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Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
law_n	king_n	power_n	regal_a	4,712	5	11.5491	5	false

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ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A91339	A political catechism, or, Certain questions concerning the government of this land, answered in his Majesties own words, taken out of his answer to the 19 propositions, pag. 17, 18, 19, 20. of the first edition; with some brief observations thereupon. Published for the more compleat setling of consciences; particularly of those that have made the late protestation, to maintain the power and priviledges of Parliament, when they shall herein see the Kings owne interpretation what that power and priviledges are. It is this twentieth day of May, An. Dom. 1643. ordered by the Committee of the House of Commons in Parliament concerning printing, that this booke entituled, A Politicall catechism, be printed. Iohn White.	Parker, Henry, 1604-1652.; Charles I, King of England, 1600-1649.; England and Wales. Sovereign (1625-1649 : Charles I); England and Wales. Parliament.	1643 (1643)	Wing P416A; Thomason E104_8a	9,843	18

us good then to grant him too much opportunity to do us hurt and the Danger is greater to the People in Englarging the Kings Power then in restraining it somewhat Q. 10 What is the Good or Conveniency of Aristocracy A. The good of Aristocracy is the Coniunction of Councells in the Ablest Persons of a State for publike Benefit page 18 Obs. ● Then surely it is for the Publike Benefit of the State that this Conjunction of Councells in Parliament should be made use of more then once in thirteen or fourteen years and the Law for a Trienniall Parliament if there were not others before for the holding of a Parliament yearly was a most necessary Law as also that it should not be dissolved for fifty dayes 2. It was not then Intended in the Constitution of this Government that the King in the Greatest Matters of Importance for Publike Benefit should only hear what they say and then follow it or reject it Meerly at his owne Pleasure for this may be as well done in an Absolute Monarchy 3. Neither is it agreeable to the Constitution of this Kingdom to withdraw the King from affording his Presence to his Great Councell of State that so the private Counsels of Private men may be preferred before those whom the Law and the Constitution of the Kingdom counts the Ablest to Iudge of Publike Benefit Q. 11 What is the Ill of Aristocracy or the Inconvenience to which it is Lyable A. The Ill of Aristocracy is Faction and Division page 18. Obs. What shall we say then to those Private Councellors that have abused the King by perswading him first to withdraw himself from his Parliament and then to call away the Members of both Houses when yet without the Consent of both Houses this Parliament cannot be Adjourned to another Place much lesse Dissolved Yet if all would have come away at call had it not been Dissolved for want of Legall Numbers Remaining And what Greater Faction or Division can there be then such as Divide between King and Parliament and between the House and their Members Are not they most Pernicious Instruments that make Monarchie it self whose end is to unite as was said before thus far guilty of Faction and Division Q. 12 What is the Good or Convenience of Democracy A. The good of Democracy is Liberty and the courage and Industry which Liberty begets page 18. Obs. 1. Then the more Liberties are Encroached upon the more the People will be rendred Cowardly and Poor as may be plain enough seen by comparing the Valour and Riches of this Nation in Q. Elizabeths dayes with what hath been of Late Dayes 2. The King himself when once his Subjects by having lost their Liberties shall lose withall their Courages will prove the greatest Looser for then his Kingdom will be an easie Prey to any Forrain Invader or even to a home-bred Usurper that could gather any sudden Strength and would Promise more Libertie Q. 13 What is the Ill of Democracy or the Inoonvenience to which it is Lyable A. The Ills of Democracy are Tumults Violence and Licentiousnesse page 18. Obs. If these be the Evils for which the Peoples Liberty ought to be Restrained by the Mixture in this Government then the Restraint of the Liberty should be measured according to the Exigency of these Evils and so much Liberty need onely be Restrained as is sufficient for the Prevention of these Evils Q. 14 What is the mixture of this Kingdom which gives it the Conveniences of all the three forementioned kinds of Government without the Inconveniences of any one A. In this Kingdom the Lawes are Ioyntly made by a King by a house of Peeres and by a house of Commons chosen by the people