his eating swines flesh The latter which was evil because forbidden was after the Law for that very reason But the former which was forbidden because t was evil was such in order of Nature before the Law The want of heed to which thing I have the rather desired to remove by insisting on it a second time because I think it is the parent of many errours § 16 HAving thus done with my Reply to the several Answers of M. Barlow I now proceed to another Argument which I lately gathered out of FRANCISCUS DIOTALLEVIUS and which is the fitter to succeed the immediate Argument going before because it will make for its Confirmation Evil works saith this Author who for strength and accuteness gives place to none are synonymous with works which are forbidden by God Almighty who hath left it in our power to make our wayes evil which yet could not be if he did not onely permit but efficaciously make us to do the thing that he forbiddeth Now the thing that he forbiddeth will be confessed not to be this That when we act what he forbids us we do not suffer to come to pass that formal obliquity annexed to all such acts by the repugnance which they have to the Law forbidden them But the thing forbidden to us is this That we do not produce the positive being of that act with which the moral obliquity is inseparably annexed The former cannot be the thing because the law being given Thou shalt love the Lord thy God we cannot possibly hate him without a repugnance unto the law which by commanding our love forbids our hatred The latter therefore must be the thing which we are forbid to put in being And which is properly our work though a positive entity because it is absolutely impossible that God who forbids us the act of hating him should make that act which he thus forbids the making of or that by acting us with his power which is irresistible he should make us to do what he forbids us the doing of But to return to Diotallevius when it is said Thou shalt not covet thy neighbours wife the meaning of it cannot be this Beware that whilst thou proâ—ucest the free act of concupiscence the moral obliquity do not follow it for alas it cannot but follow The meaning therefore must needs be this see that thou abstain from that free act of concupiscence because of that obliquity which is inseparably annext Or determine not thy will to that object which makes the act become contrary to the rule of right Reason And so he concludes it to be the Judgement of the whole Council at Trent which in matters of this Nature must needs be of great consideration That God's concurrence is onely permissive to the free determination of the created will in producing the very being of the evil act And God's permission is so distinguished both by Fathers and Schoolmen from his effection or operation as to signifie no more then the negation of an impediment or cohibition Scotus calls it the negation of the divine positive act which by consequence is not a positive act And it is not an action saith Diotallevius but the negation of an impediment in respect of that operation which doth depend upon our free determination From whence it follows that he who hates God be he man or divel is the sole cause of that act which for that reason also is wholly sin § 17. THis is farther confirmed by an Argument leading ad absurdum For if God does concurr to the positive act of hating God not onely permissively by not hindering it but physically too by praedetermining the will of the Sinner to it then he absolutely wâ—â—leth the actuall hating of himself which of all absurdities is the greatest And again when man is forbid by God to hate him and when God does grievously complain and threaten to punish with Hell fire the man that doth not obey his prohibition It cannot choose but follow that if he absolutely willeth the positive act which he forbiddeth to wit the sinners hating of him he willeth and nilleth the same thing and after the very same manner which is a blasphemous contradiction And thus it is proved to Mr. Hickman to whom alone I am henceforth speaking that the sin of hating God hath a positive being because that quality or action which hath a positive being is clearly proved to be a sin And it is proved to be a sin by being proved to be a Thing which is not made or produced but onely suffered or permitted by God Almighty to come to pass And only made or produced by them that hate him § 18. CAIETAN proves the positive Entity of sin because saith he it consisteth as well of a conversion to an object contrary to the object of virtue as of an aversion from the law And hence saith the Cardinal there is in sin a double nature of evil the one arising from the object the other from the not observing of the law the first is positive the second privative The first inferreth the second for it cannot be that a man should hate God but that in so doing he must break the law because it is simply and intrinsecally evil so that to do it is a sin And as this is observed by D. Field in confirmation of his Doctrine l. 3. c. 23. p. 120. so I find the same Cardinal elsewhere saying that in moralibus pars subjectiva mali est malum and est in moralibus malum dupliciter Implying the whole sin to be a concrete not a repugnance to the law without an act which doth imply a contradiction § 19. THe most acute EPISCOPIVS doth implicitly thus argue although by way of paralipsis As an act commanded by the law is the virtue it self or ordination of the will unto the law so the act forbidden by the law is the vice it self or inordination of the will against the law And as the act of virtue doth not contain or connote any reall thing positive superadded to the act which may be called ordination so the act of vice doth connote nothing privative superadded to the act which may be called inordination § 20. DOctor STERN a very late but Learned Writer doth briefly urge six Arguments to prove that sin may have a positive being four of which I praetermit because I have already shewd them as long since urged by other men though otherwise urged by him than others and perhaps in some places to more advantage The other two I shall mention as not yet touched First saith he a Non-entity may be morally good and therefore an entity may be morally evill The Consequence is evident both by the Rule of opposites and because there is not more repugnance betwixt Obliquity and Entity as obliquity is taken or mistaken by the adverse party then betwixt goodness and Non-entity The Antecedent is proved because a mere omission of a forbidden
wayes then one § 9. Whereas it is said p. 67. that if the man that hates God whilest yet in 's wits shall continue to hate him being mad the act remaines but not the obliquity because the act to be sinful must be rational and free I deny that any man can hate God or love him without the use of reason but I further return six things 1. That for a man to hate God is the greatest madness in the world 2. That if he is not so altered but that he continues to hate God he is not altered so far but that he continues to be a sinner in hating God 3. Whilst he continues to be a man he continues to have freedom and rationality enough to sin by 4. This Argument would prove if it had real force in it that not only all infants but some adultâ— are in a state of Impeccability 5. It would follow from hence that the goodness of a vertuous act doth not consist in the substance of it because it would then become impossible that the substance of the act should continue without the goodness Whereas it is said in this Evasion that the Act of hating God may remain in substance without the presence of its obliquity But 6. to answer yet more expresly to his reason taken from Rational and free I say the sinfulness of the act is one thing and the sinfulness of the agent is quite another The obliquity alone or the sole contrariety of the act to the Law in conjunction with the act from which it cannot be disjoyned is enough to constitute the sinfulness of the act But the Liberty of will and use of Reason are required onely to the sinfulness of the agent Which yet again is no otherwise then in respect unto God imputing or punishing according to the Equity or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the second Covenant For though otherwise considered without the Equity of the Gospel sins of ignorance are sins and Original sin which is born with us is our sin still § 10. And whereas it is added a little after that if with the very same act wherewith he now doth hate God a man should afterwards hate sin the same act for substanâ—e would be morally good p. 67 I reply that this supposeth an impossibility and confutes it self with the contradiction which it implyes To hate God one day and to hate sin the next are so far from being the same act numerically that Dr. Field doth rightly make them to be specifically distinct And the supposing them to be One was to me at first such an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that I admired how Mr. Barlow could so impose upon him-self untill I duely considered his want of years when he engaged himself for so great an Error § 11. The two arguments which follow to prove that sin hath a real being whereof the one is urged by FERRARIENSIS the other by GREGORIE ARIMINENSIS I forbear to prosecute as I might because they do not prove the positive but onely the real being of sin which Mr. Hickman grants though t is denyed by M. Barlow p. 69. or rather it was denyed by him when he was newly Master of Arts. For that he should still be so much mistaken is more then can enter into my thoughts And therefore unless he shall friendly invite me to it I will not meddle with the Infirmities of the two next pages But onely observe how the belief that sin hath no positive is apt to pass into a Belief that it hath not so much as a Real being And indeed by the same figure that sin is called a meer privation it is also called a meere nothing The reason of which I shall shew anon § 12. ANd so I pass to a fourth Reason why the sin of hating God hath a positive being Because this sin is intrinsecally evil as Mr. B. objects against himself out of IOANNES de RADA and therefore not onely evil through some privation because saith he it is impossible that any privation should be intrinsecal to a positive act And Gulielmus de Rubione doth press it thus A positive act which is so evil that no kind of circumstance can make it not evil is not evil for any defect or privation but preâ—isely for the substance of the act p. 71. To the Argument of RADA Mr. Barlow thus answers That such an act is called intrinsecally evil not because its obliquity is of its nature and essence but because by the law of nature it is evil of it self without the addition of a positive Law or because it is evil ex genere objecto and not onely for the want of some circumstance p. 73. But I reply 1. It implyes a contradiction to affirm its being intrinsecally evil and at once to deny it essentially evil for ratio formalis and ratio intrinseca are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with Philosophers and M. Hickman hath dropped a good Confession that the action of hating God is essentially evil p. 94. 