Selected quad for the lemma: law_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
law_n	moral_a	nature_n	positive_a	4,914	5	10.3383	5	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A97067	Truth tried: or, animadversions on a treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, entituled, The Nature of Truth, its vnion and vnity with the soule. Which (saith he) is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth. By I. W.	Wallis, John, 1616-1703.	1643 (1643)	Wing W615; Thomason E93_21; ESTC R11854	114,623	143

Created Spirituall substances it may be questioned yet doubtlesse in God himselfe it must needs be granted that he is Vbique Totus Now if it be not repugnant to be coexistent to one Point of Place without ceasing to coexist to another point though Distant Why not to one Point of Time without ceasing to be present to another though Successive The next Objection Concerning the nature of Evill is of lesse force against his Tenet For That Good and Evill may coexist in One entire Act That there may be some Degrees of Goodnesse in an Action and yet not that Perfection of Goodnesse that ought to be may as well be granted as That the Twilight hath not So much Light and So much positive darknesse but that it hath not so Much Light as the Midday But yet in the mean time it may be doubted whether the Nature of Evill be meerly Privative It is true indeed The nature of Moral Evill is a Non-conformity or Difformity rather to Gods Law But why may not this non-conformity arise ex praesentiâ non debiti as well as ex absentiâ debiti or ex defectu debiti inesse May not a Line disagree from its measure by being too Long as well as by being too Short The not distinguishing between bonum Metaphysicum and bonum Morale may perhaps have caused some errour in this assertion But I stand not now to decide it You shall find more of it in the next chapter But that which is assumed as a ground of this Assertion is farre more improbable then the Assertion it selfe viz. That Contradictions may be simul semel eodem respectu in the same Subject What necessity his Lordship had to embrace this opinion of Anaxagoras Democritus c. as he saith against Aristotle I do not discern Neither can I see wherein this co-existence of Contradictions doth appeare For the Presence of an Inferiour Degree and the Negation of a Farther Degree are no Contradictions because they are not ad idem And such a Coexistence Aristotle and his followers will not deny Else how can they speak of Qualitates Remissae Nay more They will grant an Inferiour Degree to consist not only with the Negation of a Farther Degree but even with the Presence of its Contrary For they deny not but that there may be Contrary qualities in the same Subject in Remissis gradibus as Heat and Cold in warm water though not in gradibus Intensis But if Anaxagoras or any other will contend That perfect Contradictions may ●t and together That the Presence of an inferiour degree may stand with the Absence or Negation of the Same degree It will be in vain to dispute against it For when I have proved it to be False they will grant it is so and affirm withall That notwithstanding its Falshood yet may it also be True because Contradictions are not Inconsistent Another adversary perhaps would deale more sharply with his Lordship upon this point I passe it He proceeds to shew by divers similitudes How the same thing may take divers shapes in our Apprehension And consequently that the severall Apparitions of Truth do not forthwith evince the Variety of Truth All which we deny not For otherwise we cannot acknowledge that there is any distinctio Rationis Rationall distinctions being no other but inadaequati conceptus ejusdem rei That there is therefore a Rationall Distinction we deny not But that there is Only a Rationall Distinction and not also a Reall distinction this is that we deny Some things we acknowledge to be only Ratione distincta but Other things we contend to have a Reall distinction Which must be overthrown before he can conclude that all the actions of reason which seem severall are but on● a fixt intire Vnity He toucheth lastly upon Copernicus his Opinion Which he saith hath been confuted these many yeares by the three leading Senses And yet his margent saith that sense is confuted by Him For we See the circumvolutions of the Heavens we Feel our selves upon a stable Foundation We Heare not from the Volutations of the Earth such a black Cant as her heavy rowlings would rumble forth But not to dispute the truth of Copernicus his Opinion I think I may affirm that Neither of these Testimonies of Sense do any way contradict his Assertion For first I deny that we See the Revolution of the Heavens We discern indeed and that Truly that the Starres at severall times have severall Positions in respect of our Horizon and this is all But whether this diversity of Position arise from the Motion of the One or the Other or Both our Sight determins not Affirming only That there is such a diverse Positure 2 Our sense of Feeling assures us of thus much That the Earth is such a Foundation as upon which we rest and that we remain in the same Positure in respect of the Earth and the Air circumstant Which may be as well if all jointly Move together as if all jointly stand still A man in a Ship under Hatches upon a smooth water supposeth himselfe to sit fast upon his Seat and he doth so and he seeth all things about him to remain at the same Distance in the same Positure discerning no alteration Yet this hinders not but that He and They may be joyntly moved Together without being thrown from off his seat upon which he may sit as firm as if he were on shore And 3 for the sense of Hearing I see no reason why it should be more blamed for not hearing the sound of the Earths Volutation then for not hearing the Pythagorian Harmony If the vast Celestiall Spheres whose almost every Starre doth farre exceed the Terrestriall Globe be whirled about with such a silent motion as that the quickest Eare cannot discern it Why may not the Earth a farrelesser body passe as quietly without such a dismall Cant such an hideous Noise as his Lordship doth suppose For Noise doth not arise meerly from Motion but from the Crossing or Thwarting of severall motions from the Clashing and Collision of one Body against another by reason that the One standing interrupts the Other in its Motion or Both moving according to severall motions do mutually hinder each others progresse Whereas if all moved the same Way with the same Speed as is supposed in the Motion of the Earth and the things adjoyning there would be no such Clashing or Interruption of one another and consequently no Noise The Senses Testimony therefore doth not contradict the Opinion of Copernicus The Eye tells us that the Starres and We are at severall times in severall Positures but whether it proceed from Their motion or from Ours it affirmeth not Our Feeling informs us that we are not tossed from Place to Place that is from one part of the Earths Superficies to another but remain upon the same part of its Surface But whether we jointly move together or jointly rest immovable it determins not The Eare can tell us