All having free Votes and particular priviledges page 18. Obs. 1. Whereas there hath been great Question made by many what is meant by the Power and Priviledges of Parliament mentioned in the Protestation which hath been so generally made thorowout the Kingdom There is no Reason to doubt but those things which the King grants afterward to be the particular Priviledge of each House and of both are their certain Priviledges according to Law and the Constitution of the Kingdom and to the maintaining of them every one that hath made the Protestation is most strictly bound without peradventure or shift 2. That the Priviledges which the King challenges to Himself are to be yeelded to onely so far forth as they are consistent with the Acknowledged Priviledges of the two Houses because the Monarchy being Acknowledged to be a Regulated Monarchy and the Government mixt of Aristocracy and Democracy as well a Monarchy it is the Priviledges of the two Houses of Parliament that makes the mixture and so they must Regulate and Interpret the Priviledges of the King and not the Priviledges of the King Regulate or Interpret theirs save onely to the maintaining still the Regall Dignitie and the Succession according to Laws Q. 15 What Priviledges doth the King chalenge to himself A. The Government according to these Lawes is trusted to the king power of treaties of warre and peace of making Peeres of choosing Officers and Councellors for State Iudges for Law Commanders for Forts and Castles giving Commissions for raising men to make Warre abroad or to preuent or prouide against Inuasions and Insurr●ctions at home Benefit of Confiscations power of pardouing and some other of like kind are placed in the King page 18. Obs. 1. That all these are ordinarily in the King Experience and Custom Teaches even those that Know not the Law by reading but by what hath been noted before and follows after it is to be understood only so as not to prejudice the Priviledges of the Houses of Parliament specially in cases of Necessitie of which hereafter Also 2. It is acknowledged here that the Government Trusted is to be according to the Lawes and so all these Things are not Absolutely in the King as for instance Pardons the Law denies Power of Pardoning wilfull Murther And Benefit of some Confiscations belongs to some Private Lords of Mannours 3. If Government onely according to Law be trusted to the King then to Resist Notorious Illegall Violences is not to Resist the Kings Authority Q. 16 For what end is this Authority trusted to the King and Placed in him A. For our Subiects sake these rights are vested in us p 17 The Prince may not make use of this high and perpetuall power to the hurt of those for whose good he hath it page 19. Obs. 1. Then the Good of the Subjects is ever to be preferred before the Monarchiall Greatnesse of the King the End is ever more considerable then the Means Salus Populi is suprema Lex 2. Whosoever counsels the King to any Thing against the good of his Subjects is the Kings Enemy as well as the Common-wealths by Attempting to turn him from that which is the end of his Authoritie Q. 17 To what purpose especially are the

A POLITICAL CATECHISM OR Certain Questions concerning the Government of this Land Answered in his Majesties own words taken out of His Answer to the 19 Propositions Pag. 17 18 19 20. of the first Edition with some brief Observations thereupon Published for the more compleat setling of Consciences particularly of those that have made the late Protestation to maintain the Power and Priviledges of Parliament when they shall herein see the Kings owne Interpretation what that Power and Priviledges are We can do nothing against the Truth but for the Truth 2 Cor. 13. 8. It is this twentieth day of May An. Dom. 1643. Ordered by the Committee of the House of Commons-in Parliament concerning Printing that this Booke entituled A Politicall Catechism be printed IOHN WHITE LONDON Printed for SAMUEL GELLIBRAND at the Brazen Serpent in Pauls Church-yard 1643. A Politicall Catechism Serving to instruct those that have made the Protestation concerning the power and priviledges of Parliament taken out of his Majesties Answer to the 19 Propositions Question HOW many Simple kinds are there of Civill Government of States and Common-wealths Answer There are three kinds of Government among men Absolute Monarchy Aristocracy and Democracy page 17. Qu. 2. Are there any of these Simple Formes perfect Ans. All these have their particular Conveniences and Inconveniences page 17. Observ. 