2. That it is evil of it self antecedently to any positive Law evil ex genere objecto is a concession whereby to prove it essentially evil 3. No part of this answer pretends to prove that it is not indeed intrinsecally evil but onely quarrell 's about the reason why the act is so called 4. It doth not speak to the chief thing of all that no privation can be intrinsecall to a positive act and so it seemeth by silence to give consent § 13 MOral evil is proved to be a positive thing because vice is set against vertue by an opposition of contrariety as Aristotle saith L. Cat. c. 10. § 1. for each term of such opposites must needs be positive because they are both predicamental species which things are so true that they are granted by M. Barlow p. 80. who therefore endeavours to elude the Argument by saying the same thing which I have often replyed unto to wit that in respect of their mâ—terial signification virtue and vice are opposita contrariè but not in respect of their formal signification To which I reply first as before that this is the old fallacie à rectè conjunctis ad malè divisa and so a flat transition à thesi ad hypothesin And if it be put into Syllogism there will be found to be unavoidably an Ignoratio Elenchi The Question being of sin or vice in sensâ—s composito and the Answer onely considering it in sensâ—s diviso Secondly Vice cannot be vice nor be imagined so to be without its material as well as formal significatum for without the act of hating God the sin or vice of hating God which is the act cannot be so much as supposed to be much less to be repugnant to any law wherein its formality is said to consist for that would imply a contradiction And thus the Answer or rather evasion doth so far forsake as indeed to nul the thing in Question Thirdly
supposing the vice to be taken from the Act or habit of hating or hatred by its having sin for its object it must be granted to be a virtue and therefore not opposed to virtue by any kind of opposition which M. B. observes to be replyed by Ferrariensis To which although it is rejoyned by the same Ferrariensis yet the rejoynder is nothing else but a gross return to the old fallacie just now discovered in the Answer and so is equally refelled by every part of my Reply By the way I note one good confession and from the words of Aquinas that vice as well as virtue may be taken for a concrete whereas M. Hickman was fain to say that sin or vice is so perfectly an abstract that he cannot conceive it to be sin unless he conceive it as an Abstract and that he is to seek what vox abstracta is if sin be not such p. 54. It may very well be that he is to seek for he elsewhere confesseth that sin is complexum quid And if he thinks that abstractum doth signifie complexum he is a small Latinist indeed if he doth not he is a self-contradictor § 14. A Sin of commission is proved to have a positive being because it necessarily requireth some positive act whereby to become a perfect sin of commission which as it is granted by M. Barlow so it seemeth to be also confirmed by him p. 84. where he approveth that of Suarez Metaph. tom 1. disp 11. Malum simpliciter est illud quod est in se malum hoc est caret aliquo bono sibi ipsi debito ad modum perfectionis propriè quale est omne peccatum praesertim commissionis For if every sin of commissi on is not simply evil only but wholly too as that must needs be which doth carere omni bono sibi debito and though I deny the supposition that any good thing can be due to sin then the positive act without which it cannot be must needs be morally and simply evil It being the Sin of commission which is spoken of in both places not any action or quality which is no sin at all so as the ordinary shift of flying from the Act of hating God which is the sin of commission and so the subject of the Discourse to the act of hating without relation to any object which is no sin at all or with relation onely to sin which makes it a high moral good is foreseen and prevented by what I now say What is said by M. Barlow of the threefold difference beâ—wixt a sin of omission and commission p. 86. concerneth nothing that I know excepting those words which he frames to himself in his objection p. 82. In hoc SOLVM distinguitur peccatum omissionis commissionis quia omissio dicit nudam carentiam actus at commissio necessario requirit actum The word solùm is very strange And if he found it in GULIELMUS DE RUBIONE as it is more then I know so I am not concerned to make inquiry It is sufficient for me that my Argument being unanswer'd needs not the help of a Reply I hasten therefore to another way of eviction § 15. THat is properly a sin which is forbidden by the Law But the positive act of Adultery theft or hating God is forbidden by the Law And therefore the Act so forbidden is very properly a sin we commonly say it is a sin to do this or that as to hate God and to love the world because God hath forbid us to do the one and the other To this it is answered by Mr. Barlow who not producing any Author for the objection and putting in the word Formaliter p. 82. may seem to have adapted the Argument for an Answer That the Act precisely taken is not forbidden as a positive Act as in Murder meerly to kill is not forbidden quoad esse physicum for then it should not be lawfull to kill a malefactor who is justly condemned to be put to death but as it recedeth from the Rule of right reason and is subjected to the privation of that rectitude which is due pag. 86. But I reply 1. That this is the old fallacie so often mentioned for an act without reference to a negative precept of the law is not an act which is forbiddâ—n nor pretended by any to be a sin much less of comm ssion which alone was the act spoken of in the Argument and so instead of an answer we have onely an escape from the thing in Question 2. It is affirmed by Aquinas 1.2 q. 71. Art 6. and q. 72. art 6. That Austin put two things in the definition of sin to wit a material and formal part that is a positive act and its repugnance to the Law witness his citation p. 85. And what is this but to say that sin is totum essentiale which it cannot be without one of its two essentials so that the Answer doth offend against the Answerer himself by considering the one without relation to the other notwithstanding his Acquiescence in St. Austin's Definition 3. The Answer doth not deny that the positive act is forbidden and so a sin but onely speaks of that thing in respect of which it is forbidden And to this it may easily be replyed that as an act is not morally evil without relation to the Law which doth forbid it so an act hath nothing of moral goodness without Relation to the law which doth command it or to the Councel which doth commend it And again as no act can be a sin without repugnance to the Rule of right Reason so can there be no such repugnance without an act 4. It is not all killing but killing properly called Murder which is forbidden by the Law which commands the killing of the Murderer and thereby makes it an act of Iustice. And therefore that should have been the instance for all such killing is forbidden by the Law and such alone doth belong to the adaequate subject of our Discourse 5. To hate God is a sin and a positive act to which it hath beâ—n proved that no kinde of rectitude can be due And it had naturally been evil though it had never been forbidden which yet it could not but have been because the not forbidding of it had been repugnant to Gods nature For though the act of hating God could not be from Eternity yet this proposition is aeternae veritatis and might truly have been spoken from all eternity that it is evil to hate God Therefore this and the like acts were forbidden by the Law even because they were evil and are not onely evil by being forbidden by the Law which yet those men do presuppose who will have every thing good that hath a positive being and nothing simply evil but an abstracted repugnance unto the Law not considering the difference betwixt the breach of a positive and moral Law betwixt a Iews hating God and
extremity and nonsense in the worst degree because it implyes a contradiction to say the sin is the mere repugnance of the act to the law without the act which is repugnant Or that the sin of hating God is a deflection from the Precept without that hating which is the sin XIII 'T is so far from being false to call it a sin to blaspheme which is a positive entity that it is blasphemy to deny it This is a proof from plain experience XIV A part of nothing can be the thing of which it is but a part for then the part would be the whole which does imply a contradiction And so the formal part of sin cannot possibly be the sin but the sin must include the material also This doth prompt me Gentle Reader to prepare thee also for those evasions with which the Adversaries of Truth will pretend to answer what thou shalt urge 1. If therefore when thou provest a sin is positive they shall onely answer concerning sin quatenus sin Remember to tell them of their Fallacie à Thesi ad Hypothesin or à dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid 2. If again when thou sayst some sins are actions such as those which God forbids us to put in being they shall answer that sins of omission are not put them in mind of that other fallacie A dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter 3. If when thou arguest by an Induction of such particulars as in the Instance of hating God they shall answer that hating is not evil in it self and good as fasten'd upon sin Tell them straight of their Fallacies A rectè conjunctis ad malè divisa and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the Argument is of hating as having God for its object And so to answer of hating without an object is an Intolerable impeâ—tinence dividing the Act from the Object which were onely considered in conjunction much more is it impertinent to talk of hating as 't is objected upon sin for that iâ— a traâ—sition à genere ad genus God is not sin nor is it a sin to hate sin but the sin of hating God is that to which they must speak in a compound sense Hold them punctually to this and they are undone 4 If they take upon them to prove acting the part of the opponent that the formal part of sin is a