sin it is suggested by some and believed by others that we make the holy God the Author of sin which is the dregs of blasphemie and that which every serious spirit abhors more than Hel. Yet we need no way to dout but that with divine assistance we may firmly assert and demonstrate the efficacitie of Divine concurse to the material entitative act of that which is sinful and yet fully vindicate the Divine Majestie from that blasphemous Imputation of being the Author of sin And for our more distinct and demonstrative procedure herein we propose this method or form as most apt for the subject mater before us 1 To examine and explicate the Terms formally implied in or virtually relating to the subject in controversie 2 To shew wherein the opposite parties agree and wherein they differ both among themselves and each from other together with the original and principal motives grounds and causes of such Differences 3 To give a Scriptural Explication and Demonstration of our own Hypothesis touching Gods efficacious concurse to the substrate mater of that which is sinful with an answer to those false glosses and comments which our Adversaries the Jesuites Arminians and some new Methodists give to those Scriptures for the evading the force of them 4 To draw up a brief Historie or Narrative of this controversie and its state in al periods of the Christian Churches to this day 5 To give the Demonstration of our Hypothesis from Reasons grounded on Scripture with the Vindication of those Reasons from the ungrounded invalid answers given to them by our opponents Strangius and others 6 To solve and answer the Objections urged by those that oppose our Hypothesis particularly Strangius Baranius Le Blanc with others 7 And finally to lay down the proper Sentiments and Hypotheses of the Orthodoxe about this subject in opposition to those false Opinions which their Adversaries charge upon them as also to produce the proper opinions of the adverse party and the dangerous consequences that naturally and necessarily flow from them § 2. Our first and indeed principal task in order to a clear and demonstrative procedure in this controversie wil be to explicate the termes and disabuse them from those ambiguities confusions and false impositions in which at present they are involved And here indeed I cannot but break forth into a doleful Lamentation over the bleeding state of the Churches of Christ by reason of those vexatious controversies which rend and tear out their very bowels and al from the sophistic abuse or Ambiguitie of termes And I no way dout but to make it most manifest when opportunitie is offered that most of the controversies of this Age are somented and maintained from the obscuritie and abuse of termes misapplyed by subtile wits for the establishment of their own Hypotheses This is most evident in our present case which makes it a duty absolutely necessary before we enter on our province to clear up the way by a distinct and particular explication of those termes that relate thereunto The first Terme we are to consider is Sin wherein we are to examine its Origne Causes Constitution both material and formal and Kinds particularly the nature of Acts substantially or intrinsecally sinful al which we shal discusse with that Brevitie and Perspicuitie the mater wil admit 1. As for the Origine of Sin it came first into the world from the Defectibilitie of our first Parents their Free-wil and has been ever since maintained and fomented by the Vitiositie of human nature depraved by Adams sin as we have copiosely demonstrated Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. § 2. and Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 3. 2. Sin as to its material constitution has for its substrate mater or subject some natural good For al sin being as to its formal nature but a moral privation or relation it necessarily requires some natural good as its substrate mater or subject The wise Creator and Gubernator of althings has by his Law so constituted al moral Beings both Virtues and Vices as that they cannot subsist but in something natural albeit sin be according to its formal reason a mere privation yet it requires some positive real natural Being for its subject according to the nature of al other privations Thus Augustin That which is evil by reason of vice is good by nature Again he saith That sin is not nature but the vice of nature And that trite Maxime communly received by al the Ancients That al evil is founded in some good i. e. natural sufficiently demonstrates this our assertion Thus Augustin Enchirid. 97. Although therefore things sinful as sinful are not good yet not only that good things but also that sinful be is good i. e. things sinful are good not morally but naturally as means utile and conducible to the promoting of Divine glorie for albeit they oppose the bonitie of the creature yet materially considered they oppose not the bonitie of the Creator who can extract the greatest good out of the greatest evils Doth it not then belong to the infinite bonitie of God to permit sins to be Yea doth not the ingresse of sin into the world belong to the perfection thereof is not then the substrate mater thereof some natural good This is wel demonstrated by Suarez Metaph. Disput 11. sect 3. p. 252. Sin as sin has a material cause which is always some good So Augustin saith That there can be no evil but in good because if there were pure evil it would destroy itself and the reason is because sin as to its formal cause is not purely positive or a pure negation but a privation of debite perfection therefore it requires a subject unto which such a perfection is due which subject must be some good c. Yea Strangius himself our principal Adversary in this Controversie grants in this particular as much as we demand pag. 629. That it is absurd to say any sin or defect can exist of itself sithat there can be no separate evil but al evil is seated in good Yea he ingenuously confesseth pag. 245. That hatred of God which is an action intrinsecally evil as it is an Act and Being so it is from God namely as it is hatred For adds he So hatred truly as it is abstracted from this or that object is a physic action to which the metaphysic bonitie of Ens or Being agrees and it is morally indifferent but as it is determined to God hence is its 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Obliquitie This concession of Strangius if wel considered would not only overthrow his own Antithesis against our Hypothesis but also put a period to this Controversie as in what follows we shal demonstrate Chap. 6. § 1. 3. But the principal thing to be examined in the explication of sin is its formal Constitution or Reason which we shal endeavour to manifest in the following Propositions 1 Al human
THE COURT OF THE GENTILES PART IV. Of Reformed Philosophie BOOK III. Of Divine Predetermination WHEREIN The Nature of Divine Predetermination is fully Explicated and Demonstrated both in the General as also more Particularly as to the Substrate Mater or Entitative Act of Sin WITH A Vindication of Calvinists and others from that Blasphemous Imputation of Making God the Author of Sin By Theophilus Gale Si Pelagio tantillum dederis danda sunt omnia Cornel. Jansen Praefat. in Pelag. LONDON Printed for John Hill at the Black Lyon in Fleet-street and Samuel Tidmarsh at the Kings-Head in Cornhill 1678. PREFACE THE strong and almost invincible Inclination I have to Solitude and Retirement with a natural aversion from the Controversies of this Age wherein there is so little of Christian Candor Fidelitie Ingenuitie and Moderation to be found hath given me no small satisfaction in my being exemted hitherto from those vexatious Conflicts which I see many learned and pious men involved in and it seems to me a thing no lesse than prodigious to consider with what warm zele and self-complacence some learned men contend in the mists and clouds of ambiguous termes as if they had no other designe but that of some Mercenary Soldiers who do what they can to protract the War These and such like considerations have kept me for some Moneths from the publication of this Discourse with hopes there might be found out some Expedients for the putting a period to those unhappy Controversies it refers to which I now have little hopes of But enough of that The Discourse it self both as to its first conception and present publication has not been without various agitations in mine own thoughts and how little my natural Inclinations have induced me hereto is wel known to some But I must confesse the crime charged on us being no lesse than Blasphemie against the God of Heaven it may be deservedly judged too great a violation to the Laws of Christianitie not to purge our selves from so black an Imputation and yet in as much as some reverend Divines of repute among us both for their Learning and Pietie have entertained Sentiments opposite to our Hypothesis we have been very studious yea emulous to deliver our own thoughts in such a mode or forme as may be least obnoxious to passionate emotions personal reflexions or whatever may unbeseem one that lies under essential obligation to love and honor the Persons of some that differ in Judgement about these points Wherefore to render our Discourse the lesse offensive we have cast it into a thetic and dogmatic Method rather than agonistic and polemic And because it is altogether impossible distinctly and demonstratively to discusse such an Hypothesis without some opposition against such as defend the Antithesis we have pitcht on Strangius as our principal Antagonist who indeed to give him his merited character has ventilated this Controversie with candor perspicuitie and force of Argument beyond his Sectators Yet we must also do the Cause we undertake this justice as to declare that we have not omitted to examine the Reasons and Arguments of other Reverend Divines who oppose our Hypothesis albeit we have as in dutie we conceived our selves obliged conceled their Names For indeed of what use are such personal Nominations and Reflexions but to render us a grief to Friends and reproche to Enemies As for my Stile if any judge my pen too much drenched in Scholastic Theologie I shal not denie but that I have spent some time in those Studies neither do I as yet see any reason to repent thereof for I have found those Controversies about Divine Concurse and Efficacious Grace no where more accurately examined and demonstratively determined than among the Scholemen specially