1 Experience hath taught men everywhere to acknowledge this and accordingly there never was long if at all continued any of these Forms exactly Simple though some have more seemed such then others Also in all mixtures there is commonly some one of these Forms more conspicuous then the rest from whence such a particular Government hath its denomination Q. 3. Is the State of England governed by any one of these kinds simply A. The Experience and Wisdom of your Ancestors hath moulded this Government out of a mixture of these page 18 Q. 4 What kind of government then is that of the state of England A. Regulated Monarchy page 18. Observ. 1. If this Government be a mixture of all these and a Regulated Monarchy then it is a fond thing with us to talk of an Absolute Monarchy and what an Absolute Monarch is or may doe And it is only the language of Flattery that holds such Discourses 2 It need not be counted a Solecisme as some would perswade us to speak of Free Subjects in a Monarchy such a Monarchy as ours is 3 If this Government be a mixture of all three then the House of Commons the Representative Body of the People must needs be allowed a share in Government some at least which yet is denyed page 19. 4 If this Government be a mixture then is not the Government according to these Lawes Solely Trusted to the King as seems to be affirmed page 18. 5 If the Government be Regulated why do men tell us that the King is above all Law for it is by Lawes that he is Regulated 6 If the King bee Regulated by the Law then is the King Accountable to the Law and not to God only as men would make us beleeve 7 If the Monarchy or Regall Authority it selfe bee Regulated then whatsoever is done by the King undeniably without and beyond the limits of that Regulation is not Regall Authority And therefore 8 To resist the Notorious Transgressions of that Regulation is no Resisting of Regall Authority And 9 It is so farre from being a Resisting of the Ordinance of God that it is not so much as Resisting the Ordinance of man Q 5. By whom was this government framed in this sort or who is to be accounted the Immediate Efficient of the Constitution thereof A. The Experience and Wisdom of your Ancestors hath so moulded this page 18. Observ. 1. If our Ancestors were the moulders of this Government then the King hath not his power Solely or Immediately by Divine Right 2 Much lesse hath he his Power or Authority by Right of Conquest 3 But the Immediate Originall of it was from the People And if so Then 4 In questioned cases the King is to Produce his Grant for he hath no more then what was granted and not the People to shew a Reservation For all is presumed to be Reserved which cannot be proved to be granted away Q. 6 Is this Regulated and mixt Monarchy as good as an Absolute Monarchy or better or worse A. This Excellent Constitution of this Kingdom the Ancient Equall Happy Well-poysed and never enough Commended Constitution of the Government of this Kingdom page 17. hath made this Nation so many years both Famous and Happy and to a great Degree of Envy page 20. Q. 7 How comes it to passe that this Constitution is so Excellent A. The Experience and Wisdom of your Ancestors hath so moulded this out of a mixture of these as to give to this Kingdom as farre as Humane Prudence can provide the Conveniences of all three without the Inconvenience of any one p. 18 Observ. 1. Then those that would place in the King an Absolute and Abitrary Power to do what he List are Destructive to the Nations Happinesse and Enemies to the Kingdom 2. If this Mixture cause this happinesse then it is not the Greatnesse of the Kings Power over his People but the Restraint of that Power that hath made this Kingdom famous and Happy for other Kings have Power as large but not so much restrained which Largenesse of their Power hath Raised those Kings indeed but not their Kingdoms to a great degree of Envy 3. Hence we discern that it is Possible for Kings to envy their Peoples Happinesse because the largenesse of the Peoples Happinesse depends much upon the Restraint of the Kings Exorbitant Power 4. If this Mixture and well-Poised Constitution have raised this Kingdom to so Great a Degree of Envy no marvell if Iesuiticall Councells be Active to overthrow this Happy Constitution Q. 8 What is the Conveniency or Good of Monarchy A. The Vniting of a Nation under one Head to Resist Invasion from abroad and Insurrection at home page 18. Obs. 1. What Pernicious Councellours are they then to a Monarch that advise him to bring in from abroad German Horse or an Irish Army or a Fleet of Danes to invade this Kingdom or to imploy Dunkeirk Ships to seaze upon his Merchants which is so formally contrary to the proper Good or End of Monarchy it self 2. Or are they better or worse that Advise him to Authorize or even permit any in his Name to Plunder Rob Spoil Imprison any of his Subjects whom they have found peaceably in their houses or at work in the Fields and have not disobeyed any Legall Command of his Q. 9 What is the Ill of Absolute Monarchy or the Inconvenience to which it is Lyable A. The Ill of Absolute Monarchy is Tyranny page 18. Obs. 1. Therefore the more Absolute a Monarch is the more prone to be a Tyrant 2. Therfore also it is safer to Restrain the King of some Power to do