mere privation therefore the sin is a mere privation tell them first of their fallacie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the Antecedent might be true and yet the sequel extremely false Tell them next there is a Fallacie of Ignoratio Elenchì For the question is of sin not of a portion or part of sin They are past all Remedy who when the Question is whether it râ—ines do onely answer that the staff does not stand in the corner Tell them over and above that the formal part of some sins as of the Divels hating God is a positive Repugnance to the Law of God and so again there is the Fallacie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 barely to say and not to prove the universality of the thing can amount to no more then onely the begging of the question Mr. Hickman must confess he is the worst of Blasphemers if there is but one sin that is a positive entity because he saith that All such must be either God's creatures or God himself This also prompts me to reflect upon the Mischievous effects of his sad Dilemma For if God is said to be the cause of that positive entity or action Adam's eating forbidden fruit And the cause of that Law Thou shalt not eat it he is said to be the Author or cause of that sin which was his very eating forbidden fruit I have therefore taken the greater pains in my following Treatise both in vindicating God from being the Author of such effects and in charging them wholly upon the Free-will of man shewing how the sinful agent is alone the cause of the sinful act to the end I might convince and convert my Adversary even in spight of his own perversness and disabuse his followers or abeâ—tors notwithstanding their partiality and praepossession That when they exert any such reall and positive actions as the hating of God the ravishing of virgins the killing of Kings the committing of sacriledge the coveting and seizing their neighbour's goods they may be forced to declare with Coppinger and Hacket in the Star-Chamber the works are evil and from themselves unless they will take in the Divel too not good and from God as Mr. Hickman no less irrationally than blasphemously saith That there are haters of God who is Love it self God hath told us by Moses and by Saint Paul And according to the importance of the original word they are hated by God who are haters of him How we ought to be affected towards them that hate God the Psalmist tells us by his example Do not I hate them O Lord that hate thee yea I hate them with a perfect hatred Who they are that hate God by way of eminence our Learned Doctor Stearn hath taken the Liberty to say I shall content my self at present to shew the place in my Margin and to observe Mr. Hickman is therein intimately concern'd I do not hate Mr. Hickman but do love him so well as to wish him better Yet of the Doctrine which he delivers and pleadeth for with so much vehemence That every positive thing is good and either God or his creature I have industriously discovered my perfect hatred For the Hellish murder of Gods Anointed of ever Blessed and glorious Memory was as positive a something as any action to be produced And all the plea of those Deicides who sought to justifie the Fact was the use they made of this Fatal Doctrine They ever imputed unto God irresistibly willing or unconditionally decreeing and effectually over-acting his peoples spirits whatsoever unclean thing they were suffer'd in What was really but the patience they call'd the pleasure of the Almighty His passive permission they stil'd appointment What he had every where forbidden they gave him out to have predetermin'd What was a sin not to be expiated They calld an expiatory sacrifice They gave out God to be the Author of all that he sufferd them to commit the favourable approver of whatsoever he condemned them to prosper in In a word they told the people that God was delighted in those impieties which with much long suffering he but endur'd And then I think I was excusable for being impatient of such a Doctrine as to the Ruin of three Kingdomes I saw reduced into practice for diverse years How impartial I have been in the maintaining of the Truth I shall evince in the following papers by my Reply to Mr. BARLOW the Reverend Provost of Queens Colledge in Oxford my very learned and loving Friend To certain Reasonings of his in his second Metaphysical
himself as shall be shew'd his making a distinction without a difference As betwixt the act of hating God which is granted to be the sin and the sin of that act which is granted to be that very act of hating God For to hate God is 1 a sin 2 a whole sin and 3 nothing but a sin to which three clauses I challenge M. Hickman to make some Answer That if he thinks there is something in hating God which is not sin but very good as being one of God's Creatures which he sufficiently intimates by distinguishing the sin of the act from the sinful act as if the very act of hating God were not a sin the world may know him to be a Libertine without the protection of his disguise Had he forâ—seen that challenge to which I call'd for his Answer in my Letter to Doctor Heylin pag. 266. I had not met with an occasion for this last Section § 13. But because he seems in this place to use the word sin for sinfulness I will first intreat him to remember how sin is taken in holy Scripture by D. Twisse by M. Whitf by M. Barlee and by himself as I have shewd in this chapter § 1.6.7 Next I will help him to understand what is the sinfulness of sin and wherein it lyes It is granted I think by all that sin is that whole or complexum which doth consist of two parts material and formal so as neither part singly can either be or be conceived to be a sin And it is granted I think by all that the materiall Part of sin is positive it being an action or quality and when a quality an act or habit as hath been shew'd The onely privative Part of sin mark the emphasis which lyes on Part is the defection from the Rule which yet is founded in a positive act of which the other is onely a superadded relation unavoidably resulting by the positive acts application to the Rule Thus I think we are to speak if we may rightfully distinguish the two parts of sin which D. Field will not allow nor indeed is it possible so to distinguish the one from the other as to intitle God to the one without the other and that I suppose is the Doctors meaning But now for the abstract of this concretum it is that which resulteth from both united For after the manner that inequality doth arise from the Relation of a Bicubitum to a cubit so the sinfulness of a sin to wit of the action of hating God or of Cain's killing Abel doth arise by resultance from these two things God 's forbidding it to be done and its being done when thus forbidden so then The positive action of hating God as the materiall part which carries with it a defection from the rule of God's Law as the formal part is that complexum or whole sin which I have proved and shall prove to have a positive being The meer defection from the rule or repugnance to it without the action of hating God is not the sin but the formal part onely The meer action of hating God without its defection from the rule which for once I will suppose docendi gratiâ would not be the very sin but the material part onely But the sin as I said is both united viz. The action of hating God in a repugnance to or defection from the rule of God's law whereas the sinfulness of this sin that is the abstract of this concrete is not both parts united for then it would be concrete and so Identical with sin but that which resulteth from both united As the humanity is not the man made up of a body and a rational soul any more then the man is either of the two without the other but that which onely resulteth from both united whereas the man is both united § 14. But now for a while let us admit that the Question were of moral evil as such It would then be comprehensive of all moral evil For à quaâ—enus ad omne valet consequentia by his own confession p. 85. what then mean's he by a privation when he saith that sin or moral evil as such is a privation unless he means a meer privation and nothing else he speaks not against the posiâ—ivity of sin which even they who do assert do also hold there is a want of such a rectitude as is due but they say there is something besides that want As in walking to kill a neighbour there is something positive besides the want of a good end to which the walking should be directed And if any thing could be due to the hating of God to make it good as nothing can be there would be an action besides the want of that due as M. Hickman confesseth p 94. Nay in saying that that action is essentially evil ibid. he confesseth the very action to be the sin And taking sin in the right sense for complexum quid as he confesseth p. 95. we may allow him his own way of stating the Question to his undoing § 15. Again he is ruin'd by his preservative as may appear by this Dilemma Does he think that privation is a thing real or onely nominal something or nothing If nothing then for M. Hickman to filtâ—h and plunder is but a sin and therefore nothing in his opinion and so is a Carneadist If something then he thinks it Gods Creature or not his creature If his creature then he thinks that God is the Authour of sin and so he must think that sin is good or not good if he thinks it to be good he will scruple to commit it If not good he thinks that God can create what is peculiar to the Devil as Master Calvin inferreth against the Libertines If he thinks it not Gods Creature though something real then he must eate up his former saying viz. That it belongs to the universality of the first cause to produce every Real Being pag. 95. § 16. I shall conclude this Chapter with the Concession of Bonaventure that the sin of Concupiscence imports two things to wit an appetite and an excesse of that appetite In which excesse he confesseth there seemes to be a Position though he endeavours by a simile which doe's not run upon all its feet to make it seem a privation rather Which however it may infer yet it cannot wholy be without implying a contradiction And if either of the two is something positive the act of the appetite it self or the excesse in the act sure that which consisteth of both together I mean concupiscence cannot be lesse then either of them CHAP. III. § 1. HAving hitherto cleared and in the doing of that accidentally proved the thing in question I might immediately proceed to shew the littleness of the Tricks in which our Gamster is wont to deal but that I think it incumbent on me to effect that first which is most material and of which most Readers