Bradwardine and Alvarez neither can I conceive how any one can distinctly and perfectly discusse these Controversies specially as now miserably perplexed with ambiguous obscure termes without some inspection into and knowledge of Scholastic Theologie For doth not a principal part of the Controversie depend on that scholastic Notion of Free-will Yea is there any thing New started by the Arminians or New Methodists but what has been fully examined and answered by some among the more sober Scholemen specially Aquinas Ariminensis Bradwardine and Alvarez Whatever others may judge of them yet Reverend Mr. Baxter Cathol Theol. Part 1. p. 124. prefers the Scholemen before Arminians And albeit I have a particular kindnesse for some of the more sober Scholemen as to such points wherein they serve not the Papal Interest and their own vain Imaginations yet what a low and cheap estime I have of the Scholemen in the general is sufficiently apparent by the Character I have given them Court of the Gentiles Part III. B. 2. c. 2. S. 1. § 2. And indeed I would read them with the same indifference and suspension of mind as I read Plato and Aristotle But to conclude if any private Christian desires not to charge his thoughts with the Scholastic part of this Controversie but only to satisfie his Douts and confirme his Faith in the Scriptural part he may confine himself to Chap. III. of this Discourse which contains almost a third Part of the Book where we have under seven general Heads largely given the Scriptural Demonstrations of our Hypothesis Touching Gods Concurse to the entitative Act of Sin with Solutions to such false Glosses and Comments as our Adversaries give thereto which are suited to Vulgar Capacities BREVIARIE of CONTENTS The COURT of the GENTILES PART IV. Of Reformed Philosophie BOOK III. Of Divine Predetermination CHAP. I. The Explication of the Termes THE Controversie about Predetermination to the entitative act of Sin p. 2 Seven heads to be discussed by us 3 The Explication of the Termes 4 1. Of Sin 1 Its origine ibid. 2 It s substrate mater 5 3 It s formal Constitution 6 1 Al acts in their generic nature indifferent ib. 2 Al moral Constitution from the Divine Law ibid. 3 Sin formally considered privative 7 4 The Kinds of sinful actions 8 1 Actions modally sinful 9 2 Actions intrinsecally sinful ib. 2. The natural libertie of the Wil what 10 The New Methodists distinction of Libertie largely and strictly taken examined and refelled 11 The true Idea of Libertie 12 3. Moral Libertie or Free-wil to good 13 Of Necessitie Impossibilitie Possibilitie 15 4. The Wil of God its Distribution into significative and decretive 17 5. Divine Concurse 1 Its Immediation consisting not in a mere Habilitie to act but in exciting to act 19 2 Its Efficacitie and Predetermination 21 1 Efficacious Concurse what 22 2 Determinative Concurse what 23 3 Predeterminative Concurse what 24 Predeterminative Concurse active and passive also Physic and Moral 25 Gods Predetermination to wicked acts 27 CHAP. II. The state of the Controversie THE agreament of the Predeterminants and Antipredeterminants in ten Propositions 28 c. The Antipredeterminants differences among themselves in 5 particulars 34 c. The
2. 11. 93. Hebrews Ch. Vers Pag. 4. 7. 23 James Ch. Vers Pag. 4. 15. 53 1 Peter Ch. Vers Pag. 2. 8. 105 Jude Ch. Vers Pag. 4.  107 Revelations Ch. Vers Pag. 17. 17. 81 Table of Hebraic Words Explicated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 verily p. 102 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to termine and determine 23 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to decree 24 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to make to stand 102 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 daub or dim 91 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to contrive 55 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath daubed 92 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Judgement 88 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he infatuateth ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to found 104 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he excited 75 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mine omnipotent severitie 103 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to ordain 104 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because 86 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be determined 23 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to cover over by daubing thence to expiate and purge 100 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Stumbling-stone or block 100 105 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to mingle or pour forth 92 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 stumbling or smiting 100 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to predetermine 80 81 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they were designed 105 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to work efficaciously 22 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to declare  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to worke 22 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 thick darknesse 93 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 efficaciously to worke 103 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to explicate more clearly 60 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to erect 102 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to stupifie 91 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to seal or constitute 24 65 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a deceiver 88 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 spoiled ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to constitute or destine 106 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to predetermine 90 102 Table of Grecanic Words Explicated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 reprobate drossie 93 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a fixed decree 62 63 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he peremtorily willed 86 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a determined decree 81 82 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hath predetermined 80 81 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Efficacitie what 22 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to worke efficaciously 22 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I have constituted 102 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 legal Autoritie 61 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to Predetermine 103 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 what 91 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aptly to fit or frame 104 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to determine 23 24 60 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a stupifying Portion 91 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 designed 107 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to predetermine 24 60 64 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to preordain 24 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Stone of offence 100 105 107 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bow down 91 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to cooperate 22 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to constitute 106 107 THE COURT OF THE GENTILES PART IV. Of Reformed Philosophie BOOK III. Of Divine Predetermination Wherein the Nature of Divine Predetermination is fully explicated and demonstrated both in the general as also more particularly as to the substrate matter or entitative act of Sin CHAP. I. The Explication of the Terms 1 The Origine of the controversie about Predetermination to the entitative act of Sin with the method we procede in 2 The Nature of Sin its Origine and material constitution al acts in their generic nature indifferent Al Morality determined by the Moral Law Sin as to its formal reason a privation Of actions modally and intrinsecally evil 3 The Libertie of the Wil The new-coined distinction of Libertie largely and strictly taken with its abuse A true Idea of Libertie 4 Moral Libertie or Free-wil to good Necessitie Impossibilitie Possibilitie what 5 The Wil of God its Distribution into Significative and Decretive 6 Divine Concurse its Immediation Efficacitie and Predetermination 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with the Nature of Predetermination explicated § 1. THE Doctrine of Divine Concurse and Creatural Dependence has in al Ages of the Church but more specially since the rise of Pelagianisme received vigorous assaults from many learned and potent Adversaries and indeed no wonder sithat corrupt Nature propagated from Adam has in imitation of its first parent been ever aspiring after an equality to the Deitie and that not only in being the last End of its Acting but also the first Principe of its Dependence This vain attemt has appeared more visibly in some daring and proud spirits such as Nebuchadnezar Dan. 4. 30. Is not this great Babylon that I have built c But in others the Design and opposition against the Concurse of God has been more refined under a pretext of vindicating the Divine Majesty from the blasphemous imputation of being the Author of sin And because al pious Souls have so great a veneration for the Blessed Deitie as to abhor the very shadow of such Blasphemie therefore the Adversaries of Divine Concurse have in al Ages pitcht on this as the most puissant argument to oppose the same that it brings the most holy and blessed God under the black imputation of encouraging yea impelling men to Sin And albeit those that assert Gods efficacious Concurse to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin do most vehemently detest in their own souls and solemnly protest against the least thought or opinion that makes God the Author of sin yet nevertheless this direful piece of blasphemie is stil charged on them Moreover there being in this Doctrine of Efficacious Concurse as in al other great Mysteries of Faith some intricate difficulties which the wise God has left us under to trie our faith and submission to divine Revelation hence also many learned and some pious men have been at a great loss in their Inquiries how to reconcile the Libertie of the human Wil with the Efficace of Divine Concurse so as to free the blessed God from the imputation of impelling men to Sin These and such like considerations made me the more prolixe in the philosophic metaphysic contemplation of the Divine Concurse its Nature Origine and manner of working particularly as to the entitative act of what is sinful together with the creatures Dependence thereon which I have more fully discussed Court of the Gentiles Chap. 7 9 11. with design and endeavours if it might be to give the blessed God and his sinful Creature both their dues and remove those extremes which men are apt to fal into But these my sincere desires and endeavours have not had that success which was desired which brings me under a fresh obligation to vindicate mine own Hypothesis touching the efficacious concurse of God to the substrate mater or entitative act of what is sinful I must confess the province before us is difficult on many accounts but principally because whiles we endeavour to defend the Concurse and Providence of God about the entitative act of
