sown in Corruption and Weakness and Dishonour Either therefore he must speak of the same Body or his meaning cannot be comprehended For what doth all this relate to a Conscious Principle The Apostle speaks plainly of that Body which was once quickened and afterwards falls to Corruption and is to be restored with more noble Qualities For this Corruptible must put on Incorruption and this Mortal must put on Immortality I do not see how he could more expressly affirm the Identity of this Corruptible Body with that after the Resurrection and that without any Respect to the Principle of Self-consciousness and so if the Scripture be the sole Foundation of our Faith this is an Article of it and so it hath been always understood by the Christian Church And your Idea of Personal Identity is inconsistent with it for it makes the same Body which was here united to the Soul not to be necessary to the Doctrine of the Resurrection but any Material Substance being united to the same Principle of Consciousness makes the same Body The Dispute is not how far Personal Identity in it self may consist in the very same Material Substance for we allow the Notion of Personal Identity to belong to the same Man under several changes of Matter but whether it doth not depend upon a Vital Vnion between the Soul and Body and the Life which is consequent upon it and therefore in the Resurrection the same Material Substance must be reunited or else it cannot be called a Resurrection but a Renovation i. e. it may be a New Life but not a raising the Body from the Dead 2. The next Articles of Faith which your Notion of Ideas is inconsistent with are no less than those of the Trinity and of the Incarnation of our Saviour The former by the first Article of our Church is expressed by three Persons in the Vnity of the Divine Nature the latter is said Art 2. to be by the Vnion of the Divine and Humane Nature in one Person Let us now see whether your Ideas of Nature and Person can consist with these But before I come to that I must endeavour to set this Matter right as to the Dispute about the Notion of Nature and Person which you have endeavour'd with all your Art to perplex and confound and have brought in several Interlocutors to make it look more like an Entertainment Of which afterwards The Original Question was whether we could come to any Certainty about the Distinction of Nature and Person in the Way of Ideas and my business was to prove that we could not because we had no simple Ideas by Sensation or Reflection without which you affirm that our Vnderstanding seems to you not to have the least Glimmering of Ideas and that we have nothing in our Minds which did not come in one of these two Ways These are your own Words And then I undertook to shew that it was not possible for us to have any simple Ideas of Nature and Person by Sensation or Reflection and that whether we consider'd Nature as taken for Essential Properties or for that Substance wherein that Property lies whether we consider it in distinct Individuals or abstractly still my Design was to shew that in your Way of Ideas you could come to no Certainty about them And as to Person I shew'd that the Distinction of Individuals is not founded meerly on what occurs to our Senses but upon a different manner of Subsistence which is in one Individual and is not communicable to another And as to this I said that we may find within our selves an intelligent Substance by inward Perception but whether that make a Person or not must be understood some other way for if the meer intelligent Substance make a Person then there cannot be the Union of two such Natures but there must be two Persons Which is repugnant to the Article of the Incarnation of our Saviour That this was the true State of the Question will appear to any one that will vouchsafe to look into it But what said you in your first Letter in Answer to it As to Nature you say That it is a Collection of several Ideas combined into one complex abstract Idea which when they are found united in any Individual existing though joyned in that Existence with several other Ideas that individual or particular Being is truly said to have the Nature of a Man or the Nature of a Man to be in him forasmuch as these simple Ideas are found united in him which answer the â—omplex abstract Idea to which the specifick Name is given by any one which abstract specifick Idea he keeps the same when he applies the specifick Name standing for it to distinct Individuals And as to Person in the way of Ideas you say that the Word Person in it self signifies nothing and so no Idea belonging to it nothing can be said to be the true Idea of it But as soon as the common Vse of any Language has appropriated it to any Idea then that is the true Idea of a Person and so of Nature Against this I objected in my Answer to that Letter that if these Terms really signifie nothing in themselves but are only abstract and complex Ideas which the common Use of Language hath appropriated to be the signs of two Ideas then it is plain that they are only Notions of the Mind as all abstracted and complex Ideas are and so one Nature and three Persons can be no more To this you answer in your second Letter That your Notion of the Terms Nature