is united to a Body which is worse than none p. 50. l. 20. I must tell him first That there is no such Thing as a Man's being united to a Body for though the Soul is united to a Body yet the Man is not but contains both Body and Soul united to one Another And I must tell him further That the Soul 's being united to a Body which is worse than none does not make that Body less an Essential Part of the Man and of the Person than if it were the most accomplish'd Body in the World In the mean time I must desire the Reader to take Notice of the Intolerable Absurdity of this Author 's affirming a Man to be united to a Body and that his own Body too For at this rate the Man must be one Term of the Vnion and his Body the other But still he goes boldly on and tells us p. 51. l. 2 3. That the Soul is the Person and the Body only the Instrument or Organ of it In answer to which I must tell him That not the Soul but the whole Compositum is the Person and that the Body is not the Instrument of the Soul as of the Principal Agent but of the whole Compositum and moreover that the Soul is as much the Instrument of the said Compositum as the Body is or can be and lastly That Both of them are such Instruments as are also Vital Essential Parts of the Compound
together at the Resurrection But that one Person should suffer for what was done by another Person I am sure is not resolvable into the stated Course or Rule of God's dispensing Rewards and Punishments But he now lays about him at an higher rate Does this profound Philosopher says He think indeed that the Body either sins or suffers p. 54. l. 24. My reply to which shall be neither by an Absolute affirmation or negation but by Distinction And here that must be repeated and applyed which was mentioned before viz. that we must distinguish between the Principal and Proper Agent or the Principium Quod and between the Instrumental Principle or Principium Quo by which that Agent is properly said to Act Likewise between the Subjectum Quod which is also called the Ultimate Subject and the subject of Denomination and between the Subjectum Quo or Subjectum proximum which is the immediate subject of Inhesion Accordingly I answer That as from the Principium Quod or Prime Agent the sinful Act proceeds from the whole Person or Suppositum but as from the immediate Producing Principle or Principium Quo the said Act proceeds from the Soul In like manner as the Subjectum Quod or Ultimate Subject of denomination the whole Man or Person suffers but as the Subjectum Quo or immediate Recipient of the Impression it is the Body that suffers So that by Reason of this Subordination of the Principium Quo to the Principium Quod and the Subjectum Quo to the Subjectum Quod the Soul is not properly denominated the Sinner but the whole person who sins in and by his Soul nor the Body the Sufferer but the whole Man who suffers in and through both his Body and Soul too And this is the true Answer to this his silly Objection and to that other too viz. That Vice and Vertue are seated only in the Soul p. 54. l. 30. For we affirm them to be seated only in the Soul as in the Subjectum Quo or immediate subject of Inhesion but in the whole Person as the Ultimate and Proper Subject of Denomination By which it is manifest that this Author's Ignorance of these Terms or his inability to apply them has betrayed him into all these wretched Paradoxes about the Personality of the Soul But whereas in the next place he says That as the Body may be made the Instrument of Vertue or Vice so it may be the instrument of Rewards or Punishments p. 54. l. 27. Could there well be a grosser Blunder than to call that the Instrument of Rewards and Punishments which is properly the subject of them For an Instrument is properly an inferior sort of efficient cause acting in the vertue and strength of the Principal but a Subject is not so And the Principal Cause of Rewards and Punishments is God himself and if there be any Instrument or Instrumental Cause of the same it is properly that by which and not that upon which he bestows the One and inflicts the Other The next Thing he carps at is the Animadverter's way of concluding his Argument It is worth observing says he p. 55. l. 1. how notably he winds up his Argument and possibly the Animadverter may not be quite so well skilled in the Art of winding as this Man is in that of turning Nevertheless as he lays it before us so let us consider it If it be intolerably Absurd as no doubt it is said the Animadverter That the Soul in the other World should not be responsible for what the Man himself in Person had done in this c. To this replies our Author What then One would then expect the Conclusion should be That the Soul is the Man himself in Person p. 55. l. 5. No stay a little good Sir you are not to form the Animadverter's Argument for him for fear you should cast it into a Syllogism consisting only of Two Terms as you have done for the Socinians p. 82. but if the Animadverter had designed to give the Principal Inference from the Thing it self there spoken of the Consequence of the forementioned Hypothetick should have been this Then it is equally absurd to affirm the Soul in the other World to be another Numerically distinct Person from what the Man himself had been in This. This Sir would and should have then been the Consequence But since the Animadverter had sufficiently shewn this before and moreover since this Author had so often and so insolently exploded all the Terms used by the Ancients in their Discourses about the Trinity as good for nothing but to confound Men's Notions of it he thought fit by way of over-plus to his Argument to return the Reproach upon him by shewing that he treated of Things in such false and such misapplied Terms that they must of Necessity throw all Discourse and reasoning about them into Paradox and Confusion In a word the Animadverter had no intent here to shew the immediate Logical Consequence of the Thing laid down in that Hypothetick Proposition as being evident to the first apprehensions of all Mankind and having withal been effectually proved by what went before viz. That one Person could not be responsible for what had been done by another But his sole Purpose was to shew by the present Instance the Intolerable Inconvenience of this Man's way of discoursing of Things in words quite contrary to the sence which the whole World took them in For surely none before him if he had but one grain of Philosophy ever affirmed The Soul to be the Person of the Man And therefore whereas he represents the Animadverter in this matter like one who runs out at the back door to avoid paying the Reckoning Let him not fear it for I assure him that he shall be effectually reckon'd with before I have done with him and Paid home too In the mean time I would not have him despise Back doors too much considering what singular use they have been of in Conventicles and possibly may be again But the Animadverter had argued further against him upon the same subject thus That the Soul 's thus changing its state forwards and backwards from one manner of subsistence to another looks very odd and unnatural As that from an Incomplete state in the Body it should pass to a Personal and Complete State out of the Body which state is yet preternatural to it and then fall back into an incomplete state again by its reunion to the body at the Resurrection which yet one would think should rather improve our Principal Parts in all respects not merely relating to the Animal Life as the bare subsistence of them I am sure does not These things I say seem very uncouth and improbable and such as ought not without manifest necessity to be allowed of which here does not appear since all this Inconvenience may be avoided by holding That the Soul continues but a Part of the whole Person and no more in all its conditions Animadv p.