inevitably import the whole complexum viz. that very act in conjunction with that very object that it cannot so much as be conceived to be the sin of hating God when the act is supposd to be divided from the object To shew him the fruit of his Distinction I will put the case into other colours Let him prove he is a man by the best medium that he can use and I will prove ad hominem he can be none For man is complexum quid and must not be spoken of as One there is something in him material and something formal The Animal is one thing the Anima rationalis is quite another And M. Hickman being either without the other may be a Brute or an Angel but not a man And being for certain not an Angel of light he must if an Angel be one of darkness This is every way as pertinent and as tolerably applyed as what is spoken by M. Hickman against the positive being of hating God If this Coin is not currant let him not pay it to other men And if it is let him accept it when it is paid Secondly He so shamefully flyes from the thing in Question to that which he knew neither was nor can be as to discover the mean opinion which he really hath of his own Tenet and to prove his Book written against nothing so much as his own conscience 1. He knew it was not the Question whether hatred without relation to God as its object is a sin or whether any thing without hatred is the sin of hating God But he knew by what I had said in my 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the thing in Question was the hating of God in sensu composito For I had said in the plainest terms That to hate God is a sin or a sinful act two expressions for one thing That the sinfulness consisteth neither in God without hating for he is purity it self nor in hating without God for hatred in it self is a thing indifferent and apt to be good as well as evil God himself hating sin with a perfect hatred but in the union and application of that act to that object As the nature of man consists not in a body onely nor onely in a soul but in the union of the one with the other p. 13. 2. He knew it could not be a Question whether hatred is a sin when taken per se without an object or whether the pravity of hating God can be any thing at all without the act of hating God or whether there can be possibly any act when there is none And yet his answer is as impertinent as if one of these had been the Question Thirdy In saying such works as the hating God are from God which the Scripture calleth the works of the Devil he speaketh Blasphemy And in saying the sin of hating God is complexum quid which must not be considered of as One he contradicts his other sayings that sin and sinfulness are the same that is a meer abstract and which cannot else be considered as sin So that here I must ask him a second time and challenge him to give me a Categorical Answer can the hating of God be conceived to be a sin or can it not when he answers I will reply But for his Blasphemies and self-contradictions let him read my letter to Dr Heylin p. 265. to p. 270. § 7. Having insisted thus largely on my Reply to those Answers which appear to shew us the very utmost that can be pleaded in the defence of so gross an Error and having detected the obvious Fallacies in which the whole force of the answers lyeth I shall study to be the briefer in all that follows without the least fear of being thought to be obscure by my plainest Reader To Dr. Field his 2. Reasons above recited A Third Reason may be added from HUGO GROTIUS who saith that some things are evil without the Law and that the Law being continuing to oblige it is naturally evil to procure any man's acting against the Law or to make a Law to the contrary and therefore repugnant to the Nature of God From whence there follow 2. things 1. that some whole acts are immutably evil and 2. That they cannot have any being from the Almighty IACOBVS ALMAIN giveth an instance in the hating of God and in Adultery and saith they could not but be forbid To whom 't is answered by Mr. Barlow that if God did not forbid theft it would not be a sin and that he may dispense with his Law as when he said to Abraham go kill thy son But I reply 1. That he speaks not to the Instances brought by Iacobus Almain It had been ill to hate God had it been possible that God had not forbid it 2. Theft is not of those things which are onely evil because forbidden as the eating swines flesh among the Jews but of those other things which are onâ—ly forbidden for being evil And therefore 3. It was not possible that God should never have forbidden all manner of injustice of which theft is one species 4. God did not say to Abâ—aham Go kill thy son but go and offer him up which he also did without killing 5. Had he done it he had not dispensed with his Law which onely forbiddeth such a killing as ipso facto becomes a Murder not such as ipso facto becomes a sacrifice else a thief could not be hanged for the fulfilling of one Law without the breach or dispensation of another The prohibition of murder comprehends not killing by commission from God who may as lawfully take away Isaacks life by Abrahams hand as by a Feaver 6. If the act of stealing or hating God be affirmed to be good and so a positive entity abstractly considered from Gods forbidding it must be granted to be such when it is forbidden I mean a positive entity although not good and so the Answer destroyes its end Mr. Barlow's words are si illud mandatum abfuisset idem numero actus horrendum fuisset homicidium p. 66. Had it been murder it had been sin for murder cannot but â—e sin and so we have his confession that sin may be a positive act But 7. It does imply a contradiction to say the same numerical act can be forbidden and not forbidden which I therefore leave to consideration § 8. What Mr Barlow calleth a concession in his behalf I call an argument against him viz. That if God could produce that act of hating God in respect of the substance of the Act then it would not be evil but say I that act is proved by me and others yea and confessed by Mr. H. to be wholy because intrinsecally and essentially evil evil ex genere objecto and antecedently to the Law therefore it cannot be Gods production for all its having a positive Entiâ—y This I retort to Mr. B. his p. 66 67. and it pincheth Mr. H. more
act although a Non-entity is morally good Again the Schoolmen do hold a twofold punishment the one of sense the other of loss whereof the latter is the wages of an aversion from God as is also the former of a conversion to the Creature so that if sin were nothing but mere privation the poena sensus would be inflicted without all justice under the notion of Revenge for a conversion to the creature § 21. AGain it may be thus argued and out of BARONIVS his Metaphysica Generalis That which hath not a positive entity cannot be the cause of any thing But sin many wayes is the cause of something For 1. it is the cause of punishment and 2 one sin is the cause of another A vitious act is the cause of a vitious habit A vitious habit is the cause of vitious actions And a natural propension to evil which Baronius calls original sin is said by him to be the cause of all the vitious actions oâ— our will T is true he answers this argument but his answer may be refuted by my Replyes to Mr. Barlow and by what Baronius grants of which anon as the Reader will finde if he makes a triall § 22. Now besides these Arguments thus largely urged and that from many more Authors then Mr. Hickman hath named for his opinion I shall exhibit a larger Catalogue but with a lesser expense of time and paper of such eminently learned and knowing men as have justified my judgement with the authority of their own and of whom unawares I have undertaken a justification I will begin with those Writers with the concurrence of whose opinions Dr. Field thought fit to credit his § 23. ALVAREZ saith the sin of commission is a Breach of a negative Law which is not broken but by a positive Act. Aquinas also saith that though in a sin of omission there is nothing but a privation yet in the sin of commission there is some positive thing Nay he saith more plainly what Dr. Field doth not observe that the ratio formalis of sin is two fold whereof the one is according to the intention of the sinner And that it consisteth essentially in the Act of the free-will He also infers it to be an accident whilst he saith that every sin is in the will as in its subject And very often that in every sin there are two things whereof the one is a quality or action and so the whole sin must have a positive being Farther yet it is consequent to the opinion of Cajetan saith Gregory de Valentiâ that sin formally as sin is a positive thing which he expresly also affirmeth in primam 2 dae q. 71. art 6. Some hold saith Cumel that the formal nature of sin consisteth in some positive thing to wit in the manner of working freely with a positive repugnance to the rule of Reason and the law of God Ockam saith further that the very deformity in an act of Commission is nothing else but the act it self viz. actus elicitus against the Divine Law And these are cited by Dr. Field l. 3. c. 23. p. 120. § 24. To these I add many more which partly were not and partly could not have been observed by Dr. Field LESSIVS saith that an evil act is in somâ— sort evil even according to its Physical Entity Nay upon this passage of C. VORSTIVS Omne ens quà ens bonum est Piscator himself hath this note and it is a note of exception At vitiosa illa qualitas in nobis unde oriuntur actuâ—lia peccata bona non est The learned Professor of Divinity in Academiâ Tubingensi affirmes Original sin to be an accident as the opposite member to substantia and calls it the accident of a substance and compares it to the image of God in man which he also saith was not a substance but an Accident And that will be yielded to have a positive being especially if he means as Piscator did that that accident is a Quality Another learned Professor in Academiâ Oxoniensi by saying Concupiscence is a sin inferreth that sin to be a positive entity which concupiscence will be granted by all to be And if it is with consent it is an actual sin if without consent it is an inbred Rebellion of the flesh against the law of God He also takes it to be an accident by ascribing to it subjectum quo subjectum quod because by entring at the flesh it did infect the spirit Dr. GOAD who was sent to the Synod at DORT whilest he was speaking in that Tract which some do call his Retractation against an ordinary Calvinian distinction which he conceived to make God the Author of sin expressly used these words Might I here without waâ—dring discourse the nature of sin I could prove sin it self to be an action and confute this groundless distinction that way The tract