priviledges of the house of Commons and the house of Peeres A. That the Prince may not make use of this High and perpetuall power to the hurt of those for whose good he hath it and make use of the name of publike Necessity for the gain of his priuate Fauourites and Followers c. page 19. Obs. 1. The Law then supposes that such Cases may fall out though it then Charge the Blame upon those Favorites and Followers and not upon the King as we shall see by and by 2. We need not wonder then why Private Favorites and Followers are such Enemies to Parliaments and their Priviledges which are on purpose to hinder their gains Of which also more anon 3. The two Houses are by the Law it seems to be Trusted when they Declare that the Power is made use of for the Hurt of the People and the Name of Publike Necessitie made use of for the Gain of Private Favorites and Followers and the like Q 18 What are the speciall priviledges of the House of Commons towards this A. The House of Comm●ns an Excellent conseruer of Liberty is solely Intrusted with the first propositions concerning the Leauies of Moneys which is the Sinnews as well of peace as of warre c page 19 Obs. 1. It seems then the House of Commons is presumed to be more carefull for the Subjects Liberties then either the King or the House of Peers 2. Then it must needs be strange for any to conceive as the Kings Declarations would Perswade that the House of Commons would Fight against and Subvert the Libertie and Propriety of the Subject and the Kings Favorites and Followers Fight for them and Protect them 3. Then no Moneys may be Levyed neither for Peace nor Warre no not under Pretence of Publike Necessity as Ship-money and Monopolies were without the House of Commons first propound and Grant it 4. If the House of Commons be an Excellent Conserver of Libertie it must Needs have some Power in some Cases to Levie Mony even without the Kings consent or else it will be utterly unpossible to conserve Libertie at all Of which likewise more anon Q. 19. But if the Kings Private Favorites and Followers have ●ctually perswaded him to any Thing against the Laws and Liberties of the Subject with what further Power and Priviledge is the House of Commons Intrusted toward the Conserving of Liberty A. With the Impeaching of those who for their own Ends though countenanced by any surreptitiously-gotten command of the King haue violated that Law which he is bound when he knowes it to protect and to the protection of which they were bound to aduise him at least not to serue him in the contrary page 19. Obs. 1. Then it is no Excuse to any that Violate the Laws that they serve the King in it 2. The Law counts all Commands from the King which are any way contrary to the Law Surreptitiously-Gotten 3. Then the Parliament speaks according to the Law when they constantly lay the Blame of all violations upon the Kings Favorites and Followers and their getting Surreptitiously Commands from him and not upon the King himself 4. No Command of the King is to hinder the Commons from Impreaching such as have violated the Law 5. The King is bound not to Protect any of his Followers and Favorites against the Commons Impeachment of them because he Knows and Affirms that he is bound to Protect the Laws and that this is the Law that the Commons are to Impeach such Qu. 20. What is the speciall Priviledge of the House of Peers in the former Case of such Favorites and Followers of the Kings as are Impeached by the Commons and so to decide all Matters in Questions between the King and the People A. The Lords being trusted with a Iudicatory power are an Excellent Screen and Bank between the Prince and the people to Ass●st●nch against any Encroachments of the other and by iust Iudgments to preserue that Law which ought to be the Rule of euery one of the three page 19. Qu. 21. But have the two Houses Power to put their judgements into Execution as well as to Impeach and Iudge A. The power of punishment is already in your hands according to Law page 20. Obs. 1. Then again it is no wonder that the Kings Favorites and Followers hate Parliaments who not onely Hinder their Gain but have Power to punish them when they have violated the Laws 2. Then the Lords and much more the two Houses together are supreme Judges of all matters in Difference between the King and the People and have Power to Prevent all the Kings Encroachments upon the People as well as the Peoples upon him 3. Then the King is Bound not to Protect any whom