and Person is that they are two sounds that naturally signifie not one thing more than another nor in themselves signifie any thing at all but have the signification which they have barely by Imposition Whoever imagined that Words signifie any otherwise than by Imposition But the Question is whether these be meer Words and Names or not Or whether there be not a real Foundation in things for such a Distinction between Nature and Person Of which I gave this evident Proof that if it were not the same Nature in different Individuals every Individual must make a different Kind And what Answer do you give to this plain Reason Nothing particular that I can find But in the general you say that all that you can find that I except against in your Notion of Nature and Person is nothing but this viz. that these are two sounds which in themselves signifie nothing And is this all indeed Did not I tell you in these Words which I am forced to repeat on this occasion although I am very unwilling to fill Pages with Repetitions The Question now between us comes to this whether the common Nature or Essence of things lies only in an abstract Idea or a general Name and the real Essence consists only in particular Beings from which that Nature is abstracted The Question is not whether in forming
be this from your own words 1. That the Identity of living Creatures depends not on a Mass of the same Particles but on something else for in them the variation of great Parcels of Matter alters not the Identity for which you instance in the growth of an Oak and a Horse 2. That the Identity of a Man consists in nothing but a Participation of the same continued Life by constantly fleeting Particles of Matter in Succession vitally united to the same Organized Body 3. That Personal Identity i. e. the sameness of a Rational Being lies in Self-consciousness and in that alone whether it be annexed only to one Individual Substance or can be continued in a Succession of several Substances 4. That those who place Thought in a purely material animal Constitution void of Spirit do place Personal Identity in something else that Identity of Substance as Animal Identity is preserved in Identity of Life and not of Substance 5. That it matters not to this point of being the same self whether this present self be made up of the same or other Substances 6. That in this Personal Identity of Self-consciousness is founded all the Right and Iustice of Reward and Punishment Happiness and Misery being that for which every one is concerned for himself not mattering what becomes of any Substance not joined to or affected with that Consciousness 7. That the Sentence at the Day of Iudgment will be justified by the Consciousness all Persons shall have that they themselves in what Bodies soever they appear or what Substances soever that Consciousness adheres to are the same that committed those Actions and deserve that Punishment for them This I suppose to be a true and just Account of your Sense of this Matter and so the Article of the Resurrection is Resolved into your Idea of Personal Identity And the Question between us now is Whether your Certainty of this Matter from your Idea have no influence on the Belief of this Article of Faith For the main of your Defence lies upon this Point Whether your Method of Certainty by Ideas doth at all shake or in the least concern the Assurance of Faith which you absolutely deny and affirm That Faith stands upon its own Basis and is not at all altered by your Method of Certainty and every Article of that has just the same unmoved Foundation and the very same Credibility that it had before Now I take this Article of the Resurrection of the Dead to be an Article of Faith and we are to consider whether if your Method of Certainty by Ideas do hold in this Matter it continues as firm and in the same Credibility it had before I shall not urge you with the Sense of our own or other Christian Churches in this Point of the Sameness of the Body in the Resurrection of the Dead But I shall continue my self to the Scripture as the Foundation and Rule of our Faith and the main Point is Whether according to that it be not necessary for the same Substance which was united to the Body to be raised up at the last Day I do not say the same individual Particles of Matter which were united at the Point of Death for there must be a great Alteration in them in a lingring Disease as if a Fat Man falls into a Consumption I do not say the same Particles which the Sinner had at the very time of commission of his Sins for then a long Sinner must have a vast Body considering the continual spending of Particles by Perspiration but that which I suppose is implyed in it is that it must be the same Material Substance which was vitally united to the Soul here You mention the Hypothesis of those who place Thought in a purely Material Animal Constitution void of Spirit but you agree that the more probable Opinion is that this Consciousness is annexed to the Affection of one Individual Immaterial Substance It is very well that it is allowed to be the more probable Opinion but it seems without any Certainty as to the Truth of it For you have told us what the Effect of Probability is viz. That it is enough to induce the Mind