is a Manuscript but divers have Copyes as well as I. And sure the world must enjoy it if not by other men's care at least by mine That Great Divine Dr. IACKSON who was withall a great Philosopher and inferiour to none for skill in Metaphysicks doth not content himself to say of original sin that it is not a mere privation but also defineth it to be a positive Renitency of the flesh or corrupt nature of man against the spiritual law of God especially against the negative Precepts c. And as he highly commends Illyricus for an extraordinary writer so he vindicates his notion by explaining his true sense of Original sin which if the Dr. took by the right handle Mr. Barlow took it by the wrong in the latter part of his 2. excercitation It was the businesse of Illyricus saith Dr. IACKSON to banish all such nominal or grammatical definitions as have been mentioned out of the Precincts of Theology and to put in continual caveats against the Admission of abstracts or mere relations into the definition of Original sin or of that unrighteousness which is inherent in the man unregenerate The Judicious Doctor doth also tell us and who could tell better then he that St. Austine Aquinas and Melanchthon do say in effect as much as Illyricus if their meanings were rightly weighed and apprehended by their Followers Nay Calvin and Martyr and many other good writers consort so well with Illyricus in their definitions of sin in the unregenerate that they must all be either acquitted or condemned together Illyricus himself explains his meaning by producing the definitions of Original sin not onely given by Calvin and Martyr but explained by themselves into Illyricus his sense In so much that Dr. Iackson ranking Calvin and Martyr with Illyricus doth affirm them to make original sin to be the whole nature of man and all his faculties so far forth as they are corrupted Yet still their meaning was no more
illi annexam Nam Daemones non producunt Actiones quibus malitia est annexa sed tantum solicitant c. multo itaque magis Malitiae reus est qui sciens volens non tentat aut solicitat sed actionem reipsa producit cujus malitia ut ab ea prorsus inseparabilis ipsi quà m clarissimè patet What kind of Adversaries they are whom the Doctor thus handles and how much Mr. Hickman becomes concern'd he gives us to know by his two instances in Twisse and Zuinglius § 12. A whole Colledge of Remonstrants men of renown for their piety and learning too thought fit to shame the common subterfuge by these two wayes of Argumentation 1. Whensoever a superiour and omnipotent cause doth so move and determine the inferiour and impotent that it being so moved cannot choose but sin Then must the guilt of that sin be wholly transferred on the superiour and omnipotent cause But according to those men who affirm the positive acts of all the very worst sins to be the creatures and works of God the inferiour cause is so moved by the omnipotent and superiour as that it cannot choose but sin Therefore according to those men the sin is wholly to be transferred on the superiour cause 2. When two causes do concurr to one action to wit the action of hating God whereof the one act 's freely and the other of necessity then must the cause which acts freely sustain the whole fault of its coming to pass But according to the men aforesaid God acts freely in the producing of such an action which M. Hickman reckons amongst Gods creatures and the inferiour cause of necessity Therefore according to those men God sustains the whole fault of its coming to passe And we know in the whole fault is included the obliquity as well as the act § 13. The Apologist for Tilenus doth make this Answer to the distinction 1. That man doth seldom or never entertain sin or consent to it with a designe to oppose himself to the divine Law but to enjoy his Pâ—easure and satisfie his appetites 2. He supposeth that a man should consent to sin with such a set purpose to oppose Gods Law And then infers that according to Mr. H.'s Doctrine that consent and that purpose being positive entities and acts of the soul are from God and of his production from whence it followes either that man doth not sin when he commits such an act or that the fault is imputable to God who is called by Mr. Hickman the first cause of that Act. I wonder when Mr. H. will give that Author a Reply § 14. But after all and above all I commend to consideration the words of the Reverend Dr. HAMMOND who having shewed how those Doctrines which are commonly called Calvinistical are so noxious to the practice and lives of men as to be able to evacuate all the force of the Fundamentals of Christianity those I mean by him forementioned And coming to speak of the Distinction betwixt the act and the obliquity which the Assertors of those Doctrins have commonly used as an Artifice for the avoiding of those consequences by which their Doctrines are rendred odious at last proceeds to make it appear That this is no way applicable to the freeing of God from being the Author of that sin of which he is said by those men to predetermine the act For 1. Though a free power of acting good or evil be perfectly distinct and separable from doing evil and therefore God that is the Author of one cannot thence be inferred to be the author of the other yet the act of sin is not separable from the obliquity of that act the act of blasphemy from the obliquity or irregularity of blasphemie the least evil thought or word against an infinite good God being as crooked as the rule is straight and consequently he that predetermines the act must needs predetermine the obliquity Nay 2. if there were any advantage to be made of this distinction in this matter it would more truely be affirmed on the contrary side that God is the author of the obliquity and man of the act for God that gives the rule in transgressing of which all obliquity consists doth contribute a great deal though not to the production of that Act which is freely committed against that rule yet to the denominating it oblique for if there were no Law there would be no obliquity God that gives the law that a Jew shall be circumcised thereby constitutes uncircumcision an obliquity which had he not given that law had never been such But for the act as that differs from the powers on one side and the obliquity on the other it is evident that the man is the cause of that To conclude this Chapter It is a thing so undeniable that the Author of the act of hating God must needs be the Author of the obliquity that as the men of the Church of England affirm man to be the Author and the sole author of both and God of neither so the rigid Presbyterians as well as Papists affirm God to be the Author not onely of the act but of the obliquity of the Act. Witness Mr. Archer so much commended by Thomas Godwin in his Comfort for believers p. 36.37 Mr. Whitfield also and Mr. Hobbs Occham in sent 3. q. 12 cited by Dr Field p. 128. and Mr. Hickman in effect when he saith that God is the Cause of all Beings p. 78. and p. 95. and Pet. Mart. in 1 Sam. c. 2. CHAP. V. § 1. THE positive entity of sin is so clear from Scripture and from the writings of all the Fathers both Greek and Latine that as Mr. Hickman hath not attempted to give us Scripture for his opinion so the FATHERS are very few whose very figurative speeches do look that way And their meaning is so conspicuous by what the same Fathers say before and after that if he drank out of the Foâ—ntaines as I see he hath done out of several Cisterns I admire the greatness of his delusion His performance being no better then mine or any mans would be who should prove that an Idol hath not a positive being although the work of mens hands and made of Massy Gold or silver because it is said by the Apostle an Idol is nothing in the world Or that the Planters of Christianity had not onely no positive but not so much as a Real Being because it is said by the same Apostle that God hath chosen the things that are not to bring to naught things that are Yet this ad hominem is a strong way of arguing very much stronger then Mr. Hickmans by how much that of the Scripture is the greatest Authority in the world Now though it is said by the Holy Ghost that Circumcision is nothing that the foreskin is nothing that wicked men are of nothing that every man is but vanity yea and
altogether lighter then vanity it self which will be granted by all the world to have positive beings yet doth he not say in any one text That sin is nothing in the world or that Blasphemies and Rapes have no positive being but on the contrary sins are said to be the works of men and devils And now to prevent any exception to the propriety of the word § 2. Those are properly called sins which God himself in his written word doth commonly call by that name And how many things are there that have positive entities or beings by the very confession of Mr. H. and all that are of his way of which wickednesse and sin are found to be predicated in scripture As for example For the man to lie with the Masters wife Ioseph called a great wickedness and a sin aginst God To take another mans wife was called a great sin by King Abimelech And Ieroboam in driving Israel from following the Lord is said to have made them sin a great sin Davids sin is called a deed that is an act or fact 2 Sam. 12 14. If St. Paul had not thought that some sins are actions and that other sins are qualities he would not certainly have told us of the motions of sins and the lusts of sins The motions of sins which were by the Law did work in our members to bring fruit unto death Rom. 7.5 So in the 7. verse of that Chapter he expresseth sin by lust as lusting by coveting And yet so far is the Apostle from ascribing those positive things to God that speaking there of wilful sin in the person of a Carnal unregenerate man the doing that which he would not do he doth not add like Mr. Hickman It is not I that DO it but GOD that DOTH it in me No his words on the contrary are justly these It is no more I that do it but SIN that dwelleth in me That I may not be over-long in so clear a case I fain would know of Mr. Hickman whether those works of the flesh which are manifest saith the Apostle and set in opposition to the fruits of the spirit and by an opposition of contrariety too Gal. 5.17 I say I would know of Mr. Hickman whether those lusts of the flesh are not properly called sins And whether Adultery Fornication Vncleanness Lasciviousness Idolatry Witchcraft Hatred Variance Strife Seditions Heresies Envyings Murders Drunkenness Revellings and such like have not real and positive beings He will not sure deny this because he knows that these things are either qualities or actions Nor can he deny they are sins because they are set in a contrariety to the Fruits of the spirit and because it is added presently after that they which do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God And as I take it they must be sins for which the Doers are to suffer the loss of heaven which is waited on with the paines of Hell too When Iudas said I have sinned in that I have betrayed innocent blood Cain complained that his sin was greater then he could bear meaning the killing his brother Abel who sees not that sin is predicated in Recto of two such actions as are granted by all the world to have positive beings It is but dipping into the Scripture to finde abundance of such examples § 3. 