acts considered in their generic physic Entitie or natural Being abstracted from their moral constitution are neither good nor evil but morally indifferent Al moral Beings or Acts are scated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in proper nature as Cyril neither can they existe without that proper nature whereunto they are appendent There is no virtue or vice which has not something of nature for its subject and seat it 's true there may be nature where there is no moralitie yet there cannot be moralitie where there is not some nature to sustain the same Now al human nature as also al natural Acts considered in their generic natural Idea albeit capable of virtue or vice yet are in themselves morally indifferent Al thoughts words and actions considered physically and abstractly without regard to their moral determination by the Wil and Law of God are neither good nor evil For Moralitie is a mode not physically or intrinsecally inherent in human acts but appendent to them from the determination of the Divine Law The very acts of loving and hating God considered in their generic physic and entitative nature as abstracted from the moral relation they have to their object are morally neither good nor evil because moral Bonitie and Vitiositie are differences of human acts merely accidental or modal as Suarez and other Scholemen generally grant Thus much Strangius frequently grants as pag. 158. he saith That moral Bonitie and Vitiositie are accidents of natural Actions So pag. 875. The action considered apart and physically is morally indifferent neither may it be lesse subject to virtue than to vice Hence 2 Al Moralitie and moral Acts whether good or evil receive their Constitution and Determination from the moral Divine Law This Hypothesis is defended by Scotus and other Scholemen and that on the highest reasons For the Divine Wil is the supreme measure and rule of al Justice and Sanctitie Things are therefore just and good because God wils them and whatever God wils is for that very reason because God wils it good and just Therefore that Platonic notion defended by some learned men That the reasons of good and evil are eternal is of dangerous consequence albeit it hath somewhat of Truth as other errors have mixed with it we grant that in things morally good there is a natural condecence or congruitie to human nature even antecedent to the Divine wil and constitution As on supposition of mans being created he immediately falls under a necessary and essential obligation of loving God hating sin c. These are duties naturally congruous yea morally necessary to human nature Whence it is that Divines usually determine That Original Righteousness was natural to Adam i. e. most condecent congruous and morally necessary to his Nature Yet all this hinders not but that the formal Determination of al Morals arise from the free constitution of the Divine wil and Law The Law of God is the great Expansum or firmament which God has spread over the rational world whereby al Mankind are moderated and regulated in al their moral Acts and by which they shall be at last day judged whence it necessarily follows that al moral constitution must procede hence as we have more amply demonstrated Court Gentiles P. 4. B. 1. c. 2. § 1 2. Thus also Voetius Disput Theolog. Par. 1. de jure justit Probl. 10. p. 351. proves That the divine wil is the fountain and rule of al Goodness So much also Strangius grants us p. 89. namely That as whatever is true is therefore true because conform to the first Truth so whatever is good is therefore good because conform to the first Goodness and as the Truth of God belongs to his Intellect so Goodness to his Wil. The like Mr. Baxter Catholick Theolog. Part 1. p. 100. Al created Justice and Holiness is such i. e. good for goodness is their essence because Gods efficient wil made them so Hence 3 The formal reason or nature of Sin consists in its being a Deordination or Transgression of the Divine Law This Proposition is fully stated and demonstrated in Sacred Philosophie as we have copiosely proved Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. § 1. and Philos General P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. S. 4. § 1. so that it requires not further Explication or Demonstration Hence 4 Sin as to its formal constitution and nature is not a positive real Being but privative This Hypothesis has found general assent to it among al the Ancients both Pagan Philosophers and Christians excepting some few Marcion and Manes with others It 's true the Manichees held Sin to be a positive Being and they took up principes suited thereto namely That there were two first Beings or Causes one of good the other of evil But the sober Philosophers and Christians abhorred such sentiments Simplicius on Epictetus c. 34. p. 171. has an excellent Discourse to prove that sin is not in the nature of Beings but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a privation of Good which we have largely explicated Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3 § 4. § 2. And this was generally asserted by the Greek and Latin Fathers Thus the spurious Dionysius assures us that Sin must necessarily be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without nature without subsistence So Greg. Nyssen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is an insubsistent Being or privation And it was a general conclusion in the Greek Scholes that sin resulted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from the absence of good as darkness from the absence of light Thus also among the Latins Augustin asserted that Sin was not Nature but the evil of Nature Again the Amission of Good has taken up the name of Sin And Strangius who is our principal adversary in this controversie yet l. 1. c. 13. p. 97 c. he strongly demonstrates this Hypothesis That the formal reason of sin consists in Privation This I conceive deserves a particular remarque because some late Authors and those not of inferior note make great use of this Antithesis namely That Sin is as to its formal nature positive as their chief engine to oppose our general Hypothesis touching Gods efficacious concurse to the substrate mater of that which is sinful They tel us that Sin as to its forme is not a mere privation but a moral Relation which has so much Realitie as a relation But to obviate al mistakes and verbal contests we grant 1 That Sin may be termed a moral privative relation or rather relative privation as it is a transgression of and so must have relation to the Moral Law 2 That Sin is not a mere nothing but has some kind of logic positivitie or notional entitie so far as to render it capable of being the terme of a Proposition as we have more fully shewen Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. S. 4. § 2. But 3 We may not yield that Sin is a moral positive Relation much less a positive act or real Being such as
is from the Creature 3 Between the wil of God decreeing and the wil of God commanding Whence he concludes Thes 100. p. 427. For God wils and produceth by the Creature as the first Cause by the second the Act as an Act of it self indifferent to moral Bonitie and Vitiositie and wils and effectes the same albeit depraved by the Creature as invested with his moral rectitude because he produceth it by his own power from his immaculate Sanctitie and Justice which can never be made crooked or corrupted by any second Cause Whence he addes Thes 101. And this act essentially good even as defiled by the Creature God justly and holily useth either as an Instrument of punishment or of exploration or exercice and as an ordinate convenient Medium according to his Justice for the best ends Thes 102. In this sense God is said To create evil to produce it out of his mouth to send Joseph into Egypt by the Vendition of his Brethren to rob Job of his goods to command Shimei to curse David to use Absolon for the defiling his Fathers Concubines to deliver Christ into the hands of Jews and Gentiles Thes 103. For God decreed to produce those acts as acts and to permit the depravation of them by the Sinners and to use them albeit depraved wisely and justly to ends holily ordained by him 2. Divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin may be also demonstrated from the formal nature of Sin which consistes in the privation of that moral rectitude due to actions as Ch. 1. § 2. we have more fully explicated Whence we thus argue If every deflexion from the Law of God be sin then certainly God necessarily predetermines to the substrate mater of some sins and if of some why not of al even such as are intrinsecally evil That God predetermines to the substrate mater of some sins is evident and that from the concessions of our Adversaries who grant That God doth predetermine the Wil to actions imperfectly good which also according to their own confessions are modally sinful Whence we thus argue The substrate mater of the same action as good and as sinful is the same wherefore if God predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the action as good must he not also predetermine it to the substrate mater of the same action as sinful When we say That God predetermines to the substrate mater of the same action as sinfil As here may not be taken reduplicatively but only specificatively i. e. as it specifies and distributes the same action into good and sinful which are different modes of one and the same substrate mater or entitative act so that our Opponents granting