be then how can it be contrary to the other Since that Nothing cannot be opposite to Nothing but Something to Something or Something to Nothing I say therefore that Metaphysicall Evill is meerly Privative as being opposite to the Goodnesse of Being and it is no other but Non-Entity But Morall Evill is every way as Positive as is Morall Good For what is the nature of Morall Good or Evill is it not a Conformity or a Difformity to a Morall Precept Then the Goodnesse or Evill of it is not in the Being of the Action but in the so Being It lies not in the Positive or Absolute Entity of the Action but in the Relative nature Morall Goodnesse therefore and Morall Evill have not an Absolute Essence but a Relative An Agreeing or Disagreeing a Likenesse or Unlikenesse to its Rule Now if Likenesse be a Reall Relation why may not Vnlikenesse be also a relation Reall If Simile be Reall why not Dissimile If the One be Positive why not the Other Object They will say perhaps That the nature of Morall Evill is not a Difformity but a non-Conformity to its Rule not to be positively Vnlike but only Not to be Like Answ If so then not to be is a Sinne for not to Bee includes not to be Like or not to be Obedient If the blessed Angels had never been Created they had been eo ipso Sinfull For if they had never Been they must of necessity Not be Obedient though not Disobedient For how can they be Obedient if not at all Being A Stone must then be Sinfull when it doth not-understand the Nature of God as a man doth and ought to do For though it be not Disobedient to the precept of Knowledge because this precept was not made to a Stone but to Man Yet you cannot say that it is Obedient and therfore must of necessity be not-Ob●dient or not-be Obedient wherefore if a bare not-obedience or a not conformity to the command be a Sinne then doth a Stone Sinne. Scire Deum is morally Good and therefore if morall Evill be only an Absence of Good since there is not in a Stone this Scire Deum how can it be but that a Stone must sinne God commanded Moses to go down into Egipt c. and Aaron to offer Sacrifice Doe I Sinne therefore when I doe not-obey this command made to them How is it possible that I can obey the command for Moses his Journey or Aaron's sacrificing for My going is not Moses his going nor is my sacrificing Aaron's Sacrificing Yet doe I not sinne in not-obeying When Moses made the Brazen Serpent he did not in that obey the precept of going into Egipt for to go into Egipt and to make the Serpent is not the same Yet was it not Sinfull to make the Brazen Serpent though it were-not an Obedience to that Command for neither was it a Disobedience for that Precept did neither injoyn nor forbid it Thus every Action though never so Good will be a Sinne For there is in the most perfect Act a not-Obeying of many precepts yea of all precepts except that which injoyns this Action though there be not perhaps a Disobedience of any The nature of Sinne therefore or Morall Evill is not barely a Not-Obeying but a Disobeying It is not a Not-Conformity but a Difformity a Crossing or Thwarting of some Command Therefore the Stone sins not because there is no Disobedience in its not-Knowing because it was not Commanded Moses his making the brazen Serpent was not a Breach of his former Injunction although not an Obeying of it for in his Commission to go into Egipt his making the brazen Serpent was neither Forbidden nor Commanded The Act of one Morall Virtue is not an offence against the rest for it is no Breach of their Rules though it be not an Observance of them It is Praeter but not Contra. Ans 2. But if I should say on the contrary That the nature of Morall Good were not a Conformity or positive Likenesse but only a not-Difformity a not-Disagreeing or not crossing its Rule Might not this be said with as good probability as the other You would think it strange perhaps that Evill should be Positive and Good Negative But if I m●stake not there is more truth in this then is in the other For a bare not-agreeing doth not make an action Sinfull but a not-disagreeing d●th make it Lawfull and so Morally Good For where there is no Law there is no Sinne. If I walk for my refreshing in one part of the Garden to day and in another to morrow or in that other to day in this to morrow I sinne not in either Not because I have a Command to walk in this first or in the other part first But because neither is Forbidden therefore is neither Vnlawfull I ask therfore whether the Lawfullnesse of this Action in walking first in this part of the garden and not in the other part doe depend upon its Conformity to some Rule or its not-disagreeing from any Now what is the Lawfullnesse of an Action but its Morall Goodnesse Ans 3 Yet Thirdly I affirm not the nature of morall Good or Evill to be Negative but both equally Positive If by Good you understand That which Ought to be not That which May be And therefore I make three sorts of Morall Beings Bonum Malum Indifferens Good which must be done Indifferent which may be done Evill which may-not be done The first Commanded the last Forbidden the other of a midle nature neither Commanded nor Forbidden which being Indifferent is often called Good but never Evill The first consists in a Conformity to its Rule the last in a Difformity the other in a bare not-disagreeing The first and last are of a Positive nature the other of a Negative And yet sometimes this Positivenesse whether in Good or Evill is rather Positivum Logicum the Praedicat of a Positive or Affirmative Proposition then Positivum Reale For an Omission Negatio act●s may be Good or Evill which having in it selfe no reall Being cannot be the Subject of a reall Relation Yet doth not this contradict their Opinion who affirm That non datur actio Indifferens in individuo For by Good and Evill they mean Licitum Illicitum Lawfull and Unlawfull including under the name of Good or Lawfull not only that which Ought to be done but whatsoever May be done as when in civill matters we say it is Lawfull for me to give such a portion of my Estate to such a Man not because the Law of the Kingdom Injoins me so to doe but because it doth not Inhibite me And thus Licitum will be a Negative term and Illicitum a Positive though by the Grammaticall Notation it might seem contrary for Illicitum affirms that there is a Law to the Contrary Licitum denies only that there is such a Law to Forbid it but whether there be any to Command it it affirms not And thus