'T were easy to write â— just volume in shewing the concurrence of Antient Fâ—THERS and even the least that I can shew with a desire of Brevity will be more then Mr. Hickman was able to wrest to his seeming interest I cannot better begin then with the great ATHANASIUS whom several mens misapprehensions have helpt to speak for their judgement against his own First he delivers his true meaning when he useth the expression of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 applied to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And therefore with the Apostle he first applies it unto Idols which had as positive beings as those that made them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Next he sets down the reason why he useth that expression 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and his reason is because they are not from him who is indeed the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but from those free and depraved Agents who revolting from their maker made them Idols or Gods of their own invention 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 4 where the lusts of the flesh which he calls the body are given as Instances of the sins to which the creature was now descended and by much repetition had made habitual After this he asserteth the opposition of contrariety twixt vice and virtue thereby proving the positivity as well of the one as of the other And giving examples of those actions as well as qualities which man is able to produce by being a voluntary Agent abusing the Liberty of his will to desires and lusts of his own forging he names the committing of Adultery Murder Rebellion Blasphemies Comumelies Perjuries plundering Beating Gluttony Drunkenness which though granted by all the world to be positive things are affirmed by that Father to be the wickednesse and sin of the soul of man 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 6. And to make it yet more undeniable that he opposeth his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to the excellent Creatures of God himself whom he often calls the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and not to all that hath a positive being He sets Concupiscencies or Lusts in opposition to the Creature that is the creatures of wicked men in opposition to those of God Then shewing the power of the soul to incite the members of the body and of her self to excite her self he saith in the concrete she formeth evil unto her self And so he proceeds to shew the errour of certain Graecians who held sin to have a substance and not to be a meer accident A substance created by a God too whom they would have to be coeternal with the Father of Lights and the maker of sin as a second Nature which from all eternity was collaterall with the First First in Dignity though not in Time 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 6. which shews Mr. Hickman the strange Impertinence of what he citeth from Athanasius p. 76. not onely quite beside but as I shall shew when I come thither against his purpose For the Father having proved against those hereticks That there is one onely God and that evil is a thing temporal not derived from God but from the voluntary creature indued with liberty of will goes on for several whole pages to speak as much for my purpose as I can wish him He shews the folly of their distinction who so endeavour to put a difference betwixt the act of hâ—ting God and the sin of hating God which they call the obliquity of the act as to affirm the first to be from God and therefore good the other evil and from the Creature whereas 't is impossible saith the Father that
own Lusts. CHA P. VI. § 1. HAving bestowed so much paper on what is thought of most moment I shall need spend but little in the dispatching of those flyes to which Mr. H. gives the name of Arguments Artificial p. 69. The first he confesseth was Mr. Barlees If sin as sin be a positive entity then it is a thing in it self good For t was added by Mr. B. but now substracted by Mr. H. every positive thing is good Sect. 2. To this I answered many things of which Mr. H. replyeth onely to a few As 1. That if sin is a thing positive he seeks to prove by this Argument that sin is good 2. That I had proved sin a thing positive in my two last sections which continuing firm and not disproved evinceth the force of his Argument to serve for nothing but only to prove that sin is good 3. That a thing which is privative in one respect is also positive in another As that which is privative of life and sight must needs be positive of Death and blindnesse 4. That Mr. B. himself did grant as much in confessing the efficient cause of sin and saying there may be somthing of positive in a privation 5. That in saying sin is privative he confesseth it is not a meer privation because a privation is but the abstract of privative and what is most positive in one case may be privative in another 6. That sin is not conceivable unlesse as a concrete which hath something positive as well as privative there being no kinde of difference betwixt Davids lying with Bathshebah and hiâ— Adultery with Bâ—thshebah at the time of her being Vriahs wife 7. That bonum Metaphysicum hath quite another signification then bonum morale to which alone we oppose sin or malum morale 8. That a Libertine a Ranter or a Carneadist will be glad to introduce an opinion that sin is good by calling it bonum Metâ—physicum and confounding that with bonum morale 9. That the subject of Metaphysicks is ens quatenus ens reale illud not omnimodo positivum quatenus positivum and so in one sensâ— it comprehendeth Res aliquid 10. That bonum metaphysicum doth not signifie good in English as Canis astronomicus doth not signifie a dog in our english streets and apprehensions 11. That Dr. Twisse was betrayed into one of his worst errourâ— that it is better to be tortured to all eternity then not to have a real being by not considering this very thing 12. That a lye is verum as much as sin is bonum Metaphysicum because it hath a positive being which proved the Argument to be impertinent at the best § 3. Now Reader observe what an incomparable confuter I have to deal with There are but four things of twelve on which his courage would serve him to try his teeth which finding also to be too hard he does as lepidly nibble at them as the tame creature did at the Thistles which made Philemon so full of laughter For to the first he thus replyes The designe of the argument is to fright Mr. P. out of his sad opinion concerning the positivity of sin by bringing him to the grand Absurdity of saying sinne is good p. 70. But I rejoyn 1. That my answer was designed to fright Mr. Hick from his opinion concerning Gods being the Author of all things positive nay of all things real too neither Blasphemy nor Buggery nor hating God being excepted by bringing him to the grand Absurdities of saying God is the Author of the greatest wickednesse in the world and withal of saying the greatest wickednesse is good 2. He cannot bring me to saying that sin is good but onely he can say he designed to bring me which shews the folly of his designe too For. 3. as I said that Bonum amongst the Heathen Metaphysicians did not signify good in our English acception of the word any more then malum which is latine for an apple can signifie evil in a Translation though malum is latine for evil too so I shall make it undeniable by appealing even to them who are partial to him whether we can properly say in English That it is good to hate God or good for Mr. Hickman to lie with a beast because they are actions which have positive entities and therefore are Bona Metaphysica in Mr. Hickmans Dialect Nay in very broad English Mr. H. will tell us that they are Good and from God if he dares say twice what he hath said too often by saying once to wit in his pages 95 96 4. I told him Aristotlâ—'s phrase of every entity being good should rather have been rejected as unsound and unsafe and so returned to that Heathen from whence it came then have been used by a Christian to prove it good to hate God And accordingly Dr. Stearn doth somewhere deny that metaphysical Axiom to be of universal truth for when it was urged that the Act of hating God must be good because ens bonum convertuntur he called it the begging of the question as well he might 5. Mr. H. saith theMaxime is ens bonum convertuntur not quatenus positivum and so ascribes an equal goodnesse to the formal obliquity which is ens as to the Act it self to which the obliquity it annexed 6. T were easy to prove to Mr. H. that the greatest Lye is as true as the truth it self because it is Aristotle's Maxime and as generally received as that he urged ens and verum convertuntur 7. I had told him whilest it was time that if by good he means bonum morale as to be pertinent he must he must also prove parricide incest witchcraft or Rebellion a thing neither better nor worse then witchcraft either meer privations of being or moral good things For according to his dreaming they must be nothing or 2. no sins or 3. moral vertues or 4. sins and moral vertues too § 4. He replyes to the third by a full Concession p. 70.71 But conceiving it a disgrace to stick at nothing he wholy passeth by my answer and onely quarrells my Illustration which yet in one sense he doth approve too That sense was mine and as pertinent it was as whatsoever similitude he hath stoln from Mr. Morice what I said of darknesse he confesseth to be a truth and with a But it is very vulgar p. 71. As if the Sun were the worse for being an every day spectacle He thought his axiom the better for being vulgar and gave it this commendation that it is commonly received p. 70. when he impertinently saith that darkness cannot be felt p. 72. he should have excepted the Aegyptian and that of his own apprehension which is now so palpable to every Reader 2. I gave an instance in the transgression of the Law which I said was sin and yet a thing positive as well as privative to wit privative of virtue and positive of vice To this Mr.