that God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the action as imperfectly good how can they possibly denie that God predetermines it also to the same substrate mater which is modally sinful When I can see a rational solution given to this argument which I despair of I shal think our Adversaries have done much service to their Cause But they replie If God concur by determinative influence to imperfectly good actions it doth not thence follow that he concurs to actions intrinsecally and in the substance of them evil But I conceive this evasion wil soon vanish into smoke and vapor if we consider wel 1 That the least sin may not be imputed unto God as the Author of it any more than the greatest the difference between sins modally and intrinsecally evil finds no place here dare our Adversaries say that God is the Author of that modal sin which adheres to actions imperfectly good but not of that intrinsecal evil which is in the hatred of God or the like Whence 2 The force of our Argument ariseth from this paritie of reason If God doth concur yea predetermine the wil to an act only modally sinful without falling under the imputation of being the Author of sin why may he not also predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of that which is intrinsecally evil without the like imputation Albeit there be a disparitie in the sins yet is not the paritie of reason for the one and the other the same Ought we not to be as cautelous in exemting the Sacred Majestie of God from having any hand in the least sin as in the greatest And if we allow our selves the libertie of making him the author of the least sin wil not that open a wide gate for atheistic blasphemous wits to impute to him the greatest sins Whence if we can prove what our Adversaries wil never be able to disprove yea what they approve of namely that God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater or entitative act which is imperfectly good but modally sinful it thence follows by necessary consequence and inevitable paritie of reason that he can and doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of that which is intrinsecally evil without the least imputation of being the Author of sin annexed thereto I would fain have our Opponents weigh impartially the force of this Argument § 6. Our next Argument for Gods Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin shal be drawen from his Permission of Sin And to make way to this demonstration we must distinguish of Permission which is either legal or natural Natural Permission is either divine or human and both either negative or positive 1 God gives no legal Permission or Indulgence to sin but on the contrary severely prohibites it and that on pain of death 2 Gods natural Permission as Rector of the World is not of sin simply as sin but as conducible to the principal ends of his divine Gubernation It 's true Divine Permission regardes not only the substrate mater of sin but also sin formally considered and so sin under that reduplication as sin yet not simply considered but as it has a tendence or conducibilitie to the advance of Divine Glorie and so much is confessed by Strangius l. 2. c. 22. p. 399. If the Reduplication be joined to the terme sin it 's true that sin as sin is permitted by God physically not morally Yet I adde not simply but respectively as conducible to Gods supreme ends of Government And Lud. Crocius Duodec Dissert 8. Thes 74. pag. 415. assertes That God albeit he wils and decrees only the material of sin yet unbelieving and disobedient both Iews and Cananites c. 2. Whereas he tels us that the Mythologists say Mars was the first that invented militarie weapons and affairs c. This may as well refer to Joshua as to Nimrod For albeit Nimrod began wars in Asia the greater or Babylon yet we find no considerable wars amongst the Cananites or Phenicians till Ioshua's time who by reason of his great militarie Exploits and victories might well be reputed the God of War Mars or Hercules 3. That which may adde to this parallelizing of Mars with Ioshua is that the Mythologists whom Diodorus
God a velleitie or imperfect conditional volition which never takes effect 7. There is something in Nature which was never decreed by the God of Nature 8. God hath a general antecedent conditional love and desire of the Salvation of al men 9. Some Decrees of God may be frustrated and never come to passe 10. The reason why God hated Esau and loved Jacob must not be resolved into the 〈◊〉 or good pleasure of God but into his prescience of Esau's actual and final disobedience and Jacobs obedience 11. There is Scientia media or middle Science in God dependent on mans ambulatory wil and so only conjectural and uncertain 12. God as an idle Spectator looks on the wicked world but doth not neither can omnipotently rule dispose and order their sinful acts for his glorie 13. When it 's said that God wils the permission of sin it must be understood only of the effect 14. Al Divine Concurse is not particular total immediate and efficacious 15. The creature is in some natural acts independent and the first cause of its own acts or the second cause can act without being applied and actuated by the first cause 16. God can make a creature which by having its capacitie preserved and made habile can of itself act without immediate efficacious concurse Baron 131. 17. Supernatural good is from God but not al natural good 18. Efficacious grace in Conversion destroyeth human libertie 19. Gods efficacious Concurse is in the power of mens natural free wil either to use or refuse the same 20. God vouchsafeth to al men sufficient grace which if wel improved he wil reward with efficacious grace Strang. 229. 21. Al Predetermination impels the wil and acts it as a mere Machine 22. There is a twofold libertie one essential to the wil but lesse proper the other accidental consisting in indifference which is most proper 23. Alhuman acts ought not to be performed for Gods glorie 24. The vitiositie of sin is essential to some human natural acts as natural We do not produce the consequents here drawen from the Antitheses of Antipredeterminants as their proper sentiments at least not of al that espouse those Antitheses but only as such as may be naturally and logically deduced from their Antitheses albeit they do not formally assent to al of them FINIS ERRATES BOOK II. PAge 489. l. 31. for God read us BOOK III. Page 10. l. 33. for drive r. denie p. 22. l. 26. after elswhere put a period Item l. 36. dele by p. 23. l. 32. r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 24. l. 39. dele and. p. 28. l. 1. dele and stating p. 42. l. 36. r. that God only p. 76. l. 19. r. same p. 79. l. 38. r. to Gods p. 80. l. 31. for like r. agreable p. 86. l. 7. r. Tarnovius p. 89. l. 3. for is he r. he is p. 111. l. 18. for Baronius r. Bellarmine p. 119. l. 16. r. c. 34. p. 129. l. 23. r. This he p. 142. l. 5. dele who p. 145. l. 2. r. so not p. 166. l. 26. r. Compton p. 170. l. 9. r. it workes The Origine of the Controversie The method of our procedure The explication of the Termes Of Sin 1. It s Origine 2. It s substrate mater Quod malum est per vitium bonum est per naturam Aug. contra Advers Leg. Prophet cap. 5. Absurdum esset si diceretur ullum defectum aut peccatum aut ullum peccatum aut defectum posse per se existere cùm nullum detur separatum malum sed omne malum sit in bono Strang. de Volunt l. 3. c. 19. p. 629. Al Acts in their generic nature indifferent Actio seorsim per se physicè considerata indifferens est moraliter nec minùs virtuti quà m vitio substerni potest Al moral constitution from the Divine Law Sin as to its formal nature a privation Actions modally sinful Actions intrinsecally evil The Libertie of the Wil. The new coined distinction of Libertie largely and strictly taken The True Idea of Libertie f Libertas voluntatis in genere nihil aliud esse videtur quà m 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 spontaneum intellectuale Strang. l. 3. c. 14. p. 686. Moral Libertie or free-wil to good Necessitie impossibilitie and possibilite what In libero arbitrio est simultas potentiae ad opposita sed non potentia simultatis Alvarez The wil of God its distributions c. Of Divine Concurse Immediate Concurse what Efficacious and predeterminant concurse Efficacions concurse what Eph. 1. 19. Ephes 3. 7. Phil. 3. 21. 1 Cor. 12. 6 11. Rom. 7. 5. 2 Cor. 4. 12. 1 Cor. 12. 11. Eph. 1. 11. Determinative Concurse what Act. 17. 26. Heb. 4. ◠Luke 22. 22. Acts 2. 23. Predeterminative concurse what in Scripture 1 Cor. 2. 7. Rom. 8. 29 30. Eph. 1. 5 11. Acts 4. 28. Predeterminative Concurse active and passive Predetermination physic and moral Praedeterminare voluntatem est applicare voluntatem ad agendum facere ut faciat Strang. Wherein we and our Opponents agree Volitiones pure conditionales sunt alienae à sapientia prudentia Dei Ruiz de Volunt Dei Disp 20. §. 1. Wherein our Opponents differ among themselves Their differences 1. about Gods Prescience 2. The futurition of sin 3. Divine Concurse 4. Gods permission of sin 5. The nature of sin difnew 1. As to Gods Decrees 2. The Futurition of sin 3. Gods permissive Decree 4. Gods prescience of sin 5. Divine Predetermination 6. Human Libertie 7. God not the Author of Sin Scriptural Demonstrations 1. God the first Cause of al natural Actions and Things Esa 26. 12. Rom. 11. 36. * Nam vitiorum nostrorum non est auctor Deus sed tamen ordinator est Eph. 1. 11. Psal 33. 15. Prov. 21. 1. Hab. 3. 4. Act. 11. 21. Act. 17. 28. Jam. 4. 15. Si Dii volunt volentibus Diis Cic. in Offic. Act. 18. 21. 1 Cor. 4. 19. God doth predetermine natural actions to which sin is annexed 1 Arg. from Josephs Vendition Gen. 45. 5 7 8. Non refert in Deum peccatum fratrum sed transitum suum in Aegyptum Erasm Act. 7 9 The Objections against Josephs Vendition answered 2. Arg. from the Crucifixion of Christ Mat. 26. 24. Luk. 22. 22. Act. 4. 28. Joh. 19. 10 11 Act. 2. 23. Act. 4. 28. Our Adversarie evasions examined 1. Evasion touching active and passive Crucifixion 2. Evasion Strangius ' s Evasions Answer Quum Pater tradiderit Filium Christus Corpus suum Judas Dominum cur in hac traditione Deus est justus homo reus nisi quia in re una quam fecerunt causa non est una ob quam fecerunt August Epist 48. ad Vinc. 1. Gods punishing his sinful People by wicked Instruments Esa 10. 5 6 7. Jerem. 16. 16. 2. Gods afflicting his righteous Servants by wicked Instruments Job 1. 21. Psal 105. 25. 4. Gods immediate hand in the Acts of sin 2 Sam.