the Lords upon the Impeachment of the Commons have Judged Delinquents For he hath granted that he is bound to Protect the Law and that according to Law the Power of Punishing even of his Favourites and Followers 'fore spoken of is in their hands and they cannot punish them so long as he Protects them 4. Then the Law Allows them as the Supreme Judicatory even th●t which must be a Skreen between the King and the People and Assist the People against the Kings Encroachments and punish the Kings Favorites and Followers though countenanced by Surreptitiously-Gotten Commands from the King a Power to bring such as they have Judged or are to Judge to Condign Punishment which is granted to all Inferiour Judges in their Circuits and Iurisdictions 5. Then if those Delinquents get the King to Protect them or surreptiously get Commands of him to Raise Arms to Shelter themselves against the Iudgement of the two Houses the two Houses have Power by the Law to Raise not onely the Posse Comitatus of those Counties where such Delinquents are to apprehend them but also the Posse Regni the Power of the whole Kingdom if need be or else the Power of Punishment is not in their hands according to Law and it would be safer contemning and scorning and opposing the highest Iudicatory the Parliament then any Inferiour Court a Judge of Assize or the like and they that could get Commands to Violate the Law before would easily get Protection against the Parliament when they are Questioned if the Parliament had no Power to Raise Arms to suppresse them Qu. 22. But if there be an Attempt or Danger that the Kings Favorites and Followers go about to change this Regulated Monarchy into an Arbitrary Government and so into a Tyrannie is there Authoritie in the Houses sufficient according to what was sore mentioned to remedy this A. Power Legally Placed in Both Houses is more then sufficient to Preuent and Restrain the power of Tyrannie P. 20. Obs. 1. Then at least what ever Power is Necessary to Prevent or Restrain the Power of Tyrannie is confessed to be Legally placed in both Houses for else there is not Power sufficient much lesse more then sufficient 2. Then

it is Lawfull for the two Houses to Raise Arms to defend themselves in case an Army be Raised against them for else they have not Power sufficient to restrain the Power of Tyrannie There is no Greater Attempt of Tyrannie then to Raise Arms against the Houses of Parliament and there is no way to Restrain this Tyrannie but by Raising Arms in their own Defence Lesse then this cannot be sufficient 3. If a Legall Power be placed in them not onely to Restrain but prevent the power of tyrannie then they are the Legall Iudges when there is danger of Tyrannie and they have Legall Power to Command their judgement to be obeyed for Preventions as well as Restraint of Tyrannie 4. Then it is Lawfull for them to provide for their own and the Kingdoms safetie and they have Legall Power to command the People to this purpose not onely when Arms are Actually Raised against them but when they Discern and accordingly Declare a Preparation made towards it for if they let alone altogether the Exercise of their Power till Arms are Actually Raised against them they may in all likelihood finde it too late not onely to Prevent but even to Restrain the Power of Tyrannie 5. Then they have Legall Power in such Times of Danger to put into safe hands such Forts Ports Magazines Ships and Power of the Militia as are Intended or likely to be Intended to Introduce a Tyranny for else they cannot have Power sufficient to Prevent or Restrain the Power of Tyrannie 6. Then they have Legall Power to Levie Moneys Arms Horse Ammunitions upon the Subjects in such cases of Danger even without or against the Kings Consent for it cannot be imagined that in such cases when the Kings Favourites and Followers have gotten Commands from him to Protect them in their Delinquencies and Attempts to Introduce Tyrannie that ever he will consent to ●evies of Moneys against those Favourites and Fol●owers of his or to the Raising Arms against them specially he being still in their hands and among them and not with his Parliament and without such Levies of Moneys c. it is not possible for the two Houses of Parliament to Prevent or Restraine sufficiently the Power of Tyrannie 7 They that have made the Protestation to maintain and defend the Power and Priviledges of Parliament may see in all these Things Acknowledged by the King and clearly Following from his Acknowledgements what is that Power and what are Priviledges of Parliament which they have so solemnly in the Presence of Almighty God Vowed Promised and Protested to maintain c. 8. And finally since the two Houses of Parliament have so often and fully Declared their Intentions in