here observe two things 1 His affirming the act of Blasphemy to be from God as he doth expresly lin 13 14. Next his denying those things to be the works of the Divel to which the Scripture hath given that Name He denyes it here partly and partly pag. 96. what yet the Scripture asserteth plainly 1 Ioh. 3.8 But more of this Reason in the following Section For § 13. After five pages of impertinence he argues thus If a thing be therefore sinful because it wants some perfection that it ought to have and cease to be sinful when it hath all the perfection which it ought to have then is sin a privation but a thing is therefore sinfull c. Ergo pag. 84. As this is also taken from Mr. Barlow but no more acknowledged by the Taker then all the rest so an Answer to it is given in my Reply to Mr. Barlow in vindication of Dr. Field who having proved that there are acts to which no rectitude can be due to make them perfect as the act of hating God had such an answer from Master Barlow as I shew'd to be invalid in five respects And in each of them Mr. Hickman is equally concern'd But yet I add 1. that this makes against those sins onely which are onely sins because forbidden not at all against those which are onely forbidden for being sins of which I have spoken ch 3. § 6. That something may be evil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is affirmed by Saint Basil as he confesseth And that the action of hating God is intrinsecally evil we have his word p. 94. But 2. This onely proves that some sins are privative not that sin is a 〈◊〉 privation And what is privative of one thing is also positive of another as hath been shewed § 1. and 4. 3. Doctor Field and others have often told him of a positive repugnance to the Law of God And when it was said by himself pag. 79. he could derive the irregularity from corruption and the Divels Temptation he did not say it was not positive unless nothing can be so that is fâ—om corrupâ—ion and the Divel A man may thus make him confute himself of the vitall acts speaking and Blasphemy or lying he saith the former is from God the latter from the Divel and yet the Blasphemy is as positive as speaking can be because it is speaking to Gods dishonour and so at once in opposition and yet according to Mr. Hickman who is often Antipus to himself there are some things positive which are neither God nor from God but from corruption and the Divels temptation § 14. What he is wiâ—ling to inferr from the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 85. which he saw urged by Mr. Barlow in no less then three places I shall shew to be faulty in six respects 1. He seems not to have known what Mr. Barlow well knew but considered not that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in composition hath a threefold importance and thence is called by three names 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And that the Law is transgressed by him who adds to it or goes beyond it 2. By this way of arguing he might endeavour to prove God to be meerly privative because he is said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Infinite that is without any bounds or terms of being And Dionysius the Areopagite delights to tell us what he is by telling us what he is not as hath been shewd chap. 5. 3. What St. Iohn hath expressed by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 others commonly do express by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 each of which I now see in the same page of Athanasius who also puts 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as an instance of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 contra Gentes pag. 4. 4. There is nothing commoner in the N. T. then for words compounded with α to have a positive signification in one respect as well as a privative in another As Rom. 1.30.31 we find 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to import Rebellious 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 covenant-breakers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 implacable 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cruel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is foolish but so as foolish signifies unreasonable actions as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth malice and mischief against Christ Luk. 6.11 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 those that were guilty of brutish practises Tit. 3.3 v. D. H. in locum so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Damascene is positively liberal and used as an Epithet of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 positively confident 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a positive sorrow The word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rom. 1.28 does not onely denote a man who goes without a reward but that is positively opposite to every thing that is good as Doctor Ham. observes upon the place Noteh 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in aequivalence is the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which with the learnedest Remonstrants is actus hominis as hath been shew'd ch 3. § 25. And so it is with Hemmingius who saith the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unrighteousness which is used by Saint Iohn doth signifie in concreto whatsoever thing is done in a contrariety to the Law And accordingly I observe in the most Judicious Doctor Hammond that he takes the Transgressing of the Rule to be a positive thing a doing contrary to Gods commandment from whence ariseth the obliquity of any act 6. Nay Mr. Hick implies as much in the simplicity at least of his understanding which one Mr. Bagshâ—w was so ignorant â—s to believe he had expressed by a simplicity of heart whilst he confesseth that pravitas malitia 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 import the same with peccatum p. 54. § 15. And that peccatum doth import concretively both a positive Act and an obliquity or inordination may be made undeniable from the origin of the word as well as from the Authors by whom it is used 1. Pecco is a verb active peccare an action just as much as malefacere Peccatum clearly comes from the passive voice of that verb even as much as benefactum from the passive voice of benefacio multa peccantur legitur apud Cic. 1. Off. And peccare is a Transiâ—ive Plant. Bacch'd 8.29 And peccatum is sometimes a passive participle Terent. in prol Eunuch 27. And accordingly 't is said by all kinde of writers as well by our Enemies as our Friends that sin connoteth two things whereof the one is materiaâ— the other formal Not Aquinas onely and all his followers but Dr. Twisse and all his do affirm all sin to import 2 things sins of Omâ—ssion not excepted And Hemmingius saith that the matter of the sin against the holy Ghost is a contempt of Christ and hâ—s Gospel which he also saith is demonstrated both by St. Matthew and St. Mark I hope Mr. H will not say that the contempt
of the Gospel being positive is very good and from God which yet he must or he must sing his Recantation In a word It can no more be proved that sin is a privation and nothing else from the saying of St. Iohn that sin is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the Transgression of the Law 1 Iohn 3.4 then that Christ himself is not positive from the tropical saying of St. Paul that Christ was made sin 2. Cor. 5.21 or that darknesse is as positive as iron because the Angels were delivered to chaines of darknesse 2 Pet. 2.4 And whether it is not indeed a sin without any such figure or catachrestical way of speaking to ravish Virgins and lye with beasts to hate God and to love the Devil which are confessedly as positive as any actions that can be named I appeal to the usage of the word Sin in the common experience of all mankind § 16. His last argument as he calls it is very rare Original sin is not positive ergo sin as sin is not positive p. 8â— First for the manifold Absurdities as well as guilt into which he falls by his reduplication sin as sin I briefly refer to every part of my second chapter especially § 8 9 10 11 12 c. Next for what he saith of Original sin I refer to all I have produced from the Antient Fathers and learned modern Divines who held it to be a posiâ—ive quality in the third and fourth Sections of the fifth Chapter of this Book and also in the 3. Ch § 23. But thirdly as I never yet said so neither aâ— I concerned to say that all sins are positive It is enough that some are and those the worst to be imagined Nay Mr. H must be concluded a strange kinde of Blasphemer in saying all things positive are either Gods Creatures or God himself although there were but one sin that had a positive being such as was the Angels pride and the Divels hatred of God Almighty or the lusts of the Devil Joh. 8.44 Yet now to speak more of Original sin as that doth signifie the proneness of the will to evil after the image of Adams will from after the time of his Depravation it must needs be also positive to wit a conversion to the creature And why might not Adam acquire by his sin the image of Satan unto himself and offspring too as well as sin-away the Image of God But this is not that upon which I am obliged to lay a stresse Nor shall this be the subject of new disputes whether a man doth beget a man as much as a Horse begets a Horse It may be argued for ever on either side but I believe with greatest force for that part of the question to which St. Austin was most inclined and all that is said by Mr. H. doth but help to disprove Original sin for which Pelagians and Socinians may chance to thank him I know St. Paul held that the whole of man doth consist of three things Body Soul and Spirit concerning which Dr. Hammond hath a most profitable Discourse with a Reference to which I will shut up this Section see his Annotation upon 1 Thess. 