to judge the Proposition true or false rather than the contrary and that it is conversant about things whereof we have no Certainty but only some Inducements to receive it for true Thence I cannot but observe that we have no Certainty upon your Grounds that Self-consciousness depends upon an individual immaterial Substance and consequently that a Material Substance may according to your Principles have Self-consciousness in it at least that you are not certain of the contrary Now I pray consider whether this doth not a little affect the whole Article of the Resurrection For if it may be only a Material Substance in us that thinks then this Substance which consists in the Life of an Organiz'd Body must cease by Death for how can that which consisted in Life be preserved afterwards And if the Personal Identity consists in a Self-consciousness depending on such a Substance as cannot be preserved without an Organiz'd Body then there is no Subsistence of it separate from the Body and the Resurrection must be giving a new Life To whom To a Material Substance which wholly lost its Personal Identity by Death So that here can be no Personal Identity at all unless you say the very same Life which was long since at an end can be Reproduced Which I suppose you will not assert But let us take the more probable Opinion which I think certain viz. That Self-consciousness depends upon an Immaterial Principle in us and then the Question is How far the Scripture determines the sameness of the Body at the Resurrection i. e. of that Material Substance which was vitally united with that Immaterial Substance in this Life The Doctrine delivered by our Saviour is that All that are in the Graves shall hear his voice and shall come forth they that have done good unto the Resurrection of Life and they that have done evil to the Resurrection of Damnation What is the meaning of all that are in their Graves Doth this relate to any other Substance than that which was united to the Soul in Life Can a different Substance be said to be in the Graves and to come out of them Is it not material as you say whether the present Self be made up of the same or other Substances If it be not so to your Idea of Identity it is as to the Sense of our Saviour's Words unless you can make it out that a Substance which never was in the Grave may come out of it But it may be said That if these Words be taken strictly they confine the Resurrection to those Particles of Matter only which were in the Grave if not then they may extend to another Substance I answer that by comparing this with other places we find that the
Words are to be understood of the Substance of that Body to which the Soul was united and not to those Individual Particles So St. Paul For we must all appear before the Iudgment Seat of Christ that every one may receive the things done in his body according to that he hath done whether it be good or bad Can these words be understood of any other Material Substance but that Body in which these things were done How could it be said if any other Substance be joyned to the Soul at the Resurrection as its Body that they were the things done in or by the Body Curcellaeus his Copy reads it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Complutensian 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and several of the Fathers so took it either way it must relate to that which was the real Body in which the Person lived and acted whether Good or Evil. And St. Paul's Dispute about the manner of raising the Body might soon have been ended if there were no necessity of the same Body If there be no Resurrection of the Dead then is not Christ raised It seems then other Bodies are to be raised as his was and can there be any doubt whether his Body were the same material Substance which was united to his Soul before And the Apostle lays so much weight upon it that he saith if Christ be not raised your Faith is vain doth he mean if there were not the same personal Identity as to the Soul of Christ and the Matter united to it after the Resurrection That cannot be his meaning for then there would have been no necessity of Christs own Body being raised which he asserts and proves by undoubted Witnesses Were they Witnesses only of some material Substance then united to his Soul He saith He was seen of five hundred Brethren at once What He was this It was Christ that died Yes the Person of Christ but personal Identity doth not require the same Substance but the same Consciousness and so if Christ were conscious to himself in another Substance there was no necessity of the same Body And so truly from the seeing the Person of Christ they could not prove it was the same Individual Body But Thomas said Except I shall see in his hands the print of the Nails and put my Finger into the print of the Nails and thrust my Hand into his side I will not believe The doing whereof convinced him it was the same Individual Body but there will be no such proof at the great Day And there is no Reason there should since the Resurrection of Christ was a sufficient proof of God's Power to raise the Dead and the Dissimilitude of Circumstances can be no Argument against it since the Power and Wisdom of God are concerned in it But the Apostle