the generation of a man and of an horse and of a mouse but we determine that the influxe of God is special to special effects as they are physically distinguished specie and unto al kind of entitie but not to the reason of moral iniquitie which consistes in privation Strangius here seems to oppose Baronius's Hypothesis touching a general indifferent concurse but yet I must confesse upon a more accurate research I cannot find that he differs materially from Baronius herein for although l. 1. c. 11. p. 61. he cals this concurse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 efficace yet he makes it be but commun and no way determinative and therefore only indifferent The like l. 2. c. 19. p. 373. And I am very positive in this that no man living can rationally exemt themselves from the imputation of the Jesuites indifferent concurse and assert an efficacious special concurse but what is determinative as to the subject it workes on And thence Le Blanc Concil Arbitr part 3. thes 36. p. 434. confesseth That Strangius ' s opinion as to this point differs but little from that of Baronius Lastly Baronius denies al predetermination both as to good and evil actions as Metaph. Sect. 8. Disput 3. § 78 c. p. 146. Strangius allows predetermination to al acts moraly though but imperfectly good and to many other acts of the wil whensoever God pleaseth or need requireth yet he denies it to al acts of the creatures specially to such as are intrinsecally evil as lib. 2. cap. 4. pag. 162. and elsewhere Herein he is followed by some Divines of note among our selves who I am very confident wil never be able to maintain their singular Hypothesis but wil at last be driven to the opinion of Baronius the Remonstrants and Jesuites or else fal under the lode of al those black consequences they clog our Hypothesis with of which hereafter Chap. 5. § 4. 4. Our Adversaries differ much among themselves about Gods permission of sin its nature and efficace 1 A Divine of repute among our selves assertet◠that no act of sin no not the active selling of Joseph or crucifying of Christ was willed by God but only the passive vendition and crucifixion or effect yea he saith That God doth not wil sin as a punishment in a proper sense but others allow that God wils the acts of sin as penal or conducible to his own glorie though not as sinful acts Thus Strangius l. 4. c. 2. p. 773. where having refuted that distinction at first framed by Bellarmine and of late reassumed by a Divine of great name among our selves of active and passive vendition and crucifixion he concludes thus Therefore here was not an otiose or idle permission but an efficax operation in the selling of Joseph which is more orthodoxe and consistent with itself than the former Hypothesis which seems to be contradictory to itself as hereafter Chap. 3. § 2. 2 Some of our Opponents assert Gods permission of sin to be altogether inefficacious yea idle and unactive but others allow it an efficace and energie for the limiting directing and ordering of sinful acts to their proper ends albeit not about the act itself which I conceive no better than a modest contradiction for how can Gods permission limit direct and order sinful acts but by influencing the very act itself materially considered See more of this Chap. 5. § 6. 5. Our Adversaries also differ greatly among themselves about the Nature of sin its formal Reason c. Some and those of no smal repute among our selves hold sin as to its formal reason to be a positive real Being which indeed is most agreable to their Hypothesis touching acts intrinsecally evil which they denie to be as to their substrate mater or entitative act from God I must confesse this opinion would carry somewhat of probabilitie with it if we could with the Manichees hold two first Principes or Causes one of good the other of evil but for us that assert but one first Cause of al create positive Beings I cannot imagine how any can maintain this Hypothesis of the positivitie of sin without making God the Author of sin or making mans corrupt wil independent and so the first cause of a real positive act Therefore Strangius lib. 1. cap. 13. to avoid these black consequences strongly argues with the Orthodoxe that the formal reason of sin consistes in privation But withal we are here to note that this Hypothesis utterly overthrows his other Hypothesis touching acts intrinsecally evil which he denies to be from God as to their substrate mater of which more hereafter Chap. 5. § 5. There are other points of moment wherein our Antagonists differ among themselves as wel as from us namely touching the natural or moral libertie of the wil natural impossibilitie and possibilitie Gods decretive and approbative wil of which before Chap. 1. And indeed we need no way wonder that our Adversaries thus differ among themselves sithat their Hypothesis is liable to so many inconsistences and contradictions for how is it possible that they should agree among themselves when as their principal Hypothesis is so disagreeing from itself But more of this when we come to the demonstrative part Chap. 5. § 3. We procede now to shew Wherein we differ from those of the new method Strangius Baronius Le Blanc and others about Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin Immediately on the breaking up of the Synod of Dort wherein the Antitheses and sentiments of the Arminians were so strongly and fully refuted there sprang up some Divines who gave their assent and consent to the Canons of the said Synod but yet contrived a new method specially as to universal Grace Reprobation and Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin in order to a coalition with the Arminian partie as we shal hereafter demonstrate And the principal Agent who undertook the new modelling this last head was Strangius which he has copiosely treated of according to the new method in his Book De Voluntate Actionibus Dei circa peccatum whose sentiments we are to examine in what follows but at present we shal only lay down in several Propositions wherein we differ from him and those who follow his method in the stating Gods Concurse to the mater of sin We assert 1. Prop. God has an absolute efficacious Decree about the substrate mater or entitative act of al sin This Proposition Strangius lib. 3. cap. 2. pag. 547. grants to be true in althings but sin specially the first sin and such acts as are intrinsecally evil which sufficiently proves our Proposition for we say and are ready to demonstrate that the substrate mater or entitative act whereto sin is annexed is not in itself or its natural entitie sinful but naturally good What there is of sin annexed to it ariseth from its moral estimation and relation to the Law of God violated thereby in which regard we peremptorily
must be resolved into the wil of God as their prime cause so that If God wil here is the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 elsewhere if God concur if he assiste if he by his efficacious predeterminative wil without which we can do nothing concur And that this is the genuine mind of this Text is most evident by the use of this phrase among the Ancients both Jews and Pagans Bensyra that ancient Hebrew Sent. moral xi thus speakes Let man never say he wil do any thing before he hath prefaced this If the Lord wil i. e. assiste or concur not permit So among Pagans Hom. Iliad B. vers 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. The like Demosth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If God wil. But none speakes more fully to this point than Plato Alcibiad pag. 135. where Alcibiades demanding How he ought to speak touching Divine efficacious concurse Socrates replies 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If God wil and in his Laches But I wil do this and come to thee to morrow 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If God wil. Whence it 's evident that this formule of speech was ordinary even among the Heathens as wel as Jews and Christians noting not only a permissive or Directory but Decretory and predeterminative wil. So the same Phrase must be understood Act. 18. 21. If God wil and 1 Cor. 4. 19. If the Lord wil. Is it possible that these Phrases should be understood of a mere permissive wil Do not al mankind need an efficacious concurse and predeterminative wil to conduct them in al their affaires Again 2 Gods permissive wil is either natural or moral it cannot be meant of Gods natural permissive wil because that regardes only sin which there is no mention of in these Textes neither is it necessarily included Neither can it be meant of Gods moral permissive wil because that was already declared and manifest in the Laws of God for al moral permission belongs to Gods Legislative wil declared in his word It remains therefore that this phrase If God wil be understood of Gods efficacious wil whereby al natural motions and so the entitative acts of sin are predetermined § 2. I now descend to the Second Head of Scriptural Demonstrations namely That God doth predefine predetermine and fore-ordain such natural actions whereunto sin is necessarily annexed I shal mention only two Actions The Selling of Joseph and the Crucifixion of our Lord whereof the former was but a Type of the later 1. I shal begin with the Selling of Joseph mentioned Gen. 45. 5 7 8. Joseph saith v. 5. Now therefore be not grieved nor angry with your selves that ye sold me hither for God did send me before you to preservelife Joseph here has a double aspect on his Brothers sin the one regards their hand in the sin which he out of a noble generous principe of fraternal Love passeth by the other regards the special hand of Divine Providence in this their Sin which he admires and adores in that it by an efficacious predeterminative Concurse brought so great a good out of so great an evil which no finite power could do men may make good use of what is in it self good but who can bring so great good out of so great evil but a God omniscient and omnipotent 1 Let us remarque their Sin in selling Joseph and of what a black Idea it was 1 It sprang from Hatred yea a deliberate rooted hatred as Gen. 37. 