5.23 § 17. Having seen his Reasons let us see what he saith to some few of mine or rather how guiltily he sneaks from the whole duty of a respondent p. 90. For though he knew what I had said to wit that Sins in Scripture are called works works of Darknesse works of the flesh works of mens hands and works of the Devil as it were on purpose to shew that they are positive things yet he passeth by that as if the word works had been of no consideration and onely nibbles at my saying That that was positive that Christ came to destroy concealing also from his Reader what I had cited from St. Iohn of Christs being manifested in the flesh that he might destroy the works of the Devil 1 Iohn 3.8 nor taking notice of what I said about vacuum vacui implying locatum as the privation of a privation implyeth position by all confessions I shewed it implyes a contradiction to say an habit is a privation because it is called by a Catachresis the privation of a privation when after a losse it is recovered from hence I argued that if the works of the Devil which are also called the Lusts of the Devil Joh. 8.44 had been meere privations the destruction of them could have been none But Mr. H's very weaknesse doth serve him here instead of strength for not considering that Death is said to be capable of destruction 1 Cor. 15.16 by the same catachrestical way of speaking whereby it is said in other places to have a body and a sting and so I might prove it at least to him to have a positive entity he urgeth his ignorance for a proof that of a meer privation there may be properly a privation How much better might I prove that death it self hath a positivity from Rev. 21.8 where to be burning in a lake of fire and Brimstone is expressed by the name of the second death But the work of the Devil is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly so called and therefore positive The words of St. Iohn are even litterally true 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 1 Joh. 3.4 and lusts are qualities Iohn 8.44 § 18. To the Argument which I urged from sins habitual or habits of sin such as Drunkennesse in a man who is seldom sober it seemes he knew so exactly that no good answer was to be given as to resolve to supply it with meer scurrility and impertinence p. 91. He is fain to say that I intended a Soriâ—es or rather seemed to intend it that he might seem to have something at which to nibble But no such thing as a Sorites was any more in my thoughts then in my mention And therefore this is so vile a practice as may be used by any Atheist who hath a minde to calumnâ—ate any passage of any writer It i an easy thing to say that such an Author makes a face as if he intended this or that which we have reason to believe he could not possibly intend But what saith the Rhapsodist to my Argument that vices are habits as well as vertues and therefore positive Qualities as well as Vertues He doth not deny that some sorts of vices indeed are Habits for he cannot think that an act of Drunkennâ—ss is a vice and that an habit of Drunkennenss is none at all nor can he think it impossible to be habituâ—lly drunk and that an habit is a thing positive he is so far from denying that he affirmes it he prâ—fesseth not to doubt of it p 92. so that now there is no question whether Drunkennesse when an habit is positive or not But whether or no it is a sin or whether it is not from God in Mr. Hickman's judgement one of the two we are assured by himsâ—lf is his
objecto and antecedently to the Law I say in this I have enough wherâ—by to prove him most clearly his own Refuter And yet I add that if the undue referring of hatred to God be not positive but privative as he unskilfully saith p. 95. then hatred being positive doth cease to be posiâ—ive by being fastened upon God as Mr. Hickman must needs inferr unless he denyes the hatred of God to be a sin and yet the fastening it on God is as positive as the fastening it on the Divel § 21. After this having itch to steal a discourse from Mr. Barlow concerning several grounds of Difference betwixt the sins of omission and commission And knowing not how to bring it in either by head or by shoulders by way of answer to any argument which he had seen in my writings thought fit to forge such a syllogism as might be suitable to his purpose and setting a bold face upon it to tell the Reader that it was mine pag 97. I stood amaz'd for some time at his resolution especially when I saw him making as good as a profession of such impiety For although he had directly laid his child at my doore and pronounced me the father without Reserve yet few lines after he confesseth in effect that it is his own For he confesseth he does but suppose that if my words were reduced to mood and figure they would appear in such a Form as he hath now represented p. 97. But least his Readers should see my words concerning sins of omission and commission by being directed to the page where I had spoken of that subject he straight creates an ignis fatuus whereby to lead them out of their way For he saith my words are p. 167. wherâ—as in all that page there are not onely no such words but no occasion or hint for so leud a Fiction The onely place for ought I know wherein I used any such terms as sins of omission and commisâ—ion but without any likeness to what he forgeth was pag. 146 And there my words were precisely these If sins of omission as not praying and not giving alms c. had but a deficient cause yet sins of commission as cursing and Sacriledge c. have a cause efficient with a witness It s true I said in another place p. 162. that whilst M. Hickman denyes sin to be something positive he seems to make no difference betwixt a simple negative and a privative properly so called And again confounds a privation properly so call'd with a thing call'd privative secundum quid He makes no difference betwixt not blessing and cursing God c where first I say not he makes no difference but that he seems to make none meaning none as to the point of its positivity And as to the force of my Accusation he hath not uttered one word in his own defence Nay he hath proved his gross mistake of a simple negative for a privative properly so called And so he proves I had used him with two much candor § 22. Of all the Texts which I had brought for the proving of sins being something positive 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 163. He wilfully passeth by the rest and shews his impertinence upon one in which the force of my Argument did least consist unless as it relates to the next text after of which M. Hickman would take no notice My Aâ—gument was that as we reade of great and litle sins in comparison so we reade in proportion of greater and lâ—ssâ—r damnation Mat. 23.14 Luk. 12.48 Now 't is so evident in it self and so acknowledged a thing amongst the men of all parties that all the Damned souls in hell are wholly destitute of Grace and that of those who have a totall privation of it some shall have fewâ—r and sâ—me more stripes some a lesser and some a greater damnation that I thought Mr. Hickman could not choose but understand me but being convinced of the truth which yet he resolved to abjure sought to hide his conviction by this incomparable Impertinence That he would answer if he could guess where the vein of proof did lye and if he may guess it lyes in this that there can be no degrees in a privation p. 99. In which words ' â—is hard to say how many wayes he is unhappy 1. He cannot guess wherein the force of the proof doth lye and yet he will answer for all his ignorance But 2. he will not answer neither unless he may have leave to forge the thing to which he conceives he can give an answer if he may make a man of cloâ—ts he will adventure on that condition to strike at it when he hath done 3. He either thinks there are degrees even of total privations of which some are privations of no more then all grace but others of all and some too or else 4. of those that are damned in hell he thinks that some have more grace some less or some none at all some less then none at all Because some have a greater some a lesser damnation For my Inference is this That of those that are wholly deprived of grace some are greater sinners then others and more tormented Whose sin by consequence must be something besides a whole privation of grace It was indeed for want of Grace or by resisting Grace given that Ammon lusted after fiâ—st and secondly loathed his sister Tamar But besides that want or privation of Grace there were some positive effects which were damning sins 1. He lusted after 2. He dissembled with 3. He violently defiled 4. He hated his injured sister It is not through a want of Grace but abundance of wilfulnesse that some do resist the holy Ghost and depart from grace given And sure besides the privation of Grace there is that in some sinners by which they are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inventors of evil things In a word there is some thing pâ—sitivâ— above the total privation of Grace by which it shall be more tolerable in the day of judgement for one reprobate then another So Mr. H. aymes purposely beside the mark unlesse he thinks there is Grace in hell Sect. 23. I having argued that sin is sâ—id to work in the Sinner all manner of concupiscence Rom. 7.8 perfectius est agere quà m esse Mr. H. saith that in such speeches sin signifies not abstractly and formally but it signifies our nature and its faculties as under corruption c. p. 100 Here is work for a volume if I could think it not below me to pursue Mr. H. in all his follies First I note his Confession that sin doth signifie something positive concretively and materially and that in Scripture Next his self-contradiction in that he had said p. 54. sin is so perfectly an abstract that if we conceive not of it as an abstract we cannot conceive of it as sin 3. His vertual denyal that sin and sinfulnesse are synonymous which yet he affirmed p. 53.