insists upon the Resurrection of Christ not meerly as an Argument of the Possibility of ours but of the Certainty of it because he rose as the first Fruits Christ the first Fruits afterwards they that are Christs at his coming St. Paul was aware of the Objections in Mens Minds about the Resurrection of the same Body and it is of great Consequence as to this Article to shew upon what Grounds he proceeds But some Man will say How are the Dead raised up and with what Body do they come First he shews that the seminal Parts of Plants are wonderfully improved by the ordinary Providence of God in the manner of their Vegetation They sow bare Grain of Wheat or of some other Grain but God giveth it a Body as it hath pleased him and to every Seed his own Body Here is an Identity of the Material Substance supposed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that proper Body which belongs to it every Seed having that Body in little which is afterwards so much inlarged and in Grain the Seed is corrupted before its Germination but it hath its proper Organical Parts which make it the same Body with that which it grows up to For although Grain be not divided into Lobes as other Seeds are yet it hath been found by the most Accurate Observations that upon separating the Membranes these Seminal Parts are discerned in them which afterwards grow up to that Body which we call Corn. St. Paul indeed saith that we sow not that Body that shall be but he speaks not of the Identity but the Perfection of it And although there be such a difference from the Grain it self when it comes up to be perfect Corn with Root Stalk Blade and Ear that it may be said to outward Appearance not to be the same Body yet with regard to the Seminal and Organical Parts it is as much the same as a Man grown up is the same with the Embryo in the Womb. And although many Arguments may be used to prove that a Man is not the same because Life which depends upon the course of the Blood and the manner of Respiration and Nutrition is so different in both states yet that Man would be thought Ridiculous that should seriously affirm that it was not the same Man And you grant that the variation of great parcels of Matter in Plants alters not the Identity and that the Organization of the Parts in one coherent Body partaking of one common Life makes the Identity of a Plant so that in things capable of any sort of Life the Identity is consistent with a continued succession of Parts and so the Wheat grown up is the same Body with the Grain that was sown And thus the Alteration of the Parts of the Body at the Resurrection is consistent with its Identity if its Organization and Life be the same and this is a Real Identity of the Body which depends not upon Consciousness From whence it follows that to make the same Body no more is required but restoring Life to the Organized Parts of it And you grant likewise That the Identity of the same Man consists in a Participation of the same continued Life by constantly fleeting Particles of Matter in Succession vitally united to the same Organized Body So that there is no difficulty as to the sameness of the Body if Life were continued and if by Divine Power Life be restored to that Material Substance which was before united by a Re-union of the Soul to it there is no Reason to deny the Identity of the Body Not from the Consciousness of the Soul but from that Life which is the Result of the Union of Soul and Body But St. Paul still supposes that it must be that Material Substance to which the Soul was before united For saith he It is sown in Corruption it is raised in Incorruption It is sown in Dishonour it is raised in Glory It is sown in Weakness it is raised in Power It is sown a Natural Body it is raised a Spiritual Body Can such a Material Substance which was never united to the Body be said to be
Gentleman were so much at a loss as you represent him you should have helped him out by your relative Ideas For hard things go down much better with some Men's minds in the Way of Ideas which is a sort of gilding the Pills and I doubt not but you could have satisfied him that the Understanding may by virtue of a relative Idea be very well satisfied of the Being of Nature as well as Substance when I declared that I took them to be of equal Extent as they were the Subject of Powers and Properties But he saith that this he understood not because Nature extended to things that were not Substances Did I not say that Nature was sometimes taken only for Properties but that there must be another Sense proved because there must be a Subject wherein these Properties are and in that respect I said that Nature and Substance were of equal Extent But he doth not understand the Deduction Aristotle takes Nature for a corporeal Substance therefore Nature and Substance are of an equal Extent What a hard Fate doth that Man lie under that falls into the hands of a severe Critick He must have a care of his But and For and Them and It For the least Ambiguity in any of these will fill up Pages in an Answer and make a Book look considerable for the Bulk of it And what must a Man do who is to answer to all such Objections about the Use of Particles But let any indifferent Reader judge how I am used in this