4. They hated him and could not speak peaceably unto him Their hatred was grounded on his fathers love to him Yea 2 There was much Envy and Indignation joined with their hatred as v. 8. Shalt thou indeed reign over us c. whence v. 11. and his brethren envied him c. 3 There was in like manner bloudy Cruelty yea intended Murther in this sin as v. 20 21 22 24. 4 There was also notorious Lying evident in this sin v. 32 33. 5 That this sin was of a very crimson bloudy guilt is evident by their own Convictions and Confessions when God began to awaken their Consciences as it is conjectured about fourteen years after Gen. 42. 22. Behold his bloud is required 6 By al which it is most evident that this vendition or selling of Joseph was a sin intrinsecally evil For certainly if a sin of such bloudy Aggravations deserve not the name of intrinsecally evil I know not what sin doth Hence 2 We are to demonstrate that God did predefine and predetermine Josephs Brethren to the entitative act or substrate mater of this Sin And this Province we no way dout but to make good out of the Texte Gen. 45. 5 7 8. compared with other Texts 1 Joseph saith v. 5. 7. God did send me before you to preserve life 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sent me forth by his efficacious predeterminative hand which conducted me hither The LXX render it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies to send forth with a mighty hand as Captives into Libertie Luke 4. 18. also to send forth with commands autoritie and power Mat. 10. 16. 11. 10. as elsewhere again to send forth executioners Mat. 2. 16. lastly to direct the course of a Ship In al these notions Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse in sending Joseph into Egypt is necessarily included This also appears 2 by what is added v. 5. God did send me before you to preserve life Note here that God certainly and absolutely foresaw the Famine and Josephs being sold into Egypt which he intended to turne for good even for the preservation of Jacobs Familie and the Elect seed in him Now how could God foresee this absolutely and infallibly but in the predefinition or fore ordainment of his own Wil And Strangius grants this that where there is Predefinition there also follows Predetermination Must we not then conclude that this Vendition of Joseph was both predefined and predetermined by God Yea 3 Joseph addes v. 8. So now it was not you that sent me hither but God c. You see here Joseph makes a three-fold mention of Gods over-ruling hand in this their sin and that for their as wel as his good And he tels them plainly that it was not they that sent him but God As if he had said You indeed sent me to be a poor Vassal in Egypt but did not God send me to be a Ruler over Egypt You sent me to destroy me but why did God send me but to preserve both you and me You sent me out of Hatred and Malice but did not God send me out of great Love and pitie both to me and you And what could be spoken more emphatically to illustrate and demonstrate Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin than this It was not you that sent me hither but God Why doth he use this manner of speech was it not they that sold him Yes but because they were but as mere passive Instruments or Midwifes
The Decree of Reprobation is not the proper efficient or formal cause of the Sinners Induration or Condemnation but his own wilful obstinacie This sufficiently clears the Sanctitie and Justice of God 2. Prop. Yet supposing the Decree of Reprobation the sinners Induration or Hardnesse follows infallibly and in some sense necessarily i. e. by a modal hypothetic necessitie not brutish or coactive such as should destroy Libertie The holy God doth not infuse hardnesse or by any compulsion hurrie men into it but leaves them to the swinge of their own lusts which violently hurrie them into such courses as necessarily harden This also cleareth Gods Justice from the imputation of sin 3. Prop. Gods Providence in Judicial excecation and Induration is very efficacious and illustrious 1 God leaves men to the Blandishments Allurements and Ensnarements of an heart-bewitching world which insensibly harden 2 He delivers up men to the power of Satan the God of this world whose subjects and vassals they willingly become 2 Cor. 4. 3 4. and so are taken alive captive at his wil 2 Tim. 2. 26. 3 God so disposeth and orders al his Providences as that they do al accidentally by reason of mens lusts conspire to harden them Mercies become Curses to them Rom. 11. 9 10 11. Yea 4 The very means of Grace become the means of their hardening their Food and Physic become Poyson to them 2 Cor. 2. 16. Esa 28. 12 13 14 15. 5 Christ himself the chief Corner-stone of salvation becomes to them a stone of stumbling and offence Esa 8. 14. a stone of stumbling 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of smiting such as lying in the way the foot may smite against and thence stumble and receive hurt It answers to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 scandal in the New Testament Thence it follows and for a rock of offence Heb. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not a bare Stumbling-stone or block such as a man may make a shift to avoid or get over or if he stumble yet recover himself again but he is a rock of offence which notes 1 The Offence to be inevitable and unavoidable as the removing of a rock 2 The ruine to be certain as that of a Ship falling on a rock Whence he addes for a gin and for a snare such as men should neither by power wit or craft escape Whence it follows v. 15. And many among them shal stumble and fal and be broken and be snared and be taken The like Rom. 9. 33. 6 God puts a period to the day of Grace and leaves men to the plague of their own heart Esa 22. 14. Surely this iniquitie shal not be purged from you til you die Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If this iniquitie be purged It is the concise forme of an Oath frequently used in Scripture as Chap. 5. 18. whereby God sweareth that their iniquitie should not be purged So Luke 19. 41 42. Heb. 3. 7. 7 God doth positively yea efficaciously concur to al that is positive material entitative and natural in judicial hardnesse without the least hand in the obliquitie or vitiositie 4. Prop. The suspension of restraining Grace in Judicial excecation is not properly a privation of any Grace due to the Creature but a negation or withdrawment of undeserved and abused Grace For the clearing whereof we are to consider the difference between Man and God in this particular No meer man may or ought to permit or deliver up another to sin or hardnesse if it be in his power to hinder 1 Because al men are under a Law and obligation of subjection to their Creator whereby they are obliged to promove his Glorie and prevent sin and rebellion against him the most they can 2 Because al men are under a communion of Natures and therefore bound to afford assistance each to other so far as they may for their natural and moral good But now the soverain Creator of man is under no such obligation and therefore may as he please dispose of his own grace or suspend it specially when abused by sinners 5. Prop. God doth not deliver up men to judicial hardnesse simply as hardnesse under that reduplication but penally as it conduceth to the vindication of his Justice For the explication and demonstration of this Proposition we are to remember that there is nothing in the world of itself purely and simply evil for if there were any pure and chiefest evil in the world then God who is the chiefest good could not wil it but the greatest evil has something of good mixed with it and this God wils Thus in judicial hardnesse there is a penal vindictive good which God wils for the illustration of his Justice 6. Prop. In judicial hardnesse that which is morally evil in regard of man and his transgression is naturally good in regard of God and his Providence For albeit God doth concur with the sinner who is deficient as to his dutie yet God is no way deficient 1 Al moral evil of sin is only such to him whose it is or to whom it doth belong as the Author thereof by virtue of some Law he offends against But now this judicial hardnesse or sin doth not belong to God as the proper Owner or Author of it but only to the sinner neither doth the holy God offend against any Law 2 The specific qualitie of an effect is not to be ascribed to the universal first cause but to the second particular cause from which it receives specification 3 The sinner is only the moral cause of his own hardnesse because he is the meritorious cause thereof and also a voluntary yea wilful Agent therein Al his hardnesse is voluntarily contracted albeit judicially inflicted by God he suffers his heart voluntarily to be defloured by sinful objects God threatens to suspend his Divine influence and the obstinate sinner cries Content Satan comes and blinds his eyes and he hugges him for it So that the whole deficience or moral causalitie is on the sinners part not on Gods The sinner wants Divine influence and is willing yea glad to want it therefore his depraved wil is the sole formal vital subjective and moral efficient cause of his own hardnesse and sin § 7. We come in the last place to such Scriptures as mention Gods efficacious ordering disposing and directing the sins of men unto his own glorie which evidently demonstrates his immediate concurse and predetermination to the substrate mater or entitative act thereof Thus Exod. 9. 14 15 16. God threatens Pharaoh vers 14. to send al his plagues on his heart i. e. in a way of judicial excecation and induration And why That thou mayst know there is none like me in al the earth i. e. that I may magnifie my vindictive Justice and Power on thee Whence he addes v. 15. For now I wil stretch out mine hand that I may smite thee and thy people with pestilence and thou shalt be cut off from the earth It runs in the