settling the Militia securing Hull and the Magazine there and the Navie at Sea with the Ports and Forts and afterward in Raising Arms under the Command of the Earl of Essex and last of all Levying Moneys by voluntary Contibutions and Assessements they have onely used that Legall Power which is in them for the Punishment of Delinquents and for the Prevention and Restraint of the Power of Tyrannie of all which they are the Legall Judges and all the Subjects of this Kingdom are bound by the Laws to obey them herein and those doubly bound that have made the late Protestation That the Reader may the better discern how the Answers here applied do agree with the words of his Majesties Answer to the 19 Propositions I have here transcribed so much of it as concerns this particular Page 17. We call God to witnesse that as for our subiects sake these Rights are vested in Vs so for their sakes as well as for our own we are resolued not to quit them nor to subuert though in a parliamentary way the ancient equall happy well-poysed and neuer-enough-commended Constitution of the gouernment of this kingdom There being three kinds of gouernment amongst men Absolute Monarchy Aristocracy and Democracy and all these hauing their particular conveniences and inconveniences page 18. The experience and wisdom of your Ancestors hath so moulded this out of a mixture of these as to giue to this Kingdom as farre as humane prudence can prouide the conveniences of all three without the inconveniences of any one as long as the Ballance hangs euen between the three Estates and they run ioyntly on in their proper channell begetting Verdure and Fert●lity in the meadows on both sides and the ouer-flowing of either on either side raise no Deluge or Inundation The Ill of Absolute Monarc●y is Tyranny The Ill of Aristocracy is Faction and Diuision The Ills of Democracy are Tumults Violence and Licent●ousnesse The good of Monarchy is the Vniting a Nation under one Head to Resist Inuasion from abroad and Insurrection at home The good of Aristocracy is the coniunction of Councell in the Ablest persons of a State for the publike benefit The good of Democracy is Liberty and the courage and industry which Liberty begets In this kingdom the Laws are iointly made by a King by a house of Peeres and by a house of Commons chosen by the people all hauing free Votes and particular priviledges The gouernment according to these Laws is trusted to the King power of Treaties of war peace of making Peeres of chusing Officers Counsellours for State Iudges for Law Cōmanders for Forts Castles giving Cōmissions for raising men to make war abroad or to preuent provide against Invasions or Insurrections at home benefit of Consiscations power of pardoning some more of the like kinde are placed in the King Again Page 19. that the Prince may not make use of this high and pertetuall power to the hurt of those for whose good he hath it and make use of the name of publike Necessity for the gain of his priuate Fauorites and Followers to the detriment of his people the house of Commons an excellent Conseruer of Liberty but neuer intended for any share in Gouernment or the chusing of them that should gouern is solely intrusted with the first Propositions concerning the Leauies of moneys which is the sinews as wel of peace as warre and the unpeaching of those who for their own ends though countenanced by any surreptitiously-gotten cōmand of the King haue violated that Law which he is bound when he knows it to protect to the protection of which they were bound to aduise him at least not to serve him to the contrary the Lords being trusted with a Iudicatory power are an excellent screen and bank between the Prince and people to assist each against any Incroachments of the other and by iust iudgements to preserue that Law which ought to be the Rule of euery one of the three Pag. 20. Since therefore the Power Legally placed in both Houses is more then sufficient to preuent and restrain the power of Tyrannie since this would be a totall Subuersion of the Fundamentall Laws and that excellent Constitution of this Kingdom which hath made this Nation so many years both Famous Hapy to a great degree of envy since to the power of punishing which is already in your hands according to Law if since the encroaching of one of these Estates upon the power of the other is unhappy in the effects both to them all the rest Pag. 2● Our answer is Nolumus Leges Angliae mutari But this We promise that We will be as carefull of preserving the Lawes in what is supposed to concern wholly our Subiects as in what most concerns Our self For indeed We professe to belieue that the preseruation of euery Law concerns Vs those of Obed●ence being not secure when those of protection are Violated FINIS