Place My words are Sometimes Nature is taken for the Thing it self in which those Properties are and so Aristotle took Nature for a Corporeal Substance which had the Principles of Motion in it self but Nature and Substance are of an equal Extent Doth not any Man of Common Sense see that I oppose this to Aristotle's Sense of Nature for a Corporeal Substance He confines it to that only I say That it is of equal Extent with Substance whether Bodily or Spiritual and those very words follow after If you had really such a Conversation with a Gentleman I am sorry for him and I think you did not deal so like a Gentleman by him to expose him thus to the World But I perceive he is a Philosopher too for he proves That Aristotle 's Notion of Nature for a Corporeal Substance will not hold Did I ever say that it would I am far enough from thinking that a Corporeal Substance hath a Principle of Motion from it self but might not I mention Aristotle's taking Nature for a Substance although I presently add his Sense was too short and narrow because Nature and Substance were of equal extent But did not his Notion of Nature imply that it was a Principle of Motion in it self Whatever Aristotle thought the Notion of Nature doth not depend upon a Principle of Motion from it self but it was considered not as in it self as the Cause but in it self as the Subject And that Philosophical Gentleman might be pleased to consider that Aristotle did not make Motion to arise from Matter but asserted it to come from a first Mover and said That those Philosophers talked like Men not well in their Wits who attributed Motion to Matter of it self as I could easily prove if it were needful And methinks you should not have been such a Stranger to Aristotle to let your Acquaintance run into such Blunders and then to print them for them But the Gentleman is farther plunged and knows not how to get out He cannot for his Life understand Nature to be Substance and Substance to be Nature Where lies the Difficulty Is the Repugnancy in the Words or in the Sense Not in the Words or Sense either in Greek or Latin For the Greek if I may have leave to mention that Language in this Case those who have been very well acquainted with the force of Words therein have made Nature of the same importance with Substance So Hesychius renders it by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Substance but I shall not bring the Testimony of Criticks but of Philosophers And Aristotle may be allowed to understand his own Language he saith positively 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 every Substance is called Nature and the Reason he gives for it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because Nature is a Substance It may be said That Aristotle said this because he took Nature for such a Substance as had the Power of Motion in it self I do not deny but he look'd on that as the proper Acception of Nature but from hence it follows that whatever Substance had such a Principle of Motion in it self was truly and properly Nature not as exclusive of a Superiour Principle of Motion but as having an internal self-moving Principle And herein Aristotle differed from some modern Philosophers who make all Motion to come from the Impulse of another Body and to be a meer Mode of Matter continued from one Body to another I confess Aristotle was of another Opinion from those Gentlemen and look'd on Motion as an Effect of an inward Principle and not meerly of an External Impulse but whether Aristotle were mistaken herein is not the Question and it is possible he was not however it plainly appears that Substance with a Power of Motion in it self and Nature had the same Sense and none of those who have been the most severe Criticks upon Aristotle have disputed that I remember against this Sense of Nature in him One of them finds this fault that it was but a Repetition of what he had said in his Physicks where he doth likewise treat of the Sense of Nature And there he takes it for such a Substance which hath the Principle of Motion and Rest within it self and by it self which he opposes to artificial things as a Bed or a Garment And as much as this Definition hath been run down by some Men if we set aside some affected Obscurity in his Philosophical Writings there is no such Absurdity in it when he explains himself not to understand it of meer Local Motion or change of Place but of all Alterations incident to Bodies So that Nature in his Sense was a Substance endued with a Principle of Life and Action And all those things which did partake of Nature in this Sense he said were Substances 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For Nature is always a Subject and in a Subject i. e. the Substance it self is Nature and that which is in it is according to Nature And this Sense of Aristotle Plutarch relies upon as the true Notion of Nature which he saith is the Principle of Motion and Rest because the beginning and ending of things depend upon it But Plutarch by no means approves of those Mens Opinion who made Nature to be an Original Self-moving Principle For saith he Matter of it self cannot move without an Efficient Cause no more than any Metal can frame it self into a particular Form without an Artificer