Concurse to the entitative act of sin is sufficiently evident from those great reproches which the Papists lode him with for it which he wiped off with this answer That the same action which is sinful in regard of man is not so in regard of God because he is not under the same Law with man Thus Baronius Metaphys Sect. 8. Disput 3. § 87. pag. 152. The third mode saith he is peculiar to Zuinglius who teacheth that God exciting the wil to an evil object doth not sin because God hath no Law set to him but man hath To which Baronius answers That albeit God hath no Law set to him by any Superior yet he hath a Law set to him by his own nature not to deal injustly or cruelly with men This replie although borrowed from Bellarmine is now become commun with our Adversaries yet without the least shadow of reason for they do but beg the question in saying That God hereby deals injustly or cruelly with his creature As for Zuinglius's proper sentiments about Gods exciting and applying the wils of men to the entitative acts of sin they are fully and clearly laid down in his Book de Providentia Dei cap. 6. tom 1. of his Workes pag. 365. Seeing a Law is given to man he always sins when he actes against the Law albeit he neither be nor live nor operate but in God and from God and by God But what God workes by man is turned to man for sin but not in like manner to God for man is under a law but God is free Therefore one and the same wickednesse suppose adulterie or homicide as from God the Author Motor and Impulsor it is a work not a crime but as it is from man so it is a crime and wickednesse for God is not bound up by law but man is condemned by law Thus he procedes to illustrate by many exemples of David c. Thence pag. 367. he instanceth in the induration of Pharaoh c. wherein note 1 That he cals God the Author Motor and Impulsor of the act which must be understood not morally but physically as he excites and applies the wil to its act 2 That he frees God from being the Author or moral cause of the sin because he actes not against any law a distinction which was valid in his time albeit scoffed at now-a-days even by Reformed Divines yea Calvinists Neither was this distinction coined by Zuinglius as Bellarmine and others would fain persuade but in use long before Zuinglius by Scotus Ariminensis and other scholastic Theologues who followed Augustin herein Thus Scotus in Sent. 2. Dist 37. Quaest 2. saith The same action is sinful in regard of the create wil but not as to Gods concurse quia voluntas creata debet rectitudinem actioni tribuere Deus autem non debet because the create wil is under an essential obligation or law to give rectitude to the action but God is not as before How deeply Beza was engaged in the defence of our Hypothesis is sufficiently evident by his Controversies in this point as Tractat. Theolog. vol. 1. pag. 313 c. in answer to the calumnies of Heshusius about the Providence of God he saith 1 That no event ever happens otherwise than God decrees which he demonstrates from the Omnipotence of God Thence he procedes 2 to demonstrate That albeit God wil and know and decree althings in the world yet that he is not the Author of sin So pag. 315. 3 He proves That Gods permission of sin is not idle or merely negative This he demonstrates pag. 317. from the vendition of Joseph the robbing of Job the ravishing of Davids wives by Absolon Davids numbering the people and Gods inciting his heart thereto Shimei's cursing of David the defection of the ten Tribes from Rehoboam c. 4 He procedes pag. 319. to the fal of Adam which he assertes to be from the decree and ordination of God c. The same Controversie he manageth against Castellio de aeterna Dei praedestinatione p. 360. where he proves That Adams fal was decreed and determined by God The like pag. 401. where he proves That God doth not compel men to sin or infuse sin into them but justly and rightly incite their wils to the entitative act which is good This he confirmes by the induration of Pharaoh and Gods making use of wicked instruments for the punishment of men That Calvin and Beza did fully espouse our Hypothesis is evident not only by the opposition of Bellarmine and his sectators but also by that of Arminius who objectes the very same things against them as are objected against us namely That God ordained that man should fal and become vitiose by which opinion saith he God is made the Author of Adams fal and sin of which see Strangius lib. 3. cap. 2. pag. 554. And indeed al the Helvetian Churches to this very day continue very orthodox and zelose against al the Arminian Dogmes in this as in other points which sufficiently appears by their new Articles lately added to their Confession and signed by their Ministers and Professors for the condemning the new method of Amyraldus and others in the French Churches That not only the German and Helvetian but also the French Churches in their first Reformation fully maintained our Hypothesis is most evident by the most elaborate acute and demonstrative determinations of great Chamier the greatest light that ever France Reformed had Calvin only excepted who in his Panstrat Cathol tom 2. lib. 3. gives us a copiose distinct and convictive decision of this Controversie as then agitated by the Calvinists and Jesuites which answers exactly to our present Controversie with the new Methodists He titles this Book Of the Author of sin and proves cap. 1. That the Reformed Divines do not make God the Author of sin albeit the Jesuites accuse Calvin Martyr and Beza therewith Thence cap. 2. he layes down the opinion of the Reformed Divines namely That al actions both sinful and good are to be referred to the actuose providence of God Which he demonstrates by Shimei's cursing David Absoloms incest c. Whence cap. 3. he passeth on to the Papists opinion touching the Providence of God about sin which they make to be only by speculative idle permission as some new Methodists Cap. 4. he procedes to prove That God wils the existence of sin Wherein he answers Bellarmines Objections against Calvin and Beza as to this point Cap. 5. he passeth on to the second Argument of the Calvinists namely that men are in their sinful acts the instruments of God Thence cap. 6. he descends to their third Argument from Gods excecation and induration of mens hearts wherein he distinctly opens the Scriptures about induration Whence cap. 7. he comes to their fourth Argument from Gods energie in sinful acts which he demonstrates both rationally and scripturally And thence cap. 8. he gives us Augustins opinion consonant to Calvins
is not the same objection with its reasons as much urged and that with as great color of Reason by the Molinists and Arminians against al Predetermination to gracious acts I must confesse I could never neither do I think any else can maintain and defend our ground against the Jesuites and Arminians if those reasons and grounds which our Adversaries urge against Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin be admitted as valid 2 The like may be said of that other objection or reason why our Adversaries reject Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin namely That it makes al Gods Laws naturally and absolutely impossible c. Is not this very objection and the reason urged to enforce it as much urged by Molinists and Arminians against al Predetermination even to gracious Acts And are not the reasons as valid on the later as on the former side What reason do the new Methodists give that Predetermination to the entitative act of sin makes Gods Laws impossible but that it takes away the Wils Indifference and destroys the natural power that the wil is invested with to act or not to act And doth not Predetermination to good as much destroy the wils indifference and its power to act or not to act 3 Our Adversaries urge That this Predetermination takes away the use of Promises Invitations and al evangelic offers of Grace and supposeth God not to deal sincerely with Sinners in making offers of Grace and yet irresistibly determining their Wils against the acceptance of these offers Is not this very objection with its reason urged and that with as much force of reason by Jesuites and Arminians against Predetermination to gracious Acts For if no man can entertain those offers of Grace by his own freewil without a predeterminative Concurse are not al gracious Promises Invitations and offers of Grace to Sinners who fal not under this Predetermination vain and uselesse Our Adversaries the new Methodists generally some few excepted denie any sufficient Grace or Free-wil in corrupt Nature for the reception of evangelic offers and Grace and is not then the vitious wil of corrupt Nature as wel determined by its own vitiositie against the offers of Grace as by the predeterminative Concurse of God 4 Our Adversaries object That this Predetermination to the entitative act of sin supposeth God to compel and force men to sin and so makes him to be the real Author of Sin yea more than the Sinner that is under a violent compulsion c. and is not this very argument urged by Jesuites and Arminians against al Predetermination even to what is good and that with as much color of reason For say they If God predetermine the wil to what is good then he compels and forceth the wil to be good so that the wil being under a compulsion cannot be said to be the Author of its own act but is as a Stock or Stone in the exercice of that act which destroyeth al moral good c. Which objection is as valid as that of our Adversaries and can never be solidly answered if their objection be good though according to our Principes neither the one or the other objection has any force in it as we shal demonstrate c. 6. § 5. To conclude this argument I am very confident our Opponents the new Methodists wil never be able to defend an efficacious determinative Concurse to what is morally or supernaturally good so long as they denie the same to the substrate mater of sin which is naturally good for al or at least the most of those arguments they urge against the later may and are urged by the Molinists and Arminians against the former and that with equal force And this Baronius did by his natural acumen foresee and therefore he took a course more seemingly rational according to his Principes though lesse friendly to divine Concurse to denie al Predetermination as wel to supernatural as natural good of which see his Metaph. Sect. 8. Disput 3. n. 66. c. p. 136. § 5. Our fifth Argument shal be taken from the Nature of Sin its substrate mater and formal reason 1. As to the general Idea and substrate mater of sin we have demonstrated Ch. 1. § 2. 1 That al human acts considered in their natural entitie abstracted from their moral constitution are neither good nor evil 2 That al moral acts whether good or evil receive their formal Constitution and Determination from the Moral Law 3 That no human Act considered physically or according to its natural entitative substance is intrinsecally evil but only morally in regard of its moral specification or determination to such or such an object Hence 4 That sin has for its substrate mater some natural good Now these Propositions being laid as so many Principes we hence argue That God must necessarily concur to yea predetermine the substrate mater of actions intrinsecally evil For if al sinful acts even such as are intrinsecally evil morally are according to their substrate mater physically good doth it not necessarily follow that God the first cause must concur thereto yea predetermine the same Must not every second Cause as such be actuated and so determined by its first Cause and his efficacious Concurse Doth not the subordination of the second Cause to the first necessarily demonstrate not only its dependence on but also Predetermination by the same in al its natural operations and effects Is not every Being by participation necessarily limited defined and predetermined in al its natural entitative motions by the first Being which is such by Essence May not this also be demonstrated from the very concessions of our Adversaries who grant that vitiositie follows not any Act as a natural Act So Strangius l. 2. c. 11. p. 243. We confesse saith he that Vitiositie doth not follow the act of sin as an act for then every act would be sin also that it doth not follow as the act procedes from God for then every act that procedes from God would have sin Now if sin follows not the act of sin as an act what reason can there be why God should not efficaciously concur to yea predetermine the entitative act of Sin This is wel explicated by Lud. Crocius that Breme Professor who was a member of the Synod of Dort and there began the New Method Duodecas Dissert de Volunt Dei Dissert 8. Thes 99. p. 426. As to the Act saith he of the Divine Wil about sin the effates of Scripture seem to contradict themselves whiles that some expressely affirm That God nils and hates sins and those that commit them Psal 5. 5 6 7. Zach. 8. 17. but others seem to say That God wils creates effectes them Esa 45. 7. Lam. 3. 37 38. Amos 3. 6. But these things do wel agree if the distinction be rightly observed 1 Between the Act and the Vitiositie of the Act. 2 Between the Act as it is from God and as it
Privation only An acute and excellent Decision of this Controversie were not the minds of men eaten out with Prejudices the sum whereof is this The Act of sin entitatively and substantially considered is naturally good and so wel-pleasing unto God the Author of Nature yet if we consider it morally in regard of its Vitiositie so it is infinitely displeasing to God This is as a Key to open the dore to a more ful solution to al objections against us so that at present we need say no more than this that our Hypothesis is no more obnoxious to these aspersions than that of our Adversaries Is not the Divine Sanctitie as illustrious in Gods predetermining to the substrate mater of Sin as if we held only with our Adversaries an immediate previous concurse thereto Are not those very Acts which are morally evil as to the Sinner both naturally and morally good as to God Suppose he predetermine to the entitative act of sin yet must we thence necessarily conclude that he predetermines men to sin formally considered Must not the sinful qualities of al moral effects be imputed to the second particular cause and not to the first universal cause It 's true the Sinner comes short of the Divine Law and therefore sins but doth God come short of any Law Has not his Wil the same Rectitude which his Nature is invested with and therefore whatever he wils must be right and holy even because he wils it The sin which he governs is it not only sin in regard of the Creatures wil not in regard of his wil It is confest that God and the Sinner concur to the same sinful act materially considered but yet is their Concurse the same Yea is there not morally an infinite distance between the one and the other Doth Sin as to Gods Concurse include any more than a natural act which is in regard of God and the conducibilitie it has to his glorie morally good but doth it not as to mans Concurse speake moral vitiositie Again what doth Gods permission of sin implie but a natural or judiciary Negation of that Grace he is no way obliged to give But doth not sin as to the sinner denote a moral privation or deficience of that rectitude which ought to be in his act Is there any thing in the world purely simply and of it self sinful without some substrate mater naturally good What reason therefore can our Adversaries allege why God may not predetermine the wil to the said substrate mater without prejudice to his Sanctitie § 3. We descend now to a third objection taken from the Word of God both Preceptive and Promissive which divine Predetermination of the wil to the substrate mater of sin doth according to the Antithesis of our Adversaries render uselesse impossible yea collusive and unsincere For say they Gods Precepts Promises and Comminations whereof mans Nature is capable should be al made Impertinences through his constant overpowering those that should neglect them 1. As to Gods Laws and Prohibitions they urge That our Hypothesis renders them altogether uselesse yea naturally and simply impossible This they exaggerate with many fine words and rhetoric flourishes which are the best armes they have to defend their declining cause with But having God and Truth though naked and simple on our side we no way dout but to stand our ground against al their fiery or venimous darts And in answer to the first part of their Objection from the Impossibilitie of divine Precepts and Prohibitions we answer 1 That our Adversaries greatly please themselves in their false sophistic Ideas and Notions of what is possible or impossible which we have endeavoured to clear from that ambiguitie and confusion Chap. 1. § 4. with endeavors to explicate what is possible and what impossible to corrupt Nature as to divine Commands 2 We are to know that the Laws of God in their Second Edition were primarily intended to subserve the ends of the Gospel as to the heirs of Salvation to whom they are by Grace in an Evangelic way made possible The Law is said to be given in and by the hands of the Mediator i. e. to subserve his ends which principally regard the Elect. 3 Yet we grant that the Law is also of great use even unto Reprobates 1 In that it lays a great restraint on them not only as to wicked actions but also as to lusts in some measure as Exod. 34. 24. The Autoritie and Majestie of Divine Precepts backed with many severe Curses leaves a great awe and restraint sometimes on the most debaucht spirits and so keeps their lusts from open violences 2 The Precepts are so far useful to Reprobates albeit they have no power to observe them in that they are thereby instructed how much obedience is wel-pleasing to God and how ungrateful they are in not performing of it whereby they are left without al Apologie or Excuse The Precept shews us what we ought to do not what we can do it is always imperative albeit not always operative and may not the Soverain Lord require of man the payment of his debts although by reason of his profligate bankrupt humor he hath disabled himself from the payment of them What excuse is it for the Sinner to say it is impossible for him to obey the Precept whenas the impossibilitie lies in his own wil not in any force or defect on Gods part Doth he not in that very moment wherein he is predetermined by God to the entitative act of Sin voluntarily espouse and wil that act And doth not this leave him without al shadow of Excuse Where can he loge the blame of his Sin but on his own crooked depraved wil which electively and freely determines it self to the Sin in the same moment of time though not of nature that it is predetermined by God to the entitative act 4 We affirme that Gods certain Prescience of Mens sins with the conditional Decree of Reprobation Gods immediate previous Concurse to the entitative act of sin and mans universal impotence to perform what is spiritually good which are al granted by our Adversaries bring sinners under as great impossibilitie of obeying Gods Commands as absolute Reprobation and predeterminative Concurse to the mater of Sin asserted by us This is wel demonstrated by a judicious and awakened Author in his late Letter touching Gods Providence about sinful Acts c. from p. 67. to 74. But because he is a party I shal mention only the Response of Davenant Animadv p. 341. As for Gods Law which cannot be kept without supernatural Grace we say that men are as capable of any supernatural Grace considered under the absolute Decrees maintained by S. Augustine and by the Church of England as considered under the conditional Decrees of late framed by Arminius And p. 418. he strongly proves That Divine eternal Prescience of future Actions or Events infers as absolute a necessitie of such events and impossibilitie of